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File 70113-3

استاد لانه چا سو سی

The Kurdish Problem in Perspective

A Research Paper

کردستان (۲)

شماره (۳۲)

داسجوان مسلمان بیرو خط امام

Secret

PA 79-10330D
August 1979

COPY 280



**In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful**

IN THE NAME OF GOD ,
THE MERCIFUL AND THE
COPASSIONATE

TELEGRAM BONN 85481 WAS THE LAST COPY OF
ITS ORIGINAL TEXT AND, THUS, VERY DULL IN
COLOR, THEREFORE ITS PRINTING AND PHOTO-
GRAPHING IN BOOKS WAS NOT FAVORABLY PO-
SSIBLE. FOR THIS REASON, THE ABOVE-MENTI-
ONED DOCUMENT WERE RE-TYPED.

19 AUG

S I C T I 24
CIT FR SAN EP
TO: DIRECTOR
WNI HQ AJAJA
REF DIRECTOR

STAFF
SIP
ROB

1. PHANG
STAFF POOL AND
NOV ARMS WITH
AND RE-ENTER T
ASS STANCE WITH
SHOULD ALSO BE
AND ALLOW HIM

WORK HERE BY TDY ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFFER RODMA
COUNTERPART LEE BEAUCHAMP, SDTHROP/1 (T/1) IS
PERMIT WHICH WILL PERMIT HIM TO LEAVE
FOR MISSIONS ON BEHALF OF STATION. THE
ON BEHALF OF OTHER T/1 FAMILY MEMBERS
SOME OF HIS ANXILITIES OVER THEIR SITUATI
NOW ON OUR PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

2. C/O
AND TRAVEL IN
T/1 MAY EXPECT

DISCUSSED THE AREAS OF COVER, DOCUMENTATION
T/1 ON 2 AUGUST. ALSO SURFACED WAS WHAT
AS COMPENSATION FOR HIS WORK ON OUR BEHAL

3. BASS
APPROACH THAT
THREE WEEKS BY
PURPOSE OF RECO
LOCATE AND GET
HE WOULD ALSO
THE WARDENS SH
BE PROVIDED WITH
STATION. THE
OTHER THAN THE
24235 T/1 WOULD
188 HIM ARMED.
DAUGHTER THE
IS BELIEVED HE
PERSONAL FILES.
REMAIN IN HIS
DIRECTOR THEM.
SUMMONED TO THE

AND T/1 IS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THIS
AN EXPLORATORY TRIP TO EUROPE OF TWO TO
SOON AS HE CAN BE DOCUMENTED, FOR THE
SINCE FORMER KURDISH ACQUAINTANCES AS HE CAN
GUESS THEM, A LINE ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF OTHER
INTELLIGENCE ON THE ACTIVITIES AND PLANS
AS HE IS ABLE TO GATHER. T/1 SHOULD
EMERGENCY PLAN FOR CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL
STOPS IN LONDON, PARIS AND GERMANY.
IS MENTIONED IN TR/SF 24327 AND FR/SF
LOCATE IN LONDON THE BROTHER OF KDP LEADER
ATTEMPTING TO PIN DOWN, THROUGH HIS
OF ALI QAZI. IF HE IS IN GERMANY, AS
A KEY SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON OTHER KURIDS
SHE WOULD BE HARD PUT
SUGGESTED THAT IF HIS DAUGHTER COULD BE
EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTION ON SOME PRETEXT,

AGE 2 NR/SAN I
HE COULD PASS
TO HQS R
PHONE DIS
ED THIS A
ORCE ON BEM
RECTED TO ST
ESTABLISH W

4. T/1 BE
VSEVERAL
E MOST SUPER
ADETER OR W
AT HE HAS B
OWERNMENT IN
TBLISH A D
OUND OUT L
OWERNMENT.
SSIONS BU
E MOMENT. T
ZIS UP HIS
IE TO BEKE
TID THEMSEL
ZIRGAN AND
S IN MEXICO
AT IF KURDIS
AST FOR CROW
GASH:

(1) PA
INSTANCES, AN

(2) KUR
E BETRAYED
E EXPERIENCE

REALIZES T
REFRARED TO
OR OT PRO-
ZBAN HAS S
B. RE DO

S E C R E T

TO A STATION OFFICER FOR FORWARDING HERE-
LITY. OTHERWISE, T/1 WILL HAVE TO USE
OR FREQUENT THE USUAL KURDISH HANNTS.
OME SUCCESS DURING HIS 1975 TRIP TO
'S INTELLIGENCE BUREAU. T/1 HAS BEEN
THE PHONE AND TRY IN ADVANCE OF TRAVEL
HIS TARGETS.

IS COVER STORY FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE SHOULD
BELED OFF ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES.
OULD BE A STORY OF TRAVEL TO SEE HIS
THE SECOND LAYER WOULD INVOLVE THE STORY
WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BAZARGAN
THEY HAVE ENLISTED HIM IN AN EFFORT TO
RDISH LEADERS ABROAD. THE MISSION IS
CONDITIONS FOR PEACE WITH THE CENTRAL
DELICATE BECAUSE BAZARGAN IS READY FOR
ISSUE WITH KHOMEINI AND HARD LINES FOR
STORY IS THAT AFTER GIVING SECOND, T/1
POSES SOME PRIVATE ENTERPRISE BETWEEN
PAGE FROM T/1'S ROLE AS EMISSARY, I.E.
AFS EXTRACT MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM
UGGESTED TO GO ALTERNATE STORY THAT HE
OT SOME PROMISES OF HELP FROM PEOPLE ARO
FOR TOGETHER TO SUPPORT COMBAT. AT
DOES NOT THINK HIGHLY OF LATTA VERSION

APPEARS UNLIKELY UNDER ANY CIR-

KDP CHIEFS CONSIDER THEMSELVES TO HAVE
T AND ARE UNLIKELY TO WANT TO REBAT

OUT SHAH HAS MONEY AND CONCEIVABLY COUL
IT TO HARASS THOSE WHO KICKED HIM OUT
ORCE BUILDING IN IRAQ UNDER GENERAL
CURRENT).
FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE. T/1 BELIEVES BEST

FA 3 FR/SAN FRANCISCO
HOPEFUL (AND SUPPORTIVE)
IRANIAN PASSPORT IN THE
IN TRUE NAME AND BE WA
OPINION BEST APPROACH
IN TRUE NAME WHICH MIGHT
AVAILABLE. IF OCCURS
NAME U.S. RE-ENTRY PERM
SPACE FOR VISA ENTRIES
TO HIS CONTACTS. HE WOULD
OBTAIN AN IRANIAN PASSPOR
HAS ALLEGEDLY ENTRUSTED

SECRET
RAZARGANI (MISSARY COVER STORY) I
SINCE PEOPLE WILL CONTACT HIM IN
TO YND. HE IS REGULAR IRANIAN PASSPOR
T/1 HAS EXPIRED IF NEW TRAVEL NOT
NEED SOME UPDATING OF PASSPORT AND PAS
T/1 COULD EVEN TRAVEL ON THIS
HAS APPEARANCE OF PASSPORT AND PAS
T/1 DOES NOT NEED TO SHOW HIS PASSPORT
T/1 DOES NOT NEED TO EXPLAIN WHY HE IS NOT
FROM THE CURRENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT (WHICH
WITH HIS SENSITIVE COVER MISSION).

6. T/1 TOLD CO TO
ABOVE TRAVEL AND OPS E
(AND THE SOONER THE BETT
BY HIS FAMILY IN IRAN
HIS DESIRE TO TRANSFER
LATER. CO TOLD T/1 TH
HE WOULD BEST MAKE HIS
MAKING HIS A FORMAL R
WING MERICLES IN INS
HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE TO
THAT T/1'S PROPOSAL TH
THE TEHRAN CONSULATE M
ESTABLISH A DIAL/DOLLA

SECRET
HE WANTS AND EXPECTS NO SALARY OVER AND
S. HE DOES WANT AT SOME FUTURE TIME
TO BE ABLE TO CONVERT RIAL FUNDS HE
U.S. ACCOUNT IN DOLLARS. T/1 MENTIONED
ABOUT \$17,000 NOW, UP TO \$50,000
WE ARE CURRENTLY CLUTTERED WITH RIALS AND
SURVY TRIP AND SHOW UP SOME RESULTS SPEAK
S. BEHALF. CO BELIEVES T/1 WOULD
IN HIS CONVERSION REQUEST. CO BELIEVES
DAUGHTER BRING HIS PERSONAL PAPERS TO
ALSO HAVE BEEN IN PART CALCULATED TO
CONVERSION CHANNEL.)

7. REQUEST HCS GO
WILL BE 0/4 15 AUGUST.

SECRET
MENT ON THE ABOVE. NEXT MEETING WITH T/1

8. FILE: 201-5
ALL SECRET.

SECRET
8995 RWV 04AUG99 DRV DRC.1 BY 033151.

COMMENTS: RELATED I
SECRET

SECRET
TO TEHRAN PER DIR 491412.

#202

9 AUG 79

020215Z AUG 79 STAFF
TEHRAN
O: ERIC
MINTEL A
REF: FR/
SDTHROB/

CASE PROGRESSING NICELY AND BELIEVE WE ARE ON TRACK FOR
1. (T/1) EXPLORATORY TRIP TO EUROPE PER PARA 3 PROPOSAL.
2. CONCUR DESIRABILITY T/1 TRAVEL IN T/M. RE-DO COME
A. WHICH CAN PROVIDE IRANIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON, D.C. RE-
CACHET DATED 25 MARCH 79 FOR T/1'S TOURIST PASSPORT.
REVALIDATION STAMP IS NORMALLY VALID FOR ONE YEAR. NOTE HOWEVER
REVALIDATION STAMP WASHINGTON EMBASSY WAS STILL USING IMPERIAL
MARCH 79 DOES NOT CONTAIN ISLAMIC OR REVOLUTIONARY REFERENCE
STAMP WE MENTION THIS TO T/1 THOUGH WE DO NOT FORESEE ANY PRO
SUGGEST YOU THIS CACHET OUTSIDE IRAN THAT T/1 COULD NOT FINESS
WITH USE OF THIS CACHET ENTRY REQUEST YOU POUCH HIS PASS
IF T/1 IS UNABLE TO USE OF THIS ENTRY REQUEST YOU POUCH HIS PASS
TO HQS CONFST.

B. U.S. REENTRY PERMIT IS VALID FOR ONE YEAR AND DOES
NOT REQUIRE ENTERING OR LEAVING U.S. HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT IS
LIMITED TO TRAVEL IN MIDDLE EAST TRAVEL IN ORDER TO LIVE HIS COVER TO THE FU
EUROPE/ MIDDLE EAST TRAVEL IN ORDER TO LIVE HIS COVER TO THE FU
PLS STRIVE TO BE USED ONLY FOR EMERGENCIES AND/OR REENTERING THE
RESERVE TO BE USED ONLY FOR EMERGENCIES AND/OR REENTERING THE

PARA 3 RAISED ISSUE OF T/1'S ADDRESS BOOKS/FILES HE'S
TO LOCAL HIS TURKISH CONTACTS. AGREE IT DESIRABLE TO OBTAIN
THESE IN ORDER TO SAVE TIME AND ENSURE T/1'S CONTACT IS /ITIN
IS THOUGH HOWEVER FEEL RISK OF T/1'S DAUGHTER ATTEMPTING TO
TEHRAN EMBASSY COMPOUND WITH DOCUMENTS OUTWEIGHS CONVICTION
FACTOR. SINCE EMBASSY CONTINUES TO BE GUARDED BY MUJAHIDIN IN
FORCE AND ANYONE ENTERING COMPOUND SUBJECT TO CLOSE SURVEILLANCE
SEARCH SUBJECT TO TEHRAN STATION CONCURRENCE. WE PROPOSE A
BETWEEN A MEMBER OF THE STATION AND T/1'S DAUGHTER AWAY FROM

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 491419 S 2 C R E T U L D B E C O L L E C T E D A N D C O U C H E
EMBASSY, AT WHICH TIME MATERIALS COLLECTED BY T/1 TO CONSIDER APPROPRIATE
FOR PLANNING PURPOSES SUGGEST OF SK T/1 TO CONTACT AUGUSTER WITH
VENUE FOR EXCHANGE AND HOW/WHE E CAN CONTACT AUGUSTER WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.

4. PER PARA 4, CONCUR THAT IRANI COME BACK COVER IS W
TO BE AVOIDED. OTHER "LAYERS" OF SHOU A
PRACTICABLE. DEFER TO BASE EXTENT TO WHI A /1 SHOULD B ASK
EMBELLISH STORY/STORIES AND ASSESSMEN AS W O M E N T H I S A P P I T U
FINESSE IF CORNERED. (WOULD IMAGINE AS O F I R O T H A T B E C A N T A
GARD OF HIMSELF BUT REQUEST YOU EMPHASIZE O N T / 1 N E E D F O R I R O N
PLAUSIBLE COVER STORY WHICH WILL BE PARTIC L A R L Y I M P O R T A N T F O R
SUBSEQUENT TRIPS TO IRAQ, ETC.)

5. APPRECIATE BASE'S NON-COMMITTAL STAND ON IRAQ. EXCHANGE
REQUEST YOU MAINTAIN IT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND A LAST
T/1 HAS MADE A TRIP IN OUR BEHALF. T/1 (AND HIS FAMILY) HAVE
BENEFITED GREATLY AS REGARDS NATURALIZATION. (HESSU AND HIS SHOU
CARRY WEIGHT (FOR NOW AT LEAST) WITH T/1 V S C O M M E N T A T I O N
WITH CURRENT RUMORS REGARDING POSSIBLE CURRENCY CHANGE AN LOSS
DEMONSTRATION IN IRAN. BELIEVE IT URGENT TO WAIT FOR AT LEAST
A COUPLE OF MONTHS BEFORE CONSIDERING ANY COMMUNICATION EXCHANGE
ESPECIALLY OF THE SCALE T/1 IS SEEKING

6. PREVIOUS PLANNING IN THIS CASE IS L O A D E D S C H E D U L I N G T /
FOR SGSWIRL. PLEASE FACTOR THIS INTO PRESENT T I M E T A B L E A N D A D V I S E
DATE AND ALTERNATE T/1 AVAILABLE FOR TRIP.

7. FOR TEHRAN: A. FYI SUTER B (I D E N T I F I C A T I O N F R A N C
ASSET WHO FORMER SDJANUS COLONEL AND CHIEF OF CURTIS KURDISH
OPERATIONS SECTION. (IT WAS SUTER B WHO R O C K E R D I T O O P E R A T I O N
SUTHERMAN/T/1 TO BASE.) T/1 RESIDES IN CALIF IN A HEALTH RESORT
ATTAINED PRA STATUS) AND IS NOW IN POSITION TO FULFILL HIS OFFER
OF FEB 79 TO TRAVEL ON REACTION'S BEHALF TO CONTACT KURDISH
FRIENDS/A C Q U A I N T A N C E S A N D R E P O R T O N K O R D I S H A C T I V I T I E S
GENERAL. T/1 IS KURD HIMSELF AND HAS B E T W E E N S T A N D I N G C O N T A C T S
WITH BARZANI SONS. FR/SAN FRANCISCO HAS D E F I N E T I T E T / 1
EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS KURDISH CONTACTS AND ALSO D I S C U S S E S H I S O F F E R
TO RETURN TO IRAN TO SEEK KURDISH LEADERSHIP JOINTLY WITH PGC. T/1
ATTEMPTED TO SOUND OUT THE RECEIPT VIT IN TEHRAN TO SUCH AN APPR

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-283-845

DIRECTOR 421412 S P C H E I
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONCRETE OFFERS (PLEASE INDICATE IN II
WOULD BE INADVISABLE FOR HIM TO RETURN TO IRAN. AN IMMIGRANT
TRAVELLER PLAN WAS ADOPTED.

B. PLAN CENTERS ON T/1 TRAVELING IN EUROPE AND THE M
ST, EXCLUDING IRAN, ON HIS EXPIRED IRANIAN TOURIST PASSPOR
SUITABLY UPDATED BY DIRTECE) IN SEARCH OF THE OLD RUSSIAN NETWO
HIS PLANNING REACHED AN IMPASSE BECAUSE OF HIS INABILITY TO
TRAVEL UNTIL RECENT ADJUSTMENT OF HIS STATUS (ICR) ALTHOUGH HIM
WANT/ENTER U.S. ON REENTRY PERMIT. WITH A VIEW TO OVERCOMING
HE NOW ANXIOUS TO ACCELERATE CASE AND EXPEDITE T/1'S LABORATORY
TRIP AS SOON AS IS PRACTICABLE.

C. PER PARA 3 REF AND PARA 5 ABOVE SOLICIT COMMENTS
HCE T/1'S MATERIALS COULD BEST BE OBTAINED AT STATION FOR ONWAR
POWCEING TO FR/SAN FRANCISCO. ASSUME STATION RISK OF F
DANGER ENTERING COMPOUND EXCESSIVE. SUGGEST CONCURRENCE OF F
BE FOR JIGAMIAN TO CALL T/1'S DAUGHTER AND ONE SOLUTION MIGHT
MEETING FOR EXCHANGE. FR/SAN FRANCISCO WILL CHANGE IN CHARGES
CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS FOR STATION AND TO ATTEMPT ST T/1 TO PROVIDE
A CALL FROM AN AMERICAN FRIEND. HIS DAUGHTER TO H

D. WELCOME STATION COMMENTS/ADVICE ON THIS CASE WHICH
FEEL HAS CONSIDERABLE OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL. GIVEN T/1'S UNIQUE
ACCESS TO KURDISH LEADERSHIP.

E. FILE: 241-32995. FW 08AUG69 DEC. 1 ALL SECRET
SECRET
BT
#9005

17 AUG 79

11

S E C R E T 161930Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25174 (MADENSKY ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTHROB SGSWIRL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 476612
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25118
C. DIRECTOR 491419
D. TEHRAN 53880

1. SDTHROB/1 (T/1) ADVISED CO 15 AUG 79 THAT IN VISIT SAME DAY TO IRANIAN CONSULATE HERE, VICE CONSSUL GHAFFARI TOLD NIME HE HAD RECEIVED AUTHORIZATION FROM TEHRAN TO ISSUE NEW, REGULAR IRANIAN PASSPORT TO T/1. PASSPORT WILL BE READY FOR PICKUP 21 AUGUST. GHAFFARI DID NOT ELABORATE ON APPROVAL MESSAGE FROM MFA AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IN TERMS OF T/1 STATUS WITH PGOI NOT YET CLEAR. IN ANY CASE, THE DEVELOPMENT OBVIATES NEED TO DOCTOR T/1'S OLD, EXPIRED PASSPORT FOR USE IN FOREIGN TRAVEL PER REFS.

2. MEANS OF GETTING T/1'S NOTES FROM DAUGHTER TO TEHRAN STATION OFFICER DISCUSSED WITH T/1. PROPOSE FOLLOWING, WHICH LETS STATION RETAIN CONTROL OF TIME AND PLACE OF MEETING: T/1 WILL CALL HIS DAUGHTER AND ENSURE THAT SHE HAS IDENTIFIED PAPERS OF INTEREST AND HAS THEM IN HAND. IN SECOND, SEPARATE CALL, T/1 WILL INSTRUCT HER TO LOOK FOR CALL FROM EMBASSY OFFICIAL RE A MEETING ON THE VISA PROBLEM. AT SAME TIME, T/1 WILL TELL HER TO TAKE TO THAT MEETING AND SURRENDER THE "PAPERS HE MENTIONED THE PREVIOUS CALL." (BELIEVE THAT IF SECOND CONVERSATION MONITORED, REFERENCE TO PAPERS WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY AMBIGUOUS AS TO BE REASONABLY CONSTRICTED BY EAVES-DROPPER TO REFER TO CONSULAR FORMS.) DAUGHTER (IDEN) SPEAKS AND UNDERSTANDS ENGLISH AT FAIR LEVEL, CERTAINLY ADEQUATE FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ACCEPTING CALL FROM STATION OFFICER AND UNDERSTANDING MEETING ARRANGEMENTS. DAUGHTER'S HUSBAND MIGHT BE CURIOUS IF PRESENT WHEN STATION OFFICER'S CALL COMES IN. CALL BEST MADE DURING WORKING HOURS WHEN HE WOULD PRESUMABLY BE IN OFFICE. TO SAVE TIME THAT WOULD BE INVOLVED IN TWO-WAY POUCHING, PROPOSE WE SCRATCH NOTE OF INSTRUCTION FROM T/1 TO DAUGHTER; HE WILL MAKE HIS WISHES CLEAR IN

6

REF 2 SAN FRANCISCO DEPTA S T C 1 1
FIG SEPARATE INTRONS. SAN ALBANY INSPECTED T/1 TO MAKE FIRST
CALL. AVOID ANY APPROVAL BEFORE DEPARTING SECOND.

3. APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN T/1 FIRST, EXPLANATORY TRIP TO EUROPE
CAN BE ANTICIPATED TO TAKE PLACE NO EARLIER THAN MID-SEPTEMBER (CON-
SISTING TIME REQUIRED TO GET HOME FROM SF, SOGWI, AND OTHER
PREPARATION. T/1 HAS ALREADY AGREED TO SOGWI. PROPOSE THAT SAME
SOGWI OPERATOR WHO WILL CONDUCT INTERVIEW OF VPYCOON/1 (SEE SF/SF
1512) IN LATE AUGUST-EARLY SEPTEMBER IN SAN FRANCISCO INTERVIEW T/1
AT SAME TIME. IN ANY CASE, T/1 IS AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME AS OF NOW.

4. WITH BOSTON IMPRESSION IMPLICIT REF D THAT T/1'S PRINCIPAL
ACCESS IS TO BARZANI FACTION. TO CONTRARY, ALTHOUGH T/1 WAS
SHEWAN'S LIAISON MAN WITH ALLAG MUSTAFA AND KNOWS MASUD AND IDRIS
WELL, HE PERSONALLY LOATHES BARZANIS AND THIS FEELING IS PROBABLY
RECIPROCATED. T/1 WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN PERSUADING SDJANUS LEADER-
SHIP AND SEEM TO SUPPORT KDF FACTION OF JALAL PALERANI, VICE
BARZANIS, AND THIS WAS PRINCIPAL REASON HE EVENTUALLY LEFT SDJANUS.
T/1'S STRONGEST ATTACHMENT AND ACCESS IS WITH KDF FACTION OF
JALAL TAHRANI-IBRAHIM AHMED. LATTER HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE IN
LONDON AND T/1 IS PRESENTLY TRYING TO OBTAIN HIS LONDON PHONE NUMBER
(VIA HIS WIFE) THROUGH AHMED'S BROTHER-IN-LAW IN TEHRAN, AHMED KALEGI.

5. FOR DIRECTOR: T/1 HAS COPY OF "VISA 40- TELEGRAM SENT TO
INS PDS FROM SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE NOTIFYING THEM OF APPROVED
IMMIGRATION PETITION BY T/1 SON (CITIZEN) ON BEHALF OF HIS MOTHER
(T/1'S WIFE), WHICH WAS TO HAVE BEEN RELAYED TO TEHRAN
CONSULAIR. TO DATE, T/1 WIFE HAS NOT BEEN SUMMONED BY CONSULATE
IN TEHRAN. IF THERE ANY WAY PDS COULD ASCERTAIN WHETHER TELEGRAM
ACTUALLY SENT TO TEHRAN VIA STATE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION.

6. FILE: 201-0328995. RWV 16AUG99 DRV D9C.1 BY 033151.
ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#2715

17 Aug 79 12 14z

S E C R E T 161207Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE: PR/SAN FRANCISCO 25175 (MADENSKY ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

WMINTEI AJAJA FORRES SDTEROB EGSWIRL

REF: PR/SAN FRANCISCO 25174 /

1. IDENTITY IS: MRS. JALEH PORKAR AGHDAM
KF. MOSSADEGH, KF. MANAZ #11 APT 3, TEHRAN
TELE: 293367

2. FILE: 201-7328995. RVW 16AUG99 DRV D9C.1 BY 033151.

ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

BT

#9717

T 310130Z AUG 79 STAFF

/SAN FRANCISCO 25280

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO/TEHRAN.

INTEL SAJAJA FORRES SDTHROB

RTS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25174
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25215
C. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25233
D. DIRECTOR 499989
E. TEHRAN 54086

1. ON 29 AUGUST SDTHROB/1 (T/1) RECEIVED NEW, REGULAR IRANIAN PASSPORT FROM HAND OF NEWLY-ARRIVED IRANIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN SAN FRANCISCO, FNU KHORRAM. THIS OBVIATES NEED FOR ANY MOLOCK DOCTORING OF OLD, EXPIRED PASSPORT BEING HANDCARRIED HQS.

2. IN LENGTHY, CORDIAL CONVERSATION WITH KHORRAM, WHO IS ABOUT 32 AND SAID HE WAS RECENTLY BROUGHT INTO FOREIGN MINISTRY BY IAZDI, T/1 GAVE KHORRAM HIS BACKGROUND. T/1 THEN OUTLINED HIS PREVIOUS, UNAVAILING EFFORTS TO ELICIT POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM RESPONSIBLE LEVEL OF REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT RE HIS DESIRE TO RETURN TO IRAN AND SERVE WITH SOVIET SUCCESSOR ORGANIZATION OR OTHERWISE AS KURDISTAN EXPERT. T/1 ALSO DREW IN FOR INTEREST THAT HE HAD HAD FLEETING ACQUAINTANCE IN THE PAST (IN SECONDARY SCHOOL IN KERMANSHAH AND ON ENCOUNTER ABOUT TEN YEARS LATER) WITH DR. MUSTAFA CHAMRAN, PRESENT IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE HEAD. KHORRAM EVINCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ALL THIS AND SAID HE WOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO TEHRAN. (T/1 STILL BELIEVES THAT HE HAS A SLIM CHANCE OF GETTING ABERRED BY THE NEW REGIME AND WILL NOT GIVE UP IF ANY OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF.)

3. T/1 HAS MADE SECOND CALL TO DAUGHTER IN TEHRAN WHEN HE ASKED TO LOOK FOR CALL ON VISA MATTER FROM EMBASSY OFFICER. IN REPLY, HOWEVER, T/1 NOW PLANS TO SEND HIS SON HAMID TO LEARN HIS LESSONS 6 SEPTEMBER FOR TWO-THREE WEEKS WITH HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY TO NEGOTIATE SALE OF T/1'S TEHRAN HOUSE. T/1 WANTS TO USE PROCEEDS TO ENTER INTO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PARTNERSHIP HERE WITH ANOTHER BUSINESSMAN. (JUST HOW HE INTENDS TO GET PROCEEDS OUT OF

SAN FRANCISCO 23282 S E C R E T

PERSON WILL OF COURSE BE IN CONTACT WITH HIS SISTER, JANE. SHOULD BRIEF HER DIRECTLY ON THE MATTER OF PASSING T/1'S PAPERS TO EMBASSY OFFICER WHO WILL CALL, AND T/1'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTION ON ITS SLOW WAY TO TEHRAN STATION WOULD BE REDUNDANT. BASE RECOMMENDS THAT LETTER (NOW ON WAY TO HQS) BE POUCHED ONWARD TO STATION ANYWAY IN CASE HAMID'S TRIP PLANS CHANGE. ONCE WE KNOW HAMID HAS ARRIVED IN TEHRAN AND HAS TALKED TO SISTER, HOWEVER, STATION COULD PLACE CALL TO HER WITHOUT AWAITING ARRIVAL OF POUCHED LETTER. WILL ADVISE.

4. T/1 RAISED FINANCIAL PROBLEM NEAR END OF MEETING AND ASKED CASE OFFICER IF ORGANIZATION COULD LEND HIM \$5,000 NOW WIFE UNDERSTANDING THAT HE WOULD REPAY AS SOON AS HOUSE SALE PROCEEDS ARE REPATRIATED. (SEE ABOVE) T/1 SAID HIS PENSION MONEY (\$5,000) DID NOT COME THROUGH IN AUGUST AND HE HAS TAKEN SAVINGS ACCOUNT DOWN TO DANGEROUSLY LOW LEVEL. CASE OFFICER REPLIED BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD MENTION THIS TEMPORARY NEED TO HQS AND SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. IT APPEARS TO GO IN RETROSPECT THAT T/1 WAS SIDESTEPPING ISSUE OF ACCOMMODATION TRANSFER IN HIS REQUEST BUT ACTUALLY EXPECTED TO EVENTUALLY REPAY "LOAN" IN RIALS. ALTHOUGH BASE SHARES HQS VIEW THAT WE SHOULD NOT LET T/1 GET VERY FAR AHEAD OF US, HE APPEARS TO HAVE GENUINE CURRENT FINANCIAL PINCH, HAS HIGH POTENTIAL, AND BELIEVE THAT SOME RESPONSE CALLED FOR WHICH AT SAME TIME WOULD NOT BE INSULTING. PROPOSE FOR CONSIDERATION A \$2,000 PAYMENT WHICH COULD BE PRESENTED AS A RECRUITMENT BONUS FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL GSWIRL IF T/1 INSISTS ON ULTIMATE REPAYMENT, BASE CAN CARRY AS OP'S LOAN ON BOOKS. PLS ADVISE.

5. RE IMMIGRATION PETITION (VISAS FORTY) CABLE ON WIFE OF T/1. NO WAY CALBE COULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO TEHRAN PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST. CONCLUDE IT NEVER LEFT WASHINGTON AND INQUIRY SHOULD START WITH INS, WASHINGTON.

6. FILED 201-732099. RWV31AUG97 DRV DC01 BY 037451.
SECRET
S E C R E T
BT
#0210

12 SEP 79 03 4 12

SECRET 112344Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25329

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.


MINTEL ANAJA FORRES SDTHROD S6SWIEL

- REFS: A. DIRECTOR 366755
- B. DIRECTOR 369586 (NOT SENT TEHRAN)

1. EDTHROD/1 WAS S6SWIELD 7 SEP WITH NO INDICATIONS HE EVER JOINED AGENT, TURKISH PARTY, OR DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN REGION. TESTING ALSO SUPPORTED HIS DENIAL OF COOPERATING SECRETLY WITH LEADERS OF KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN IRAQ WITHOUT IRANIAN GOVT'S KNOWLEDGE, AS WELL AS THAT HE HAS NOT WORKED FOR SAVAK SINCE RESIDING IN U.S., AND THAT HE HAS HAD NO CONTACTS WITH KURDISH DEMOCRATIC REPS WHILE IN U.S.

2. TESTING LIKEWISE INDICATED THAT OUTSIDE OF HER FAMILY AND SPYTHRAL/1. HE HAS NOT DISCUSSED HIS SECRET REACTION RELATIONSHIP FOLLOWING HIS RECENT RECOLLECTION THAT MR. KROHMAN HAD ASKED T/1 TO WRITE ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES FOR THE SHAH SO THAT THESE STATEMENTS COULD BE FORWARDED TO TEHRAN. THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS THAT T/1 WAS NOT TRUTHFUL AND COMPLETE IN HIS REPORTING OF HIS 22 AUG MEETING WITH MR. KROHMAN. TESTING INDICATED THAT T/1 HAD NO INFO ABOUT SPYTHRAL/1'S CIRCUMSTANCES IN TEHRAN WHICH HE HAD NOT ALREADY TELL US ABOUT.

