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the most
Compassionate and Merciful**

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The Kurdish Problem in Perspective

A Research Paper

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August 1979

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The Kurdish Problem in Perspective (U)

A Research Paper

*Research for this report was completed
on 30 June 1979.*

Analysts from the Office of Political Analysis and the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research have contributed to this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to Nelson Henderson, Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis, on 351-6522. (U)

This paper has been coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency. (U)

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FA 79-10300
August 1979

The Kurdish Problem in Perspective (U)

Key Judgments

The fall from power of the Shah of Iran and the instability that has plagued the Khomeini regime have focused international attention on the Kurds. A distinct ethnic group with their own language and culture, the Kurds for several thousand years have occupied a mountainous region, historically known as Kurdistan, which includes parts of southeast Turkey, northwest Iran, and northern Iraq as well as smaller enclaves in Syria and the USSR. (U)

Although the Kurds constitute the fourth most numerous people in the Middle East (after Arabs, Turks, and Iranians), they have not achieved territorial independence because:

- Tribalism, differences in religion and dialect, and national barriers have prevented the development of any real Kurdish unity; as a consequence, Kurdish nationalist groups have tended to act independently of one another.
- Competing groups within Turkey, Iran, and Iraq have almost always been able to unite to frustrate Kurdish separatist or autonomist aspirations. (U)

The chances that the Kurds will be able to achieve self-determination in the future are not good:

- Even though the Kurds in Iran have assumed de facto control over much of the predominantly Kurdish area of the country, the revolutionary government will not permit infringements of its ability to conduct foreign, defense, or economic policy to go unchallenged. Most Kurdish leaders recognize that when the government's forces are sufficiently rebuilt, it will, if necessary, use force to reestablish its control over the Kurdish region. Moreover, most Iranian Kurds probably would prefer to settle for autonomy than risk open conflict with the government.
- The Turkish Government will not grant the Kurds in Turkey greater political autonomy, although Ankara might allow its Kurdish minority greater freedom of cultural expression.
- The Iraqi Government will continue to use a combination of military force and economic inducement to discourage a resurgence of dissident activity among Iraqi Kurds.
- The Kurdish community in Syria has been assimilated by the local society to a greater degree than Kurdish minorities in neighboring countries, and antigovernment activity by the Syrian Kurds seems unlikely. (S)

Although full-scale conflict between the Kurds in Iran and the revolutionary government does not seem likely in the near term, an attempt by the government to extend its control in the Kurdish region led to serious clashes in late July. Guerrilla activity, especially by Kurds in Iran and Iraq, is likely to continue. Over the longer term, the possibility of more serious conflict between the Kurds and the governments of the states in which they live probably depends on two factors: whether future events so weaken the control of the governments in question as to provide the Kurds with an opportunity to press for greater self-determination; and whether any of the Kurdish communities is able to obtain substantial outside aid such as that provided by Iran to the Kurds in Iraq before March 1975. (c)

The Soviets would undoubtedly like to use Kurdish dissidence to put pressure on neighboring governments that are not considered pro-Soviet. They are inhibited from providing large-scale, direct support to such minorities in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, however, by their desire to avoid severe damage to their relations with these states. At the same time, the Soviets may indirectly support the Kurds by condoning third-party transfers of Soviet equipment. As most Kurdish dissident leaders have ties to pro-Soviet Communist parties, such arrangements would be relatively simple. In doing so, they would hope to encourage continued instability in Iran and create problems for the increasingly anti-Soviet Baathist government in Iraq; such action would also serve to remind area states of the Soviet capability to create dissension among their minorities. (s)


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Kurdish Areas in the Middle East and the U.S.S.R.

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The Kurdish Problem in Perspective (U)

Background

Since ancient times, the Kurds have inhabited the mountainous region stretching from southeast Turkey across northern Iraq and into northwestern Iran, with small enclaves in northern Syria and in the Transcaucasus region of the USSR. The total area, covering approximately 287,000 square kilometers, has never constituted a formal political entity, despite ill-fated attempts over the years to establish a separate Kurdish state. Nevertheless, this area has historically been labeled "Kurdistan." Other small communities of Kurds have emigrated from the Kurdish heartland to more economically advantageous urban areas or have been relocated by the governments of the states in which they live. (U)

Ethnic Origin

It is generally thought that the Kurds are the descendants of Indo-European tribes that settled in the Kurdish areas perhaps up to 4,000 years ago. The Kurds consider themselves, inaccurately according to some historians, to be the direct descendants of the ancient Medes, conquerors of Ninevah in 612 BC, who were defeated by the Persians 62 years later. In physical appearance the Kurds vary throughout

Kurdistan as a result of mixing with other ethnic groups over the centuries. They are, however, regarded as a distinct and separate ethnic group. (U)

Population


Most estimates of the number of Kurds living in the region range from 9.65 to 12.4 million--4 to 6 million in Turkey, 2.8 to 3.5 million in Iran, 2.5 million in Iraq, 250,000 to 300,000 in Syria, and 100,000 in the USSR. Estimates by some Kurdish sources of a total population of around 16 million seem high and may be designed to justify territorial claims. Although there are a smaller number of Kurds living in Iraq than in Turkey and Iran, they account for some 20 percent of Iraq's population, as opposed to approximately 10 percent in Turkey and Iran. The Kurds in Syria constitute only 5 percent of the total population. (U)

Although most Kurds in Turkey inhabit the mountainous areas in the southeastern part of the country, some are found in central Anatolia. In addition, several hundred thousand Turkish Kurds have migrated to Ankara and Istanbul in search of employment. (U)

*Mountainous terrain
west of Lake Urmia in
Iranian Kurdistan.*



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The Great Zab River Valley near Hakkari, Turkey, an example of the deep, narrow valleys and swift moving streams common throughout Kurdistan.

Confidential

In Iran, the Kurds are found mainly in the mountainous northwestern part of the country, although some 300,000 inhabit the mountainous area northwest of Mashad along the Soviet border. Iranian Kurds are also found southwest of Khorramabad, near Shiraz, near Birjand in eastern Khorasan Province, and south of Zahadan in Baluchistan va Sistan Province. There are also Kurds living in Tehran and other large cities in the country, although no figures are available. (U)

Most Iraqi Kurds live in the mountainous region of the north, although some are also found along the Tigris River south of Mosul, along the Tigris River southeast of Baghdad, and in Baghdad. There are several large towns in northern Iraq, but only Sulaymaniyah is predominantly Kurdish. An Iraqi Government Kurdish resettlement program initiated after 1976 has forced the relocation of thousands of Kurds to the area south of Baghdad, although most have since been permitted to return north. (C)

Most Syrian Kurds are located in the northern section of the country along the Turkish border and in the northeastern Jazirah area between Turkey and Iraq. Approximately 30,000 Syrian Kurds live in Damascus. (C)

Most Kurds in the Soviet Union live in the republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaidzhan. In 1944 a sizable Kurdish minority in the Georgian-Turkish border area, as well as some Georgian Muslims and a number of Armenians living along the Turkish border, was deported to Soviet Central Asia in anticipation of a Soviet military move against Turkey. (C)

Language.

The Kurdish language is a central element of the cultural heritage of the Kurds. Their demand that Kurdish be adopted as the official language in Kurdish-speaking areas has long been a serious point of contention between Kurdish groups and the governments of the countries in which they reside. In Turkey, the teaching of Kurdish in schools was forbidden, as was the case in Iran before the revolution. Unlike the Turks, however, the Iranians allowed the printing of Kurdish books and the broadcasting of Kurdish radio programs. Since the Shah's overthrow, the Kurds in Iran have proclaimed Kurdish an official language, and in towns such as Sanandaj, Mahabad, and Kermanshah, the Kurdish language reportedly is being taught in schools. Currently in Iraq there is some



Kurdish village in northwestern Iran.

Confidential

indication that the Baathist government is considering granting some linguistic autonomy to the Kurds and will permit the expansion of Kurdish-language radio and television broadcasting. As recently as two years ago, however, the government was accelerating its efforts to curtail the teaching of the Kurdish language in elementary and secondary schools in the Kurdish region, as well as doing away with all Kurdish studies in Iraqi universities. The Kurds in the USSR are permitted to use Kurdish in schools, radio programs, and newspapers. (C)

Kurdish belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European family of languages and is related to Farsi, Baluchi, and Pushtu. It has been characterized by one scholar as a "special language, the sister of Farsi, and perhaps the more ancient of the two." Kurdish is divided into two broad classifications of dialects: Kurmanji, spoken throughout the northwestern portion of Kurdistan, and Kurdi, prevalent in the southeastern region/Zaza, spoken by Kurds in central Turkey, is sometimes listed as a third major dialect, although it may be a separate language. Many variations of these groupings are spoken by the Kurds and are known throughout Kurdistan by their local names. In Iraq, for example, the major dialect used in the dominant Kurdish tribal areas and among most Kurdish urban dwellers is Sorani, which is closely related to the Kurdi dialect. (U)

Differences in dialect tend to offset any unifying influence that a common language might have. Some spoken dialects have diverged to the point of mutual unintelligibility; to complicate matters even further, in some areas the Kurdish dialects have been so heavily influenced by neighboring languages that in their vocabulary they often more closely resemble Turkish, Arabic, or Farsi. (U)

The most common form of written Kurdish is literature published in Kurdi (or Sorani), which is based on the Sulamaniyah dialect. It uses a modified Arabic script. Some literature in Kurmanji has been published using a script based on the Roman alphabet. Kurds in the Soviet Union use a script consisting largely of Cyrillic characters plus a few Roman characters. (U)

Religion

Even though the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence, religion has acted as a divisive factor. Many Kurds are drawn to various Dervish orders, and differences over practices and adherence to Sufi mysticism have added to overall tribal divisions. In addition, many tribal leaders combine hereditary religious leadership with their temporal authority, adding to the intensity of tribal distinctions. In Iraq and Iran, where some Kurds are

Shias, religious differences are further compounded. Iranian Kurds in the Kurdish provinces of Kermanshahan and Ilam are virtually all Shias and identify with fellow non-Kurdish Shias. Kurds from the more northern Kurdish region of Iran do not regard the Shias in the south as Kurds at all and frequently refer to them as *Far* (Iranian). Kurds in the USSR have included Sunnis, Shias, and Yezidis (a minor, pre-Muslim sect), but these distinctions have become blurred over the years. There are also small groups of Jewish and Christian Kurds, but their present status is unknown. (C)

Structure of Society

Tribalism has also acted to promote disunity. Over the centuries, it was the tribe that received the primary allegiance of most Kurds, and even Kurds who have been settled for many generations maintain their tribal affiliation. Such fervent tribal loyalty, combined with the mountain isolation which inhibited intertribal communication, promoted tribal feuding and mutual suspicion, which still exists today. During the height of the Kurdish uprising in Iraq during the early 1960s, some tribes fought on the government's side, and others switched back and forth. Some families assured their fortunes either by having one branch stay neutral or by making sure that one group fought on each side of the conflict. (C)

In general, the Kurds have refused to be assimilated under any central governmental authority; they have instead looked to their tribal leaders or *aghas* for support and guidance. The *aghas* spend most of their time negotiating, or feuding, with the government or other tribes, conducting intertribal business where tribal alliances existed, and resolving disputes within the tribe. In return for their leadership, the tribes supported the *aghas*—many of whom were wealthy landowners—by sharecropping on tribal land or through direct contributions in the form of gifts. In some instances where the tribe had no title to the land it used, other than traditional grazing rights, the *aghas* were able to acquire legal possession of the tribal lands, thereby safeguarding their incomes and acquiring large landholdings in the process. (U)

Information available on the role and significance of individual Kurdish tribes outside Iraq is very limited as well as dated. In Iraq, the most important tribes are the Barzani, Talabani, and Jaf. Historically the Barzani tribe has been regarded as the most warlike and independent of all the tribes. Located in northern Iraq around the village of Barzan near the Turkish border, the Barzanis are a settled tribe, chiefly involved in farming. They have long feuded with nomadic tribes that migrate seasonally across grazing lands regarded by the Barzanis as their private lands; in its conflicts with the Barzanis, the government has often been aided by their traditional tribal enemies, both settled and nomadic. From the late 1930s until his death in early 1979, Mulla Mustafa Barzani¹ was the undisputed leader of the Barzanis. (C)

Some members of the Talabani tribe are located in villages northwest of Khanaqin, while the majority of the tribe lives in the area around Kirkuk. One faction of the Talabani tribe, which like the Barzanis is a settled tribe largely engaged in agriculture, is composed of followers of Jalal Talabani,² long a principal opponent of Mulla Mustafa Barzani for leadership of the Kurdish movement. Other factions of the Talabani tribe are led by various family sheikhs. (C)

The Jafs are believed to be the largest of all the Kurdish tribes. Most Jafs lives in three areas of Iraq—Diyala, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah. Until prevented from doing so by the Iranian Government in the late 1960s, the Jafs migrated to Iran for summer grazing, and some have remained there. Since the late 1960s, the Jafs have turned to a settled existence. In the early 1970s, they were described as neutral in the conflict between the government and the Barzanis. (C)

Although the majority of Kurds today live a settled agricultural or seminomadic existence, tribal pride and identity continue to be important. Tribal disputes center on such topics as grazing rights and marriage

¹ For biography, see Appendix.

² See biographic appendix.

partners. There are indications, however, that tribal bonds among Kurds are weakening. A traditional ruling family may retain some control in settled village communities, but the customary social order is no longer close-knit. Within the urban areas, tribal identity is less important economically. Although belonging to a particular tribe may still have some social significance, many better educated Kurds identify with the overall Kurdish cause rather than a particular tribe. Kurdish leftists have accused wealthy Kurdish tribal leaders, along with affluent Kurdish merchants and religious men, of perpetuating the oppression of the poorer Kurds. (U)

In Iran, the Shah's land reform laws broke up most large estates held by the Kurdish landowning class, destroying much of the influence of the Iranian tribal chiefs or khans. Kurdish tribesmen in other countries are also breaking with the tradition of financially supporting their leaders. While younger Kurds, as well as those now living along the periphery of traditional Kurdistan, still maintain their sense of ethnic identity, many are straying from the old tribal traditions. The effect of these changes, along with the policies of individual governments intended to incorporate Kurds under a centralized authority, has been to reduce and, in some cases, eliminate the political power of many traditional tribal chieftains. (C)

Economic and Social Situation

Years of unrest and resistance to central authority, indifference by the various governments, and the mountainous terrain have checked the spread of modern health practices and education among the Kurds. The traditional nomadic way of life led by most Kurds has offered little opportunity for economic improvement. In recent years, however, some governments have come to recognize the need for economic and social improvements in the Kurdish areas—if for no other reason than to improve security. Under the land reform laws of 1970 in Iran, large Kurdish holdings were broken up and turned over to the Kurdish peasants who farmed it. Since the end of the

Kurdish revolt in Iraq in 1975, the government has moved some Kurds from their isolated mountain homes to "modern model villages" supplied with electricity, running water, schools, and medical clinics. In the USSR, life on the collective farms offers the Kurds more security than their former nomadism, but at the expense of their traditional lifestyle. (C)

Although there are still some nomadic pastoral tribes, most Kurds are now settled farmers. Despite the use of traditional farming methods and equipment and the difficulty of the terrain, Kurdish agriculture is believed to be fairly productive. Where conditions permit, tobacco is the principal cash crop. (U)

The illiteracy rate of the Kurds is somewhat above the generally high levels prevailing in the Middle East. Nevertheless, over the last few decades a small Kurdish intelligentsia has developed among the educated and professional class of Kurdish society. It was this almost exclusively urban group that provided the impetus for the nationalist aspirations of the Mahabad Republic¹ and has played an increasing role in national movements since then. Graduates of universities in the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America, the educated Kurds tend to leave the Kurdish areas to seek employment in urban centers or even outside the country. In the USSR, some educated urban Kurds are involved in the media, teaching, and, at times, local government. (U)

The Rise of Kurdish Nationalism

The early history of the Kurds records little evidence of Kurdish unity or national cohesion, although short-lived Kurdish principalities flourished in a few areas. Located between the rival Turkish and Persian empires, individual tribes aligned themselves with one side or the other and often fought each other. In the

¹ See pages 22-23.

Kurdish women in tribal dress.



Confidential.

early 17th century, the Turkish-Persian frontiers were finally stabilized, with three quarters of the Kurds falling under Ottoman rule and the remainder under the Savafid dynasty of Persia. The few attempts to penetrate or pacify the Kurdish area, however, were unsuccessful. Despite a series of insurrections in the early 19th century, there was no sign that the tribes were becoming one nation. The first indication of Kurdish political nationalism was the revolt led by Ubaydallah of Shamiran in the 1880s which was aimed at uniting the Kurdish peoples of the Turkish and Persian empires into one state, but this failed when both empires cooperated to eliminate the common threat. (U)

In the years immediately before World War I, Kurdish intellectuals established secret nationalist societies but modern Kurdish nationalism did not take shape until the end of the war. The promise of self-determination held out following the defeat of Turkey raised the hopes of the non-Turkish peoples of the Ottoman Empire, including the Kurds, that they would be able to control their own destiny. The Treaty of Sevres signed by Turkey and the allied powers in August 1920 acknowledged the existence of a distinct Kurdish community and called for provisional recognition of an independent Kurdistan made up of territory that today composes part of southeastern Turkey. (U)

The Treaty of Sevres was never ratified, however, and in July 1923 it was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, which ignored the Kurdish minority. "Southern Kurdistan" -- the Ottoman province of Mosul, which was under British control when the war ended -- was made part of the newly created state of Iraq -- which was placed under British mandate. The remainder of Kurdistan fell under the control of Turkey and Iran, with small areas in Syria and the Soviet Union. (U)

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The Kurds in Iran fared little better between the wars. **The government of Reza Khan, later Shah Pahlavi, forged a new national unity by defeating tribe after tribe by force of arms or intrigue. He placed influential Kurdish leaders in enforced residence in Tehran or elsewhere. Revolts in 1920, 1926, and 1930 led by Agha Ismail, known as Simko, of the Shikak tribe, were suppressed. Efforts were made by the Iranian Government to impose the Persian language on the Kurds and to replace traditional Kurdish dress with Western dress. A revolt in 1931 by Sheikh Tafar of the Hamadan tribe was put down harshly, after which the government declared with some truth that "it had no Kurdish problem."** (U)

In Iraq a revolt by Sheikh Mahmud in the Sulaymaniyah area in 1919 was put down by the British. Another revolt in 1923 by Sheikh Mahmud, who proclaimed himself the King of Southern Kurdistan, was again suppressed, but it secured for the Kurds the right to teach Kurdish in the schools, a right incorporated in the terms of the 1925 League of Nations mandate to the United Kingdom. Although British foreign policy was not actively hostile to Kurdish desires for autonomy, the discovery of oil in southern Iran and the possibility that oil was also present in northern Iraq worked against British support for an independent Kurdistan. The discovery of oil in 1927 near Kirkuk in a concession held by US and European oil interests acted to limit Western sympathy for the Kurdish independence movement. (U)

In 1932 Iraq, which had become independent in 1930, enacted constitutional safeguards for the Kurdish population in order to satisfy requirements for membership in the League of Nations. In the same year, however, efforts by the government to establish firmer control over the northern region triggered a revolt led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani. Airstrikes by the British, who maintained a military presence in Iraq after independence, forced Mullah Mustafa and his supporters to withdraw into Turkey. The Barzanis again revolted in 1943 and were not subdued until 1945 when Mullah Mustafa fled to Iran. (U)

The Soviet-British occupation of Iran in August 1941 provided the Kurds with the opportunity to form the only independent Kurdish state in modern times. The

Soviet zone of occupation included most of the Kurdish region of Iran; for over four years, the Kurds and the Azerbaijanis, both of whom revolted against the Iranian central government at the time of the occupation, effectively ruled themselves. In December 1945, both national groups proclaimed independent republics: the Democratic Republic of (Iranian) Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. The president of the Kurdish republic was Qazi Mohammad, who had headed the committee that had ruled the district since the 1941 uprising. Only the presence of Soviet troops prevented the Iranians from reasserting their control over the district; when the Soviets, reluctantly adhering to the terms of a treaty concluded with Iran, withdrew in May 1946, the two republics collapsed. Qazi Mohammad and a number of other leaders of the Kurdish republic were executed. Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who had taken command of the armed forces of the republic, fled to Iraq and shortly thereafter to the Soviet Union, where he remained for 11 years. (U)

The decade following the collapse of the Mahabad Republic was relatively peaceful as the governments of Iran and Turkey moved to disarm and subdue their Kurdish populations. This period of tranquility was followed in 1960 by another uprising in Turkey, where the Kurds took advantage of political instability accompanying the overthrow of the government by the Turkish armed forces to demonstrate forcibly against repressive government policies; the army, however, moved to crush the rebels. (U)

In Iraq, government refusal to meet Kurdish demands triggered a conflict that was to last with occasional cease-fires for 14 years. The return of Mullah Mustafa to Iraq from the Soviet Union shortly after Abd-al-Karim Qasim took power in July 1958 precipitated a struggle between the Barzanis and other Kurdish tribes. Although Mullah Mustafa extended his hegemony over much of the Kurdish population, Qasim, fearful that the Barzanis were becoming too powerful, began to aid traditional enemies of Mullah Mustafa. Hostilities began with government bombing of the traditional stronghold of Barzan in September 1961 in retaliation for an attack on army forces by a tribe allied with the Barzanis. (U)

Mullah Mustafa's return to Iraq also marked the beginning of a successful effort on his part to control the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the principal political organization of the Kurdish movement. Founded in 1946 in Iran from the remnants of prewar Kurdish political organizations, the party revealed in its program as well as its structure—it has a Politburo and a Central Committee—considerable Communist influence. Despite the Soviet sponsorship of the party, however, control of the party has largely remained in the hands of leaders devoted more to Kurdish independence than social revolution. (U)

In 1959, Mullah Mustafa expelled members of a pro-Communist faction from the party and moved the orientation of the party to the right. The party remained, however, essentially an urban-based organization with its greatest appeal among educated, detribalized Kurds. In 1964, more militant party leaders, including Jalal Talabani and party secretary Ibrahim Ahmad, attempted to depose Barzani as head of the party, but were forced by Barzani's tribal supporters to flee to Iran. In later years, the Iraqi Government reportedly subsidized the Talabani faction in an effort to weaken Barzani. (U)

Between 1961 and 1970, the government initiated a number of offensives against the Kurds, but none were successful in suppressing the Barzani-led forces, in large part because of Iran's willingness to aid the Kurds and to allow its territory to be used for their supply and support. Despite Iran's experience with its own Kurdish minority, the Shah perceived support for the Kurds in Iraq as a means of containing a pro-Soviet socialist neighbor. Both the Kurds and the Iraqi military, which at times had as much as 80 percent of its forces deployed against the rebels, suffered heavy losses. The military wing of the KDP, the Pesh Merga, meaning "those who face death," constituted the principal Kurdish fighting force. (U)

In 1970, conscious that the strains caused by the war in the north had brought down a series of regimes, the Baath government under Saddam Husayn concluded a peace agreement with Mullah Mustafa. The provisions of the accord between the Kurds and the central government granted Barzani and the KDP greater concessions than they had ever received. It recognized the binational character of Iraq—in effect establishing

the Kurds as free and equal partners with the Arabs—reaffirmed Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights, and provided for economic rehabilitation and development of the devastated regions of Kurdistan. Most important, the accord provided for the establishment of a self-governing region of Kurdistan. An official census was to determine those areas in which the Kurds were a majority. (U)

In the subsequent four years during which the accord was to be carried out, the two sides were unable to agree on its implementation. Disagreement over the disposition of oil-rich Kirkuk Province prevented agreement on the territorial limits of the proposed autonomous region. The Kurds accused the government of attempting to Arabize the Kurdish area by settling Arab tribes there and granting cultural rights to other minorities in order to undermine the Kurdish position in Kirkuk. Several attempts to assassinate Barzani and his sons confirmed the Kurdish belief that the government did not intend to honor the accord. (U)

An autonomy law unilaterally promulgated by the government in March 1974, which in effect would have restored the control of the central government over the Kurdish areas, was rejected by the Kurds as a violation of the 1970 accord. Fighting broke out the same month and lasted until the following year. By late 1974, however, as Iranian military units became increasingly involved in border incidents with Iraqi troops, the Shah's perception of the advantages of continued support for the Iraqi Kurds clearly began to change. It is doubtful if the Iranian leader really wanted a clear-cut Kurdish victory. His main goal was to keep the Iraqis so preoccupied that they would be unable to interfere with his policies in the Persian Gulf. He apparently came to see a Kurdish victory as a greater threat to Iranian unity and security than an Iraqi Government victory. (U)

Consequently, in March 1975 in the Algiers Accord, Iraq and Iran agreed to the demarcation of territorial and maritime borders and "the establishment of mutual security and confidence along their joint borders to put a final end to all subversive infiltration from either side." In the agreements following the Algiers Accord, Iraq made several concessions, both

territorial and political, to Iran. Iraq had long encouraged Arab and Baluchi resistance to the Shah and had laid claim to the Khuzistan Province in Iran as part of the Arab homeland. The Baathist government conceded all claims to Khuzistan and agreed to a boundary along the center of the Shatt al-Arab. It also acceded to other territorial border arrangements long sought by Iran. Iran, in turn, stopped aiding the Kurds. In return for its concessions, Iraq was able to reach an agreement with Iran ending the Kurdish revolt and the threat of foreign intervention. (U)

Since the end of the fighting in March 1975, Iraqi military vigilance and a program of economic incentives to the Kurdish minority have kept the level of antigovernment activities to a minimum, although some incidents and attempts to assassinate Kurds who have cooperated with the government have occurred. Between 90,000 and 250,000 Kurds fled to Iran after the Kurdish front collapsed, but by the end of 1975, the majority of the refugees had taken advantage of an amnesty to return to Iraq. Although Barzani left Iraq for exile in the United States, where he died in March 1979, his sons Idris and Masud have sought to assume leadership of the KDP. (S NF)

Attempts by Kurdish nationalists in Iran to take advantage of the fall of the Shah in early 1979 resulted in a number of clashes with government forces, with some areas in Iranian Kurdistan remaining under effective Kurdish control. At the same time, the revival of Kurdish dissident activities in Iran has contributed to an increase in Kurdish nationalist sentiment and activities in Turkey. Some escalation of dissident activity was evident in Iraq's Kurdish provinces in mid-1979, with small clashes occurring frequently between Iraqi army patrols and Kurdish guerrillas, but there was no major increase in fighting. (S NF)

The Kurdish Problem and Government Policy

The area traditionally known as Kurdistan includes territory in five states: Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and the USSR. An examination of the policies of these countries toward their Kurdish minorities and the Kurds throughout the area follows. (U)

Iran

From the late 1940s until early 1978, the Shah's government was able to keep the Kurds in Iran relatively quiet by maintaining a large-scale military presence in the Kurdish area, selectively arming Kurds loyal to the government, exiling tribal leaders suspected of antigovernment activities, and increasing economic development and educational programs in the Kurdish area. Kurds who advocated Iranian nationalism as opposed to Kurdish rights were among the most prominent supporters of Prime Minister Mossadeq in the early 1950s; under the Shah, an increasing number of Kurds came to see their future linked to that of Iran. (U)

The more than 40 Kurdish tribes and confederations in Iran have a strong and continuing tradition of disunity and fighting among themselves, and there is no single leader to whom a majority of the tribes give allegiance. Land reform, which tends to weaken the authority of tribal leaders, has been applied more rapidly and effectively in the northwest than in any other area of Iran, although some tribal leaders thought to be loyal to the government have been allowed to retain large holdings. In addition, the movement of many younger, better educated, and more ambitious Kurds to the cities has reduced the number of potential leaders and linked the welfare of a growing number of families to Iran proper. (U)

Kurdish antigovernment activity in the year before the collapse of the Shah's regime was probably motivated largely by the same sentiments that stimulated opponents of the government throughout the country, although resentment over anti-Kurdish actions by the government may have strengthened those feelings. Many Kurds, including some who felt little sympathy for the Kurdish revolt against the Iraqi Government,

felt a sense of betrayal over the Shah's 1975 agreement with Baghdad ending support for the Iraqi Kurds. This resentment was heightened by the "pacification operations" subsequently undertaken by the Army against the Kurds along the Iraq-Iran border. Strongly desiring increased autonomy and possessing established guerrilla groups, the Kurds were able to take advantage of the weakening central control more quickly than other ethnic groups. (S NF)

Government Policies and Attitudes. When Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan took office in February 1979, he found that a loose federation of well-armed Kurdish tribal, religious, and political leaders, backed by guerrilla forces and army deserters, had assumed control in much of the area of the northwest where Kurds predominate. Tensions quickly rose, and several violent incidents occurred as Kurdish factional leaders, government representatives, and local pro-Khomeini leaders maneuvered for position. (U)

Government and religious officials appeared to throw their support behind a prominent citizen of Sanandaj, Ahmad Moftizadeh, naming him in April the Kurd's "sole religious and political leader." They also apparently expected that Shia Kurdish religious and political leaders could take charge in their own localities, but several of the Shia dignitaries reportedly fled the area after clashes with dissident Sunni Kurds. (S NF NC OC)

The government, fearing an open rebellion by Kurdish dissidents heavily armed with captured military equipment, sent delegations to persuade the Kurds to accept a compromise. Although their promises that the area would be granted substantial autonomy in the new Islamic republic helped to calm the situation, tension remained high. Relatively minor incidents sparked five days of bloody fighting between government troops and Kurdish irregulars in March at Sanandaj and clashes between Kurds and Khomeini supporters at Naqadeh in West Azerbaijan Province in late April. In mid-1979, Khomeini supporters and security forces were still contending with Kurdish leaders for control of the local governments and population in the area. The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), in particular, seemed to be aggressively trying to expand its influence and membership—sometimes by force—in order to establish its preeminence in as much of the Kurdish area as possible. (S NF)

The Bazargan government's policy toward the Kurds reflects Tehran's limited ability to project its authority. The government seems to be playing for time with its offers to negotiate and assertions that the new constitution and new laws will provide substantial autonomy. Official spokesmen have stated several times, moreover, that instruction in the Kurdish language and customs will be allowed in the schools and that the use of Kurdish in radio, television, and the press will also be permitted. The draft constitution, published on 15 June, provides for local councils to govern "each village, district, town, city, or province." (S NF)

Political and religious leaders fear that the Kurdish autonomy movement encourages other Iranian minorities to agitate for equal treatment that could cause the breakup of the state, and they have tried to limit the KDP's growth by hindering its expansion into areas of mixed population, trying to deny full political status to its leadership, and apparently arming anti-KDP or neutral inhabitants of Kurdish areas. (S NF NC OC)

Kurdish Attitudes, Groups, and Leaders. Most Kurdish leaders seem cynical about the government's promises and realize that the central government will eventually have to use force to try to reestablish its full authority. Kurdish spokesmen assert that they do not want independence and prefer to achieve their goals peacefully, but say the Kurds will fight for their rights if necessary. Kurdish demands, made public at a rally on 2 March, include:

- Control of an area determined by "historic, economic, and geographic" considerations and decided by a referendum. This would include Kordestan Province and large parts of neighboring provinces.
- A popularly elected Kurdish regional parliament and local control of all government, law enforcement, and military units.
- Use of Kurdish in the schools and as the autonomous area's official language.
- Guaranteed freedom of speech, press, association, travel, employment, and unionization. (S NF NC OC)

In an interview before a meeting with Khomeini in mid-May, Kurdish Sunni leader Sheikh Ez-ed-Din Hoseini¹ seemed to reduce Kurdish demands for control of cultural activity and local economic affairs, official use of Kurdish, and free'om to choose their own "political line." He specifically renounced the demand for control of the armed forces in the area—a point the government could not have conceded. It is not known if the press account of his remarks was accurate or if other Kurdish leaders would accept his modified position; all seem to agree, however, that foreign affairs, national defense, finance, and major economic planning—that is, economic grants for development in Kurdistan—should be under central government control. (S NF NC OC)

Numerous leaders and political groups recently have come forward to speak for the Kurds. The KDP has been the most active in espousing Kurdish demands, but the extent of its grass-roots organization or support is unknown. The party in Iran is only loosely related to the KDP in Iraq, which was the principal political organization of the Kurdish rebellion led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani. The party was illegal under the Shah, but had a following among students in the United States and Europe. Only since the overthrow of the Shah has the party become a viable political organization in Iran. (S NF NC OC)

Most party leaders seem to be leftists who returned from exile in the last days of the monarchy. Party Secretary General Abdol Rahman Qasemlu,² who lived outside Iran for 25 years, has been the most prominent. He claims that the KDP represents a consensus of Kurdish sentiments and has said that negotiations with the government have been necessary to obtain autonomy guarantees in the new Islamic constitution. Qasemlu reportedly has been criticized both because he seems to have changed his allegiance many times and because he has been willing to negotiate with the government and religious leaders whom many Kurds believe are determined to thwart Kurdish demands. Qasemlu lived in Czechoslovakia for a number of years and has had close ties to the Iranian Tudeh (Communist) Party. (S NF NC OC)

¹ See biographic appendix.

² See biographic appendix.

