

استاد لانه جاسوسی

secret
noforn-nocontract-orcon

شماره (۱۹)

«امریکا حامی اشغالگران قدس»

March 1979

Israel

Foreign
Intelligence
and
Security
Services



دانشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام

secret

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH
THE MOST BENEFICIENT, THE MOST MERCIFUL

"THE U.S. AND ISRAEL
ARE THE FIRST ENEMIES OF ISLAM"
IMAM KHOMEINI

For the people who have felt deeply the crimes and tyranny of Zionism and its racist regime, to speak of oppression of the usurpers of the beloved Qods, reminds us of the numerous wounds they have inflicted on the palestinian people.

This reminder is an impetus which strengthenn the Muslim nations' will for unity and Jihad in the way of liberating the land of the prophets of GOD, the real owners of which have been wandering around the world.

It is doubly necessary to recall these peoples deprivations at the present time when some of the heads of the Arab and so-called Muslim governments have completely forgotten these crimes and utter words indicating intention to recognize Israel.

The wave of oppression and crime which began with the intervention of imperialism in the region and has continued through the present, has not concerned the heads of the U.S.-installed reactionary regimes. This despite the way it has made destitute the homeless palestinian widows and children existing in misery and hardship. Today, if some one is to eradicate the root of this symbols of corruption(i.e. Zionism) from the heart of the Islamic lands, it will be the hundreds of millions of oppressed Muslim of the region and the Islamic countries who can realize this task. Those who rely on GOD and consider the U.S. as their number one enemy and never, in this holy Jihad, attach their hearts to any power other than faith in ALLAH.

Today, the role of the U.S., in the survival of the racist regime occupying the land of GOD's prophets has been clearly understood. The Muslim people of the region have realized the fact that those who have joined hands with their American masters will never act against Israel.

We, on the basis of our Islamic commitment to the Muslim ummah have presented a part of the documents found in the "U.S. spy den". They show the unity and harmony existing between criminal U.S. imperialism and the occupiers of Gods in plundering and massacring the Muslims by means of their hellish military and espionage systems.

In this collection too, following book no. 11, we have gathered the rest of the first documents of that book, concerning the organization of the system of MOSSAD, coupled with pieces of documents from the CIA which indicative of the close cooperation of these two Satanic systems. The documents which attest to the agreement of these two devilish systems in conspiracy against the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its growth and movement in the region.

The criminal organization of the CIA, with all its satanic levers under the guise of diplomatic posts, is a valuable information of the so-called security systems of Israel. Of course, it would cause surprise if this was not so. This little racist population (of Israel) could never push the world of Islam towards weakness, in the way it does without the help of world-devouring U.S. imperialism. However, as we see in document no. 2, the regimes united with the world-devouring U.S. are apparently immune to the evil of the CIA and MOSSAD except for those cases where a pre-arranged accident is concerned..

Who can really rely on unity with these dependent regimes in this holy Jihah against the criminal Zionism? They will never fire a bullet at Israel. The death of Israel will entail their own demise. That are just

other symbols of atheism and hypocrisy.

In the third document you will see examples of the news and information that are placed at the disposal of MOSSAD by the CIA. From the background of this news it can easily be ascertained that they are an intrusion to schemes and plots against the anti-Israel Muslim regimes of the Mid-east region and the glorious Islamic Revolution. Today the question regarding what incentive has made the news of Kordestan popular with the U.S. and Israel as they, the constantly analyze this issue, is clear. The source of this news are to be found among the third elements of that defunct triangle of: CIA-MOSSAD-SAVAK.

The fourth document, too, shows another aspect of this coordinated attempt. Of course today the Muslim people have identified the face of all these involved in the Kurdestan issue. These are the ones who kept the deprived people of Kurdestan further deprived at the order of their American and Israeli masters. Having been frustrated there in Kurdestan, owing to the efforts of the heroic guards and valiant soldiers and other popular of the Revolution, they took revenge for the U.S. against the Hezbollahi Ummah in their dreams and in every street and passage of this land of revolution and freedom. But they were ignorant of the fact that these people have already been inspired with a divine spirit and will never allow the agents of the criminal U.S. and occupier Israel to grow in this Islamic land.

The fifth document, shredded by the CIA agents in Tehran, which was put together as a result of the efforts of our sisters and brothers, shows the cooperation of this satanic organization in employing mercenary spies for plotting against the Islamic Revolution in Iran. This is another fact proving that the agents of the U.S. should not be regarded as different from those of Israel.

The sixth and seventh documents are another part of this intelligence cooperative at the heart of which lies the initiatives of superpowers' bloody plots against the Muslim people.

The eighth document is also from the documents shredded by the CIA spies in Tehran which have been pieced together. In this document the exchange of views between the criminal U.S. and occupying Israel against our Muslim people is obvious.

These are only a small part of the documents that remained in the espionage house of the great satan in Tehran. The spies did not manage to destroy all of them. Surely there existed more proofs of these relations among the documents destroyed by the spies before the takeover of the U.S. spy den. Undoubtedly those documents would have shed further light on the treacherous conspiracies of the murderous U.S., the enemy of humanity and mankind, and the racist regime of Israel. However what we salvaged clearly portrays this sinister unity for the deprived and oppressed Muslims of the world. Already they bear innumerable wounds on their injured bodies inflicted by American and Israeli arms. They have sacrificed many of their beloved ones and relatives in the way of this holy battle. The Muslims will never forget that tyranny and cruelty, in spite of the U.S. dependent heads of the reactionary Arabs regimes extending the hand of friendship toward the occupiers of Qods.

In this collection, besides the documents discovered in the U.S. spy den, a number of documents belonging to the former so-called embassy of the criminal Israel in Tehran are presented to the martyrdom-loving Ummah and the oppressed people of the world. These documents were placed at the disposal of the Muslim students following the Imam's line by some brothers of Revolutionary committees after the takeover of the U.S. spy den.

These documents which contain the negotiations of the Shah's generals with the bloody brass hats of the Zionist regime, show the incredible intimacy between the U.S.-installed shah's regime with the most murderous stooge of imperialism in the region, namely, the regime occupying Qods. They delineate how the two regimes prepared and promoted arms supplies for the repression of the Muslim Revolutionaries in Iran and occupied

Palestine.

But the Islamic movement in Iran, foiled all these plots and sent the shah's merciless regime to hell in spite of all the supports of the superpowers, particularly from the world-devouring U.S.

This movement called upon the truth-seekers of the world to come to the luminous path of the pious, from the darkness of the dominance of evil.

The light which has emerged in the hearts of the deprived and oppressed people of the world because of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, will kindle a fire which will burn away the criminal U.S. This conflagration will also consume its puppets in the region, including Israel and other regimes allied with the U.S. imperialism, especially the Ba'athist regime of Iraq.

The Islamic Revolution, under the leadership of the hope of the oppressed, the beloved Imam Khomeini, has opened the way and will proceed. This way of love, enthusiasm and martyrdom calls for self-sacrificing believers who have chosen the other world's prosperity as their aim and have seized ALLAH's rope and aimed their weapons at the heart of world arrogance in the region.

We are ready for the liberation of Qods from everything which has stained its chastity with polytheism and infidelity. May the liberation of Qods be a prelude to the emergence of the savior of humanity, the promised MAHDI(A.S.)

And peace be upon the pious servants of ALLAH.

THE MUSLIM STUDENTS FOLLOWING THE INAM'S LINE

11 AUG 78 07:41 Z

SECRET E I 210010Z AUG 78 STAFF

OFFICE DIRECTOR 486364.

TO: TEL AVIV UNFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, TEHRAN, KUWAIT, MANAMA, ABU DHABI, MUSCAT, SANA, CAIRO, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, ALGERIA, RABAT, CASABLANCA.