3. FINAL TESTING ON THE ISSUE OF CONSCIOUSLY OR UNCONSCIOUSLY JOINING NATIONAL POLICE/1'S EFFORTS AGAINST NOW WITH AS MENTIONED IN REF. 369586 INDICATED REJECTION AND THAT T/1 WAS NOT WILLING WITHHOLDING INFORMATION. T/1'S SIN ISSUE IS A RESULT OF S6SWIELD TRIP AT THE TIME HE WAS IN SAUVAN RATHER THAN NATIONAL POLICE SHOULD BE WORKING WITH U.S. REPS. IN ADVISORY T/1 CLAIMED HE WAS ORDERED BY THE SHAH TO ASSIST IN PLANS TO ASSASSINATE SH. BAKHTIAR. FORMER SAVAK CHIEF, AND THIS WAS PRIORITY OVER THE JOINING. WHEN TESTING INSIDERS CONTINUED REJECTION, T/1 BROUGHT UP A PROTOCOL PROBLEM WITH U.S. REPS. THEY DID NOT ARRIVE ON TIME FOR A SECOND MEETING WITH T/1 ABOUT THE JOINT OP SO HE SUGGESTED THEY BE NOT MEETING THEM.



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12 SEP 79
R C R T 120000Z SEP 79 STAFF
OCTE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25531 (SECTION 1 OF 2)
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

UNWTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTHROB SCSWIRL
REYS: A. DIRECTOR 599586
B. DIRECTOR 599759
C. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25529

1. SDTHROB/A (T/I) WAS AFFORDED SCSWIRL EXAMINATION ON 1 SEPTEMBER WITH RESULTS DESCRIBED REY C WHEREAS CI FACTOR IMMEDIATELY RESOLVED. T/I'S WITHHOLDING OF THE QUESTION ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1969 LIAISON OPERATION SUGGESTS AT LEAST THAT FUTURE BASE IS CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS. BASE IN LATE PARAGRAPH HAS 3 COMMUNICATIONS.

2. SCSWIRL TEST SURFACED SOME NEW INFORMATION. ONE ITEM IS ADMISSION THAT UPON RETURN FROM HIS 1975 TRIP ABROAD TO EUROPE LEADERS AT THE SHAH'S REQUEST, T/I WAS ARRESTED AT AIRPORT ON ORDERS OF THE SHAH OR GENERAL NASSIRI AND HELD FOR SOME 24 HOURS UNTIL THE SHAH ORDERED HIS RELEASE. T/I BELIEVED THAT MEMBERS OF THE SHAH'S FAMILY WHOM HE HAD MET IN EUROPE MUST ALSO HAVE BEEN SAHAWI INFORMANTS AND THAT UNWARY OF T/I'S BIRTH ORDER, HE LEARNED OF T/I'S MEMBERSHIP WHEN T/I ADDED THAT DESPITE THE SHAH'S ORDER OF RELEASE, NASSIRI HAD HAD DEPARTMENT FIGHT THE SHAH'S ORDER OF INVESTIGATION AGAINST T/I. T/I SAID TUDER PART MEMBERSHIP BELONGS TO NASSIRI MUSTAFI PARZANI. THIS WAS OLD CANARD LAUNCHED

3. T/I'S LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH AMERICANS IN BAGHDAD, IRAQ, SUPPORTED THIS HAD BEGUN WITH CONTACTS WITH U.S. CONSUL AND IN INTERNAL MESSANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE PART OF T/I THAT SUBSEQUENTLY SANCTIONED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN T/I AND COOPERATE (T/I SAID SHAH HOPED THROUGH DIRECTOR TO OBTAIN FROM U.S. SPECIALIZED WEAPONS AND SOPHISTI- CAL EQUIPMENT FOR IRAQISH ELEMENTS IN COOPERATION WITH IRAN.)

PAGE 2 PR/SAN FRANCISCO 25531 S E C R E T
LATER SAID T/1, A NEW U.S. COLONEL ARRIVED IN BAGHDAD WITH
SPRING DEPUTY (WHOM BASE ASSUMES WAS SMERWORTH--T/1 CLAIMS
WAS FORGOTTEN ALL NAMES) LATER OF WHOM T/1 CONCLUDED WAS PR
REACTION ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NEVER EXPLICIT. T/1'S EXCHANGES W
THE DEPUTY WERE ALL DULY REPORTED TO THERAM AND HE DID NOT
CONSIDER THAT DEPUTY'S INTEREST IN HIM WAS OTHER THAN STRICTLY
PROFESSIONAL. PROMPTED BY SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS U.S. CONTACTS,
MENTIONED THAT SAVAK DEPARTMENT TWO, HIS DEPARTMENT IN PRE-PAGE
OF DAYS, HAD HAD REACTION ADVISER WHOM HE DESCRIBED MERELY AS
T/1 TALL.

RE POLICE/REACTION 1969 INCIDENT, T/1 MENTIONED AFTER H
ONE THAT HE HAD CONSIDERED DEPUTY NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF
SAVAK'S ORDERS (THAT HE ENTERTAIN CONTACT WITH AMERICAN REPRE-
SENTATIVES OF SOVIET MATTER) HAD BEEN CONTRARY TO HIS UNDERSTANDING
OF THE POLICE BUREAU AND GOT IN WAY OF OTHER PERSON
WHO SAID ON WITH BY POLICE CHIEF MOBASSER AND SEAR (NOTABLY
WAS TO LAY TRAP FOR LAND ASSASSINATE FORMER SAVAK CHIEF GENERAL
SAVAK). T/1 SAID HE HAD ARGUED WITH MOBASSER TO EITHER CUT IN
WITH SAFAARI (RE BAKHTIAR PLAN (SAVAK HAD ITS OWN PLAN GOING IN
DIRECTION ONE THAT WAS APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL IN THE END, OR
WAS TO GET SAFAARI OFF HIS BACK. T/1 MAINTAINED WITH GO AND
SAID THAT HE HAD FEEL ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN IRAN WHEN THE
FUNCTION OF SAVAK'S DEPARTMENT NIGHT. T/1 CYNICALLY ACCUSED
HIM OF PROMOTING THE ANTI-SOVIET LIAISON WITH REACTION IN ORDER
TO GET A TRIP TO THE U.S. (WHICH HE DID). T/1 NONETHELESS
HELD AN INITIAL HALF-HOUR MEETING WITH REACTION REPS IN HIS
OFFICE AND THEN A SECOND MEET WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SET UP. T/1 SAID
HE ARRIVED IN HIS OFFICE AT 6:00 AM OF THE APPOINTED DAY,
AND HAD IN HIS MIND OF THE APPOINTMENT, AWAITED EXPECTED GUESTS
OF REACTION VISITORS. AT 6:00 T/1 DELIBERATELY ABSENTED HIMSELF
FROM THE MEETING IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE HIS UNEASINESS WITH THE
REPRESENTATIVES HE TERMED UNMILITARY. T/1 SAID HE NEVER HAD
CONTACT WITH THE U.S. REPS AND TURNED THE DOSSIER OVER
TO SAFAARI, A MAJOR, ALLEGEDLY TELLING LATER TO GO ON
TO GET ALL THE FACILITIES TO THEIR BUSINESS. T/1 MAINTAINED
HE HAD LOST TRACK OF THE ACTIVITY AND ITS PROGRESS.
CURRENTLY T/1'S CONTINUED PROBLEMS WITH THIS QUESTION ARE
BASED FROM THE GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT HIS ALLEGED ORDER
ALL THE FACILITIES WERE EITHER NONEXISTENT OR CONCEALED

PAGE 5 FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331 S E C R B T
IN HIS ENCOURAGING TERMS, THAT T/1 COULD LET PERSONAL LIQUOR
COVER HIS DUTY IS BELIEVABLE WHEN ONE CONSIDERS T/1'S MAIN
ECONOMICAL SIDE. IN ANY CASE, T/1'S "EXPLANATION" RUNS CON-
TO TEHRAN STATION'S 1969 DESCRIPTION OF AN ACTIVE COMPETITION
AT THAT TIME BETWEEN SAVAK AND THE POLICE IN SOVIET OPS. T/1
DOES NOT SOUND LIKE ONE OF THE COMPETITORS.

5. INTERVIEW ALSO BROUGHT ADMISSION THAT T/1, DURING WHOLE
PERIOD 1971-1976, WHEN HE WAS SUPPOSEDLY EMPLOYED BY OFFICE OF
POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE SHAH (GENERAL PAKRAVAN)—NOT PART OF
GENERAL FARDOUST'S SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU AS PREVIOUSLY
REPORTED. ONLY MISSION HE PERFORMED WAS THE 1975 TRIP TO
EUROPE. T/1'S EMPLOYMENT WITH DR. VALLAN'S OFFICE OF HOLY
WHICH T/1 HAD PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS HIS COVER, SEEMS TO BE
REALITY BEHIND HIS MAIN OCCUPATION (AND WE GUESS A VERY LUCRATIVE
ONE). T/1 DESCRIBED TRIPS HE HAD MADE TO SOUTH IRAN FOR VALUE TO
INVESTIGATE CORRUPTION AMONG OFFICIALS HANDLING SHIRIN'S ENDS TO
LANDS AND SERVICES WHEN CO SUGGESTED HE HAD REPORTED TO
SOME MAN.

6. SGEWILL HAS BROUGHT INTO BETTER FOCUS PICTURE OF A MAN WHO
RATHER CONSISTENTLY ADVANCED OWN INTERESTS AND WHO CEREAL
NOT AT ANY PREVIOUS TIME (AND HE HAD SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES) TO
OF HIS WAY TO ADVANCE THOSE OF REVOLUTION. THAT HE SHOULD
WANT TO DO SO NOW HAS TO BE LOOKED AT FROM BOTH PAST AND PRESENT
PERSPECTIVE. IT IS NOW FAIRLY CLEAR THAT T/1 HOPES VIA REACTION
TO EJECT SOME OF HIS RIVAL HOLDINGS IN IRAN AND THAT THIS MAY HAVE
BEEN A STRONG FACTOR IN HIS SEEKING AN OPERATIONAL ROLE WITH US.
HE WILL MAY HAVE A DEAL HERE, BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT CLOSE COOPER-
ATION TO BE NECESSARY. THE ITINERANT COLLECTOR PLAN, WHICH
WOULD HAVE TO REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENT INITIATIVE ON
BEFORE TRAVELS OUT OF CONTACT WITH OURSELVES FOR LONG PERIODS
MAY BE PERHAPS A LONGER ROPE THAN DESIRABLE. WERE T/1 OCCUPYING
STRONG POSITION IN THE PGOI AND WILLING TO PASS DOCUMENTS FOR
IN SITUATION WOULD BE BETTER SUITED TO THE TEMPERAMENT AND
THE MEN AND THE EXIGENCIES OF CONTROL AND SECURITY.

7. IN RECENT INTERVIEW MEETING IN WHICH T/1 WAS TOLD THAT HE
WAS BEING PASSED WITH FLYING COLORS, CO DISCUSSED THE

SECRET 122105Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE R/SAN FRANCISCO 26331 (FINAL SECTION OF 2)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WINTEL AJAJA WORRIES SDTHROB SCSWIRL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 50858Z
B. DIRECTOR 50873Z
C. R/SAN FRANCISCO 25329

EXPLORATORY TRIP AGAIN WITH T/1, WHO ADMITTED THAT UNLESS HE
CONTACT KDF LEADER ABRAHIM AHMED IN ADVANCE AND SET UP A MEETING
WITH HIM IN ENGLAND, CHANCES OF HIS ACQUIRING SIGNIFICANT
INTELLIGENCE ON THIS FIRST SWING WERE IN DOUBT. T/1 WAS
ENDING REEVALUATION OF THE SCSWIRL RESULTS. HE SHOULD COME
EFFORTS ON GETTING AHMED'S LONDON PHONE NUMBER FROM
OFFICE IN TEHRAN. HE SAID, AND PLACE THAT CALL. T/1 WAS
REF B, THAT CONVERSION OF HIS FUNDS WAS NOT PRESENTLY
WAS A LOAN BUT HE COULD SET UP A MEETING WITH AHMED
WIDELY DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS TRIP WOULD BE WORTHWHILE.
CONSIDER HELPING HIM TO THE EXTENT OF \$2,000. (T/1, WHO
WAS AND HER FOLLOWING MEETING, T/1 HAD ABANDONED THE IDEA
OF HIS SON, HAMAD, TO TEHRAN TO SELL HIS HOUSE. T/1 SAID
HIS DAUGHTER COULD HANDLE THE TRANSACTION. CO VERIFIED
HIS DAUGHTER, JAFAR, WOULD BE IN TEHRAN AT LEAST THROUGH
OCTOBER AND LOOKING FOR A CALL FROM AN AMBLAZON OFFICIAL.

HE ALSO DISCUSSED WITH T/1 THE ADVISABILITY OF HIS RESPON-
DING TO GENERAL KHORRAM'S REQUEST FOR A WRITTEN REPORT ON THE
BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES TO BE SENT BACK TO TEHRAN IN SUPPORT OF
HIS REQUEST FOR A SUITABLE JOB IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. T/1 HAS
ALREADY WRITTEN SUCH RESUMES FOR KHORRAM'S PREDECESSORS AND COULD
OPINION IS THAT THE PCO SHOULD BY NOW HAVE SUFFICIENT BACKGROUND
INSTEAD OF SITTING HERE AND WRITING MORE RESUMES. T/1 IN CASE
T/1 SHOULD SEE ABRAHIM AHMED IN LONDON SOONEST, NOT WAITING FOR
PAPERS FROM TEHRAN, AND RETURN HERE TO REPORT. UNTIL T/1 HAS
SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED AT LEAST THAT OPERATIONAL MISSION (AND
OTHER SCSWIRL WORK NOT BE A BAD IDEA ON RETURN), WE WILL HAVE
A CLEAR LINE ON HIS REPORTING CAPABILITIES WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY

PAGE 2 FR SAN FRANCISCO 25331 S E C R E T
THE CONTINUED EXPENDITURE OF TIME AND EFFORT HERE. IF
ABLE SET UP MEETING WITH AHMED WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS.
PURPOSE TO CUT BRIT AND REMAIN IN LOOSE CONTACT WITH
PURPOSE OF MONITORING POSSIBLE RETURN TO IRAN. REQUEST
COMMENTS.

9. FILE: 201-0328995. RW11SEP99 DRV D9C1 BY 0334

S E C R E T

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 515775.

TO: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTROB

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25322

1. REGRET DELAY IN RESPONSE. HAS IN FULL AGED BASE'S LATEST ASSESSMENT OF SDTROB/T/1 (T/1) CIST IN SSSWIRL RESULTS PER REF A. WHILE IT CLEAR THAT PREVIOUS MISGIVINGS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, CONCUR THOSE ELEMENTS OF MAKE-UP WHICH ARE SELF-SERVING AND/OR LESE THAN TOTALLY FORTHCOMING DICTATE DEVISING A MORE CLOSELY SUPERVISED AGE ROLE FOR T/1.
2. ACCORDINGLY CONCUR BASE PROPOSAL (PER PARA 3 REF A) T/1 BE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH IBRAHIM AHMED AND TRAVEL EXPEDITIOUSLY TO LONDON WITHOUT WAITING FOR ARRIVAL OF PACKAGE FROM TEHRAN. WE COULD ADDRESS PROPOSAL FOR SECOND SSSWIRL FOLLOWING DEBRIEFING T/1 ON THE TRIP.
3. IN VIEW OF OUR DECREASING (THOUGH NOT ABANDONED) INTEREST IN T/1 PERFORMING DOOSE-WASHED ITINERANT COLLECTOR MISSION, POSSIBILITY HE MIGHT YET BE ABLE TO ACQUIRE TEHRAN JOE WITH PCOI BECOMES ALL THE MORE ATTRACTIVE. BELIEVE T/1 SHOULD COOPERATE WITH KHORRAM TO THE FULL IN PROVIDING ANY INFORMATION ABOUT HIMSELF (WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE NON-INCRIMENTAL) IN ORDER TO SATISFY KHORRAM'S REQUESTS (WHICH WE REALIZE ARE BY NOW BECOMING REDUNDANT). T/1 SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CONTRY IMPRESSION KHORRAM THAT HE BORED AND LISTLESS IN HIS PRESENT SITUATION AND EAGER TO RETURN TO IRAN IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

FILE: 201-522995, RVN 19 SEP 99 DRV DDC.1 ALL SECRET

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25 SEP

SECRET 272556Z SEP 79 SHAF

DATE FROM SAN FRANCISCO 25424

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TERROR.

WINTER LAJA FORRES SETHROB

FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331
FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25323
DIRECTOR 215775

1. FOLLOWING IS INTERIM STATUS REPORT TO B/L T/1 IN LONDON. T/1 WAS CONTINUING EFFORTS TO REPEAT ED'S BROTH ERAGE WAS NU KERO M T/1 ALSO TRYING TO GET ARMED'S R V T/1 FORMER SDJANUS OFFICER NOW LIVING IN LONDON T/1 H TH ATIM GO THA KAEROM PASSED THROUGH SAN FRANCISCO T/1 H PNU AMAN VISIT RELATIVE HERE, ABOL BOLUGH, AND T/1 H WHE BOT KAEROM TOLD T/1 THAT ANOTHER FORMER SDJANUS OM E GR TO A ALSO LIVES IN LONDON (T/1 REMEMBERS AMMANOM PRO MANI (M IN SDJANUS KURDISH DEPARTMENT). T/1 FIGURE THE IDOU LE THROU KAEROM AND LEARN AHMED'S PARTICUL PRO ON AHRO COMME WE INTEND TO QUIZ T/1 IN DETAIL THE TR UNRECORDED CONTACT HERE WITH KAEROM. REB

2. T/1 HAS ALSO REPORTED THAT HIS T/1 ER PETER JALE IS T FIELD CALL FROM STATION RE HIS DOCU (S) OBE AND VISI GNS VISA AND WAS PLANNING TO LEAVE T IN C OBE WHI MOTER (IF LATER GOT IMMIGRANT VISA BY T. GH CE HER MOE (T/1 WIFE) HAS NOT HEARD FROM CONSULAT IGH WILK LT TH OF T/1 WILL DEPART FOR U.S. ON 6 OCTOBE WILL NTINNE TO THAT SITUATION, HOWEVER, AND IF JALER DE S T DE W THROU WILL HAVE T/1 PASS SAME INSTRUCTIONS AS BY B T OLDI DANGER JALA AND ADVISE STATION LATER. LL . PHONE N AND ADDRESS.

3. T/1 IN PROCESS OF DRAFTING CV E DOC CONSUL GENE

AGE 2 R/SAN FRANCISCO 26424 E C R E T
HERE HAS BEEN NO OTHER OFFICIAL NEWS PRD

4- FILE: 201-9529995. RW27SLP98

SECRET
E C R E T

BT
#1981

...MORNING OF
...FATHER'S DOCUMENTS.
...DAYS ON WHICH TO MEET, DAUGHTER
...THAT AFTERNOON. C/O MET DAUGHTER AND
...DIARIES/TELEPHONE BOOKS, AND FOLDER OF NOTES AND
...IS (WRITTEN IN COMBINATION PERSIAN, ARABIC AND KURDISH,
...FATHER'S OWN "CODE"). ALL POUCHED HQS 16 OCT VIA
...NUMBER 7194. NOT YET RECEIVED IS REPORT, WRITTEN BY MEMBER
...AL TALEBANI'S FAMILY, ON CURRENT KURDISH SITUATION.

2. DAUGHTER THEN TRAPPED C/O IN LENGTHY DISCOURSE
...N-IRANIAN RELATIONS, INCLUDING ASSESSMENT
...AND COMPANY IN POWER
...Y. HUNTING

SECRET 261882Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELETYPE
CITE WASHINGTON 54043.

TO: FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO THERAN.

FROM: CNE/IRAN INFO FR/SF

SUBJECT: WNYNTEL AJAJA FORRET SDTHROB - STATUS SDTHROB

REFS: 1. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 2559
2. DIRECTOR 525744
3. DIRECTOR 515773
4. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 2531
5. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 2511

1. WITH THE RECEIPT OF REF. WE HAVE REVIEWED IN DEPTH THE
ALREADY LENGTHY SDTHROB/1 (T/1) FILE AND, IN LIGHT OF OUR OTHER
EFFORTS AGAINST THE KURDISH TARGET WE ARE REASSESSING WHERE WE
ARE GOING WITH THIS CASE AND THE OPERATIONAL USEFULNESS WE CAN
EXPECT FROM IT. WHEN THE T/1 CASE FIRST SURFACED IN FEBRUARY
1979, WE HAD LITTLE INFORMATION ON KURDISH ACTIVITIES AND FEWER
SOURCES. T/1'S BACKGROUND, EXPERIENCE, AND CONTACTS WERE VIEWED
POTENTIALLY FILLING SEVERAL IMPORTANT GAPS IN BOTH OUR INTEL-
IGENCE COLLECTION AND OPERATIONS AND WE APPRECIATED THEM AND
WANT TO APPRECIATE THE BASE'S RAPID AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSE
TO OUR REQUIREMENTS AND THE T/1 CASE.

2. AS THE BASE IS AWARE, THE PACE OF THIS CASE HAS SINCE
SLOWED CONSIDERABLY, DUE TO THE INELUCTABLE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN
TARGET AND DURING THE INTERVENING TIME WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
OBTAIN OTHER SOURCES ON KURDISH ACTIVITIES. THE REPORTING FROM
THESE SOURCES PROVIDES A BEGINNING TO COVERAGE OF KURDISH EVENTS, WHILE
THE COVERAGE OF THE TARGET IS NOT WHAT WE WOULD WISH IT TO BE.
OUR CONCERN WITH T/1'S POTENTIAL FOR KURDISH REPORTING IS THAT
HE HAS NOT REALLY STARTED AND EVEN WHEN HE DOES, IT APPEARS
HE WILL BE COVERING MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND AS OTHER SOURCES
WE HAVE REPORTERS. AS A CASE IN POINT, THE REF NOTE
Mentions ATTEMPTING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH IDEN A AND THAT HE
HAS BEEN ASKING FOR BOOKS AND NOTES FROM THERAN TO BE ABLE TO

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 82-4383 SECRET
REVALIATION OF CONTACT LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT T/1 IS NOT
AS WIRE INTO THE IRAISH MOVEMENT AS WE HAD HOPED. IDEN A I
CATOMIC/19, A VERY COMBAT UNIT WHOSE MEMBERS ARE HAVING
NO DIFFICULTY IN FINDING WAYS TO REASSUME HIS REPORTING RE-
LATIONSHIP WITH BARTON. IN ADDITION, WE ARE IN DIRECT CONTACT
WITH STJANUS/22 (IDEN). W/1 WISHES TO BE AS A SOURCE OF
INFORMATION ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF HIS VARIOUS IRAISH CONTACTS.
STJANUS/22'S ACCESS TO THE IRAISH COMMUNITY IS MUCH MORE RECENT
THAN T/1'S AND WE BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST FROM THE STJANUS ANGLE,
HE WOULD BE A MORE PRODUKTIVE REPORTER. IN SECRET, AT THE PRESENT
TIME, WE THINK T/1 CAN BE USEFULLY DIRECTED INTO OTHER
TARGETS AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD HAVE T/1 STAND DOWN ON HIS
EFFORTS TO WORK AGAINST THE IRAISH TARGET.

2. WE STILL WISH TO ENCOURAGE THE BASE TO DIRECT, IF POS-
SIBLE, T/1 INTO THESE OTHER IRAISH TARGETS. WE ARE STILL VERY
MUCH INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITY OF T/1 REGAINING A POSITION
IN THE EGOT, PARTICULARLY IN THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND,
AS BEIC INDICATES, WE FIND THIS TO BE MUCH MORE ATTRACTIVE ALTERNA-
TIVE AND ONE WHICH WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD SATISFYING AN IM-
PORTANT FI REPORTING REQUIREMENT. WE WELCOME BASE COMMENTS ON
HOW WE MAY BEST ACCOMPLISH THIS, RECOGNIZING THAT IN THE END,
T/1'S SUITABILITY FOR SUCH AN OPERATION MAY BE OPEN TO QUESTION.

4. FILE 201-328995. RWW 25 OCT 79. DRV Doc.1 ALL SECRET.

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C R E T 251858Z OCT 78 DEFERRED TE EPO
WASHINGTON 540461

FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.

CNE/IRAN INFO JR/3/5E

INTEL AJSJA FORRES SDTHOE - STATUS (DTHROB/1 CA)

WASHINGTON 540443

ITEM A: ALI HOMAN GAZI
ITEM B: JAMSHID AMANI

RTM 200-328995. RYM 250199 DR V DE .1 SECRET.

SECRET 170004Z APR 79 STAFF
SITE DIRECTOR 420311.

17 APR 79 03 18 E

TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, VIENNA,
MINTEL RYBAT AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL

REF: BONN 80198 (NOT SENT/NEEDED TEHRAN)

1. WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ALMOST ANY LIGHT CATOMIC/IS
(A/19) (IDENTITY TEHRAN ONLY) COULD SHED ON THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
OF KURDISTAN (DPK), BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT IRAN. PLEASE
IDENTIFY SUB-SOURCING, SPECIFICALLY, ON IRAN:

A. WHO HEADS THE DPK IN IRAN AND ANY OTHER
IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEADERSHIP?

B. WHAT IS THE PARTY STRUCTURE, BOTH WITHIN AND
OUTSIDE OF IRAN?

C. WHAT IS THE PARTY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS COUNTRY-
PARTS IN IRAQ, SYRIA, AND TURKEY?

D. WHAT IS ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRAQI COMMUNIST
PARTY?

E. IS CASEMOU A MEMBER OF THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY
IF SO, DOES HE REPRESENT THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY WITHIN THE
DPK?

F. IS THERE A MILITARY WING OF THE DPK AND IF
IF YES, WHEN IS IT?

G. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DPK AND THE
PLO?

H. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE IRANIAN GOVERN-
MENT AND THE JUDAN PARTY?

ON IRAC:

A. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF CONTACTS BETWEEN IRAQI MEMBERS
AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF IRAN? HOW ARE THEY
COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH SUZSIS GROUPS IN NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAN AND TURKEY?

B. WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, IS THE SOVIET UNION PLAYING

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PAGE 2 DIRECTION 427311 S E C R E T
ON THE KURDISH QUESTION

C. WHAT KINDS AND HOW MUCH SUPPORT IS BEING PROVIDED BY
LIBYA TO THE KURDISH GROUPS?
ON TURKEY:

A. WHAT IS THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE TURKISH KURDS
IN GERMANY? ARE THEY ORGANIZED IN ANY WAY?

B. ARE THERE ANY KURDISH ACTIVIST/POLITICAL/
REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS IN GERMANY?

C. ARE THESE GROUPS INVOLVED WITH KURDISH MOVEMENTS/
ACTIVITIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES?

D. WITH WHOM IS A/19 IN CONTACT IN TURKEY?

E. ARE THESE TURKISH KURDS POLITICALLY ACTIVE?
F. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE KURDS OF
SYRIA, IRAQ, TURKEY AND SIRIA?

2. FOR VIENNA: ABOVE MAY BE DRAWN ON FOR USE WITH
DGC/1.

3. FILE: 281-8386414. RYM 16 APR 99 DRV DSG-1. ALL SECRET.

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OR 7 T 110315Z AUG 78 HIAF

Z DIRPCOR 483004

TEHRAN INFO DCD/HEADQUARTERS, DCD/CHICAGO, SINGAPORE.

INTEL AJAJA

1. AS RESULT OF MEETING BETWEEN HIS OFFICER AND DCD CONTACT ROBERT MCY. BURNS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE SURFACE INDIVIDUAL IN TEHRAN WHO STATION MAY FIND USEFUL. WE REALIZE THAT THIS DEPARTURE FROM OUR NORMAL PRACTICE OF NOT BURDENING STATION WITH S LEADS BUT WE BELIEVE YOU MAY AGREE THIS ONE HAS UNIQUE POTENTIAL.

2. BURNS WAS FMC CORPORATION MANAGER IN TEHRAN FROM MID 1975 TO DECEMBER 1978. DURING COURSE OF HIS TOUR THERE, HE DEVELOPED SEVERAL HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS IN AGRICULTURAL, MILITARY, AND COMMERCIAL SECTORS OF IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. ON HIS DEPARTURE FROM TEHRAN IN LATE 1978, HE LEFT CANADIAN NATIONAL HENRI STE. MARTIN IN CHARGE OF FMC OPERATIONS IN IRAN, AND STE. MARTIN HAS CONTINUED FMC OPERATIONS THERE AND MAINTAINED SOME OF THOSE CONTACTS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, STE. MARTIN HAS PURPORTEDLY DEVELOPED, OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS, EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN KURDISH MOVEMENT. STE. MARTIN DEVELOPED THESE CONTACTS THROUGH HIS IRANIAN AZARI WIFE WHO IN TURN HAS MANY KURDISH RELATIVES. IT WAS APPEAL FROM THESE KURDISH CONTACTS THAT LED STE. MARTIN, THROUGH BURNS, TO ATTEMPT TO CONTACT US.

3. STE. MARTIN, WHO IS 38 YEARS OLD, NATIVE OF QUEBEC AND GRADUATE FROM UNIVERSITY OF MONTREAL, ARRIVED IN IRAN IN 1976 WITH HIS IRANIAN WIFE. HE WORKED AT VARIETY OF JOBS IN TEHRAN UNTIL SUMMER 1978 WHEN HE WAS HIRED BY FMC. DURING HIS THREE YEARS IN TEHRAN STE. MARTIN HAS DEVELOPED ACADEMIC INTEREST IN KURDISH NATION AND HAS BUILT UP THROUGH HIS WIFE LIST OF EXTENSIVE CONTACTS. IN JUNE 1979 HE AND HIS WIFE TRAVELED FOR SEVERAL WEEKS INTO KURDISTAN AND MET WITH SEVERAL PROMINENT KURDISH LEADERS, INCLUDING RAHIM SAIF G. H. A. Z. I., WHO, ALONG WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF GHAZI CLAN, TOLD STE. MARTIN THAT HE WOULD LIKE HIS ASSISTANCE IN CONVEYING MESSAGE TO WESTERN POWERS

REF ID: A120127

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21-25-44

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ALL SECRET.

21 SEP 79 1342

201634Z SEP 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 517434.

IMMEDIATE BONN INFO GERMANY, STUTTGART, TEHRAN, ANKARA,

NBLS

BONN.

TEL AJASA CATONIC

A BONN 84680

H DIRECTOR 515091

C BONN 84421

WE THINK REF B SHOULD ANSWER REF C. YOU ARE NOT IN
REF B. IT AUTHORIZES REF C PROPOSAL WITH AN INITIAL
OF DM 7500 TO COVER CATONIC/79 EXPENSES FROM MAR 79
SEPTEMBER 79 AT DM1500/MONTH, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A THREE MONTH TRIAL PERIOD FROM OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 79.

FILE: 201-6300414. RVW 25 SEP 98 DMF 98C.1 ALL SECRET

SEP 21 12 00 47Z SEP 79 STAFF
DIR DIRECTOR 510707
FOR PRIORITY BOMN INFO TERRAN.
UNTELE AKAJA CATOMIC
REF BOMN 84921

1. AGREEMENT BETWEEN C/19 AND NOWIKOWSKI
RELATED TO SEP 78, IS THAT WE WILL PAY HIM DM1500 PER MONTH
EXPENSES INCURRED IN CONTACTING BUREAU TARGETS OF INTEREST
EITHER BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON AND THAT, AS HE HAD BEEN DOING
THIS FROM APRIL 1979 UNTIL WE WERE CONTACTED BY HIM IN AUGUST AND
SEPTEMBER 1979, WE WOULD SUPPORT THOSE EXPENSES AT THE RATE
DM1500 PER MONTH FROM MAY THROUGH SEPTEMBER. NOWIKOWSKI HAS
PAID C/19 DM1500 IN APRIL 1979.
WE WOULD ALSO PAY HIM DM1500 PER MONTH FROM OCTOBER THROUGH
DECEMBER AS PART OF A CONTINUING TEST PERIOD TO DETERMINE
USEFULNESS OF HIS INFORMATION. IN RETURN FOR HIS MONEY,
HE HAS AGREED TO MEET EVERY TWO WEEKS WITH AN ATTENTION OFFICER
RESPOND TO OUR REQUIREMENTS. AT THE END OF DECEMBER, NOWIKOWSKI
AND C/19 AGREED THAT WE WOULD REVIEW THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION
PROVIDED AND ADJUST HIS ALLOWANCE ACCORDINGLY.
BUT HIS NEED BE PROVIDED TO SUPPORT HIS COLLECTION OF THIS
MONEY DOES HE HAVE TO ACCOUNT FOR EXPENDITURES.