Sheikh Ez-ed-Din Hoseini, the principal Sunni cleric in Mahabad, the capital of the short-lived Kurdish republic, appears to be the most popular and influential Kurdish religious figure. He has led several efforts to negotiate with the principal religious and political leaders of the revolutionary government, although he is deeply suspicious of Khomeini and his intentions. In mid-May 1979, Hoseini and other Kurdish clerics met with Khomeini, whom Hoseini described as not "indifferent" to Kurdish autonomy, and with Ayatollah Talegani, who negotiated a settlement between dissident Kurds and pro-Khomeini forces earlier this year. (C)

As of mid-1979, Kurdish leaders and their followers were actively protesting the text of the new Constitution and the process by which it would be approved. The Kurds—like other minorities—believe that the constitutional provisions for regional autonomy and respect for Sunni Muslims are too weak. Hoseini has said the Constitution's provisions for minorities are "old concepts with new names" and that its specification that Shia Islam is the state religion is "certain to provoke sectarian conflict." Ahmad Moftizadeh, the government's designated Kurdish leader, has also criticized the text of the draft Constitution and has called for the elimination of its reference to Shia Islam as the state religion. Moftizadeh and Hoseini have issued a joint protest calling for an Islamic republic without reference to sects and for minority representation on the council that will review the constitutionality of all new laws. (C)

Cooperation With Neighboring Kurds. Dissident Iraqi and Iranian Kurds have a long history of cooperation. KDP Secretary General Qasemlu has had close ties to the Iraqi Communist Party, which has a large Kurdish membership. (C)

Two rival Iraqi Kurdish guerrilla groups, led by Jalal Talabani and the sons of the late Mullah Mustafa Barzani, also command the loyalty of some Kurds in Iran. KDP Secretary General Qasemlu is reported to be trying to mediate between the two rival guerrilla groups and has tried to ally both with the KDP. There is

also some evidence that the new government in Tehran has attempted to develop ties with the Barzani brothers. At about the same time, Qasemlu was said to be trying, apparently without success, to negotiate an alliance with the Barzani forces, which seem uninterested in supporting the political ambitions of Qasemlu or the KDP in Iran. A number of reports suggest that Talabani may be cooperating with the KDP, but the Iranians' loose use of the term Pesh Merga often makes it difficult to determine whether the guerrilla units being discussed are the followers of Talabani or are other armed Kurds. It is certain, however, that Talabani and KDP leaders are discussing joint or parallel activities. (S NF NC OC)

Widespread rumors, believed by the Iranian Government, assert that another guerrilla band, including some Jafs, and allegedly led by Lt. Gen. Azizollah Palizban, a Kurd who was a longtime chief of military intelligence under the Shah, has been active against local government and pro-Khomeini representatives in the west and northwest. Many of the incidents attributed to this band, however, may have been the work of bandits. (S NF)

Various sources have claimed that each of the three guerrilla bands and the KDP have a disciplined core in Iran numbering from a few hundred to several thousand. These claims cannot be confirmed, but most Kurdish groups do include well-armed, sizable, but undisciplined elements that would turn out to defend their own territory against government forces. (S NF)

Weapons captured by security forces in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey have shown that there is still a thriving arms trade among the Kurds across the three borders. Kurdish dissidents recognize that they will be strengthened if they can establish a secure base area, and to a certain extent the Iranian border area is now serving such a function for activity in both Iraq and Turkey as well as Iran. (S NF)

Iraq

Relations between the Kurds of Iraq and the Arab-controlled central government in Baghdad have been shaped by years of conflict and by a deep-seated Kurdish distrust of Baathist schemes for Arab unity, which they regard as detrimental to their own aspirations. Although the Kurds have taken advantage of periods of weakened central authority and promises of outside assistance to stage several revolts against the government, for the most part they have not sought independence from Iraq; rather they have fought for equal rights with the Arabs and self-rule within a single Iraqi state. When Kurdish hopes for autonomy and equality were quashed by Qasim following the 1958 revolution, they began 14 years of intermittent revolt. Failure to end that conflict contributed to the fall of three Iraqi governments in the 1960s. (U)

Kurdish ambitions came closest to fulfillment in 1970 when the Baathist government under Saddam Husayn signed an accord with Mullah Mustafa Barzani recognizing the national rights of the Kurdish people and granting them regional autonomy. Kurdish was to be the official language in the Kurdish autonomous region, and Kurdish educational institutions, including a university at Sulaymaniyah, were to be established. Kurds were to be appointed to posts in the military, the police, and the universities in proportion to their number in the general population. The KDP was officially recognized, and the Baathist government promised to appoint a Kurd vice president of the republic. Barzani was permitted to retain his heavy arms, while the government promised to pay his Pesh Merga troops, who had fought the rebellion, to act as a frontier force. (C)


The Baathist government, in power only two years and in need of internal security and stability, had made major concessions to Kurdish aspirations. Barzani gained control of more territory than he had ever held, a Kurdish newspaper and radio station began operation, and the Pesh Merga remained armed and intact. Over the next four years, however, relations between the central government and Mullah Mustafa deteriorated as the Baathists consolidated their control of the government and as the Kurds escalated their demands for territory and oil revenues. (C)

Iraq: Kurdish Areas



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Secret



resh Mersa troops surrendering to Iraqi Army in April 1975

The renewal of fighting in March 1974 was probably inevitable. The government was unwilling to grant the Kurds economic and political privileges that it denied the rest of Iraq's population. Of particular importance was the government's refusal to conduct a census in Kirkuk to determine the ethnic makeup of the city. The autonomy plan put forth by the Baathist government in March 1974 granted nominal self-rule to the three provinces where the Kurds constituted a majority, but in reality gave the Kurds only a semblance of self-rule. The members of the executive and legislative councils established by the autonomy law were chosen by the government. The progovernment Kurds who were appointed as Cabinet members and as vice president were careful not to test the extent of their authority. In March 1975, the 14-year rebellion of the Iraqi Kurds against the government was effectively ended by the Algiers Accord between Iraq and Iran, which destroyed the ability of the Kurds to resist government efforts to pacify the Kurdish area. (C)

Government Policies and Attitudes. The Baathists are determined to deny the Kurds the opportunity to regain the capacity for independent action. As of mid-1979, the government maintained a significant military presence in the north, while at the same time it was allocating large sums for the economic and social development of the region. (C)

Baghdad keeps five of its 11 Army divisions in the northern provinces, as well as 50,000 police, border guard, and reserve brigadish personnel. Military control in the traditionally Kurdish region is thorough and sometimes oppressive, especially in areas near the Turkish and Iranian borders. The Army maintains a highly visible presence with armed camps and outposts on the hilltops and soldiers in the towns. A 20-kilometer security zone has been created along the border with Iran and Turkey in which the regime has destroyed villages and forcibly relocated large numbers of villagers to less sensitive areas in the north. In areas away from the border regions and outside the difficult mountain terrain, the Iraqi military presence is more discreet, and village life appears to be normal. (S NF)

Iraq became increasingly concerned in the spring of 1979 about the possible resurgence of dissident activity following reports of Kurdish unrest in Iran and Turkey. Through November 1978, Iraq and Iran had conducted joint military operations aimed at pacification of the border. Baghdad's concern about the increased availability of arms in the area, the lack of border controls in Iran, and "hot pursuit" of Kurdish insurgents led to the overflight of Iran's border and bombing of Iranian villages in June. (S NF)



Housing built by Iraqi Government at Sulaymaniyah for relocated Kurds.

Unclassified (C)

The government has tempered its threats to use military force and other repressive tactics with offers of amnesty and promises of generous economic and agrarian reform. In December 1977, in an act clearly aimed at the Kurds, the government announced an amnesty for all political exiles living abroad. In March 1979 an unknown number of Kurds who had fled to Iran in 1975 were allowed to return. Most of the Kurds resettled in the south after the end of the civil war have been permitted to return north, although not to their traditional villages. Instead, they are being "encouraged" to settle in small groups in newly constructed reservations scattered throughout the north. Families of missing Pesh Merga fighters or suspected saboteurs apparently remain in enforced exile either in the south of Iraq or in Iran. (C)

The government also is making a massive economic investment in the north. Following a trip by Saddam Husayn to Sulaymaniyah and Irbil in late March, the government announced that 30 percent of the 1979 development budget—or more than \$3 billion—would be spent on programs in the three Kurdish provinces. The largest share of the money, 30 percent, will be allocated for the improvement of transportation and communications, necessary for military operations as well as civilian use. Education received the smallest allocation, only 5 percent. Baghdad also has been

promoting tourism in the region and building extensive resort facilities, hoping eventually to tie Kurdish economic interests to tourism and continued stability. (C)

Baghdad has tried over the past several years to contact representatives of the Barzani and Talabani factions in order to negotiate a reconciliation. The Kurdish terms, however, are unacceptable to the government. These usually include demands for an expanded autonomous area to include Kirkuk and its oilfields; the withdrawal of government forces from the autonomous region and the assumption of security functions by the Pesh Merga; and the dismissal of all present government-appointed Kurdish members of the executive and legislative councils, to be replaced by elected representatives. (S NF)

Kurdish nationalists were concerned last year by the government's decision that 40 percent of all instruction in Kurdish schools, excluding language training, be given in Arabic. Although Baghdad argued that the purpose of the reform was to develop a balanced educational program, Kurdish nationalists saw the move as a further attempt by Baghdad to Arabize the Kurdish homeland. (S NF)



Children studying the Kurdish language in an outdoor classroom northern Iraq.

Although some escalation of guerrilla activity was evident in early 1979 and small clashes were occurring almost daily in mid-1979 between Iraqi Army patrols and Kurdish guerrillas, there was no major upsurge of dissident activity. Continued guerrilla activity, however, has exacerbated government fears of outside meddling. Kurdish guerrillas mount hit-and-run operations against isolated Army units, but fighting between the various Kurdish factions, difficulty in maintaining supply routes, and intense government military pressure have weakened their ability to strike effectively at government forces. The freedom of action the Kurds have acquired in Iran and their access to large stocks of weapons seized from Iranian Army garrisons could pose problems for Baghdad in the future. (s)

Kurdish Organizations and Leaders. As of mid-1979, the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq was in disarray—its leaders in exile, its factions badly split, its organizations virtually nonexistent. Attempts by rival leaders to patch over their differences and form a common front against the Iraqi Government have failed. Instead, factions loyal to the Barzani family and those loyal to Jalal Talabani continue to accuse each other of signing secret agreements with Baghdad or Tehran aimed at the liquidation of the other. (s)

Events in Iran and the death of Mullah Mustafa Barzani apparently have done little to improve relations between the disparate Kurdish factions. Barzani had been discredited to some extent by the loss of the civil war and by revelations of aid from US, Israeli, and Iranian intelligence services. In exile in the United States since 1975, he had only minimal contact with his former Pesh Merga fighters and the KDP. Before his death in 1979, Barzani apparently recognized that the Kurds had few options and was considering easing his demands. (s)

Several contenders are vying to replace Barzani. His sons Masud and Idris claim leadership of what remains of the KDP and of the exile communities in Iran and Europe. Masud, the youngest son of Mullah Mustafa, is a member of the KDP's provisional leadership and at one time reportedly favored coming to terms with the Iraqi Government. Masud appears to be the military commander of the Barzani faction, traveling frequently between Syria, Iraq and Iran, while Idris acts as the political negotiator in Tehran. Both Barzanis rely on traditional tribal ties as their base of support. (s)

A second major challenger for leadership of the Iraqi Kurds is Jalal Talabani, once a member of the KDP and a longtime rival of Mullah Mustafa. Talabani was based in Damascus until the Iraqi-Syrian reconciliation talks began and over the years has received Syrian, Libyan, and allegedly Soviet aid for his forays into Iraq. The differences between the Barzanis and the 46-year-old Talabani are more tactical than ideological. Talabani has the image of being leftwing in comparison to the Barzanis' current pro-Western identification, but these labels are not very meaningful in the Kurdish context. Talabani, who advocates the use of terrorism, maintains contact with Palestinian rejectionist leader George Habbash and was probably responsible for the abduction of French and Polish workers in northern Iraq in late 1977, and the assassination of pro-Baghdad Kurdish officials in 1977. Talabani's followers may also have attempted to assassinate Iraqi Interior Minister and Revolutionary Command Council member Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri in Sulaymaniyah in early June 1979. (S NF)

Talabani and the Barzanis have made several attempts at unifying their forces to fight the common Iraqi enemy, but these efforts have all failed. In March 1977 Talabani and Masud Barzani signed an agreement pledging to join forces. Orchestrated by the Syrians and entered into reluctantly by the Barzanis, the agreement was never implemented. The Barzanis objected in particular to Talabani's penchant for urban terrorism. Within six months, the two factions were fighting each other again. (S)

A third contender for the leadership of the Iraqi Kurds Muhammad Mahmud Abd al-Rahman --has emerged in the past several months and appears to be making a bid for leadership of Kurdish dissidents. Known as Sami, Abd al-Rahman was a member of the Iraqi Communist Party in the 1950s but became an influential member of the KDP in the 1960s. He apparently was trusted by Mullah Mustafa and represented him in negotiations both with the Iraqi government and with Talabani. Abd al-Rahman was one of the five pro-Barzani Kurds appointed to the Iraqi Cabinet following the 1970 armistice, and served as Minister for Northern Affairs until fighting broke out again in 1974. He is described as the head of the Provisional Command, a small group of former KDP loyalists. (C)

As of mid-1979, little information is available on the size of Kurdish dissident forces. Talabani may have 2,000 to 3,000 armed adherents, while the Barzanis' claim of 10,000 armed supporters is probably exaggerated. Abd al-Rahman probably has no more than 500 to 1,000 supporters. Although the Barzani forces appeared to be the more effective of the factions, Talabani was increasingly active in Iran and Iraq in early 1979. All factions claim they could turn out thousands more fighters if sufficient arms were available. (S NF)

Turkey

In the early days of the Turkish Republic, the government responded to Kurdish protests against Ataturk's modernizing and centralizing reforms by ruthlessly suppressing all antigovernment activity and by attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to eliminate all manifestations of Kurdish culture and nationalism. With the advent of a multiparty democracy in the late 1940s, however, the government adopted a policy of attempting to co-opt the Kurdish minority. Since then, Kurdish leaders, particularly the wealthy landlords and religious leaders, have been recruited into the ruling elite. Ferit Melen, an interim prime minister in the early 1970s; Deputy Prime Minister Hikmet Cetin,* one of Ecevit's close advisers; and Kamran Inan,† until recently the number two man in the opposition Justice Party, are Kurds. As of mid-1979, the legislature included about 35 Kurdish deputies, led by independent Minister of Public Works Serafettin Elci; this group generally supports Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. (S)

The resurgence of Kurdish separatist sentiment in Iran and persistent Kurdish unrest in Iraq have helped to revive fears among Turkey's leaders that Turkish Kurds may follow suit. Even limited Kurdish unrest while the country is beset by deepening economic and internal security crises, might pose a test for the Ecevit government and for Turkey's democratic institutions. (S)

* See biographic appendix.

† See biographic appendix.

Turkey: Kurdish Areas



Government Policies and Attitudes. Ankara's concern over the Kurdish problem has been highlighted by a number of developments:

- Regular and gendarmerie troops in the east and southeast have been reinforced.
- Prime Minister Ecevit has privately expressed growing concern about Kurdish unrest and the possibility of foreign involvement.
- General Staff Chief Kenan Evren and Deputy Prime Minister Cetin visited Iraq in April to discuss the Kurdish issue. Iraq, plagued more acutely with Kurdish restlessness, offered to sell Turkey oil on easy credit terms if Ankara would try to prevent armed Iraqi Kurdish bands from seeking sanctuary on Turkey's side of the border. (S NF NC OC)

Although this concern has been heightened by increased communication and arms smuggling between Turkish Kurds and Kurds in adjacent countries, it stems primarily from a history of conflict with the Kurdish minority that has often threatened the integrity of the state. In that sense, Turkish fears may be out of proportion to the actual threat posed by the Kurds. (S NF OC)

Ankara's efforts to assure the loyalty of individual Kurds have not been matched by any comparable development effort in the Kurdish region. Although data are sketchy, one Turkish publication claims that the eastern provinces have received only 10 percent of state industrial investment and only 2 percent of all commercial investments. Public services such as hospitals and education facilities are thinly spread among the larger cities. Unemployment is above the national average of 20 percent, illiteracy in Turkish among Kurds is 80 percent, and such amenities as electricity, piped water, and passable roads are lacking in more than half the villages. Although this neglect can be explained in large part by the remote and inhospitable nature of the Kurdish region, it is also attributable to the continued hostility between Turks and Kurds. Educated Turks are reluctant to live and work in such "alien" rural areas. The most conspicuous symbol of the Turkish Government, the Army, has at times been viewed by the Kurds as a "colonial" occupation force. (S)

The taboo against public and official discussion of the sensitive Kurdish issue has dissipated in the past few years. Newspapers, perhaps spurred by events in Iran, have been less hesitant to acknowledge that Kurds exist and to discuss their living conditions. At the height of public concern about Kurdish separatism last April, six ministers took the unprecedented step of accusing Minister of Public Works Serafettin Elci of having Communist sympathies and stacking his Ministry with Kurds. Elci created a public controversy when he openly declared himself a Kurd in a heated exchange with a reporter. Responding to press allegations, Elci insisted that acknowledging the existence of Kurds in Turkey was not tantamount to promoting separatism. (C)

Persistence of Kurdish Separatism. The Kurds' sense of separate identity has not been significantly reduced by the government's attempts to co-opt or suppress them. The Kurdish language has flourished, and clandestinely published Kurdish literature is surreptitiously obtainable in Kurdish areas. Kurdish leaders, fearing that development and modernization would undermine the highly traditional social structure and thereby their own positions, have often been unreceptive to Ankara's efforts to extend aid to the Kurdish regions. Kurdish notables reportedly often deliver the votes of their followers to politicians in return for pledges of noninterference in local affairs. Urbanization is taking place, however, and it has somewhat weakened to some extent the hold of traditional leaders. Nationalist Kurdish sentiment now seems strongest among politicized urban Kurdish youth, many of whom are educated. (S)

In the past several years, several overt "cultural associations" and covert liberation groups have formed to promote the idea of Kurdish autonomy and independence. The appearance of these groups broadly parallels the growth of Turkish radical leftist student groups that appeared in the late 1960s. These radicals often included demands for greater Kurdish autonomy in their programs, and until the Kurds began to form their own associations, Kurds were prominent in these

organizations. Mahir Cayan, the most prominent martyr of the Turkish left after he was killed by government forces in 1972, was a Kurd. Because avowedly Kurdish organizations are still illegal, the overt radical groups feature nonethnic names such as the Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Association. They insist that they are interested mainly in social progress and Turkish recognition of long-denied Kurdish cultural rights. The clandestine groups, on the other hand, employ a mixture of leftist and nationalist rhetoric and call for autonomy or independence. Two of the more important covert groups are KAWA (the name of a legendary Iranian and Kurdish hero) and KUK (Kurdish National Liberation). The overt and clandestine groups undoubtedly interact to some degree, and there are indications that they may still cooperate with some Turkish extreme leftists. (S)

The driving forces for Kurdish nationalism, however, suffer from the same factionalism that has weakened their Turkish counterparts. The cultural associations have small memberships, and the illegal groups, though dominated by urbanized young Kurds, do not seem popular even in the larger eastern towns. This probably results from a generation and cultural gap between youthful, educated Kurds and the more conservative and tradition-bound majority led by coopted elites. The activist groups themselves, moreover, have long quarreled over whether to remain separate from other Turkish radical groups and seek independence or to cooperate with the Turkish proletariat in its "battle against capitalism" as a means of ultimately achieving Kurdish autonomy within a Turkish state. (S)

Although very little information is available on relations between the Turkish Kurds and Kurds outside Turkey, Kurds in Turkey have shown little inclination to collaborate politically with their Kurdish neighbors in Iran and Iraq. Tribal loyalties appear to be more important than ethnic ties. The warring Talabani and Barzani factions in Iraq, for example, have been aided by some Turkish Kurds and opposed by others during their skirmishes in Turkish border areas. Language differences may partly explain this lack of cooperation. Although approximately half of all Kurds speak the Kurmanji dialect, in Turkey only the Kurds of Hakkari Province speak this dialect. (S)


Syria

Relations between the Syrian Government and the Kurdish minority have not been marked by the hostility and conflict that have characterized relations between the Kurds and the Governments of Iraq and Iran. Since Syria was granted its independence by France in 1946, there has been little significant antigovernment activity involving the Kurds. Nonetheless, Syrian authorities have feared that unrest among Kurds elsewhere could spread to Syria. During times of major Kurdish unrest in Iraq, for example, Damascus has kept close watch on its own Kurds. Moreover, from time to time, Kurdish nationalist leaders have been arrested in government moves against the Communists. The government's sensitivity to Kurdish involvement in Communist activities is not altogether unfounded since the founder and leader of the pro-Soviet, legal Syrian Communist Party (SCP) Khalid Bakdash, is a Kurd, and the SCP has long recruited heavily from the Kurdish minority. (U)

In recent years, the Kurdish minority has participated relatively actively in Syrian politics. Some of Syria's most distinguished leaders have been Kurds, including two past Presidents, Husni al-Za'im and Abid al-Shishakli. Under President Assad, himself a member of the Alawite minority, the status of most minority groups in Syria generally has been quite good. (U)

Most Syrian Kurds are distrustful of central authority and their loyalty to their tribe is probably stronger than their loyalty either to the Syrian state or to a Kurdish nation. Relatively peaceful residence in Syria and gradual assimilation, however, have mitigated their distrust of the Syrian authorities. Damascus, moreover, has encouraged Arab settlement in the northeast to weaken the Kurdish hold on the area. In the last two years, however, there has been a significant influx of Kurds into northern Syria from Iraq. These Kurds are less assimilated than those long resident in Syria. (CONF)

Syria: Kurdish Areas



We have no evidence of organized Kurdish separatist activity in Syria. The KDP has been banned in Syria for several years. One source reported in early 1979 that the influx of Kurds from Iraq was exacerbating Arab-Kurdish tensions in the northeast, but there is no sign that the problem has become serious. There are no local Kurdish parties or any prominent Kurdish political leaders who espouse Kurdish nationalism in Syria. (C NF)

Before the October 1978 Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement, Syria provided support to dissident Kurds in Iraq led by Jalal Talabani. Talabani received arms and his followers were trained at bases in northeastern Syria. After the conclusion of the Charter for Joint National Action between Syria and Iraq in late 1978, Syria's support for Talabani ceased, and he was expelled from Syria. Although the Syrians probably can still contact Talabani if they should desire to renew the relationship, there is no indication they are currently providing support to Kurdish dissidents in either Iraq, Turkey, or Iran. There is also no indication that Syrian Kurds acting independently of the government are supporting their compatriots. (C)

USSR

Attitudes and Policies Toward Kurds in Neighboring States. The possibility of Soviet manipulation of their Kurdish minorities has been a matter of serious concern for the Governments of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. The Soviets would certainly like to make use of the Kurds in neighboring states to advance their own objectives in the area—specifically to put pressure on regimes that have adopted anti-Soviet positions. Soviet inclinations to directly support Kurdish minorities in other countries, however, are inhibited by a desire not to push these states too far and thus risk serious damage to bilateral relations. Funneling assistance indirectly to Kurdish minorities through third parties, however, is a tempting and very real option for the Soviets. (S)

In Iran, the Soviets have sought to advance their relations with the Khomeini-backed regime in order to preserve their economic assets there, encourage continuation of the government's anti-US policies, and prevent repression of leftist elements within the country, especially those that are pro-Soviet. At the same time, they would like to encourage the emergence

of a more pro-Soviet regime. As part of a long-term effort to undermine the government and promote leftist prospects, they have supported the Tudeh Party's efforts to construct a united front of all leftist parties and to infiltrate Khomeini's forces. It is worth noting in this regard that KDP Secretary General Qasemlu has longstanding ties to the Tudeh Party. He was a Tudeh activist during the Mosadeq era and remained active in party affairs while in exile. (S NF NC OC)

Because they hope to see a more pro-Soviet government emerge in Iran if the current regime is unable to prevent the situation, the Soviets have an interest in preventing the regime from stabilizing the country. For this reason, the disruptive activities of Iranian minorities, including the Kurds, complement Soviet interests. (S NF NC OC)

Before the fall of the Shah, there had been little indication of Soviet involvement with the Kurdish movement within Iran in recent years—presumably reflecting the Soviet perception that the government's control of the Kurds was virtually complete and that efforts to meddle would antagonize the Shah. With the upsurge in activity among Iran's Kurds in recent months, facilitated by the breakdown in Iranian control of movement in the border areas, the Soviets have probably been tempted to play a more active role. (C)

Through their clandestine radio in Baku, the National Voice of Iran, the Soviets have expressed their support for Kurdish demands for autonomy within the framework of the Iranian nation.¹ According to one source, the Soviets have also encouraged contacts between the Tudeh Party, the Communist Party of Iraq, and the Talabani Kurdish faction. The source stated that Tudeh had offered to support Talabani in a guerrilla war against the central government; he indicated that although the offers of cooperation had thus far been rejected by Talabani, Tudeh leaders were optimistic

¹ The Soviets make a clear distinction between the "legitimate" desires of minority groups for local autonomy and what they term "imperialist-backed separatist" demands. This reflects their own claims to have granted such autonomy to many of their minorities as well as a desire not to provide any opening to these groups to make separatist claims. (C)

that the latter, while not a Communist, might eventually accept assistance for pragmatic reasons. (S NF NC OC)

There is no convincing evidence of direct Soviet material support for the Kurdish movement in Iran, although there have been unconfirmed allegations that such assistance was being offered or provided. The absence of confirmation does not mean that the Soviets are not materially backing the movement, given the difficulty of obtaining such evidence in the isolated border areas involved. It is likely, however, that the Soviets are reluctant to become directly involved in any large-scale supportive efforts, given the effect discovery of such activities would have on relations with the central government. At the same time, they would probably condone the funneling of Soviet arms to the Kurds by third parties; such a policy would enable them both to deny involvement and to indirectly sustain destabilizing activities within Iran. (S NF)

In Iraq, Soviet support for the Kurdish cause has fluctuated over the years in inverse relation to Soviet success in courting the central government in Baghdad. During the early 1960s, Moscow vigorously supported Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. And, in the early 1970s, the Soviets tried to mediate between the Kurds and the Baathist regime with which they were building close ties. With the collapse of negotiations between the Kurds and the Baathist regime in 1974 and the renewal of fighting, the Soviets gave their full support to Baghdad. This decision was made at a time when the USSR saw its overall position in the Middle East deteriorating: Egypt had turned to the United States, and other Arab states (including Iraq) were increasingly oriented economically toward the West. The Soviets, clearly anxious not to lose Iraq's friendship and eager to sell arms for hard currency, presumably had little difficulty making the choice. (U)

Since the Algiers Accord of March 1975, which effectively ended the Kurdish war in Iraq, Soviet-Iraqi relations have deteriorated steadily, although the mutually beneficial arms relationship has been maintained. The Soviets have resented Iraq's improved relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia and have been unhappy about Iraq's turn to the West for arms as well as civilian technology. In addition, they have been frustrated by the Baathist disregard for and repression

of the Communist Party of Iraq. Their increasing dissatisfaction reportedly made the Soviets receptive when Talabani sought assistance in mid-1978. (S NF NC OC)

According to one source, Talabani turned to the Soviets in mid-1978 because the Syrians, who had been backing him, had stopped their support in order to improve relations with Iraq. The source reported that both the Soviets and Syrians subsequently provided assistance to Talabani and encouraged him to seek reconciliation with other Kurdish factions in northwest Iraq. Several other reports indicate that the Soviets were sympathetic to Talabani's efforts in 1978 and that they encouraged the Iraq Communist Party to establish contacts with Kurdish elements with the objective of overthrowing the Baathist regime. There is, however, no confirming evidence that the Soviets actually furnished such assistance. (S NF NC OC)

While reports that the Soviets were backing Talabani may be unfounded, Iraqi leaders apparently believed them. In a June 1979 conversation, Saddam Husayn expressed concern that Talabani's group was under the control of the USSR, which was trying to use a "neighboring state" (Syria) to foment trouble in the region. This comment was in contrast to his statement in late 1977 that the Soviets did not at that time appear to be involved with the Kurds. This Iraqi perception has undoubtedly contributed to Iraq's growing anti-Sovietism and its repression of the Iraq Communist Party. (S NF NC OC)

There have been no reports of Soviet involvement with Kurdish elements in Iraq since mid-1978. This may be because the focus of Kurdish activities has shifted to Iran, where there are new opportunities. It may also reflect Soviet sensitivity to the damage already done to relations with Iraq and a desire not to foster further strains or provoke increased repression of Iraqi Communists. (S)

In Turkey, direct Soviet involvement in the Kurdish movement is precluded by Moscow's desire to maintain good relations with Ankara. Early this year, an advocate of the Kurdish Shia cause was rebuffed by both the Soviet and Bulgarian Embassies in Ankara in

his search for support. A Soviet Embassy officer explained to him that the USSR feared jeopardizing its primary goals of expanding trade with Turkey and unifying the Turkish left behind a pro-Moscow line. (c)

Turkish Government officials maintain, nevertheless, that the Soviets are providing Kurdish dissidents with arms, military training, and financial assistance. They claim that caches of Soviet-made weapons have been discovered in eastern Turkey and that arms are being smuggled across the Syrian, Iranian, and Soviet borders. Undetected border crossings from the USSR into Turkey could be accomplished fairly easily. In early 1979, Turkish intelligence reported that a Kurdish tribal leader had undergone insurgency training in the USSR and was to be infiltrated into southeastern Turkey via Iran. (S NF)

In the absence of reliable evidence, we cannot confirm that Moscow is providing direct support to the Turkish Kurds. Nevertheless, Moscow no doubt wants to avoid alienating any political groupings with which it might have to deal in the future. A Soviet military attache in Ankara recently stated to his US counterpart that Kurdish aspirations were for "equality and local autonomy" rather than nationhood, and that the USSR would show its "spiritual" support for the Kurdish movement. (C NF)

Policy Toward Kurds in the Soviet Union. The small number of Kurds in the USSR, estimated at 100,000 in 1979 or less than 5 percent of the total Kurdish population, provides a basis for the Soviet claim to an interest in the Kurdish question. Most of the Soviet Kurds live in scattered communities in the Transcaucasus, and many, particularly those in cities, are gradually becoming integrated into the dominant cultures of the region. (u)

The vast majority of Soviet Kurds speak Kurdish as their native language, but knowledge of Russian and other languages of the area is becoming widespread. In Azerbaïdzhani, for instance, the older generations speak Kurdish, but the younger people increasingly speak only Azerbaïdzhani or Russian. The most concentrated settlements of Kurds are in Armenia, and here the Kurds have preserved their traditional way of life and Kurdish cultural traditions are strong. (u)

The Soviet Kurds enjoy the use of a comparatively large number of cultural institutions, reflecting the importance the Soviet regime attaches to its Kurdish minority as a potential foreign policy asset. Kurdish is taught in the schools in Kurdish villages. There is a Kurdish newspaper, *Ria Taza*, published in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, and there is some radio programming in Kurdish. The center for Kurdish studies in Yerevan, the only such center in the USSR, offers courses in Kurdish language and culture and publishes in Kurdish periodicals and works of Kurdish poets and writers, some of whom have a reputation in Kurdish communities abroad. One of the main purposes of the center is to support Soviet claims that the Kurds in the Soviet Union enjoy cultural facilities that are not available to those in other parts of the Middle East. (c)

The regime has little reason to fear that its policy of fostering Kurdish national consciousness abroad will encourage troublesome pan-Kurdish sentiments at home. The number of Kurds in the Soviet Union is small, and the regime can count on the more urbanized and educated Armenian majority to act as a restraining influence. The Armenians are unlikely to forget the Turkish massacre, in which the Kurds played a part, and Moscow on occasion has had to warn the Armenians not to discriminate against the Kurdish minority. (u)

Outlook

The collapse of the Shah's regime and the assumption of de facto control by the Kurds in much of the predominantly Kurdish areas of Iran have raised aspirations for greater autonomy not only among Iranian Kurds but also among the Kurds of neighboring Turkey and Iraq. To at least some degree, relations between the Kurds and the governments of the other states in which they live will be determined by the course of events in Iran. If the central government in Tehran is able, through negotiation and compromise, to reestablish its authority over the areas under Kurdish control, the prospect for continued peace between the Kurdish minorities and the other governments of the area will be enhanced. If, on the other hand, Tehran is compelled to use force, the resulting conflict could spill over national borders and involve the Kurds in neighboring states. (c)

The relationship between the Kurds in Iran and the Tehran government will depend to a large extent on each side's interpretation of the balance struck between minority rights and central control under the constitution now under consideration. Government and religious leaders do not want to grant the minorities rights that could threaten national cohesion; on the other hand, they want to reach an accommodation that will keep the minorities quiet. The Kurds, for their part, do not want to lose the benefits of Iran's oil wealth; at the same time they are unwilling to give up the de facto autonomy they have established, and individual leaders want freedom to compete with their rivals for political influence in Kurdistan. (C)

Full-scale conflict between the Kurds and the revolutionary government in Iran does not seem likely in the near term, although an attempt by the government to extend its control in the Kurdish region led to serious clashes in late July. There is little prospect that the government will soon be able to rebuild the military or develop its irregular forces to the level needed to reestablish its authority in the Kurdish areas. For their part, Kurdish leaders do not seem prepared for an all-out effort to remove the remaining central government presence in the area. Moreover, the local population, despite its strong ethnocentrism, is unlikely to support a protracted armed struggle in its towns and villages. (C)

If they chose, the Kurds, even hampered by their disunity, could carry out sustained dissident activity and disrupt Iranian overland trade to Europe and the USSR. The Kurds' challenge to central control would grow more serious if most of the Kurdish tribes were willing to cooperate. Longstanding religious, tribal, and personal rivalries among the Kurds, however, seem to have been only temporarily smoothed over by the revolution and the local autonomy they now enjoy. These differences probably will reappear and may even be intensified as the various leaders try to exploit their new relationship with the central government. The most serious liability facing the Kurds, however, is their lack of continued, substantial support—either open or clandestine—from a neighboring government such as that provided by the Shah to the Iraqi Kurds before 1975. Neither Iraq, Turkey, nor the USSR is

likely to play such a role; the USSR would provide such support only if Moscow decided that its best interests would be served by trying to topple the Khomeini regime and replace it with a leftist government. (S NF)

As long as the present unstable situation exists, the central government and Iran's Kurdish leaders will carefully monitor each other's activities. At the same time, the leaders of the various Kurdish factions can be expected to compete actively for influence among their fellow tribesmen. Relatively minor incidents or miscalculations could cause armed clashes—some of which could be serious—between pro-Khomeini and central government forces, dissident and pro-Khomeini Kurds, and supporters of rival tribal leaders. (C)

In Turkey, the government would fiercely resist any attempt by the Kurdish minority to gain greater political autonomy, although it might grudgingly concede the Kurds greater freedom to express their cultural heritage. The Kurds are aware that the government has large army and security forces stationed in the provinces and is capable of reinforcing them quickly. The most important deterrent to the realization of the desire of the Turkish Kurds for greater autonomy, however, is the absence of a single leader capable of uniting the disparate Kurdish groups. Many important Kurdish leaders have been co-opted or intimidated, while Kurdish leaders active in Turkish politics often hold opposing political views. (S)

Nevertheless, the Kurds in Turkey will remain susceptible to separatist and pan-Kurdish sentiment as long as Ankara fails to assimilate them into Turkish society. Turkish Kurds could be encouraged to defy Ankara if Iranian Kurds secure a greater degree of autonomy from the new Iranian regime or if the government in Ankara fails to come to grips with Turkey's staggering economic and political problems. (S)

The ability of the Iraqi Kurds to effectively oppose the Iraqi military depends on the Baghdad government's domestic political strength and external support for the Kurds from Iran or other countries. As of mid-1979, Baghdad has not been sufficiently distracted by the troubles in Iran or potential problems with the Shias in the south to shift its attention or its troops away from the north. The government is unlikely to permit anything more than the token autonomy it has already granted the three Kurdish provinces in the autonomous region. (S)

Iraq has a highly centralized political and economic structure with no room for decentralization as envisioned by Kurdish nationalists. At best, the Kurds may be permitted a wider role through the already existing mechanisms of the executive and legislative councils. They will not be accorded rights and privileges denied the rest of the population. Most Kurds, however, are likely to regard as acceptable the narrowly defined political autonomy offered by the government. That majority probably does not favor a military solution to the problem of assimilation and is unsure that the alternatives to a Baathist Government would improve conditions for the Kurds of Iraq. (S)

There is little chance that the Syrian Government will grant the Kurds more autonomy in the future. There is little pressure from the Kurds themselves to do so, and the government would be reticent about providing any minority group autonomy for fear that others, like the Druze, would demand similar treatment. (C)

Although the desire not to damage relations with Iran, Turkey, and Iraq probably will continue to deter the Soviet Union from directly aiding Kurdish minorities in those states, Moscow will probably maintain contact with selected Kurdish groups and may indirectly support them through third parties. In Iran, circum-spect support for the Kurds serves to foster continuing instability, which may eventually produce a more pro-Soviet, leftist regime. In Iraq, such an approach also serves to put pressure on a regime that is increasingly independent and anti-Soviet. At a minimum, Soviet support for Kurdish cultural activities within the USSR and expressions of sympathy for "legitimate" Kurdish requests for local autonomy will serve to remind the states involved that the Soviets retain the capability to encourage dissension among their minorities. (S)

Appendix

Selected Biographies

Kamran Inan (Turkey)

Senator Kamran Inan's long effort to challenge Suleyman Demirel for leadership of the Justice Party ended in June 1979 when he announced his decision to withdraw from politics to become a special ambassador in the Foreign Ministry. He left the diplomatic corps in 1973 to represent his home province of Bitlis; from 1975 to 1977 he served as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Inan has always been an outspoken, independent conservative in the Justice Party. His decision to resign from the party followed the overwhelming rejection by the party convention of his attempt to unseat Demirel. His realization that his Kurdish background and Swiss wife were serious political impediments probably prompted his decision to resign. (C)



Unclassified

Hikmet Cetin (Turkey)

Deputy Prime Minister Hikmet Cetin's political career has been as meteoric as that of his longtime friend Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. Born in the eastern city of Diyarbakir in 1937, Cetin moved to Ankara as a young man and earned a B.A. degree in economics from the University of Ankara. He then came to the United States and obtained an M.A. degree in economics from Williams College in 1965. From 1971 to 1977, he served as the head of the Economic Planning Section of the State Planning Office. Coaxed into politics in 1977 by Ecevit, Cetin quickly became one of the Prime Minister's closest advisers. He is responsible for economic relations with socialist states and for coordinating governmental policy on Cyprus. Quiet and modest, yet intensely dedicated, Cetin has a reputation for meticulousness and skilled handling of Turkey's cumbersome bureaucracy. His easygoing personality has earned him many admirers and few enemies. (C)



Unclassified

The Barzani Family (Iraq)

The Barzani family has been active in the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq since the 1930s, when Mullah¹ Mustafa led his first rebellion against Baghdad. Mullah Mustafa remained the pivotal figure in Kurdish politics for the next 40 years. Despite the loss of the civil war and his long years in exile, at his death he was still regarded as the symbol of Kurdish independence. Neither his sons nor any of his several rivals seem to have his charisma or ability to unite the disparate tribes and factions into an effective and credible force. (c)