MINTEL INTEL

REF: TEL AVIV 291K1

1. REPASSING REF. HOS NOTES THAT ISRAELI LIAISON'S UPDATE THE INFORMATION IT WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE INCLUDES BASICALLY SIX NEW TOPICS:

- A. SYRIAN-IRACI UNIFICATION EFFORTS
- B. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
- C. IRAQ'S ROLE IN THE GULF
- D. IRAN
- E. THE YEMINIS.

HOS CONCURS IN SHARING SELECTED INTELLIGENCE ITEMS ON THESE SUBJECTS WITH THE ISRAELIS. OVERALL, WE FIND NO MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE SUBJECT AREAS IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS EXPRESS AN INTEREST EXCEPT TO THAT WE CAUTION ADDRESSES NOT TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF ALLY COUNTRIES SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN, WITH EXCEPTION OF INFORMATION OF AN EARLY WARNING NATURE. HOS WILL REFORMALLY STOP PROVIDING INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES SERIOUS GOVERNMENT INSTABILITY THAT WOULD AFFECT THE ISRAELIS. INFORMATION SHOULD BE CAREFULLY SCREENED TO PRECLUDE ACCUSATIONS OF COMPLAINING ABOUT EGYPT'S NEGOTIATING POSITION BY PROVIDING THE ISRAELIS WITH BEHIND-THE-SCENES INFORMATION.

2. HOS FEELS THAT THE CONTINUED PASSAGE OF SELECTED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO THE ISRAELIS HELPS GIVE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT A

END

SECRET 121655Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH
SITE WASHINGTON 511992. SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEL AVIV INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, TEHRAN
FROM: NE/ISR INFO NE/SLJ, NE/EL, NE/PAL, NE/IRAN, NIO/NESA, OPA/ME
SUBJECT: WNINTEL - MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING

1. THE MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING WAS HELD AT HEADQUARTERS ON
6 SEPTEMBER 1979 FOR MOSSAD REP MOSHE MOR. LIAISON AGENDA (K/2A/3
79) WAS USED AS BASIS FOR THE BRIEFING.

SIRIA

2. REGARDING THE RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES IN LATAKIA LAST WEEK
WHICH FLARED INTO CLASHES BETWEEN SUNNIS AND ALAWITES, THE NFAC
ANALYST SAID THIS IS THE FIRST SERIOUS DISTURBANCE WE KNOW OF IN
LATAKIA. THE KILLING OF THE SHAYKE IS THE ONLY BACKGROUND REASON
WE KNOW OF THAT PROVOKED THESE RIOTS. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT DETAIL
AS IT SHOWS HOW THE SITUATION CAN GET OUT OF HAND OVER A MINOR
INCIDENT. THE ALAWITE REGION IS NOT IMMUNE FROM ATTACKS, AS IT
APPEARED TO BE BEFORE. WE DO NOT KNOW WHO KILLED THE SHAYKE. THIS
REALLY DOES NOT MATTER AT THE ALAWITES AND SUNNIS ARE PREPARED TO
ASSUME THE WORST ABOUT EACH OTHER ANYWAY.

3. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HEARD RUMORS
THAT A DEFENSE COMPANY WAS USED WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAT A SPECIAL
FORCE BATTALION AND TWO REGULAR ARMY BATTALIONS WERE USED.
ALL THREE UNITS FOLLOWED ORDERS AND RESTORED ORDER. THIS IS SIGNIFI-
CANT IN THAT REGULAR BATTALIONS ARE MOST LIKELY TO BE SUNNI, AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GENERAL POPULATION, WHILE THE SPECIAL FORCE
UNIT WOULD BE ALAWITE. ACCORDING TO THE NFAC ANALYST, THE HEAVY
CASUALTIES MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM THE HEAVY HANDED TACTICS OF THE
MILITARY UNITS ON TOP OF THE CASUALTIES CAUSED BY THE RIOTING ITSELF.

4. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THE RIOTING HAS INCREASED ALAWITE
CONCERN IN LATAKIA ABOUT SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD'S ABILITY TO KEEP
CONTROL. SOME ANONYMOUS ALAWITES FEEL THAT ASSAD'S ANTI-TERRORISM

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 51199Z S E C R E T

POLICIES ARE NOT WORKING AND THAT THE SOLUTION WOULD BE TO GIVE AN ALAWITE A ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT. THESE ALAWITES COULD BE BUSINESSMEN WHO ARE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT STABILITY THAN A POLITICIAN WOULD BE.

5. THE CURRENT TREND IN SYRIA, ACCORDING TO THE NFAC ANALYST, IS ONE OF INCREASED TENSION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. THE LONGER THIS TREND CONTINUES, THE GREATER THE CONCERN WILL BE AMONG MINORITY GROUPS AS TO WHETHER ASSAD'S REGIME WILL COLLAPSE OR BE REPLACED. WE DO NOT FEEL THE SUNNIS COULD STAGE A SUCCESSFUL COUP AS ASSAD IS HAS MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES AT HIS COMMAND. THE GREATEST THREAT TO ASSAD IS THE EROSION OF SUPPORT BY ALAWITES IN KEY POSITIONS. FOR YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN COMPLAINTS ABOUT ASSAD'S BROTHER. REGARDING ASSAD, HOWEVER, HE WAS PREFERRED BY THE ALAWITES OVER THE UNCERTAINTY OF CHANGE. HOWEVER, THERE IS CONTINUAL REEXAMINATION TAKING PLACE, AND THE SITUATION COULD CHANGE. AT SOME POINT, THE CRITICISM OF ASSAD'S POLICIES COULD TURN INTO CRITICISM OF ASSAD HIMSELF OR INTO A DEMAND THAT HIS BROTHER RIFAT BE REMOVED. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN ANY CRITICISM OF ASSAD, AND WE DO NOT KNOW OF ANY ORGANIZED OPPOSITION GROUP. WE DO NOT EXPECT ASSAD TO REMOVE HIS BROTHER. ASSAD RELIES ON RIFAT AS COMMANDER OF THE DEFENSE COMPANIES AND AS A LOYAL SUPPORTER. THE PRESIDENT AND RIFAT NEED EACH OTHER TO SURVIVE. THE ABSENCE OF ONE WOULD EXPOSE THE OTHER TO GREATER DANGER.

6. THE NFAC ANALYST REMARKED THAT ANY COUP ATTEMPT AGAINST ASSAD WOULD HAVE TO BE EXTREMELY QUICK AND PROBABLY REQUIRE ACQUISITION OR SUPPORT FROM SOME OF THE DEFENSE COMPANIES AS THE DEFENSE COMPANIES ARE LOCATED AROUND DAMSCUS AND ARE TRAINED TO DEPLOY TO PUBLIC BUILDINGS IF A COUP ATTEMPT IS RECEIVED.

7. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY MOB, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID WE DO NOT SEE ANY INDICATION IN THE ALAWITE COMMUNITY OF PREPARATIONS FOR POSSIBLY LIVING UNDER A SUNNI-CONTROLLED REGIME.

SYRIA - IRAQ

8. ACCORDING TO THE NFAC ANALYST, SYRIAN - IRAQI RELATIONS WERE IN A SENSE FROZEN. THIS STEMS FROM IRAQI ACCUSATIONS THAT SYRIANS WERE INVOLVED IN JUNE'S COUP ACTIVITIES. IN BAGHDAD, THE WORD HAS BEEN SPREAD TO IRAQI OFFICIALS THAT THERE WERE CONTACTS BETWEEN SYRIANS AND THOSE IRAQIS INVOLVED IN THE COUP ATTEMPT. WE THINK

PAGE 3 WASHINGTON 511998 S E C R E T
THE CONTACTS BEING REFERRED TO MAY HAVE BEEN ONES THAT RESULTED
IN APPROXIMATE TALKS OR PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1978. WE THINK THAT SYRIAN
INVOLVEMENT IN CONSPIRACY PLANS AFTER OCTOBER 1978 IS FLIMSY.