2. HOPE THIS CLARIFIES MATTER. APPRECIATE BASE
ON HIS SUBJECT.
E. FILE 201-08414. EWW 21SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL
S E C R E T
#467

SECRET 251532Z SEP 79 STAFF
CITE STUTTGART 17957 SECTION 1 OF
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, BONN INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL
MINTEL REBT AJAJA CATOMIC
REF: BONN 84660 (NOTAL)

1. ERIC E. TORLERNY HAD INTRODUCED MEETING WITH CAROLIN/19
(T/19) 28 SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1500 HOURS IN ROOM 1003 COLOGNE INTERCO
CONTINENTAL, AS ARRANGED. MEETING LASTED FOR ALMOST FOUR HOURS.
AND T/19 WAS PAID IN 1979 FOR PERIOD MAY 1979 THROUGH SEPT 1979.
1979 IN RATE OF DM 1500 MONTHLY FOR PERIOD SEP 1979 FOR WHICH HE SHOWED
HAND RECEIPT IN USUAL ALIAS. IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT NOTHING WOULD
CONTINUE FOR THREE MONTHS TRIAL PERIOD IN OCTOBER THROUGH
DECEMBER, WITH DM 1500 MONTHLY AS A PENALTY. THE NEW CONTRACT
WILL BE ON 27 SEPTEMBER. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS WERE APPARENT.

2. ATMOSPHERE: TORLERNY BEGAN BY EXPLAINING HIS RE
(SLIGHTLY INCREASED) AND HIS LONG BA GROUND IN AREA OF CURDISH
OUT THAT HE HAD VIEWED KURDIAN-IRI HISTORY, ETC. HE THEN ADDED THAT HE AS KNOWER OF TURKISH
LIKE A JAZZER WHEN NECESSARY AND THAT AS GOING TO TAKE TO T/19
GOOD. HE THEN STARTED TO QUESTION T/19 OF HIS SERIOUSNESS AND
KURDISH PROBLEMS, GENTLY POINTING OUT THAT T/19 HAD MADE STATE-
DO WITH KURDISH NATIONALISM DURING HIS ADVT LIFE AND A FULL STATE-
FINE PRAISING T/19'S FATHER AND HIS CAUSE. TORLERNY STATED THAT
INTRODUCTION BY NOTING HIS PERSONAL REASONS FOR HIS KURDISH AND
SYMPATHY FOR T/19'S DESIRE TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE. ALL THIS WAS
RECEIVED BY T/19.

3. COMED: TORLERNY THEN RAISED OUT TROUBLE OF WHAT HE BELIEVES IS
/19. DESPITE T/19'S DENIALS, HE HAD NO INTENTION AT THIS POINT
SETTING KURDISH NATIONALISM WITH ANOTHER IN MIND AND T/19 WAS
AWARE OF THE REASONS FOR THIS. TORLERNY SAID HE HAD NO
TO RETURN "BLANK" TO KURDIAN, BUT WOULD BE AS HIS OWN
WILLY CREATE MORE PROBLEMS FOR EVERY COUNTRY BY SUPPLYING ACCURATE INFO. HE COULD NOT SAY
T/19 ON WHAT SHE BELIEVES

PAGE 2 STUTTGART 1987 SECRET
HAPPENING THERE AND HOW EVENTS WERE CONTROLLED. THIS WAS FIRST
AND BASIC STEP. T/19 AGREED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POLICY.
EVEN THOUGH HE DIDN'T LIKE IT AND HE AGREED THAT THREE-
MONTH TRIAL PERIOD SHOULD BE GOOD TEST. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO
LONG DISCOURSE ON FACT THAT HE WAS GRADUALLY BEING SEPARATED
FROM HIS SOURCES AND WOULD SOON HAVE NOTICED TO REPORT. HE THEN
STATED THAT HE IS ABLE TO ENTER KURDESSAN SUCCESSFULLY AND SET UP
NEW SOURCES AND ROUTES. HE ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
HE COULD ASSIST HIM IN TWO MATTERS: (A) SUPPLYING HIM WITH SAFE
COMMUNICATION, I.E. PHONE FACILITIES, BETWEEN GERMANY AND IRAN
AND (B) WHETHER HE WOULD HELP HIM SEND EUROPEAN NEWSPAPER TV
TERMS INTO KURDISTAN "SEAK" IN ORDER TO PUBLICIZE TRUE STATE OF
AFFAIRS THERE. TOLENNY REPLIED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER
SOME QUESTIONS BEFORE RESPONDING BUT MADE NO COMMITMENTS. T/19 CONT-
TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD CONVERSATIONS PRIMARILY THROUGH (A) CONTACTS AND
THESE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS SISTER IN TEHRAN, WHO IS MARRIED
TO HER IN JAV CITY AND SHE IN TURN HAD CONTACT WITH KURDISTAN IN
AND LETTER. HER SISTER'S CONTACTS IN KURDISTAN HAD TEND TO KILLS
AND SISTER HAD MOVED TO BAHN. HOWEVER, PUBLIC COMMO IN
KURDISTAN WAS INCREASINGLY CONTROLLED AS WAS THAT IN TEHRAN.
THIS INDICATED THAT HE STILL HAD PLenty OF POTENTIAL SOURCES
IN KURDISTAN BUT HE HAD NO WAY TO REACH THEM FROM GERMANY AND
TO SEE IF NEW ROUTES AND CONTACTS.

4. INTL: T/19 HAD NO IDEAL OTHER THAN GENERAL STATEMENT
THAT ON 12 SEPTEMBER THERE HAD BEEN FIGHTING IN MANY KURDISH
TOWNS BUT HE HAD NO NAMES OR NUMBERS. TOLENNY SYMPATHIZES
WITH T/19'S PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED THAT HE TRY TO EXTRACT MORE
INFORMATION FROM TRUSTED KURDS IN GERMANY WHO ALSO HAD THEIR
OWN SOURCES. HE AGREED TO DO THIS.

5. TARGETS: TOLENNY TOLD T/19 THAT FIRST THING WAS TO
GATHER LIST OF NAMES, ADDRESSES AND BIO DATA ON KURDS IN
GERMANY. T/19 TRUSTED AND THOUGH CAPABLE OF OBTAINING
IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM KURDISTAN. HE ALSO ASKED FOR SIMILAR
LIST OF KURDS IN TEHRAN AND KURDS IN KURDISTAN. DEPENDING ON
THAT LIST, WE COULD TRY HELP T/19 DETERMINE (A) WHO WAS
MOST LIKELY AND (B) IF IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR US TO ASSIST HIM
IN HIS TARGETS. WE HAD TO KNOW FIRST WHOM HE WAS DEALING
WITH AND WHAT THEIR BACKGROUNDS WERE. T/19 AGREED READILY TO THE

NAME'S NEUTRALITY 1950'S TO 1960'S
BEING THINKING IN OTHER CAREFULLY AND AFTER BEING ASSURED HE
WOULD HANDLE INFORMATION IN SECURE MANNER. HE PROMISED TO
HAVE SOME INFORMATION AT NEXT MEETING.

3. SOVIET INFLUENCE: T/19 HAS NO HARD INFORMATION ON SOVIET
CONNECTIONS WITH NATIONALIST FORCES IN KURDISTAN, ESPECIALLY IN
RECENT YEARS. HE POINTED OUT THAT ALMOST ALL KURDISH LEADERS
HAVE HAD SOME CONTACT WITH SOVIETS, USUALLY FOR A PURPOSE.
DARRIED, FOR EXAMPLE, HE KNEW AS COMMUNIST AND TUBER MEMBER,
BUT OBSERVED THEM BROKE WITH SOVIETS AND PERHAPS NOW IS BACK IN
THEIR. IN ABSENCE OF HARD AND CURRENT INFORMATION, ALMOST ALL KURD
WOULD BE UNREASONABLY EXPECTED TO HAVE SOME SOVIET CONNECTIONS.
T/19'S FATHER, A DEEPLY RELIGIOUS MAN AND STRONG KURDISH
NATIONALIST, HAD ACCEPTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO ACHIEVE HIS
PURPOSE. T/19 WAS INSTRUCTED TO BE ESPECIALLY ALERT FOR
INFORMATION CONCERNING SOVIET INFLUENCE.

4. HIS SOVIET CONTACTS: AT THIS POINT, TORLERNY ASKED
TO ADAPT HIS SOVIET CONTACTS. HE HAD ENVIRED SOME MONTHS AND
WAS BEING HELD SECRETARY ALEXANDER S. KULLU TO HIS PARTY AND
WAS RETURNED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO UNEXPECTEDLY AND ASKED IF
HE HAD ANY INTERESTS HE COULD DO TO HELP T/19. REFERENCE TO T/19
WAS OF PSYCHOMATIC SORT. ACCORDING TO T/19, REFERENCE TO T/19
WAS NOT HEARING HE WOULD BE BACK, BUT HAS NOT YET RETURNED AND
HE DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS A TRIP FOR HIS FUTURE FUTURE
NOT. BUT KINSHIPS KULLU TO RETURN AND TALK ABOUT T/19 AND
OTHER INFORMATION. T/19 PROMISED TO REPORT AT CONTACT
RECENTLY AND IN DETAIL. HE WAS ALSO WARNER OF CONTACT
MAY BE AN PERSONAL SURVEILLANCE. T/19 THEN ASKED IF
T/19 THOUGHT KULLU WAS CONNECTED WITH SUBJECT MENTIONED TO
BY HIS COUSIN, NAME BRIT C K A ZI, PROP. SOBE KURDISH
SPORT AND CULTURE IN BAKO. T/19 HIS COUSIN OF FIRST TIME IN YEARS
MARRIED IN BAKO AND COUSIN MENTIONED THAT HE MIGHT
BE CONNECTED TO T/19. HE DIDN'T EXHAUST ABOUT IT AT THAT TIME. NAME
MARRIED COUSIN WAS ALLOWED TO COME TO BAKO AS HE
WAS THE FATHER OF SUBJECT PREVIOUSLY DURING THE SOVIET UNION.
T/19 NEW NOT TO MARRIED COUSIN MARRIED BY SUBJECT. A KUND WHO
MARRIED HIM A COUSIN IN SOVIET UNION OF SOVIET CONNECTIONS
MARRIED OR MARRIED MARRIED MIGHT SOMEONE REPRESENTING SOVIET
INTEREST. TORLERNY SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW, AND T/19 ASKED IF HE

AGE A STUTTGART 7937 S. E. C. R. I. T.
WOULD ASK COUSIN TO SEND SOMEONE.

8. THIS RECOGNIZING THAT TORLERNY ADVISED WAITING.
WHEN IN BOMB WOULD ASSIST SISTER NOW IN WORK IN EDUCATION AT
AMERICAN SCHOOL. SINCE CHILDREN HAD PREVIOUSLY ATTENDED AMERICAN
SCHOOL IN TEHRAN. TORLERNY SAID HE HAD NOTHING OF DONN SCOTT
BUT WOULD ACQUAINT HIMSELF WITH SITUATION. (B) E/19 WOULD A
COPY OF BOOK BY (FNU) REGGELTON ABOUT KURDS AND (C) COPY OF
ROOSEVELT ARTICLE IN MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ABOUT KURDISH REPUBLIC
OF 1945-46. HE HAD NO MONEY REQUESTS, AND ALMOST FORGOT TO
COLLECT MONIES OVER HIM.

9. IN GENERAL MEETING WENT VERY WELL WITH GENUINE CORDIALITY
AND ENDS AT END OF MEETING AND A SENSING BACKNESS TO GET ON
WITH BUSINESS. TORLERNY SUGGESTED MOVING NEXT MEETING UP TO 27TH
SCHEDULED 2 OCTOBER JUST AS LEAVING IT UNMENTIONED THAT ON
11 SEPTEMBER HE WAS GOING TO REGISTER IN BOMB A GROUP TO BE
CALLED "THE COUNCIL FOR PARADISE AUTONOMY". HE ALREADY HAD THE
PAPERS DRAWN UP AND IT WOULD BE A BEGINNING OF HIS ATTEMPT TO
GATHER TOGETHER AN ORGANIZATION HE COULD USE. TORLERNY WILL
OBTAIN COPY OF PAPERS AND ADDITIONAL DETAILS AT NEXT MEETING.

10. COMMENTS: IN PRESENT SITUATION AND WITH PRESENT GUIDELINES
WE REALLY HAVE LITTLE TO OFFER E/19 AND HAS LITTLE TO OFFER
US. THEREFORE, WE SHOULD GET OUR SONS BEFORE WE GET BACK IN
MORE DIRECTLY THAN WE WANT TO BE. THREE MONTHS TRIAL SHOULD BE A SILENT
ONE THE OTHER HAND. TORLERNY BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE
MORE ACTIVE ROLE. BASED ON REWARDING ONLY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT, TAKING
THE E/19 MAY HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL. THERE SEEM TO BE NO
OTHER KURDS WITH SIGNIFICANT BACKGROUND AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
WHO CAN MAKE STRONG IMPRESSIONS AND LEADERSHIP AND PERHAPS THIS
WAS NOT HIS ALL TOGETHER FOR HIM. PERHAPS ENOUGH TO ALLOW
TORLERNY TO ASK HIM UNLESS HE LERNEED IT AND HIS TRACK
RECORD AS KURDISH NATIONALIST WAS VERY POOR. HE HAD TO MAKE
HIMSELF INTO SOMEONE OTHERS WOULD FOLLOW. BOTH KURDS AND
OTHERS WERE DRIVEN FORWARD FOR HIM. THIS TOOK HIS VERY SERIOUSLY
AND FINALLY ASKED THAT HE HAD TO WORK AND MORE HARD TO GET
WHAT HE WANTED. HE NOTED THAT KROVINSKI HAD DONE MUCH WITHOUT

PAGE 5 STOUTGART 17937 S E C R E T
HELP AND WHILE EN EXIST. TOBLERNY BELIEVES REACTION SHOULD
CONSIDER SERIOUSLY WHERE AND HOW IT ULTIMATELY WANTS TO GO WITH
T/19 BEFORE THE TRAIL PERIOD IS UP IN DECEMBER. TOBLERNY ALSO
BELIEVES THAT IF THE SOVIETS OFFERED T/19 GUNS, MONEY, ASS STANG
TOMORROW, HE WOULD LEAVE DIFFICULT TIME REFUSING, BELIEVING
THAT HE COULD SOMEHOW USE THE SOVIETS FOR HIS OWN ENDS. T/19
SAYS HE BELIEVES IN AUTONOMY FOR KURBS, RATHER THAN INDEPENDENCE
AND SAYS HE WOULD BE WILLING TO DO ALMOST ANYTHING TO HELP
ACHIEVE IT FOR THE KURBS. HE IS BEGINNING TO THINK MORE OF
IMITATING HIS FATHER. HOW THAT TRAN IS A MESS. WHAT HE CAN DO,
HOW FAR HE CAN CHANGE HIS PLAYBOY PAST, WHAT INFLUENCE HE CAN BRING
AROUND HIS NAME, IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE. THE POINT IS
THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO DECIDE IF WE WANT HIM, WHAT WE WANT
HIM FOR, AND HOW BADLY WE WANT HIM. IF NOT, HE WILL EITHER
PASSE THE POINT WHERE HE HAS THE DESIRE TO WORK FOR THE KURBS
OR SOMEONE ELSE MIGHT ALREADY OWN HIM.

11. FILE: 201-2306414. RW 25SEPT99 DRW D9C.1
S E C R E T
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SECRET 271028Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 04301

TO: STUTTGART INFO DIRECTOR, BONN, GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL

WHINTEL RMDAT ALJAWA CATOMIC

REF: STUTTGART 17937

1. ACCORDING TO 12 SEPTEMBER ISSUE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE WEEKLY CALLED "THE IRANIAN", RANIM GHAZI RETURNED TO IRAQ IN APRIL 79. MAGAZINE SAYS HE WAS MEMBER OF KURDISH DELEGATION WHICH RECENTLY CAME TO TEHRAN TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE WITH PLOI ON KURDISH REBEL ION. THERE IS NO MENTION OF TRAVEL OUTSIDE IRAN SINCE GHAZI'S RETURN FROM USSR.

2. FILE: 201-306424. RWV 27 SEP 99 DRV DSC.1. ALL

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KURT

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23 SEPTEMBER 1979
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ANNUNCIATION OF THE JAF TRIE
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THE ATTORNEY...
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REF: 201-2326414 900 3 SEP 20 1979

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SECRET 281653Z SEPT 99 STAFF
BONN 84952

DIRECTOR, STUTTGART INFO GERMAN
TEL AJAJA CATOMIC TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANB

1. STUTTGART 17957
3. BONN 84944

1. REF B REPORTED INTD FROM 27 SEP MEETING WITH CATOMIC
(IS)

2. SARDAR J A F. ONE OF LEADERS OF JAF TRIBE OF KURDS.
ARRIVED TO T/19'S SISTER (PARA EIGHT REP A). AFTER FLEEING
HE ULTIMATELY ARRIVED IN BAGDAD WHERE HE BECAME
KURDS WHO WERE SAFE-HAVENED IN IRAQI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSISTING
DURING IRAQI-KURDISH FIGHTING IN IRAQ. JAF TRIBE WAS
AN SLAVE. HE WAS SCHEDULED TO COME TO GERMANY AND SARDAR APPARENTLY
IRAQI MILITARY GROUP AND TO MEET T/19 AND HIS SISTER.
MINUTE TRIP WAS POSTPONED SO SARDAR COULD MAKE TRIP
STAN. AND HE IS NOW SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE BONN 6 OCT.
L ARRANGE FOR TOELERNY TO MEET SARDAR.
E TO T/19, SARDAR'S CHILDREN (3) HAVE BEEN ENTERED IN
AFRICAN SCHOOL, BUT WITH COST RUNNING OVER \$2,000

(THIS FIGURE CHECKS) T/19 HAS REQUESTED OUR ASSISTANCE
CONSULTATION WITH BONN. TOELERNY PROPOSES USING SCHOOL
PROGRAM WITH SARDAR SUGGESTING A "PAY-AS-YOU-GO"
IN RETURN FOR HIS CONTINUING COOPERATION. TARGETS
BOTH KURDS AND IRAQI SERVICE. METHOD OF COMMO WOULD
FIVE ALLOWS TRAINING. OTHERWISE, WOULD ARRANGE FOLLOW-
UP WHICH WE COULD UNDERWRITE TO GERMANY. "TO SEE FAMILY"
DATE TRAINING AND SCSWIRL.

REQUEST TRACES SARDAR. ALSO REQUEST HQS APPROVAL THIS
L BY 5 OCT.

FILE: 201-030641A. RVN 28SEP99 DR DEC 1

41775 17 262

SECRET 12 OCT 70 STAFF

CITE FROM 22448

MR. WINDSTON, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, IRAN

URGENT 12 OCT 70

REF: DOWN 24822

1. FOLLOWING PIECES OF INFORMATION WERE PROVIDED BY
SOURCE T/19 (T/19) DURING LAST MEETING WITH TOLBERT AND ARE
FORWARDED FOR HIS INFORMATION AND POSSIBLE COMMENT.

2. SOURCE T/19 (T/19), 2ND VICE PRESIDENT
IRANIAN LEADERSHIP, HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS RELATIVE OF KHOMEINI WHO VISITED
IRAN SOURCE, WEST GERMANY. T/19 HAS TELEPHONE NUMBER AND
NAME. SAYS IS INTERESTED.

3. T/19 HAS STORY OF SON OF TURKISH KURD, INU
T/19 (T/19) WHOM T/19 EXTRACTED FROM SHAN'S PERSON AT SOURCE'S
REQUEST IN 1967. SON RECENTLY CAME TO T/19 WITH UNKNOWN KURD
T/19 (T/19) WITH STRANGE STORY. SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IDENTIFIED
WANTED TO SEND ARMS TO KURDS UNDER GUISE ARMS ARE BEING
FORWARDED THROUGH SUPPLIERS IN EUROPE. KURD ASKED T/19 IF HE
COULD DELIVER ARMS TO KURDISTAN BY
SOURCE REQUESTS MUCH MORE DETAIL AND SUBSTANTIATION.
SOURCE ASKED T/19 TO ACQUIRE IN NEXT MEETING WITH
T/19 (T/19) REGARDING IS ABOUT THREE WEEKS. T/19 SUGGESTED
T/19 (T/19) SOCIALIST, PRESUMABLY NATIVE GERMAN, WHO COULD
BE IN LINE WITH SOURCE OF CHECKING FEASIBILITY. TOLBERT
REQUESTED OF STORY AND WERE NO COMMITMENT.

4. SOURCE ALEXANDER K V L I N (PARA SEVEN REF 1)
NO FURTHER CONTACT.

5. 247 220001A. 12 OCT 70 REF DOC 1.

6 Oct 79 17 07z

SECRET 051436Z OCT 79 STAFF

TO BOMB 05112

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, AKAR, MANBUL.

DIRTEL AJAJA CATOMIC

INFO DIRECTOR 006149

1. AS SPECULATED IN REF, SARDAR JAF IS DEEDS BROTHER OF SALAR. CATOMIC/19 (1/19) INFORMED TOLERN & CATI TMA SARDAR JAF WILL BE DEPARTING BAGHDAD 3 OCT, ALTHOUGH LATER DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WILL BE COMING FIRST TO LONDON OR TO BONN. JAF WILL BE IN BONN ONLY FEW DAYS AND 1/19 WILL BROKE MEETING BETWEEN JAF AND C/O AT THAT TIME. WILL USE THAT OPPORTUNITY TO EXTRACT ANY INTELLIGENCE JAF MAY HAVE. WE MAY HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION CONCERNING IRAQI INVOLVEMENT WITH ANTI-KHOMEINI TRENDS, SUN-RUNNING TO KURDS AND MILITANT KURDISH LEADER HIP

2. GIVEN RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED REF. WILL SE IT'S OPPORT TO MAKE FURTHER ASSESSMENT OF JAF. IF PROSPECTS LOOK GOOD, BASE PROPOSES TO UNDERWRITE JAF'S RETURN TO BONN ASAP. ROM BAGHDAD. AT THAT TIME WE CAN BETTER ASSESS JAF'S ACCESS A CAPABILITY AND WHERE WE WANT TO GO WITH HIM.

3. WSS STUTTGART AND BONN RECEIVE LITTLE KURDISH AFFIC THAN MLDIST. IT WOULD AID CONSIDERABLY IN HANDLING KURDISH CASES IF WE COULD BE INFO ADEES ON RELEVANT KURDISH REPORTS, SO AS TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF REPORTING AND TO BEING BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE UP TO SPEED.

4. CATRICE/1 C/O WILL BE MEETING WITH ASSET IN APPROXIMATE THREE WEEKS. THERE GOOD CHANCE CATRICE WILL HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF SARDAR JAF AND BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ASSESSMENT DATA.

5. FILE: 201-386214. RWV-3 OCT 50 DR 19CA.

SECRET

NOV 19 05 1952

191755Z OCT 52

COMM 85221

STATE DIRECTOR, FID GERMANY, BERLIN, ANKARA, ISRAEL

EL SAJA CATOMIC INTELL

NO 85112

1. IN MEETING 18 OCTOBER 1952 WITH CATOMIC/ED
IN WASHINGTON, SAJAR J A M, FOLLOWING INFORMATION

2. JAP IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH IRAQI GOVERNMENT
TO CAP KURDS WHO HOLD AN AREA EAST AND WEST OF
ISRAEL. JAP HAS BEEN A NUMBER OF TIMES

IN CONTACT WITH SAJAR J A M AS WELL AS WITH SAJAR
WHOM SAJAR HAS MET IN THE PAST. SAJAR HAS BEEN
IN CONTACT WITH SAJAR J A M IN THE PAST AND
DURING THE PAST SAJAR HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH
SAJAR J A M IN THE PAST AND DURING THE PAST

SAJAR HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SAJAR J A M
IN THE PAST AND DURING THE PAST SAJAR HAS
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AND DURING THE PAST SAJAR HAS BEEN IN CONTACT
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WITH SAJAR J A M IN THE PAST AND DURING THE PAST

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1 Nov 79 04 24Z

C R E T 210212Z NOV 79 INTEL

DIRECTOR 543732 .

TEHRAN INFO BONN, GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, STUTTGART,
AVIV, MOSCOW.

INTEL AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL

BONN 95221 (NOT SENT TEL AVIV)

FOLLOWING IS TDFIRDB-315/19265-79 BASED ON REF FOR
DISSEM PER FIELD DISSEM LINE.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASS SECRET W/NINT NOFORN NOCONTRACT CROGN

COUNTRY: IRAN/IRAQ/USSR
 SUBJECT: 1. ARMS OBTAINED BY KURDISH FACTIONS
 2. COMMENTS OF KURDISH TRIBAL LEADER ON OTHER COUNTRY SUPPORT TO THE KURDS (DOI: OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT KURDISH FAMILY WHO HAS LONG STAYING TIES TO KURDISH LEADERS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. SOME OF HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED. THE INFORMANT HAD GOOD ACCESS.

1. ONE KURDISH TRIBE, THE JAYS, ARE CURRENTLY ENCLAVED IN AN AREA EAST AND WEST OF KERMANSHAH. IN THIS AREA, THE TRIBE HAS 1,500 MEN, A NUMBER DELIBERATELY KEPT THIS LOW IN ORDER TO GET QUALITY FIGHTERS. THEIR ORIGINAL SUPPLY OF ARMS WAS OBTAINED BY TAKING A MILITARY COMPOUND NEAR KERMANSHAH IN LATE APRIL 1979. THEY OBTAINED FROM THE FORTRESS MORE THAN 1,000 GERMAN G-3'S, AS WELL AS 100 "LARGE" G-3'S, PRESUMABLY THE G-3'S IN THE MACHINE GUN MODE; TWELVE D.E. M48 81-MM MORTARS; TWO "SMALL" ARTILLERY PIECES; AND THREE TRUCK LOADS OF AMMUNITION. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER, THE GROUP RECEIVED AN ADDITIONAL 400 KALASHNIKOV'S WHICH WERE PROVIDED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. THIS GROUP OPERATES IN THE KERMANSHAH-SAMENAN AREA TO THE WEST OF THIS AREA UP TO THE IRANQ BORDER - THE HANDESH-BANER AREA. THE KURDISH ELEMENTS ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP).

2. A LEADING MEMBER OF THE JAYS CLAIMS THAT NO ONE IS HELPING THE KURDS SECRETLY, AND THAT IRAQ IS PROVIDING CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT. (SOURCE COMMENT: KURDS APPARENTLY HAVE UNLIMITED AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN ASSISTANCE FROM IRAQ IF THEY HAVE GOOD CREDENTIALS.) SYRIA HAS BEEN HELPING THE NORTHERN KURDS, THE SORRANI, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF JALAL TALA BANI. BUT THEIR AID HAS NOW STOPPED. TALABANI WAS RECENTLY IN BAGHDAD LOOKING FOR ASSISTANCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS IS CONSIDERED AN UNUSUAL STEP AS TALABANI FOUGHT THE IRANS IN 1974-1975.) THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) IS ALSO RECEIVING SOME HELP FROM IRAQ, ALTHOUGH MOST OF THEIR ARMS HAVE

BEEN LOOTED FROM THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES. EVEN ABDOL RAHMAN
S A S E M L U, THE PRESENT LEADER OF THE KDP, HAS VISITED
MADRID SEVERAL TIMES.

3. THE SOVIET UNION IS DOING NOTHING TO HELP THE KURDS,
EVEN THOUGH THEY COULD DO IT VERY EASILY ACROSS COMMON BORDERS,
AND EVEN THOUGH MOST OF THE KDP ARE BELIEVED BY THE KURDS TO
BE COMMUNISTS, OR AT LEAST LEFTISTS. THE GROUP THAT VISITED
THE SOVIET UNION TO ASK FOR ASSISTANCE HAD NOT RETURNED AS OF
14 OCTOBER. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: SET TDFINDE-616/1627-79
DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1979 FROM THE SAME SOURCE WHICH REPORTED ON
THE VISIT.) (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, KURDS
FROM MANY TRIBES HAVE SENT REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE VIA RELATIVES
IN THE SOVIET UNION, BUT SOURCE SAID AS FAR AS HE KNEW, NONE
CLAIM TO HAVE RECEIVED AID AND HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANYTHING
WHICH WOULD INDICATE SUCH AID HAD BEEN GIVEN.)

4. IRAQ, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS COOPERATING IN EVERY WAY,
OPENING AND CLOSING THE BORDER FOR CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY, AS
WELL AS SUPPLYING MATERIAL AID. IN LATE AUGUST SADDAM HUSAYN
VISITED SULAYMANIYAH, THE KURDISH CAPITAL IN IRAQ, AND THE
SOURCE OF HIS AID TO IRANIAN KURDS WAS SO WELL KNOWN AND BELIEVED
THAT HE WAS GREETED AS IF HE WERE A HERO. (SOURCE COMMENT:
WHILE ADDING THE IRANIAN KURDS MAY LEAD AGAIN TO A RESURGENCE
IN IRAQI KURDISH ACTIVITY, THE IRAQIS APPARENTLY WANTED TO
USE THE KURDS AGAINST K H O M E I N I IN IRAN. IRAQ SEEMED
TO BE USING THIS PERIOD OF COMMON PURPOSE TO EXPLORE WHETHER
IT WOULD BE BETTER TO FAVOR THE KURDS RATHER THAN FIGHTING
THEM.)

5. ACC.: (12 OCTOBER 1979)

6. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

REMOVE CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION
AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RMW
50 OCT 98 DRY DEC 11 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS
CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

BT
#4863

11 Oct 79 05 09z

R E T 101745Z OCT 79 STAFF

DOWN 2522Z

FOR IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN
SECRET.

FROM L AJALA CAROMIC

DOWN 2522Z

PURSUANT REF OPS INTEL CABLE, KEITH L. TORBERN MET
CAROMIC/19 (F/19) AND SARDAR J A F 10 OCTOBER 1979 FOR
TWO HOURS WHICH WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SORT OUT ALL OPS MATTER
BUT A MARIGN TIME JAF AVAILABLE. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED
WITH CAROMIC ON 24 OCTOBER.

TORBERN ATTEMPTED TO ASSESS JAF WHILE EXTRACTING INFO IN
TEHRAN, PRIMARILY BY ASKING HARD QUESTIONS. JAF CAME ACROSS
AS A VERY CONFIDENT MAN WITH STRONG IDEAS ABOUT WHAT HE KNEW AND DIDN'T
KNOW. HIS OPINIONS ON DATES (WHICH IS FAIRLY COMMON), VERY CAREFUL WITH
FACTS. THOUGH HE DROPPED A FEW, HE WAS NOT SELLING. HE
IS A TALL, BROOKY MAN WITH ALMOST A DISTINGUISHED APPEARANCE.
HE HAS DARK HAIR AND GRAY HAIR AND AN AIR OF QUIET AUTHORITY.
HE SAID THAT HE HAD COME TO THE MEETING PRIMARILY TO
SEE CAROMIC AND T/19 WHO HE THOUGHT HE COULD BRING
SOME INFORMATION. HE ASKED FOR MORE INFO AND
FOR ANY KIND OF ASSURANCE, EVEN FOR HIS
WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED. IN FACT, BY F/19
THE ISSUE TO OPENS UP. JAF RAISED IT, AND
TOLD THAT JAF HAD OFFERED TO TAKE HIS FA
WITH HIM, THAT HE COULD NOT AFFORD TO
TORBERN POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE
THAT IDEA WOULD BE DANGEROUS. JAF ASKED
FORCE AND THAT TORBERN DIDN'T HAVE TO
THANK YOU JUST THE SAME. HE MAY BE CLEVER
MIGHT WANT TO HEAR AND DIDN'T WANT TO
MIGHT CROSS BY SAYING THAT IF THINGS DID
THE FAMILY IN NASHRABAD, TO PASS THE WORD

PAGE 2 BOMN 85222 S E C R M T
THROUGH 1/19 AND JAF WAS PLEASED.