Although Barzani was head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), he owed his support to traditional tribal loyalties that were often forged following intertribal warfare. Bitter disagreements between the tribes and within the KDP—usually over tactics to be pursued in the successive confrontations with Baghdad—always threatened to divide the Kurdish movement and erode Barzani's power base. In later years, there was criticism of his feudal style of leadership, but he was always able to defeat the internal challenges to his authority. Although he was accused of ruthlessness in pursuing his military and political aims, he was acknowledged to be personally incorruptible. (c)

Little is known of his sons and possible successors. Two sons—Masud and Idris—are members of the KDP and are actively working to revive the Kurdish movement in Iraq. A third son, Ubaydallah, has been a Minister of State in the Iraqi Government since April 1974. Kept a virtual prisoner by the Baathists, he was declared an outlaw by his father, to be taken dead or alive. Masud and Idris—both in their early 30s—appear to have the same goal as their father—meaningful autonomy within an Iraqi state. They have organized guerrilla operations against government military units stationed in the north, but they probably would be receptive to a political settlement with Baghdad if sufficient concessions to self-rule were made. Like their father, they seem wary of promises of assistance from Iran against Baghdad. (c)

¹ It should be noted that in this case, Mullah is a proper name and not a title. (U)



Mullah Mustafa Barzani



Idris Barzani

Jalal Isam al-Din al-Talabani (Iraq)

Jalal Isam al-Din al-Talabani has been a rival of the Barzani family for leadership of Iraq's Kurds since the 1960s. Once a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and a representative of Mullah Mustafa Barzani in negotiations with several Iraqi governments, Talabani claims that he broke with Barzani in 1974 because of the latter's contacts with the United States and Israel. An experienced and capable military leader, Talabani also has a reputation as an intellectual and a skillful propagandist. (C)



Confidential

Born in Kuysanjak, Iraq, in 1933, the son of a religious leader, Talabani joined the KDP in the late 1950s after a brief flirtation with the Iraqi Communist Party. When fighting broke out in the early 1960s between the Kurds and Baghdad, Talabani served as a military commander and a political negotiator for Mullah Mustafa. Disagreements with Barzani, however, over the appropriateness of reconciliation and the acceptability of negotiating terms with Baghdad led to a series of breaks between the two. Barzani first expelled Talabani from the KDP in 1964 and in 1967 sentenced him to death in *absentia*. Talabani at that time was living in Baghdad under government protection. Clashes between factions loyal to the two dissident leaders recurred throughout the late 1960s. (C)

The feud between Barzani and Talabani was encouraged by Baghdad's policy of supporting one Kurdish faction against the other. The Baathist government rewarded Talabani, paying him a subsidy until it concluded the accord with Barzani in March 1970. Faced with the loss of his patron and an uncertain fate as an exile, Talabani made his peace with Barzani in August 1970 and merged his organization -- the Kurdistan Revolutionary Party -- with the KDP. For the next four years Talabani traveled in the Middle East and Europe as Barzani's representative. Following his break with Barzani in 1974, Talabani went into exile in Syria, where, in 1975, he established the Kurdish National Union. (C)

Abdol Rahman Qasemlu (Iran)

Qasemlu, about 49, was born into a wealthy landowning family in Urumiyeh (formerly Rezaieyh) in Iranian Kurdistan. After a year as an economics student in Paris, he moved to Prague, where he continued his studies until he returned to Iran in 1953. By that time, Qasemlu was already a member of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) General Committee and a liaison officer with the Iranian Tudeh (Communist) Party. (S NF NC OC)

Forced because of his leftist activities to flee Iran two years later, he returned to Prague, becoming a lecturer at the university and continuing activities on behalf of the Tudeh Party and the KDP. Details of the next two decades of Qasemlu's life are limited. He seems to have shuttled between Prague and Iraq until he reportedly "became disillusioned with the USSR" because of its 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. He may have begun to spend his time in France, where he lived after the 1975 Iran-Iraq accord ended the Iraqi Kurds' rebellion. Qasemlu taught Kurdish civilization and language in Paris until 1978. (S NF NC OC)

He established contact with Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris in the fall of 1978 and returned to Iran in December to head the KDP revival. He now presides, as first among equals with no executive power of his own, over its loose and disparate, but rapidly expanding organization. Qasemlu has aggressively pressed his claim to be the leading secular spokesman for the Kurds, but the strength of his personal following is unknown. (S NF NC OC)

Sheikh Ez-ed-Din Hoseini (Iran)

Probably the single most popular Iranian Kurdish figure, Hoseini, 57, is from a family of clerics and is said to be a well-read, cultured man. He reportedly leads an ascetic life, supporting a large family on his salary as professor of Arabic at Mahabad's Koran school. (U)

Hoseini began to speak out on political issues in 1942, advocating a revival of Kurdish traditions. In 1953 after the fall of Prime Minister Mossadeq, Hoseini was forced by security officials to leave the village where he taught. He first assumed leadership of the religious community in Mahabad in the early 1960s and soon won over Kurdish nationalists with his sermons. In 1964 he joined the Kurdish Democratic Party, but he claims now to have resigned in order to preserve his objectivity. Hoseini insists, however, that he does not aspire to a dominant political role among the Kurds. He says that his activities are based on "Kurdish nationalism, reasonable socialism, and morality, without which no society can help people lead decent lives." (S NF NC OC)



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Secret

Sources of Copyrighted Photographs

Page 15: Franz Furst

Page 16: Baghdad *al-Thawrah*

Page 17: Sygma

Page 29: Turkish *Daily News*
Diplomacy

Page 30: *Akhirsah* Cairo
UPI

Page 33: Wide World Photographs

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The Ambassador

December 19, 1970

FOL - Donald R. Toussaint

Your Meeting with Mr. Meir Ezeri, Head of the Israeli Mission,
December 21

Mr. Meir Ezeri, Chief of the Israeli Mission, is calling on you at 11:00 a.m., December 21. A brief biographic sketch is attached. We understand from Mr. Ezeri's staff that the call is principally a goodwill call "in connection with the holidays", but you might, if the occasion arises, probe on the following points:

(1) Israeli assessment of apparent warming of Iran/Arab relations, e.g., renewal of Iran/UKR relations, rumors of the renewal of Iran/Lebanon relations, and slight thaw in Iran/Syria relations.

(2) The Israeli assessment of the Kurdish situation. There are signs that the situation between Barzani and Baghdad is slowly deteriorating, though neither side apparently wants fighting to start again. Because of long time Israeli involvement in the Kurdish question and support for Barzani, we would be interested in Mr. Ezeri's assessment of the present situation and his prediction how long it will last.

(3) Iraqi Troops in Jordan. We have recently heard from Iranian charge in Baghdad that the Iraqi troops in Jordan have, for tactical reasons, been moved back very close to the Jordanian side of the Jordan/Iraq border. Do the Israelis have any information on this?

Attachment: Ezeri Bio Sketch

FOL:GMcCaskill:psk

Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELEGRAM

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR, PINT, SREF, IZ, IR, US

SUBJECT: KURDISH REFUGEES

REF: TEHRAN 2684

1. HOAGLAND ARTICLE AND OTHER PRESS REPORTING HERE CONCERNING SERIOUS PROBLEMS FACING KURDS IN EXITING IRAQ BY APRIL 1 AND REPORTED PLEA BY BARZANI THROUGH HOAGLAND FOR U.S. INTERCESSION FOR EXTENSION OF APRIL 1 DEADLINE, HAS CREATED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN PRESS AND ON HILL CONCERNING PLIGHT OF KURDS. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSESSMENT WHETHER IRAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE AMENABLE TO FOLLOWING UP WITH IRAQIS ON BARZANI'S SUGGESTION TO EXTEND DEADLINE TO MAY 1 FOR CLOSURE OF BORDER.

2. ON CONTINGENCY BASIS WE ARE URGENTLY EXAMINING POSSIBLE CHANNELS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO KURDS SHOULD THAT BE NECESSARY. KISSINGER
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Department of State
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Embassy BEIRUT

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SECRET TEHRAN 2750

E.O. 11652: GDS

TRGS: PFOR, PINT, SERP, IE, IR, US

SUBJECT: Kurdish Refugees

REFS: (A) State 66705 (NOTAL); (B) Tehran 2684 (NOTAL)

1. Embassy knows of one Kurdish approach to a high-level GOI official requesting extension of April 1 deadline on movement across Iran-Iraq border. This was turned down, and new request has been made with no response as yet. Head of Kurdish Democratic Party office in Tehran told newsmen he had approached unnamed GOI official on same matter with same inconclusive results. Tehran ICRC Director Hans Becker made similar approach through Red Lion and Sun society but has not yet received reply.

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2. GOI officials continue to talk of complete closure of border April 1. Governor General of Kermanshahan province told Tabriz Consul Neumann March 24 border would be closed righty April 1 and made no mention of any request for extension. He said Barzani was expected to cross into Iran in early April (sic). Governor/~~Barzani~~ ^{General} said 60,000 Kurds in his province were being told Iran could not support them indefinitely, and they would be eventually/~~dispersed~~ ^{dispersed} within Iran to seek employment and settle down.
3. Finally, we have received reports that Turkey may accede to a request that it open its border for transit of unarmed Kurds to Iran. We do not know, however, whether this report accurate or what time frame may be envisaged. Perhaps Amembassy Ankara can illuminate.
4. Foregoing and ~~the~~ info provided Washington via other channels suggest there is little or no GOI disposition at this time to follow up with Baghdad Barzani's plea for extension deadline. As we see it, responsibility for extension of deadline rests primarily with Iraqi Government as border closure date is tied to expiration of Iraq's Kurdish amnesty. Dept and Baghdad better judge than we whether direct USG appeal to Iraqi Government feasible or desirable. If Dept wishes matter to be pursued with Iran, it our judgment only effective means would be message from President to Shah.

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5. Given important roles we understand both Sadat and Bounediens played in encouraging Iran/Iraq agreement, they appear to be in the best position to prevail on Saddam Hussein to grant extension of deadline, and Dept may wish to consider pursuing this option.

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- USCINCEUR
- Amconsul KHORRAMSHAHR (POUCH)
- Amconsul TABRIZ (POUCH)

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 3281

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PIMS, SREF, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: Iraqi Kurds in Iran

REF: Tahriz 17

1. Subsequent to AmConsul Tabriz Neumann's meeting with Barzani representative (reftel), Neumann met April 7 with Barzani's son Idris in Mahadeh, Western Azerbaijan, at Idris' request. Idris made similar arguments, saying that ICRC presence in refugee camps would keep Iranians from pressuring Kurds to return to Iraq. He went further and asked for guarantees from US or from Iran (as result of US influence or pressure) that there

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no forced return. Naumann replied that such an intervention by US was not remotely possible. Idris stated several times that Kurds fear dispersal within Iran as a result of destruction of their ~~ethnic~~ status, and expressed his view that it was the United States' humanitarian duty to prevent this from happening.

2. Idris commented that ~~the~~ result of the termination of ineffective Kurdish resistance, his father's prestige with his people had declined. He feared that without the Barzani family's leadership the Kurds would be at loose ends and might turn against anyone they blamed for their problems. Idris asked if the US had set up Kurdish refugee ~~program~~ program and was told no. He noted that General Barzani was in Tehran April 7-8.

3. Shah told UPI Middle East correspondent Michael Keats (protect) in interview April 9 that Iranian aid to Kurds had been cut off because they were engaged in futile struggle. He had not recently seen Barzani, who, Shah said, is now living near Tehran and free to do what he wants and go wherever he pleases. Shah did not expect Barzani to leave Iran--"Where would he go, and to do what?" Drawing a parallel with Palestinian refugees, Shah said Kurds could not remain indefinitely in camps because this would breed laziness and hatred. Keats said Shah added that because Kurds were of same stock and language (sic) as Iranians, they could easily be assimilated in Iranian society.

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Department of State

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4/13/73

PRECEDENCE

ACTION: SecState Wash DC Priority 116/116

INFO: Ambassador Ankara 16/17
Ambassador Damascus 07/08
Ambassador Beirut 22/23
US Mission Geneva 02/03
USUN 02/03
Ambassador Tehran (02/03)
Anc consulate Khorramshahr
USCINCEUR

TABR-3

AMB
DCM
POL-2
ECON-2
POL/W
OR-2
USIS
CONS
CRU

POBCH
RGNOR-3
18/1b

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Confidential Tabriz 37
BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD
E.O. 11652: GUS

TAGS: PINS, SREF, EK

Subject: Iraqi Kurds & Yazas: Situation w/ request

SUMMARY: ~~XX~~ Representation of General Banat...
me April 5 to request... use its influence...
the International Red Cross...
if low level, ICRC and...
presence in the refugee...
fear that Iran is...
measures to force...
ing IAS conversation...

RENeumann *RN*

RENeumann *RN*

POL: AMEolster
POL: WILL *WILL*

... road from Piranshahr to Andimeshk
... stance.

... Kurds feel that Iran is beginning a policy of
... ed pressure to induce the refugees to either return
... or, in the case of professionals and technicians,
... leave the border areas and take jobs in Iran. As signs
... of this pressure they cite the fact that administration
... of the refugee camps has now been taken over by the Iranian army,
... and that the Kurds have at times, and in certain camps,
... been ordered to turn out for one or two days, that Kurdish
... (Kurdish) tribesmen who had been living outside the camps were
... ordered to sell all their livestock immediately and move
... to the refugee camps, and that Iranian officials are
... threatening to send back refugees to return while offering
... good jobs and ~~money~~ to professionals if they will leave
... the camps and ~~return to their homes~~. Comments: While none of
... this adds up to a ~~conviction~~ conviction that harsher measures of
... persuasion are in order for the future, the Kurds are
... clearly worried.

... Government and the KDP leadership, according to Dr.
... Fisher,
... have two main reasons for wishing to hold the
... people in the camps together. One is a very real fear
... that will happen to them if they return to Iraq.
... that disturbances being executed and farmers being

desired permission to return to their land are circulating widely. With ~~the~~ border closed and access to ~~the~~ camps curtailed, very little reliable information is now coming in from the Iraqi side of ~~the~~ border and this increases the feeling of fear and uncertainty. Second, ~~the~~ Kurds believe (or are trying to believe) that ~~the~~ Iran-Iraqi honeymoon of good relations will be shortlived and that Iran will eventually want to make use of ~~the~~ Kurds again. While they see no prospect of renewed fighting they think that such a situation might increase their political weight in dealing with Baghdad.

3. Given ~~the~~ above factors, General Barzani has requested that ~~the~~ USG use its influence with ~~the~~ ICRC to maintain a low level of assistance to the refugees and hence access to ~~the~~ camps. Without this they fear increasing isolation from ~~the~~ outside world and possible Iranian mistreatment. ~~The~~ Kurds have heard that Iran has already told ~~the~~ ICRC ~~that~~ there is no further work for it to do in Iran and it should go home.

Asfandiar

4. / stated that ~~the~~ USG had, as ~~the~~ Dr. /kher, not been involved in ~~the~~ war and had no wish to impact itself politically now that peace seemed to be in sight. At the same time he said that the Kurds were in a

questions and I promised to pass request to Department.

~~Early Departmental Response to Comments~~

6. Comment: From very limited vantage point of Tabriz it does ~~not~~ seem that continued involvement of ICRC would be useful, even if not for exactly reasons given by Kurds. If Kurdish fears of poor treatment and pressure to return to Iraq materialize, there will probably be press attacks accusing Iran of mistreatment of a betrayed people, and the U.S. could be accused of having turned a blind eye to such conditions. A low-level ICRC presence would provide internationally acceptable testimony of camp conditions which, to date, have been quite good. Further, if Baghdad does not apply extremely harsh and repressive measures to returnees, then ICRC reports to refugees of actual conditions in Iraq might well help persuade large numbers of refugees to return to Iraq in not too distant future. This would largely defuse refugee situation and would also lessen requests for US to accept large numbers of refugees. If Department concurs in this belief that low-level ICRC involvement would be helpful, perhaps on both sides of border, an appropriate method to change Iraq's mind would be to ask Egyptians and Algerians to attempt to persuade Iraqis that genuine UNRWA delegation from ICRC would show appropriate humanitarian concern and also substantiate Iraq's fine (but not well-grounded) case.

7. Embassy Comment: Official ICRC statement on end of its assistance to Kurds (Geneva 2398) clearly leaves open possibility that ICRC could be persuaded to render further humanitarian assistance. Embassy agrees that Egyptians or Algerians could be helpful in urging Iraqis to agree to limited ICRC program, just as Embassy/UNHCR ^{recommended} earlier that Sadat and Boumediene could be helpful in obtaining extension of deadline on ^{refugee} ~~Iraqi~~ movements across Iraq-Iran border (Tehran 2750).

23
NEUMANN AS

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ACTION ZNY SSSSS ZZH
POL-3 R 241736Z APR 75

SECRET LIMDIS

LONDON 06227

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0501
AMB RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0515
DCM RUQMRE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2212
ECON-2 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2215
POL/M RUQMAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1727
OR-2 RT
COMS S E C R E T LONDON 06227
CRU

Apr 26, 75 - 1

BEIRUT ALSO PASS BAGHDAD

POUCH
KHOR LIMDIS
TABR

13/r1b E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: IR, IZ, UK, PFOR
SUBJECT: REPORT OF FINANCIAL PAYMENT BY IRAQ TO IRAN

1. DURING LAST WEEK'S US-UK TALKS IN LONDON ON THE GULF, BRITISH MENTIONED AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT ALLEGING THAT, AS PART OF THE ALGIERS' AGREEMENT, IRAQ WOULD PAY IRAN 300 MILLION DOLLARS. THIS WAS JUSTIFIED AS HELPING COVER THE COSTS OF KURDISH REFUGEES IN IRAN. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY RELEVANT INFORMATION ADDRESSEES MIGHT IN TIME TURN UP.

2. FOR DEPARTMENT: DRAFT MEMCONS OF TALKS WERE POUCHED TO NEA DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOKER APRIL 23 FOR HIS APPROVAL AND APPROPRIATE DISTRIBUTION.

RICHARDSON
RT
06227

SECRET LIMDIS

AmEmbassy TEHRAN

ACTION:

Cons

INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONTROL NO.

12996

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 03 1977

INFO:

AMB *1*

DCM *1*

SA

PER *1*

ECON

FM

USIS

CONS

OR

ADM

GSO

BF

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MSG

ICO

SCRO

CIO

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DAO

MAAG

AGR

DEA

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ICTR

AIDTO

TU

CRU *1*

SHR

TABR *1*

ISFA

General PN

R 021359Z NOV 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHTR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0274
INFO RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 5249
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 261784

FROM NEA/ARN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CASC

SUBJECT: BARZANI'S ENTOURAGE

1. A MEMBER OF MUSTPHA BARZANI'S ENTOURAGE HAS INFORMED US THAT BARZANI WANTS TO BRING SOMEONE TO THE UNITED STATES TO PERFORM GENERAL HOUSEHOLD WORK. THEY HAVE CHOSEN A MUSTAPHA AHMAD AND TOLD US THAT SAVAK HAS AGREED TO GIVE HIM A PASSPORT AND ALLOW AHMAD'S DEPARTURE.

2. SINCE THE SPONSOR IN THE UNITED STATES (BARZANI) HAS NON-IMMIGRANT STATUS, AND AHMAD HAS SOME PRIOR CONNECTION WITH BARZANI, HE APPEARS TO QUALIFY FOR A TEMPORARY VISITOR'S VISA.

3. IF AHMAD APPLIES FOR A VISA, THE EMBASSY SHOULD CHECK WITH SAVAK BEFORE ISSUING. PLEASE NOTIFY US WHEN VISA ISSUED. VANCE

AHMAD, Barzani

*Visa Issued on Refugee Document
11-10-77
BB
(B-1/B-2, Multiple, 12 mos.) SAVAK APPROVES*

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Signature]

DISTRIBUTION LIST
T-3C1-20492

ACTION COLLECTORS

USDAO IRAN (1)
USDAO TURKEY (1)
DCDR INSCOM/JAFM OPS-HUC-C Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755 (1)
7602AIG/INCD Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060 (1)
USDAO SYRIA (1)

INFORMATION COLLECTORS

DA/DAI-ISH Washington, DC 20310 (1)
KINCFUR/ICJ2 P APO NY 09128 (1)
CIA/DCO-INT-RQ Washington, DC 20505 (4)

DC-1 (CCF) (1)
DB (1)
DB-3A (1)
DB-3C (1)
DB-3D (1)

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT

7. SUBJECT Area Reaction to Kurdish Activity (U)	8. OBJECTIVES: PG2250	4. EXPIRATION DATE Aug 79	6. CONTROL NUMBER (15) T-3C1-20492
	10. COLLECTION ACTION SEE DISTRIBUTION LIST	9. DISPATCH DATE 23 AUG 1978	5. PRIORITY 4
10. COLLECTION ACTION SEE DISTRIBUTION LIST		11. INFORMATION SEE DISTRIBUTION LIST	

12. REQUIREMENTS/GUIDANCE

A. (C) REQUIREMENTS:

1. (C) What impact are evacuations, resettlements, and complete destruction of old Kurdish villages in Iraq having on Kurdish attitude toward Iraq/Iranian governments?
2. (C) What are Iran's current and future plans regarding participation with Iraq in operations against the Kurds? What is the reaction of the Iranian Kurdish population to Iran's cooperation with Iraq against the Iraqi Kurds?
3. (C) What is the Iranian assessment of Iraq's ability to control Kurdish activity?
4. (C) What is the possibility of covert Iranian support to the particular Kurdish groups? Which Kurdish factions is Iran presently supporting and by what means/methods?
5. (C) To what extent does the Kurdish affiliation with the Iraqi Communist Party affect the stability of the present Iraqi regime?
6. (C) Are Kurds trusted in the Iraqi military and para-military units? To which units are they assigned and what kinds of missions do they receive? What restrictions are placed upon Kurds drafted within the Iraqi military?
7. (C) What steps have the Iranian and Turkish Governments taken to control their Kurdish populations?
8. What is the threat to the security of NW Iran as a result of Kurdish activity in this area? What steps is Iran taking to preclude any kind of hostile Kurdish activity in Iranian Kurdistan?
9. (C) What foreign assistance are the Kurds receiving?
10. (C) To what extent will recent Kurdish activity affect Iranian/Iraqi relations?

12. ATTACHMENTS NONE	14. APPROVED FOR COLLECTOR <i>[Signature]</i> DANIEL B. SIBBET, MAJ, USAF Chief, Requirements Acty	<i>[Signature]</i> ERNEST FRANKE, ACTG Asst. Dep. Dir. for Human Resources
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13. CONTROL MARKINGS Class. by DIA/DB-3, Subj. to General Declass., Schedule of EXEC. Order 11652, Automatically Downgraded at 2 yr. Intervals, Declassified on 31 Dec 1994.

FORM 1 MAY 63 1265

17. CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM
MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JULY 1983

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT CONFIGURATION SHEET

Area Reaction to Kurdish Activity (U)

18, 12, 10

B. (C) GUIDANCE:

1. (C) Recent reporting has indicated expanded Iranian and Iraqi cooperation in controlling Kurdish activity. It is expected that such cooperation will continue particularly in response to increased communist support of certain Kurdish elements.

2. (C) These requirements cannot be released to foreign governments. Discreet use of this information may be made by collectors in contact with foreign nationals only as prescribed in paragraph 16.b., Part Four, Volume II, DIAM 58-2.

3. (U) Request that one copy of each response to these requirements be mailed to DIA, ATTN: DB-3C1, Washington, D.C. 20301.

4. (U) Originator's control number is DB-3C1 04378.

D FORM 1365c
1 MAY 63

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 2 OF 2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions	<p style="text-align: center;">C O N F I D E N T I A L NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><small>Classification/Control Markings</small></p>	This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on basis of this report.														
<table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">1. COUNTRY: IRAN(IR) IRAQ(IQ)</td> <td style="width: 50%;">2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 846 0498 78</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. TITLE: Government of Iran Policy Controlling the Kurds (U)</td> <td>4. PROJECT NUMBER: <i>CHPOW</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 770600 thru 780626</td> <td>6. DATE OF REPORT: 781016</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7. DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 781009, Tehran, Iran</td> <td>8. REFERENCES: T-3C1-20492</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE <u>B</u>, INFO <u>2</u></td> <td>10. ORIGINATOR: USDAO, Tehran, Iran</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11. REQUEST EVALUATION <u> </u>, OPQ <u> </u> <small>(country)</small></td> <td>12. PREPARING OFFICER: <i>Harry K. Bonfield</i> HARRY K. BONFIELD SSG, USA Intelligence Assistant</td> </tr> <tr> <td>14. SOURCE: American Embassy, Tehran</td> <td>13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Thomas E. Schaefer</i> THOMAS E. SCHAEFER COL, USAF Defense Attache</td> </tr> </table>			1. COUNTRY: IRAN(IR) IRAQ(IQ)	2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 846 0498 78	3. TITLE: Government of Iran Policy Controlling the Kurds (U)	4. PROJECT NUMBER: <i>CHPOW</i>	5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 770600 thru 780626	6. DATE OF REPORT: 781016	7. DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 781009, Tehran, Iran	8. REFERENCES: T-3C1-20492	9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE <u>B</u> , INFO <u>2</u>	10. ORIGINATOR: USDAO, Tehran, Iran	11. REQUEST EVALUATION <u> </u> , OPQ <u> </u> <small>(country)</small>	12. PREPARING OFFICER: <i>Harry K. Bonfield</i> HARRY K. BONFIELD SSG, USA Intelligence Assistant	14. SOURCE: American Embassy, Tehran	13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Thomas E. Schaefer</i> THOMAS E. SCHAEFER COL, USAF Defense Attache
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15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NOFORN Caveat utilized to protect the collection capabilities of this office. <table border="0" style="float: right; margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td>D</td> <td>YES <input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>I</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>R</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C</td> <td>NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> </table>			D	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	I		R		C	NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>						
D	YES <input type="checkbox"/>															
I																
R																
C	NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>															
16. SUMMARY: (C/NOFORN) This report provides an overview of Iranian policies designed to control its Kurdish population and the activities of Kurd refugees from Iraq.																
18. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: <small>DIA (original)</small> USCINCEUR Vaihingen GE EUDAC Vaihingen GE COMIDEASTFOR CINCPAC FICPAC USDAO Ankara Cdr US Army Intel Agency Fort Meade	19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA: CLASSIFIED BY DATT IRAN, EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2. DECLASSIFY ON NOTIFICATION OF ORIGINATOR.	20. ENCLOSURES: No Enclosures														
<p style="text-align: center;">C O N F I D E N T I A L NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><small>Classification/Control Markings</small></p>		21. This IR contains <u>2</u> pages.														

17. SUBJECT AND AREA CODES:

Continuation Sheet

C O N F I D E N T I A L
N O T R E A S A B L E T O F O R E I G N N A T I O N A L S

Report No. 6 846 0498 78

Page 2 of 2 pages

Originator USDAO Tehran Iran

22. DETAILS: (C/NOFORN)

(Leave Blank)

Since the 1975 collapse of the Kurdish guerilla effort in Iraq, some 150,000 Kurd refugees have entered Iran. To the great relief of the GOI, the vast majority of this number have been either settled in other countries (including the USA) or have readily accepted assimilation in Iran. Some 65% of the Iraqi Kurd refugees remaining in Iran (30,000) have found permanent jobs; the others have part-time jobs or have not been resettled. GOI policy towards these refugees has been to cooperate with joint GOI-Kurd committees to handle problems, and allow Kurdish resettlement where jobs are available. Jobs are available in most Iranian cities. The refugees are not allowed to settle in provinces on the Iraq border.

Source reported that I D R I S B A R Z A N I, dissident Kurd leader residing in Iran stated that an unnamed GOI official told him (October 1977) to stop contacting compatriots in Iraq and to stop sending them reinforcements. BARZANI denied these activities were taking place. The same GOI official reportedly stated that all Kurds caught violating border controls would be turned over to Iraqi authorities. Source reported that Kurd observers believed Iranian enforcement of that policy would ease. GOI has repeatedly opposed any forced repatriation to Iraq.

Most recent Source information reports border cooperation between Iran and Iraq is very close. Iran is curbing the activities of Kurdish refugees under its jurisdiction closer than ever. Source also reports that it appears Iranian restrictions on Iraqi Kurdish leaders parallel the Iraqi stance towards the activities of Iranian Shite Moslem dissident A Y A T O L L A A L K H O M E I N I.

Concerning Iranian policy towards its own Kurdish population, Source reports that Kurdish tribal leaders in the Tabriz area face inevitable decline of their authority due to GOI attempts to assimilate their people. Land reform in the area has effected the Kurdish population. One negative effect has been to dilute tribal power so it is difficult to put effective pressure on GOI organizations on such matters as road construction, irrigation and agricultural policy. Kurdish leaders do not trust the GOI because they feel the government is deliberately trying to destroy the Kurd nomad culture. Kurdish land holders are losing labor to the cities. Some land holders themselves in the area spend up to half the year in cities. The Kurd leaders also feel this GOI "policy" will succeed.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: (C/NOFORN) The Iranian Government policy toward the Kurds is one of assimilation. It consists of diluting the power of the tribal society through the lure of economic attraction in the cities. Meanwhile its policy towards the Iraqi refugees seems to have the same basis. In addition, Source's linkage of Iran's Kurdish policy with Iraqi policy concerning AYATOLLA AL-KHOMEINI point to future change due to the recent trip by KHOMEINI to France places him beyond Iraqi control.

C O N F I D E N T I A L
N O T R E A S A B L E T O F O R E I G N N A T I O N A L S

Classification/Control Markings

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TEHRAN 1649

P 011415Z FEB 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3628
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0635
ZEN AMCONSUL TABRIZ
INFO RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 1008
BT

CHRG: STATE 2-1-79
APPRV: LCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSSTMPPEL:IAB
CLEAR: POL:3BLANBRAXIS
DISTR: POL-3 AM ICM
ECON-2 FM USICA
OR SHIR COMS
TABR ISF CHRON/16

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01649

E.O. 12065: GDS 2-1-86 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: CVIS, SREF, PINS, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: (LOU) KURDISH REFUGEES IN IRAN

REF: STATE 25114 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAN HAS UNDOUBTELY BEEN AFFECTED NEGATIVELY BY PRESENT DISORDERS. KURDISH REPRESENTATIVE RECENTLY PASSED US COPY OF LETTER TO UNHCR URGING GREATER EFFORT ON BEHALF OF KURDISH REFUGEES. NOTWITHSTANDING ABOVE, IT DOES NOT SEEM TO US THAT KURDS HAVE BEEN ANY MORE ADVERSELY AFFECTED THAN OTHER MINORITIES, SUCH AS JEWS AND BAHAIS AND PROBABLY LESS. GIVEN RECENT ARRIVAL OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, WE THINK IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE TO COME TO TEHRAN TO LOOK NOT ONLY AT KURDISH PROBLEM BUT INTO POTENTIAL REFUGEE PROBLEMS AMONG OTHER GROUPS. END SUMMARY.

3. KURDS, ALONG WITH OTHERS, HAVE DEFINITELY BEEN AFFECTED NEGATIVELY BY RECENT UNREST IN IRAN. KURDS HAVE PARTICIPATED IN BOTH PRO- AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT RALLIES IN WESTERN IRAN AND HAVE SUFFERED VIOLENCE ALONG WITH OTHERS. KURDISH REPRESENTATIVE ALI-SULIAMAN VISITED WITH CONSUL GENERAL RECENTLY AND PROVIDED COPY OF LETTER SENT BY BARZANI GROUP TO UNHCR (BEING POUCHED HA AND IRN) CALLING FOR MORE ASSISTANCE FOR KURDISH REFUGEES IN BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ.

4. IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT KURDS HAVE SUFFERED ALONG WITH OTHERS AND HAVE PROBABLY NOT RPT NOT BEEN AS BADLY AFFECTED AS SOME OTHER MINORITY GROUPS, NOTABLY BAHAIS AND JEWS. WHILE NOT WISHING TO MINIMIZE DIFFICULTIES OF REFUGEES IN COUNTRY UNDERGOING POLITICAL UNREST, IT SEEMS FAIR TO SAY THAT KURDS ARE PROBABLY NOT RPT NOT IN AS GREAT A DANGER AS OTHERS. THEY ALSO HAVE EXISTING KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY ORGANIZATION TO HELP THEM, WHICH HAS BEEN WORKING ON REFUGEE PROBLEMS FOR FOUR YEARS AND IS UNDOUBTEDLY BEHIND CAMPAIGN IN U.S. AND ELSEWHERE TO DO MORE FOR KURDS. POLITICAL UNREST IN IRAN THUS BECOMES NATURAL OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW KURDISH LOBBYING EFFORT.

5. HAVING SAID ABOVE, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE POTENTIALLY VERY USEFUL FOR UNHCR TO GET A MAN OUT HERE ON THE SCENE. TODAY'S ARRIVAL OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI MAY WELL USHER IN A PERIOD OF DECREASED TOLERATION FOR ALL MINORITIES, INCLUDING KURDS AND FOREIGNERS. PRESENCE OF UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE COULD PROVIDE REMINDER TO IRANIANS

62

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TEHRAN 1649

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TEHRAN 1649

OF WORLD CONCERN OVER MINORITIES (INCLUDING KURDISH REFUGEES) AND EXERCISE GENTLE PRESSURE ON POLITICAL SYSTEM TO MITIGATE EXCESSES. AT MOMENT, U.S. IS ILL-PLACED TO LOBBY FOR KURDISH REFUGEES AND, FRANKLY, WE THINK OUR LIMITED POLITICAL CAPITAL MIGHT BE BETTER USED FOR OTHER GROUPS. SUCH CONSTRAINTS WOULD NOT RPT NOT APPLY TO UNHCR VISITOR, WHO COULD MAKE GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF WIDE-RANGE OF POTENTIAL PROBLEMS. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE HAPPY TO COOPERATE WITH SUCH A VISIT.

4. EMBASSY IS ATTEMPTING TO RECONTACT ALI-SULAIMAN AND WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LATER. SULLIVAN
BT
#1649

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TEHRAN 1649

HNNNVV ESA641BRA225
OO RUCMHR
DE RUEHC #7613 0330330
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 020034Z FEB 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2602
INFO RUCMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0172
RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 9815
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 027613

L O. 12005: N/A

TAGS: CVIS, SREF, PINS, IR

SUBJECT: KURDISH REFUGEES; POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL AGENCY ASSISTANCE

REF: TEHRAN 01649

1. MISSION IS REQUESTED TO DISCUSS WITH ICRC AND UNHCR WHAT PLANS THEY HAVE TO ASSIST IRAQI-KURDS AND OTHER MINORITIES THREATENED BY THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN.
2. WE UNDERSTAND ICRC HAS MAINTAINED AN OFFICE IN TEHRAN. COULD ITS DELEGATES THERE ASSIST IRAQI-KURDS AND OTHER MINORITIES WHO MAY SEEK TO LEAVE IRAN?
3. DOES UNHCR HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE IN IRAN, OR COULD IT SEND ONE TO ASSESS CURRENT SITUATION AS IT AFFECTS IRAQI-KURDS AND OTHERS?
4. SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS MESSAGE IS NOT SUGGESTING ANY PARTICULAR ACTION AT THIS TIME. WE WOULD HOWEVER APPRECIATE INFO ON WHAT THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS MAY BE DOING OR PLAN TO DO. VANCE

BT

#7613

C O N F I D E N T I A L



ACTION TO PO

027613 04 12z
ACTION:
ADM3
INFO:
AMB
DCM
~~CONC~~
CHRON RS

TEHRAN 1969/1

P 061416Z FEB 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0703
 INFO ZEN/AMCONSUL TABRIZ
 RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0638
 RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 1223
 RUQMQU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4324
 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0711
 RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0753
 BT

HPGE: STATE 2-6-79
 APPRV: ISM:OWAAS
 LRPTD: POL:JSTEN/11A
 CLEAR: POL:DELANE/11G
 IISTR: ~~POL:JSTEN/11A~~
 ECON-2 14 010A
 OR SHIA IADR
 ISF CHRCN/14

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01869

E.O. 12065: GDS 2-6-86 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
 TAGS: CWIS, SREF, PINS, IR, IZ
 SUBJECT: (LOU) KURDISH SITUATION

REF: A. TEHRAN 1649 (NOTAL), B. STATE 27613 (NOTAL),
 C. STATE 25114 (NOTAL), D. BAGHDAD 264 (NOTAL), E. GENEVA
 1889 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) REPRESENTATIVE ALI-SULAIMAN CONFIRMED OBSERVATIONS (REF A) THAT KURDS WERE SUFFERING ALONG WITH OTHERS FROM RECENT IRANIAN VIOLENCE. HE ALSO DESCRIBED ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF MASSOUD BARZANI IN VIENNA 15 DAYS AGO AND PUSHED HARD FOR AFFIRMATIVE U.S. RESPONSE ON NEW KURDISH REFUGEE PROGRAM. ALI-SULAIMAN SAID TALABANI FACTION WAS GROWING STRONGER AND MADE USUAL PLEA FOR U.S. HELP ON BEHALF OF PARZANI GROUP. ACTION REQUESTED: REPLY TO SULAIMAN'S QUERY ON ANY NEW KURDISH REFUGEE PROGRAM THAT WASHINGTON MIGHT CONTEMPLATE (PARA 6 BELOW). ALSO, REPLY TO OUR SUGGESTION THAT UNHCR AND MORE ACTIVE ICRC REPRESENTATION WOULD BE HELPFUL.