9. AS STATED IN A PREVIOUS MEETING, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID
THAT THE JUNE EVENTS IN IRAQ AS A POLITICAL STRUGGLE BY THOSE IRAQIS
WHO REPRESENTED ONE-MAN RULE. THESE OFFICIALS OBVIOUSLY MISJUDGED
SADDAM HUSAYN'S WILLINGNESS TO TOLERATE OPPOSITION.

10. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THAT GIVEN ASSAD'S REMARKS IN
DECEMBER SPIEGEL THAT SYRIA WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ANY PLANS TO STAGE
CONTACTS IN IRAQ, IT WOULD BE UP TO IRAQ TO INITIATE RENEWED RAPPROCH
CONTACTS WITH SYRIA. WHAT WE SEE NOW IS IRAQI RELUCTANCE TO RE
BACK TO OPEN HOSTILITIES WITH SYRIA. THE IRAQIS DO NOT WANT TO
THE UPWARD APPEARANCE OF AN ARAB CONSENSUS, BUT THE CHANGES ARE
OF SYRIA AND IRAQ REACHING AN AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE MILITARILY AN
POLITICALLY. AT SOME POINT, IRAQ MAY DECIDE THAT IT DOES NOT NEED
SYRIA IF OTHER AVENUES BECOME AVAILABLE IN IRAQ'S QUEST FOR ARAB
LEADERSHIP. THESE AVENUES ARE NOT YET IDENTIFIED OR AVAILABLE.
IF IRAQ FEELS IT DOES NOT NEED SYRIAN SUPPORT, IT MAY STILL NOT RE
HOSTILITIES WITH SYRIA IN DEFERENCE TO THE GREATER ARAB CAUSE.

11. ACCORDING TO THE NFAC ANALYST, THE IRAQIS HAVE REJECTED
AN OFFER FOR JORDANIAN KING HUSAYN TO NEGOTIATE. TO THE IRAQIS,
SUSPICION REMAINS THAT SYRIA WOULD GO FOR A SEPARATE PEACE. MOR
OBSERVED THAT IRAQ WOULD HAVE MORE EFFECT ON PREVENTING A SEPARATE
PEACE BY COOPERATING WITH SYRIA THAN BY BREAKING WITH SYRIA.

IRAN - SYRIA

12. REGARDING RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, THE NFAC ANALYST
STATED THAT DURING THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN HAVANA, THE IRANIAN
PRIME MINISTER INVITED SADDAM HUSAYN TO VISIT TEHRAN. THIS VISIT
WOULD BE DESIRED BY IRAN IN ORDER TO WORK OUT PROBLEMS OF ARABS IN
SUZESMAN AND WITH THE KURDS. IRAQ COULD ALSO BE FAVORABLE TO THIS
SIT IN ORDER TO SOLVE THE KURDISH PROBLEM.

13. AS FOR CURRENT EVENTS, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THAT TWO WEEKS
AGO THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 30,000 KURDS AROUND MAHABAD. THERE WERE
IRANIAN TANKS, AND THE KURDS WITHDREW TO SARDASHT. THIS SURPRISE

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US AS WE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED THE KURDS TO FIGHT. AS THE KURDS
HAVE NO PLACE TO GO NOW EXCEPT ACROSS THE BORDER, BACK TO THE
MOUNTAINS, OR INTO THE SOVIET UNION, NOW IS A LOGICAL TIME FOR IRAQ
TO SIT DOWN AND TALK ABOUT THIS PROBLEM.

14. THE MFAC ANALYST SAID WE DO NOT SEE THE CHANCE OF TRIP
COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN-IRAQ-TURKEY ON THE KURDISH PROBLEM, BUT
SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.
SITUATION NOW IS ONE OF MUTUAL SUSPICION. IRAQ WAS INITIALLY C
BLAMED ABOUT SHIA DISSIDENCE, WHICH HAS SINCE DIED DOWN. IRAN
BLAMED MOST OF ITS PROBLEMS IN KHUZESTAN ON OTHER COUNTRIES (IT
US AND THE USSR) RATHER THAN ON IRAQ. WE ASSUME THAT KHOMENI
MIGHT FAVOR A SHIA REVOLUTION IN IRAQ, BUT BARGARAN AND SAZIMI
TO BE MORE PRACTICAL ON THIS AND WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO GET INVOL
IN A SITUATION LIKE THIS, THEY WOULD PREFER TO GET INVOL
THAT FINALLY KHOMENI IS IN QOM SURROUNDED BY CONSERVATIVE MUSL
THE GOVERNMENT IS IN TEHRAN AND MUST TRAVEL TO QOM IN ORDER TO T
KHOMENI'S EXTREME IDEAS, SUCH AS THE ONE ABOUT DESTROYING ALL

15. THE KURDS ARE STILL DIVIDED INTO THE QASEMLU, THE BARE
AND THE TALABANI FACTIONS. THE KURDS ARE STILL EXPERENCING IN-
FIGHTING AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE BEING FIRED ON BY THE IRANIAN
MILITARY. ALSO THERE ARE KURDS WHO WOULD BE WILLING TO COOPERATE
WITH THE GOVERNMENT. SIGNS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KURDISH
FACTIONS WOULD INDICATE A CHANGE IN THE SITUATION. FOR THE LARGE
PART THE IRANIAN ARMY SEEMS RELUCTANT TO FIGHT AGAINST THE KURDS
VICE VERSA.

FILE: 95-2-8/6. RWV 12SEP89 DRV D082. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

0770

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-703-731

2 NOV 79 11 38z

S E C R E T 011328Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE TEL AVIV 38056

TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

WMINTEL INTEL SDTRAMP

REF: TEHRAN 54626 (NIT-10,792)

1. WITH STATION CONCURRENCE WOULD LIKE TO PASS REF ON EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH REBELLION TO ISRAELI LIAISON. REPORT WILL BE SOURCED TO "A RELIABLE SOURCE."
2. NO FILE. RVN 01 NOV 69 DRV D9B.2 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

BT

#0056

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1977-504-830

1

SECRET 250314Z SEP 79 STAFF

CIA MEMPHIS 24298

TO: ELAVIV.

UNINTL INTEL

REF: AM TEL RVIV 23692
TERRAR 24267

IC: WAF INTERVIEW WITH MAGARY BEARS WITH SOME GENERAL
SUBJECT MATTER AS REF B. AS SPRALL IS KNOWN OF STRANGERS AND HIS
EMPLOYMENT, REF B COULD NOT BE PASSED TO THEM WITHOUT SERIOUS
RISK OF SOURCE COMPROMISE. IT IS THEREFORE NOT FOR LIAISON.

REF: NO FILE. RVIV 25 SEP 79 DRV DDC.1. ALL SECRET.

C R I

SECRET 201022Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEMRAN 54535 (JAUMOTTE ACTING)

TO: TEL AVIV INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL INTEL

REFS: A. TEL AVIV 29919
B. TEL AVIV 29924

1. CONCUR PASSAGE TO ISRAELI LIAISON AS REQUESTED REFS.
2. NO FILE. RVW 20OCT99 DPV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

S E C R E T 030911Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54654

TO: TEL AVIV INFO DIRECTOR.