2. JAF WILL BE BACK IN BOMN, PERHAPS IN A WEEK. HE
IS PREMIER BAKHTYAR IN PAKISTAN AND A DENTIST IN
AS INTEL FROM THE BAKHTYAR VISIT. THIS CAN PROBABLY
BE OBTAINED THRU 1/19, BUT IF HE WANTS TO RECONSIDER
OF A L TO BOMB SCHOOL COSTS IN BOMN (AND WE SUPPORT
WE CAN MAKE ONE LAST
HE RETURNS IN A WEEK.

3. JAF IS VERY SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT HIS SECURITY
WITH THE IRAQIS AND SAID THEY WOULD KILL HIM IN A MINUTE
IF HE IS DETECTED IN BEING ARRESTED. HE IS
ASKING AND REQUESTING ANY INTEL REGARDING THE
WE WOULD REQUEST THAT JAF BE ENLIGHTENED AND FOR THIS

TOHLERNY (AS PLOY) TOLD JAF THAT REACTION NOT BE
FRIGHT BUT WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN KURDS. ANY ACTION
BY THE U.S. OR ACTIONS AVOIDED WILL BE EASIER IN THE
OF THE SITUATION. IT IS WANTED TO BE
IT IS THE BEST WAY TO
SITUATION. IT IS WANTED TO
WE SHOULD MAKE A
AND THAT
AND ALWAYS
WHETHER HE WILL DO
BOMN AGAIN. ALTHOUGH HE
TWO MONTHS. TOHLERNY

TOHLERNY'S MESSAGE FROM THE
KURDISH LEADER, HAS
THAT HE IS SAYING ISLAMIC
LEADERS, ENDED ISLAMIC, AND TO THE
LEADING BUT IMPROPERLY
CONTINUE TO SHARE
LEADER. HE
HE WOULD LIKE TO
OF HIS KIND, HE
U.S. NOT NECESSARILY COME THROUGH IN SOME WAY, A

3 BOW 85222 S E C R E T

ENCOURAGED. IF HE COULD BE PERSUADED TO LEAVE HIS
IN L.A., WITH OUR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR HIS OWN
EDUCATION, HE MIGHT CHANGE HIS MIND. WE WOULD NOT
WANT TO BE DONE ON A QUOTE UNQUOTE BASIS IN RETURN FOR
WE WOULD NOT PLAN APPROACH ON THIS BASIS AS
IT WOULD BE OFFENSIVE TO HIM, BUT HE WOULD BE
WE WOULD NOT MISS POINT, AND ENCOURAGEMENT WOULD COME TO GEN.

2. PROPOSE HQS CONSIDER PAYMENTS OF TRIP FOR THREE
CHILDREN TO ALLING APPROXIMATELY USD 2,000 (1970-1971) THROUGH
ON WIFE TO KEEP
THE POINTS IN HERE" AND THEN HER COLLECTION AREA AS
AND HER WIFE AND HER WIFE WOULD BE IN THE AREA
WITH SIMILAR PAYMENTS THROUGH. APPROXIMATELY USD 2,000
IN ORDER TO APPROACH JAY ARAN BEFORE HE LEAVES OR IS AWAY

FILE: 281-306414. RW 12 OCT 60 REV DOCK

190079 00232

E T 182056Z OCT 79 STAFF

RECTOR 535045.

BONN, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANFA, ISKANDER,
D.

TEL AJAJA SDFICKLE SDDAZE CATOMIC

BONN 85221

1. DURING CURRENT OR UPCOMING MEETINGS WIFE CAEGYIC/1 (P/1) AND SDFICKLE/1 (F/1) WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE SUPPORTING SDDAZE/1'S (P/1) REPORT ON GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (GOI) SUPPORT TO KURDS FIGHTING IRANIAN FORCES. HOWEVER, WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION ANY OF ABOVE NAMES CAN PROVIDE ON N A G H S H R A N D I FAMILY, REPUTEDLY PROMINENT KURDISH FAMILY LEADERS OF WHICH HAVE FLED TO IRAQ. FAMILY REPORTEDLY HAD LONG HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION WITH SWAR.

2. FILE 201-963160; 201-960951; 201-326414. RW 1800189
ENV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

BT

07755

--SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

IRAN

FORMER IRANIAN PREMIER BAKHTIAR'S NASCENT EFFORTS TO RETURN TO POWER (DOI: MID-OCTOBER 1979)

RE: A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT KURDISH FAMILY WHO HAS LONG-STANDING TIES TO KURDISH LEADERS. HE ATTENDED A MEETING WITH BAKHTIAR. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED.

1. FORMER IRANIAN PREMIER SHAPUR B. A. K. H. T. I. / A. R. HAS BEEN HOLDING DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS WITH INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF VARIOUS KURDISH FACTIONS, AS WELL AS WITH EXILED IRANIAN GROUPS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S. BAKHTIAR HAS STRESSED TO THESE GROUPS THAT SHOULD HE RETURN TO POWER IN IRAN, HE WOULD FAVOR KURDISH AUTONOMY BUT NOT SEPARATION FROM IRAN. BAKHTIAR HAS ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAS ENOUGH POLITICAL SUPPORTERS AND WILL SOON HAVE ENOUGH FINANCIAL AID TO CARRY OUT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE KHOMEINI REGIME. HE FURTHER IMPLIED THAT HE HAS BEEN IN INDIRECT CONTACT WITH THE FORMER SHAH, BUT THAT HIS PAST LOYALTY TO THE SHAH PLAY NO ROLE IN HIS PRESENT OR FUTURE PLANS VIS-A-VIS RETURN TO POWER IN IRAN.

2. BAKHTIAR HAS GIVEN HIM MORAL SUPPORT TO THE KURDS. AT KURDISH REQUEST, BAKHTIAR HAS ALSO AGREED TO ENLIST THE AID OF FORMER SAVAK OR IRANIAN ARMY OFFICERS TO GO TO KURDISTAN TO TRAIN KURDISH FIGHTING FORCES. BAKHTIAR HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH KURDISH ARMY BOTH THE KERMANSHAH AND MAHABAD AREAS WHO WOULD LEAD THESE FORCES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS. HE IS PLANNING TO DISPATCH IN MID OR LATE NOVEMBER AN EMISSARY TO IRAN TO NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL AND MILITARY LIAISON WITH THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP).

3. IN ADDITION TO COMING TO TERMS WITH THE KURDS, BAKHTIAR REALIZES THAT HE MUST ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE IRANIAN COMMUNISTS IF HE IS TO REGAIN AND RETAIN INFLUENCE IN IRAN.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: BAKHTIAR SPEAKS WITH CONFIDENCE ABOUT HIS EVENTUAL RETURN TO POWER, AND GIVES EVIDENCE OF

ABLE TO ATTRACT A RAPIDLY INCREASING ENTOURAGE OF
SIDENT IRANIAN ELEMENTS TO HIM.)

5. ACC: (26 OCTOBER 1979)

6. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-WARNING NOTICE, INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR CONSULTANTS,
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
ORIGINATOR. RVW 29OCT99 DRV D9C. (BY RECORDED REPORTING
OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF
OVERALL DOCUMENT.

29 OCT 79 17 12Z

291128Z OCT 79 INTEL

BTBTZ ZNY KXXXX

CTOR INFO STUTIGART, GERMANY, BERLIN, TEHRAN,
ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

L AADGA CATOMIC INTEL ZRWAHOO

DATA: ZRWAHOO FOR THIRD COUNTRY CONTENT. SOURCE CATOMIC IS
MACAGONE OBTAINED. PLACE ACQUIRED OMITTED FOR SOURCE
PROTECTION. SEE BONN 85172 (NOTM.) FOR DETAILS OF
ACQUISITION THAT DO NOT AFFECT DISSEM. OBJ: S-Y.
NO LIAISON, NO INDEX. FILE: 281-8306/1A, EG-7851
RVM 29OCT79/D9C.1 BY 85536Z.

FILED: 291128Z

3 Nov 79 07 17z

S E C R E T 021349Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE BONN 85912

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO STUTTGART, GERMANY, TEHRAN, PARIS, GENEVA

MMINTEL AJAJA CATOMIC

REF: A. BONN 85797 3309324
B. DIRECTOR 543343

1. MEETING WITH CATOMIC/19 (T/19) HELD ON 31 OCTOBER; NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 8 NOVEMBER TO COINCIDE WITH T/19 RETURN FROM PARIS.

2. T/19 HAS TALKED BY TELEPHONE WITH BAKHTIAR AIDES IN PARIS. BAKHTIAR SLIPPED OUT OF PARIS DURING WEEK OF 29 OCTOBER AND TRAVELED TO IRAQ WHERE HE MET WITH HIGH-LEVEL IRAQI GOVERNMENT LEADERS. BAKHTIAR WAS EXPECTED BACK IN PARIS AT THE END OF THE WEEK, AND T/19 WAS INSTRUCTED TO COME TO PARIS FOR A 4 NOVEMBER MEETING WITH HIM.

3. T/19 ALSO MET IN BONN WITH GLOBAL AIRWAYS REPRESENTATIVE JAMES SALINAS DESCRIBED REFS A AND B. DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON GLOBAL GUN-RUNNING CAPABILITIES. SALINAS WAS VERY INTERESTED IN PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE KURDS FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES. THIS IS IN LINE WITH T/19 UNDERSTANDING THAT AN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY, PROBABLY CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HAS AGREED TO SUPPLY WEAPONRY TO THE KURDS, BUT THAT THE KURDS MUST ENLIST THEIR OWN MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION FOR THE ARMS.

4. T/19 DISCUSSED RUMORS CONCERNING PRO-SHAH DEMONSTRATIONS TAKING PLACE IN IRAN BUT COULD NOT PROVIDE DETAIL OR RELIABLE SOURCING.

5. FILE: 201-306414. RVW 02 NOV 99 DRV D9C1.

CDS COMMENT: RELAYED TO INFO TEHRAN, PARIS, GENEVA PER DIR 545680
S E C R E T

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U.S. Government Printing Office 1974-298-630

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3 Nov 79 17 202

SECRET WINTTEL NOFORM NO CONTRACT ONCON 2320582 NOV 79 INTEL
TE DIRECTOR 545700

TEHRAN INFO PARIS, LONDON, GENEVA, BONN, STUTTGART, GERMANY.
INTEL AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL

(BONN 85912. BEING RELAYED PARIS, GENEVA,
LOND. SERIALIZED LONDON)

FOLLOWING IS TDFIRDS-315/19334-79 BASED ON REF FOR DISSEM
FIELDY DISSEM LINE. FOR LONDON: OKAY FOR GRAPH SOUNCED
UNTESTED SOURCE WITH GOOD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION.

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IRFIRB-313/19334-72

DATE: 22 NOVEMBER 1979

THIS IS INFORMATION RECEIVED, NOT FULLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
CLASS SECRET UNINTL UNFORN NO CONTRACT ORCON

IRAN/IRAC
CLAND STAIN VISIT TO IRAQ BY FORMER IRANIAN PRIME
MINISTER SHAHRIJ BAKHTIAR (DOI: 29 OCTOBER - EARLY

NOVEMBER 1979)
A MEMBER OF A FORMER BAKHTIAR FAMILY WHO HAS LONG
STANDING TIES TO FORMER LEADERS. HIS IDENTIFICATION
HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. SOME OF THE INFORMATION HAS
BEEN SUBMITTED. HE HAD GOOD ACCESS TO THE
INFORMATION CITED BELOW.

1. DURING THE WEEK OF 29 OCTOBER 1979, FORMER IRANIAN
PRIME MINISTER SHAHRIJ BAKHTIAR LEFT PARIS AND TRAVELED TO IRAQ. THERE
HE HE IS CURRENTLY RESIDING AND TRAVELED TO IRAQ. BAKHTIAR WAS
MET WITH HIGH LEVEL GOVERNMENT LEADERS. BAKHTIAR WAS
GIVEN EACH A SET OF THE NAME OF BAKHTIAR'S TRIP TO IRAQ.
SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE PURPOSE OF BAKHTIAR'S TRIP TO IRAQ
WHAT HE DISCUSSED WITH THE IRAQI OFFICIALS.

- 2. ACC. (on OCTOBER 1979)
- 3. FIELD DISSEM. SENT TO TEHRAN, PARIS, LONDON

NO CLASS. NO E. E. -WARNING NOTICE-INTelligence SOURCES
METHODS INVOLVED- NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS- NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OF CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS- DISSEMINAT
EXTRACTING OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RWV
OVERS DIV D.C. BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS
BY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

3 Nov 79 07 23z

S E C R E T 030035Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 545686.

TO: PRIORITY BONN, GENEVA INFO PARIS, STUTTGART, GERMANY, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDSTAY CATOMIC

REFS: A. BONN 85912 (BEING RELAYED GENEVA, PARIS,
TEHRAN)

B. DIRECTOR 536378 (NOT SENT/NEEDED BONN, STUTTGART, GERMANY,
TEHRAN)

1. WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN ANY SUPPORTING DETAIL CATOMIC/19 (C/19) (IDEN FOR GENEVA, PARIS) CAN PROVIDE ON REF REPORT OF BAKHTIAR'S TRAVEL TO IRAQ. PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHO HE MET, SUBJECT THEIR DISCUSSIONS, NATURE/RESULTS ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED AND IN ACTIONS TAKEN RESULTING FROM SUCH MEETINGS. PLS PREPARE ANY SUCH INFORMATION IN INTEL FORMAT TO FACILITATE MORE RAPID DISSEMINATION.

2. FOR GENEVA: REF A MAKES REF B PROPOSED CONTACT WITH SDSTAY/1 (S/1) (IDEN FOR BONN, STUTTGART, GERMANY) OF MORE PRESSING IMPORTANCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE GUNION ATTEMPTING CONTACT S/1 AT HIS EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO ATTEMPT DETERMINE RESULTS BAKHTIAR'S IRAQI TRIP AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION ON CURRENT BAKHTIAR ACTIVITIES. PLEASE ADVISE.

3. FOR BONN: WE ALSO INTERESTED IN DETAILS C/19 CONTACT WITH GUN-SHIPPERS AND C/19'S ROLE IN ALL OF THIS. WHERE DOES C/19 GET UNDERSTANDING THAT EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY HAS AGREED SUPPLY WEAPONS TO KURDS, WHO IS ARRANGING FOR SUCH SUPPLY, HOW WILL THEY BE SHIPPED PRIOR TO TURNOVER TO ANY CHARTER OUTFIT C/19 PROVIDES?

4. FILE: 201-0306414; 201-0212149. RVW 2NOV99 DRV D9C.1

ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

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CATOMIC/19. Name unknown. Resides in Berlin. May be a teacher. Regards himself as a principal leader of the Kurdish community in Europe. Comes from prominent Kurdish family (family may have branches in both Iran and Iraq). Was in Europe well before the Revolution, and it is possible that his family had been in opposition to the Shah, and that he was in effect in exile.

Purpose of contact: To acquire information on the situation in Kurdistan. C/19 was to debrief or introduce to us people with firsthand knowledge of developments in Kurdistan. Believe it was he who introduced a Kurdish leader who was traveling in Europe in September or October. Name not recalled, but believe he is brother of Kurdish leader who was executed after the Revolution, probably in March. There were one or two meetings, during which he claimed to have Iraqi support for his Kurdish force near Kermanshah.

Jun 79 12 52

E C R E T 010127Z JUN 79 STAFF

ITE DIRECTOR 449193.

O: TEHRAN INFO FB/LOS ANGELES.

NINTEL AJAJA FORRES SP RA SIT

REF: DIRECTOR 449149

- 1. IDEN A IS HAMA OUN ROWSHA
- IDEN B IS AMIR ROWSHAI
- IDEN C IS HANSA ROWSAHI

Handwritten notes:
 J. J. [unclear]
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2. FILE: 201-9-12 5. RVM 31 MAY 90 DRV 09C-1 ALL SECRET

E C R E T
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REF: 191820Z JUN 70 STAFF

20 JUN 70 03 58Z

FROM: LOS ANGELES 23553 (TELETYPE UNIT)

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

INTEL: ANAFA FORRES SDTRANS T

INFO: DIRECTOR 458173 ✓

1. IN CONTACT WITH SDTRANSIT/L (T/1) 18 JUNE HE ADVISED HAS BUYING GIFTS TO TAKE TO FAMILY IN TEHRAN AND IN PROCESS OF BUYING CAR. HE IS DELAYING HIS DEPARTURE ONLY BECAUSE HE IS WAITING FOR AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON AS TO WHETHER HE WILL BECOME ASSOCIATED WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE. HE STATED THAT THERE IS INTEREST IN HIM AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING AND ADVANCE AND BRIEFINGS FOR PERIOD REQUIRED.

2. AS REQUESTED BY BASE LIAISON TELCOM WITH T/1 ON 15 JUNE, HE TELEPHONED HIS BROTHER IN ABADAN ON 17 JUNE. HE HAD ALSO TALKED TO HIS FAMILY IN TEHRAN OVER WEEKEND. BROTHER SAID THAT T/1 UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, COULD NOT ANTICIPATE BEING HIRED FOR OFFERED POSITION IN NIOC PRIOR TO ARRIVING IN COUNTRY AND HE HAD PLACED THIS OUT OF QUESTION FOR ANY EMPLOYMENT AT ANY LEVEL. HE STATED THAT THOSE PREVIOUSLY SENT BY NIOC FOR TRAINING ABROAD COULD BE SURE THEY HAD JOBS ON RETURN. BROTHER EXPLAINED THAT HE IN AUTHORITY WOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY BUT ADDED THAT T/1'S CHANCES FOR EMPLOYMENT WERE VERY GOOD FOR REASONS: T/1 HAD PREVIOUSLY WORKED FOR ABADAN REFINERY AND WAS BEING RETURNING TO REQUEST REEMPLOYMENT IN SAME OTHER ORGANIZATION. T/1 BROTHER HIMSELF HAD BEEN MEMBER AND PARTICIPATING IN ORGANIZING THE PRO-REVOLUTIONARY, PRO-KHOMENI COMMITTEE OF ORIGINAL ELEVEN PERSONS AT THE ABADAN REFINERY WHO WERE CURRENTLY STILL IN PARIS. T/1 BROTHER, AN OFFICIAL IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PROCESSING, PLANNING AND ENGINEERING AT THE ABADAN REFINERY, HE WOULD ASSIST T/1 IN GETTING NIOC EMPLOYMENT THROUGH HIS CONNECTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES. ALSO, AS AN OFFICIAL OF THE REFINERY, BROTHER RECOMMENDED THAT T/1 APPROACH HASAN NAFEEJI, NIOC AND SAID HE WOULD PREPARE A LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION IF NEEDED.

2. FROM LOS ANGELES 24533
3. IN CONNECTION WITH
4. HIS BROTHER, A RETIRED
5. IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
6. TRANSPORTATION,
7. PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS GOVERNOR
8. ASSISTANT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
9. HARRSTANI HAD RESIGNED AS
10. GOVERNOR OF IRAN.
11. HARRSTANI WAS APPROACHED BY
12. T/1 WHO MET WITH CRITICISM
13. AMONGST CERTAIN MEMBERS OF
14. THE ASSASSINATION COMMITTEE
15. HARRSTANI REMAINS A FRIEND
16. AND OCCASIONAL CONFIDANT OF
17. MEINI. THE FAMILY ALSO HAS
18. A RELATIONSHIP WITH FPM (FOSSIE
19. GABAN) Z A G A Z AN, THE
20. ONCE-TIME CONSIDANT AND
21. FRIEND OF KROMEINI. T/1
22. HAS PERSONALLY INTERVIEWED
23. T/1 ON HIS RETURN REGARDING
24. HIS EFFORTS TO SECURE EMPLOY
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3. FAMILY IN CONNECTION WITH
4. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OF THE
5. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
6. THE LATTER, A FRIEND OF HARRSTANI,
7. OF TEHRAN, GOVERNOR OF TEHRAN
8. GOVERNOR OF TEHRAN ABOUT A YEAR AGO
9. TO REASSUME THIS POSITION.
10. AMONGST CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE
11. ASSASSINATION COMMITTEE
12. AND OCCASIONAL CONFIDANT OF
13. MEINI. THE FAMILY ALSO HAS
14. A RELATIONSHIP WITH FPM (FOSSIE
15. GABAN) Z A G A Z AN, THE
16. ONCE-TIME CONSIDANT AND
17. FRIEND OF KROMEINI. T/1
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4. BASE CONSIDERS IT VERY
5. ESSENTIAL THAT T/1 RECEIVE
6. TRAINING PRIOR TO HIS RETURN
7. TO IRAN. HE SHOULD NOT SIMPLY
8. BE GIVEN SOME FORM OF COMMUNIC
9. ATION WITH WHICH TO ADVISE
10. HARRSTANI. BASE ENCOURAGES HQS
11. TO REVIEW THE ABOVE CIRCUMST
12. ANCES ON A PRIORITY BASIS, FOR
13. T/1 WILL NOT CONTINUE TO DELAY HIS
14. DEPARTURE WITHOUT SOME SORT
15. OF ENCOURAGEMENT THAT THERE IS
16. A FIRM INTEREST IN HIM. HE IS
17. ABLE TO STATE THAT HE IS
18. ANXIOUS TO BE ON HIS WAY.

4. MUCH ESSENTIAL THAT T/1 RECEIVE
5. TRAINING PRIOR TO HIS RETURN
6. TO IRAN. HE SHOULD NOT SIMPLY
7. BE GIVEN SOME FORM OF COMMUNIC
8. ATION WITH WHICH TO ADVISE
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14. OF ENCOURAGEMENT THAT THERE IS
15. A FIRM INTEREST IN HIM. HE IS
16. ABLE TO STATE THAT HE IS
17. ANXIOUS TO BE ON HIS WAY.

5. FILE: 201-2961045. 19JUN69 DRW DSC-1. ALL SECRET.
SECRET
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SECRET
2. DIRECTOR 481826 S E C R E T
SHORTAGE OF INSTRUCTORS IS PROBLEM WHICH
AFFECTS TRAINING OF MANY NEWLY RECRUITED ASSISTS.)

5. SUGGEST BASIS OF TRADECRAFT TRAINING SHOULD BE OPERATIONAL SECURITY IN MAKING PERSONAL MEETINGS, ESPECIALLY CAR MEETINGS SINCE THESE MOST COMMON FORM OF AGENCY MEETING CONDUCTED IN TEHRAN GIVEN PRESENT CLIMATE. HE SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF COLLAR AND ALTERNATE COMMO PROCEDURES, BUT ALSO IN OPEN COIN TELEPHONE MESSAGES TO TRIGGER UNSCHEDULED MEETINGS. IN VIEW OF UNKNOWN HIS BEING LOCATED IN ABADAN, THIS SPECT MAY BE PARTICULARLY PERTINENT. ADDITIONALLY SUGGEST THAT THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL TRAINING IN SURVEILLANCE AND SURVEY (LAND DETECTION (VEHICLE AND FOOT)) BE PROVIDED, AS WELL AS SIGNALS AND DROPS.

6. PROPOSE THAT A FIRST MEETING WITH TEHRAN STATION OFFICER BE SET UP SO T/1 CAN MAKE CONTACT AS SOON AFTER HE GETS ESTABLISHED IN NEW JOB AS POSSIBLE. SUGGEST T/1 TRIGGER THIS MEETING WITH APPROPRIATE OPEN CODE SIGNAL. SOLICIT ADDITIONAL OPINIONS ON HOW TO BEST TAILOR A COMMO PLAN FOR T/1.

7. FOR TEHRAN: PLS PROVIDE FR/LOS AND FILES WITH TEHRAN STATION OFFICER BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE, AND ANY OTHER PERTINENT SUGGESTIONS.

8. FILE: 201-961045. RWV 20JUN69 DR 09C.1 ALL SECRET

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S E C R E T 211240Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 65506 (BIELINSKI ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE FR/LOS ANGELES WFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WMINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTRANSIT

REF: A. DIRECTOR 461326
B. FR/LOS ANGELES 20513

1. CAR PICK UP SITE FOR SDTRANSIT T/1: THE GENERALLY TRIANGULAR AREA FORMED BY ABBASABAD STREET ON THE WEST AND AN UNMARKED FOUR LANE DIVIDED ROADWAY THAT RUNS BETWEEN ARGENTINE SQUARE AND SHAHANSHAH EXPRESSWAY. THIS PLACES ARGENTINE SQUARE AT NORTH APEX OF TRIANGLE.
2. GENERAL AREA WITHIN THE TRIANGLE BOKHAREST STREET ON THE WEST AND AN UNMARKED FOUR LANE DIVIDED ROADWAY THAT RUNS BETWEEN ARGENTINE SQUARE AND SHAHANSHAH EXPRESSWAY. THIS PLACES ARGENTINE SQUARE AT NORTH APEX OF TRIANGLE.
3. SPECIFIC AREA: PROCEEDING NORTH ON BOKHAREST STREET FROM ABBASABAD STREET TOWARD ARGENTINE SQUARE AT THE FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION (AFTER PASSING THROUGH THE ABBASABAD/BOKHAREST MAIN INTERSECTION) ON THE RIGHT IS EIGHTH STREET. OPPOSITE SIDE OF INTERSECTION IS SEVENTH STREET. EIGHTH STREET RUNS BETWEEN BOKHAREST AND THE UNNAMED STREET CITED IN PARA ONE, BUT ALSO INTERSECTS CLOSE TO THE JOINING OF THE UNNAMED STREET AND SHAHANSHANI FREEWAY. SDTRANSIT T/1 SHOULD STAND NEAR THE EAST END OF EIGHTH STREET ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE STREET. AS STREETS IN PROCESS OF BEING RENAMED T/1 SHOULD FOCUS ON EIGHTH STREET BEING THE FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION NORTH OF THE INTERSECTION OF BOKHAREST AND ABBASABAD.
4. BELIEVE T/1 SHOULD BE ISSUED STATION OPS PHONE NUMBER (838-899 RPT 838-899) FOR OPEN CODE CALL-IN TO TRIGGER MEETINGS. AS HIS VISITS TO TEHRAN LIKELY TO BE INTERMITTANT, SUGGEST THAT HE OFFER CASE OFFICER MEANS TO RETURN CALL AND THROUGH OPEN CODE ESTABLISH TIME/DATE FOR MEETING. POSSIBLE HE CAN BE NEAR TELEPHONE AT RELATIVE IN TEHRAN AT CERTAIN TIME FOR CASE OFFICER'S CALL.

5. FILE: 201-961045. R 21 JUN 79 DRV DSC.I. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

7 JUL 78 02 56z

SECRET 062015Z JUL 78 STAFF
FM LOS ANGELES 2058L (HAGERDP ACTING)
TO: AIRFOURTEEN, DIRECTOR I PC DIRTECH, ATTECH,
INTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORNE AQUATEC SDTRANSIT
PS: A. DIRTECH 53270
B. DIRECTOR 469885
C. FR/LOS ANGELES 20577
D. TERRAN 63506

1. ON 6 JULY SDTRANSIT T/1 (E/1) MET WITH HAGERDP FOR NEXT
LAST TIME IN LOS ANGELES (FINAL MEETING 1500, 9 JULY).
AS COMPLETED ALL ARRANGEMENTS TO DEPART, WITH EXCEPTION OF
PACKING SOME BOOKS WHICH HE LEAVING WITH FRIEND TO SEND TO
ATER. HE HAS NOT YET SOLD CAR, BUT HE AND PURCHASER WERE
ANT WATER IN AFTERNOON SAME DAY. HE WAS ADVISED OF THE
ND DEMONSTRATED SURPRISE THAT ENZHAN NO LONGER IN DEPUTY
REMUN POSITION. HE SAID OTHER ASSISTANT TO REFLECT ENZHAN VO
E FAMILY FRIEND (HASSAN) E A P A C H I A S, ELDERLY STOCK
R THE PREMISE. HE BROTHER WHO MADE THE APPOINTMENTS, HE W
TING ON BEHALF OF HANFET AND NOT ON HIS OWN. T/1 SAID HE
T HAVE SPECIAL ACCESS BUT EYE OF BROTHER WHO WAS LIKED B
NE AND ACTIVE IN TAKING CARE OF FAMILY REQUIREMENTS. INTERE
T/1 FAMILY MEMBERS, CONTACT, AND FRIENDS WAS PUT OFF UNT
T/1 USUALLY IN CONTACT WITH STATION.

2. RE EW: HAGERDP HAD RECEIVED FINAL TEST LETTER FROM
DIRTECH OFFICER FLOAN BY EXPRESS MAIL ON 4 JULY. T/1 SEEMED
IN CAR WITH EXCELLENT RESULTS. EW WOULD ASSURE BASE WITH
MESSAGE CAME CLEAR. BASE APPRECIATES THIS ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE
INDICATORS LITED PARA 4 SEE A WERE REVIEWED. A SINGLE
ADDITION WAS ADDED ONLY FOR USE IN OVERT TEST. THIS WOULD
BE IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT T/1 WOULD BE FORCED UNDER DURESS
WRITE A/A ADDRESS. LETTER WOULD INCLUDE DON'T SEND TRASH
AS I NO LONGER PLAN TO RETURN TO SCHOOL. IDEN IS A/A AND
FOR USE BY T/1 IN EVENT HE WRITES TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
C. ON TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION. TELEPHONE NUMBER CITED

PAGE 2 FR/LOS ANGELES 20581 S E C R E T
REF D WAS GIVEN T/1 FOR ALTERNATE CONTACT WITH STATION.
THIS POSSIBLE CONTACT SYSTEM IF T/1 CALLS HE WILL SAY
THIS IS MIKE, CAN I SPEAK TO CHARLES? WHEN CHARLES COM
PHONE HE WILL EXCHANGE AMENITIES AND THEN MENTION THEY SHO
GET TOGETHER FOR COFFEE OR TEA. THE PLACE OF CONTACT WILL
CAR PICKUP SITE AS STIPULATED IN REF D. ANY OTHER PLACE M
TIONED BY EITHER PARTY IS MEANINGLESS AND SHOULD BE DISREG
FOR IF INCLUDED IT IS ONLY FOR CONVERSATION PURPOSES. THE
DATE/TIME OF MEETING CAN BE SUGGESTED BY EITHER PARTY AND
OUT ON PHONE. NO MATTER WHAT AGREED, THE DATE/TIME WILL BE
DAYS AND 2 HOURS PRIOR TO TIME AGREED UPON; I.E., IF IT AG
MONDAY NIGHT AT TEN P.M. (2200 HOURS), THE CAR PICKUP WOULD
SATURDAY NIGHT AT EIGHT P.M. (2000 HOURS). T/1 HAS MEMORIZ
THIS SIMPLE 2/2 SYSTEM. IN THE EVENT STATION WANTS TO TEL
T/1, IT WILL HAVE TO BE ARRANGED PRIOR TO CALL. THE TIME O
THE CALL WILL BE BASED ON SAME 2/2 SYSTEM. IF T/1 IS ADVIS
THAT HE WILL BE CALLED, DATE AND TIME MUST BE GIVEN. HE WI
ARRANGE TO BE AT HIS PARENTS HOME AT TIME CALL EXPECTED.
NUMBER TO CALL IS IDEN 1 AND CALLEK SHOULD ASK FOR IDEN C.
IT WOULD BE BEST IF CALL WAS MADE IN FLUENT PERSI.