3. KDP REPRESENTATIVE ALI-SULAIMAN CALLED ON POLOFF FEB 3 TO REVIEW KURDISH SITUATION, WHICH HE HAD PARTIALLY DISCUSSED WITH CONSUL-GENERAL SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER. ALI-SULAIMAN CONFIRMED THAT KURDS ARE SUFFERING AS A RESULT OF RECENT VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL UNREST WHICH HAS GRIPPED IRAN. AS FUEL OIL SUPPLIES HAVE GONE DOWN AND FACTORIES CLOSED, KURDISH WORKERS, ALONG WITH OTHERS, HAVE BECOME UNEMPLOYED. THERE HAS BEEN NO DIRECT DISCRIMINATION IN THIS PROCESS, BUT AS MANY KURDS WERE "LAST-HIRED," THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN "FIRST-FIRED." GOI RELIEF PAYMENTS TO KURDS VIRTUALLY CEASED AT BEGINNING OF MOHARRAM (DEC 2, 1978), AND RESULTANT CONFUSION HAS LEFT MANY KURDISH REFUGEES WITHOUT USUAL HANDOUT. KDP HAS TRIED TO HELP OUT, BUT IT CANNOT DO EVERYTHING.

4. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION WHETHER KURDS HAD BEEN DISCRIMINATED AGAINST MORE THAN OTHERS, ALI-SULAIMAN SAID THEY, AS ALL FOREIGNERS, HAD FELT WARM BREATH OF IRANIAN XENOPHOBIA. IT DEPENDED VERY MUCH ON LOCAL CONDITIONS AND LOCAL OFFICIALS. MANY WERE TOLERANT AND HELPFUL; SOME WERE NOT.

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5. IN PASSING, ALI-SULAIMAN DESCRIBED ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF MASSOUD BARZANI, SON OF GENERAL BARZANI, IN VIENNA JUST OVER TWO WEEKS AGO. MASSOUD AND TWO FRIENDS WERE RIDING IN A CAR WHEN MEN IN ANOTHER VEHICLE ATTACKED THEM WITH GUNS. MASSOUD ESCAPED HARM, BUT TWO FRIENDS WERE WOUNDED. AFTER THEY RECOVERED, AUSTRIAN POLICE FOILED SECOND ATTEMPT AT AIRPORT WHILE MASSOUD AND HIS FRIENDS WERE LEAVING. ALI-SULAIMAN SAID KDP SOURCES BELIEVED BOTH ATTEMPTS WERE WORK OF IRAQI INTELLIGENCE.

6. CITING ABOVE PROBLEMS, ALI-SULAIMAN SAID HE HAD HEARD NO MORE ABOUT POSSIBLE NEW KURDISH REFUGEE PROGRAM BY U.S. WAS THERE GOING TO BE A NEW PROGRAM OR NOT? EMBOFF REPLIED HE HAD HEARD NOTHING BUT WOULD QUERY WASHINGTON. (DEPT-HA: PLEASE CONSIDER YOURSELF QUERIED.. WOULD APPRECIATE STATUS REPORT ON KURDISH REFUGEE PROGRAM.) ALI-SULAIMAN SAID MANY KURDS WISHED TO GO TO U.S., EVEN THOSE WHO HAD BEEN SETTLED. EMBOFF EXPRESSED SYMPATHY WITH THEIR POSITION AND NOTED OTHER MINORITIES WERE HAVING PROBLEMS, TOO. ALI-SULAIMAN SAID HE WISHED KURDISH LOBBY IN U.S. WAS AS EFFECTIVE AS SOME OTHERS. EMBOFF REPLIED DRYLY IT HAD NOTHING TO BE ASHAMED OF.

7. ALI-SULAIMAN REPEATED HIS USUAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE JALAL TALABANI FACTION GROWING STRONGER AT BARZANI'S EXPENSE AND SAID IRAQI-TURKISH FRONTIER IS NOW PRETTY WELL POPULATED BY BARZANI GROUPS, WHILE TALABANI HAD SHIFTED AROUND TO THE IRAN-IRAQ BORDER, WHERE KDP SOURCES INSIST HE IS GETTING HELP FROM IRANIAN TULFH GROUPS. (COMMENT: FIRST TIME WE HAVE HEARD THIS, BUT WOULD WELCOME COMMENTS FROM OTHERS. TALABANI FORCES WERE BLAMED FOR ONE CURIOUS KURDISH ATTACK ON A GENDARMERIE POST A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO, BUT THAT INCIDENT HAS NEVER BEEN EXPLAINED.)

8. FOR STATE: REF C SUGGESTS PERHAPS EXTENT OF DISORGANIZATION IN IRAN NOT FULLY APPRECIATED BY ALL
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TEHRAN 1969/

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TEHRAN 1486/2

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
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RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 1024
RUQMGBU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4325
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0712
RUFHAW/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0794

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 22 TEHRAN 21869

OFFICES IN DEPARTMENT. REGRET WE HAVE NOT REPORTED MORE SPECIFICALLY ON THIS BEFORE. HOWEVER, UNDP, WHICH HANDLES ADMINISTRATION FOR UNHCR, HAS VIRTUALLY CLOSED DOWN AND SENT MOST OF ITS STAFF OUT OF THE COUNTRY; UNHCR OFFICE ITSELF ICES NOT ANSWER ITS TELEPHONES AND UNHCR HAS NO REPRESENTATIVE HERE NOW. WE HAVE NOT MADE CONTACT WITH ICRC REPS HERE IN CHAOS OF PAST THREE-FOUR MONTHS BUT ARE PLEASED TO HEAR (REF C) THAT THEY STILL RETAIN A PRESENCE. THEY HAVE NOT SOUGHT US OUT (GENEVA MIGHT WISH TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THIS IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL.). FOR PAST TWO MONTHS PARTICULARLY, VAST MAJORITY OF THOSE REMAINING HERE HUNKERED DOWN AND CONCENTRATED ON KEEPING THEIR OWN GLUTI MAXIMI INTACT RATHER THAN EXTENDING LIMITS OF THEIR MANDATES. CONDITIONS MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY SITUATION IN MOST MINISTRIES, WHERE CONTENTING FACTIONS HAVE BROUGHT "NORMAL" CONTACTS AND WORK TO A HALT. THIS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE FOR NEXT FEW WEEKS.

9. PERHAPS MOST USEFUL THING DEPT CAN DO AT THIS POINT IS STIMULATE THINKING IN ICRC AND UNHCR HEAD OFFICES AND PROMOTE ARRIVAL OF UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE (REF A) WHO MIGHT HAVE SOME FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT NEXT WEEK OR WEEK AFTER (IF SITUATION HERE PERMITS). WHATEVER GROUNDWORK IS REQUIRED FOR MORE GENEROUS U.S. TREATMENT OF ALL MINORITY AND FOREIGN REFUGEES WHO MIGHT BE EXITING IRAN OVER NEXT FEW MONTHS SHOULD BE STARTED NOW. SULLIVAN

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TEHRAN 1486/2

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 2727

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/5/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR -p
TAGS: PINS, PINT, PGOV , SOCI, IR
SUBJECT: KURDISH PARTICULARIST ACTIVITIES

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE FALL OF THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT AND CURRENT WEAKNESS IN TEHRAN HAS LED TO A RESURGENCE OF PARTICULARIST SENTIMENT AMONG IRANIAN KURDS. FOR THE MOMENT, THE KURDISH LEADERSHIP IS PROCEEDING CAUTIOUSLY, INSISTING THAT ITS DEMANDS ARE ONLY FOR AUTONOMY WITHIN THE IRANIAN NATION. HOWEVER, THE LEADERSHIP HAS INDICATED THAT IT IS SERIOUS IN ITS OBJECTIVES AND THAT IRANIAN KURDS WILL FIGHT, IF NECESSARY, TO REALIZE THEM. IN A MAJOR SHOW OF STRENGTH MARCH 2, 200,000 DEMONSTRATED IN MAHABAD. THE GOVERNMENT HAS FOLLOWED A POLICY OF VACILLATION WHICH REFLECTS BOTH ITS PRESENT INABILITY TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY IN KURDESTAN AND ITS FEAR THAT THE MOVEMENT MAY HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES . END SUMMARY.

3. THE FALL OF THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT WAS QUICKLY FOLLOWED BY A RESURGENCE OF PARTICULARIST SENTIMENT IN THE LARGE AREA ALONG IRAN'S BORDER WITH IRAQ INHABITED BY THE 3.5 MILLION STRONG IRANIAN KURDISH MINORITY. REPORTS OF UNREST IN THE REGION PROMPTED BOTH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF MEHDI BAZARGAN AND AYATOLLAL KHOMEINI TO DISPATCH DELEGATIONS TO THE KURDS, HEADED BY MINISTER OF LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS DARIOUSH FOROUSHAR AND DR. MEHDI MOHAMMAD MOKRI, RESPECTIVELY, TO DETERMINE THE SOURCES OF THE UNREST AND TO DO WHATEVER POSSIBLE TO NIP IT IN THE BUD. THE PROBLEM FOR BOTH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND KHOMEINI, HOWEVER , IS THAT THE KURDS HAVE SHREWDLY SEEN THAT THE COLLAPSE OF THE MILITARY

AND THE EMASCULATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES MEAN THAT FOR THE MOMENT TEHRAN CAN DO LITTLE TO CHECK KURDISH DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY OR TO PREVENT DE FACTO IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME ASPECTS OF THEIR PROGRAM.

4. BUT DESPITE THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THEIR CURRENT POSITION, KURDISH LEADERS SEEM INCLINED TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY. THE MAIN GROUP, CONSISTING OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) AND THE FOLLOWERS OF SHEIKH EZZEDIN HOSSEINI, THE IMAM JOMEH OF MAHABAD, HAS BEEN TAKING THE LINE THAT THE KURDS WANT ONLY AUTONOMY WITHIN THE IRANIAN STATE. ON MARCH 1, ABDUL RAHMAN QASSEMLOU, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE KDP, CLAIMED THAT TALK OF A SEPARATIST MOVEMENT HAD BEEN STARTED BY ELEMENTS WISHING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT CONFUSED STATE IN IRAN AND WHICH HAVE CONTRACT WITH CERTAIN UNSPECIFIED FOREIGN NATIONS. QASSEMLOU SAID THAT THE KDP BELIEVES THAT FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL DEFENSE, FINANCIAL AFFAIRS AND LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PROJECTS MUST REMAIN UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE PROVINCES, AND SPECIFICALLY CITED POLICIES RELATING TO LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, CULTURE, AND EDUCATION IN THIS REGARD.

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5. HOSSEINI HAS TAKEN A SIMILAR LINE ON MARCH 4 HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE KURDS WERE GIVEN THE AUTONOMY THEY ARE SEEKING , IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE WOULD IN FACT BE STRENGTHENED SINCE " THE ENEMIES OF THE NATION WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONSPIRE IN THE NAME OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE." ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, HOWEVER, HOSSEINI HAS EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WILL SHOW THE STATESMANSHIP REQUIRED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE. ON MARCH 4 HE EXPRESSED FEARS THAT PEOPLE AROUND KHOMEINI MAY NOT BE KEEPING HIM FULLY INFORMED OF EVENTS IN KURDESTAN. HE SAID THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE AYATOLLAH WOULD BE PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE THE RIGHTS OF THE KURDS, BUT WENT ON TO WARN THAT IF THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT WHICH MIGHT SUCCEED IT DID NOT HEED THE DEMANDS OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE, THAT THERE WOULD BE TROUBLE. HE PROMISED THAT HIS FOLLOWERS WOULD ATTEMPT TO REALIZE THEIR GOALS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS, BUT DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED STRUGGLE. AS AN INCENTIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT TO BE FORTHCOMING, THE KDP, TOO, HAS HELD OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT INTRANSIGENCE ON TEHRAN'S PART WOULD ONLY RESULT IN LEADERSHIP OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT DEVOLVING UPON YOUNG RADICALS.

6. IN MAJOR DEMONSTRATION IN MAHABAD ON MARCH 2 THE KDP ISSUED A STATEMENT THAT SUMMED UP THE KURDISH POSITION. THE STATEMENT INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING POINTS: THE BOUNDARIES OF KURDESTAN SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE KURDISH PEOPLE AND SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION HISTORICAL, ECONOMIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS. COMMENT: THE LATTER MEANS THAT THE KURDS ARE LAYING CLAIM TO A MUCH LARGER AREA THAN THE PROVINCE OF KURDESTAN ITSELF. THE KURDISH HOMELAND WOULD INCLUDE THAT PROVINCE, KERMANSHAHAN, ILAM AND THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF WEST AZARBAIJAN, AN AREA OF 140,000 SQUARE KILOMETERS

THE EXECUTION OF SALAR JAF, A KURDISH MEMBER OF THE LAST MAJLES, IN MARCH 5, WHILE OSTENSIBLY FOR JAF'S EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE SHAH, IS APT TO BE VIEWED IN KURDESTAN AS HAVING ANOTHER, MORE SINISTER MOTIVE. THE END RESULT MAY WELL BE A PROGRESSIVE RADICALIZATION OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT AND ULTIMATELY VIOLENT CONFRONTATION WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

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AMB: WHSULLIVAN
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE 470
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA, IMMEDIATE 013 RUGMGL
USINT BAGHDAD, IMMEDIATE 014 RUEHCR
AMEMBASSY LONDON, IMMEDIATE 024 RUDIC
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, IMMEDIATE 023 RUEHMO

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/20/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: KURDISH UPRISING IN SANANDAJ

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY: ARMED KURDS IN SANANDAJ LAID SIEGE TO GOVERNMENT POSTS IN SANANDAJ MARCH 18. A CEASEFIRE MARCH 19 PROVED SHORT-LIVED. END SUMMARY.
3. SEVERE FIGHTING BROKE OUT IN SANANDAJ, THE CAPITAL OF KURDESTAN PROVINCE, ON THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 18. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHAT PRECIPITATED IT. THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED RADIO, THE VOICE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION (VOIR) REPORTED THAT A NUMBER OF OTHERWISE UNIDENTIFIED ARMED PEOPLE WENT TO THE CITY GARRISON TO DEMAND AMMUNITION BUT WERE REFUSED BY THE IMAM JOMEH OF SANANDAJ. THEREAFTER, THE CITY'S SHOPS WERE CLOSED AND RESIDENTS GATHERED OUTSIDE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S OFFICE. AT THAT POINT, ACCORDING TO VOIR, "ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS" BEGAN FIRING INTO THE CROWD, KILLING AND WOUNDING SEVERAL PEOPLE. THE PRESS, PERHAPS LESS INHIBITED BY THE SELF-CENSORSHIP (EXERCISED AT THE NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION) (NIRT) ORGANIZATION, REPORTS EVENTS SLIGHTLY DIFFERENTLY. KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL MARCH 20 SAYS THE ARMED GROUP WAS COMPOSED OF KURDS WHO

AND A POPULATION OF APPROXIMATELY 3,000,000, END COMMENT.

THERE SHOULD BE A KURDISH PARLIAMENT, POLULARLY ELECTED, WHICH WOULD BE THE HIGHEST LEGISLATIVE POWER IN THE PROVINCE. ALL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN THE PROVINCE SHOULD BE LOCALLY DIRECTED.

THERE SHOULD BE A PEOPLE'S ARMY, BUT THE POLICE AND GENDARMERIE SHOULD BE ABOLISHED AND REPLACED BY A NATIONAL GUARD. LAW ENFORCEMENT ELEMENTS IN KURDESTAN SHOULD BE UNDER LOCAL CONTROL.

KURDISH SHOULD BE THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIUM OF INSTRUCTION IN SCHOOL. PERSIAN COULD CONTINUE AS A SECOND OFFICIAL LANGUAGE.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS , AND RIGHTS OF ASSOCIATION AND TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE GUARANTEED, AND THE KURDISH PEOPLE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TRAVEL FREELY AND CHOOSE THEIR OWN OCCUPATIONS.

APPROXIMATELY 300,000 PEOPLE TURNED OUT FOR THE DEMONSTRATION, AND AS IF TO ADD EMPHASIS TO THEIR DETERMINATION TO REALIZE THEIR DEMANDS, MANY WERE CONSPICUOUSLY ARMED.

7. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IS CAUGHT ON THE HORNS OF A VERY DIFFICULT DILEMMA: ON THE ONE HAND, SEVERAL SPOKESMEN HAVE MADE CONCILIATING STATEMENTS AIMED AT PLACATING THE KURDS WHOM THEY KNOW CANNOT BE REINED IN AS LONG AS THE PRESENT NEAR PARALYSIS PREVAILS AT THE CENTER. ON THE OTHER, THESE SAME SPOKESMEN HAVE TALKED TOUGH ABOUT THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE IRANIAN NATION, TALK THAT MAKES THE KURDISH LEADERSHIP PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO MEET ITS DEMANDS IN FULL BY WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CLEARLY HOPES WILL CHECK THE GROWTH OF PARTICULARIST TENDENCIES AMONG OTHER MINORITIES AS WELL AS THOSE AMONG THE KURDS THEMSELVES.

WERE REFUSED AMMUNITION BY THE CLERGYMAN WHO HEADS THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE IN CHARGE OF THE SANAN^NDAJ GARRISON. WHEN A CROWD, WHICH INCLUDED THE KURDS WHO WERE DEMANDING AMMUNITION, MOVED TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S OFFICE TO PROTEST THE CLERGYMAN'S ACTION, THE SHOOTING BEGAN. ACCORDING TO VOIR, "A NUMBER OF OPPORTUNISTS AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS" THEREAFTER CAPTURED THE LOCAL NIRT FACILITIES AND BEGAN TO BROADCAST FALSE CLAIMS IN THE NAME OF THE ARMY COMMANDER TO BE REPRESENTATIVES OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND SUPPORTERS OF THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT. THE PRESS SAYS THAT WHEN THE SHOOTING BEGAN THE KURDS CAPTURED THE SANANAJ GARRISON COMMANDER, AS WELL AS THE NIRT FACILITIES AND SEVERAL POLICE, GENDARMERIE AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, AND LAID SIEGE TO THE GARRISON ITSELF.

4. IN ANY EVENT, FIGHTING CONTINUED INTO THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 19 WITH PERHAPS SCORES KILLED AND MANY MORE WOUNDED. ~~BY MID-DAY MARCH 19 KHOMEINI BROADCAST AN APPEAL THAT FIGHTING STOP. KHOMEINI'S STATEMENT CHARGED THAT THE OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE HAD BEEN INSTIGATED BY A GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO DID NOT WISH TO LEAVE THE MUSLIMS~~ (PGOI SPOKESMAN ENTEZAM TOLD PRESS KURDISH REPS TOLD HIM 82 WERE KILLED AND OVER 200 WOUNDED. ENTEZAM LAID THE ORIGINS OF THE INCIDENT TO A MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT PGOI MOVEMENT OF WHEAT.) BY MID-DAY MARCH 19 KHOMEINI BROADCAST AN APPEAL THAT FIGHTING STOP. KHOMEINI'S STATEMENT

CHARGED THAT THE OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE HAD BEEN INSTIGATED BY A GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO DID NOT WISH TO LEAVE THE MUSLIMS IN PEACE. HE SAID THAT HIS MOVEMENT HAS NO DISPUTE WITH ITS SUNNI BROTHERS, THAT THEY WERE ALL MEMBERS OF A SINGLE NATION AND ADHERENTS TO A SINGLE KORAN. ANYONE WHO ATTACKED THE ARMY, POLICE AND GENDARMERIE, WHICH HE SAID HAD BECOME THE GUARDIANS OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S INTERESTS AND INDEPENDENCE, WAS NOT PART OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLE BUT RATHER AN AGENT OF FOREIGNERS.

5. LATE MARCH 19 THE VOIR ANNOUNCED A CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN ARRANGED. APPARENTLY, HOWEVER, IT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BROKE DOWN, AN IMPRESSION REINFORCED BY VOIR'S REPEATED BROADCAST OF KHOMEINI'S STATEMENT AND ANOTHER APPEAL TO STOP THE SHOOTING MADE BY SEVERAL KURDISH RELIGIOUS LEADERS FROM SAQQEZ DURING THE EARLY HOURS OF MARCH 20. AS NEAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE, THE FIGHTING CONTINUES AS OF 1300 HOURS LOCAL TIME MARCH 20. WE ARE HANDICAPPED IN GETTING INFORMATION BY OUR RELUCTANCE TO APPROACH OUR KURDISH CONTACTS AT THIS TIME, LEST WE GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE SOMEHOW HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE UPRISING IN SANANDAJ.

6. WHILE THIS INCIDENT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A SPONTANEOUS ONE, AND ONE THAT MANY AMONG THE KURDISH LEADERSHIP MAY NOT HAVE WANTED AT THIS TIME, IT REPRESENTS TWO FACTS THAT WILL CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE ~~PROVISIONAL~~ PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

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THE FIRST IS THAT ITS WRIT IN OUTLYING AREAS SUCH AS KURDESTAN IS EXTREMELY TENUOUS. WE WERE RECENTLY TOLD BY AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM THE REGION THAT THE KURDS FOR THE MOMENT ENJOY A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF DE FACTO AUTONOMY BY DEFAULT. SECOND, IRAN'S SUNNIS APPEAR TO BE LESS THAN ENCHANTED BY THE ESSENTIALLY SHIA REVOLUTION IN THIS COUNTRY. IN ADDITION TO ITS CURRENT TROUBLES WITH THE OVERWHELMING SUNNI KURDS, THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS FACED CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION FROM OTHER SUNNI STRONGHOLDS AS WELL. THE MOST RECENT INCIDENT (ASIDE FROM THE ONE IN SANANDAJ) OCCURRED ON QUESHM ISLAND NEAR BANDAR ABBAS ON MARCH 17 WHEN "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES" (ALMOST CERTAINLY LOCAL SUNNIS) CAPTURED A GENDARMERIE POST. SULLIVAN##

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INF RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 014
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 026
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 025
RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 015
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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 3155

EO 12065 GDS 3/21/85 (TOMSETH , VL) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR, SOCI
SUBJ: KURDISH UPRISING IN SANANDAJ
REF: TEHRAN 3136

1. C- ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED VOICE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION'S FAILURE TO CONFIRM A NEW CEASEFIRE IN SANANDAJ DURING EARLY MORNING NEWSCASTS LEADS US TO CONCLUDE THAT FIGHTING PROBABLY CONTINUES THERE, REPEATED BROADCASTS OF AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI'S APPEAL TO THE KURDS TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS, FIRST MADE EVENING MARCH 20 AND AGAIN THIS MORNING, WOULD ALSO INDICATE THIS. REFERRING TO THE KURDS AS FELLOW IRANIANS AND CO-RELIGIONISTS, TALEGHANI SAID THAT THEIR LEGITIMATE DEMANDS WOULD BE MET AND THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IS PREPARED TO SEND A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO KURDESTAN TO LOOK INTO THEIR GRIEVANCES

3. WE DOUBT THAT SENDING A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FROM KHOMEINI WILL HAVE MUCH EFFECT. KHOMEINI, BAZARGAN AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ALREADY SENT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO KURDESTAN AS WELL AS OTHER AREAS WITH CONCENTRATIONS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES. RECEPTION OF THESE DELEGATIONS HAVE RANGED FROM COOL TO DOWNRIGHT HOSTILE.

3. WE HAVE BEEN HEARING MORE AND MORE REPORTS OF UNREST

AMONG VARIOUS OF IRAN'S ETHNIC MINORITIES, INCLUDING
THE AZARBAIJANI TURKS (BEING REPORTED SEPTTEL). WE
SUSPECT THIS PHONOMENON WILL INCREASE IN INTENSITY , AND
POS A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM INDEED FOR THE PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT .

SULLIVAN

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INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 016
RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 016
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 029
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 027
BT

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 3170

EO 12065 GDS 3/22/85 (TOHSETH, VL) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, SOCI, IR
SUBJ: KURDISH UPRISING IN SANANDAJ

REF: TEHRAN 3155

1.C- ENTIRE TEXT

2. IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING FIGHTING IN SANANDAJ, TWO HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATIONS WERE DISPATCHED TO THE CITY ON MARCH 21. ONE GROUP, COMPOSED OF AYATOLLAH TALAGHANI AND TWO OF KHOMEINI'S CLOSEST CONFIDANTS, REPORTEDLY MET WITH A GROUP OF KURDISH LEADERS HEADED BY AHMAD MOFTIZADEH LATE LAST NIGHT. THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED VOICE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION (VOIR) ANNOUNCED EARLY MARCH 22 THAT THE TALEGHANI AND MOFTIZADEH GROUPS WOULD CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS TODAY, THE SECOND DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY MINISTER OF INTERIOR JAVADI AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE MADANI. AS OF 0800 LOCAL TIME MARCH 22, KURDISH REBELS APPEARED TO OCCUPY MOST OF THE CITY, ALTHOUGH THE GARRISON WAS STILL IN THE HAND OF THE ARMY AND REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN REINFORCED BY HELICOPTER FROM URUMIEH (FORMERLY REZAYEH) AND TEHRAN. A STATEMENT CARRIED BY VOIR MARCH 21 CLAIMED THAT NO TROOPS HAD VENTURED OUTSIDE THE GARRISON, BUT BBC REPORTED MARCH 22 THAT TANKS HAD BEEN OBSERVED IN THE CITY'S STREETS.

3. WE ARE SCEPTICAL THAT ANY PEACE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN TALEGHANI AND MOFTIZADEH WILL HAVE MUCH LASTING EFFECT.

MOFTIZADEH HAS BEEN PROMINENT AMONG THE MODERATE KURDISH LEADERSHIP IN RECENT WEEKS, BUT WE SUSPECT THAT THE FIGHTING IN SANANDAJ OVER THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS HAS SEVERELY WEAKENED THE MODERATES' POSITION AMONG THEIR PEOPLE. AFP HAS BEEN CARRYING REPORTS SUGGESTING THAT LEADERSHIP IN SANANDAJ HAS PASSED TO MORE RADICAL FORCES, PERHAPS INCLUDING FEDAYING ELEMENTS. THE FIGHTING HAS PRESENTED THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WITH THE STERNEST CHALLENGE IT HAS YET FACED. IF THE SANANDAJ GARRISON IS FORCED TO SURRENDER OR EVACUATE, THE MILITARY'S WEAKNESS WILL BE CONFIRMED AND OTHER POTENTIAL DISSIDENT GROUPS WILL THEREBY BE ENCOURAGED TO PRESS THEIR DEMANDS.

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 506
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 018
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 108
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 026
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 032
RUEHMO /AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 031
BT

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 3194

EO 12065 GDS 3/24/85 (TOMSETH, VL) OP-R

TAGS: PINS, PINT, SOCI , IR

SUBJ: KURDISH UPRISING IN SANANDAJ

REF: TEHRAN 3155

1. (C) IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, THROUGH THE MEDIATION EFFORTS OF AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI, WAS WON A LITTLE TIME TO DEAL WITH ITS KURDISH PROBLEM. THE CEASEFIRE ACHIEVED MARCH 22 WAS STILL HOLDING EARLY MARCH 24. TENSIONS, HOWEVER, REMAIN HIGH. TALEGHANI AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY WHO ADDRESSED A LARGE CROWD IN SANANDAJ'S CENTRAL SQUARE MARCH 23 WERE HECKLED BY SOME AMONG THOSE PRESENT. AFP REPORTS ARMED KURDS ARE STILL MUCH IN EVIDENCE IN THE CITY.

2. (C) TALEGHANI WAS TO HAVE RETURNED TO TEHRAN LATE MARCH 23 WHERE HE WILL PRESENT KURDISH DEMANDS TO THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. WHILE EXPRESSING SYMPATHY FOR KURDISH ASPIRATIONS, TALEGHANI WARNED BEFORE DEPARTING SANANDAJ THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS POSED BY DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY. THAT IS A COMMODITY THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT MAY NOT HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF. THE GOVERNMENT IS PREDISPOSED TO RECOGNIZE ONLY RELATIVELY MODERATE KURDISH LEADERS SUCH AS AHMAD MOFTIZADEH OF SANANDAJ AND SHEIKH EZEDDIN HOSSEINI OF MAHABAD, WHEREAS THOSE FAVORING MORE RADICAL SOLUTIONS APPEAR INCREASINGLY TO BE IN THE ASCENDANT. IF THE PROVISIONAL

GOVERNMENT DOES NOT MOVE QUICKLY TO FORMALIZE THE CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF DE FACTO AUTONOMY THAT ALREADY EXISTS IN MUCH OF DURDESTAN-WHICH WOULD PROBABLY SATISFY THE MODERATES AMONG THE KURDS-IT IS LIKELY TO BE SOON CONFRONTED WITH FAR MORE EXTREME DEMANDS THAN ARE NOW BEING MADE.

3. (U) MEANWHILE, IN A MOVE THAT IS ONLY GENERALLY RELATED TO THE KURDISH PROBLEM, THE CABINET HAS ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION THAT P.M. BAZARGAN, HIS DEPUTY AMIR ENTEZAM AND DEFENSE MINISTER MADANI WILL LEAVE TODAY, MARCH 24, FOR KHUZESTAN AND GO ON TO TABRIZ MARCH 25. BOTH AREAS HAVE BEEN THE SCENE OF ETHNIC GRUMBLINGS AS WELL, AND THE VISIT HAS BEEN ADVERTISED AS AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PEOPLE'S PROBLEMS.

SULIVAN

BT

#3194



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 9, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

THROUGH: NEA/ARN - Mary Anne Casey
FROM: S/S-S - David Reuther
SUBJECT: Kurdish Views on Iraq and Iran

At his invitation, I lunched with Mohammed Dosky, ^{KDP rep.} May 3. Dosky's apparent purpose was to maintain his acquaintances with Department officers. During lunch he made the following observations:

Iraqi-Iranian Relations:

-- Iraq is using Jahlal Talabani to stir up the Kurds in Iran. Iraq's purpose is to demonstrate that if Iran did not cooperate with Iraq, Baghdad could make things difficult.

-- Iraq's chief objective is to make certain that the new government in Tehran lives up to the Algiers' Accord.

-- Due to the condition of his confinement during his sojourn in Iraq, Khomeini is not particularly disposed to Baghdad. Close Baghdad-Shah ties are a recent memory. Just before the Shah's fall, his sister made a highly publicized visit to the Shiite shrines.

Iraqi-Kurds in Iran:

-- Iraqi Kurds in Iran are under the impression that the new Tehran government will not enforce the Shah's *dispora* and will allow them to live in traditional Iranian Kurdish areas.

-- Few of the Iraqi Kurds, however, have in fact returned to the Kurdish areas.

-- Kurds and Local Government in Iran:

-- In the one Iranian province where Kurds pre-dominate, the Kurdish leadership established the familiar local advisory council. The council was set up at local initiative, and without direction from committees in

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RDS-4, 5/8/89

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Tehran. The Kurdish leadership has connections with the Kurdish Democratic Party.

-- In other provinces with large Kurdish minorities the Turkomans established the local committees first.

-- One gets the impression of significant decentralization in Iran. The border areas are loosely connected to the center.

Iraq's View of Kurdish Problem:

-- The Iraqis remain concerned about their own Kurdish minorities.

-- Iraq has pressured Turkey recently to more tightly control Ankara's Kurds.

Barzani's Kurdish Movement:

-- The sons of the late General Barzani remain active in Kurdish Democratic Party affairs.

-- Idris handles political matters.

-- Masoud handles military affairs.

-- A force loyal to Talabani and supported by Baghdad recently tried to ambush Barzani loyalists near the Turkey-Iranian-Iraqi border intersection. "Our Kurdish friends in Turkey" turned the tables and bloodied the Talabani unit.

Note: Mary Ann - I believe that Dosky's thrust essentially agrees with Baghdad's reporting (Baghdad 1006) and rumblings from Turkey (Ankara 2868, State 113267).

cc: S/S-S Director

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BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

JMS

(U) THE KURDS AND MOSCOW

Summary

(U) Recent disturbances in Iran have again focused international attention on the Kurds and raised questions about Soviet support for their cause. Historically, a change of political climate in any of the five countries--Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and the USSR--containing large Kurdish minorities has led to shifts in the focus of Kurdish activities generally; despite tribal and ideological divisions, developments in one country have tended to affect Kurds everywhere.

(C) The Shah's fall from power changed the political and military balance in Iran and the Gulf and rekindled hope among Iranian Kurds for greater national autonomy. Neighboring states are now worried about the possibility of the unrest in Iran spilling over into their territories. At the same time, they are suspicious about Soviet policy toward the Kurds.

(C) While the Soviets have aided the Kurds occasionally in the past, there is no evidence that they are currently doing so. Indeed, Moscow has done its best to stay aloof of the present round of Kurdish unrest. In any event, since the early 1970's, Soviet state-to-state relations with all the countries involved have consistently taken precedence over the needs and interests of the Kurds.


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GDS 5/14/85 (Baraz, R. H.)

Report No. 1179
May 14, 1979

Kurdish-Inhabited Area



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(U) Background

Recent disturbances in Iran have again focused international attention on the Kurds and raised questions about Soviet support for Kurdish separatism. Approximately 10-15 million Kurds inhabit the mountainous terrain that spans the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the USSR. The largest segment--about 5 million--lives in Turkey; the smallest--about 100,000--in Soviet Armenia. Most of these fiercely independent tribesmen are clustered in small villages dotting the scrub-covered hills of traditional Kurdistan (see map), but growing numbers--especially in Iraq and Turkey--have been attracted by the relative affluence in city life and joined the urban work force. In Iraq, many have been resettled in government-built villages where the army and security forces can better monitor their activities, which traditionally have included gun-running, smuggling, and banditry.

Historically, a change of political climate in any of the countries containing significant Kurdish minorities has led to shifts in the focus of Kurdish activities there. And despite the various tribal and ideological divisions among the Kurds themselves, developments in one country have tended to affect the Kurds living in neighboring states. In the 1920's and 1930's, Kurds in Turkey launched large uprisings against the secularist and centralizing drives of Ataturk, claiming the right of self-determination and statehood promised by the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. Since then, Iraq has been more of a focal point.

In the 1930's and 1940's, the influential Barzani tribe revolted against the Iraqi Government. Baghdad, with British aid, put down the revolt. In 1943, the late Mulla Mustafa Barzani fled to Iran, where in 1945 Kurds declared a Kurdish People's Republic in Kurdistan province. With the fall of the republic in 1946, Barzani took refuge in the USSR.

The Kurds in Iraq remained relatively quiet until 1958, when the fall of the Iraqi monarchy rekindled the dream of Kurdish self-rule. The new government, headed by Gen. Abdul Karim al-Kassem and aided by the USSR, pardoned the Barzani Kurds and permitted Mulla Mustafa Barzani to return. This truce was short-lived, however, and in 1961 Barzani once

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again took his people into the hills. The Iraqi Kurds under Barzani were fairly isolated, receiving only limited aid from Iran. In addition, they were divided among themselves, with Barzani commanding the northern mountain tribes and the more urban-oriented Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) under Jelial Talebani centered farther south. The Kassem government itself, however, was beset with internal problems and unable to direct full attention to its minorities.