WINTEL INTEL

REFS: A. TEL AVIV 30056
B. TEHRAN 54626 (NII-10,792)

1. CONCUR PASSAGE REF B TO LIAISON, LESS FIRST SENTENCE OF SUMMARY AND ALL OF PARA ONE, ATTRIBUTED TO A RELIABLE SOURCE.

2. NO FILE. RVW 03NOV99 DRV D9.C.1. ALL SECRET

S E C R E T

SECRET 190722 SEP 19 0947
CITE TIRAN 2224
FOR TEL AVIV 1979 DIRECTOR,
UNINTEL INTEL

REF: A. TEL AVIV 19647
B. TIRAN 2224 (017-19,729)

1. CORRECT PARAGRAPH SET IN ISRAELI LIAISON, ATTRIBUTED
GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, DELETING PARAS ONE AND FIVE FIELD
COMMENTS, AND WITH FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL CHANGES: AT BEGINNING
OF PARA ONE, DELETE "MINISTER OF LABOR BARUCH FORUMER" AND
SUBSTITUTE "AN IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL." DELETE "FORUMER"
FROM BEGINNING SECOND SENTENCE PARA ONE AND SUBSTITUTE "THE
OFFICIAL."

2. NO FILE. RUM 19 SEP 64 DRV D9C-1. ALL SECRET.
SECRET

TOP SECRET

Tel-Aviv
July 18, 1977

MINUTES FROM MEETING HELD IN TEL-AVIV BETWEEN H.E. GENERAL M. DAYAN,
FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL AND H.E. GENERAL H. TOUFANIAN, VICE MINISTER
OF WAR, IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN

General Dayan welcomed the Guest and expressed his wish that the General convey to His Imperial Majesty, General Dayan's gratitude for the time His Imperial Majesty spared during their most interesting discussion they had during General Dayan's recent visit to Teheran. General Dayan remarked that he was deeply impressed with His Imperial Majesty's wisdom and insight in world affairs and was grateful for the thorough global tour d'horizon which His Imperial Majesty was kind enough to spare.

General Dayan continued to note that this was the best lecture in international affairs which he has heard in years, indicating that this does not exclude similar exposés he had occasion to listen to by American and other world leaders.

General Toufanian responded by remarking that, as Staff Officer to His Imperial Majesty, he is familiar with His Imperial Majesty's views and global concepts which from time to time he tries to convey to Americans. Unfortunately, however, he has to say that he finds Americans' mentioning, Senators in particular, unfamiliar in geography and ignorant in world affairs.

General Toufanian continued to say that His Imperial Majesty was rather apprehensive concerning the policies and objectives of the new Administration in Israel, and that he (General Toufanian) is under instruction to exchange views with General Dayan on this subject.

General Toufanian remarked that there are very few countries in the immediate region on which one can rely, mentioning in particular the present situation in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey. General Toufanian stated that Iran is very interested in mutual reliance with Israel, and continued to say that it is in the interest of Iran that Israel internationally project its desire for peace and not for war.

General Dayan responded by stating that Israel wants peace, however, without any preconditions and without any but's or if's.

General Dayan stated that Israel is seeking a negotiated peace, beneficial to all parties concerned. General Dayan continued to say that he cannot promise that peace will indeed be reached, but that it is the intention of the present Government of Israel to exhaust all reasonable venues to that end. General Dayan continued to state that all points are open to negotiations, and that Israel is prepared to sit down with her Arab neighbours without any preconditions. General Dayan emphasized, however, that Israel will not negotiate with the P.L.O. and will not agree to a P.L.O. State being established. In this connection, General Dayan further remarked that His Imperial Majesty Himself is aware of the danger which the P.L.O. and other Palestinian terrorist organizations constitute to any peace arrangement in the Middle East, and rendered His advice that negotiations should be launched with neighbouring states but not with terrorist organizations.

General Dayan reiterated at this point that by next week it will be clear to the world that Israel is seeking a peaceful solution to its problems with her neighbours and that it is prepared to negotiate on all points.

General Dayan emphasized that Israel is not seeking to gain time, under false pretences. Indeed, Israel is endeavouring to reach a peaceful solution and even if this will be unobtainable in toto Israel would even be willing to agree to anything close to that, should the Arabs be reluctant to go the whole way.

General Toufanian remarked that it is his feeling that this is exactly the policy which His Imperial Majesty is advocating. The General continued to say that once His Imperial Majesty will be reassured that this is the policy pursued by the present Israel Government, he will order the General to go ahead full speed with our mutual projects, and that cooperation between the two countries would be further developed and deepened.

At this point, General Dayan mentioned the fact that he proposed to His Imperial Majesty that he come to Iran for another meeting with His Imperial Majesty within a short period of time in order to brief His Imperial Majesty on the developments as those will arise out of Prime Minister Begin's meetings in Washington and Secretary Vance's envisaged tour of the Middle East which is to follow.

General Dayan remarked that he would not have proposed such a meeting were he not convinced that he will be the bearer of good news to His Imperial Majesty. General Dayan added that it is in his interest that His Imperial Majesty should know what the Arabs are saying, what he (General Dayan) is saying, and what the Americans are saying so that he will perhaps be the most well informed person concerning developments in the Middle East.

General Dayan continued to say that we are fortunate in having a friend in the person of His Imperial Majesty, we rely on Him, and we shall withhold no information from Him.

General Toufanian expressed his gratitude for General Dayan, stating that after having heard General Dayan's words he is authorized to say that with the policy of the Government of Israel as described, it will be possible not only to continue but to considerably extend cooperation between the two countries.

General Dayan asked General Toufanian about his plans concerning the "Salgad" Mortar project. General Dayan added that he knows Mr. Zablodowitz personally and has very high regard for his ability, integrity and the technical capabilities of his organization.

General Toufanian responded by saying that this is indeed a project in which His Imperial Majesty is interested. The General added that during Zablodowitz's recent visit to Teheran, progress has been made concerning the envisaged Mortar factory and that a contract covering this project is to be signed within three months.

The General added that following his discussions with Mr. Zablodowitz, he has conveyed to His Imperial Majesty Zablodowitz's proposal that an Iranian team make a thorough assessment concerning the 155mm. gun. According to the proposal, this team should go to Israel, Germany and Sweden in order to study the progress made on this gun and report to His Imperial Majesty. The General added that he is well aware of the fact the 155mm. gun in Israel is by far advanced and that the German and Swedish guns are not yet in production and will possibly also be inferior to the Israeli gun, the latter gun will be chosen.

The General mentioned here the contract with the British concerning the production of this gun within a gun factory complex to be built by them, adding that even if the production of the 155mm. will remain within the British complex, the Israeli gun will be manufactured there under license.

The General also mentioned the fact that this project is to be done through Zablodowitz's Finish organization, and General Dayan responded that this is perfectly all right from his point of view.

General Toufanian mentioned that he has the approval of His Imperial Majesty to Zablodowitz's proposal and consequently intends to send the proposed team to Israel and to the other countries at as early a date as possible.

General Dayan responded by saying that the team will be most welcome.

General Toufanian said that he has had today discussions with General Weizman. These discussions were both of a political and a technical nature. The General added that following the elections in Israel and the advent of the new Administration, he received instructions from His Imperial Majesty to "go slow" on the secret projects. (At this point General Dayan interpreted by saying that His Imperial Majesty told him that he ordered the stoppage of work on these projects). General Toufanian continued to say that after what he has heard today both from General Dayan and General Weizman, he feels confident that all will be well.

The General added by saying that he understands well the statements of General Dayan. Israel seeks to prove to the world that your policy is for peace and not for war. If this policy of Israel will be successful, all will be pleased, but if not, it will not be Israel's fault.

General Dayan reiterated that Israel will seek peace with Egypt, Jordan and Syria and that every problem is negotiable with the exception of P.L.O. and a Palestinian State.