4. RE CAR PICKUP: T/1 REQUESTED THAT FIRST DAY OF HIS C
PICKUP BE 20 JULY REPEAT 20 JULY AT 2100 HOURS WITH
ALTERNATE OF 2200 HOURS. IF THIS CONTACT NOW MADE, HE WILL
EVENT TO 1ST AND 15TH OF EACH SUBSEQUENT MONTH, USING WESTE
CALENDAR. MEETS WILL BE AT SAME CAR PICKUP SITE ALWAYS USING
100 AND 2200 HOURS. HE WILL WAIT AT SITE FOR MAXIMUM OF TEN
MINUTES. T/1 WILL ATTEMPT TO HAVE IN LEFT HAND SMALL SHOPPI
NG. IN RIGHT HAND HE WILL HAVE NEWSPAPER. HE WILL BE DRESS
IN BLACK TURTLE NECK SWEATER AND BLUE JEANS. (THERE WAS RECENT
DEATH IN FAMILY JUSTIFYING THIS DRESS.) HE WILL WEAR
DRAVY HORN-RIMMED GLASSES WITH CLEAR GLASS. HE WILL APPROACH
CAR PICKUP SITE FROM ABBASABAD/BOKHAREST MAIN INTERSECTION.
HE KNEW OF LOCATION AND SAID HE WOULD DRIVE HIS BROTHER'S CAR
NEIGHBORHOOD PRIOR TO MEETING TO MAKE SURE HE HAD LOCATION
ELL IN MIND.

5. T/1 IS PRECISE AND INTELLIGENT; HE ASSUMES INSTRUCTION
THOUT QUESTION AND REPEATS BACK WELL GUIDANCE PREVIOUSLY GI
M. HE WANTS EARLY CONTACT SO AS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIB

OKV

... LOS ANGELES 2056... SECRET... OTHER ASPECTS OF OPER...
... DOES NOT QUESTION HIS OWN ABILITY OR... ADVISE ADDRES IF EVER...
... BASE WILL HAVE FINAL MEETING AND... HE HAS TICKETS FOR 1000...
... COMMEND FURTHER REPORTING BY BASE...
... 18 JULY. GOOD LUCK.

S: FILE: 241-0961045... 06JUL99 DRV DGC.1. ALL SECRET
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7 Jul 79 2 30 E

E C R E T 062100Z JUL 79 STAFF
TE FR/LOS ANGELES 20582 (HAGERUP ACTING)
: PRIORITY TEBFAN. DIRECTOR INFO DIRTECH. AIRTECH.
INTEL REPEAT AJAJA FORRES AQUATIC SIDTRANSIT
EPS: FR/LOS ANGELES 20581

1. IDEN AF PROFESSOR ROBERT M. CARTER, UNIVERSITY OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TYLER BUILDING, 3601 MI
STREET, LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA 90007.

IDEN B: 057-725 REPEAT 057-725.

IDEN C: HOMATOUN

2. FILE: 201-09 104. RVW 06JUL99 DRV DEC. 1. ALL SECR
E C R E T
BT
9075

JUL 79

SECRET 154800Z JUL 79
CITE W/LOS ANGELES 220700 (C) (S) (P) (AC) (INGO)
INFO: PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO DIST
W/TEL: W/TEL: SAJAJA FORMER SOURCE
A. W/LOS ANGELES 220700
B. W/LOS ANGELES 220700

FROM: SAJAJA MET WITH SOURCE (T/I) ON 9 JULY
ADVISING THAT HE IS DEPARTING LOS ANGELES
ALL NEARBY FRIENDS REMAIN THE SAME.
WAS CALL FROM T/I'S CLOSEST FRIENDS
FATHER WAS JUST ARRIVED FROM TEHRAN. FATHER,
I WAS RECENTLY
HE BECAME 55. THIS
WITH SAME FAMILY NAME
AND OTHER POSITIONS
HE WAS MOST RECENTLY
IMPORTANTLY HE IS CLOSE FRIEND
ALSO DESCRIBED IN PARA 3
T/I WAS INVITED FOR DINNER
UNTIL NEXT IN AIR
TO REQUEST LETTER OF INTRO-
DUCTION FROM SAJAJA TO THE POLICE CHIEF

HE WILL BE PROMPTLY IN HIS FIRST CAR PICKUP
AND WILL BE AT SITE
BY 1900. RW 1599 DRV D90.1. ALL SECRET.

13 Jul 79 04 30z

REF T 222427 JUL 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 474988. SECTION 1 OF 2.

MM OF: FR/LOS ANGELES INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

ELERY AT KAJAJA NORRES/ROTRANSYT.

FR/L 20589

James file RQ

1. THERE IS HIGH DEGREE OF INTEREST IN WEATEVER INFORMATION SHAHRESTANI MAY HAVE ON THE IRANIAN SITUATION. IF AT ALL IN THE BRIEF REMAINING TIME T/1 WILL BE IN LOS ANGELES. WOULD LIKE HIM TO DEBRIEF SHAHRESTANI ALONG LINES OF INTERESTS WHICH PROVIDED BELOW. T/1 HIMSELF SHOULD KEEP INTERESTS IN MIND. PARTICULARLY THOSE CONCERNING COM SINCE HE IS IN A POSITION TO ANSWER THEM AFTER HIS PLANNED VISIT TO TEHRAN (MENTIONED IN REF).

2. POI TEHRAN: IF FR/LOS ANGELES UNABLE ACCOMMODATE DEBRIEFING IN VIEW OF FACT T/1 ON VERGE OF DEPARTURE FROM U.S., REQUEST YOU DEBRIEF T/1 ON HIS MEETING WITH GEN. SHAHRESTANI AFTER REESTABLISHING CONTACT IN TEHRAN.

3. REQUIREMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

MILITARY

A. ACCORDING TO RECENT PRESS REPORTS, THE POI TRIED TO PERSUADE GENERAL AZIZOLLAH RAHIMI, THE OUTSPOKEN COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY POLICE, BUT WAS OVERRIDDEN BY AYATOLLAH KHOMENI, CAUSING CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT. SOME DEFENSE MINISTER RIABI AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF FARROD HAYE SAID THAT THEY WILL OBEY KHOMENI'S ORDER. WOULD APPRECIATE SOURCE'S COMMENTS ON RAHIMI AFFAIR. IS RAHIMI TRYING TO PUT HIMSELF INTO POSITION TO TAKE RIABI'S OR FARROD'S PLACE? HOW MUCH SUPPORT DOES RAHIMI HAVE WITHIN THE MILITARY?
B. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE HOMOFAR GROUPS? ARE THEY ALLIED WITH THE MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ? ARE THEY MOVING AWAY FROM REPORT OF KHOMENI?

[Handwritten signature]

DIRECTOR 474998 S E C R E T
C. COMMITTEES WITHIN THE MILITARY: IS THERE A COMMAND
URE OF HIERARCHY? DO THEY COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER?
E THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEES? ARE THEY NOMINATED OR
ED BY SOMEONE OR SOME GROUP? ANY SIGNIFICANT LEADERS?
ING? COMMENTS ON MADANI RELATIVE TO THE COMMITTEES?
IONS BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMMITTEES?
N ARMED? PLANS TO REBUILD THE MILITARY? STATUS OF U.S.
LIED EQUIPMENT?
E. ARE MILITARY PERSONNEL TRAINING REVOLUTIONARY?
OSP?

ESTAR
F. COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT PIPELINE SITUATION: DOES
RGE KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT LABOR TROUBLE IN THE OIL FIELDS?
YTHING ABOUT THE ARAB PROTESTS IN KHUZESTAN?
G. ARE THE IRAQIS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE TROUBLES
KHUZESTAN?
H. DOES HE HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
HE GASCOAT?
COMMITTEES

I. DO COMMITTEE LEADERS HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO KHOMEINI
OR DO THEY HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE TEHRAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE?
OR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL?
J. IS THERE A GATHERING MOMENTUM AWAY FROM THE
COMMITTEES TOWARD POLICE AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS? CAN SOURCE
DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF SOME OF THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE COMMITTEES
AND OTHERS WHICH NOW SEEM TO BE FREQUENTLY REPORTED FROM
PROVINCIAL CITIES?

QOM
K. DESCRIBE THE ORGANIZATION OF KHOMEINI'S HEADQUARTERS.
IS HIS HEADQUARTERS ACTUALLY LOCATED AT THE FATIMEH SCHOOL? OR
DOES HE USE OTHER BUILDINGS? HOW ARE THE GUARDS ORGANIZED? ARE
THEY TRAINED? BY WHOM? WHO ARE THEY? IS THERE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF SOME KIND? WHO RUNS IT?

DIRECTOR 476883 E C R E T
 IS IT POSSIBLE ABOUT THE PEOPLE IMMEDIATELY
 A. BEING ALL OUT WITH HIM MOST OFTEN? ARE ANY OF THE
 REMAINING WHO IS WITH HIM? AND IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE ANY
 INFO REGULARLY WITH HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMENI? HIS SON
 S ABOUT THEM AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMENI, KHAKHALI,
 HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW ESHRAFI, BERSHTI, BANISADR, KHAKHALI,
 THE PRESIDENT, MOHAGHERI, IS KHAKHALI ITS LEADER? WHAT ARE
 THE RELATIONSHIPS? ISLAM? HOW MANY MEMBERS DOES IT HAVE?
 SALS OF THE IRANIAN ISLAM? HOW MANY MEMBERS DOES IT HAVE?
 PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMENI,
 AT-ABDOLAH, GOLPAYEGAN, AND MARASHI-NAJAFI. DO EACH OF THESE
 IS THERE HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF GUARDS?
 WHERE ARE THE VARIOUS REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL LOCATED IN
 COM? IS THERE ISLAM ON IT? HOW OFTEN DOES IT MEET? DOES
 MEET REGULARLY WITH KHOMENI?
 C. WHO DOES KHOMENI AGREE TO SEE IN SMALL MEETINGS?
 DO PEOPLE ARRANGE TO GET ACCESS TO KHOMENI? WHAT SORT OF
 RELATION DOES ONE HAVE TO BE IN TO SEE HIM?
 E. WHO WOULD BE A LIKELY SUCCESSOR TO KHOMENI IF HE
 WENT ANY SPECULATION ON WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN COM? WHO THE
 PRINCIPAL ACTORS WOULD BE?
 F. IS THERE A REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS POST IN COM? HOW
 MANY OF THEM ARE THERE? ARE THEY TRAINED? BY WHOM?
 G. THE BLACK-UNIFORMED GUARDS WITH RAHIMI. WHO ARE
 NO HAVE SOME KIND OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO KHOMENI. WHO ARE THEY?
 H. WHO TRAINED THEM? HOW MANY ARE THERE? WHO ARE THEY
 I. WHAT IS THE SECURITY SITUATION IN COM? HOW
 SECURE IS IT TO FOREIGNERS? ARE THE POLICE RESPONSIBLE FOR
 SECURITY IN COM? THE MUJAHEDIN, OR THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS?
 WHO IS THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO EACH OTHER?
 J. WHAT SORT OF INCIDENTS INVOLVE TERRORISTS? WHO ARE
 THEY? WHAT SORT OF SENTENCES DO THEY RECEIVE WHEN THEY ARE
 CONDEMNED?
 K. IS THERE FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT WITH OR SUPPORT TO THE
 ABOVE PROVES HELPFUL. REALIZE SOURCE WILL NOT BE
 AVAILABLE ALL AROUND HOWEVER. HE SHOULD KEEP THEM IN MIND FOR

474908 3 17 45
RAN.
231-3881745.

Page 12 of 25 pages. ALL SECRET

523

S E C R E T 251650Z JUL 78 STAFF

28 JUL 78

CITE DIRECTOR 482370

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS ANGELES

PRINTED NAME MORRIS S DRYANIN

- REFS: A. TEHRAN 20700
- B. FR/LOS ANGELES 28281
- C. TEHRAN 20800

1. SUBJECT REF A WHO CALLED IS DRYANIN/A. FOREIGN WAS CONTACT BLANK

A. TELEPHONE COMM. W/D WILL CALL CHARON OF ...
 20000 INT 20000 AMN WHI HAN HE. THIS IS FINE ...
 CHARLES. WHEN CHARLES COMES ON PHONE HE WILL ...
 AND THEN WHENEVER THEY SHOULD USE ...
 PLACE OF CONTACT WILL BE CAR PICKUP SITE ...
 PLACE MENTIONED BY ... PARTY IS ...
 RECORDED BECAUSE IF ... PARTY IS ...
 THE DATE/TIME CAN BE ... EITHER PARTY ...
 THE BEING. NO MATTER WHAT ... THE DATE ...
 AND TWO HOURS FROM ... TIME ...
 MONDAY NIGHT AT 2200 ... CAR PICKUP ...
 2000 HOURS. IN ... CHARON SHOULD ...
 HAVE TO BE ... ARRANGE ...
 OF CALL WILL BE ... NAME TWO ...
 THAT HE WILL BE ... DATE AND ...
 ARRANGE TO BE ... HOW ...
 NUMBER TO CALL ... AND ...
 BEST IF ...


B. CAR PICKUP ...
 CAR PICKUP ...
 2000 HOURS. IF ...
 AND DATE OF ...
 WILL BE ...
 HE WILL WANT ...

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 482379 \$ I C R E T SHOPPING BAG AND IN RIGHT HAND
 ATTEMPT TO HAVE IN LEFT HAND SMALL BLACK TURTLE NECK SWEATER
 A NEWSPAPER. HE WILL BE DRESSED IN BLACK TURTLE NECK SWEATER
 AND BLUE JEANS. HE WILL WEAR HEAVY HORN RIMMED GLASSES WITH
 CLEAR GLASS. HE WILL APPROACH CAR PICKUP SITE FROM ABBASABAD
 BOKHAREST MAIN INTERSECTION. HE HAD SAID HE KNEW OF LOCATION
 AND SAID HE WOULD DRIVE BROTHER'S CAR IN NEIGHBORHOOD BEFORE
 MEETING TO MAKE SURE HE HAD LOCATION WELL IN MIND. THE GENERAL
 AREA OF THE SITE IS WITHIN THE TRIANGULAR AREA FORMED BY ABBAS-
 ABAD STREET ON THE SOUTH, BOKHAREST STREET ON THE WEST, AND AN
 UNMARKED FOUR LANE DIVIDED ROADWAY THAT RUNS BETWEEN ARGENTINE
 SQUARE AND THE ISRAELI EXPRESSWAY. THIS PLACES ARGENTINE
 SQUARE AT THE NORTH AREA OF TRIANGLE. SPECIFIC AREA: POLICE DINING
 NORTH ON BOKHAREST STREET FROM ABBASABAD STREET TOWARD A CORNER
 SQUARE AT THE FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION (AFTER
 CROSSING THROUGH ABBASABAD/BOKHAREST MAIN INTERSECTION) ON THE
 LIGHT IS EIGHTH STREET. OPPOSITE SIDE OF INTERSECTION IS SEVENTH
 STREET. EIGHTH STREET RUNS BETWEEN BOKHAREST STREET AND UNNAMED
 STREET ABOVE, BUT ALSO INTERSECTS CLOSE TO THE JOINING OF UNNAMED
 STREET AND SEAFANSEHET EXPRESSWAY. 1/1 SHOULD STAND NEAR THE
 EAST END OF EIGHTH STREET ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE STREET. AS
 STREETS ARE BEING RENAMED SHOULD FOCUS ON EIGHTH STREET BEING
 FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION NORTH OF INTERSECTION
 OF BOKHAREST AND ABBASABAD.

2. IF NEWS AND OTHER MATERIAL RELATING TO TRANSIT/LEAVE
 BEEN DESTROYED, ADVISE AND WE WILL FORWARD.

3. FILE: 621-661645. RW 25 JUL 69 DRY DSC.1 ALL SECRET.

I C R E T
 BT
 #0016



26 JUL 79 13 35Z

S E C R E T 252205Z JUL 79 INTEL

CITE DIRECTOR 482711.

TO: TEHRAN INFO NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, KARACHI, KABUL, TEL AVIV,
AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JIDDA, KUWAIT, FR/LOS ANGELES, RIYADH.

WNINTEL INTEL

FOLLOWING IS TDFIRDB-315/13141-79 FOR DISSEM PER PARA FOUR.

TD FIRDB-315/13141-79
DIST: 25 JULY 1979

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS SECRET WNINTEL NOVORN NOCONTRACT ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: STATUS OF IRANIAN POLICE FORCES AS OF LATE
SPRING 1979 (DOI: MAY-JULY 1979)

SOURCE: A WELL-EDUCATED IRANIAN SOURCE WITH AN INTEREST IN
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT
BEEN DETERMINED. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A SOURCE
WITH GOOD ACCESS.

1. THE IRANIAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCE (INP) CONTINUES TO BE
UNABLE TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL DISCIPLINE AND TO FUNCTION AS AN EFFECTIVE
POLICE FORCE. LARGELY SUPPLANTED BY THE PASDARANS (REVOLUTIONARY
GUARDS), THE MORALE OF THE POLICE FORCES HAS SUNK TO THE LOWEST POS-
SIBLE EBB: THEY ARE UNARMED; MOST OF THE LOWER RANKS PAY NO ATTENTION
TO THEIR OFFICERS; THEY DO NOT WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS; AND THEIR APPEAR-
ANCE IS GENERALLY SLOVENLY. PUBLIC ORDER IN THE COUNTRY CONTINUES TO
BE MAINTAINED BY THE PASDARANS, WHO COULD FORM A NATIONAL POLICE FORCE
THE MINUTE AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I GAVE THE WORD. EVEN IF
THE INP WERE AGAIN GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER,
IN THEIR PRESENT CONDITION THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO DO SO.

2. THE CURRENT COMMANDER OF THE INP IS A LIEUTENANT COLONEL
NASER M O J A L A L I, WHO IS FORMALLY RESPONSIBLE TO THE
INTERIOR MINISTER. HE RECEIVES AT LEAST SOME GUIDANCE FROM QOM ON
ACTIVITIES OF THE INP. THE COURT SYSTEM STILL DOES NOT FUNCTION
PROPERLY AND IF THE POLICE DO BECOME INVOLVED IN APPREHENDING A SERI-
OUS CRIMINAL, THE CRIMINAL IS STILL TURNED OVER TO THE REVOLUTIONARY
COURTS, RATHER THAN THE GOVERNMENT COURT SYSTEM.

3. ACQ: (20 JULY 1979)

4. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, KARACHI,
KABUL, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JIDDA, KUWAIT.
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE
TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION
OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RW 25JUL99 DRV D9C.1 BY
RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CON-
TROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

BT
#1326

P E T 021300Z AUG 78 044

ENHIAN 5380

INTECTOR-INFO HEADQUARTERS

(S)TRANSIT

1. STATION OFFICER AT FIRST MEETING
WANTED TO DISCUSS HIS ACTIVITIES AND HIS
WANTED A JOB OF INTEREST IN NIQC.

2. T/1 HAS VISITED THE OFFICE OF AYAT
TO ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A GOOD POSITIO
MENT WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IN COMMON
PURPOSE. AT THESE MEETINGS, HIS PITCH IS
OF AN ENGINEER AND A LOYAL IRANIAN MUSLIM IN
COUNTRY. HE DOES NOT EXPECT ANY DIRECT HEL
P BUT THEY HELP SPRING UP HIS CREDENTIALS
TO GET HIM TO PAY ATTENTION TO ALL THE AD
INVOLVED IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH KHOMENI
A POSSIBLE REPORT AFTERWARDS.

3. T/1 HAS ALSO PREPARED A RESUME AND
A SPEECH HE GAVE IN ISLAM AND
SOCIETY TO SECRETARIAT OF HASSAN NAJIBI,
IRAN. HE HAS MET WITH MR. KHACHATRIAN,
IRAN, TO APPLY FOR JOB THERE. T/1 THINKS
OF A JOB IN ABADAN, BUT IS NOT SO CERTAIN
WILL HE GET HIM THAT WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN T
IRAN AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM THERE. I
INTERESTED IN POLICY SECTION OF NIQC, WORKING
IN TEHRAN, WE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED
THAT WE HAVE LITTLE INTEREST IN PRODUCTION
TECHNICAL AND EVEN LESS IN RESEARCH OR PRODU
TIONS. WE WOULD TAKE A JOB OF THIS KIND IN TEHRAN, WE W
WOULD BE MAINTAINING THIS CONTACT. T/1 W
OPERATIONS.

4. T/1'S YOUNGEST BROTHER, MASSOUD,

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Z TEHRAN 53827 S E C R E T

NY, 30 JULY. T/I'S FAMILY HAD KNOWN FOR 2-
DID WAS A MEMBER OF THE FEDAYAN (CHARIK),
KING SPECIFIC ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES. THEY D
HE DIED, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT BELIEVE A VER
HAS BEEN DECLARED BY THE PASDARAN REVOLU
HIMSELF IS A SUPPORTER OF THE MUJAHEDIN, BU
FEDAYAN WHO WERE HIS BROTHER'S CONTACTS. H
FROM THESE FRIENDS TO ACCOMPANY THEM TO K
HOW THE FEDAYAN ARE SUPPORTING THE KURDISH
C/O TOLD T/I THAT WE ARE RELUCTANT TO L
PAST HIM FROM GOAL OF OBTAINING JOB IN NIIC
STAN. HOWEVER, COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KU
BE AN IMPORTANT REPORT, IF HE COULD ARRAN
IT WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH HIS EMPLOYMENT
BELIEVES THAT HE CAN DO SO AND WILL REPORT
FEDAYAN INVOLVED AND THEIR PLANS AT THE NEX
WOULD LAST ABOUT ONE WEEK AND COULD NOT TA
ON AUGUST. IN DISCUSSING THE TRIP, C/O LEA
KURD HIMSELF.

5. FROM HIS BROTHER AT THE KOMITER IN A
ABOUT LABOR PROBLEMS AT NIIC. THE WORKER
DIED ABOUT RATION PRIVILEGES FOR FOOD WHICH
SEVERAL YEARS, WHICH HAVE BEEN CANCELLED. COO
THE GUARD FORCE AND THE PASDARAN GUARDS IS
WILL BE RETURNING TO ABADAN ON 3 AUGUST TO
(IDENTITY) BEFORE RETURNING TO TEHRAN VI
STATED THAT WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN ALL T
BROTHER IN ABADAN AND THAT T/I SHOULD PA
HIS BROTHER'S REMARKS ON LABOR PROBLEMS.
T/I ALSO KNOWS AN ARAB SHEIKH, WHO WAS
IRANISTAN IN THE SHAH'S ERA. C/O TOLD
STATED IN LEARNING ABOUT ARAB ATTITUDES AND
CONCENTRATING ON ARAB-FARSI POLITICAL DI

6. FOR NEXT MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR 13 A
T/I REPORT ON HIS SPACE JOB PROSPECTS A
HE MEMBER AT THE ABADAN KOMITER, AND ON

ARE THAT
DID NOT KNOW
OT KNOW EXACT
T OF SUICIDE
WARY GUARDS.
KNOWS SOME OF
AS A TENTATIV
IRAN TO
OCRATIC PARTY
OTHER ISSUES
REFERABLY IN
AND THE FEDA
THIS AREA SO
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PLACE BE CRE
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7. T/I HAS
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BIG PROBLEMS
IT FAMILY AND
OM. C/O
PROBLEMS FACE
ENTION TO
REPORT THEM
FOR POLITICA
THAT WE ARE
POLITICA
DRENCE IN THE

8. T/I IS
ON INFOR
IN INTERVIEW

3827 S E C R E T
AGE 3 TEHRAN 5
TH KHOMEINI IN COM. HE WILL ALSO PROBAB
ON ON FEDAYAI-KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY CO

7. FROM LOS ANGELES: SD TRANSIT/1 APP
ETING, TO BE A WELL-MOTIVATED AGENT WHO
MADESTINE ROLE FULLY. HIS FUTURE VALUE
JOB WITH THE RIGHT ACCESS, BUT HE IS THE K
E NEED.

8. FILE # 201-961045. RUM 2 AUG 89
S E C R E T

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AFTER THIS FIRST
SCOTED HIS
DEPEND ON LANDING
AGENT MATERIAL

D9C.1. ALL SECRE

BT
3827

S E C R E T 141325Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53916

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL/INTEL - SOURCES

1. PLEASE ADVISE SOURCES OF FOLLOWING DISSEMS:
TDFIRDB-315/13892-79 @IRECTOR 482881)
TDFIRDB-315/13141-79 @IRECTOR 482711)
TDFIRDB-315/12861-79 @IRECTOR 478697)
TDFIRDB-315/13216-79 @IRECTOR 484384).

2. NO FILE. RVW 13 AUG 79 DRV DRC.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

18 AUG 79

SECRET 171404Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 496859.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: WNE/IRAN/R

SUBJECT: WMINTEL/INTEL - SOURCES

REF: TEHRAN 53916

1. SOURCES OF REF DISSEMS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. TDFIRDB-315/13092-79 SDVALID/1;
- B. TDFIRDB-315/13141-79 SDTRANSIT/1;
- C. TDFIRDB-315/12061-79 SDACE/1;
- D. TDFIRDB-315/13216-79 SDVALID/1.

2. NO FILE. RVW 18AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT

#9925

700 -

S E C R E T 210820Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53983

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL ~~INTEL~~ PROPOSED SOURCE DESCRIPTIONS

1. IN ANTICIPATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION FROM SDTRANSIT/1 AND SDPROBE/1, FOLLOWING ARE PROPOSED SOURCE DESCRIPTIONS:

A. SDPROBE/1.

(1) FOR REPORTING IN WHICH SDPROBE/1'S NAME APPEARS AS THE ULTIMATE SOURCE, E.G., "VIEWS OF (SDPROBE/1) ON . . .": "A MEMBER OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY WHO IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF (SDPROBE/1). HE IS BELIEVED TO REPORT ACCURATELY WHAT HE IS TOLD."

(2) FOR ALL OTHER REPORTING: "A LIBERAL POLITICIAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED."

B. SDTRANSIT/1.

(1) FOR REPORTING ON PETROLEUM AT KHUZESTAN: "AN IRANIAN ACADEMIC WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN THE IRANIAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY. HIS RELIABILITY IS UNDETERMINED."

(2) FOR REPORTING ON KURDISTAN AND TEHRAN POLITICS: "AN IRANIAN INTELLECTUAL OF KURDISH DESCENT WITH PERSONAL CONNECTIONS TO THE FEDAYAN AND MUJAHEDIN ORGANIZATIONS HIS RELIABILITY IS UNDETERMINED."

2. WELCOME HQS INPUT. PLS ADVISE APPROVED BYLINES.

3. NO FILE. RWV 21 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 181536Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54525

TO: DIRECTOR INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

WNINTEL SDTRANSIT


1. CASE OFFICER MET SDTRANSIT/I (T/I) ON 15 AND 17 OCTOBER FOR DEBRIEFINGS ON HIS ACTIVITIES FOR PAST TWO MONTHS. T/I SPENT MOST OF AUGUST IN KURDESTAN, ACCOMPANYING FEDAYAN FIGHTERS WHO WERE ASSISTING THE KURDS. HE BROUGHT SEVERAL HUNDRED PHOTOS TO 15 OCTOBER MEETING, SOME OF WHICH DOCUMENT FEDAYAN PARTICIPATION IN KURDISH DEMONSTRATIONS. C/O SELECTED SOME FOR COPYING AND FORWARDING TO HQS.

2. ON 9 SEPTEMBER, NEAR PAVEH, T/I WAS WOUNDED BY A GUARDSMAN (PASDAR). BULLET HIT T/I IN SIDE, GLANCING OFF RIB. A KURDISH DOCTOR TREATED HIM AND HE RETURNED TO TEHRAN TO RECUPERATE. DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, HE CONTINUED EFFORTS TO SECURE GOOD POSITION AT NIOC, EITHER IN TEHRAN OR ABADAN. HE HAS BEEN OFFERED POSITIONS TEACHING AT UNIVERSITY OF SHIRAZ AND AT ABADAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AIT), NEITHER OF WHICH IS OPERATIONALLY INTERESTING. T/I DOESN'T WANT TO TAKE THESE POSITIONS BECAUSE HE FEELS HIS CREDENTIALS ENTITLE HIM TO SOMETHING BETTER.

3. T/I MISSED MEETING DATES EITHER BECAUSE HE WAS IN KURDESTAN OR WAS CONVALESCING. HE SAID THAT AT LAST MEETING DATE ON 1 OCTOBER, A GUARDSMAN APPEARED AND ASKED HIM WHAT HE WAS DOING AT MEETING SITE. T/I SAID WAITING FOR A FRIEND. C/O AND T/I CHANGED MEETING POINT TO NAHID STREET OFF MOSSADEGH AND MADE MEETING TIME 1900 HOURS, WITH ALTERNATE AT 2000 HOURS.

4. C/O AND T/I MEETING AGAIN ON 19 OCTOBER. PROCESSING INFORMATION ON FEDAYAN COOPERATION WITH KURDS FOR DISSEMINATION.

5. FILE: 201-961045. RVW 18 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T





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خلق


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فردوسی



ننگ بره
عوامل اشتعمار

REPORT CLASS--SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: KDP AND FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ ACTIVITIES IN KURDESTAN
(DOI: AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN IRANIAN OF KURDISH DESCENT WITH PERSONAL
CONNECTIONS TO THE FEDAYAN AND MUJAHIDIN ORGANI-
ZATIONS. HIS RELIABILITY IS UNDETERMINED.

1. DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1979, THE KURDISH AREAS OF WESTERN IRAN AROUND KHANEH AND MAHABAD WERE UNDER CONTROL OF THE LOCAL POPULATION, WHICH IS OVERWHELMINGLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE LEADER OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP); AYATOLLAH EZZEDIN HOSSEINI HAS THE HIGHEST PRESTIGE OF ALL THE KDP LEADERS, WHILE ABDUL RAHMAN QASSEMLOU ENJOYS SOMEWHAT LESSER RESPECT. THE BARZANI BROTHERS, IDRIS AND MASSOUD, THE SONS OF MULLA MUSTAFS BARZANI, ARE CONSIDERED MERCENARIES (JOSH) WHO HAD BEEN PAID BY THE SHAH AND BY FOREIGNERS, AND WHO NOW HAVE NO STANDING AMONG THE KDP SUPPORTERS.

2. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ACTIVE WORKERS WITHIN THE KDP IS CALLED THE KOMITEH ZAHMAT KESHAN KURDESTAN AND INCLUDES ALL KURDS WHO TAKEN ACTIVE PART IN SUPPORTING THE FIGHTING GUERRILLAS, THE PESHMERGA. THE ORGANIZATION IS INFORMAL AND IS PREPARED TO ASSIST ANY KURDS WHO WISH TO FIGHT WITHOUT INQUIRING INTO CREDENTIALS OTHER THAN KURDISH PARENT ABE. (SOURCE COMMENT: DURING SEPTEMBER 1979, THE MEMBERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION IN THE BORDER TOWN OF KHANEH PASSED OUT WEAPONS FREELY TO ANY ONE WHO VOLUNTEERED TO FIGHT THE GOVERNMENT FORCES.)

3. ABOUT 95 PERCENT OF THE ARMED KURDS BELONG TO THE KDP'S PESHMERGA, WHILE THE FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ GUERRILLAS WERE NOT MORE THAN FIVE PERCENT OF ALL FIGHTERS. DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1979, ABOUT 25 KNOWN FEDAYAN WERE IN MAHABAD-KHANEH AREA. (SOURCE COMMENT: THERE WERE PROBABLY NO MORE THAN 200 FEDAYAN FIGHTING IN ALL OF KURDESTAN DURING THIS PERIOD.)