Kassem's inability to deal with the Kurds was partly responsible for his downfall in 1963. The new Baath government promised the Kurds greater autonomy and even hinted that it might be willing to accept Kurdish demands that the new Iraqi constitution provide for a Kurdish vice-president, deputy chief of the armed forces, and one-third of the cabinet seats. But when Baghdad began to talk of uniting Iraq in some form with Syria and/or Egypt, the Kurds hardened their own demands for fear of being swallowed up by an Arab majority. In mid-1963, Iraqi forces attacked Kurdish strongholds. Once again, Barzani and his followers were saved by internal Iraqi dissensions; in the fall of 1963, the Baathist government fell and was replaced by a coalition headed by the Arif brothers.

The Arif brothers also tried to make peace with the Kurds, but their pan-Arab sentiments made this impossible. After an 18-month cease-fire, the central government attacked the Kurds. During the hiatus, Barzani had purged the DPK and forced many of his opponents to accept his leadership. At the same time, he made overtures to the Iraqi communists and to the Baathists, who, now out of power, were more willing to accommodate the Kurds. The purge of the DPK probably weakened the Kurdish military effort; in any event, over the summer and winter of 1965, the central government pushed the Kurds back into their mountain strongholds. In the spring of 1966, however, the offensive sputtered to an end and both sides accepted a cease-fire. The Arif government then offered Barzani new concessions which were quickly accepted. That cease-fire held for the next two years.

In 1968, the Arif government fell and the Baathists once again came to power. They attempted to split the Kurds by appealing to Jelial Talebani; when that ploy failed, they launched a new offensive which also foundered, owing to internal disorder and Iranian aid to the Kurds. In 1970, the central government put forward a 15-point plan offering the tribesmen autonomy in an area of northern Iraq, to go into effect in four years. Between 1970 and 1975, however, the Baathists managed to consolidate their hold on the

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countryside and opened contacts with the Iranians. When the implementation date rolled around, Baghdad reneged on the 15-point plan.

The Kurds thereupon took up arms again, but this proved to be the last time. In 1975, Iran and Iraq reached an understanding; the Shah closed the border and cut off support, thus eliminating a major source of arms and sanctuary for the Kurds. With that gone, the Iraqis were able to subdue the Kurdish area with relative ease. In early 1979, Barzani, the rallying point for the Kurds for 30 years, died an exile in Washington.

(C) New Opportunities

The Shah's fall from power radically changed the political and military balance in Iran and the Gulf. In doing so, it rekindled hope among Iranian Kurds for greater national autonomy, if not independence. As the crisis grew, they became increasingly vocal and active in their demands for autonomy. Considerable stores of arms and ammunition passed into their hands, and the army and security forces became virtually inactive in Kurdish areas. In March and April, in clashes with central authorities, the Kurds demonstrated that the government in Tehran was still too weak to exercise any real authority over the Iranian Kurds and would probably have to consider concessions.

Thus far, however, the Kurds claim to want only cultural autonomy and a greater say in the daily running of their lives, not independence. But at the same time, they may be storing arms and ammunition in preparation for an extended guerrilla war if the political authorities fail to respond to their demands. They are hindered, however, by their lack of a paramount leader.

Both the Turkish and Iraqi Governments are worried about a revival of Kurdish activity in their countries due to events in Iran. Some Turks claim that Kurds in Turkey are being supported and armed by the Soviets and seek to join their comrades in Iran for the purpose of establishing an independent Kurdistan. Except for individual adventures, however, the Turkish Kurds did not react to Barzani's movement in Iraq, even during his periods of greater autonomy. The official Iraqi line is that the Kurdish problem is a thing of the past, the situation having been defused by Baghdad's policy of resettlement and granting the Kurds some economic concessions. US Embassy Baghdad believes that the Iraqis are simply ignoring the problem in the hope

US Embassy Baghdad
disagreed with this Baghdad
1204, May 79

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it will disappear. Recently, Baghdad has dispatched additional troops into Kurdish areas to close off the border with Iran and keep an eye on things.

The Soviet Angle

(U) The Soviet-Kurdish relationship, if tenuous, is relatively old. Moscow probably first established contact with the Kurds in the early 1920's. Little resulted, however, because the USSR was far more concerned at the time with maintaining correct relations with both Turkey and Persia and countering British influence in the region. During World War II, the Soviets occupied part of Persia to curtail German activity there, insure that lend-lease conduits remained open, and again offset the British. In December 1945, the Soviets announced their support for the creation of an independent Kurdish People's Republic and refused to withdraw their forces from Iran as promised at the Tehran conference in 1943. But in the face of British and US objections, Moscow soon backed down and the Kurdish republic fell.

(U) With the fall of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958, Moscow pushed for Barzani's return, perhaps with the hope that he might become a valuable asset in Iraq after his long exile in the USSR. At first, Barzani formed an alliance--probably on Soviet recommendation--with the Iraqi communists. By mid-1959, however, this alliance was dead and Barzani purged his Kurdish movement of all who were tainted with communist heresy. When the Kassem government in Iraq began its crackdown on the Kurds in 1961, the Soviets made no move to help. Although Moscow may have been disappointed with Kassem and the turn that the Iraqi revolution had taken, its relations with Baghdad outweighed in importance any ties to the Kurds.

(U) Moscow's effort to remain aloof became increasingly difficult after Kassem's fall. The new Baath regime was violently anti-communist. When fighting between the Kurds and central government forces broke out in 1963, the USSR openly sided with the Kurds. On Soviet urging, Outer Mongolia placed the Kurdish question on the UN agenda, and on May 6, 1963, Pravda expressed support for the "Kurdish struggle for autonomy" and accused the Iraqis of repression. Later, in June, Red Star accused the Baghdad government of practicing genocide on the Kurds. But Soviet support remained chiefly rhetorical, although the USSR during that period did cease supplying Baghdad with large amounts of arms.

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(U) The Soviet position shifted again with the fall of the Baathists in November 1963. Propaganda support for the Kurdish cause tapered off somewhat. In addition, Moscow began to supply the Arif regime with arms on a relatively large scale. Throughout the five-year Arif rule, Moscow inched closer and closer to Baghdad and paid correspondingly less heed to the Kurds.

(U) When the Baathists returned to power in 1968, Moscow's working relationship with Baghdad continued to improve--especially with the formation of the United Front government, which included the Iraqi communists. The Kurdish question was not allowed to endanger state-to-state ties. Although Pravda on October 3, 1968, defended the Kurdish fight for greater autonomy as "just" and the following spring insisted that any arms given Iraq were not to be used against the Kurds, Soviet support for the Kurds evaporated with the signing of a Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty in 1972. Barzani came to depend more and more on the Shah. By 1975, Moscow was doing nothing to help the Kurds in Iraq.

(C) Indeed, the entire Kurdish question seemed moot as far as the USSR was concerned until the fall of the Shah. Thereupon, many of the Kurdish leaders, including Jelal Talebani, who had contacts with the Soviets in the past, returned to Iran. Furthermore, the Tudeh Party, the Soviet-recognized Iranian communist party, is heavily Kurdish in composition; one of its centers of strength is in Iranian Kurdistan.

(C) Despite claims in the Turkish press that the Soviets are airlifting arms to the Kurds in Iran, there is no evidence that the Soviets are currently aiding the Kurds anywhere. Soviet media, especially the clandestine radio stations, the National Voice of Iran and Bizim Radyo, which is directed at Turkey, have expressed some sympathy for Kurdish aspirations, but Moscow has been careful to distance itself from the Kurdish separatism. It stresses that it opposes any move to dismember Iran. On April 13, for example, the NVOI emphasized that the new Islamic republic would guarantee the rights of all minorities. The next day, Pravda carried a similar message and denied that the USSR was in any way connected with national unrest in Iran. Soviet reporting on the violence in Kurdistan claimed in general that it was the result of insufficient minority knowledge of the new government's policies and of CIA meddling.

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Prospects

(U) If history has taught the Kurds anything, it is that others consider their interests expendable, and that while the USSR may occasionally voice support for greater Kurdish autonomy, it will not risk its relations with Iran, Iraq, Turkey, or Syria to aid the Kurds.

(C) If the government in Tehran fails to reestablish control over Iran's outlying areas, or if the country descends into civil war or chaos, the Soviets may be willing to provide some covert aid. They would do so, however, only as a means of increasing their influence in Iran as a whole, not to aid the creation of an independent Kurdistan. As in the days before the Shah's fall, Moscow apparently recognizes that its main asset, the Tudeh Party, is too small and weak to be a significant force on its own and that tactical alliances with some of the nationalist groupings, including the Kurds, may be advisable.

(C) For the time being, however, the Soviets do not seem ready to make any real commitment, largely because they are not sure what direction the revolution in Iran is taking. They do not want to alienate the present government or queer the Tudeh's future by acting prematurely. Thus, Moscow will probably continue to support the notion of greater Kurdish autonomy in Iran, but not go beyond rhetoric in doing so.

(C) Should Turkey enter a period of economic and political instability, Moscow might be tempted to try to exploit the Kurdish issue there as well, but it would act only with extreme caution. Ankara can be expected to resent strongly even the slightest hint of Soviet meddling. Prime Minister Ecevit reportedly raised Bizim Radyo's Kurdish language broadcasts with Soviet Premier Kosygin during his trip to Moscow last year. Otherwise, for the last few years, Moscow has done its best to allay Turkish suspicions of Soviet designs.

(C) Since the early 1970's, Soviet state-to-state relations with Iraq have consistently taken precedence over Kurdish interests. Given the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and Baghdad's emergence as a leader of the Steadfastness Front, this policy line is likely to persist. Should existing tensions in Iraqi-Soviet relations increase, however, and the Baathist government continue and intensify its anti-communist campaign, Moscow could again come to view the Kurds as a counter. But it is hardly likely to do so,

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particularly because the Kurds, with the loss of Barzani, have no undisputed leader and focal point, and because Iraq's pacification program seems to have generally succeeded.

(U) Underlying the Soviet caution with regard to the Kurds outside the USSR inevitably is Moscow's growing awareness of the potential problem of its own minorities in Central Asia. While the 100,000 Soviet Kurds themselves hardly present a threat within the USSR, they could serve as an unwanted example for the Soviet Muslims.

Prepared by W. Limberg
x29201

Approved by R. H. Baraz
x29194

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LIMIT

INFO: 12465: GDS 5/17/79 (ST. MARY, ...)
 INFO: MOPS, PTPR, II, CU
 SUBJECT: (C) ANTI-RECIPE MILITARY UNIT
 NORTHWEST IRAN

REF: ANKARA 3702

1. ENTIRE TEXT: ANKARA 3702

SUMMARY: WE HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION ON AN ORGANIZED
 MILITARY UNIT IN NORTHWESTERN IRAN, BUT BELIEVED TO
 INDICATE SOME OPPOSITION MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE
 AREA.

WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING AS SPECIFIC ABOUT MILITARY
 UNITS IN NORTHWESTERN IRAN AS INFO CONTAINED IN
 REPORT, BUT SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING IN NAJAF
 THREE WEEKS AGO, THERE HAVE BEEN PERSISTENT STORIES
 OF ARMED FORCES OF SOME KIND ARE OPERATING IN THAT
 AREA AND ELSEWHERE. MOST CURRENT LINE INDICATES GROUP
 OF MILITARY SUPPORTERS OF MONARCHY ARE ACTIVE AND
 LEADER BY FORMER LT. GEN. AZIZOLLAH PALIZBAN. SOME
 REPORTS INDICATE FORMER GROUND FORCES COMMANDER GENERAL
 IS INVOLVED WITH THIS GROUP.

ONE OF OUR MORE SENSITIVE RIGHTIST SOURCES HAS SPOKEN
 OF PLANS TO ORGANIZE MILITARY UNITS IN THIS FASHION, BUT
 PROVIDED NO DETAILS. WHILE THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME
 OPPOSITIONIST ACTIVITY IN FRONTIER AREAS, IT IS ALSO
 TRUE THAT STORIES OF ORGANIZED MILITARY UNITS ARE
 OFTEN PRO-MONARCHIST ATTEMPTS TO KEEP IRANIAN POT ROIL-
 ✓ WE WILL ADVISE IF ANY OF OUR INTELLIGENCE SURFACTS OR
 ACTS, AND WOULD APPRECIATE BEING KEPT INFORMED OF
 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.

REFERENCE TO ...
 SUBJECT: ANKARA 3702 (S) (P) (U) (S) (A)

4

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TEHRAN 5121

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978-12-31

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 APPRV: T.E. SCHAEFER
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USDAO/TEHRAN 08738

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 N-2
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 G-2

SECRET NOFORN DAC AUG 79

THIS IS IR 6 846 0264 79

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.

1. COUNTRY: IRAN (IR)
2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 946 2264 79
3. TITLE: AN IRANIAN'S PERCEPTIONS OF KURDISH OBJECTIVES IN IRAN (U)
4. OMITTED.
5. DATE OF INFO: 790727
6. DATE OF REPORT: 790825
7. DATE/PLACE OF ACQ: 790727/TEHRAN, IRAN
8. REFERENCES: T-SC1-20492, CONTINUES
 - T-XXY-42215, CONTINUES
 - U-UEE-49218, CONTINUES
9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE C, INFO 2
10. ORIGINATOR: USDAO (DATT) TEHRAN, IRAN
11. REQUEST EVAL: ICR
12. PREPARING OFF: T.E.SCHAEFER, COL, USAF, DATT
13. APPROVING AUTH: T.E.SCHAEFER, COL, USAF, DATT
14. SOURCE: OTS
15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: SECRET - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS - USEL TO PROTECT THE COLLECTION

ACTIVITIES OF THIS DAO. LIRC-NO.

16. SUMMARY: (S/NOFORN) AN IRANIAN OF KURDISH EXTRACTION INDICATES THAT CURRENT KURDISH GOALS ARE NOT LIMITED TO AUTONOMY FOR THE IRANIAN KURDS, BUT THAT THEIR OBJECTIVES ARE TO OVERTHROW THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND ESTABLISH A MORE REPRESENTATIVE AND RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE THE CLERGY FROM QOM. NO OTHER SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED THAT KURDISH GOALS ARE OTHER THAN GREATER AUTONOMY AND SELF RULE. IN DATT'S OPINION THERE IS NO GROUP OF IRANIANS AT THIS TIME THAT CAN OVERTHROW THE ENTRENCHED KHOMEINI REGIME.

17 THRU 21 OMITTED.

22. DETAILS:

A. (S/NOFORN) BACKGROUND: AN IRANIAN BUSINESSMAN OF KURDISH EXTRACTION STATED TO THE DATT THAT THE CURRENT KURDISH CONFLICT IN WESTERN IRAN IS NOT SIMPLY A MATTER OF THE KURDS ATTEMPTING TO GAIN AUTONOMY AND INCREASED BENEFITS FROM THE PROI. PATHER, HE SAID, THEIR OBJECTIVE IS TO OVERTHROW THE PRESENT KHOMEINI LED GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. GEN PALIZBAN, HE STATED, IS THE LEADER OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT AND HE HAS 500,000 FOLLOWERS IN TEHRAN ALONE. HE ADDED THAT THE CONFLICT IN KORDESTAN AND W. AZARBAIJAN IS JUST THE BEGINNING, AND IN TWO MONTHS THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION WILL START IN TEHRAN. HE STATED HE IS SENDING HIS FAMILY OUT OF IRAN IN A FEW DAYS AND HE WILL REMAIN TO FIGHT AND IS FULLY PREPARED TO GIVE UP HIS LIFE TO RID IRAN OF THE AYATOLLAH CONTROLLED GOVERNMENT.

B. (S/NOFORN) KHOMEINI'S FOLLOWING: NOT ONLY ARE MIDDLE CLASS IRANIANS FED UP WITH KHOMEINI AND HIS STUPID CLERGY, HE SAID, BUT MANY OF THE POOR ARE TOTALLY DISCOURAGED WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAN. KHOMEINI, HE SAID, HAS LOST THE BACKING OF THE PEOPLE AND HIS FOLLOWING IS NOW LESS THAN 30%. BESIDES, HE ADDED, KHOMEINI NEVER TRULY HAD THE SUPPORT INDICATED BY THE MASS MARCHES PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION, SINCE MOST OF THE PEOPLE WERE PAID TO MARCH.

C. (S/NOFORN) KURDISH STRENGTH: WHEN ASKED BY DATT IF PALIZBAN HAD THE MILITARY STRENGTH TO COMBAT THE IRANIAN ARMY, ESPECIALLY WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF TANKS AND APC'S INTO THE BATTLE, HE RESPONDED THAT THE ARMY HAD PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF THE KURDS BY MOVING THE TANKS OUT OF

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 USDAO/TEHRAN 08735

THE SECURITY OF THEIR COMPOUNDS INTO THE OPEN. HE INDICATED THAT TANKS COULD BE NEUTRALIZED BY THE KURDS, BUT HE WOULD NOT VOLUNTEER ANY INFO CONCERNING TYPE OF WEAPONS THAT MIGHT BE USED.

D. (S/NOFORN) FUTURE GOVERNMENT: WHEN ASKED WHAT TYPE OF FUTURE GOVT HE ENVISIONED FOR IRAN, HE REPLIED, "SOMETHING OTHER THAN A DICTATORSHIP" AND "A GOVERNMENT THAT REPRESENTED THE PEOPLE." A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT WITH A STRONG LEADER WAS REQUIRED, HE SAID, AND ADDED THAT BAKHTIAR (FORMER PM) WAS THE CHOICE OF MANY IRANIANS.

ORIGINATOR COMMENTS:

A. (S/NOFORN) DATT WAS KNOWN SOURCE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AND HAS SEEN HIM SEVERAL TIMES AT SOCIAL GATHERINGS. SOURCE MANAGES HIS OWN BUSINESS AND HAS SAID HE WILL NEVER LEAVE IRAN. HE HAS AN EXTREME DISTASTE FOR KHOMEINI AND HIS "FOLLOWERS." THIS IS THE FIRST TIME HE HAS DISCUSSED PALIZBAN AND KURDISH OBJECTIVES. MOST PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS ONLY INCLUDED REMARKS OF HOW BAD THINGS WERE GOING IN IRAN AND HOW INEPT KHOMEINI WAS AS A LEADER.

B. (S/NOFORN) DATT BELIEVES SOURCE HAS OVERSTATED PALIZBAN'S FOLLOWING AND THE FACT THAT PALIZBAN IS THE LEADER OF THE KURDS. NO INDIVIDUAL AT THIS TIME CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS A SINGLE LEADER OF THE KURDS. ALSO, WE HAVE NO OTHER EVIDENCE AT THIS TIME TO INDICATE THAT THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THE IRANIAN KURDS IS TO OVERTHROW THE KHOMEINI LED PGOI. KURDISH EFFORTS TO DATE INDICATE THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO FIGHT FOR MORE SELF RULE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME EXPECTING A LARGER SHARE OF THE BENEFITS THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT CAN PROVIDE.

C. (S/NOFORN) ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NUMEROUS DISILLUSIONED AND UNSATISFIED IRANIANS (MOSTLY MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASS), THIS OFFICE DOES NOT FORESEE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE (NEXT TWO TO THREE MONTHS), A SECOND REVOLUTION AND DISOLVEMENT OF THE PGOI. NO SINGLE GROUP OF IRANIANS AT THIS TIME ARE SUFFICIENTLY ORGANIZED, ARMED AND TRAINED TO OVERTHROW THE ENTRENCHED KHOMEINI REGIME.

D. (S/NOFORN) HOWEVER THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT IF ENOUGH OF THE POORER CLASS RELIGIOUSLY CONSERVATIVE IRANIANS BECOME SUFFICIENTLY DISGRUNTLED AND DISENCHANTED WITH KHOMEINI AND HIS INABILITY TO MEET THEIR RISING EXPECTATIONS FOSTERED BY THE 1ST REVOLUTION, AND IF THIS GROUP IS PRESENTED WITH A STRONG MAN/ORGANIZATION WHICH PRESENTS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CHAOTIC DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF THE KHOMEINI GOVERNMENT, THEN WE WILL SEE A BACKLASH REVOLUTION OR AT LEAST INSTALLATION OF A NEW "NON-KHOMEINI" GOVERNMENT. IF THE ECONOMY CONTINUES TO FALTER AND THE MASSES SEEK NEW LEADERSHIP, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS FOR A LEFTIST TAKEOVER WITH A RESULTING SOCIALIST REGIME. THE KURDS MAY BE STRONG ENOUGH TO INSURE MORE AUTONOMY FOR THEMSELVES IN WESTERN IRAN, BUT AT THIS TIME WE THINK THEY ARE INCAPABLE OF EXPANDING THEIR INFLUENCE AND STRENGTH TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT. IF THE KURDS, AZARBAIJANS, ARABISTANS, AND OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS (SIMULTANEOUS REBELLION) AND GAIN MUTUAL SUPPORT AND COOPERATION TOWARDS THE SINGLE GOAL OF TOPPLING THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, THEN IN OUR OPINION THEY

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COULD SUCCEED. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT ALL THESE GROUPS WILL ATTEMPT NOR EVEN WANT TO COMBINE THEIR EFFORTS AT THIS TIME. ONE QUALIFICATION TO OUR COMMENTS MUST BE MADE THOUGH. IF PALIZBAN IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS CAN NEUTRALIZE THE ARMY IN KORDOSTAN (THIS IS A POSSIBILITY) AND THE MASSES BEGIN TO ABANDON KHOMEINI BECAUSE OF FURTHER DECAY OF THE ECONOMY, THEN PALIZBAN (NOT NECESSARILY THE KURDS) MAY BE ACCEPTED AS A NEW LEADER. IN SUMMARY, WE FORESEE KHOMEINI REMAINING FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AHEAD. PALIZBAN AND THE KURDS MAY OBTAIN GAINS IN SELF-LEADERSHIP AND MORE INFLUENCE IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, BUT THEIR STRENGTH IS NOT AND PROBABLY WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO TOPPLE THE AYATOLLAH AND HIS REVOLUTIONARIES.

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S E C R E T

TEHRAN 8738/2

DE RUQMHR #8877 220 **

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TO USINT BAGHDAD 0225

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 08877

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: CVIS, IR (JAFF, SARCHEL)

SUBJECT: NIV CASE

CLASS: LIMITED OFFICIAL

CHRG: STATE 8/7/79

APPRV: CONS: RHMOREFIELD

DRFTD: CONS: OSRICHARDSON

AV

CLEAR: AGATT

DISTR: CONS-3 AMB DCM

CRU

REF: BAGHDAD 1635

1. CONFIRM ISSUANCE OF B-2 VISA FEB. 6, 1979 TO SARCHEL JAFF. HIS FAMILY, WHICH ACTIVE IN AGROBUSINESS, WELL AND FAVORABLY KNOWN TO OFFICE OF AGRICULTURAL ATTACHE TEHRAN.

2. ACCORDING TO AGATT , FAMILY CAME TO IRAN FROM IRAQ, FOUND FAVOR, AND PROSPERED. FORTUNES SUPPOSEDLY DECLINED WITH THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND ALL FAMILY MEMBERS EITHER LEFT IRAN OR WENT INTO HIDING. WE ARE UNABLE TO EXPLAIN CURRENT SPECIAL INTEREST TAKEN IN SUBJECT BY GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ. THERE WAS NO DOUBT HERE THAT HE WAS MEDICAL STUDENT PRIOR TO LEAVING IRAN, LAINGEN

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 09448

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BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09448

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGY: STATE 8/26/79
APPRV: CHARGE:BLTOMSETH
DRFTD: POL:NASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG ECON
DAO CHRON RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/26/75 (SWIFT, E. ANN) OR-P
TAGS: PINS PGOV IR
SUBJECT: FIGHTING IN KURDESTAN CONTINUES

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. PGOI'S GET TOUGH POLICY WITH KURDS APPEARS TO HAVE
LED TO INCREASINGLY SERIOUS KURDISH ATTACKS. OVER THE
PAST TWO DAYS, KURDISH REBELS APPEAR TO HAVE ATTACKED
PGOI FORCES IN SEVERAL POINTS IN KURDISTAN AND WEST
AZERBAIJAN, SEIZING AND APPARENTLY HOLDING FOR AT LEAST
TWO DAYS THE TOWN OF SAGREZ LOCATED MIDWAY BETWEEN
SANANDADJ AND THE TEMPORARY DEFACTO HEADQUARTERS OF THE
KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN MAHABAD. KDP LEADER
GHASSEMLOU AND KURDISH RELIGIOUS LEADER HOUSSENI ARE
STILL APPARENTLY IN OR NEAR MAHABAD AND WHILE IT IS
UNCLEAR IF THE KDP CONTROLS THE CITY OF MAHABAD, KURDISH
REBELS HAVE SEIZED THE TV MAHABAD RADIO STATION AND ARE
PREPARING TO USE IT.

3. ACCORDING TO AF REPORTS THE KDP IS TRYING TO
NEGOTIATE A CEASEFIRE IN THE AREA, BUT EMBASSY DOES NOT
BELIEVE THAT EITHER SIDE IS PREPARED TO COME TO TERMS
AT THE MOMENT. AT PRESENT KURDS APPEAR TO BE HOLDING
THEIR OWN, ALTHOUGH PGOI IS CONTINUING TO SEND RE-
INFORCEMENTS TO THE AREA.

4. ACCORDING TO REPORTS REACHING EMBASSY, TENSION IN
BOTH TURKISTAN AND BALUCHI AREAS ARE INCREASING AND
PEOPLE THERE ARE WATCHING EVENTS IN KURDISTAN CLOSELY.

5. EMBASSY SPECULATES THAT ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION
AUGUST 26 OF EDITOR OF GOVERNMENT PAPER KAYHAN ALTHOUGH
SEEMINGLY UNRELATED TO KURDISTAN WILL SERVE TO FURTHER
HEIGHTEN TENSIONS IN TEHRAN AND QOM AND MAKE PGOI MORE
DETERMINED TO "WIN" AGAINST KURDS. TOMSETH

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RUHQHQA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI

RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

RHHMBRA/FICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI

RUCFBA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA

RUCESAA/FICEURANT NORFOLK VA

RUCSAAA/USCINCPAC WASHINGTON GE

RUCSAAA/USDAC WASHINGTON GE

RUEFAAR/CINCUSAFB RAMSTEIN AB GE

RUEFAAA/CINCUSAREUS HEIDELBERG GE

RUEFSEA/TFB BOEHRING MIK GE

RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

RUEFBAA/COMIDRFASTFOR MANAMA BA

RUCIPEA/TAC LANGLEY AFB VA

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF USDAC/TEHRAN 09447

FOR:

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SECRET NOFORN WNIINTEL DAO AUG 79

THIS IS IR 6 846 0297 79

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.

1. COUNTRY: IRAN (IR)/IRAQ (IZ)
2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 846 0297 79
3. TITLE: CONDITIONS IN WESTERN IRAN (U)
4. AB)
5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 790822
6. DATE OF REPORT: 790825
7. DATE/PLACE OF ACQ: 790822/TEHRAN, IRAN
8. REFERENCES: T-XXX-42015, CONT; T-301-20492, CONT
U-DED-49219, CONT
9. ASSESSMENT: ~~SECRET~~ INFO 2
10. ORIGINATOR: USPRO (DATT) TEHRAN, IRAN
11. REQUEST EVAL: ICR
12. PREPARING OFFICER: T.E.SCHAEFER, COL, USAF, DATT
13. APPROVING AUTH: T.E.SCHAEFER, COL, USAF, DATT
14. SOURCE: FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHE
15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: SECRET - WARNING NOTICE -
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS USED TO PROTECT SOURCE AND

SECRET USDAO TEHRAN 09447/1

COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF THIS DAO. DIRC-NO. 17. SUMMARY: (S//NOFORN//NINTEL) LOCAL MILITARY ATTACHE TAHSI BAY VISIT TO E. AZARBAIJAN AND KURDESTAN FROM 12 TO 21 AUG 79. TAHSI BAY, KURDISH RELIGIOUS LEADER, 227TH INFANTRY'S S. S. INFLUENT JUSTICE COMMITTEE CHIEF, 1949'S AND 1951'S INFLUENT. NEARLY ALL OF W. IRAN FROM SAHANDAJ (ZANJAN) TO SANANDAJ CONTROLLED BY KURDS AND POSSIBLY AS A RESULT RELATIVELY PEACEFUL.

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17. SUBJECT:

A. (S//NOFORN//NINTEL) WESTERN MILITARY ATTACHE, WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF HIS DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, JOINED A SMALL PARTY OF POLITICALISTS AND AN INTERPRETOR FOR A VISIT TO WESTERN IRAN. TRIP STARTED TROY TEHRAN ON 18 AUG AND PROCEEDED TO BILJAN (3214N/48022E), ZANJAN (3640N/48229E), CHIRAN (3628N/4800E), SAHABAD (3214N/4416E), MAHABAD (3244N/4824E), ZANJAN (3628N/4824E), THEN S. S. TO SANANDAJ (3517N/4720E) AND THEN RETURNED TO TEHRAN VIA BIJAN, ZANJAN AND TEHRAN.

B. (S//NOFORN//NINTEL) GENERALLY CONDITIONS WERE CALM THROUGHOUT THE AREA. NO MAJOR BATTLES/COMFLOTS WERE SEEN DURING THE TRIP. THERE WAS NO SIGE OF SANANDAJ. ALL GUYARMAHIA GARRISONS SEEN BY THIS GROUP BETWEEN ZANJAN AND SANANDAJ EXCEPT FOR ONE WERE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE KURDS. THE GROUP WAS TOLD BY THE KURDS AND PARTIALLY CONFIRMED THROUGH THEIR OWN OBSERVATIONS THAT MOST OF THE IRANIAN 26TH DIV AND 64TH DIV ARMY UNITS DID NOT LEAVE THEIR GARRISONS DURING THIS TIME FRAME. NO TANKS WERE SEEN IN UPURNIAH AREA AND A FEW M-48'S SEEN IN FIANSAHAB.

C. (S//NOFORN//NINTEL) IN THE OPINION OF THE SOURCE THERE WERE SCATTERED SPORADIC STIRRISES IN THE AREA BUT NO MAJOR BUILD UP OF KURDISH FORCES FOR ANY OFFENSIVE PLANS. THE KURDS WERE ON THE DEFENSE HE SAID, AND MOST NEWS REPORTS OF KURDISH BATTLES WERE GREATLY INFLATED AND SOME WERE FABRICATIONS. WHEN DRIVING BETWEEN BIJAN AND ZANJAN THEY HEARD RADIO REPORTS OF A MAJOR BATTLE BETWEEN THE KURDS AND PASDARANS NEAR ZANJAN, THEY HEADED FOR THE AREA AND FOUND NO BATTLE. THE ONLY PASDARANS SEEN WERE SIX OR SEVEN ABOUT 8KM OUTSIDE OF ZANJAN CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS AT A

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D. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) IRAQI KURDS (ACCORDING TO INTERPRETOR WHO SAID HE LIVED IN KORDRESTAN) WERE SEEN IN MANY IRANIAN VILLAGES. SOURCE STATED THAT GENERALLY ONE COULD DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE IRAQI KURD AND THE IRANIAN KURD BY THE TYPE OF WEAPON THEY CARRIED. THE IRAQI'S HAD KALASH-NIKOV'S AND THE IRANIAN'S G-35. SOURCE ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT UNUSUAL FOR THE IRAQI KURDS TO ENTER IRAN TO VISIT RELATIVES AND SEEK FOOD. HOWEVER, THEIR PRIMARY REASON FOR CROSSING INTO IRAN AT THIS TIME IS TO OBTAIN WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION.

E. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) CONTACTS WITH IRAQI KURDS INDICATED THAT BORDER CROSSINGS WITH SMALL GROUPS WAS NOT DIFFICULT. THE KURDS TOLD OF A 20KM STRIP - "ZONE OF DEATH" - THAT RAN FOR 1000KM INSIDE OF IRAQ ALONG THE SYRIAN, TURKISH AND IRANIAN BORDER. SMALL FORTIFICATIONS AND TOWERS WERE PLACED AT INTERVALS ALONG THE STRIP AND THESE WERE MANNED BY ONE TO THREE IRAQI GUARDS. PENETRATION INTO AND THROUGH THE ZONE EVEN IN DAYLIGHT WAS NOT DIFFICULT IF GROUPS WERE SMALL AND REMAINED ALERT. PENALTY FOR BEING CAUGHT IN THE ZONE WAS DEATH IF YOU COULD READ AND 20 YEARS IMPRISONMENT IF YOU COULD NOT. IRAQI KURDS, THEY WERE TOLD, WOULD STILL ATTEMPT TO GROW SOME FOODSTUFFS IN THE AREA BECAUSE IT WAS SO FERTILE. EVEN THOUGH THE PRICE MIGHT BE DEATH, WATER WAS CARRIED IN FOR NEEDED GROWTH OF PLANTS.

F. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) IRANIAN KURDS DISCUSSED WITH THIS GROUP AN IRAQI KURDISH LEADER BY THE NAME OF DR. MOHAMMAD OSMAN SURANI WHO LED THE UNITED SOCIALIST PARTY OF KORDRESTAN. THEY SAID IT WAS A UNIFICATION OF OTHER KURDISH PARTIES AND THAT ONE OF THEIR GOALS WAS TO HELP IRANIAN KURDS. NO FURTHER INFO PROVIDED.

G. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) SOURCE SAID THAT THEY HAD TALKED WITH THE CHIEF OF THE URUMIEN KOMITEH, MR. HASSANI. HE WAS A TALL, WELL BUILT W. AZARBAIJAN WHO WAS EXTREMELY POSITIVE ABOUT HIS CAPABILITIES FOR CONTROLLING THE KURDS. SOURCE INDICATED HE REMINDED HIM OF AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI. IN THAT HASSANI WAS A RUTHLESS EGOTIST. SOURCE FELT THAT HIS EFFECTIVENESS WOULD ONLY BE LIMITED TO THE CITY OF URUMIEN SINCE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRYSIDE WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE. THE COUNTRYSIDE WAS VIRTUALLY UNCONTROLLED.

H. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) SOURCE STATED THAT HE HAD TALKED WITH THE KURDISH RELIGIOUS LEADER EZZEDDIN HOSSEINI. HOSSEINI SAID THAT THE KURDS DO NOT WANT TO FIGHT THE IRANIAN ARMY, BUT THAT THEY JUST DESIRED THEIR AUTONOMY. THE KURDS, HE ADDED, DO NOT WANT TO HURT THE PASDARANS AND MOJAHADEEN, BUT ONLY WISH TO TAKE THEIR WEAPONS AND AMMO AND SEND THEM AWAY. SOURCE STATED THAT HE HAD SEEN A BUS

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1979-204-020

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ROAD OF PASDARANS STOPPED BY THE KURDS (UNDER THE DISGUISE OF AN AUTO ACCIDENT) AND ALL WEAPONS WERE REMOVED FROM THE PASDARANS WITHOUT A SHOT FIRED. THE KURDS TOLD THE BUS DRIVER TO TURN AROUND AND RETURN THE PEOPLE TO TEHRAN. HOSEINI SAID THE KURDS HAD NOT BEHEADED ANY IRANIAN AND IF THAT DID HAPPEN, THE PASDARANS BEHEADED THEIR OWN PEOPLE FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.

I. (S/NOFORN/WHINTEL) DATT ASKED SOURCE IF GEN PALIZBAN'S STATUS WAS DISCUSSED OR KNOWN BY THE KURDS THAT HE MET. SOURCE REPLIED LITTLE WAS KNOWN ABOUT PALIZBAN EXCEPT THAT HE WAS NOT LINKED WITH THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP). NO OTHER INFO WAS PROVIDED BY THE KURDS CONCERNING PALIZBAN.

ORIGINATOR COMMENTS:

A. (S/NOFORN/WHINTEL) SOURCE (HIGHLY PROTECT) IS A SEASONED MILITARY ATTACHE IN IRAN. DATT AND SOURCE MEET AT LEAST TWICE A WEEK TO DISCUSS THE IRANIAN SITUATION. HIS INFO HAS BEEN VERY ACCURATE IN THE PAST.

B. (S/NOFORN/WHINTEL) UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD ANY FOLLOW-UP REPORT INDICATE THAT A MILITARY ATTACHE (MILATT) IN IRAN MADE A TRIP THROUGH WESTERN IRAN. ALL MILATTS ARE RESTRICTED FROM TRAVELING BY SURFACE TRANSPORT OUTSIDE TEHRAN AND ALL TRIPS BY AIR MUST FIRST BE APPROVED BY THE J-2 PROTOCOL AND FOREIGN LIASON OFFICE. OBVIOUSLY ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THIS TRIP ASSOCIATED WITH A FOREIGN MILATT WOULD MEAN INVESTIGATIONS AND POSSIBLY DISMISSAL.