General Toufanian remarked that effort should be made to save Sadat and Hussein. The General added that he would like the work on projects to be continued and General Dayan remarked that he felt that this would also be the wish of His Imperial Majesty, adding that in any case, the work on these projects is by nature slow.

General Dayan raised the problem of the adjustment of the credit terms of the oil barter deal to the 120 days of credit given to the 17 million tons of oil purchased by the "Transasiatic" during the current fiscal year.

General Toufanian responded by saying that he would advise that the credit terms for the barter deal be left as they are because of international implications which may arise if they are changed.

The General added that he will find other ways to deal with this problem, and that he will do so on his return to Teheran.

General Toufanian raised the problem of the "Flower" telling General Dayan of General Weizman's decision on a reassessment of this project. General Toufanian expressed his agreement to this proposal, informing General Dayan of his views that this project is indeed a most ambitious one from a technological point of view, mentioning the problems which the "Harpoon" missile is still facing.

General Dayan responded by saying that he personally looked into this project and entirely concurred with General Weizman's decision. He added that he thought that the decision to freeze the project for the time being will enable a thorough reassessment to take place and this may result in a proposal for different characteristics to be agreed upon for the envisaged missile.

General Toufanian remarked that this is agreeable to him on the condition that anything which will be decided upon jointly will have the approval of both parties and that the project will be a joint one.

General Dayan raised the problem of the Americans' sensitivity to the introduction of the kind of missiles envisaged in the joint project. He added that the ground-to-ground missile which is part of the joint project can be regarded also as a missile with a nuclear head, because with a head of 750 kg. it can be a double purpose one.

General Dayan remarked that at some stage, this problem will have to be raised with the Americans and that he intends to raise the subject with His Imperial Majesty during their next meeting.



Commander in Chief
ISRAEL NAVY

Tel - Aviv 18.6.78

Dear Gen. Toussian

Having returned home I would like to express my thanks for your hospitality.

Meeting you and discussing the various subjects with you was a pleasant and interesting experience.

I am sure that ties of friendship between our nations and navies have gained from this opportunity.

May I assure you of my deepest esteem and wish you personally and to your country all the best.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "M. Barkai". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent vertical stroke at the beginning.

M. Barkai, RADN
Commander I.D.F. Navy



ISRAEL DEFENCE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
AND DEFENCE MISSION
IRAN

SECRET

2nd July, 1978

Ref. 372

TEHRAN
145 AB KAKH
TEL. 661223

H.E. General H. Toufanian,
Vice Minister of War for Armament,
Purchase and Procurement Dept.,
SALTANATABAD.

SUBJECT: Minutes of final discussion between
Admiral Habibollahi and R. Adm. Barkai -
Commander, I.D.F. Navy.

Your Excellency,

I take pleasure in enclosing herein the minutes of the final discussions between Admiral Habibollahi and R. Adm. Barkai.

This visit proved to be useful and successful to both sides as Your Excellency will read in this report.

Admiral Habibollahi will visit our country within a few months and we are continuing to work on these subjects.

I would be most grateful to Your Excellency for your comments particularly concerning Groups A & B, and kindly advise me whom I should contact to continue the staffwork regarding these subjects.

I remain Your Excellency, with deep respect

Yours Sincerely,


I. SEGEV Brig. General

MINUTES OF FINAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN ADM. HABIBELAHII AND R. ADM. BARKAI

R. Adm. Barkai mentioned a series of subjects that he found could be taken up in the future for cooperation between the two navies and / or between the I.I. Navy and the Israeli industries.

R. Adm. Barkai divided the subjects into four groups.

Group A - Subjects existing in the Israel Navy that may be of interest to the I.I. Navy which R. Adm. Barkai offered to open for inspection and send any required information as a courtesy of the Israel Navy.

1. Range tables for 76mm. gun.
2. History of faults and maintenance of 76mm gun.
3. Information about faults and maintenance of MTU engines.
4. Inspection of Israel Navy Officers School and methods employed by Israel Navy to train officers.
5. Upon arrival of I.I. Navy submarines the Israel Navy could send a limited number of instructors to inspect I.I. Navy drills and procedures for safety and tactical operation.
6. Inspection of missile boats fitted with V.D.S. Sonar.
7. Inspection of the 30mm AMSD gun that is being developed in the Israel Navy.

Group B - This group of subjects includes a list of equipment that has already been developed by the Israel Navy and is currently being fitted into our ships.

These subjects could be inspected by I.I. Navy specialists and eventually, after due staff work, be purchased from our industry as the cooperation between the two navies develops on subjects of mutual interest.

1. 360° Thermal Radar for use in Ships and Airplanes.
2. Digital equipment for rapid relaying of tactical information from airplanes to ships and for over the horizon target designation for Harpoon missiles (compatible with Link 11, with U.S.N. N.T.D.S. and with Israel Navy N.T.D.S. for small missile boats). Lightweight N.T.D.S. for small missile boats.
4. Conversion of existing airplanes in the I.I. Navy into Maritime Control airplanes, using the concept of the Israel Navy (could be accomplished by Israel Aircraft Industries).

Group C - This group of subjects includes items that are in various stages of R & D.

R. Adm. Barkai strongly emphasized the importance he attaches to this equipment and the cost effectiveness of transforming these projects into joint projects. Cooperation in these subjects would enhance the existing ties between the two navies.

1. A new third generation E.W. suit for ships to become operational by 1982-3.
The suit would be fully integrated and fully computerized.
2. An acoustic self defense system for submarines that would include the capability to jam and deceive enemy sonars, to jam and deceive enemy torpedoes and to release anti-torpedo decoys.
3. A pulse dopler radar that would be capable of missile detection at great ranges (above 20km). This radar would be fully compatible with the existing and future E.W. suits and would enable the ships to react early.
4. The development of an anti-missile missile that would serve as a second generation AMSD weapon for the defense of ships against missile threat.
5. Enhancing the Flower project to enable it to be launched from submarines.

Group D -

1. The Israel Navy expresses its interest to make an operational evaluation of the 40mm proximity fuse that is in use with the I.I. Navy. The results of the tests would be made available to both navies.
The I.I. Navy could, if it so wishes, send specialists to take part in the evaluation tests.
2. The Israel Navy expressed its interest to receive publications concerning the conduct of SSK (exercises between two submerged submarines).

When concluding the discussion R. Adm. Barkai suggested that a group of I.I. Navy officers would come to Israel in order to study the different subjects that have been discussed and that are mentioned above and to be able to submit a thorough report.

SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL

ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES LTD.

BEN GURION International Airport, ISRAEL
Cables: Israelavia Telex: Israviva 31114, Telephone: 97 31 11

May 23, 1978.

LWF-4 Investigation Stage Objectives & Program

1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 A program for the development of a combat aircraft which will be designed to serve in the high-technology environment of the 1980's and 1990's is a multi-year activity. In order to assure that the end-result will satisfy the needs of the operator and will do so with the minimum practical expenditure, the first stage must contain a detailed study of the existing and forecasted operational requirements; the technologies which are presently available and applicable; and the predictable development and the service life of the aircraft.

At the end of the investigative stage, the operational requirements will have so been delineated that the technical specifications of the aircraft will be prepared and the development program defined.

- 1.2 The proposed first (investigative) stage for the LWF-4 program is predicted to require 12 to 18 months and its estimated cost is \$ 25,000,000 (twenty five million U.S. dollars).
- 1.3 The proposed first-stage effort forms an integral part of a total program which will develop and produce a combat aircraft capable of competing with any plane it will meet during its projected service life. However, its is so structured that should the parties involved elect to terminate the program at the end of this stage, the findings of the investigators and the results of the study will provide useful data for future use by the parties.