4. GUERRILLAS AND SYMPATHIZERS OF THE FEDAYAN-E-KHALO HAVE FOUGHT AND DEMONSTRATED TOGETHER WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY SINCE FEBRUARY 1979, BUT THERE IS NO ORGANIZATION COORDINATING THE

ACTIVITIES EXPLICITLY SPONSORED BY THE FEDAYAN ARE WELCOMED IN THE LARGER CITIES SUCH AS MAHABAD AND SANANDAJ, WHERE FEDAYAN AND PESHMERGA GUERRILLAS OF THE KDP HAVE FOUGHT SIDE BY SIDE, WHILE MARXIST FEDAYAN CONCEAL THEIR AFFILIATION IN SMALLER VILLAGES AND THE COUNTRY SIDE, WHOSE PEOPLE ARE DEVOT MOSLEMS AND DEEPLY-ANTI-COMMUNIST.

5. ALTHOUGH THE FEDAYAN ARE ORGANIZED INTO GROUPS CLASSIFIED AS "SYMPATHIZERS" AND "FIGHTERS" BOTH TYPES OF MEMBERS TRAVELED TO KURDESTAN TO TAKE PART IN THE FIGHTING IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE FEDAYAN NORMALLY TRAVEL IN SMALL GROUPS, USING ORDINARY MEANS OF TRANSPORT, AND PICK UP WEAPONS AFTER THEY ARRIVE IN KURDESTAN.)

6. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (19 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO. NIT- 10,787.

7. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KOWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DEHLI, TELAVIV.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCE AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 25OCT99 DRV D9C.1 CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

This text is rewritten from typewriter tapes left in CIA station on 4th November 1979.

S E C R E T

OCT 79 INTEL

CITE TEHRAN

ZNY XXXXX

TO: DIRECTOR INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD
JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DEHLI, TELAVIV.

WINTEL SDTRANSIT INTEL

SUPDATA: SDTRANSIT/1. NOLIAISON. NO FILE. NO INDEX. OBTAINED
BY JAMOTTE. FIELD REPORT NO. NIT-10,787. CLBY 015356.

FILED: PAQUIN

This text is rewritten from typewriter tapes left in CIA station
in 4th November 1979.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SITRANSIT/1. Name unknown. Marital status: Believed to be single. Age: Probably mid-twenties. Educated in the U.S. (school unknown). Academic specialty: Petroleum engineering, or possibly a related field. Returned from the U.S. in July or August. No regular employment since his return.

Contacts: Met approximately once a week, when in Tehran (see below). Picked up by car. Meetings either pre-arranged or scheduled by means of phone call from the Source.

Purpose of contact: 1) Information on organization and activities of the Fedayan; 2) Information on the petroleum industry (production, physical security, labor situation, etc.); 3) Arab politics and organization in Khuzestan, to include Iraqi involvement, if any. Re 1): Source had personal friends in the Fedayan, and although not himself a member, was able to spend approximately two weeks with them in Kurdistan, where he received a bullet wound. (He reported a maximum of about 50 Fedayan fighting with the Kurdish dissidents.) Re 2): Source was offered at least one job with NIOC in Tehran, but it was judged that this would not provide the desired access to the situation in the oil fields themselves, and as of 4 November he was exploring job prospects in Abadan. Re 3): Access to the Arab situation would have been contingent on his finding a job in Khuzestan.

Payment: Source received regular compensation, exact terms not known.

SECRET 211625Z JUN 79 STAFF
CITE BONN 22216 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, AMMAN, ISTANBUL
WMINTEL AJAJA WEYWAY CITEG SDFICKLE

FROM: A. DIRECTOR 44543 (444543)
3. BONN 91346
6. WASHINGTON 459972, 19 JUNE 79

1. PER INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF BASE, WALBO R. FELT
HOUSE CONTACTED SDFICKLE (S/1) AND ARRANGED A MEETING
FOR THE EVENING OF 18 JUNE. THE MEETING, WHICH
LASTED MORE THAN TWO AND A HALF HOURS, TOOK PLACE IN THE HOTEL
IN COLOGNE. IT WENT SMOOTHLY AND WITHOUT INCIDENTS
AND THE CIAE JANUARY 1979 REPORT IS BEING
RENDIT.

2. VALERIE VASILEVICH VALENTIN (201-898458) KNOWN
IN ONE LAST MEETING WITH HIM, HE DID NOT SHOW PICTURES
OF LOWLAND SOVIETS TO S/1. VALENTIN SUGGESTED THAT S/1 MEET
AT 1200 HOURS ON 30 JUNE 79. VALENTIN WOULD MEET S/1
ON THE STREET OPPOSITE THE SMALL CHURCH AT REINHARDTSTRASSE
IN COLOGNE. S/1 STATED THAT EXCEPT FOR THE 26 MAY MEETING
HE HAD REPORTED ALL OF HIS MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS IN DETAIL
TO HIS FORMER SOJANUS CASE OFFICER.

3. ACCORDING TO S/1, HIS SOJANUS CASE OFFICER HAD
INSTRUCTED HIM ON THE KINDS OF SUBJECT TO DISCUSS WITH HIS
SOVIET CONTACTS AND THE KINDS OF INFORMATION TO PASS TO THEM.
S/1 IS CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT THE INFORMATION
WHICH HE PASSED TO THEM WAS GENUINE, AND THAT THEY TRUST HIM.

18 AUG 1972

2 AUG 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR, GERMANY, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN.

TOP SECRET/NOFORN SDFICKLE INTFL

183673

LANGTON 496090

SITUATION IN EAST IS CERTAINLY NOT CALM. WE FEEL THROUGH HIS FAMILY CONNECTIONS, MIGHT BE ABLE TO MOVE FREELY THAN OTHER FOREIGNERS. HE COULD GET INTO AREA TO ASK QUESTIONS INDISCRIMINATELY OF EVERYBODY, EXPECT HIM TO DO SO.

IS WHETHER SDFICKLE WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO JUSTIFY COST OF TRIP WHICH, WE ASSUME, WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING MORE DETAILS FROM WHOM SDFICKLE WOULD SEE AND WHAT SPECIFIC INFORMATION HE WOULD BE ABLE TO COLLECT. WILL HE BE ABLE TO OBTAIN SPECIFIC DETAILS ON SOVIET SUPPORT, ON SUPPORT POSSIBLY IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, AND ON WEAPONS SMUGGLING. WILL HE BE ABLE TO OBTAIN DETAILED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT SITUATION OF THE KURDS, THEIR FUTURE INTENTIONS, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THEM. WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN PROPAGANDE-TYPE

201-960951, 201-306414. RWV 17 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1

↓
SDFICKLE

8

SECRET 211837Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITY DIRECTOR 488994.

TO: PRIORITY BOMN, ANKARA INFO GERMANY, ISTANBUL, TURKEY

FROM: EL AJAJA SOJUNUS CKLEG SOFICKLE

RE: A. ANKARA 4435D
B. WASHINGTON 44089B
C. BOMN 83873

1. WE ARE, IN FACT, INTERESTED IN SOFICAN BAL'S (F/I) TRAVEL IN TURKEY AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IF HE WILLINGNESS TRAVEL IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, SOFICAN'S INTEREST IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN, AS BOTH AREAS OF PRIORITY INTEREST, IS INDICATED BY REF B. WE DO NOT HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS CONCERNING SOFICAN'S TRAVEL IN TURKEY DUE TO POTENTIAL AND DANGER, AND WE SIMILARLY CONCERNED OVER F/I TRAVEL IN IRAN. AT SAME TIME, BELIEVE NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED IF F/I PROPERLY BRIEFED ON REQUIREMENTS AND STIPULATED CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES. ACCORDINGLY, WE WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST SOFICAN RECONTACTING F/I AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO INQUIRE FOR HIS WIL- LINGNESS TRAVEL THROUGH TURKEY TO IRAN FOR PURPOSES OF HIS VISIT. WE WOULD LIKE, IF POSSIBLE, FOR F/I BEGIN TRAVEL WITHIN NEXT 2-3 WEEKS. IF SOFICAN WOULD LIKE TO TRAVEL LASTING ONE TO TWO WEEKS, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO ARRANGE TRAVEL BOTH IRAN AND TURKEY. DO NOT BELIEVE WE WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEND MORE THAN TWO-THREE DAYS IN EASTERN TURKEY AND IRAN. USUAL REQUIREMENT IS IN IRAN.

2. WE ARE PREPARED FUND COST OF F/I'S TRAVEL AND, IF WE RECEIVE SIGNIFICANT REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO REQUIREMENTS, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE HIM WITH BONUS DEPENDING ON QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND ITS FULFILLMENT OUR REQUIREMENTS.

3. WE WISH EMPHASIZE NEED FOR THOROUGH BRIEFING F/I CONCERNING REALITIES OF SITUATION IN EASTERN TURKEY AND IRANIAN KURDISTAN, WHICH, BEING KURDISH, WE SURE HE AWARLY AWARE. HE SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF DANGERS HE MAY ATTRACT ATTENTION TO HIMSELF BY HIS TRAVEL IN TURKEY AND HE SHOULD BE DISCREET TO WHO HE COMES INTO CONTACT AND HOW HE ACQUIRES INFORMATION, AS TURKISH SECURITY AGENCIES

PAGE DIRECTOR 498994 S E C R E T
OF COURSE FOR JUST HIS SORT OF ACTIVITIES. IN IRAN, AS F/1 EVEN
MORE AWARE, IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEGUN CRACKDOWN ON KURDISH
MOVEMENT AND HIS ABILITY TRAVEL OR CONTACT MEMBERS HIS FAMILY
COUNTRY MAY BE RESTRICTED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, OF COURSE,
SHOULD HE EVER ADMIT RTACTION CONTACT AND WE NOT IN POSITION TO
OFFER HIM ASSISTANCE SHOULD WE RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES EITHER
COUNTRY. WELTHOUSE SHOULD INSURE F/1 UNDERSTANDS ALL OF ABOVE
REASONS HE ACCEPTS OUR INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING HIS TRAVEL.

4. WHILE WE ANTICIPATE NO CONTACT F/1 IN TURKEY, AS HE
SHOULD BE DEBRIEFED BY HIS C/O IN BORN ON HIS RETURN FROM THIS
TRAVEL, WE WOULD APPRECIATE EMERGENCY CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS IN
CASE HE HAS HIGHLY PERISHABLE INFORMATION WHICH COULD NOT WAIT FOR
HIS RETURN TO GERMANY. F/1 SPEAKS NO ENGLISH, SOME TURKISH,
EXCELLENT GERMAN, EXCELLENT FARSI, AND HIS NATIVE KURDISH.
BEST ISTANBUL, BEST CHOICE FOR CONTACT SINCE COB IS FLUENT
KURDISH LANGUAGE. PLS ADVISE.

5. IN RESPONSE REF QUESTIONS CONCERNING ACCESS F/1, WE
BELIEVE WE WOULD BE ABLE SERVICE THOSE REQUIREMENTS IN SUFFI-
CIENTLY JUSTIFY EXPENDITURES INVOLVED. REFER BONN AS TO EXACT
WHAT HE WOULD BE ABLE SEE IN TURKEY AS F/1 HAS BEEN PRIMARILY
TARGETED AGAINST IRANIAN KURDISH PROBLEM. IN ADDITION REQU-
REMENTS POSED REF A, FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, ISSUES OF HIGH INTERE-
ST CONCERNING IRANIAN KURDS:

A. IDENTIFICATION OF VARIOUS FACTIONS AND LEADERS
OF KURDISH MOVEMENT OF CONTINUING INTEREST.

B. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR KURDISH
MOVEMENT, IF ANY. WHAT TYPE OF SUPPORT? ARMS? MONEY? CAN U.S.
CLEAN, SOVIET INVOLVEMENT BE IDENTIFIED?

C. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF TUBEN OR CHARIKHA-YE FED-
ERATION SUPPORT FOR KURDS?

D. KURDISH STRATEGIES CONCERNING RESOLUTION OF
OF MINORITIES ISSUE IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE?

E. WITH GROWING EVIDENCE THAT RIVAL KURDISH FAC-
TIONS ESTABLISHING ENCLAVES IN KURDISTAN, I.E., F/1'S KDP RELAT-

14 SEP 78 152

OR ET 1:0659Z SEP 78 TO STAFF

INFO 84385

PARIS INFO DIRECTOR, GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.
MIL AMAJA SOFICKE

PARIS : 1836

DURING A REPTENT MEETING SOFICKE SAID THAT MRS. AL-RAMHAN BASIRLU APPEARS TO BE 44-46 YEARS OLD, MEDIUM BUILD, LIGHT BROWN HAIR, SOMETIMES DYES HER HAIR. SHE DRESSES SIMPLY AND CONSERVATIVELY. THE OLDER DAUGHTER IS ABOUT 20-21 YEARS OLD. THE YOUNGER ONE IS ABOUT 17-18 YEARS OLD. BOTH GIRLS ARE INTELL. SOFICKE IS NOT SURE BUT THINKS THAT THE OLDER ONE IS GOING TO COLLEGE, WHILE THE YOUNGEST IS ATTENDING FRENCH SECONDARY SCHOOL.

ACCORDING TO FAMILY, BASIRLU HAS POLITICAL EXILE PERMITS FOR RESIDING AND WORKING IN PARIS. SUCH PERMITS ARE ONLY OBTAINABLE WITHIN KURDISH CIRCLES IN PARIS.

FILE: 88-692200, 88-692651. RWV 10 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1

SECRET 110927Z SEP 79 STAFF

11 SEP 79 12 45Z

BONN 84384

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN.

TEL AJAJA SDFICKLE

A DIRECTOR 508752

BONN 84385

SDFICKLE/1 (F/1) MET EVENING 8 SEPT 79 BY FELTHOUSE
NOVIKOWSKY. WAS GIVEN REF A AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR
MIGHT TRIP TO KURDISTAN. DURING MEETING F/1 WAS REPEATEDLY
FROM ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY AND FACT WE NOT
POSITION OFFER HIM ANY HELP IF HE ENCOUNTERS ANY DIFFICULTIES
IRAN OR IRAN. F/1 ACCEPTED AAG RECEIPT FOR DM 2500
EL EXPENSES; DM 800 AUG SALARY AND DM 1200 OPS EXPENSES.

2. F/1'S SCHEDULE HAD HIM TRAVELING PARIS 9 SEPT 79 TO
LENA GASEMLU AND GET LETTER FOR DELIVERY TO HER HUSBAND.
WILL RETURN BONN AND DEPART BONN 12 SEPT 79 VIA TURKISH
NEES FOR ISTANBUL AND VAN. HE WILL THEN TRAVEL INTO BOTH
SM AND IRANIAN KURDISTAN, EXPECTING RETURN EUROPE AT END
MOR. WILL MEET AND DEBRIEF AT THAT TIME.

3 FILE: 201-0960951. RVW 10 SEPT 99 DM DSC.1.

SECRET

10927Z
10927Z

9 OCT 79 12 58z

C R 81 09 12 06Z OCT 79 STAFF

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, G
INTEL AIAA SDFICKLE

SOON CASE

SDFICKLE HAS RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO TURKI
FELTHOUSE CONTACTED HIM ON THE EVE
DEBRIEFING SESSION FOR 9 OCT IN DUE

ONE OF THE REASONS SDFICKLE'S RETURN WAS DEL
(MILITARY)

HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY IRANIAN (MILITARY)
IN TURKEY

HE WAS ACCUSED
FOR FOUR DAYS. HE WAS ACCUSED
TURKISH-IRANIAN BORDER AND FAL

SDFICKLE SAID THAT HE HAD LEFT
TURKEY

THE AUTHORITIES
AND FRIENDS OF SDFICKLE'S FAMIL

A NEWS ITEM ENTITLED "IRON RE SHAH
NEWSPAPER

WE ARE FORWARDING THE NEWSPAPER CLIP
NUMBER 44

SDFICKLE'S ARREST TO HQS VIA ITN NUMBER 44

RESULTS OF THE DEBRIEFING SESSION WILL BE

DRM DS II.

105

SECRET 171517Z OCT 79 INTEL

CITE BONN 85481 SECTION 1 OF 2 ZNY XXXXX

TO: DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN .

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFICKLE INTEL ZRWAHO O

SUBJECT: ZRWAHO O FOR THIRD COUNTRY CONTENT. SOURCE SDFICKLE/1.
SUB-SOURCES SDFICKLE'S FATHER AND OTHERS DESCRIBED
IN BONN 85330. FELTHOUSE OBTAINED. PLACE ACQUIRED
OMITTED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. OBJ: S-1. NO LIAISON
NO INDEX. FILE: 201-0960951. EGN-7833. RVW
17 OCT 99 DRV D9C . 1 BY 055303.

FILED: 171517Z

REPORT CLASS- SECRET-WNINTEL-NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: STATUS OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT IN IRAN (DOI:
LATE SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: A KURD, NOW RESIDING ABOARD, WHO IS BELIEVED TO
HAVE GOOD ACCESS TO THE KURDISH COMMUNITY IN IRAN
AND WHO RECENTLY VISITED IRANIAN KURDISTAN. HIS
REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THE MORALE OF PARTISAN FIGHTERS IN IRANIAN
KURDISTAN IS HIGH , AND THE KURDS CONTINUE IN THERE
DETERMINATION TO GAIN AUTONOMY. THE PRINCIPAL PARTISAN GROUPS
CURRENTLY OPERATING IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN ARE THE RESISTANCE
GROUP OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN, THE SAZEMAN-E,
ZAHMAT-E FASHAN-E KURDISTAN, THE KURDISTAN SECTION OF THE
PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN AND THE FOLLOWERS OF HOSSEINI. THE KURDS
ARE ARMED WITH WEAPONS STOLEN FROM RAIDS ON IRANIAN GARRISONS
AND WITH ARMS SUPPLIED BY IRAQ. KURDISH FORCES HAVE SOME
CONTACT WITH THE TUDEH PARTY, BUT ACTUALLY COLLABORATE
ONLY WITH THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN AND CHRIKH-HAYI-~~IRAN~~ IRAN.
A NEW ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN FORMED TO LIQUIDATE KURDS WORKING.
WITH THE KHOMEINI REGIME. END SUMMARY.

1. DESPITE THE RETREAT OF KURDISH RESISTANCE FIGHTERS
AND THE EXTENSIVE MATERIAL AND HUMAN LOSSES SUFFERED IN
AUGUST 1979, THE SPIRIT AND MORALE OF THE GENERAL KURDISH
POPULATION AND THE PARTISAN FIGHTERS IN IRAN IS HIGH. THE
KURDS ARE HOPEFUL ABOUT THE FUTURE AND ARE DETERMINED TO
WIN THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY. THE PEOPLE DO NOT BLAME
ABD-AL-RAHMAN Q A S E M L U , SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (BPK), OR KURDISH RELIGIOUS
LEADER, EZ-ED-DIN H O S S E I N I , FOR THE LOSSES AND RETREAT.
KURDS RESPECT AND ADMIRE THESE TWO LEADERS.

2. THE MAJORITY OF KURDISH RESISTANCE UNITS ARE
LOCATED NEAR THE IRAQI AND TURKISH BORDER, AND IN THE MOUNTAINS
AND FOREST REGIONS OF KURDISTAN. THERE ARE FOUR MAIN ARMED
KURDISH PARTISAN GROUPS. THEY ARE:

A. THE ARMED RESISTANCE GROUP OF THE DPK-THIS GROUP'S LEADER IS A FORMER MAJOR IN THE IRANIAN ARMY AND MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE DPK, ABDUL RAHIM A B B A S S I. THE GROUP'S HEADQUARTERS IS IN THE FOREST OF X SARDASHT. THESE FORCES ARE CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INTENSIVE TRAINING FOR SUDDEN ATTACKS AND QUICK RETREATS. MILITARY UNITS OF THE DPK ARE OPERATING FROM WESTERN AZERBAIJAN DOWN TO THE SOUTH OF THE KURDISH MOUNTAIN TRAILS TO IRAQ.

B. MILITARY UNITS OF SAZEMAN-E ZAHMET-E KASHAN-E KURDISTAN-THIS IS A MARXIST-LENINIST, LEFTIST MILITARY UNIT LED BY FORMER LAW STUDENT SALAH M U H T A D I. THE SAZEMAN -E ZAHMET-E KASHAN-E KURDISTAN IS RUMORED TO BE OPERATING EITHER IN THE SOUTH NEAR THE IRAQI BORDER OR IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF SANANDASH.

THE KURDISTAN SECTION (SHAHA-YE KURDISTAN) OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN-THIS KURDISH GROUP ALSO HAS MARXIST-LENINIST CONVICTIONS AND IS PART OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN. IT STRONGLY OPPOSES THE PRESENT KHOMEINI REGIME. THE SO-CALLED RADICAL KURDISH COMMUNIST GROUPS, THE KURDISTAN SECTION OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN AND THE SAZEMAN-E KASHAN-E KURDISTAN DIFFER IN THAT THE FIRST IS PART OF AN IRANIAN ORGANIZATION; THE SECOND IS A PURELY KURDISH ENTITY. BOTH ARE ANTI-SOVIET. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS NO ENMITY BETWEEN THEM. THE KURDISTAN SECTION OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN OPERATES IN THE MARIVAN AREA.

D. ARMEC FOLLOWERS OF RELIGIOUS AND NATIONAL LEADER HOSSEINI-THEY CONSIST OF VARIOUS SMALL GROUPS WHO ARE HIDING AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION IN TOWNS AND LARGER VILLAGES.

E. BESIDES THE ABOVE-MENTIONED FOUR GROUPS, THERE ARE VARIOUS SMALL KURDISH ARMED RESISTANCE GROUPS, AMONG THEM TWO SIGNIFICANT ONES--THE GROUP UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF ROSSOUL M O L M A N FROM THE PEOPLE'S SOCIALIST MOVEMENT OF KURDS IN IRAQ, AND THE GROUP OF DR. MAHMOUD Q S M A N ALSO FROM IRAQ.

3. THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF KURDISH RESISTANCE FIGHTERS IN IRAN STANDS AT MORE THAN 20,000 . THE MAJORITY OF THESE

FIGHTERS BELONG TO THE ARMED GROUP OF THE DPK. THEY ARE ARMED WITH WEAPONS CAPTURED FROM THE IRANIAN GARRISONS IN MAHABAD, SANANDAJ AND NUSUT IN FEBRUARY 1979. THE KURDS HAVE SUFFICIENT ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO LAST THROUGH THE WINTER ACTIONS.

4. MORE ARMS ARE COMING TO THE IRANIAN KURDS FROM IRAQ. THE MAIN SUPPLIER OF THOSE ARMS IS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE CELAL T A L A B A N I ORGANIZATION. THE IRANIAN KURDS ALSO RECEIVE AID FROM EAST GERMANY, ROMANIA AND CUBA. THIS AID, HOWEVER, IS ~~SCARCELY~~ OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES, FOOD AND CLOTHING, AND USUALLY REACHES THE KURDS VIA IRAQ. IN AUGUST 1979, THE DPK SENT A SPECIAL DELEGATION TO CUBA. AS OF LATE SEPTEMBER, THE DELEGATION HAD NOT YET RETURNED TO IRAN.

5. Q A S E M L U SPENDS MOST OF HIS TIME IN IRAQ AND VERY SELDOM COMES TO IRAN. HOSSEINI IS ALSO HIDING IN IRAQ, BUT FREQUENTLY VISITS IRANIAN KURDISTAN. THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DPK CENTRAL COMMITTEE SUCH AS MEHMED.EMIN S I R A C I, AMIR K H A Z I AND HANI B U L U R I Y A M ARE REMAINING IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN WITH THE ARMED GROUPS.

6. THE DPK AND OTHER KURDISH ARMED GROUPS HAVE SOME CONTACT WITH THE TUDEH PARTY, BUT THEY ARE NOT COLLABORATING WITH IT. THE DPK AND OTHER KURDISH FACTIONS ARE, HOWEVER, CLOSELY COLLABORATING WITH THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN. CHRISH-HAYI-KHLKI IRAN, AND OTHER IRANIAN DISSIDENT GROUPS WHO ARE OPPOSING THE KHOMEINI REGIME. NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY TO ADOPT A JOINT ACTION PLAN WITHIN THE COMING SIX MONTHS AGAINST THE KHOMEINI REGIME.

7. IRANIAN ARMY UNITS PRESENTLY STATIONED IN KURDISTAN ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION. THEY OFTEN PROTECT THE LOCALS FROM KHOMEINI'S MILITIA FORCES. THE DPK AND OTHER KURDISH FACTIONS VALUE THIS EFFORT AND SEE IT AS A GOOD SIGN FOR THE FUTURE. THE DPK IS WORKING TO WIN THE SYMPATHY OF ALL TO ESTABLISH A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH IRANIAN ARMY UNITS.

8. A NEW KURDISH ORGANIZATION IS BEING CREATED IN

BT

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IRANIAN KURDISTAN. IT IS CALLED SHAHIT (WITNESS). THE GOAL OF THIS ORGANIZATION IS TO LIQUIDATE THE KURDS WHO ARE COLLABORATING WITH THE KHOMEINI REGIME. NOT LONG AGO SHAHIT KILLED A KURDISH LANDLORD, T E L I B E K (LNU), WHO HAD COLLABORATED WITH KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVES. NOW THE ORGANIZATION IS PLANNING TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST OTHER KURDS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF WORKING FOR KHOMEINI'S REGIME.

9. NEITHER THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION(PLO) NOR ANY OTHER PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATION HAS AN OFFICE OR REPRESENTATIVES IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN. KERIM H I S S A M I. A MEMBER OF THE DPK'S POLITBURO, IS IN CONTACT WITH A PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN BAGHDAD. HISSAMI ALSO HEADED A DPK DELEGATION WHICH VISITED PLO HEADQUARTERS IN LEBANON. SINCE THAT TIME HE HAS HAD CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE PLO. HISSAMI IS ABOUT 54 YEARS OLD AND RESIDED IN PRAGUE FOR MANY YEARS. HIS FAMILY IS STILL LIVING IN PRAGUE BUT HISSAMI HIMSELF IS IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN.

10. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY IS IN SESSION IN TEHRAN. THE KURDS ARE NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO IT AND FEEL IT IS WORTHLESS. ONLY ONE KURD FROM SANANDAJ IS A MEMBER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND HE HAS NO INFLUENCE IN IT.

11. ACQ: (9 OCTOBER 1979)

12. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 17OCT99 DRV D9C. 1 BY RECORDS REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

BT

#5481

S E C R E T 242201Z OCT 79 STAFF

25 OCT 79 04 17z

CITE DIRECTOR 539929.

TO: BONN INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA ZRWAROO

REF: BONN 95541 EGN-7939

1. DO NOT PLAN TO DISSEM REF AS REPORT AS WRITTEN DOES NOT APPEAR TO ADD SUFFICIENT NEW INFO TO WHAT ALREADY KNOWN TO WARRANT DISSEM.

2. IT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN THAT PAST EFFORTS BY BARZANI AND TALA-P BANI TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES HAD FAILED. THIS SUPPORTED ALSO BY TDFIRDB-315/13524-79 FROM GNGRAPH (FROM AN ESTABLISHED SOURCE DRAWING ON A NUMBER OF SUBSOURCES WHOSE RELIABILITY AND ACCESS CANNOT BE ASSESSED) WHICH REPORTED THAT MASUD BARZANI HAD CROSSED FROM IRAN INTO NORTHERN IRAQ TAKING WITH HIM SIZEABLE GROUP OF PESH MERGA. JALAL TALABANI, DISSIDENT KURDISH LEADER UNTIL RECENTLY SUPPORTED BY SYRIA, ATTEMPTED RECONCILIATION WITH MASUD WHO REJECTED HIS ADVANCES. REPORT ALSO SAID MASUD BARZANI HAD ESTABLISHED A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH IRANIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YAZDI AND THE KDP HAD GAINED SUPPORT OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD GIVEN IT WEAPONS AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. CATOMIC/19 IN TDFIRDB-315/15112-79 (BONN 84015) REPORTED ALSO THAT BARZANI BROTHERS HAD NOT ATTEMPTED TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH THE IRAQI KURDISH LEADER TALABANI. AGAINST THIS ARE TWO REPORTS OUT OF BAGEDAD IN AUGUST 1979 WHICH INDICATE THAT IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979 THERE WAS TO BE FRESH EFFORTS BETWEEN TWO FACTIONS TO REACH SOME KIND OF ACCOMMODATION.

3. IN VIEW OF ABOVE INFO BELIEVE REF REPORT WOULD BE MORE USEFUL IF SDFICKEL/1 COULD BE MORE SPECIFIC AS TO DATE OF HIS INFO. DID HE PICK UP IN ANY SPECIFIC INFO OF PROPOSED MEETINGS IN EITHER SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER; IF SO, WERE THESE EFFORTS ALSO REJECTED ETC. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF SDFICKEL/1 COULD PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC INFO THAN BONN 85336 ON WHO SUBSOURCES WERE WHO CAN DEFINITELY SAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT COORDINATION EFFORT

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 538929 S E C R E T
BETWEEN THE TWO FACTIONS. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON PAST COORDINATION
BETWEEN KURDISH FACTIONS AND COMMUNISTS PLUS AMPLIFICATION ON EXACT
MEANING OF STATEMENT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP IS IMPOSSIBLE BECUASE THE
BAGHDAD REGIME CONSIDERS THE IRAQI COMMUNISTS TRAITORS AND IS ACTIVE-
LY PERSECUTING THEM" WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL.

4. PLS ADVISE. NO FILE. RVW 23 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#5514

1 Nov 79 04 17z

S E C R E T 311839Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 543375.

TO: .BONN INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFICKLE

REF: BONN 95706

1. CONCUR PARA TWO REF.
2. WILL PROVIDE MORE DETAILED COMMENTS RESULTS SDFICKLE/1'S TRIP IN NEAR FUTURE. WE VERY PLEASED.
3. FILE: 201-0969951. RVW 30OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

BT
#4196

1

S E C R E T 140623Z STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 419277

TO: TEHRAN INFO PARIS

WNINTEL AJAJA UNCAMEL FUSIL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 408750 (NOT SENT)
B. PARIS 98132 (BEING RELAYED)
C. PARIS 95702
D. PARIS 96210 (FEB 1979)

1. REF A REQUESTED PARIS ST
RECRUITED STATION ASSETS UNCAMEL/1
TO REPORT ON KURDISH AUTONOMY MOVE
ACTIVITIES IN IRAN, AND TO SPOT LE
ASSETS WITH ACCESS TO TRIBAL AFFA

2. FURTHER TO REF B RESP
FRENCH CITIZEN, IS FREE-LANCE JO
OF FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF)
PARIS STATION SINCE 1972 AS RE
ON PCF AFFAIRS AND ON COMMUNIS
HAS TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY IN
CONTACTS IN VARIOUS AFRICAN A
CIRCLES, INCLUDING KHOMEINI
FRANCE. UNCAMEL/1 HELD INTE
AND LATER SUCCEEDED IN HAVIN
ALSO, RE REF C AND SUBSEQU
FULLY TO ACCOMPANY KHOMEINI

3. WOULD APPRECI
RESPONSE TO REF B AS
VENTURE

2 DIRECTOR [REDACTED] E T
FACTS.

4. PARIS [REDACTED] TO ABOVE, DOES UNCAMEL/1 HAVE ANY
POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE CONTACTS WITH IRANIAN COMMUNIST
ELEMENTS?