C. (S/NOFORN/WHINTEL) IN DATT'S OPINION, BASED ON THIS FIVE DAY, ON-SCENE INSPECTION TOUR OF W. IRAN AND ADDITIONAL INFO FROM OTHER SOURCES, THE SITUATION IN KORDESHAN AND W. AZARBAIJAN HAS BEEN GREATLY EXAGGERATED, OVERSTATED AND BLOWN OUT OF PROPORTION BY THE FARSI PRESS. IT APPEARS THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN ATTEMPT BY SOMEONE OR GROUP IN THE GOVT, POSSIBLY EVEN KHOMEINI, TO PURPOSELY MAGNIFY AND DISTORT THE SITUATION IN KORDESHAN IN AN ATTEMPT TO RALLY MASS OPINION OR AT LEAST PROVIDE SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR MAJOR AND MORE DRASTIC DECISIONS AND DECLARATIONS BY KHOMEINI. A SPARK MAY HAVE BEEN NEEDED TO PULL MORE SUPPORT FOR KHOMEINI, AND THE CONFLICTS IN KORDESHAN HAPPENED TO BE ADEQUATE CHIPS TO FUEL THE FIRE. DATT CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE KURDISH PROBLEM WILL NOT IN ITSELF PROVIDE A SPRING BOARD FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE PRESENT KHOMEINI REGIME. MILITARILY THE KURDS CAN BE VERY EFFECTIVE GUERRILLA FIGHTERS, BUT THEY CAN NOT FIGHT ON THE ARMY AND PASDARANS OUTSIDE THE SECURITY OF THEIR MOUNTAINS, AND ON THE OTHER HAND THE IRANIAN ARMY EVEN WITH THE HELP OF THE PASDARANS CANNOT EFFECTIVELY PLAN, COORDINATE

ATTN AND EXECUTE ANY MILITARY EFFORT AS THIS TIME NO.
EFFECTIVELY CONTROL THE TURKS. THE PASDARANS DO NOT
HAVE THE TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE AND THE ARMY DOESN'T
HAVE THE WILL TO FIGHT.

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 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0204
 RUHQHD/USINT BAGHDAD 0250
 RUCMCI/AMEMBASSY DCHA 0216
 RUSQSD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0281
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0277
 RUSBLI/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0286
 RUCMTE/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0246
 RULTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0349
 RUQAMM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0212
 RUERMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0267
 RUCGMM/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0142
 RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0203
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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRG: STATE 8/27/79
 APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMS:
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 CLEAR: POL:EASWIFT
 DISTR: POL2 CGG ICA
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 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 02504

E.O. 12065: EDS-4 8/27/94 (TOMSWTH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
 TAGS: PINS, PINP, IR
 SUBJECT: UNREST IN SANANDAJ

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. IRANIAN FRIENDS OF EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER WHO VISITED HAJ SHEIKH OL-ISLAM KURDESTANI, SANANDAJ RELIGIOUS LEADER RESIDENT IN TEHRAN, TO OPEN GREETINGS ON EID-EB-FEER (AUG 24), TOLD REPORTING OFFICER THAT ALL THOSE PRESENT AT SHEIKH'S HOUSE WERE VERY UPSET AT SITUATION IN KURDESTAN, AND THAT ATMOSPHERE WAS MORE FUNERAL THAN FESTIVE. DURING THEIR VISIT, A TELEPHONE CALL FROM SANANDAJ TO HAJ SHEIKH REPORTED THAT FOLLOWING EID PRAYERS STREET FIGHTING HAD BROKEN OUT THERE BETWEEN FOLLOWERS OF KHOMENI SUPPORTER MOJTAZEDDIN AND PARTISANS OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP).
3. DURING THEIR VISIT, OFFICER'S FRIENDS WERE TAKEN ASIDE BY THE SHEIKH'S SON (WHO CLEARLY WANTED HIS INFORMATION PASSED TO REPORTING OFFICER) AND TOLD THAT THE SITUATION IN KURDESTAN WAS BEING VERY CLOSELY WATCHED BY IRANIAN SUNNIS IN COCHAN, TURKMAN-SAIRA, BALUCHISTAN, ANGANI THE PERSIAN GULF COAST. HAJ SHEIKH OL-ISLAM HAS TRADITIONALLY MAINTAINED VERY CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THESE OTHER SUNNI COMMUNITIES.
4. COMMENT: SANANDAJ HAS NEVER BEEN A STRONGHOLD OF KURDISH NATIONALISM. RATHER, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE MOST PERSIANIZED OF THE CITIES OF KURDESTAN AND THE CENTER OF TEHRAN'S INFLUENCE IN THAT PROVINCE. SANANDAJ WAS NEVER INVOLVED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE KURDISH REPUBLIC MOVEMENT OF 1945-46, AND DURING THAT TIME REMAINED LOYAL TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. FROM THESE AND OTHER REPORTS IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE POPULATION IS NOW DIVIDED IN ITS LOYALTIES AND THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITIES

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HAVE YET TO ESTABLISH THEIR AUTHORITY THERE. BUT THE EXISTENCE OF PROBLEMS IN SANANDAJ, WHERE CURDISE AUTONOMY FEELINGS ARE RELATIVELY WEAK, IS AN INDICATION THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MAY BE FACING MUCH MORE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL MATTERS OF CURDISH NATIONAL FEELING SUCH AS HANBAT AND BAHAN.

5. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE: HAJ SHEIKH CO-ISLAM TURDESTANI HAS BEEN IN DISFAVOR SINCE THE REVOLUTION BECAUSE OF HIS TIES WITH THE MONARCHY. HIS BROTHER, MEEDI SHEIKH CO-ISLAM, FORMER PARLIAMENT DEPUTY AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF JUSTICE, WAS RECENTLY RELEASED FROM PRISON AND STILL WAGES A HEAVY FINE. THE SHEIKH'S SON AS'AD, PROFESSOR OF HISTOLOGY AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY, SPENT THE ACADEMIC YEAR 1972-73 AT THE HARVARD CENTER FOR WORLD RELIGION. FAMILY TRADITIONALLY SUPPORTED THE SHAH NOT BECAUSE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ATTACHMENT TO THE MONARCHY BUT BECAUSE OF FAVOR SECURED BY MONARCHY TO SUNNI MINORITY AMONG MEMBERS OF SHIA RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT. TOMSATH

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RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 4303
INFO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1992
RUMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 4065
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 226730
E.O. 12065 D/S 8/28/85 (MILLERY, C. EDWARD)

TAGS: PEPR, TU, IR

SUBJECT: (C) TURKISH CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. POLICY TOWARDS
KURDS IN IRAN; TURKISH AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH UNDER
SECRETARY NEWSOM

1. (O. - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. TURKISH AMBASSADOR ELEKDAG CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM AUGUST 27 ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM ANKARA TO DISCUSS U.S. VIEWS AND POLICY ON KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAN. IN OPENING CONVERSATION, ELEKDAG SAID GOT HAD RECEIVED CONFUSING WIRE SERVICE REPORTS OF DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN'S AUGUST 24 STATEMENT AND RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS. THIS HAD CAUSED ANKARA TO ASK HIM TO CLARIFY U.S. VIEWS AND POLICY WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THE DEPARTMENT. HE HAD SEEN COPY OF DEPARTMENT PRESS GUIDANCE (SEPTEL). SPECIFICALLY, ELEKDAG ASKED FOR U.S. "VIEWS AND POSITIONS" ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND ON THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAN.
3. UNDER SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT US-IRANIAN RELATIONS ARE IMPROVING AFTER NATURAL PROBLEMS WHICH AROSE IN THE WAKE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. NOTING THAT WE HAVE MANY SPECIFIC ISSUES LIKE COMMERCIAL CLAIMS AND MILITARY CONTRACTS, THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT THE SITUATION IS IMPROVING.
4. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THE KURDISH SITUATION IS AN INTERNAL IRANIAN MATTER. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF IRAN. WE SEE THE KURDISH SITUATION AS ONE OF THE INTERNAL PROBLEMS FACING THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. MR. RESTON HAD COMMENTED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE "QUICK JUSTICE" THAT HAD BEEN METED OUT IN THE KURDISH AREA. HIS COMMENTS WERE ALONG THE LINES OF OUR STANDING OPPOSITION TO EXECUTIONS WITHOUT FAIR TRIALS.

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4. ELEKDAG NOTED THAT IN THE REPORTS THE GOT HAD RECEIVED, THE U.S. AUG. 24 STATEMENT SEEMED TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR STRENGTHENING THE AUTHORITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT AND THE NEED FOR STABILITY IN THE REGION. THE STATEMENT DID NOT, HOWEVER, DISCUSS THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAN. THE UNDER SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT AS HE HAD SAID, WE DO SUPPORT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAN. HE GAVE AMBASSADOR ELEKDAG A COPY OF A RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT BY U.S. CHARGE LAINGEN WHICH CLEARLY MAKES THIS POINT (SEPTEL). HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE RESTON STATEMENT HAD TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THE QUESTION THAT HAD BEEN ASKED. THE QUESTION CONCERNED EXECUTIONS AND MILITARY SALES AND WAS NOT RELATED TO THE SUBJECT OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

6. ELEKDAG ASKED HOW THE U.S. VIEWS THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ALL OF IRAN. THE UNDER SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE TROUBLES THERE, NOT JUST IN THE KURDISH AREA, BUT AMONG THE OTHER MINORITIES. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS DOING BETTER IN ESTABLISHING ITS AUTHORITY IN THOSE AREAS AND THAT THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH HAD BEEN BATTERED BY THE REVOLUTION, ARE ALSO NOW IMPROVING THEIR PERFORMANCE.

7. ELEKDAG ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY INFORMATION THAT THE KURDISH REBELS IN IRAN HAD BEEN INFILTRATED BY COMMUNISTS. THE UNDER SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT WE HAD NO SUCH HARD INFORMATION. THERE WAS AN INDICATION THAT THERE WERE MANY SOVIET WEAPONS BEING USED. THEY COULD, OF COURSE, COME FROM ANYWHERE. THE UNDER SECRETARY NOTED THAT UNHELPFUL BROADCASTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION DO CONTINUE TO EMANATE FROM THE BAKU AREA.

8. AS AMBASSADOR ELEKDAG WAS LEAVING, THE UNDER SECRETARY ASKED HIM IF THE GOT SAW ANY SPILL-OVER EFFECTS IN THE CURRENT UNREST IN THE KURDISH SITUATION OF IRAN. ELEKDAG RESPONDED THAT IF AN AUTONOMOUS KURDISH AREA WERE TO BE

CREATED IN IRAN, THERE WOULD BE EARLY PRESSURE FOR AN INDEPENDENT KURDISH STATE. KURDISH MINORITIES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES WOULD BE AFFECTED BY SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS IN IRAN WOULD PROBABLY ALSO MAKE SIMILAR DEMANDS.

9. COMMENT: IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT THE PRIMARY CONCERN OF THE GOT WAS THAT THE U.S. STATEMENT OF AUGUST 24 DID NOT MENTION TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. AS SOON AS THE UNDER SECRETARY REAFFIRMED THAT THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED THIS CONCEPT, ELEKDAG SEEMED TO BE SATISFIED AND HE BROUGHT THE CONVERSATION TO A QUICK CLOSE. VANCE

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TEHRAN 09656/1

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 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3555
 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0251
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0242
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0257
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0223
 RUSEBQ/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0290
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0285
 RUSEBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0294
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0255
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0361
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0221
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0275
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0149
 RUPNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0310
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRG: STATE 9/30/79
 APPRV: CHARGE: VLTOM
 DRFTD: POL: EASWIFT
 CLEAR: NONE
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1974-283-344

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 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 09656

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/30/95 (SWIFT, E. ANN) OR-P
 TAGS: PINT, PINS, IR
 SUBJECT: KURDISH SITUATION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: RELATIVE CALM CONTINUED TODAY IN KURDESTAN AS THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES APPARENTLY REFRAINED FROM ADVANCING ON KURDISH STRONGHOLDS AND VARIOUS EFFORTS WERE MADE TO FIND A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. EMBASSY IS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT ANY LASTING SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND. END SUMMARY.
3. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE KURDISH AREAS SEEMS TO HAVE STABILIZED TEMPORARILY WITH KURDISH REBELS CONTINUING TO HOLD SOME IMPORTANT TOWNS (MAHABAD, BANEH, SARDASHT) AND THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES, ALTHOUGH IN PLACE ON THE ROADS TO THESE AREAS, REFRAINING FROM FRONTAL ATTACKS. THERE WERE REPORTS OF MINOR ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENTAL FORCES BY KURDS AUGUST 29, THE MOST SERIOUS BEING AN ATTACK ON A MILITARY POST AT JALDIAN (3652N, 4508E) NEAR THE IRAQI BORDER.
4. ALTHOUGH KHOMEINI, FROM HIS STATEMENTS AND PRESS INTERPRETATIONS, APPEARS UNWILLING TO DEAL WITH KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADERS, SEVERAL EFFORTS SEEM TO BE UNDERWAY TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. KHOMEINI HIMSELF HAS OFFERED AMNESTY TO ALL LOWER RANKING KURDS WHO ARE WILLING TO TURN THEMSELVES IN. A FIVE-MAN DELEGATION FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF MAHABAD HAS BEEN IN TEHRAN FOR SEVERAL DAYS MEETING WITH A WIDE RANGE OF PGOI LEADERS INCLUDING INTERIOR MINISTER SABBAGHIAN AND UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE KHAMENE'I. THE TEHRAN TIMES ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING THAT SABBAGHIAN HAD REACHED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE

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DELEGATION TO PERMIT THE ARMY TO ENTER MAHABAD PEACEFULLY, BUT IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT, IF ANY, AUTHORITY THE KURDISH GROUP HAS. INDEED, ACCORDING TO ONE AFP REPORT THE REBELS IN MAHABAD HAVE REJECTED ANY AGREEMENT TO ALLOW THE ARMY TO ENTER. AT THE SAME TIME, SHARIAT-MADARI HAS ISSUED A CALL FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, THE NATIONAL FRONT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO SEND A DELEGATION TO KURDISTAN, KHOMEINI'S OWN REPRESENTATIVE, HOJATOLESLAM SHEIKH HOSSEINI KERMANI, WENT TO THE AREA AUGUST 28 TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE AND THE PAPERS ARE EVEN CARRYING THE RUMOR THAT AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI HAS ASKED SHEIKH HOSSEINI TO COME WITH HIM TO QOM TO MEET KHOMEINI.

5. ARMED FORCES INACTIVITY AND ALL THE ABOVE INITIATIVES DO SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THE PGOI IS STARTING TO LOOK FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. ANY SUCH SETTLEMENT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF AN AMNESTY FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF THE KDP AND A PROMISE TO WITHDRAW THE DISLIKED PASDARAN FROM THE AREA. SHOULD SUCH A DEAL BE STRUCK BY LOWER RANKING PGOI OFFICIALS, IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR THAT KHOMEINI WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT IT.

6. IN THE MEANWHILE, THE PGOI APPEARS TO BE STARTING TO LOOK FOR SCAPEGOATS TO BLAME FOR THE KURDISH UNREST AND APPEARS TO HAVE FALLEN ON AN OLD FAVORITE -- THE ISRAELIS. THE TEHRAN PRESS IS CARRYING VAGUE REPORTS OF THE CAPTURE OF FOUR ISRAELIS IN THE FIGHTING AND PRIME MINISTER BARZAGAN (ACCORDING TO THE PRESS REPORTS) INTIMATED TO THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR THAT HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS BACKED BY EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CAPITALISTS ARE SOMEHOW INVOLVED. THE PGOI IS ALSO APPARENTLY CONCERNED OVER LEFT WING (FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ) OR "COMMUNIST" INFLUENCE IN THE EVENTS. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, SOME FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ MEMBERS HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE FIGHTING ON THE KURDISH SIDE AND AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI'S PEOPLE HAVE MENTIONED THEIR CONCERN OVER LEFT WING INVOLVEMENT IN KURDESTAN TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER.

7. THE PGOI APPEARS TO BE DEALING VERY CAREFULLY WITH BOTH IRAQ AND TURKEY DURING THIS CRISIS. PGOI ARMED FORCES HAVE CAPTURED TWO ALLEGED IRAQI OFFICERS IN THE BT.
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TEHRAN 9656/2

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 TEHRAN 09656

FIGHTING, BUT PGOI DOES NOT SEEM TO INTEND TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF THIS. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR MET KHOMEINI IN QOM AUGUST 26 AND PROMISED THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT ALLOW KURDISH REBELS TO ENTER IRAQ. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS IN THE IRANIAN PRESS OF AID TO KURDISH REBELS FROM TURKEY. THE IRANIAN BORDER AREA WITH BOTH TURKEY AND IRAQ IN THE KURDISH AREAS APPEARS TO BE WIDE OPEN ON THE IRANIAN SIDE, AND EMBASSY HAD BEEN HEARING STORIES OF GUN RUNNING FROM TURKEY TO IRAN FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY OFFICER WHO VISITED TABRIZ AUGUST 27-28 TURKISH CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE AREA ARE KEEPING CLOSE TRACK OF KURDISH ACTIVITIES. TOMSETH

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TEHRAN 9656/2

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 INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 360
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4838
 RUFHBB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1814
 RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 203
 RUFHOLA/AMCONSUL BREMEN 801
 RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 3119
 RUFHOLC/AMCONSUL HAMBURG 1194
 RUFHMU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 2251
 RUFHOLD/AMCONSUL STUTTGART 872
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 C O N F I D E N T I A L USBERLIN 1928

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225-373

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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/31/85 (HUMPHREY, GEORGE) OR-0
 TAGS: ASEC, PGOV, PINT, PINS, GW, WB
 SUBJECT: KURDISH STUDENTS IN WEST BERLIN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. THE ASSOCIATION OF KURDISH STUDENTS IN EUROPE (KSSE) HAS ANNOUNCED A DEMONSTRATION IN WEST BERLIN (BRITISH SECTOR) FOR 2 SEPTEMBER.
3. THE KSSE, REPORTED TO BE A PRO-MOSCOW MARXIST-LENINIST ORGANIZATION, WITH APPROXIMATELY 150 MEMBERS IN THE FRG, HAS 40 MEMBERS IN WEST BERLIN. FIRST SECRETARY ZARADACHET HAJO, WHO RESIDES IN WEST BERLIN, IS KNOWN TO TRAVEL FREQUENTLY TO THE FRG IN CONNECTION WITH KSSE BUSINESS. DURING ITS APRIL MEETING THE KSSE OPENLY ADMITTED TO BEING A BRANCH OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (DKP), A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION CLAIMING TO FIGHT FOR KURDISH AUTONOMY WITHIN IRAN, SYRIA AND TURKEY.
4. THE KURDISH STUDENT ASSOCIATION (AKSA), HEADED BY JAHAL TALABANI, WITH HEADQUARTERS IN AMSTERDAM, REPORTEDLY HAS A MEMBERSHIP OF 250 KURDISH STUDENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE INCLUDING 20-30 IN WEST BERLIN. THE AKSA, ANOTHER REVOLUTIONARY LENINIST-MARXIST POLITICAL ORGANIZATION TOOK A STRONG STAND AGAINST THE SHAH REGIME HOPING THAT A NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD GRANT FULL AUTONOMY TO KURDISTAN.
5. DURING THE 12 JULY MEETING OF THE IRANIAN COORDINATION COMMITTEE HELD IN BERLIN'S TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY AND

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SPONSORED BY THE CISNU, KEY MEMBERS OF THE ISV (EXTREME LEFT) CRITICIZED THE NEW REGIME WITH STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT INSTEAD OF BEING NATIONALIZED, IRAN WAS NOW BEING RUN BY STATE OFFICIALS AND CONDEMNED THE MASSIVE SUPPRESSION OF MINORITY GROUPS WHICH WERE FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. THEY ALSO VOICED APPREHENSION THAT THE MILITARY AND SAVAK MAY BE REACTIVATED AS AN INSTRUMENT OF OPPRESSION AGAINST THE PEOPLE. THIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY APPROXIMATELY 900 PERSONS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE CISNU, ISV, THE ALTERNATE LIST FOR DEMOCRACY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (INCLUDING KPD AND KB MEMBERS), THE PROTESTANT STUDENT COMMUNITY (ESG), GIM, AND AKSA.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-222-323

6. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE CISNU, WHICH RECENTLY TOOK A STAND AGAINST THE PRESENT REGIME IN IRAN, IS SUPPORTING THE KURDISH CAUSE ABROAD BY ORGANIZING MEETINGS AND PRO-KURDISH DEMONSTRATIONS. THE SUPPORT OF THE AKSA AND KSSE BY THE CISNU IS SEEN IN BERLIN AS A FORERUNNER OF SIMILAR POLITICAL MERGERS WHICH COULD EASILY DEVELOP IN IRAN AND BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE ORTHODOX RELIGIOUS REGIME OF KHOMEINI. THE COMBINED CISNU/KURDISH DEMONSTRATIONS IN FRANKFURT AND BONN LAST WEEKEND ARE CLASSIC EXAMPLES OF THIS COOPERATION.

7. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS THAT THE AKSA OR KSSE INTEND TO ENGAGE IN ANY RADICAL ACTS AGAINST THE ALLIES IN WEST BERLIN. NELSON

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TEHRAN 09713

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RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0255
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0246
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0261
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0227
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0294
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIEDA 0289
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0298
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0259
RUOTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0366
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0225
RUERMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0280
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0153
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0314
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09713

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE 9/2/79
APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978-18-344

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/2/85 (SWIFT, E. ANN) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PINS, IR
SUBJECT: KURDISH SITUATION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THE PGOI HAS CONTINUED TO HOLD BACK FROM A FRONTAL ATTACK ON KURDISH HELD TOWN. HOWEVER, REPORTS CONTINUE OF SCATTERED ATTACKS BY KURDISH REBELS ON GOVERNMENT FORCES. INTERIOR MINISTER SABBAGHIAN WARNED ON NATIONAL TV SEPTEMBER 1 THAT THE ARMY IS READY TO GO INTO MAHABAD AND KHOMEINI IS CONTINUING TO CALL FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE KURDISH DOMOCRATIC PARTY AND ITS LEADERS. ACCORDING TO FARSI PAPER KAYAN, KHOMEINI HAS THREATENED TO GO PERSONALLY TO KURDESTAN IF THE PROBLEM THERE IS NOT SOLVED SOON.

3. THERE IS AN OBVIOUS SPLIT AMONGST IRANIAN AUTHORITIES ON HOW TO HANDLE THE KURDISH PROBLEM. AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI HAS GIVEN PUBLIC SUPPORT TO ANY EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT WITH THE KURDS AND BOTH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN AND ARMED FORCES LEADERS PREFER THIS COURSE. EMBASSY CONTINUES TO RECEIVE STRONG INDICATIONS OF ARMY RELUCTANCE TO ATTACK REBEL HELD TOWNS. TALEGANI, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE NOT RULING OUT NEGOTIATIONS HAS CALLED FOR A MUCH TOUGHER LINE.

4. IF SOME SORT OF SOLUTION IS NOT REACHED SOON, EMBASSY DOUBTS, HOWEVER, THE MODERATES WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD OUT MUCH LONGER AGAINST KHOMEINI'S STRIDENT CALLS FOR ACTION. IRANIAN LEADERS APPEAR INCREASINGLY TO VIEW KURDISH PROBLEM AS COMMUNIST INFLUENCED, AND DENUNCIATIONS OF COMMUNIST PARTICPATION IN THE KURDISH REVOLT BY

KHOMEINI AND TALEGANI OVER THE WEEKEND REFLECT A GROWING

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CONCERN. ALTHOUGH MANY IN THE GOVERNMENT SEEM TO REALIZE THAT CURRENT PROBLEMS IN KURDISH AREAS ARE NOT ENTIRELY THE FAULT OF THE KURDS, MOST OF THE IRANIAN LEADERS INCLUDING BAZARGAN WOULD PROBABLY APPROVE THE USE OF FORCE IN THE AREA ONCE THEY SEE IT AS THE ONLY SOLUTION TO A THREAT TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAN.

5. THE ONLY HOPEFUL SIGN IS SABBAGHIAN'S COMMENTS IN HIS TV INTERVIEW THAT THE REBEL HELD TOWNS ARE RUNNING SHORT OF FOOD AND FUEL. SHOULD THIS PROVE TRUE THERE IS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PGOI MIGHT BE ABLE TO FORCE REBEL EVACUATION OF THE TOWNS. WHILE THIS WOULD NOT RESOLVE THE REBELLION IT WOULD AT LEAST AVOID THE KILLING THAT WILL INEVITABLY OCCUR IF THE ARMY IS FORCED TO A FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE TOWNS. TOMSETH

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R U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1976-258-344

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TEHRAN 09764

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 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
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 RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0257
 RUQMGE/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0248
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0263
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 2229
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0296
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JILDA 0291
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0300
 RUQMW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0261
 RUOTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0369
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0227
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0282
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0155
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0319
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRG: STATE 7/4/79
 APPRV: CHARGF:VLTOMS
 DREFD: POL:FASWIFT:G
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: POL2 CHRG ICA
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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979-258-344

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 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09764

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/4/85 (SWIFT, E. ANN) OR-P
 TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
 SUBJECT: THE COMMUNISTS AND THE KURDISH REBELLION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. AS INDICATED BY EMBASSY REPORTING OVER THE PAST WEEK IRANIAN LEADERS HAVE SHOWN INCREASING CONCERN OVER "COMMUNIST" INFLUENCE IN THE KURDISH REBELLION. AYATOLLAH TALEGANI IN A SPEECH AUGUST 31 WENT SO FAR AS TO ACCUSE "OUR NORTHERN NEIGHBOR" (I.E. THE USSR) OF AIDING THE REBELS.
3. EMBASSY HAS NO EVIDENCE THAT USSR IS IN ANY WAY DIRECTLY AIDING THE KURDISH REBELS. AS WE NOTED IN TEHRAN 9646, HOWEVER, THE USSR BROADCASTS TO IRAN HAVE OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS SHOWN SUPPORT FOR THE KURDS (BUT NOT FOR THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY) AND AN INCREASING TENDENCY TO CRITICIZE THE PGOI'S HARSH ATTITUDE TOWARD THE KURDISH REBELLION. THE TUDEH PARTY, HOWEVER, IS TREADING A VERY FINE LINE IN TEHRAN. THEY HAVE CALLED FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE FIGHTING BASED ON AN IMMEDIATE TRUCE BY BOTH FORCES, AN END TO THE REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH PROBLEMS.
4. EMBASSY DOES HAVE INDICATIONS THAT LEFT-WING FEDAYAN KHALQ HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN THE KURDISH REBELLION. BUT WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY, WHETHER THEIR PRESENCE THERE IS CENTRALLY CONTROLLED FROM TEHRAN, OR WHETHER THOSE MEMBERS OF FEDAYAN KHALQ INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING MAY ACTUALLY BE KURDS. AT LEAST ONE FEDAYAN KHALQ MEMBER HAS BEEN REPORTED EXECUTED BY THE PGOI IN SANANDAJ IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIGHTING AND STELA AT

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OF AUGUST 29 CARRIED A STORY THAT "HEMAD SHAYBANI, A PROMINENT MEMBER OF THE PRO-MARKIST FEDAYAN KHALQ GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION" WAS ARRESTED RECENTLY ON CHARGES OF SENDING MEDICINE TO THE KURDS.

5. TALEGANI'S SON TOLD EMBOFF RECENTLY THAT A MEDICAL STUDENT EXECUTED AFTER PAVEH FIGHTING HAD WORKED FOR TALEGANI RELIEF GROUP FOR A BRIEF PERIOD BUT THAT THEY HAD STOPPED USING HIM BECAUSE THEY WERE CONVINCED HE WAS A COMMUNIST AND ONLY INTERESTED IN SPREADING COMMUNIST LITERATURE IN THE KURDISH AREAS RATHER THAN DOING ANY USEFUL WORK FOR THE TALEGANI MEDICAL RELIEF ASSOCIATION. TALEGANI'S GROUP IS CONVINCED THAT "COMMUNISTS" ARE VERY ACTIVE IN THE PRESENT KURDISH REBELLION. EMBASSY DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER COMMUNISTS HERE MENTIONED ARE UN-ALIGNED MARXISTS, FEDAYAN KHALQ OR TUDEH PARTY.
6. IN ADDITION, MINISTER OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE, NASSER MINACHI, DURING MEETING WITH CHARGE SEPTEMBER 4 MENTIONED "COMMUNIST" INVOLVEMENT IN KURDESTAN AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE LEFT WING PARTIES HAD ABUSED THE FREEDOM GIVEN THEM IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE REVOLUTION. MINACHI SAID THAT THE PGOI HAD BEEN WILLING TO OFFER THE COMMUNISTS FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION, BUT THEY HAD ABUSED THIS BY INCITING ARMED REBELLION IN KURDESTAN AND OTHER AREAS AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1974-332-344

7. A SEPTEMBER 3 FBIS REPORT OF MOSCOW DOMESTIC RADIO (FBIS 032350Z SEP 79) JUST RECEIVED, QUOTES A TUDEH PARTY LETTER AS DENYING AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT TWO TUDEH PARTY MEMBERS (UNIDENTIFIED) WHO WERE EXECUTED IN KERMANSHAH, HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE "EXTREMIST GROUPS AND EVENTS IN KURDESTAN." TOMSETH

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TEHRAN 09764

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TEHRAN 09769

DE RUQMR #9769 247 **
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 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3614
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
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 RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0258
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0249
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0264
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DORA 0230
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0297
 RUSBLX/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0301
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0262
 RUDTIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0369
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0228
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0283
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0156
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0319
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0292
 BT

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRG: STATE 9/4/79
 APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
 PRFTD: POL:MJMTRINKO:GC
 CLEAR: POL:BAWSIFT
 DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
 ECON CHRON RF

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979-200-314

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09769
 E.O. 12065: GDS 9/4/85 (METRINKO, MICHAEL J.) OR-P
 TAGS: PINS, PINT, MOPS, IR
 SUBJECT: TABRIZ ATTITUDES TOWARDS KURDISH UNREST

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: DESPITE BASIC ETHNIC DIFFERENCES AND SOME TRADITION OF ANIMOSITY, AZARBAIJANI TURKISH COMMENTS ON KURDISH UNREST REVEAL A LARGE DEGREE OF SYMPATHY FOR KURDISH AIMS. KURDISH INSURGENTS ARE REPORTEDLY BEING VERY CAREFUL IN DEALING WITH THEIR ETHNIC TURKISH NEIGHBORS, AND POPULAR PERCEPTION OF THIS IS AFFECTING THE ATTITUDES OF TURKS IN IRAN TOWARDS THE KURDS. END SUMMARY.
3. DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS, POLOFF HAS SPOKEN TO A NUMBER OF ETHNIC TURKS IN TABRIZ AND TEHRAN ABOUT THE KURDISH UNREST. THE BASIC TABRIZ ATTITUDE EXPRESSED TOWARDS THE KURDISH FIGHTING HAS BEEN ONE OF SYMPATHY FOR KURDISH DEMANDS, AND CONDEMNATION OF PGOI AND QOM ATTACKS ON KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADERS.
4. ON 28 AUGUST VISIT TO TABRIZ, POLOFF WITNESSED FUNERAL PROCESSION FOR TWO TABRIZ REVOLUTIONARY GUARD VOLUNTEERS WHO HAD BEEN KILLED IN KURDISH FIGHTING. THE PROCESSION WAS COMPOSED OF ONLY SLIGHTLY OVER 100 PEOPLE, AND DESPITE ITS ROUTE ALONG TABRIZ'S MAIN STREET, ATTRACTED NO INTEREST FROM PASSERS BY. PEDESTRIANS CONTINUED TO WALK NORMALLY AS THE PROCESSION PASSED, AND THE SLOW-MO-VIN IN STREET TRAFFIC WAS GREETED WITH HORN BLOWING BY IRRITATED DRIVERS. THE PROCESSION LED THE DRIVER OF POLOFF'S TAXI TO COMMENT CAUSTICALLY ON THE POLITICAL CHAOS RESULTING FROM THE REVOLUTION, AND HE CONTINUED WITH A LENGTHY DESCRIPTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN TABRIZ AND THE GENERAL STUPIDITY OF SENDING VOLUNTEERS FROM

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TEHRAN 09769

TABRIZ TO FIGHT THE KURDS. IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH A LOCAL MERCHANT, POLOFF WAS TREATED TO ONE VERSION OF THE GUARDSMEN'S DEATH. THE MERCHANT CLAIMED THAT TWO HELICOPTERS OF VOLUNTEERS HAD BEEN SENT FROM TABRIZ TO THE SAQQEZ AREA, AND THE VOLUNTEERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED IMMEDIATELY AFTER LANDING. THE KURDISH CAPTORS ALLEGEDLY ASKED THE VOLUNTEERS IF THEY PROFESSED LOYALTY TO SHARIAT-MADARI OR KHOMEINI. THOSE WHO CLAIMED THE FORMER WERE SET FREE AND TOLD NOT TO INTERFERE IN KURDISH AFFAIRS AGAIN. THOSE WHO CLAIMED THE LATTER WERE SHOT. IN A DIFFERENT INCIDENT REPORTED BY THE PRESS, A NUMBER OF TABRIZ VOLUNTEERS WERE STRIPPED OF THEIR WEAPONS BY KURDISH INSURGENTS AND ALLOWED TO RETURN HOME PEACEFULLY. SEVERAL TABRIZ SOURCES HAVE COMMENTED TO POLOFF THAT THE KURDS WERE TREATING ETHNIC TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS FAR BETTER THAN THEY DESERVED, AND THAT THIS POLICY WAS AIMED AT KEEPING TURKISH/KURDISH RELATIONS AS AMICABLE AS POSSIBLE.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1974-285-344

5. TABRIZ'S RELIGIOUS LEADER AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI HAS ALSO MADE PUBLIC COMMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE SEEN AS GUARDELY PRO-KURDISH. IN A PRESS INTERVIEW ON 29 AUGUST, SHARIAT-MADARI CLAIMED THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE FIGHTING IN KURDESTAN WAS TO SECURE THE RIGHTS OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE. AND SUCH RIGHTS COULD BE SAFEGUARDED AND GUARANTEED WITHOUT THE NEED TO RESORT TO WAR AND VIOLENCE. UNLIKE KHOMEINI, SHARIAT-MADARI HAS NOT ATTACKED KURDISH RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL LEADER SHEIKH IZZEDIN HOSSEINI, PERHAPS SEEING POTENTIAL PARALLELS IN HOSSEINI'S ROLE AND HIS OWN AS AN ETHNIC MINORITY LEADER. TOMSETH

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TEHRAN 09769

DE RUQMHR #9858 249 **
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3667
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
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 RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0261
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0250
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0267
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DCHA 0233
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0299
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0295
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0302
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0265
 RUDDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0373
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0231
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0284
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0159
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0321
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09858

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHGGE: STATE 9/6/79
 APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
 DRETD: POL:SGRU1MON:GO:F
 CLEAR: POL:EASWIFT
 DISTR: POL-2 CHARGE CHRON
 F DATT ARMISH/MAA

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979-0-344

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/6/85 (GRUMMON, STEVE) OR-P
 TAGS: PINS, IR
 SUBJECT: TURKISH RELATIONS WITH IRANIAN KURDS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WHILE IN TABRIZ POLOFF METRINKO AND DEPTOFF GRUMMON PAID A COURTESY CALL ON THE NEW TURKISH CONSUL GENERAL. DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION THE LATTER REVEALED THAT TURKISH OFFICIALS (PARTICULARLY AT THE TURKISH CONSULATE IN URUMIYEH, FORMERLY REZAIYEH) HAVE REGULAR CONTACT WITH IRANIAN KURDISH LEADERS. (HE DID NOT SAY WHETHER TURKEY WAS PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO THE KURDS.)

3. APPROXIMATELY FIVE DAYS AFTER THIS CONVERSATION THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS IN RESPONSE TO AN IRANIAN COMPLAINT THAT AN UNNAMED MOSLEM COUNTRY WAS SUPPORTING THE KURDS, ISSUED A FORMAL PUBLIC COMMUNIQUE EMPHATICALLY STATING THAT TURKEY WAS NOT INTERFERING IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THAT IT WAS NEITHER GIVING SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT NOR THE KURDS IN THE CURRENT ROUND OF FIGHTING. THE TURKISH CONSUL'S COMMENTS INDICATE, HOWEVER, THAT THE TURKS INTEND TO APPLY THEIR NEUTRALITY POLICY EVENLY BY KEEPING COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS OPEN TO BOTH SIDES.