2. TASK STATEMENT

- 2.1 The first stage shall determine the best program management structure and organization. It shall identify the development risks and present a plan for eliminating them.

./..2

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- 2 -

- 2.2 A work schedule for the remainder of the program shall be prepared. This schedule shall include milestones and procedures for assuring that they are met. It shall also provide for evaluation of the program at each milestone.
- 2.3 The operational requirements of the aircraft shall be defined.
- 2.4 The performance specifications for the aircraft and its systems shall be developed to meet the operational goals as defined. Areas involving trade-offs or performance penalties shall be identified.
- 2.5 Program options and alternative program plans shall be delineated on the basis of the trade-offs and performance penalties previously identified.
- 2.6 Budget estimates shall be created and substantiated. They shall be presented on a per-fiscal-year basis and on a program stage (pre-production, qualification, production, etc.) basis.
- 2.7 At the end of the proposed first stage, a firm estimate of the unit fly away cost of the production aircraft shall be available.
- 2.8 During the proposed first stage, main sub-contractors shall be identified and preliminary contacts shall have taken place.
- 2.9 A summary of the basic technologies and know-how which will be required to complete the program shall be compiled and a plan for acquiring and/or developing them shall be prepared.
- 2.10 Estimates of man power, skills and tools which will be required at each party's facilities for development and for production shall be completed and plans for recruiting and training shall be developed.

3. SUMMARY

- 3.1 In accordance with predetermined milestones, the result of all of the above tasks shall be presented in reports and documents. This will enable all parties to evaluate the program and to rationally decide on the advisability of continuing.

Should a negative decision be made at the end of the investigative phase, the information gained by each party will at a minimum be worth the amounts expended.

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TOP SECRET

M E E T I N G

Minister of Defense, Gen. E. Weizmann, and
Gen. Tufanian, of Iran.

Ministry of Defense, Tel-Aviv
Monday, July 18, 1977, 3 p.m.

Also Present: Mr. Uri Lubrani
Dr. Suzman, Director-General
Mr. A. Ben-Yosef
Col. Elan Tehila

GEN. TUFANIAN: Congratulations to you on your new position.

GEN. WEIZMANN: Thank you, my friend. It is now 7 years since I left the Government as Minister of Transportation and almost 8 years that I left the Army. And I must confess that basically nothing has changed much. Only the zeros after the figures, instead of millions, it is billions; all the zeros in the big figures of the budgets. That's about the only thing that has changed. Some people got a little bit balder.

GEN. TUFANIAN: That's life.

GEN. WEIZMANN: But I hope you didn't get too much of a shock when you heard we kicked the other government out of office.

GEN. TUFANIAN: In principle, some of the new government we knew. I know you for many years; I know Dayan for many years. So I think what we really need in this area is peace and stability.

GEN. WEIZMANN: You see, I think that there is more of a chance with a government like ours, with all due respects to the old government, because we know what we want and you don't

have every minister having his own opinion. With all due respects to my friends in the other party, each and every minister in the old government had his opinion.

GEN. TUFANIAN: In Iran also we believe in the unity of command. And we think that a snake with seven heads never goes into his pit. And so we need unity. That is the reason that we all are after His Majesty. And we implement his orders, with full support and full strength, because we think that he believes in his country and wants for his people a better life, better civilization. And we cannot have civilization without a good economy and we cannot have a good economy without security and stability in the country. That is the reason we think we have to develop deterrent forces in the area, to keep security and stability in the country. And we are doing it. In the region, unfortunately it is very difficult. Pakistan is our neighbor; Afghanistan is our neighbor; Iraq is one of our neighbors; Turkey is one of our neighbors.

GEN. WEIZMANN: And Russia.

GEN. TUFANIAN: Russia. So we have really first of all to depend on ourselves. Experience has showed us we cannot depend on other people. We have to depend upon ourselves.

And we think -- that is His Majesty's message -- to talk especially with you and to tell you that you here, we in Iran, can be two defense fortresses, and we can cooperate together. Of course we have to prove to the world -- you have to prove to

that
the world/you want peace, that you aren't after war. Then our political situation will permit us to expand our cooperation. This afternoon I got a newspaper and started reading the results of Mr. Begin's visit in New York today. It appears to me that you are after peace.

GEN. WEIZMANN: Of course.

GEN. TUFANIAN: In principle, His Majesty believes that you have to keep the door of negotiations open, and it is better that you discuss all subjects and negotiate.

GEN. WEIZMANN: I would love very much to see His Majesty again. I haven't seen him for 11 years. I remember the last time I saw him was in March 1966. And to try to prove to him that the last thing we want and the last thing we need is war. You must remember that Egypt, Jordan, Syria, all around us, they possess now over 5,000 tanks and over 1300 fighting airplanes. Iraq can move in 48 hours with quite a force. Saudi Arabia is buying a lot of arms. Libya is an arsenal of weapons. And I don't want to go into high strategy but you only have to look at the map and see what happens to a small country like ours if we go all the way back to the old borders without real security.

But I think that Mr. Begin --first of all I am sure, I know him very well, that he is a wise man. He definitely doesn't need and doesn't want war. And I think it will be very interesting to see tomorrow night the first impression of the first meeting between him and President Carter.

I believe that one of the strengths of Israel to deter is to be economically independent as much as possible. It is not enough to have F-15s and F-4s and a lot of tanks and lots of weapons. We have a big arsenal; weapons-wise we have quite a big force. But first of all to be economically sound. That is why you see we are taking some very drastic measures now. I am cutting the budget for defense by about \$140 million, which for us is a lot of money, much to the horror of my friend, the Director-General, and the Chief of Staff. We are trying to put the economy on a much better footing. The other thing is to strengthen the defense of our country by being industrially independent as far as possible. You are familiar with our industry, probably in many respects now even more than I am: the aircraft industry, the military industries, all the scientific institutions. We are building our own tank, which is a very good tank. We have built the Kfir, which is not one hundred percent ours, but it is a very interesting technology, a very good airplane.

And the big question now is, are we going to team together and do things or not. One thing I want to promise you, and I want to emphasize. That I shall do my best that everything we do jointly we shall discuss thoroughly and go deep into the requirements, into the technology, into the economics of whatever we have.

I will give you an example. I have gone over the six contracts in action now. I have also put my mind to those things

that are not in contracts, for instance the future fighter. Are we going to or are we not going to develop a joint effort on a future plane. And I would like you to know all the time what I think is good for us. You must tell me what you think is required for you. If the two things match, it is very good. If not, then we say we would like to develop this for ourselves or not, and you say you would like to develop this for you or not.

For instance, in the program there are missiles, short ones, Cubism, which are your requirement more than ours. Right or wrong?

DR. SUZMAN: It is ours too. It is a joint requirement.

GEN. WEIZMANN: For 28 km.?

DR. SUZMAN: That is the Bolt.

GEN. WEIZMANN: Which is an Iranian requirement?

DR. SUZMAN: No, it is an Israeli requirement and an Iranian requirement.

GEN. TUFANIAN: I don't think any of the subjects we discussed is an individual requirement, for us or for you. In all subjects we discussed, you have had some development program or developed something. You had reached some stage, and then we agreed in principle to go on together. There are not individual things, where I said I want this or that. Except the 120 mm ammunition.

GEN. WEIZMANN: I will give you one example. I went over the program. And on the next stage of the Harpoon, what we

call the Flower, I am having a discussion with our Navy, and I am not sure that for our immediate future we need the 200 km. missile.

GEN. TUFANIAN: Do you know, this is a very advanced thing and for us this is a very difficult thing.

GEN. WEIZMANN: Why?