5. PARIS [REDACTED] THAT UNFUSIL/1 IS PREPARED TO
MAKE TRIP, BEGINNING [REDACTED] 20 APRIL. (DO NOT SEE OVERLAP
IN AGENTS' ACTIVITIES. THEY WILL BE DIRECTED SEPARATELY
AGAINST RESPECTIVE [REDACTED] TARGETS.) UNCAMEL/1 IS U.S.
CITIZEN RESIDING IN [REDACTED] WHERE HE IS SELF-EMPLOYED AS PHOTO-
GRAPHER AND FILM PR [REDACTED]. HE WAS BRIEFLY EMPLOYED BY IRANIAN
GOVERNMENT IN 1977 TO PRODUCE SERIES OF FILMS FOR TELEVISION
AND PRESUMABLY SPENDING SOME TIME IN IRAN DURING THAT PERIOD.
A WITTING, PAID AGENT. HE WAS RECRUITED [REDACTED] 1978 AS ACCESS
AGENT TO LEFTIST AND [REDACTED] THEAST ASIAN TARGETS IN FRANCE AND ELSE-
WHERE. UNFUSIL/1 WAS ACCOMPANYING PHOTOGRAPHER AT SERIES OF
INTERVIEWS WITH KHOMENI HELD NOVEMBER [REDACTED]. HE MANAGED TO
INGRATIATE HIMSELF WITH MEMBERS OF KHOMENI'S IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE
AND HAS SINCE ESTABLISHED GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
PRINCIPAL ADVISER YAZDI, WHO, PER REPORT, ISSUED STANDING INVITA-
TION FOR UNFUSIL/1 TO VISIT HIM IN [REDACTED]. UNFUSIL/1 ALSO
RECEIVED PERSONAL INVITATION TO ACCOMPANY KHOMENI GROUP FROM
FRANCE TO IRAN, BUT WAS UNABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE OF CONFLICTING
PROFESSIONAL COMMITMENTS.

6. ANTICIPATE UNCAMEL/UNFUSIL/1 IS TO EXTEND NO MORE
THAN COUPLE OF WEEKS, AND THEREFORE NO NEED AT THIS TIME
FOR DIRECT STATION CONTACT. HOWEVER, EVENT EITHER ASSET
SHOULD COME ACROSS PERISHABLE INFORMATION, REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS FOR
EMERGENCY CONTACT WITH TEHRAN STATION. STATION ALSO WELCOME TEHRAN
COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS ON ABOVE [REDACTED] AS WELL AS ON BEST
TARGETING OF EACH.

7. FILE: 29-6-248/3 [REDACTED] SECRET RWV 13
APR 1999 DRV D9C.1.
SECRET

E C R E T 151221Z APR 79 STAFF

TEHRAN 52705 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)

PARIS INFO DIRECTOR.

WINTEL AJAJA UNCAMEL E USIL

REFS: A. PARIS 98132
B. DIRECTOR 419577

1. BELIEVE THAT IF WHEN UNCAMEL/1 (HE STRESSES FACT HE IS EXPERIENCED FRE FINANCIAL MEANS AND IN GENERAL AVOIDS AFFILIATION, HE SHOULD ENCOUNTER NO B OR INTO KURDISH AREAS. ONCE IN IRAN. CREDENTIALS TO GAIN MORE FRIENDLY RE NALISTS, EVEN AMERICANS, HAVE RECENT AND AS FAR AS WE KNOW DID NOT RUN I ATTACHE CONFIRMS THIS.) PGOI PERM WE BELIEVE THAT C/1 CHANCES OF SUC HAS LOCAL ASSISTANCE IN TEHRAN. FRIENDS FOR DRIVER/GUIDE WHO UNDF HAVE A LEG-UP ON THE PROBLEM. I PARIS WHO REPRESENTS FRENCH PRES ONLY, TEHRAN ASSET SDTRAMP/1 (T UNTIL ITS RECENT CLOSURE AND IS LIKELY PROVIDE C/1 WITH ADVICE CONTACT T/1 AT HIS OWN INITIA THAT WE SHOULD OURSELVES PLAC

2. SUGGEST THAT C/1 INIT VIEWING KURDESTAN DEMOCRATI WHO HAS OPENED PARTY OFFICE ACTING AS UNIFYING FORCE A VIOUSLY GHASMLOU WILL PRO THAT C/1 WILL PUBLISH SYM QUARTERS REQUIREMENTS AP C/1 SHOULD MANAGE TO HOPE

PLIES FOR VISA JOURNALIST OF SOME NG HIS POLITICAL HIS TRAVEL TO TEHRAN LD PLAY ON HIS CP KDP. WESTERN JOUR- ELLED INTO HINTERLANDS BLE. (EMBASSY PRESS ; NOT REQUIRED, BUT LD BE ENHANCED IF HE AN ARRANGE THROUGH KURDISH DIALECT HE WOULD JGGEST HE INQUIRE IN RAN. FOR STATION INFO LD JOURNAL DE TEHRAN AFR BIR. T/1 WOULD STANG C/1 MANAGES TO DO NOT REPORT NOT SUGGEST T/1 IN CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER.

INVESTIGATION BY INTER- ZADER ABDOL RAHMAN GHASMLOU AD AND WHO IS PRESENT" JUS KURDISH ACTIONS. OR WITH CURRENT LINE IN HOPE TREATMENT. DETAIL HEAD- LE AND GIVEN TIP AND LUCK IC QUESTIONS OF HIGH INTE ACE "LINE". AT CONSU

PAGE 02 TEHRAN SETOS & E C H E Y
VISIT, IF C/I HAS DEVELOPS LOCAL LEFTIST CO
APRECIATE RUN-DOWN OF WHO THEY ARE. IF C/I
WITH LOCAL FEDAYEEN (CHARIKS) OR MARXIST-C
THIS WOULD REPRESENT VALUABLE OPERATION
VISIT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY A CENTER FOR LEF
TO MOVE AGAINST THIS TA SET.

3. WHILE UNFUSIL/I (F/I), PER PARA
LENT ENTREE TO KHOMEINI/ GROUP, THESE CF
HIS DISADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO TALK TO
BEEN REPORTED THAT AYA/TOLLAH SAQDARI,
SHIITES WHO WAS CLOSE TO KHOMEINI, HA
ALAMEN MOFTI-ZADEH WHO WAS KHOMEINI'S
HIS POPULARITY AND IS ISOLATED. THE
A LOSS AS TO HOW BEST F/I MIGHT APP
HIMSELF AT DISPOSAL OF KHOMEINI GRO
GET CANNED EXPLANATION OF HOW PGOI
DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY. ON OTHER HA
STRAN, AS SUGGESTED FOR C/I, HE P
CHANCE OF SUCCESS IF F/I VISITS
VISIT KHOMEINI CROWD (INCLUDING
WOULD PROVIDE APPROPRIATE REQUIR
FROM PARIS.

4. BOTH C/I AND F/I SHOULD
HOTEL (JOURNALIST HANG-OUT)
APRIL, SUBJECT'S PLAN LEA
TALKING TO NEWS WHEN COME
IRAN ARE MUCH IN FLUX AND
FRAME OF COVERAGE. WE WOU
WITH STATION CONTACT PHONE
HELD AT HOTEL ROOM. PLEASE
ASSET AND TRUE NAME AS WE
PROVIDE CONTACT INSTRUCTI

5. FILE: 29-6-248/
BT

, WE WOULD AP-
NTURE INTO TALKS
O MUJAHIDIN,
HE SHOULD
CTIVITY, IN ORDER

F B, HAS EXCEL-
LS MAY WORK TO
LEADERS. IT HAS
R OF THE KURDISH
KURDISTAN AND THAT
O THE KDP HAS LOST
JE ARE SOMEWHAT AT
OBLEM. IF HE PLACES
O EXPECT THAT HE WILL
O HANDLE MINORITY
/I TRAVELS ON OWN
WOULD HAVE REASONABLE
WE WOULD WANT HIM TO
I END OF TRIP AND WE
RIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE

STAY AT INTERCONTINENTAL
LANNING DEPART PARIS 20
ATER SO HE WILL BE
ANNOUNCED. EVENTS IN
USEFUL TO READ TIME-
TO PROVIDE F/I AND C/I
D INITIAL MEETING COULD BE
LANGUAGE CAPABILITY EACH
TO THE WIRE. STATION WILL

4284. RWV 15APR89 DRV DSC.1

2 18 24z

S E C R E T 201915Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 9853E

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

WMINTEL AJAJA UNCAMEL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 419577
B. TEHRAN 52705

1. C/O BRIEFED UNCAMEL/1 GENERAL [REDACTED] RELEVANT SECTIONS OF REFS. RE PARA 4 REF A, UNCAMEL/1 [REDACTED] KNOWS NO ONE WITHIN IRANIAN COMMUNIST ELEMENTS BUT SAID [REDACTED] SOMEONE WHO DOES - JACQUES V A R I N, WHO WORKS AT FR [REDACTED] COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF) PUBLICATION "FRANCE-NOUVELLE". ACC [REDACTED] UNCAMEL/1, VARIN HAD CLOSE CONTACTS WITHIN TUDEH WH [REDACTED] INDIVIDUAL IRANIAN COMMUNISTS WERE LIVING HERE IN EXILE AND [REDACTED] CLANDESTINITY. VARIN ALSO HANDED PRINTING TRACTS FOR [REDACTED] UNCAMEL/1 KNOWS VARIN PERSONALLY AND WILL SOLICIT HIS [REDACTED] AND AID ON POSSIBLE TRIP TO IRAN. UNCAMEL/1 BELIEVES THE [REDACTED] ALL AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (AFP) OFFICE IN TEHRAN [REDACTED] IN CONFIR LBL AND WILL MAKE INQUIRIES WHERE RE WHO IS [REDACTED] WILL ADVISE.

2. INDEX VARIN. FILE: [REDACTED] 248/3. RW 20APR99 DRV
 D90-1-
S E C R E T

Merlot

11 MAY 79 23 50

C E R I 12332Z MAY 79 STAFF

TO DIRECTOR 437053.

FROM PRIORITY TEHRAN.

UNTEL UNFUSH. INTEL

REFS: A. NIT-10,501 TEHRAN 53026 TDFIRDB-315/08453-79
E. NIT-16,592 TEHRAN 53015 TDFIRDB-315/08529-79

1. REFS WERE GOOD REPORTS WHICH WERE WELL RECEIVED. IT
RAISES THE QUESTION ONCE AGAIN, HOWEVER, WHETHER GHASMOLOU'S DEMO-
CRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (DPK) AND EARZANI'S KURDISH DEMOCRATIC
PARTY (KDP) ARE TWO SEPARATE AND DISTINCT PARTIES, OR WHETHER THEY
ARE FRACTIONS OF THE SAME PARTY. THERE IS CONFLICTING REPORTING ON
THIS SUBJECT IN THE RECENT PAST. TO ADD TO THE CONFUSION, SDGABLEY
REPORTED THAT ONE OF THE FOUR LEADERS AT THE 25 FEBRUARY 1979
FOURTH GENERAL CONGRESS OF THE DPK IS A CLOSE ADVISER TO JALAL
TALABANI (WHO WE SHOW HEADS THE PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN (PUK))
AND SUPPOSEDLY SPOKE FOR TALABANI AT THE CONGRESS.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION APPROPRIATE SOURCES
COULD PROVIDE ON THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE DPK, AS WELL
AS CLARIFICATION OF ABOVE, AND, IF A FRACTION OF A CROSS-BORDER
PARTY, ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS COUNTERPARTS IN IRAQ, SYRIA, AND
TURKEY.

3. NO FILE. RWV 11 MAY 79 DRV DRC.1 ALLSECRET.

SECRET

DPK CADRE KOREAN MILITARY AID - VASILY (FR. AND OF HUNGARY/1)

DPK OFFICE 6 GOLAN MOUNTAIN (NEAR EISENHOWER AND SHADWAN ST.)

TEL. 976 127

RUSSIAN SOCIETY HEAD W/TYPE TO DPK

TEL. 976 127

DPK 105 (S. AND W. OF TEL. 976)

T 051532Z JUN

PARIS 10076

TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

EL AJAJA UNCAMEL

- 1. A. TEHRAN 53294
- 2. B. DIRECTOR 451889
- 3. C. TEHRAN 51410

1. REGRET DELAY BUT I HAD LITTLE TO
 REPORT VIS-A-VIS TRIP TO IRAN. I WOULD BE ABLE TO
 TRAVEL BY END NEXT WEEK. EDITORS OF PARIS
 LEFTIST MAGAZINE, "DEMAIN" (HE HAS WRITTEN
 IN PAST, TOLD THEM HE HAD WITH IMPLIED
 FINANCIAL SUPPORT) FROM (D) AND ASKED
 IF MAGAZINE WOULD BE INTERESTED FOR HIS ARTICLES/
 PHOTOS. EDITORS RESPONDED WITHOUT MARKED
 ENTHUSIASM AND UNCAMEL AT LEAST GET LETTER
 OF ACCREDITATION. HE VARIN, CONTACT AT
 FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY "PROGRES-NOUVELLE" WHO
 HE HAD BEEN TOLD HAD VARIN; VARIN INTRO-
 DUCED HIM TO NOURI (PCF MEMBER,
 PRESIDENT OF ONE-YEAR ASSOCIATION, AFASPI
 (ASSOCIATION FRANCAISE D'UNITE AVEC LE PEUPLE
 D'IRAN). ALBALA PRESENTS IN IRAN.
 VARIN IS ATTEMPTING TO GET FNU N A Z A R I,
 DESCRIBED AS MAN IN PARIS. WILL
 ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

3. IS REFERRING TO AGREE THAT
 UNCAMEL WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
 TION.

4. INDEXED 4284. RWV
 25 JUN 91 DRV
 S E C R E T

FOR STAFF

DIRECTOR.

#76

FOLLOWING IS NEW CONTACT PLAN FOR UNCAMEL/1. PHONE
828-891 EXT 1118 RPT 1138 DAYTIME OR 835-938 RPT
EVENINGS, AND ASK FOR "JOAN" WITH C/I IDENTIFYING
AS HENRY. HENRY'S CALL OCCUR AT LOCATION AND DATE GIVEN
PHONE CONVERSATION, 835/938 RPT ONE HOUR EARLIER THAN
AREA. C/I SHOULD CARRY COPY OF MAGAZINE IN HIS HAND,
CASE OFFICER.

2. REPEAT PHYSICAL SEARCH
AND/OR FILE HOLDINGS. PLEASE

UNCAMEL/1 NO LONGER IN
FILE.

3. FILE 819-828-
27

JUL 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET 1530Z SEP 70 STAFF
CITE WESTPORT 48618 SECTION 1 OF 2
TO: DIRECTOR INFO GERMAN, BONN, MUNICH, TEHRAN, ANKARA.

MINUTE REPEAT AJAJA TRACE
REF: WESTPORT 44648

Should have been
Baghdad

1. FOLLOWING IS A BIOGRAPHIC/BACKGROUND AND PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT REPORT ON AHMED REUF AL-NAKIB, AN IRAQI KURD WHO WALKED IN AT THE US CONGEN I MUNICH ON 27-7875 1979 AND WHO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INTERVIEWED BY ELMER J. ZARRISON IN MUNICH:

A. AHMED REUF AL-NAKIB (FROM HERE ON A) WAS BORN ON 18 NOVEMBER 1931 IN SOLEYMANIYA, KURDISTAN, IRAQ, A KURDISH NATIONAL AND IRAQI CITIZEN. IN 1950, FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL (GYMNASIUM) IN SOLEYMANIYA, HE ENROLLED IN AN AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL IN ABBAS-GRADE, NEAR BAGHDAD. HE DID NOT GRADUATE FROM THE ABOVE SCHOOL; HOWEVER, YEARS LATER, HE CONTINUED HIS STUDIES AT THE NICOLEA BALCESCU FACULTY OF AGRICULTURE IN BUCHAREST, ROMANIA. IN ROMANIA, A NET ILSE HEK BRUNSON, AN ETHNIC GERMAN WHOM HE MARRIED IN 1964, THEY HAVE A 7-YEAR-OLD SON, NURJI. FROM 1956 TO 1962, A SERVED WITH THE HANK OF LIEUTENANT IN THE IRAQI ARMY IN KURDISTAN. SINCE 1961, A INTERMITTENTLY RESIDED IN FRANKFURT-MAIN, WESTWARDS (1964-65); GIESSEN (1965-66) IN STUTTGART (1961-64), MUNICH (1964-65); GIESSEN (1965-66) TEHRAN (3 MONTHS IN 1968), SOLEYMANIYA (1968-75) WHERE HE SERVED AS DIRECTOR OF THE LOCAL AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION CENTER. FROM 1973 TO 1974, FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, A WAS AN AGRICULTURAL ADVISER TO MUSTAFA B A R I A W I, THE LATE TURKISH EMBEL LEGATION IN 1974, WHEN THE KURDISH REVOLT AGAINST THE IRAQI ARMY WAS CRUSHED. A CROSSED THE TURKISH-IRANIAN BORDER INTO IRAN WITH THE OPERATING KURDS. HERE, HE INITIALLY READED A KURDISH PRESS CAMP, NEAR PAVE (FOR CIRCA 3 MONTHS), THEN, FOR ANOTHER THREE MONTHS, HE RESIDED AT HARPULIZAND, ALSO IN IRAN. AFTER 15 DAYS IN TEHRAN, A LEFT FOR DUISBURG.

PAGE 2 WESTBERT 48616 S E C R E T

WEST GERMANY, WHERE HE RESIDED WITH HIS BROTHER DAVID FROM 1973. FROM 1973 TO JUNE 1979, A RESIDED IN WEST GERMANY, WHERE HE WAS MOSTLY UNEMPLOYED AND LIVED OFF SUBSIDIES TO HIM BY HIS HEALTHY FATHER. IN BETWEEN, IN FALL 1978, A VISITED HIS BROTHER AND IN-LAWS IN WEST GERMANY, WHERE HE COULD NOT FIND SUITABLE WORK BECAUSE OF DISCRIMINATION TOWARDS THE KURDS ON THE PART OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

MARI NURI
BYMANIYAH.
ANCE GIVEN
1978, A
CLAIMS THAT
TION

3. A CLAIMS TO BE A MEMBER OF THE BARDINGI TRIBE (COMBING ARAB) AND THE SON OF SHEIK REUF AL-NAJIBI, 67-YEAR-OLD WELL-KNOWN BUSINESSMAN AND LANDOWNER IN (TELL ZEBE). FATHER OWNS A PLANTATION, EXPENSIVE NUMBER OF SHOPS IN SULAYMANIYAH. A HAS TWO BROTHERS FORMER ARMY COLONELS. IN IRAQ: FAHER AL-WAGHER, AN AT A GOVERNMENT OFFICE IN BAGHDAD; AND SELHALDIN AL-OFFICIAL AT THE ARMY INSPECTION CENTER IN KIRKUK. ANOTHER BROTHER, THERE WORKS AS A PHYSICIAN WHO OWNS HIS OWN PRACTICE, RESIDES IN GIESSENKIRCHEN, NEAR MANNHEIM/LADBACH, FRG.

BYMANIYAH.
LA AND A
OF
STANT
D, AN
BROTHER.
ES IN

4. POLITICAL AFFILIATION: A CLAIMS TO BE A MEMBER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN - DPK (IRAQ). FROM 1958 HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE DPK'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE. EARLY WAS SECRETARY OF THE KURDISH STUDENT ORGANIZATION IN A CLAIMS TO KNOW WELL ALL LEADING PEOPLE OF THE DPK IN AS WELL AS A LARGE NUMBER OF KURDISH LEADERS IN IRAN. PERSONALLY MET MUSTAFA MERSHUTI AND IDRIS, OF MUSTAFA A CLAIMS THEY MADE THE BARRANI WAS ELECTED TO REPLACE MUSTAFA BARRANI AS THE OVERALL LEADER OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE. WAS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CURRENTLY IN EASTERN TURKEY. A ALSO CLAIMS THAT HIS PERSONAL OPPOSITION FROM EARLIER DAYS IN EUROPE AGAINST MUSTAFA BARRANI. CURRENTLY THE HEAD OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN IRAN. CURRENTLY STUDIES IN THE USSR AND IS CURRENTLY WORKING ON THE AUTHOR OF A BOOK ON KURDISH A REBEL FRACTION. HE CURRENTLY TWO REBEL FACTIONS IN THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY. THE OTHER ONE HEADED BY MUSTAFA BARRANI. A RED-COMMUNIST WHO WENT TO MAHARA

OF THE
1968.
HE
E.
Q.
KNOWS
ZANI.
WITH
S
NO-

PAGE 3 WTSR 48618 S E C R E T
IRAN, TO HELP THE KURDS THERE GAIN THEIR AUTONOMY
IRANISANS.

P. CONNECTIONS WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
CLAIMS THAT HE SOUGHT HELP FOR THIS PEOPLE BY INFILTRATING
VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS, THRU THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
PLIGHT OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE IN THEIR BIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE
AND/OR AUTONOMY. IN 1964, 1967, AND AGAIN IN FALL 1973, HE
CONTACTED THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN MAD GODESBERG, WHERE HE HAD
DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS THERE. HE ALSO MADE
REPORTS ON THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAQ. A CLAIMS THAT
OF FUNDS KEEP HIM FROM GOING TO SEE THE ISRAELI EMBASSY
MAD GODESBERG. IN 1968, HE ALSO ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH
IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, SAVAK, IN MAD GODESBERG.
ASSOCIATION WITH SAVAK CONTINUED UNTIL 1975, WHEN HE
VISITED IRAN. IN 1968, HE WAS THE GUEST OF SAVAK IN TEHRAN
CIRCA THREE MONTHS. DURING THIS PERIOD, HE HELPED IN
RELATIONS BETWEEN SAVAK AND IRAQI KURDS, LED BY MUSTAFA
BARZANI. A CLAIMS TO HAVE PROVIDED SAVAK WITH LENGTHY
DETAILED REPORTS ON THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAQ. HE
TO 1973, WHILE WITH THE KURDISH REBELS IN KURDISTAN, HE
MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH SAVAK. A EMPHASIZED THAT HE VOLUNTARILY
PROVIDED INFORMATION TO THE ISRAELIS AND IRANISANS AND
AT NO TIME DID HE ACCEPT ANY FINANCIAL COMPENSATION IN
EXCEPT FOR EXPENSES.

Q. CONNECTIONS WITH US OFFICIALS ABROAD: A ALSO
HELP BY CONTACTING US OFFICIALS AT DIFFERENT US INSTALLATIONS
ABROAD. IN EITHER 1963 OR 1964, HE CONTACTED THE US CONSUL
IN BOMBEY. IN 1968 AND IN 1974, HE CONTACTED THE US CONSUL
IN TEHRAN. THERE, IN 1974, HE DISCUSSED THE KURDISH PROBLEM
WITH MR. LARRY TREMAK (P). SEPTEMBER 1978, HE VISITED THE
EMBASSY IN ANKARA, WHERE HE VERBALLY REPORTED ON THE SITUATION
IN KURDISTAN. IN OCTOBER 1978, HE VISITED THE US CONSUL
IN MUNICH, WHERE HE DISCUSSED THE KURDISH PROBLEM WITH A

48618

WESTPORT ABLE S M C E Y T ALSO TURNED OVER A
REPORT (WEIGHTEN IN KURDISH) ON THE DEVELOPING SITHA
HEAR (SEE IT) DURING HIS 27 AUGUST 1978 VISIT TO
KURDISH CONSULATE, RETURNED OVER ANOTHER REPORT (ALS
KURDISH), WHICH HE DEALS WITH THE FOLLOWING
KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAQ: CLANDESTINE SHIPMENTS
OF WEAPONS TO KURDISH GROUPS VIA IRAQ -- WITH SA
PERSONAL OF IRAQI GOVERNMENT; PRESENCE OF IDI AMIN I
AND SAO IN KURDS ABROAD.

PERSONALITY DESCRIPTION: A MAKES A GOOD GEN
IMPRESSION. HE IS A HANDSOME AND WELL-GROOMED MAN HE
CHARMING, GENTLEMANLY AND INTELLIGENT. HE IS TALL, H
GREY HAIR, A DARK MUSTACHE, AND DELICATE FACIAL FEATURES
HE IS ELEGANTLY DRESSED. A NATIONALIST AND DEVOTED SE
MUSLIM. HE CLAIMS TO BE A DESCENDANT OF THE PROPHET MO
AND IN SUCH WOULD LIKE TO HELP BRING ABOUT PEACE BETWEEN
KURDS AND THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. A IS IN POSSESSION
SCROLLS CERTIFYING THAT HE IS A DESCENDANT OF THE PROPH
TO CONTACT THE SYRIANS KNOWING A BELIEVES HE WILL BE
PARTNER TO NEGOTIATE PEACE BETWEEN THE KURDS AND THE
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. A DOES NOT APPEAR AS A RELIGIOUS PA
HOWEVER, HE DOES APPEAR PREOCCUPIED WITH THE FLIGHT OF A
PEOPLE AND ITS REUSE FOR AN INDEPENDENT KURDISTAN. A IS
CONVERSATIONALIST AND APPEARS TO HAVE NUMEROUS FRIENDS
IN TEHRAN AND ELSEWHERE. IN ADDITION TO HIS NATIVE KURDIS
A SPEARS FLUENT ARAB (FARSI), IRANIAN, AND GERMAN. GOOD I
AND SOME ROMANIAN AND TURKISH.

2. DURING FAREWELL WITH ZAKIRIEN, A STATED THAT HE WOU
LIKE TO DISCUSS THE U.S. MIDDLE EAST EXPERTS(S) THE CURREN
KURDISH SITUATION, ASKING THAT HE WANTED TO KEEP THE U.S.
INFORMED ON EVENTS IN KURDISTAN, WITH THE AIM OF KEEPING T

SHY
WIM
CS:
AQ
D,
RE
R
C/
OOD
SHI

PAGE 5 WESTPORT 48612 S E C R E T

COMMUNISTS FROM TAKING OVER FULL CONTROL OF KURDISTAN WHEN
ASKED BY ZAKRISON WHETHER OR NOT HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN
COOPERATING WITH AIS RE ABOVE, ANSWERED THAT HE WOULD BE
HAPPY TO DO SO, BUT ONLY IN RETURN FOR U.S. BACKING OF THE
KURDISH CAUSE AND NOT FOR FINANCIAL COMPENSATION.

3. A PLANS TO RETURN WITH WIFE (WHO HAS WEST GERMAN PASS-
PORT) AND SON TO IRAQ ON 3 SEPT 1979. HE IS IN POSSESSION
OF IRAQI PASSPORT (DID NOT HAVE PASSPORT WITH HIM DURING
INTERVIEW) WITH WEST GERMAN 3-MONTH VISA VALID UNTIL 1 SEPT.
IF HQS IS INTERESTED IN FURTHER ASSASSINATING AND/OR RECRUITING A
PLEASE ADVISE. A COULD BE RECONTACTED THRU HIS IN-LAW, FAW.
GEGESCH, KIRCHSEEBOENERSTR 6 II, EGGENHARTING, NEAR MUNICH
(WHERE HE CURRENTLY RESIDES). TEL. 98894-2582, OR THRU HIS
BROTHER IN GIESSENKIRCHEN, WHERE HE PLANS TO VISIT PRIOR TO
HIS DEPARTURE FROM GERMANY.

4. A'S REPORT AND THREE PHOTOS (A WITH SOME INFLUENCE AMONG
KURDS) WILL BE TOUCHED TO HIASAP.

B. NAFILE DEER. RVV IS SEP 20 REV DO CL.

S E C R E T
BT
0810

12 SEP 19 13 202

E C R E T 120635Z SEP 70
FM DIRECTOR 511480.

OS IMMEDIATE WESTFOOT
OUTLINE TERRAN, ANLARD

MENTEL AYAT ANLAKA TRAC
KEYS: A. WESTFOOT
N. WESTFOOT

A. HEE HAS FOLLOWING
ASSIGNED 221-072061)

A. PER BAR
SERVICE LISTED NAGIS AS
SOCIETY IN EUROPE (INSE
SECONDARY SCHOOL AND W
LING IN GENERAL AGING

B. IN ROM
SHE WAS FORCED TO AG
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A
1961. IN SPIRIT OF CL
STILL COLLABORATING A
RUMANIANS.

C. WITH
TO THE EMBASSY IN THE
OFFICER. THIS OFFICER
IN FILE IS ALMOST V
WAS TOLD THAT VEIL
MINORITIES, OFFICIAL
ACKNOWLEDGMENT BEING
UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS
NOT MISINTERPRET WITH
AS ANY INDICATION O

2. DOES APT
PER REF A. PARA 2.

IMMEDIATE BOMB, MUNICH, GERMANY.

(INCLUDING RELATED ISWABU)
(MORAL)

ED ON ARRIVAL EAST AL-4 A C I D (PREVIOUSLY
ATED BY 2 APRIL 1968. THE OFFICIAL BUNCH

AN LIAISON OFFICER OF THE KUNNISH SECURITY
HE OBTAINED FROM THE BRAC AGRICULTURAL
EMENT IN RUMANIA IN 1959/60. SPECIAL

OF 31 MARCH 1968. NAGIS'S WIFE CLAIMED
COM WITH THE ROMANIAN SECRET SERVICE
IN TO JOHN REY NUBAND IN GERMANY IN
TO THE CERTAIN, NAGIS BELIEVED SHE WAS
AT ONE WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THE

ON 28 NOVEMBER 1968 STATED THAT NAGIS CAME
AND ASKED TO SPEAK WITH A POLITICAL OFF
IN THIS DOCUMENT WHICH IS THE LAST ONE
IN FILE WERE OBTAINED IN REF A. NAGIS
WAS SYMPATHIC TO THE CAUSE OF
AS THE BEST SOLUTION WAS FOR AN
SING HOMES. NAGIS STATED THAT HE
ORIGINAL U.S. POSITION AND THAT HE WOULD
OF POLITICAL OFFICER TO HEAR HIS STORY
EMBASSY SUPPORT FOR BARRANI'S KURDS.

ONE OF BEST WITH OPERATIONAL INTEREST AND
SECTION OFFICER WITH WISSE EAST

12 SEP

TELETYPE 12 030Z SEP 79 STAFF

REPORT 8028

REPORT AT DIRECTOR INFO BONN, GERMANY MUNICH, TEHRAN, ISRAEL

RYAD AJJA

DIRECTOR 5 1488

AMMAN SAUD AL-... A Q I B HAS AGREED TO POSTPONE HIS HE IS LOOKING
TO RETURN TO GERMANY UNTIL 22 SEPTEMBER AND EXPECTS PHONE MEMBER # AL-NAQUI
TO MEETING MIDDLE EAST SPECIALIST SEPTEMBER # AL-NAQUI
ON KANSAS AT 1800 HOURS ON 18 SEPTEMBER # AL-NAQUI
TO RETURN TO IRAQ BY AUTOMOBILE VIA YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE

IF WE REPORT CAN SUPPORT NEAR EAST OFFICER IN ANY WAY

FILE # 201-872 61. RVW 12 SEP 99 DIV D9C1.

13 SEP 75

C O N F I D E N T I A L 122384Z SEP 75

TO THE DIRECTOR 512332

FROM PRIORITY WESTPORT AND PRIORITY BERNARD AND PRIORITY BERNICE.

ROUTINE TEHRAN, ANKARA

TEL TEL AT AJAJA

REF A. WESTPORT 48210
B. DIRECTOR 31148

1. FOLLOWING IS THE

IRANIAN KURDISH GROUP

OPERATING ON THE IRACI

KURDISH OBJECTIVES

AS POSSIBLE, SOME KIND

OF AS WELL AS DETAIL

DATA OF ALL KDP

TALABANI FACTIONS

BETWEEN THE TWO

MAY BE EXTENDING

D. DETAILS ON

THE IRACI SIDE

E. DATA

LOCATED AND

THEY GETTING

F. SUPPORT

GETTING FROM THE

G. DETAILS

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR USE WITH SURE

IF ANY ARE THE IRACI SIDE GIVING THE

THAT INTERESTS ARE IRACI SIDE SITUATIONS

COMMUNIST. SPECIFIC SUPPORTING ON IRACI

NEXT TWO YEARS. IF INTEREST AND. IF

WARRANT OF HOW IRACI SIDE THESE OBJECTIVES

IRACI SIDE PLANS TO GO ON AUTONOMY, ETC.