4. THE CONSUL ALSO REPORTED THAT THE IRANIAN GENDARMERIE BORDER POST AT SERO (RECENTLY THE SCENE OF PIERCE FIGHTING BETWEEN KURDS AND GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES) HAD BEEN ABANDONED. PEOPLE WERE FREELY CROSSING THE BORDER (THE CONSUL HAD DONE SO ON AUGUST 26) AND THE GENDARMERIE HEADQUARTERS WAS OCCUPIED BY A LONE KURDISH SHEPHERD.
 TOMSETH

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INFO RUEHDT/COMMISSION USUN
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0700

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CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE GENEVA 14-11

DEPT ALSO PASS 0716G

INFO: 12065: N/A
TAGS: SHUM, UNHRC, IR, US
SUBJECT: 32ND SESSION, UN SUB-COMMISSION ON DISCRIMINATION;
ACTION: TELEGRAM TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN

1. AT ITS FINAL MEETING ON SEP 7, THE SUB-COMMISSION, COMPOSED OF EXPERTS FROM 26 COUNTRIES SERVING IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES, ADOPTED THE TEXT GIVEN BELOW OF A MESSAGE TO BE SENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

2. TEXT AS FOLLOWS: THEIR QUOTE.

THE UNITED NATIONS SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN ITS REPORT FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL INDIVIDUALS EXPRESSED ITS DEEP SENSE OF SHOCK AT REPORTED BARRAGE OF MURDER AND MASSACRES IN IRAN AND REQUESTED THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN TO CEASE INHUMAN PRACTICES AND STOP...

14-11

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TO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 2255
INFO RUOMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0710
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 6755
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4474
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 268469

E.O. 12065: GDS: 9/8/85 (CASEY, MARY ANN)

TAGS: PINT, IZ, IR

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON KURDS

REF: A) BAGHDAD 1951; B) BAGHDAD 1457

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977-225-373

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE APPRECIATED RECEIVING ASSESSMENT CONTAINED REPTTEL A OF CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN. WE HAVE BEEN CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE DISTURBANCES IN NEIGHBORING IRANI KURDISTAN AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING OF ANY INDICATIONS THAT EVENTS IN IRAN ARE HAVING AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON CONDITIONS IN KURDISH IRAQ.

3. WE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN HAVING YOUR VIEWS ABOUT REPORTS OF ALLEGED COLLUSION BETWEEN IRAQI KURDS AND IRANI KURDS IN THE LATEST CLASHES THAT HAVE OCCURRED WITH IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TROOPS.

4. THE INCREASED PRESENCE OF IRAQI KURDISH REFUGEES IN IRANI KURDISTAN RAISES THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THESE REFUGEES MIGHT POSE A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF IRAQI KURDISTAN, SHOULD ANY LARGE SCALE WESTWARD MOVEMENT OCCUR, EITHER AS A RESULT OF EFFORTS

TO FLEE CURRENT FIGHTING IN THE MAHABAD AREA OR AS A RESULT OF EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

5. ANY INFORMATION YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ON THIS GENERAL SUBJECT WILL BE HELPFUL IN GIVING US A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE SITUATION. VANCE

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 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
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 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC
 RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0269
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0258
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0275
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0241
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0308
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0303
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0310
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0273
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0381
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0239
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0292
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0167
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0300
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
 BT

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHG: STATE 9/9/79
 APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMS
 DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:G
 CLEAR: GENGAST
 DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
 ECON CONS CHR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09904

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/9/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
 TAGS: IR, PINT, PINS
 SUBJECT: KURDISH SITUATION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. PGOI ARMED FORCES APPEAR NOW TO BE IN CONTROL OF ALL MAJOR TOWNS IN THE KURDISH REGION. PGOI FORCES REPORTEDLY TOOK PIRANSHAHR SEPTEMBER 5 AND SARDASHT EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 6. REBEL KURDISH FORCES HAVE RETIRED TO THE HILLS BUT HAVE NOT YET BEGUN ANY ORGANIZED GUERRILLA ATTACKS ON PGOI FORCES. ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT FORCES ENTERED MAHABAD SEPTEMBER 3, TOWNS PEOPLE APPARENTLY STAGED FAIRLY LARGE PRO-KURDISH DEMONSTRATION (PRESS REPORTS 2,000 DEMONSTRATORS) SEPT 5 WHICH HAD TO BE BROKEN UP BY GOVERNMENT TROOPS FIRING SHOTS INTO AIR.
3. ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7 GROUP OF HIGH RANKING PGOI OFFICIALS LED BY PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN VISITED MAHABAD AND OTHER KURDISH TOWNS. (GROUP INCLUDED MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR SAHBAGHIAN, JOINT CHIEFS HEAD GENERAL SHAKER AND ARMY COMMANDER FALAH). GROUP APPARENTLY DISCUSSED RELIEF ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS OF THE KURDISH REGION. DURING THE VISIT, BAZARGAN PUBLICLY REAFFIRMED KHOMEINI'S STATEMENT THAT THE PGOI AMNESTY FOR THE REBELS DID NOT REPEAT NOT APPLY TO THE KDP LEADERSHIP. IN ADDITION, KHOMEINI AGAIN ON AUGUST 8 IN AN EMOTIONAL SPEECH COMMENORATING THE 17 OF SHAHRIVAR OFFERED A GENERAL AMNESTY TO ALL THOSE YOUNG KURKISH MEN WHO HAD BEEN "DECEIVED" BY THEIR LEADERS.
4. REVOLUTIONARY JUDGE KHALKHALI HAS CONTINUED TO MOVE ABOUT THE KURDISH AREAS HOLDING REVOLUTIONARY COURT TRIALS. HE HAS APPARENTLY SET UP TEMPORARY HEADQUARTERS

IN MAHABAD. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE TEHRAN TIMES SEPTEMBER 9, KHALKHALI SAID THAT CONTRARY TO REPORTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS OF APPROXIMATELY 90 EXECUTIONS, "ONLY 53 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN EXECUTED THROUGHOUT KURDESTAN PROVINCE." KHALKHALI ADDED THAT HE HAD PARDONED MORE THAN 1,000 AND DID NOT EXPECT MORE TO DRAW A SENTENCE (SIC). COMMENT: EMBASSY HAS BEEN KEEPING TRACK OF EXECUTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE TEHRAN PRESS AND OUR FIGURES ON THOSE EXECUTED FOR DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE KURDISH REBELLION IS 56. NINE OF THESE WERE PGOI MILITARY OFFICERS AND MEN AND WE ASSUMED SOME OF THOSE EXECUTED WERE NOT ETHNIC KURDS. EMBASSY ASSUMES KHALKHALI'S FIGURE IS FAIRLY ACCURATE AS HE HAS NEVER BEEN RETICENT ABOUT HIS EXECUTIONS. KHALKHALI'S BRAND ISLAMIC JUSTICE CONTINUES TO BE THAT OF AN "EYE FOR AN EYE". IN THE INTERVIEW, KHALKHALI STATES THE HARDEST PUNISHMENT HE ISSUED WAS TO A MAN IN MAHABAD RESPONSIBLE FOR SMASHING THE TEETH OF A PRISONER AND BLINDING HIM. KHALKHALI STATED HE HAD ORDERED THE SAME PUNISHMENT FOR THE MAN BUT HAD REFRAINED FROM BLINDING HIM AFTER THE RELATIVES OF THE MAN'S VICTIM, ISLAMIC STYLE, GAVE THEIR PARDON.

5. BOTH FARSI LANGUAGE AND ENGLISH PRESS HAVE CARRIED VERY BRIEF MENTIONS OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS SUB-COMMISSION APPEAL TO PGOI FRIDAY THAT "THE REPORTED SUMMARY EXECUTIONS OF NUMEROUS KURDS IN IRAN" BE STOPPED. EMBASSY NOTES THAT WE HAVE HAD NO REPORTS OF EXECUTIONS SINCE SEPTEMBER 5 WHEN FOUR REBELS WERE EXECUTED IN SAQEZ. IN PARTICULAR, THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN NO EXECUTIONS IN MAHABAD FOLLOWING ITS OCCUPATION ON SEPT 3.

6. HAVING WON WHAT THEY CONSIDER A MILITARY VICTORY AGAINST THE KURDISH REBEL FORCES, PGOI LEADERS, INCLUDING KHOMEINI ARE NOW OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO WIN OVER KURDISH ALLEGIANCE BY OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE TO THE AREA AND LENIENT TREATMENT FOR ALL BUT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE REBELS. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE KURDISH REBEL LEADERSHIP IN THE HILLS WILL PERMIT THE PGOI FORCES TO CARRY OUT THIS POLICY AND WHETHER THE KURDS IN THE AREAS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, EMBITTERED BY THE HARSH GOVERNMENT POLICIES, WILL BE WILLING TO WORK WITH THE

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TEHRAN 904/2

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 INFO RUFLIPA/AMCONSUL ADANA 9502
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 285
 RUGMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 8561
 RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6148
 RUFLAEA/AMCONSUL IZMIR 1753
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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/7/85 (KUX, DENNIS) OR-P
 TAGS: PFOR, PEPR, TU
 SUBJ: (C) TURKISH VIEWS ON KURDISH TROUBLES IN IRAN

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN INFORMATION MESSAGE; NO ACTION REQUIRED.
3. MFA DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA KOKSAL, HAS TOLD US THAT TURKS HAD HEARD IRANIANS WERE PLANNING TO LAUNCH NEW MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CONCENTRATION OF KURDISH REBELS IN AREA NEAR IRAQI BORDER. WHILE FOR THE MOMENT SITUATION IN KURDISH AREA SEEMS CALM, REPORT SUGGESTED THAT TEST OF STRENGTH BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND KURDISH OPPONENTS WAS LIMITED BUT THEY HAD THE IMPRESSION THE KURDS, DESPITE LACK OF POLITICAL UNITY AMONG THE VARIOUS GROUPS, HAD MANAGED TO AMASS A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF ARMS AND COULD POSE A CONSIDERABLE GUERRILLA THREAT TO THE IRANIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FORCES.

4. THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED ACTION NEAR THE IRAQI BORDER ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF IRAQI RESPONSE. SO FAR THE GOT WAS UNCLEAR WHAT GAME IRAQ WAS PLAYING VIS-A-VIS IRAN. ON THE ONE HAND INSTABILITY IN THE REGION WAS A UNHELPFUL TO IRAQ AS IT WAS TO ANYONE ELSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE SUFFICIENT POINTS OF FRICTION BETWEEN A REVOLUTIONARY IRAN AND IRAQ THAT THE LATTER MIGHT WELL WISH TO STRENGTHEN ANTI-KHOMEINI FORCES.

5. REGARDING TIES BETWEEN IRANIAN KURDS AND OUTSIDE COUNTRIES, KOKSAL SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY REPORTS, BUT NOT MUCH HARD EVIDENCE, OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT WITH THE IRANIAN KURDS. HE ASSUMED THAT OUTSIDE POWERS NOTWITHSTANDING PREDICTABLE DENIALS WOULD FEEL STRONG URGE TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN KURDISH ACTIVITIES. REGARDING LINKS BETWEEN TURKISH AND IRANIAN KURDS, KOKSAL EMPHASIZED THAT RECENT PRESS REPORTS THAT TURKISH KURDS WERE PROVIDING LARGE-SCALE ASSISTANCE WERE TOTAL JOURNALISTIC FABRICATIONS. TO DATE, GOT DID NOT HAVE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS ANY SUBSTANTIAL LINKAGE ALTHOUGH, OBVIOUSLY, WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE KURDS IN IRAN WOULD HAVE A GREAT IMPACT ON ATTITUDES OF TURKISH KURDS.

6. BECAUSE OF THIS, AS WELL AS IN THE INTEREST OF REGIONAL STABILITY, TURKEY'S OVERRIDING CONCERN WAS THAT IRAN MAINTAIN ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND HAVE A STRONG AND EFFECTIVE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. FOR THIS REASON THE GOT HAD NOTED WITH INTEREST AND APPROVAL CHARGE LAINGEN'S RECENT STATEMENT AFFIRMING US SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

7. COMMENT: WHILE NEW TO THE JOB, KOKSAL, FORMERLY WITH THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, WAS SUBSTANTIALLY MORE OPEN THAN HIS PREDECESSORS IN DISCUSSING KURDISH QUESTION.

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INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 462
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1702
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2212
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 344 ✓

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BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1942

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/13/85 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-.
TAGS: PINT, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: (U) SITUATION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN

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Kurd

REF: (A) STATE 236469 (B) ANKARA 6618 (C) TEHRAN 9904
ALL NOTAL

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ACCORDING TO A WELL-INFORMED SOURCE JUST RETURNED FROM A WEEK'S VACATION IN THE LAKE DUKAN AND SULAIMANIYAH AREAS, THE SITUATION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN AS OF SEPTEMBER 7 WAS ABSOLUTELY QUIET. DESPITE LARGE-SCALE CLASHES ON THE IRANIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER, MILITARY PATROLS IN THE LAKE DUKAN AREA ARE NOT NUMEROUS AND APPEAR RELAXED. OTHER SOURCES REPORT THAT IT IS ALSO RELATIVELY QUIET FARTHER NORTH IN THE AMADIYAH AREA. TOURISTS ARE MOVING FREELY THROUGHOUT THE REGION. IN FACT, DIPLOMATS STATIONED IN BAGHDAD HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED IFA PERMISSION TO VISIT AMADIYAH, THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL MONTHS THAT THIS HAS BEEN DONE. IN SHORT, FROM ALL OUTWARD APPEARANCES, THERE ARE NO SERIOUS PROBLEMS.

3. COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAQI KURDS STILL ENGAGED IN ARMED RESISTANCE AND THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN IRAN IS UNDOUBTEDLY TAKING PLACE, BUT DO NOT APPEAR TO BE AFFECTING THE GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT IRAQI KURDISH GROUPS HAVE CROSSED THE BORDER TO HELP THEIR BELEAGUERED BRETHREN, AND THIS MAY EXPLAIN THE CURRENT RELATIVE TRANQUILITY IN IRAQ'S NORTHERN AREA. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT IRAQI KURDS ENGAGED IN ACTIVE ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TEND TO REMAIN PRIMARILY IN IRAQ AND NORMALLY USE IRAN ONLY AS A SAFE HAVEN, AND VICE VERSA.

4. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF IRAQI KURDISH REFUGEES IN IRAN (PARA 4 REF A) AND HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT MANY OF THOSE THAT ARE STILL THERE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH THE GOI FOR A RETURN TO IRAQ UNDER THE CURRENT AMNESTY, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE SITUATION IN IRAN BEGAN TO DETERIORATE. WE DO NOT KNOW IF SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF IRANIAN KURDS WOULD BE TEMPTED TO CROSS THE BORDER AS REFUGEES IF THE SITUATION AT HOME GETS WORSE BUT DOUBT THAT IRAQ WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT TOO MANY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GOI IS PROBABLY WILLING TO RECEIVE ANY IRAQI KURDS WILLING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT TWO-MONTH AMNESTY, ALTHOUGH THEY WILL BE DISARMED AND PERHAPS TEMPORARILY RESETTLED ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. CURRENT IRAQI PRACTICE IS A ONE TO TWO YEAR "DRY CLEANING" PERIOD OUTSIDE KURDISTAN, AND THEN A MOVE INTO THE NEW VILLAGES IN THE KURDISH LOWLANDS.

5. WITH REGARD TO COMMENT IN PARA 4 REF A ON EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRAQ, WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THE IRANIANS REALIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE KURDISH QUESTION FOR THEMSELVES AS WELL AS OTHERS, AND ARE NOT INVOLVED IN TROUBLE-MAKING IN THAT PARTICULAR AREA. WHETHER THE IRAQI KURDS WOULD THEMSELVES CHOOSE TO LAUNCH A MAJOR GUERRILLA EFFORT IN NORTHERN IRAQ NOW IS ANOTHER QUESTION, BUT A MAJOR, UNCONTROLLED EXODUS FROM IRAN, PARTICULARLY IF THE ESCAPEES ATTEMPT TO FIGHT THEIR WAY IN, COULD PROVOKE GOI ACTION AND KURDISH REACTION. IT IS OUR ESTIMATION THAT THE IRAQI KURDS WOULD PREFER TO WAIT A FEW MONTHS BEFORE ANY SERIOUS ATTEMPTS TO INTENSIFY ANTI-GOI ACTIVITIES, SHOULD THEY BE INCLINED TO DO SO. DURING WINTER, ARMY OUTPOSTS IN REMOTE MOUNTAIN AREAS ARE PULLED BACK AND THE MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE UPLANDS IS CONFINED TO MILITARY CAMPS.
BT

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INFO RUGMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 463
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1703
RUGMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2213
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 345

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1942

DURING HEAVY SNOWS, THE KURDS CAN OPERATE WITH LESS INTERFERENCE, SO CAN AFFORD A PERIOD OF POLITICAL INACTIVITY UNTIL THE SITUATION IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN BECOMES CLEAR.

6. THE TOTAL PACIFICATION OF KURDISTAN WILL BE A LONG, SLOW PROCESS. THE MASSIVE MILITARY PRESENCE PREVENTS ALL BUT RELATIVELY UNCOORDINATED ISOLATED HIT-AND-RUN ATTACKS. IN TERMS OF POSITIVE REINFORCEMENT, GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA PROCEEDS APACE, WITH TOURISM, INDUSTRY, AGRICULTURE AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS CLOSELY LINKED TO THE COMPLEX OF HOUSING PROJECTS, ROADS, SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS. THIS ECONOMIC CAMPAIGN TO REDUCE SEPARATIST TENDENCIES IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED IF GIVEN ENOUGH TIME.

7. IRAQI KURDS HAVE NOT RESORTED TO TERRORISM, IN THE STYLE OF MOST OTHER MODERN SEPARATIST GROUPS, AND HAVE LEFT TOURISTS AND MOST FOREIGN WORKERS ALONE. THIS REDUCES KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS INDICATING A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE KURDS AND OTHERS. THERE ARE VARIOUS EXPLANATIONS FOR THIS BEHAVIOR. ONE IS THAT MANY KURDS ARE NOW SO TIED TO THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLANTED BY THE GOI THAT THEY WOULD DEEPLY RESENT THE ECONOMIC DISLOCATION THAT TERRORIST INCIDENTS WOULD BRING. ANOTHER IS THAT PUBLIC REACTION WAS SO ADVERSE AFTER A 1977 INCIDENT IN WHICH APPROXIMATELY 25 PIONEER SCOUTS AGED 12 TO 14 WERE KILLED THAT THE KURDS REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT SUCH EFFORTS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. OTHERS CONCLUDE THAT GOI SECURITY BLANKET IN AREA IS SO HEAVY, GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IS FORCED TO TAKE PLACE AT NIGHT, IN RELATIVELY REMOTE AREAS, WHERE THERE ARE NO TOURISTS. ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES ARE THUS LIMITED TO ATTACKS ON ISOLATED POLICE STATIONS, OTHER MILITARY-TYPE INSTALLATIONS AND ROAD-BUILDING CREWS - ALL OF WHICH SYMBOLIZE GOI INTENT TO INCREASE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE REGION.

8. UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR POLITICAL CHANGE (AND THE SITUATION IN IRAN COULD PRODUCE ONE), PROSPECTS FOR INITIATING REVOLT OR WIDESPREAD UNREST IN KURDISTAN ARE GROWING INCREASINGLY REMOTE. THERE WILL BE MINOR TROUBLES, HOWEVER, FOR MANY YEARS TO COME. SADDAM, AND THE BAATH, APPEAR TO BE FIRMLY IN CONTROL AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO DEAL HARSHLY WITH ANY KURDISH DISSIDENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, WORK WILL CONTINUE ON THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGION AS THE POLICY MOST LIKELY TO RESULT IN THE COOPTION AND ASSIMILATION OF IRAC'S KURDS.

PECK

BT
#1942

DE RUQMHR #0139/01 260 **
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 O 171154Z SEP 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3810
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC
 RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0287
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0269
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0283
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0258
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0322
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0321
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0326
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0290
 RUOTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0394
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0287
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0283
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0175
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0348
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRG: STAT 0/17/79
 APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAIN
 TRFTD: POL: FASWIFT: G
 CLFAR: NONE
 DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
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U.S. Government Printing Office: 1976-204-830

BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 10139

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/17/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
 TAGS: IR, PINS, PINT
 SUBJECT: KURDISH SITUATION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. KURDISH AREAS HAVE REMAINED FAIRLY QUIET OVER THE PAST WEEK ALTHOUGH SCATTERED CLASHES BETWEEN PGOI FORCES AND KURDISH REBELS CONTINUE TO BE REPORTED. PGOI HAS REESTABLISHED CONTROL OVER ALL MAIN TOWNS IN THE AREA AND APPEARS TO BE LAUNCHED ON A CAMPAIGN OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA. ALL RETURNS ARE NOT YET IN, AND EMBASSY IS UNWILLING TO SPECULATE IF THE APPARENT SUCCESS OF PGOI FORCES IN RECAPTURING KURDESTAN IS A LASTING ONE.

3. OVER THE PAST WEEK PGOI FORCES, AFTER REESTABLISHING CONTROL OVER ALL TOWNS IN THE KURDISH AREAS, HAVE BEEN ENGAGING IN "MOPPING UP" OPERATIONS. KAYHAN ON SEPTEMBER 15 REPORTED SEVERAL CLASHES NEAR THE TURKISH BORDER IN WEST AZARBAIJAN AND IN THE AREA OF PIRANSAHR, SARDASHT AND SALMAS. OTHER REPORTS MENTION GUNFIRE AT NIGHT IN THE MAHABAD AREA. ONE DRAMATIC REPORT FROM SARDASHT ALLEGES THAT THE MILITARY HAD SURROUNDED 400 MEMBERS OF THE KDP IN THE AREA AND WAS ATTACKING WITH JETS AND HELICOPTERS (WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS.)

4. IRAN DOES NOT SEEM TO BE HAVING ANY PROBLEMS WITH EITHER IRAQ OR TURKEY IN THE BORDER AREAS. ONE PRESS REPORT STATES THAT TURKEY HAS REFUSED PERMISSION FOR PEOPLE TO ESCAPE TO TURKEY VIA SERO. REVOLUTIONARY JUDGE KHALKHALI CLAIMED THAT LAST WEEK IRAQI ARMED FORCES ATTACKED IRANIAN KURDISH GUERRILLA POSITIONS 25 KILOMETRES SOUTHWEST OF BANEH AND FORCED THE KURDS TO

MOVE BACK TOWARDS THE IRANIAN BORDER. KHALKHALI IS TREATING THE CASE OF SIX IRAQUI KURDS CAUGHT FIGHTING WITH THE KURDISH REBELS WITH UNCHARACTERISTIC CAUTION. ALTHOUGH HIS COURT HAS SENTENCED THEM TO DEATH, THEY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO TEHRAN FOR REVIEW OF THEIR CASE.

5. SINCE SEPTEMBER 8, ONLY TWO KURDS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED AND THESE EXECUTIONS WERE PROBABLY UNRELATED TO KURDISH REBEL ACTIVITIES. WITH KHALKHALI'S RETURN TO QOM IT APPEARS THE PACE OF EXECUTIONS HAS DEFINITELY SLOWED ALMOST TO A HALT. THIS MAY REFLECT A MORE GENEROUS PGOI ATTITUDE TO THE CONQUERED. HOWEVER, EMBASSY WONDERS IF PGOI CAUTION MAY NOT ALSO COME FROM FACT THAT KURDS APPEAR TO BE HOLDING FAIRLY LARGE NUMBERS OF PGOI HOSTAGES (FROM 80-150). WHATEVER THE CASE WE ASSUME THAT MAJOR DAMAGE HAS ALREADY BEEN CAUSED AMONG FIERCELY LOYAL TRIBAL KURDS BY PGOI POLICY OF EXECUTIONS. THE TWO LATEST KURDISH EXECUTIONS WERE OF MEMBERS OF TOP SANANDAJ FAMILIES BAHRAMI-KAMANGER CHARGED WITH REBEL ACTIVITIES AND FORCEABLY OCCUPYING LAND NEAR THE CITY; AND ALI REZA SANANDAJI (PNCWN AS VALI KHAN) CHARGED WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE FORMER GOVERNMENT, KILLING A FARMER AND SEXUALLY ASSAULTING A VILLAGE WOMAN. REGARDLESS OF THE ACCURACY OF THESE CHARGES, THESE EXECUTIONS IN PARTICULAR ARE LIKELY TO FURTHER ALIENATE TWO VERY POWERFUL KURDISH CLANS.

6. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, PGOI OFFICIALS HAVE CONTINUED TO STRESS THEIR INTENTION TO HELP THE KURDISH AREAS RECOVER FROM THE FIGHTING AND DEVELOP ECONOMICALLY. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF KURDESTAN SHAKIBA, HIMSELF A KURD, TOLD THE PRESS THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD INITIALLY BEEN CONFIDENT CONDITIONS WOULD IMPROVE, HE WAS NO LONGER SURE. HE IS QUOTED AS SAYING THE "SITUATION IS RAPIDLY DETERIORATING IN KURDESTAN." THIS SITUATION, HE CHARGES, IS DUE TO THE SENTENCES PASSED ON REBELS BY KHALKHALI AND TO THE ACTIONS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND THE RELIGIOUS COMMITTEES.

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 10139/2

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 10139

COMMENT: THE HARSH PGOI RESPONSE TO THE KURDISH
REbellion HAS HAD TWO RESULTS: THE PGOI HAS REESTABLISH-
ED UNQUESTIONED CONTROL OVER THE MAIN KURDISH TOWNS AND
LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO THE BORDER. IT ALSO SEEMS,
MAYBE TEMPORARILY, TO HAVE QUIETED MUTTERINGS IN
CERTAIN SUNNI AREAS ABOUT INCREASED AUTONOMY. ALL THE
MATTERS ARE CERTAINLY NOT IN. WE DO NOT KNOW EITHER
HOW STRONG OR HOW UNIFIED THE REBEL KURDS WILL BE. WE
ASSUME THAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THERE WILL
CONTINUE TO BE LOW LEVEL GUERRILLA ATTACKS AGAINST THE
PGOI FORCES BY VARIOUS GROUPS. WHETHER THIS FIGHTING
WILL TURN INTO A FULL SCALE GUERRILLA WAR WITH ACTIVE
SUPPORT OF THE TOWNS PEOPLE - FIGHTING WHICH COULD
SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE PGOI'S CONTROL OF TOWNS AND
COMMUNICATIONS-IS TOO EARLY TO SAY. LAINGEN

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TEHRAN 10139/2

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INFO RUGMQU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 469
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1724
RUGMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2238
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 275
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 358 ✓
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 2045

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/27/85 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IZ
SUBJECT: (U) GOI DECREES RETURN OF KURDS TO NORTH

REF: BAGHDAD 1783

Pol 13-3

1. (U) ON SEPTEMBER 20, IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN ISSUED DECREE PERMITTING "BARZANI KURDS" IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH THE RETURN TO NORTHERN AUTONOMOUS AREA. ORDER NOTES THAT A NUMBER OF KURDS HAD MOVED FROM AREA DUE TO "EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES" PREVAILING BEFORE PROMULGATION OF AUTONOMOUS LAW ON MARCH 11, 1974.

2. (C) DECREE IS BEING WIDELY INTERPRETED AS STATEMENT BY GOI THAT IT - IN CONTRAST TO IRAN - HAS NOTHING TO FEAR NOW FROM ITS KURDISH MINORITY, AND MORE SPECIFICALLY, FROM THE VERY GROUP THAT LED THE REVOLT AGAINST THE REGIME IN THE EARLY 70'S. "BARZANI KURDS" REFERS LOOSELY TO ADHERENTS OF THE BARZANI LED KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP), THE ONLY KURDISH PARTY WITH ANY REAL FOLLOWING, BUT NOT LEGALIZED BY MEMBERSHIP IN THE PNF. AN ESTIMATED 10,000 PERSONS ARE ELIGIBLE TO MOVE NORTH UNDER THIS DECREE, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY WILL BE MOVED INTO NEW GOVERNMENT SETTLEMENTS IN FOOTHILLS OF KURDISH AREAS, RATHER THAN INTO THEIR FORMER VILLAGES IN HIGHLANDS. RELOCATION PROCESS WILL BE STRICTLY CONTROLLED BY GOI, AND HENCE RATHER SLOW; THOSE WISHING TO MOVE MUST FIRST REGISTER THEIR DESIRE TO DO SO AND THEN AWAIT HOUSING ASSIGNMENT. IN MEANTIME, GOI IS STEADILY ADVERTISING ITS OTHER EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF KURDS IN TERMS OF FACILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES.

3. (C) COMMENT: THIS DECREE COMES ONLY A MONTH AFTER SADDAM'S GRANTING OF AMNESTY TO KURDS (REFTEL). IT SEEMS TO HAVE COME AS A SURPRISE TO MANY IRAQIS IN THAT IT IMPLIES A SELF-ASSURANCE IN TERMS OF GOI CONTROL OF KURDS THAT MAY BE PREMATURE, PARTICULARLY WITH ONGOING KURDISH REVOLT IN IRAN. DECREE ESSENTIALLY FLAUNTS QUIESCENCE OF IRAQ'S KURDS AT VERY MOMENT WHEN IRANIANS ARE STRUGGLING TO CONTROL THEIRS. GOI, NEVERTHELESS, SEEMS TO BE ALL TOO AWARE OF DANGERS OF SPILLOVER INTO IRAQ OF FIGHTING ACROSS THE BORDER AND HAVE, RUMOR HAS IT, ESTABLISHED THREE CAMPS ALONG BORDER TO GATHER IN KURDISH REFUGEES FLEEING THE FIGHTING. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT TRAVEL IN AND OUT OF CAMPS IS STRICTLY CONTROLLED BY GOI TO ENSURE MINIMUM CONTACT BETWEEN REBELS AND KURDISH DISSIDENTS STILL IN IRAQ, BUT THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY BORDER CROSSINGS BOTH WAYS THAT CONTINUE UNCHECKED.

PECK

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DE RUQMFV #2334 2751912
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FM FBIS TEL AVIV IS
TO RUTLAAA/FBIS WASH DC
RUEBFGA/VOA WASH DC
RUEBHAA/STORAGE CENTER FBIS WASH DC
RUDOMKA/FBIS LONDON UK
RUDOMLA/FBIS CAVERSHAM/DW
RUQMOM/FBIS NICOSIA CY
RUCLAKA/CDR 4TH PSYOP GROUP FT BRAGG NC
RUEAIJU/NPIC WASH DC
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IR
RHFRAAB/HQ USAF/IN RAMSTEIN AB GE
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UNCLAS DEFNEDS KURDS' RIGHTS, CRITICIZES THEIR REPRESSION

TA021723

(CLANDESTINE) NATIONAL VOICE OF IRAN IN PERSIAN TO IRAN 1730 GMT
1 OCT 79 TA

((UNATTRIBUTED COMMENTARY: "LET US ERASE THE STIGMA OF SHAME FROM
THE LAP OF IRAN'S HISTORY"))

((TEXT)) DEAR COMPATRIOTS: THE COUNTRY'S NATIONAL FORCES
ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONTINUATION OF THE UNSTABLE SITUATION
IN KORDESTAN. THE REASON FOR THE ERUPTION OF INCIDENTS IN THIS
REGION IS CLEAR AND THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED MANY TIMES.
UNDER THE FALSE SLOGAN OF DEFENDING ISLAM, THE AGENTS OF IMPERIALISM
AND ZIONISM ARE ATTEMPTING TO STRIKE A BLOW AT THE TRUE FORCES
OF THE REVOLUTION AND AT THE LEGITIMATE AND JUST DEMANDS OF THE
KURDISH PEOPLE TO SECURE THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE AND CULTURAL AUTONOMY
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NATIONAL
UNITY OF IRAN.

THE DEATH OF DEFENSELESS WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE IN
KORDESTAN IS ALSO THE HARBRINGER OF THE CRUSHING OF FREEDOM
IN THE COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH IMAM KHOMAYNI STRESSES THAT THE REVOLUTION
WAS NOT CARRIED OUT SO THAT FREEDOM WOULD BE CRUSHED. IT SHOULD
BE CLEAR TO EVERYONE THAT EXECUTION, KILLING, DETENTION, EXPULSION
AND BOMBARDMENT ARE NOT THE WAY TO REMEDY SOCIAL DISEASES. AT
THE SAME TIME, ONE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT IN OUR COUNTRY THERE

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ARE WRONGED AND OPPRESSED PEOPLES, ONE OF WHICH IS THE PEOPLE OF KORDESTAN.

DURING THE DOMINATION OF THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY, THE KURDISH PEOPLE, AS OTHER PEOPLES OF IRAN, WERE PROHIBITED FROM EXERCISING THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE ORGANS OF LOCAL POWER. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS, GOVERNORS GENERAL AND DIRECTORS GENERAL WERE APPOINTED BY THE SHAH AND SENT TO KORDESTAN BY HIS GOVERNMENT. THE MAJLES REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE KORDESTAN REGION WERE APPOINTED BY THE COURTIERIS AND AGENTS OF IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM. CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS, SAVAK AGENTS AND THE KHANS AND REACTIONARY LEADERS OF THE KURDISH TRIBES PLUNDERED THIS OPPRESSED PEOPLE. INSTEAD OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL LIFE AND THE MEDICAL SYSTEM IN KORDESTAN, THANKS, ARTILLERY AND POLICE WERE DISPATCHED TO THIS REGION. WHEN THE PATIENCE OF THE KURDS REACHED ITS LIMITS AND THEY PROTESTED AGAINST SUCH TYRANNY, THEY WERE CRUSHED UNDER THE BANNER OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SO-CALLED BANDITS, SUBVERSIVES AND SEPARATISTS. THE CULTURAL AND NATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE WAS INSULTED. AS A RESULT, KORDESTAN WAS TRANSFORMED INTO ONE OF THE MOST BACKWARD AND OPPRESSED REGIONS OF OUR COUNTRY, AND THE LIFE OF THE INHABITANTS OF THAT AREA WAS TURNED INTO A REAL HELL.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE KURDISH PEOPLE PLAYED A VALUABLE ROLE IN THE CREATION OF IRAN'S ANCIENT CULTURE, AND THEY MADE INNUMERABLE SACRIFICES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE COUNTRY'S FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE. UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF POLITICAL FIGURES SUCH AS SALEHUDIN AYUBI, THE KURDISH PEOPLE ROSE AGAINST THE AGGRESSORS IN THE DEFENSE OF THE INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM OF ALL THE IRANIAN PEOPLES AND THEIR CULTURE. THEY ALSO PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL AND LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF OUR COUNTRY. THE KURDISH PEOPLE SAW THE KEY TO THEIR FREEDOM AND HAPPINESS IN THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, AND THEY STRUGGLED ALONG WITH THE OTHER PEOPLES OF IRAN UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF IMAM KHOMAYNI AGAINST THE SHAH'S REGIME, MAKING A LOT OF SACRIFICES ALONG THIS ROAD93UKK

AFTER THE REVOLUTION'S VICTORY, THE KURDS, LIKE OTHER OPPRESSED PEOPLES OF IRAN, EXPECTED AND CONTINUE TO EXPECT THAT IN THE NEW REPUBLICAN REGIME ALL NATIONAL (OPPRESSION AND INSULT), POVERTY AND BACKWARDNESS AND DEPRIVATION WILL BE ELIMINATED, AND THE ROAD FOR FREEDOM AND JUSTICE WILL BE SMOOTHED FOR THEM. THE KURDS RECOGNIZE IRAN AS THEIR REAL HOMETLAND AND THE THOUGHT OF SEPARATION FROM IRAN DOES NOT EVEN ENTER THEIR MINDS. THEY DESIRE TO LIVE FREELY IN THE FAMILY OF THE FRIENDLY AND BROTHERLY IRANIAN PEOPLES AND TO RUN THEIR LOCAL AFFAIRS THEMSELVES WITHIN UNITED IRAN'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. 211733 MS/GALLAGHER/IC 02/1801Z OCT

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#0334

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 10847

O 101327Z OCT 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4190
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC
 RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0321
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0310
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0314
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0292
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0364
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0368
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0363
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0328
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0435
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0293
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0202
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0393
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
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CHRG: STAT 10/10/79
 APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINC
 DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
 CLEAR: POL:JLIMBERT
 A/M:PGAST
 DISTR: POL2 CHRG ICA
 ECON CONS CHRON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10847

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/10/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
 TAGS: IR, PINT, PINS
 SUBJECT: KURDISH PROBLEMS

REF: TEHRAN 10804

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. ACCORDING TO PRESS AND RADIO REPORTS, IN RESPONSE TO AMBUSH OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (REFTEL) DEF MIN CHAMRAN HAS FLOWN TO KURDESTAN TO OVERSEE OPERATIONS AGAINST REBELS. AT THE SAME TIME JCS CHIEF SHAKER ANNOUNCED THAT THE ARMY HAD "EXTENSIVE PLANS TO COUNTER THE KURDISH REBELS" AND INTERIOR MINISTER SABAGHIAN TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE PGOI PLANNED TO TAKE THE WAR OUT OF THE TOWNS INTO THE MOUNTAINS "AFTER THE AREA IS STUDIED."