GEN. TUFANIAN: This concept of the Flower; it is a very difficult thing. Because we know that you can add the engine of any missile, but the most important feature of the missiles is what is called target acquisition, target identification. That is very, very important. Because there are intercontinental ballistic missiles with very accurate guidance. But for the tactical field, what is more important is the identification of the target and acquisition. And today we have already bought the Harpoon not only for our ships but for our aircraft. The Harpoon itself is faced with a difficulty. Already they have delayed the delivery of the Harpoon to us due to the technical difficulty they were faced with.

Of course, this is your proposal, your proposal that you are after such a system. This proposal for us was interesting. This proposal was interesting for us. You told me that you have a missile for this range, and supersonic, with some type of system of target acquisition and identification. That was your proposal.

DR. SUZKAN: We are developing it. We don't have such a missile.

GEN. TUFANIAN: What we agreed is if you are doing such a thing we agree to it. It was your proposal; it was not ours.

GEN. WEIZMANN: I know, sure, this is our proposal. The question is, we are developing it now--

DR. SUZMAN: We are in the early stages of development of the entire weapon system.

GEN. WEIZMANN: So this is one question I'd like to bring up in the next few days. Because I am now in a period when I have to cut budgets, and I am looking into most of the requirements of the army, navy and air force. And for the time being, if I have to decide on priorities, to me the 200 km. missile, the Flower, is not a top priority. The question is what are you and we going to do in 5, 6, 7 or 8 years when the Harpoon will become an older weapon. Therefore I think we have to discuss what we are going to do with the Flower project.

GEN. TUFANIAN: I agree to discuss the subject. Of course we also think for the future. And no country has enough money for defense, no country whatsoever.

GEN. WEIZMANN: Neither Iran?

GEN. TUFANIAN: Neither Iran, nor the U.S. In principle, we don't want -- you know, you mentioned the economy. And the first day that we joined the Bagdad Pact I was a colonel. It was the first time I had an audience with His Majesty. The Chief Supreme Commander was present with his plan to His Majesty.

So many armored divisions, etc., etc. When His Majesty looked at him, he said to the Chief Supreme Commander: Do you know, bankruptcy is worse than defeat. This is the concept of His Majesty. So we also are thinking of the economy and defense together. His Majesty thinks of economy and defense together.

GEN. WEIZMANN: The same thing here.

GEN. TUFANIAN: And we don't want to waste our money. But in principle we think that we have to develop -- you see this is our country (pointing to map), do you know that from here the Russian units are here and it goes down and around to the Persian Gulf. So we have to know what is going on here, if we want to sell our oil and develop a healthy economy, to improve the life of our people.

GEN. WEIZMANN: I fully agree with you and we are looking at the economy. That is why we developed an aircraft industry and a military industry.

GEN. TUFANIAN: So if we discuss something that is not good for the economy, we are not going to go after it.

GEN. WEIZMANN: What I suggest is that with the good people of Prof. Suzman and the aircraft industry, I would like the problem of the Flower looked into. For me now as Minister of Defense, the Flower is a question mark. Perhaps we should carry on the development in a slightly different configuration. Because I have to

decide on streamlining a little bit.

GEN. TUFANIAN: In principle, in the Mediterranean -- we hope you will keep peace, but if something ever happens, it is always the Navy that is very important. I don't know. We have to discuss it.

GEN. WEIZMANN: So will you discuss it? (to Prof. Suzman). Because I have gone into it, and the Foreign Minister, who is an ex-Defense Minister, also will discuss with you airplanes, missiles etc. So I want you to know before you go to him that I have my doubts about this missile, and I'd like to discuss it. Perhaps we will come to a conclusion that maybe we will want only 150 km. I want to re-study the requirements of this missile.

GEN. TUFANIAN: That is very good. Based on the tactics and strategy and the situation.

GEN. WEIZMANN: Otherwise, I think in the other five projects there are no problems at all. And there is no problem about this project. I started the problem. And they sometimes -- you know, it is very difficult to get used to a new minister and they are getting used to it. It's all right.

GEN. TUFANIAN: In principle, I think that first of all you are not new. And then when you are in the political game it is one thing; when you sit in the chair it is another thing.

GEN. WEIZMANN: But one thing you know, once you are an air force man, you are always an air force man; once a pilot, always a pilot. So perhaps I am looking at the Flower from an

air force point of view.

GEN. TUFANIAN: I have a blue uniform but my responsibility is not only the blue uniform. I look to all the services the same.

You know, in principle, we should have a political assurance in the area. Then we shall be able to expand our cooperation. This agreement was made with the past administration. With the new administration we became at the beginning to some extent hesitant. Because we cannot develop a threat to our security.

GEN. WEIZMANN: You want to know that we are doing our best to achieve peace. I get you.

GEN. TUFANIAN: Not only achieve peace. We want to have an assurance that really war -- and you can do it, we are sure you can do it -- ^{that} the judgement of the world is that you want peace. And we have no doubt if it is peace you can live better. The world should judge who wants war. You don't want it.

GEN. WEIZMANN: I think that tomorrow evening you will be more content and calm. We are having dinner together tomorrow evening, we shall listen to the radio, and before the dinner is over we shall have a first impression, or at the latest, Wednesday morning. When are you leaving?

GEN. TUFANIAN: Wednesday afternoon.

MR. LUBRANI: You will be having a meeting with the General on Wednesday afternoon.

GEN. TUFANIAN: In principle, I invite you to Iran also and will report to His Majesty. You haven't seen him for a long time.

GEN. WEIZMANN: I'd like to come over. Any time you tell me, I will be over in 24 hours, even less.

MR. LUBRANI: Don't do that to me. We need some time to prepare.

GEN. WEIZMANN: I sincerely think -- we were a small committee that prepared and planned the ideas for the Prime Minister before he left - the Prime Minister, Dyan and myself. And Mr. Begin is a different gentleman than let's say Mr. Rabin or Shimon Peres, who was not a prime minister but very active in ideas towards achieving an understanding with the Arabs, or Golda Meir. Mr. Begin is a different type of gentleman in his technique. And I believe, knowing what he is going to tell Mr. Carter tomorrow -- at least I hope I know, he might come out with something I don't know, which can happen with prime ministers you know -- I am sure, well I can't say I am sure, but I have a feeling, I am confident that there will be an understanding between the President and our Prime Minister. How soon this will make things more open for negotiations with the Egyptians, the Syrians, Jordanians, it is very difficult to assess now.

You know, just as well as I do, that Egypt is different from Syria, that Iraq is different to Saudi Arabia, and so on. And you know just as well as I do, what is happening now within the

Arab countries. What is happening in Syria now, instigated by Iraq, the internal problems of Egypt, the peculiar behavior of Gaddafi, the uniqueness of Saudi Arabia in its attitude, King Hussein. They are all Arabs, but in many respects they are different.

If we could have -- which is highly wishful thinking -- a separate talk with the Egyptians, I am sure we could go a long way with them. I can tell you, and you will probably hear it tomorrow, that one of the parts in the presentation of our ideas is that the Sinai from a territorial point of view is much more negotiable than other parts. And it is not only because the Egyptians are more pleasant, and I think the Egyptians are more pleasant people than for instance the Iraqis. I have lived in Egypt for two years on and off when I was in the Royal Air Force, and if there is something I really hope to be able to do, it's to go to Cairo and Alexandria as we used to when I was a young man. I drove a car to Cairo four times in my life there and back.

So it is also very dependent on the attitude in the Arab countries. And again there is a different attitude in Egypt, a different attitude in Jordan, there is a different attitude in Syria. I don't think it is an easy thing to achieve peace. I think that it will be relatively easy to convince others that we want peace. The question is what sort of arrangement and how to achieve it. On this we will be much wiser tomorrow. After Mr. Begin sees Carter, I think Mr. Vance will probably come here and then Mr. Dayan will go to Washington. And I think

he will be the most successful Foreign Minister we ever had. And I think it was a very clever move of my Prime Minister to recruit Dayan into the government. Because he is a respected gentleman, he is a renowned personality and the most important thing, he is a wise man. He can^{be} quite a pirate, quite a boy, but he is a wise man. Therefore I hope that with the ideas of Begin, of Dayan, of the rest of the Ministers -- I intend going to Washington sometime before the end of 1977, to the Pentagon -- I think the feeling in the next few weeks will be more favorable to the problem that is pressing you, which I can understand. We talked yesterday and we estimated roughly that the attitude will be first of all we want to know what is happening in the Middle East before we go building airplanes together. So I understand. I hope we will prove to the world that what we want is really peace and quiet. One of our great generals is now the Minister of Agriculture, General Sharon.

GEN. TUFANIAN: Yes, I know him.

GEN. WEIZMANN: He is growing vegetables instead of shooting at the enemy. This is a great advance towards peace.

GEN. TUFANIAN: You know, in principle, we think peace is in the interest of everyone. We realize the difficulty. We are not Arab, but we know Arabs. Lately some people from Iraq were in Teheran. We made some type of agreement together. But in principle, we know each other very well, and we know the Arabs very well. And then the most important thing is really our big

neighbor, Russia. Their aim has never changed. This is to come to all these waters. We are obliged to develop some type of deterrent force.

GEN. WEIZMANN: You will see the firing tomorrow. Unfortunately, I can't join you. I wanted to but I am going down to the Sinai because the Egyptians are returning 19 bodies tomorrow. So with your permission, I will excuse myself and won't be with you. But you will enjoy it. It is a very impressive piece of machinery. I hope the firing is successful. And I think that for you it is a very important thing. And it gives you a completely different environment. We have it, as you know, in various ways of launching, whether rigid or mobile, etc. We started working on it in 1962.

GEN. TUFANIAN: There is something started in India. What is your information about that?

GEN. WEIZMANN: The Indians are very careful with us, aren't they?

MR. BEN YOSEF: They are, but we can find out.

GEN. TUFANIAN?: The Indians started something, with the French.

MR. BEN YOSEF: We have something about the French with the Iraqis, but we didn't know about the Indians.

GEN. TUFANIAN: Do you think the French will start with Iraq in this field?

MR. BEN YOSEF: It is a possibility.

DR. SUZMAN: They will start with anyone that will pay them.

GEN. WEIZMANN: We have information that they are going over there to build a reactor.

GEN. TUFANIAN: Atomic, yes. But in principle, the family of surface to surface missiles that they have is the Platoon.

MR. BEN YOSEF: It is a possibility that one must take into account.

GEN. WEIZMANN: All missiles can carry an atomic head, all missiles can carry a conventional head. They can carry all sort of peculiar heads. Our is 750 kg.

GEN. TUFANIAN: And the Indians started to make something with a 600 kg. warhead.

GEN. WEIZMANN: Fair enough. That will carry a conventional head.

DR. SUZMAN: It will probably also carry nuclear weapons.

GEN. WEIZMANN: The worst thing that can happen to this area is when everyone starts playing with atomic weapons -- the Iraqis, Gaddafi, and the Egyptians -- and this can be in less than ten years. And the French will sell anything to anybody.

GEN. TUFANIAN: Yes, they will sell anything but it will not work in the end.

DR. SUZMAN: I wouldn't count on it. It may work and if it does it is very dangerous.

MR. LUBRANI: The General has a very poor opinion of French equipment.

GEN. WEIZMANN: Yes, he is quite right. But we improved their equipment. But you will see the missile tomorrow.

DR. SUZMAN: Even the missile is originally a French missile.

GEN. TUFANIAN: Yes, I think the French started the same thing with you and with Pakistan.

GEN. WEIZMANN: We started when Abdul Nasser fired his Zaphar--

MR. BEN YOSEF: He didn't fire it. He demonstrated it but with no firing, in July 1962.

GEN. WEIZMANN: And we convened a meeting at 12 midnight. I was Air Force Commander, Shimon was Deputy Defense Minister, and everyone got into a panic.

GEN. TUFANIAN: I don't think those Egyptian missiles ever flew.

GEN. WEIZMANN: NO, but this helped develop the missile you are going to see tomorrow.

MR. LUBRANI: And if I may say so, the General told me that it was the first news about the Scud in Iraq that raised the red beacon.

GEN. WEIZMANN: You must have a ground to ground missile. A country like yours, with F-14s, with so many F-4s, with the problems surrounding you, with a good missile force, a clever and wise one -- we have been at it in Israel now, in the country itself, for about 7 or 8 years. I mean the present missile. The Luz was the forefather of the Gabriel. Not the one in Aviation Week.

GEN. TUFANIAN: What is that in Aviation Week?

GEN. WEIZMANN: When it is serious, I will tell you and I will say: General, let's go together on it. But first I want to be one hundred per cent sure. I am not sure yet. But 20 years ago we had a small missile we called Luz, and this is the forefather of the Gabriel. We started it as a ground to ground missile for 25 km., fired off a command car. We used to go to the Negev to fire it. Once we took Ben Gurion to see it fire.

DR. SUZMAN: We spent over a billion dollars in developing our missile capability.

GEN. WEIZMANN: Air to air, ground to ground. We never went into ground to air. We tried once, to develop the Sheffer like the Shepperel.

DR. SUZMAN: We are still playing around with the idea.

GEN. WEIZMANN: I have to go now to make a speech to 2,000 officers of the Air Force. Today it is Air Force Day.

GEN. TUFANIAN: I saw in the paper that the Commander of the Air Force gave a good speech to them.

GEN. WEIZMANN: Do you know General Peled?

GEN. TUFANIAN: Yes.

GEN. WEIZMANN: You will see him tomorrow night at dinner. I want you to know he is changing his command in two or three months' time and you will meet the new commander tomorrow. He flew Oragans with me in the 1956 campaign and then he commanded the squadron in the 1967 war and now he is an aeronautical engineer.

I am sorry about tomorrow, but you are in the good hands of my friends. Whenever you decide you want to develop things together, you need it, we need it -- we will be much wiser tomorrow after, as I call it, the B and C meeting, the Begin - Carter meeting.

GEN. TUFANIAN: I think we are the only two countries in the region that can depend on each other. Because look at Pakistan. And this morning I landed in Ankara, and there is no government there still. And Iraq, we know what they are doing, an arsenal of Russia. You have two Russian arsenals - Gaddafi and Iraq. And we have Iraq as an arsenal of Russia, and not only an arsenal. They are coming down. They want to come to the Persian Gulf.

GEN. WEIZMANN: I'd like to get a MIG-23 or 25. Remember when we got the MIG-21 eleven years ago?

GEN. TUFANIAN: I tried to get it from Egypt, but I couldn't. (laughter).

MR. LUBRANI: You mean a 23?

GEN. TUFANIAN: Yes, a 23. The MIG-25 they returned back. Have you found out any information about the MIG-23?

GEN. WEIZMANN: I think we have. Will you get for the General from the Air Force anything about the MIG-23? Any intelligence you want, let me know. You want us to start looking into the subject of India?

GEN. TUFANIAN: That was a subject His Majesty raised. He mentioned that the Indians have developed or are going to develop

a surface to surface missile with a 600 kg. warhead.

MR. LUBRANI: With the French?

GEN. TUFANIAN: Yes, with the French. Usually they are interested in us also.

GEN. WEIZMANN: Good. General, anything you want, ask these gentlemen.

(Meeting adjourned at 3:30).