3. STORY OF AMBUSH SEEMS FAR FROM CLEAR: AMBUSH REPORTEDLY TOOK PLACE SUNDAY, OCTOBER 7; IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER 22 OR 52 GUARDSMEN WERE KILLED IN AMBUSH WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE OCCURRED WHEN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WITHDREW FROM GENDARMARIE POST NEAR SARDASHT TO BANEH WITHOUT COORDINATING WITH LOCAL ARMY COMMANDER AND AGAINST HIS

4. CERIMONIES FOR THE SLAIN GUARDS WERE HELD OCTOBER 10 IN CITIES ACROSS IRAN. IN TEHRAN, THE BAZAAR CLOSED AND CERIMONIES WERE HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN BUT NO FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE APPEARED AT EMBASSY. (OCT 9 DEMONSTRATIONS, ACCORDING TO JUMHURI-E-ISLAMI, WERE ORGANIZED BY TEHRAN UNIVERSITY ISLAMIC STUDENTS SOCIETY AND SHARIF INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY MOSLEM STUDENTS ORGANIZATION.)

5. RIGHT-WING ISLAMIC PAPER JUMHURI-E-ISLAMI CONTINUED ITS ATTACKS TODAY ON ALLEGED AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN KURDESTAN FRONT PAGING A GORY PICTURE OF A CHARRED REVOLUTIONARY GUARD ENTITLED "HUMAN RIGHTS AMERICAN

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• STYLE". (SEE SEPTTEL FOR DETAILS).

6. IN ADDITION PRESS CARRIED STORY BY REUTERS FROM BEIRUT THAT PGOI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TABATABAI CHARGED THAT THE SHAH HAD PAID TWO HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS TWO WEEKS AGO THROUGH EX-AMBASSADOR ZAHEDI TO FINANCE THE KURDISH REBELLION. COMMENT: PGOI COMMENTS THUS FAR HAVE BEEN FAIRLY NON-SPECIFIC ON OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE BUT IT SEEMS PLAIN THEY SUSPECT IRAQI INTERFERENCE WITH THE KURDS AS WELL AS SOME VAGUE "ISRAELI" CONNECTION.

7. ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, IN COURSE OF ALREADY SCHEDULED MEETING WITH ACTING HEAD OF THE MFA 4TH DIVISION PARSA KIA, ACTING POL COUNCELLOR SHOWED PARSA KIA A COPY OF THE JUMHURI-E-ISLAMI ARTICLE AND EXPRESSED EMBASSY'S CONCERN OVER TONE OF THE REPORTS OF US ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN KURDESTAN. EMBOFF POINTED OUT THAT SUCH UNFOUNDED REPORTING MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED SMALL DEMONSTRATION AGAINST EMBASSY OCTOBER 9. EMBOFF CONTINUED THAT JUMHURI-E-ISLAMI WAS AFTERALL PAPER OF AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI'S ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY. PARSA KIA ASSURED EMBOFF THAT PGOI WAS NOT INVOLVED IN SUCH STORIES AND THAT NO PGOI OFFICIALS HAD EVER ACCUSED USG OF INVOLVEMENT IN KURDESTAN. HE RECOGNIZED THAT SOME PRESS REPORTS HAD MENTIONED US, BUT STATED THAT ONLY ACCUSATIONS BY PGOI OFFICIALS OF INVOLVEMENT OF OUTSIDE POWERS HE HAD SEEN WERE DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAEL AND IRAQ. PARSA KIA STATED PGOI DID NOT CONTROL "FREE" PRESS SUCH AS JUMHURI-E-ISLAMI BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERN OVER THESE STORIES. HE SAID HE WOULD CONVEY OUR CONCERN TO FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI WHO HAS JUST RETURNED TO IRAN. PARSA KIA REMARKED THAT YAZDI WOULD BE GIVING A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS HIS TRIP. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION, EMBOFF REPEATED ASSURANCE (STATE 247846) OF USG RESPECT FOR PGOI TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. LAINGEN

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RUSNAAA/EUDAC VAHINGEN GE

RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE

RUFDAAB/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE

RUFTHA/TFC ROERFINK MTK GE

RUCNBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

RUFRAAA/COMIDEASTFOR

RUCIPBA/TAC LANGLEY AFB VA

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CONFIDENTIAL FAC OCT 79

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THIS IS IR 6 846 0317 79

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.

1. COUNTRY: IRAN (IR)
2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 846 0317 79
3. TITLE: THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE & THE COMMANDER OF THE IRANIAN GROUND FORCES WERE WOUNDED IN KORDESTAN (U)
4. OMITTED.
5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 791015
6. DATE OF REPORT: 791015
7. DATE/PLACE OF ACC: 791015/TEHRAN, IRAN
8. REFERENCES: U-UED-49218, CONTINUES
- - M-2E1-20254, CONTINUES
- - T-XXX-42015, CONTINUES
9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE B. INFO 2
10. ORIGINATOR: USDAO TEHRAN, IRAN
11. REQUEST EVAL: ICR
12. PREPARING OFFICER: H.F. JOHNSON, MAJ, USAF, AAIRA
13. APPROVING AUTH: T.F. SCHAEFER, COL, USAF, DATT
14. SOURCE: SCI 6 846 0028

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VZCZC 186

VZCZC 186

15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: DIRC NO

16. SUMMARY: (C) DURING A MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES ON THE MORNING OF 15 OCT 79, THE FOLLOWING DATA WAS PASSED TO THE SOURCE. MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MOSTAFA CHAMRAN AND IRANIAN GROUND FORCES COMMANDER, BGEN VALIOLLAH FALLAHI WHO WERE ON A FACT FINDING MISSION IN KORDESTAN WERE WOUNDED BY A HAND GRENADE (EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OF SOME KIND) THROWN INTO A ROOM IN WHICH THEY WERE MEETING. BOTH SUBJECTS ARE REPORTED TO BE IN A HOSPITAL IN KORDESTAN.

ORIGINATOR COMMENTS:

A. (C) SOURCE IS FAIRLY SURE THE DATA IS ACCURATE. HOWEVER, HE WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT OR THE EXTENT OF WOUNDS SUFFERED BY THE SUBJECTS.

B. (C) WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THE VERACITY OF THE INFORMATION. ASSUMING THAT IT IS TRUE, IT MAY SIGNAL NEW AND STRONGER MEASURES BY THE PGOI IN KORDESTAN. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ARBITRATE WITH THE ENEMY WHEN HE PERSISTS IN KILLING OR ATTEMPTING TO KILL YOUR ENVOY'S
DECL 15 OCT 85

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VZCZC 186

0 191135Z OCT 78 ZEEA
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE NIACT 4343
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11105

TEHRAN 11105

F.O. 12065: GDS 12/1985 (LAIGNEN, L. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: IR, PIMP
SUBJECT: IRAN'S SUSPICION OF U.S. INTERFERENCE IN KURDESTAN

POL 2
CHRG
ECON
ICA
CONS
RF
CHRN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. IRANIAN PARANOIA ABOUT US INTERFERENCE IN KURDESTAN IS A CONTINUING AND SERIOUS PROBLEM HERE. FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI'S COMMENTS TO THE SECRETARY REGARDING ALLEGED CIA INVOLVEMENT HAVE BEEN REPEATED IN MEETINGS WE HAVE HAD WITH ENTEZAM AND YAZDI THIS PAST WEEK. WHILE WE MAY HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS IN REDUCING THEIR SUSPICIONS, THIS REGIME SPEAKS WITH MANY VOICES AND THERE IS A VERY SUBSTANTIAL LEGACY OF SCEPTICISM TO OVERCOME ON THIS ISSUE.

3. MOREOVER, THE PRESS, INCLUDING PAPERS IDENTIFIED IN THE PUBLIC MIND WITH KHOMEINI AND WHICH INDIVIDUALS LIKE ENTEZAM AND YAZDI PLAINLY DO NOT CONTROL, CONTINUE DAILY TO ATTACK US WITH CHARGES OF INVOLVEMENT IN KURDESTAN.

4. ENTEZAM HAS SUGGESTED TO US THAT HE AND OTHERS IN THE PGOI WHO RECOGNIZE THE DANGERS INVOLVED IN THIS KIND OF CONTINUING CAMPAIGN WOULD BE BETTER EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM IF THE US AT A SENIOR LEVEL WERE HEARD PUBLICLY TO DENY THESE REPORTS.

5. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE RESPONSIVE. WE DO NOT WISH TO GET INTO A SITUATION OF RENDERING CREDENCE TO RIDICULOUS CHARGES BY THE PRESS AND ELEMENTS IN THE PGOI BY DENYING THEM EACH AND EVERY TIME THEY ARISE. WE RECOGNIZE ALSO THAT SO LONG AS THE PGOI CONTINUES TO HAVE DIFFICULTY IN KURDESTAN, WE WILL BE SEEN BY THE PRESS ANY MANY POLITICAL FIGURES AS A CONVENIENT SCRAPEGOAT.

6. NONETHELESS, WE THINK IT IS NOW TIME THAT WE APPEAR ON THE PUBLIC RECORD WITH A STRONG REAFFIRMATION OF OUR POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT. WE, THEREFORE, URGE THE DEPARTMENT TO FIND AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY FOR A SENIOR USG POLICY OFFICIAL TO REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF IRAN, EMPHASIZING IN THIS CONNECTION THAT ACCUSATIONS OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN KURDESTAN ARE WHOLLY WITHOUT SUBSTANCE. WITH THAT KIND OF STATEMENT FROM A SENIOR LEVEL ON THE RECORD, OUR OWN POSITION IN TEHRAN WILL BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED IN DEALING WITH SUCH CHARGES AS THEY ARISE. LAIGNEN

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#105

S E C R E T

TEHRAN 11179
POL 13-3a

DE RUQMER #1179/01 295 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 221328Z OCT 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4394
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC
 RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0339
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0327
 RUEKAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0332
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0308
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0332
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0396
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0380
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0346
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0461
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0309
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0339
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0219
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0415
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 BT

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: STAT 10/22/79
 APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAINGR
 DRPTD: POL: EASWIFT: GO
 CLEAR: POL: VTOMSETH
 DISTR: POL? CHG ICA
 ECON CONS CHRON
 RF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 11179

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/22/85 (LAINGEN, L. BRUCE) OR-P
 TAGS: IR, PINS, PINT
 SUBJECT: KURDISH PROBLEM

REF: TEHRAN 11068

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FIGHTING HAS CONTINUED IN KURDISH AREAS SINCE OCTOBER 16 WITH THE HEAVIEST IN MAHABAD. ACCORDING TO THE TEHRAN PRESS ON OCTOBER 20 THERE WAS PARTICULARLY HEAVY FIGHTING AT MAHABAD IN WHICH AT LEAST ONE TANK WAS DESTROYED WITHIN THE CITY ITSELF, THERE WAS REPORTEDLY SOME HOUSE-TO-HOUSE FIGHTING AND PERHAPS AS MANY AS 77 PEOPLE WERE KILLED. SCATTERED CLASHES CONTINUE TO BE REPORTED THROUGHOUT THE KURDISH REGION IN BUKAN, MARIVAN, SAGHEZ AND BANEH. ON OCTOBER 20 THERE WERE BOMB INCIDENTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN SANANDADJ.

3. PGOI RESPONSE TO THE INCREASED FIGHTING HAS BEEN EXTREMELY DISORGANIZED. GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF KURDESTAN PROVINCE SHAKIBA ON OCTOBER 20 TOLD THE TEHRAN TIMES THAT THERE HAD BEEN A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER IN HIS PROVINCE. IN SANANDADJ, HE SAID, THE REVOLUTIONARY GAURDS HAD RECEIVED AN ORDER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL NOT TO INTERFERE IN SANANDADJ'S ADMINISTRATION AND, THEREFORE, WITHDREW COMPLETELY. LOCAL POLICE AND GENDARMARIE REFUSED TO TAKE OVER BECAUSE IT WAS TOO DANGEROUS AND, ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNOR, THE TOWN WAS CLOSED BY A GENERAL STRIKE.

4. DEFENSE MINISTER CHAMRAN REPORTEDLY WENT TO KURDESTAN LAST WEEK TO TRY TO BRING THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL. EMBASSY HAS HAD PUMORS THAT HE AND ARMY C/G FALLAHI WERE INJURED IN VARIOUS ATTACKS. ON OCTOBER 20, HOWEVER,

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TEHRAN 11179

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1978-204-830

BOTH ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF PALLAHI AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARD COMMANDER ABU SHARIF WERE AT MILITARY ACADEMY GRADUATION CEREMONIES IN TEHRAN ALTHOUGH WE STILL HAVE NOT SEEN CHAMRAN. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, WHO ARE STILL CARRYING BURDENS OF FIGHTING IN KURDESTAN, DO NOT APPEAR TO BE FARING VERY WELL AGAINST THE HIT-AND-RUN TACTICS OF THE KURDISH REBELS. WHILE THERE ARE REPORTS THAT PGOI HELICOPTERS AND PLANES ARE TAKING PART IN THE DEFENSE OF MAHABAD, ARMY STILL IS NOT HEAVILY ENGAGED IN THE FIGHTING. THE MAHABAD ARMY COMMANDER TOLD TEHRAN TIMES THE ARMY HAS ONLY BEEN INVOLVED IN ONE CLASH THIS FAR IN THE MOUNTAINS BEHIND MAHABAD WHEN THEY WERE FIRED ON AND RETURNED THE FIRE. ACCORDING TO ONE RELIABLE REPORT, ONE TANK BATTALION REFUSED CHAMRAN'S ORDERS TO GO INTO BATTLE AND ITS OFFICERS ARE CURRENTLY ON TRIAL BEFORE A REVOLUTIONARY COURT (WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THIS REPORT).

5. PGOI ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE MADE MUCH HEADWAY AND THE PROLIFERATION OF "REPRESENTATIVES" SENT BY KHOMEINI, BAZARGAN AND OTHERS IS PRODUCING A RASH OF CONTRADICTORY REPORTS. STATE MINISTER FOROUHAR AND BAZARGAN'S REPRESENTATIVE ZIBA KALEM RETURNED TO TEHRAN OCTOBER 19 AND HAVE REPORTED TO THE CABINET. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, WHILE FOROUHAR SAW LOCAL KURDISH LEADERS HE DID NOT CONTACT EITHER HOUSSAINI OR QASSEMLOU. ON THE OTHER HAND, ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, TEHRAN TIMES CARRIED A STORY THAT KHOMEINI'S "PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE" MEHDI BAHADORAN WHO HAD BEEN IN KURDESTAN A MONTH HAD REPORTED TO KHOMEINI THAT THE PROBLEM IN KURDESTAN STEMMED FROM A VAGUELY WORDED PLOT BY ANTI-KURD SAVAK MULLAHS LOCAL MILITARY AND GENDARMARIE COMMANDERS AND DEFENSE MINISTER CHAMRAN TO ARM FEUDAL LANDLORDS AND SUBVERT THE REVOLUTION. THIS STORY WAS LATER DENIED BY BAZARGAN'S OFFICE WHICH STATED THAT NOT ONLY WAS THE REPORT A LIE BUT BAHADORAN WAS NOT KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE.

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6. ON OCTOBER 21, BAZARGAN HELD TALKS WITH KHOMEINI AND TEHRAN TIMES SPECULATES THAT HE PROPOSED AN AMNESTY FOR HOSSAINI AND GASSEMLOU AS WELL AS OTHER KURDISH KDP LEADERS. EMBASSY DOUBTS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO KHOMEINI WHO HAS TO DATE REFUSED TO DEAL WITH THESE TWO LEADERS. IN A SPEECH TO NIRT WORKERS OCTOBER 21, KHOMEINI SAID THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO UNLEASH ALL OUT WAR ON KURDESTAN AS THE REBELS WERE MIXED IN WITH THE INNOCENT LOCAL POPULATION. HE CALLED ON THE KURDS TO SEPARATE OUT THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY REBELS AND WARNED THAT THERE WAS A PLOT AFOOT "BY PEOPLE WHOSE INTERESTS HAVE BEEN ENDANGERED BY THE REVOLUTION" TO CUT IRAN INTO BITS BY SEPARATING OUT KURDESTAN, BALUCHISTAN AND KHUZESTAN.

7. IN THE MIDST OF ALL THIS ANOTHER KHOMEINI ENVOY SHEIKH HOSSEIN KURMANI, OCTOBER 21 FLEW TO THE IRAQI BORDER FOR TALKS WITH IRAQI OFFICIALS. (PRESS REPORTS HAVE ALLEGED THAT PLANES---PROBABLY IRAQI HAVE BEEN VIOLATING IRANIAN AIR SPACE IN KURDESTAN).

8. THE US CONTINUES TO BE ATTACKED IN RIGHT WING PAPER JUMHURI-YE-ISLAMI WHICH ON OCTOBER 21 CARRIED STORIES ON KURDESTAN ALLEGING THAT "MERCENARIES OF THE AMERICANS" ARE TAKING PART IN THE FIGHTING. LAINGEN BT
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S E C R E T

TEHRAN 11172/2

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RULYOSA T COMCARGRU SIX
RHEMBRA T USS JOSEPH STRAUSS
R 230129Z OCT 79
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//JSI-7//
TO DIACURINTEL
AIG 7011
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RUFLEWA/NAF SIGONELLA IT//IN
RUEBDSA/DFSC CAMERON STATION VA//FJSC//BG SEAMON
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 2548
DIADIN 295-11A (AS OF: 2005 EDT 22 OCT 79)
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

IRAN: KURDS TAKE MAHABAD. (U)

1. (C/NOFORN) LATE DURING THE WEEK OF 14 OCTOBER, HEAVY FIGHTING RESUMED IN THE KURDISH AREA OF NORTHEAST IRAN BETWEEN KURDISH REBELS AND GOVERNMENT FORCES. SINCE THE 13TH, THE MOST INTENSE FIGHTING OCCURRED IN THE FORMER KURDISH STRONGHOLD OF MAHABAD.

PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 5095 C O N F I D E N T I A L
THE KURDS HAVE, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, ABANDONED HIT-AND-RUN SUBERRILLA TACTICS AND ARE DIRECTLY CHALLENGING THE GOVERNMENT FORCES IN THE STREETS OF MAHABAD. THE KURDS REPORTEDLY MANAGED TO DRIVE GOVERNMENT FORCES BACK INTO THEIR BARRACKS ON THE 22TH, FOLLOWING 2 DAYS OF FIERCE FIGHTING IN WHICH THE KURDS DESTROYED THREE TANKS AND CAPTURED A FOURTH. THEY ARE NOW CONTROLLING MOST OF THE CITY. THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IS UNDETERMINED. THE CITY IS REPORTED RELATIVELY CALM AS OF THE 22D, AND BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO BE HOLDING THEIR GROUND. THE REBELS HAVE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO ATTACK THE BARRACKS

AND THE GOVERNMENT FORCES HAVE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO LEAVE THE BARRACKS.
2. (C/NOFORN) WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WILL RESPOND TO THIS LATEST FIGHTING BY SENDING MILITARY REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE AREA AGAIN OR SEEK A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT REMAINS TO BE SEEN. THERE ARE INDICATIONS SOME AUTHORITIES WOULD LIKE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS MINISTER FOROUHAR HAS JUST RETURNED TO TEHRAN FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY PEACE TALKS WITH KURDISH LEADERS. ALSO, AYATOLLAH BEHESTI, A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE CLERGY, WAS QUOTED ON THE 20TH AS SAYING THE INSURGENCY MUST BE SETTLED POLITICALLY AND NOT BY MILITARY MEANS. HOWEVER, WHAT THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTA-

PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 5095 C O N F I D E N T I A L

TIVES WILL HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH IS QUESTIONABLE. THE ONLY PROMISE MADE PUBLIC BY FOROUHAR THUS FAR IS AMNESTY FOR ALL KURDS EXCEPT THE TWO LEADERS, SHAYKHS BOSSEINI AND QASSEMLOU. ANY SERIOUS EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE A PEACE WILL QUITE LIKELY BE FRUSTRATED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, WHO IS NOT KNOWN FOR HIS PRAGMATISM. IN THE PAST, HE HAS REMAINED TOTALLY INTRANSIGENT TOWARD MINORITY AUTONOMY DEMANDS AND IS NOT EXPECTED TO COMPROMISE NOW. FOR THEIR PART, THE KURDS ARE PROBABLY ENCOURAGED BY THEIR GAINS IN MAHABAD AND WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE THEIR QUEST FOR AUTONOMY WITH EVEN GREATER TENACITY.

PREPARED BY: LCDR D. ADAMS, USN, JSI-5
(DECL 22 OCT -5)

BT
#5295

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 11374/1

DE RUQMHR # 1374/01 3:01**

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 281328Z OCT 79

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4507

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC

RUEKJCS/ JCS WASH DC

RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0348

RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0339

RUEHAD/USINT BAGHADA 0345

RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0317

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0389

RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0467

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0387

RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0558

RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0355

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0471

RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0316

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0355

RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0225

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0423

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 61 OF TEHRAN 11074

DEPT FOR NEA/IRN AND A/SY/CC/TAGS

KARACHI FOR RSS

E.O. 12665: GDS 10/28/85 (TOMSETH ,VICTOR L.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, MOPS , PINT , IR

SUBJECT: WEEKLY POLITICAL ROUNDUP

1. (C -ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY: UNREST IN THE KURDISH AREAS CONTINUES, AND THE CITY OF MAHABAD HAS BEEN THE CENTER OF GREATLY INCREASED VIOLENCES. THE LEVEL OF CONFLICT HAS LED TO FOUR CABINET MEMBERS BEING ORDERED TO FORM A SPECIAL PEACE-NECOTIATIONS COMMISSION. SEVERAL BOMBING INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN KHUZESTAN . LAST WEEK'S CONFLICT AT THE CASPIAN CITY OF BANDAR ANZELI SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DEFUSED, AND AN INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION HAS BEEN SENT TO REPORT ON THE SITUATION. ISFAHAN'S ANGLICAN BISHOP

HAS BEEN ATTACKED BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS. IN TEHRAN, THE CABINET IS SHOWING SIGNS OF INTERNAL STRAIN AS THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE ACCUSES TWO OF HIS PEERS OF INFLUENCING HIM TO APPOINT AN ALLEGED SAVAK MEMBER AS HIS DEPUTY. THE DEPUTY HAS APPARENTLY FLED WITH DOLS 4 MILLION OF THE MINISTRY'S FUNDS. END SUMMARY.

3. UNREST CONTINUED IN THE ETHNIC KURDISH AREA OF IRAN DURING THE PAST WEEK WITH THE MAIN FIGHTING CENTERED IN MAHABAD. ALTHOUGH REPORTS ARE VERY UNCLEAR, BY THE WEEKEND MAHABAD APPEARED TO BE MORE OR LESS INFORMALLY IN KURDISH REBEL HANDS WITH KDP REBELS MOVING FREELY ABOUT THE CITY. THE IRANIAN ARMY COMMANDER OF THE AREA TOLD THE PRZSS THAT ARMY AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARD UNITS IN MAHABAD HAD BEEN CONFINED TO BARRACKS ON PGOI ORDERS TO AVOID KILLING OF CIVILIANS IN THE CITY. WHEN PGOI UNITS TRY TO MOVE ABOUT THE CITY THEY APPARENTLY COME UNDER FIRE. SCATTERED INCIDENTS HAVE CONTINUED TO OCCUR THROUGHOUT THE KURDISH AREA WITH REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS BEING THE MAIN TRAGET OF KURDISH ATTACKS. THE LATEST CLASHES HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN MARIVAN AND BANEH. SCHOOLS THROUGHOUT THE AREA ARE NOW CLOSED AND BUSINRSSES APPEAR TO CLOSE WHENEVER AN INCIDENT OR DEMONSTRATION OCCURS (SUCH AS THAT HELD IN SAQHEZ OCTOBER 27) .

4. PRIMIN BAZARGAN AND A DELEGATION OF FIVE MINISTERS VISITED KHOMEINI ON 21 OCTOBER TO DISCUSS KURDISH PEACE PROPOSALS. BUT NO RESULTS HAVE YET BEEN ANNOUNCED. THE ISSUE OF AMNESTY FOR KDP LEADER QASSEMLOU AND KURDISH RELIGIOUS LEADERS SHEIKH EZZEDIN HOSSEINI SEEMS TO BE PROVING A MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK IN NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN THE CONTROVERSIAL HANGING JUDGE, AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI SEEMS TO HAVE BECOME INVOLVED IN THE THUS FAR FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE SOME PEACE TO THE AREA, OFFERING HIMSELF AS A HOSTAGE TO KDP FORCES IN RETURN FOR THE RELEASE OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CAPTURED BY THE KURDISH INSURGENTS. FOUR MININSTERS HAVE BEEN APPOINTED TO TACKLE THE KURDISH PROBLEM. INT MIN HASHEM SABAGHIAN, DEFENSE MIN MOSTAFA CHAMRAN AND PLAN, BUDGET ORG MIN EZZATOLLAH SAHABI AND MINISTER OF STATE FOUHAR MET WITH KHOMEINI

OCTOBER 27 TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS AND PLAN TO SET UP THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN SANANDAJ. AYATOLLAH SHARIAT MADARI'S NAME HAS ALSO COME UP AS A POSSIBLE MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE PGOI AND KURDISH INSURGENTS. COMMENT: WE HOPE THE PGOI'S MODERATE STANCE THUS FAR IN MAHABAD INDICATES THAT THE PGOI DOES INTEND TO TRY FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE KURDISH PROBLEM.

5. REPORTS OF SABOTAGE CONTINUE FROM KHUZESTAN PROVINSE. EXPLOSIONS ON THREE OILFIELD PIPES WERE REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON OCTOBER 17. THE FIRST TOOK PLACE FOUR KILOMETERS FROM AHVAZ, CAUSING A FIRE FROM THE GAS AND KEROSENE SPILLAGE. THE TWO OTHER EXPLOSIONS (ON THE AHVAZ-BANDAR KHOMEINI HIGHWAY) OCCURED ON PIPELINES LEADING FROM SHUT IN WELLS THAT HAD BEEN CLOSED FOR
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SOMETIME. ON 18 OCTOBER, SABOTEURS TRAVELING IN A WEDDING PARTY CAVALCADE IN AEWAZ TOSSED BOMBS AT THE GOVERNOR'S FORMER HEADQUARTERS AND AT A PARKED BUS. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED IN EITHER BLAST . ON 21 OCTOBER, SABOTEURS BLEW UP RAILROAD TRACKS ON THE AHVAZ-ANDIMESHK LINE, CAUSING THE DERAILMENT OF A PASSENGER TRAIN. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED, BUT THE TRACK HAS BEEN CLOSED. OTHER BOMBING INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN A CARGO TRAIN AND AT A POWER STATION AT KHORRAMSHAHR. THREE WAS APPARENTLY NO SERIOUS DAMAGE DONE. A POWER STATION IN ABADAN WAS ALSO ATTACKED DURING THE PAST WEEK. KHUZESTAN'S GOVERNOR GENERAL MADANI, WHO CLAIMS THAT THE UNREST IN HIS PROVINCE IS BEING GENERATED BY A NEIGHBORING COUNTER (IRAQ) HAS A PERSONAL INTEREST IN RESTORING CALM TO THE AREA. A POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN THE COMING ELECTIONS, MADANI'S PRESTIGE WILL SUFFER IF HE SHOWS THAT HE CANNOT CONTROL THE SECURITY SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN.

6. MADANA HAS ALSO BEEN INVOLVED IN SETTLING THE UNREST AT BANDAR ANZELI (FORMERLY BANDAR PAHLAVI).

HE VISITED THE CASPIAN CITY TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACE MAKING NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING LAST WEEK'S CONFLICT BETWEEN LOCAL FISHERMEN AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. THE CONFLICT, WHICH LED TO 14 DEATHS AND 47 WOUNDED ACCORDING TO THE PRESS (AND 23 DEATHS ACCORDING TO A NAVAL SOURCE) SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DEFUSED BY THE REMOVAL OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS FROM THE CITY AND GRANTING OF MORE RIGHTS TO THE FISHERMEN. AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE BANDAR ANZALI DISTURBANCE HAS BEEN ORDERED BY PRIMIN BAZARGAN. ACCUSATIONS FOR CAUSING THE DISTURBANCE HAVE BEEN LEVELED BY THE CITY GOVERNOR AGAINST THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND THE CHIEF OF THE IRAN FISHERIES COMPANY. THE LATTER, AS CAN BE EXPECTED, PUTS ALL BLAME AT THE CITY GOVERNOR'S DOOR.

7. TEHRAN HAS WITNESSED AN INTERESTING VARIATION ON THE PROBLEM OF THE STUDENT HOUSING SHORTAGE. THE INTERNATIONAL HOTEL ON OLD SHEMIRAN ROAD, THE SINA, THE IMPERIAL, THE WALDORF, AND ROYAL GARDEN HOTELS ON TALEGHANI (TAKHT-E-JAMSHID) AVE. AND THE SEMIRMIS NEAR THE EMBASSY HAVE BEEN SEIZED BY UNIVERSITY STUDENTS FOR USE AS DORMITORIES. ALTHOUGH TEHRAN'S PROSECUTOR GENERAL SHAHSHAHANI HAS PROTESTED THE SEIZURES, IT IS LIKELY THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO FORCIBLY EVICT THE STUDENTS WILL LEAD TO VIOLENCE. OTHER SEIZURES OF PROPERTY BY VARIOUS SUCH INTEREST GROUPS HAVE BEEN REPORTED SINCE THE REVOLUTION. AND THE PGOI MUST WALK A FINE LINE BETWEEN THE CONFISCATION DEMANDS OF GROUPS CLAIMING TO BE " REVOLUTIONARY" AND THE WELL DESERVED FEARS OF PROPERTY OWNERS.

8. ANGLICAN BISHOP HASSAN DEHQANI-TAFTI WAS ATTACKED BY THREE UNIDENTIFIED ASSAILANTS IN HIS HOME IN ISFAHAN ON 28 OCTOBER. THE THREE GUNMEN FIRED FIVE SHOTS, ONE OF WHICH STRUCK THE BISHOP'S WIFE IN THE HAND, BEFORE FLEEING THE SCENE. MOTIVES FOR THE ATTACK ON THE BISHOP, WHO WAS NOT INJURED, REMAIN UNKNOWN.

9. A MAJOR SCANDAL IS ROCKING THE MINISTER OF COMMERCH. DEPUTY MINISTER EBRAHIM NIK KHALQ HAS APPARENTLY ESCAPED INTO HIDING AFTER BECOMING INVOLVED IN A DOLS 4 MILLION

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11374 2/2

FRAUD TO PAY DEMEURRAGE CHARGES TO AN AMERICAN COMPANY.
NIK KHALQ IS ALSO BEING ACCUSED OF HAVING HAD ASSOCIATIONS
WITH SAVAK, AND OF TRYING TO SET UP A NETWORK OF SAVAK
AGENTS WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE. COMMERCE MINISTER
REZA SADR HAS BLAMED MIN OF AGRICULTURE ALI MOHAMMED
IZADI AND HEALTH MINISTER KAZEM SAMI FOR HAVING
INFLUENCED HIM TO APPOINT NIK KHALQ AS DEPUTY MINISTER
IN THE FIRST PLACE. LAINGEN

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11374 2/2

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 11513

DE RUQMHR # 1513 304 **

ZNY 'CCCCC ZZH

O 311329Z OCT 79

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4573

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC

RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC

RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0354

RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA @347

RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD @353

RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA @322

RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD @400

RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA @420

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL @ 396

RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI @ 566

RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT @ 363

RUUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON @ 479

RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA @321

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW @360

RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT @230

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS @431

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN CE

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11513

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/31/85 (TOMSETH, v.L.) OR-P

TAGS: PINT, PINS, IR

SUBJECT: KURDISH PROBLEMS

REFS: A. TEHRAN 11374: B. USDAO TEHRAN 301301Z OCT 79

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT .)

2. AFTER ONLY ONE OR TWO DAYS, A CEASEFIRE REPORTEDLY ORDERED BY THE PGOI IN KURDISH AREAS EITHER OCTOBER 28 OR 29 SEEMS TO HAVE COLLAPSED OCTOBER 30 . . . ACCORDING TO TEHRAN TIMES KURDISH RELIGIOUS LEADER HOSSEINI HAS REJECTED THE CEASEFIRE AND KDP FORCES ARE PRESSING THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY GUARD AND GENDARMERIE OUTPOSTS. ACCORDING TO TEHRAN TIMES, BOTH MAHABAD

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STAT 16/31/79
APPRV: CHARGE: LBIANGEN
DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT: EM
CLEAR: POL: VLTOMSETH: D
COLLHOLLAND: DLO:
CS COTT
DISTR: CHARGE POL-2 ECON
DN O DLO

AND BOUKAN ARE NOW IN REBEL HANDS AND THE HAS TAKEN OVER MANY OF THE GENDARMERIE OUTPOSTS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ BORDER. MAIN CLASHES AUGUST 30 REPORTEDLY CAME IN AZGELEH DISTRICT IN VICINITY OF QUSR-SHIRIN ON THE IRAQI BORDER. (FARSI LANGUAGE PRESS HAS NOT REPORTED THESE CLASHES AND MORNING PAPER BAMDAD IN CONTRADICTIONARY STATEMENT SAYS KDP HAS CALLED ON ITS MEMBERSHIP IN MAHABAD TO AVOID CLASHES BECAUSE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN KDP AND PGOI. BAMDAD ALSO SAYS MAHABAD OCTOBER 30 WAS QUIET AND SHOPS OPEN.) IN RESPONSE TO CONTINUED KDP ATTACKS JCS CHEIF SHAKER STATED THAT WHILE THE ARMY WOULD NOT START ANY ARMED OPERATION ITSELF, ARMED AGGRESSION AND PROVOCATION AIMED AT THE ARMED FORCES WILL BE CONFRONTED SEVERELY. (THE ARMY THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD HAS BEEN TRYING TO STAY OUT OF THE FIGHTING ALTHOUGH IT TOO HAS BEEN TAKING CASUALTIES. AND EMBASSY ASSUMES SHAKER'S MESSAGE MEANS THAT IT WILL CONTINUE THIS POLICY.)

3. THE KURDISH REGION IS NOW BRACING FOR DEMONSTRATIONS NOVEMBER 1. THE KDP HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THIS YEAR'S EID-E-QORBAN WILL BE CALLED MARTYRS EID. AND HANDBILLS CIRCULATED THROUGHOUT THE REGION ARE CALLING FOR THE KURDISH PEOPLE TO TURN OUT IN LARGE NUMBERS TO PROTEST THE " GOVERNMENT'S CONDUCT" IN HANDLING THE KURDISH RPOBLEM.

4. LITTLE HAS BEEN HEARD FROM THE GOVERNMENT TEAM NAMED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS AND SETTLE THE KURDISH PROBLEM. ACCORDING TO TEHRAN PRESS. HOSSEJNI HAS NOT ONLY REJECTED THE CEASEFIRE, BUT HAS ALSO PRESENTED THE NEGOTIATORS WITH STIEF DEMANDS. AT LEAST ONE OF THESE DEMANDS APPARENTLY IS THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA. LAINGEN.

BT

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