IRACI SIDE SUPPORT AS WELL AS SURE

IRACI SIDE SUPPORT THAT IRACI SIDE

SECRET
2 DIRECTOR 51 326 E C R E T
DING ARMS INTO MAN WITH TACIT IRAQI GOV APPROVAL.

THE ABOVE MAY HAVE ON POSSIBLE IRAQI SUPPORT TO ARAB-
MAKING GROUPS IN SYRIA.

WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN NAMES PLUS PERSONALITY DATA
ON SYRIAN INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE TAKEN PART WITH THE
SAID GROUPS FROM SYRIA AND WHO ARE CURRENTLY BEING
BORN TO THE KUSA.

AN IDEAL SOURCE MAY HAVE ON IRACI SAID GROUPS SUCH
AS THE NAME OF HOW WELL KNOWN THEY ARE AND THE
NAME OF THE SAID GROUPS AND THE SAID GROUPS INFO

2. FOLLOWING OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS SHOULD BE COVERED IN
COMING REFERENCE WITH SUBJ:
A- THE PRESENT STATUS AND DEVELOPMENT WITH
THE SAID GROUPS AND THE SAID GROUPS

TRAINING OF GROUPS IN THE SAID GROUPS. NEED
THE SAID GROUPS IN THE SAID GROUPS.

INTEND TO USE THE SAID GROUPS IN THE SAID GROUPS.

RAMMANN B- THE SAID CONTACTS WITH THE SAID GROUPS WITH
THE SAID GROUPS.

AS THE SAID GROUPS IN THE SAID GROUPS TO THE SAID GROUPS
THE SAID GROUPS IN THE SAID GROUPS.

13 SEP 1945 3 1/2

SECRET 1222671 STAFF

TE DIRECTOR 51223..

1. IMMEDIATE WESTPO. JOHN INFO GERMANY.

INTEL REBAT ASAJA CODE

REFS: A. WESTPO. 426
B. DIRECTOR 1488

1. APPRECIATE GRIERSON'S EFFORTS PER
ANDERSON ARRIVING SUVA VIA LUFTANSA 69 FIC
435 HOURS (ITINERARY ALREADY FORWARDED MURKIN)
ANDERSON HAS CONTACT WITH BASE AND DET
ANDERSON WILL CONTACT WESTPO RE AL-NAQIB

MR. FRANK
ON 18 SEP AT
AS SOON AS
HIS SCHEDULE,
N.

2. FOR BOMB: APPRECIATE MR. JACK GRIERSON
HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF A AND ANDERSON AVAIL
GRIERSON RETURN HQS.

SON STANDING BY
ILLYI, REQUEST TRAD

3. FILE: 15 7-361. RTV 12SEP45

DECL 1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET
BT
#1284

15 SEP 79

E T 140909Z SEP 79

ANKARA 44631

REPORT INFO DIRECTOR, GERMANY, BONN, MUNICH, TEHRAN.

RYBAT AJAJA TRACE

REPORT 48610

REF PARA 12 PLS SEE EMBASSY ANKARA AERIAL A-70 DT
FOR REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH AHMED HUSSEIN AL-NAKIB

REF DEFER. RVN 14 SEP 69 DRV DSC.1.

SECRET - EVIDENCE SENT TO STAFF

WARRANTY SHELL OR OLSTER

RE: 1. WINDWARD WINGS

1. WE CANNOT LOCATE SPERM
SUPPORTER OF THE SWANIAN KINGS
BORN FIGHTING TO IDENTIFIED FOR US
SERV.

2. WINDWARD WINGS
WINDWARD WINGS
ON ATTEMPTING TO IDENTIFY

3. FILE - WINDWARD WINGS
SECRET

19 SEP 79 00 22Z

09 12 SEP 79 STAFF

SECRET

DIRECTOR, ANKARA, STOCKHOLM INFO TERN

SECRET ANY AVAILABLE HQS AND ARDEE INFO

STOCKHOLM OF A KURDISH ASSOCIATION

KURDISH SEPARIST MOVEMENTS IN TURK

SECRETLY PREPARING INTEL DISSEM ON T

AND WOULD APPRECIATE INFO ASAP.

SEP 79 DRV DPCS ALL SECRET

SECRET 10 044Z SEP 79

CITE: ESTABHOL 126184

TO: PRIORITY ISTANBUL INFO KARAK, TEHRAN, DIRECT

UNINTL CL INTEL

REF: IS ANBUL 3265

1. SECRET HAVE NO INFO ESTABLISHMENT KURD
ASSOCIATION IN STOCKHOLM. WILL QUERY LIAISON AT
BUT REFERENCE WILL NOT BE RECEIVED IN TIME FOR YOUR

2. FILE RMW 19 SEP 79 RMW DDO, S.

SECRET

18 SEP 68

SECRET 230000Z SE 68 STAFF

SITE DIRECTOR 517040.

FM: PRIORITY ISTANBUL, ANKARA, STOCKHOLM R 050

MMIPL INTEL

REF: ISTANBUL 33065

- 1. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT DOUBT THE EXISTENCE, WE HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION ON ANY TURKISH ASSOCIATIONS IN STOCKHOLM.
- 2. NO FILE. RW 19 SEP 68 DAV DDCI.

SECRET

200875 07 4.2

S E C R E T 290619Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 522759.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAO, NE/INTEL

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - PLANS AND INTENTIONS OF FEDAYEEN AND CHARIK STUDENTS TO CREATE A FEDAYEEN PARTY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-233-233

1. FOLLOWING OBTAINED FROM SDPARTNER/1 25 SEPTEMBER.
INVITE STATION COMMENTS.

AT A MEETING OF KURDISH NATIONALISTS, CHARIK AND FEDAYEEN STUDENTS OPPOSED TO THE REGIME OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, THE STUDENTS DETERMINED THAT THEY HAVE LOST POWER AND REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN IRAN, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD A LARGE ROLE IN OVERTHROWING THE SHAH, BECAUSE THEY HAD NO REAL POLITICAL POWER BASE MECHANISM TO ENSURE THAT THEY HAD A SAY IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT ONCE THE PHYSICAL ACT OF REMOVING THE SHAH WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THE FEDAYEEN THEREFORE HAVE DETERMINED THEIR IMMEDIATE PRIORITY IS TO ESTABLISH A POLITICAL PARTY UNDER THE OFFICIAL REGULATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

RECOGNIZING THAT THIS PARTY WILL BE CONTROVERSIAL IN CURRENT DAY IRAN, WHILE THEY INTEND TO HAVE VARIOUS FRONT PEOPLE PRESENT IN IRAN, THE ACTUAL LEADERSHIP WILL BE OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY AND, AS PRESENTLY INTENDED, BASED IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

2. FILE: 201-962539. RWV 27SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#2427

FEDAYEEN PARTY

... COMPETITION FOR REPRESENTATION IN THE
PARLIAMENT WILL BE ORGANIZED ON PARTY BASIS, AND IT ENTIRELY
POSSIBLE THAT STUDENTS WOULD WANT TO GET INTO THE ACT.

2. REF ALLUSION TO "CHARIK AND FEDAYEEN" STUDENTS
SEEMS TO BE A MISNOMER, AS THE TWO TERMS ARE PART OF THE NAME
OF A SINGLE ORGANIZATION, THE CHARIKA-YE-FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ. WAS
PARTNER/1 REFERRING ONLY TO THE ONE ORGANIZATION, OR DID HE
MEAN TO INCLUDE ALSO THE ISLAMIC-ORIENTED MUJAHEDIN-E-KHALQ?
I HAVE NOT BEFORE HEARD OF SIGNIFICANT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN
IRISH NATIONALISTS AND THE FEDAYAN.

... OF ENIGRE ACTIVITY,

29 Ser 7 7 22

SECRET
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/88 BY 60322 UCBAW/STP

... IS CURRENTLY LOOKING FOR ADDITIONAL INFO MATROS ON
... AND OTHER MINORITIES IN IRAN WHO
... WE CONTEMPLATING POSSIBLE
... HOWEVER, MATROS IS DEFINITELY
... IN THE STATIONS COMMENTS/OPINIONS
... CONTAINED IN PRESIDENTIAL ON SOVIET
... AND NO RE PRESIDENTIAL

SECRET ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

MINORITIES COULD BE USED TO GOOD EFFECT AS WE SEEK
TO PROMOTE VARIOUS U.S. INTERESTS HERE, ESPECIALLY IN INTEL
LIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD. THE OTHER EDGE OF THE SWORD AS WE SEE IT HERE
IS THAT MANY--MAYBE MOST--IRANIANS TEND TO SEE THE SUPERPOWERS
AS COMING FROM SAME CLOTH, AND
IF THIS AUDIENCE WILL ASSUME THAT, WHATEVER THE RUSSIANS
ARE DOING, WE MUST BE INVOLVED IN SOMETHING EQUALLY
DANGEROUS. FOR THIS REASON, WE SUSPECT THAT MOST EFFECTIVE USE
OF SOVIET SUPPORT TO ETHNIC SEPARATISTS WOULD INVOLVE
BRIEFINGS OF RELEVANT OFFICIALS.

200K79 1547

SECRET OCT 29 1957

REF W/AM 4402

DIRECTOR, TFRANK

TEL AMJA RWINNSA INTEL

DIRECTOR, TFRANK

STATION FEELS THAT ANY COVERT ACTION EFFORT TO LINK
SOVIETS WITH KURLISH MINORITIES IN IRAN OR, BY EXTENS
REPLY IN ORDER TO BE CREDIBLE WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED ON
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. OTHERWISE OUR EFFORT MIGHT COME

COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS. MOST RECENT INFO ON ARMS SUPPLY
FROM TURKS COMES FROM EXPROMISE/1 WHO HAS JUST RETURNED
TO EASTERN TURKEY WHERE HE TALKED WITH SENIOR TURKISH
OFFICERS. ACCORDING TO THESE SOURCES, SOVIET RIFLES
MULES VIA THE BLACK SEA INTO THE TRABZON AREA.
LINE OF INFORMATION THAT WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT
IN SPECIFIC DETAILS.

REF 1 OCT 29 1957 090.5 ALL SECRET

E C R E T 030247Z NOV 79
TE DIRECTOR 348787

TEL AVIV INFO WERBA, AMAN, BEIRUT, CHIRI, DAG SOUTH
MACHI, KUMAIT, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, AMAL
HTEL INTX 701 ZEWAKO

TEL AVIV 30001 (NWV-23)

1. NOT DISSEMINATE REPT AS REPORT LA...
INFORMATION RE: BIT OF INTEREST. TCS APR...
THAT PRESENT ISRAELI RECLIMENTS STRONG...
OF METHOD OF BUILDING. HOWEVER IN THIS...
ENCE THAT AN INCREASE IN MILITARY ACT...
IS TO BE PLACED IN AUGUST FOR ST...
DERS SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTING MING...
ANOR OF SUCH SKEWER OF ISRAELI MILIT...
LEAVE BEEN OF MORE INTEREST TO ISRAEL...
ATION TO SUPPORT CLAIM THAT SUCH AN...
PARA TWO INFO ON RESENTMENT BY...
CONCERN IN MACHDED INTEREST SECTION...
PROCEDURE AS ONE DESIGNED TO KEEP...
NO FILE. NWV 230128 DR 200.1 AM...
E T

REPORT CLASS: SECRET//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//COM
COUNTRY: IRAQ/IRAN
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN KURDISH AFFAIRS (0221 OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM "A NEW SERVICE SHOWING A NUMBER OF KURDISH VISITORS TO BRITAIN."

1. THE KURD WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG KURDISH VISITORS TO BRITAIN SAID IN LATE OCTOBER 1979 THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SPLIT BETWEEN MUJIB BARZANI AND HIS BROTHER IDRIS BARZANI. THE FORMER HAS STATED THAT IRAQI AND IRANIAN KURDS ARE MAINLY IN CONTACT WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT BY SUBVERTING THE POLICY OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGAINST THE OTHER, AND HE BELIEVED THAT THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI KURDS COMBINED COULD CREATE AN INDEPENDENT UNIT WHICH WOULD NOT BE DOMINATED BY EITHER GOVERNMENT.

2. ACCORDING TO THE KURD, IDRIS BARZANI FELT THAT KURDISH OPERATIONS COULD BE BETTER SERVED BY CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE ATALLAH MUJIBALLAH K.M.C. (K.M.I.) IN IRAN. THE KURD SAID IDRIS ESTABLISHED A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH MUJIBALLAH WHO WAS TRYING TO GET THE KURDS AS A WEAPON AGAINST THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. THE SPLIT BETWEEN MUJIB AND IDRIS IS A FOGUE AND IS CREATED FOR TACTICAL REASONS TO ALLOW THE IRAQI KURDS A REFUGE IN IRAN IF IT WAS NEEDED. MUJIB, RATHER THAN IDRIS, HAS THE SUPPORT OF KURDISH FIGHTERS.

THE KURD SAID DR. MUHAMMAD QOTHI M A N, WHO HAD FORMER A SPLITTER GROUP OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) AFTER THE 1975 ALGIERIA AGREEMENT, HAD MADE HIS PEACE WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. HE HAD ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY OF HIS FOLLOWERS WERE IN BAGHDAD IN OCTOBER; THEY HAD ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE IRAN WITH THEIR WEAPONS BUT HAD BEEN DISARMED BEFORE DEPARTURE BY JABAL TALABANI'S MEN.

THE KURD ALSO SAID THAT THE KDP NO LONGER EXPECTED HELP FROM THE SOVIET COUNTRIES. IT PINNED ITS HOPES ON THE SOVIET UNION. THE KURD HAD MADE CONTACT WITH KURDISH REPRESENTATIVES IN WEST

7: ENCL. LONDON (19 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD NO.

OS - 74,357.

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT LONDON, SETTELMENT OFFICE AT DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KUWAIT, TERNAI, TEL AVIV.
REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR/PI. ALL PORTIONS DERIVED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
SECRET

SECRET 01 09Z OCT 79 INTEL

TO: LONDON, WASH DC, ZNY XXXXX

FROM: DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE, BEIRUT, CAIRO, AMMAN, RIYADH, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV.

UNCLASSIFIED FBI INTEL ZRWANOG

UPDATE: ZRWANOG FOR DESK REVIEW. GIVE APPROPRIATE PORTAL TO
CK 79-6883 WITH DELICATE SOURCE INFORMATION
FIELD NO. 79-057. NO LIAISON. NO
RW 300790 RV 0901 BY 006156

THE SUBJECTS. GABRIEL COOPERATED WITH JALAL TALABANI'S MEN.

AGG: ISRAEL. TEL AVIV (1 NOVEMBER 1979). FIELD NO: NEV-2397.

FROM: BUREAU. SUBJECT: MURKIN AT TEL AVIV. SENT TO: PERSIAN, BAHRAIN, SAUDI, JERUSALEM, SIENA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, QATAR.

SECRET CLASS. S. C. S. E. T. WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR--FCI. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.

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OFFIRDE-515/19288-88
DIST. 02 NOVEMBER 1970
UNMTEL N0FORN N0CONTRACT ORCON

REARBOU OF FORMER CHIEF OF THE IRANIAN
AZIZILLAH PALIZMAN (DOJ: MID-AUGUST 1968)
ISRAELI SERVICE
F OF THE J-12 OF THE IRANIAN ARMED F
L I Z I A N. ARRIVED IN ITALY FROM
AND IS PRESENTLY LIVING THERE. HIS
IS ALSO RESIDING IN ITALY. HIS
I HAVE IRANIAN PASSPORTS. A BROTH
RECENTLY ARRIVED IN THE U.S. UNTIL
GENERAL PALIZMAN HAD SPENT MOST OF HIS
HEADQUARTERS COMMAND. OFFIRDE-515/19288-88
A GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED
CAPTURE BY AYATOLLAH REVOLUTIONARIES
ITIME AFTER THE REVOLUTION AND WAS
SMEN. EVER SINCE, THERE HAVE BEEN
ERAL PALIZMAN WAS ORGANIZING A KURD
E INTENT OF OVERTHROWING THE ISLAMIC

TEL AVIV (02 OCTOBER 1970)
EMBASSY AT TEL AVIV: SEND TO
GIVE NOTICE THAT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS - NOT
R CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS - DESIG
RICH, CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR - G
RECORDED REPORT G. OFFICER. ALL
CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENTS.

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION
ORIGINATOR. LAW BEGETS ON
OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARR
OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLLED BY
RECORDED REPORTING
DISSEMINATION AND CONTROLS

30
8158

31 Oct 79 09 57z

SECRET 381322Z OCT 79 1414Z

TO: DIRECTION INFO BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMAS, JERUSALEM, JIDDA,
KUNAFI, TEL AVIV, RIYADH, TERFEN, PARIS.

WIMTEL INTTEL

SUBDATA:

ZRWAHOC FOR HEADQUARTERS
SOURCE: CUMINT/1 FROM [REDACTED] (UNILATERAL) FIELD NO. [REDACTED] OFACT: NONE.
OBTAINED: NO LINKSON. [REDACTED] 942. DACHEL
CC: S-1A, FILE DEPT. [REDACTED] CL BY 837620.
PARIS FOR PRESTERNU AN [REDACTED] FOR KILTYGER;

FILE#

S E C R E T

OCT 79 STAFF

CITE: TEHRAN

TO: DIRECTOR

WNINTEL INTEL SDBLADE

1. IN SW MESSAGE DROPED 10 OCTOBER, SDBLADE/1 REPORTED IRANIAN ARMY IS PLANNING "SEVER" AND "SERIOUS" ACTION AGAINST THE KURDISH REBELS IN WESTERN IRAN. PRESS IS CARRYING INTIMATIONS TO SAME EFFECT. THE PLANS ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED NEXT WEEK. REMINDER OF MESSAGE REPORTED 9 OCTOBER ATTACK AGAINST PASSDARAN FORCES BY KURDS, AND VISIT OF DEFENSE MINISTER CHAMRAN TO KURDISTAN FOLLOWING THE ATTACK, ALL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN COPIOUSLY REPORTED IN LOCAL MEDIA.

2. FILE: 201-873159. RVW 11OCT99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

This text is rewritten from typewriter tapes left in CIA station on 4th November 1979.

Chang
Somerville
10/14

OFIRPB-31/1309-79
REF ID: A111111

INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
S E C R E T -- WHITE -- NO CONTRACT -- JRCO
DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH

COUNTRY: IRAN
SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF GENERAL MOBASSER IN EXILE OPPOSITION
 INCLUDING KURDISH LEADER WITH SMALL ARMY
 (10 OCTOBER 1979)
SOURCE: A FORMER IRANIAN OFFICIAL OF PRESENTLY UNDETERMINED
 RELIABILITY. HE HAD GOOD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION
 CITED BELOW.

1. GENERAL MANUCHER H A S H E M I, THE FORMER HEAD OF
THE NOW DEFUNCT IRANIAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ORGANI-
ZATION'S (NAVAI) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL ISSA
SAVAK, AND OTHER FORMER SAVAK OFFICERS MET WITH GENERAL MOHSEN
B A S S E R, THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL POLICE,
ON FRIDAY, 19 OCTOBER 1979, IN LONDON. GENERAL MOBASSER SPOKE
OF THE NECESSITY FOR ORGANIZING A MOVEMENT TO RESIST THE NEW
ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN IRAN BY GATHERING TOGETHER IRANIANS LIVING
OUTSIDE IRAN. HE BELIEVES THAT THE SUPPORTERS OF FORMER IRANIAN
PRIME MINISTER SHAHROUR B A K H T I A R ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY
ORGANIZED TO FORM A VIABLE MOVEMENT AND THAT THE NEW MOVEMENT
SHOULD GATHER TOGETHER ALL OFFICERS AND KNOWN IRANIANS WHO RESIDE
IN LONDON. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: INFORMATION FROM OTHER RE-
PORTING INDICATES THAT MOBASSER HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN SUPPORT OF
BAKHTIAR.)

2. GENERAL MOBASSER TOLD THE SMALL GROUP THAT A LEADER OF
A LARGE KURDISH TRIBE, THE JAFI, RECENTLY VISITED LONDON AND MET
WITH GENERAL MOBASSER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS KURDISH LEADER
ALSO IN CONTACT WITH BAKHTIAR. THE KURDISH LEADER HAS A SMALL
ARMY OF 1500 MEN EQUIPPED WITH MACHINE GUNS AND RIFLES WHICH
BASED ON THE BORDER OF IRAN AND IRAQ. HE DOES NOT NEED IRANIAN
SUPPORT BUT HE DOES NEED MILITARY EXPERTS--AT LEAST TWO OR
THREE WELL-TRAINED OFFICERS WHO CAN TRAIN HIS SMALL ARMY. THE

... FOR THE TRAINING OF THE OFFICERS AND THEIR DE-
... IS HE IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT.
... MOHASSER IS THINKING OF SENDING COLONEL HASSRIN
... & FARAHPOUR AND HIS FORMER COMMANDER, OF AN ANTI-
... IN THE GROUND FORCES, TO BE ONE OF THE TRAINERS.
... MARLOU IS AN IRANIAN OFFICER WHO RECENTLY WENT TO LONDON
... (SOURCE COMMENT: ... BECAUSE HE WAS SO EASILY ABLE TO
... COLONEL MARLOU IS SUSPECTED OF COOPERATING WITH THE
... ... HAS BEEN CLEARLY OF SUGGESTING C-
... ... ATATOLLAH K. O. M. K. I. T. WILL HE
... ... LEADER.)

... BECAUSE OF THE URGENT NEED FOR THE UNITY OF KURDS, THE
... THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP).
... ... OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT, HOW-
... ... HE HAS ALSO REQUESTED THE FORMA-
... ... SERVICE IN LONDON IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
... ... THE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT. AFTER
... ... HE HAS BEEN PROVIDING WITH SUFFICIENT
... ... AN ATTACK AGAINST THE KHOMEINI REGIME.
... ... SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK SHOULD TAKE PLACE THROUGH-
... ... IN SEVERAL PROVINCES. (SOURCE COMMENT:
... ... THE KURDISH LEADER IS TRYING TO PLAY THE
... ... ATATOLLAH MUST ... BY ATTEMPTING TO
... ... OF A WESTERN GOVERNMENT.)

... THIS MESSAGE SENT TO TEHRAN, LONDON, PARIS, ANKARA

... DIRECTOR DISSEM:
... ... FOR THE DIRECTOR, INR
... ... FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA
... ... SOURCE-RELLIGENCE SOURCE AND
... ... FOREIGN NATIONALS ... OF RE-
... ... CONSULTANTS ... DIA ...
... ... ORIGINATOR ...
... ... REPORTING OFFICER ...
... ... CONTROL OF OVERALL DISSEM

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH,

THE MERCIFUL AND THE COMPASSIONATE.

ILL-REPRODUCED AND MISSING DOCUMENTS FROM
BOOK NO.32 (THE KURDISH PROBLEM) PART II ARE
INCLUDED AT THE END OF THIS COLLECTION.

19 AUG 1952

SECRET 040117Z AUG 52 STAFF
CIT FR SAN FRANCISCO 35118
TO: DIRECTOR INFO TFRAN
WNI TEL AJAJA EDW 135 (S) (THROB)
REC DIRECTOR 281911

1. THANKS TO TIME WORK HERE BY TDY ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFFER ROY STAMPOL AND HIS INSIDE COUNTERPART LEE BEAUCHAMP, SDTHROP/1 (T/1) I NOW ARMED WITH U.S. RE-ENTRY PERMIT WHICH WILL PERMIT HIM TO LEAVE AND RE-ENTER THE COUNTRY FOR MISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RTACTION. THE AFS STAFFER WHO WAS RENDERED ON BEHALF OF OTHER T/1 FAMILY MEMBERS SHOULD ALSO BE HELD TO BELIEVE SOME OF HIS ANXIETIES OVER THEIR SITUATION AND ALLOW HIM TO CONCERN HIMSELF NOW ON OUR PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

2. C/O MADDEREY DISCUSSED THE AREAS OF COVER, DOCUMENTATION AND TRAVEL ITINERARY WITH T/1 ON 2 AUGUST. ALSO SURFACED WAS WHAT T/1 MAY EXPECT OF RTACTION AS COMPENSATION FOR HIS WORK ON OUR BEHALF.

3. BASED ON OPDSSES AND T/1 IS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THIS APPROACH THAT T/1 MAKE AN EXPLORATORY TRIP TO EUROPE OF TWO TO THREE WEEKS' DURATION AS SOON AS HE CAN BE DOCUMENTED. FOR THE PURPOSE OF RECONTACTING SUCH FORMER KURDISH ACCQUAINTANCES AS THE C LOCALS AND GERING TO TOUCH THEM, A LINE ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF OTHERS SHOULD ALSO BE COLLECTED. INTELLIGENCE ON THE ACTIVITIES AND PLANS OF THE MARBLES CURRENT PARTNERS AS HE IS ABLE TO GATHER. T/1 SHOULD BE INFORMED WITH A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL STATION IN LONDON. T/1 SHOULD PLAN STOPS IN LONDON, PARIS AND GERMANY. OFFER THEM THE NEAREST AIR STOPS MENTIONED IN TR/SF 24327 AND FR/SF 24236. T/1 WOULD TRY TO LOCATE IN LONDON THE BROTHER OF YDF LEAD ISRAELI ARMED. T/1 IF NO ATTEMPTING TO PIN DOWN THROUGH HIS DAUGHTER. THE PRESENT OCCUPATION OF ALI CAZI. IF HE IS IN GERMANY, IS ADVISED. HE MIGHT BE A KEY SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON OTHERS WHO PERSONAL FILES. UNFORTUNATELY, T/1'S OLD ADDRESS BOOKS AND FILMS REMAIN IN HIS HANDS. T/1'S SUGGESTED THAT IF HIS DAUGHTER COULD BE SUMMONED TO THE TFRAN CONSULAR SECTION ON EDW 135 PHOTEXT.

2 FR/SAN FRANCISCO
COULD PASS THESE P
TO HQS RE THIS P
PHONE DIRECTORIE
LEAD THIS APPROACH
ROPE ON BEHALF OF THE
RECTED TO START NOW
ESTABLISH APPREABOU

4. T/1 BELIEVES THAT
SEVERAL LAYERS, W
MOST SUPERFICIAL I
ETER OR WIFE IN EU
HE HAS BEEN IN CON
NMENT IN WASHING
ALISE A DIALOGUE W
OUND OUT LATTER ON
NMENT. THE MISSI
NOSSIONS BUT CANNOT
EMENT. THIRD LEV
ZS UP HIS CONTACT
E TO SEIZE PERSONAL
ED THEMSELVES UP AN
ZARGAN AND COMPANY,
S IN MEXICO RECENTLY
AT IN KURDISH FORCES
A FOR CROWN PRINCE
USE:

(1) PAFLAVI CO
MEANCES, AND;

(2) KURDS INCL
BETRAYED BY SHAH
EXPERIENCE.

PFLAVIZES THIS BUT
REPAIRED TO SPEND
OR OF PRO-SHAH (IN
ZEAN HAS SOME VES
E. RE DOCUMENTA

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S E C R E T
TO A STATION OFFICER FOR FORWARDING HERE.
LITY. OTHERWISE, T/1 WILL HAVE TO USE
OR FREQUENT THE USUAL KURDISH HANNITS.
COME SUCCESS DURING HIS 1975 TRIP TO
S INTELLIGENCE BUREAU. T/1 HAS BEEN
THE PHONE AND TRY IN ADVANCE OF TRAVEL
HIS TARGETS.

IS COVER STORY FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE SHOU
ELED OFF ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES.
OULD BE A STORY OF TRAVEL TO SEE HIS
THE SECOND LAYER WOULD INVOLVE THE STORY
WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BAZARGAN
THEY HAD ENLISTED HIM IN AN EFFORT TO
DISH LEADERS ABROAD. THE MISSION IS
CONDITIONS FOR PEACE WITH THE CENTRAL
DELICATE BECAUSE BAZARGAN IS READY FOR
ISSUE WITH KHOMINI AND HARD LINERS FOR
STORY IS THAT AFTER FIVING SECOND, T/1
POSSES SOME PRIVATE ENTERPRISE BETWEEN
PAGE FROM T/1'S ROLE AS EMISSARY, I.E.
APS EXTRACT MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM
UGGESTED TO GO ALTERNATE STORY THAT HE
OT SOME PROMISES OF HELP FROM PEOPLE ARO
BUT TOGETHER TO SUPPORT COMBACK. AT
DOES NOT THINK HIGHLY OF LATTER VERSION

APPEARS UNLIKELY UNDER ANY CIR-

IP CHIEFS CONSIDER THEMSELVES TO HAVE
T AND ARE UNLIKELY TO WANT TO REHAB

OUT SHAH HAS MONEY AND CONCEIVABLY COUL
HT TO HARASS THOSE WHO KICKED HIM OUT
ORCE BUILDING IN IRAQ UNDER GENERAL
PREFENCY).
OR TRAVEL TO EUROPE. T/1 BELIEVES BEST

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 493084 S E C R E T
THAT THEIR MOVEMENT IN NEED OF WESTERN ASSISTANCE AND THAT THEY
WOULD LIKE TO OPEN CHANNEL TO WEST TO ATTEMPT SECURE THAT AS-
SISTANCE. ACCORDING TO STE. MARTI THIS GROUP, WHICH ALSO IN-
CLUDED MAHMOUD AND SADR G H A Z I CLAIMED THE SUPPORT OF
SHEIK EZZADIN H O S S E I N I AN STATED THAT THEY DID NOT
DESIRE KURDISH INDEPENDENCE, SIMPLY REASONABLE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY
WITHIN IRANIAN STATE. THEY DID NOT WANT TO SOLICIT SOVIET SUP-
PORT FOR THEIR EFFORTS BECAUSE OF THEIR DISTRUST OF SOVIET
ACTIONS LEADING TO FALL OF KURDISH REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD IN 1947.
NOR DOES THIS GROUP WISH ALLY ITSELF WITH BARZANI'S, WHO THEY
DISTRUST ALMOST AS MUCH AS SOVIETS.

4. AS STATION AWARE, NONE OF THIS NEW INASMUCH AS CATOMIC/19
HAS BEEN CONVEYING SAME MESSAGE SINCE APRIL 1979, BUT IT DOES
REPRESENT POSSIBILITY OF SECURING AN IN INTO KURDISH MOVEMENT
IN IRAN USING TEHRAN-BASED FOREIGNER WHO MAY HAVE SOME FAIRLY
GOOD CONTACTS IN THAT MOVEMENT. STE. MARTIN MAY BE ATTRACTIVE
IN SEVERAL OTHER WAYS IN THAT, ACCORDING TO BURNS, HE SPEAKS
EXCELLENT FARSI, NATIVE FRENCH AND ENGLISH, ALTHOUGH ENGLISH
HEAVILY ACCENTED. ACCORDING TO BURNS, STE. MARTIN WOULD BE WILLING
COOPERATE REACTION IF BURNS GIVES WORD, AND INTENDS REMAIN IN
IRAN FORESEEABLE FUTURE. WE, OF COURSE, WOULD NEED GO THROUGH
PROCESS SECURING CORPORATE AND CANADIAN APPROVALS USE OF STE.
MARTIN AND BELIEVE IT WOULD BE AT LEAST THREE TO FOUR WEEKS
BEFORE WE WOULD BE ABLE COMPLETE NECESSARY PAPERWORK/APPROVALS.
IF THIS INTERESTING TO YOU, WE WILL BEGIN PROCESSING NOW. WE
ENVISION INITIAL CONTACT WITH STE. MARTIN AT SOME POINT OUTSIDE
TEHRAN FOR INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND, IF FEASIBLE, RECRUITMENT AND
TRAINING PRIOR TO TURNING OVER STATION, BUT OTHER OPTIONS MAY
BE AVAILABLE, INCLUDING INITIAL CONTACT IN TEHRAN. WOULD
APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS.

5. FILE: DCD CASE 62638. RVW 10AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

SECRET - INTEL - NO CONTRACT - OR CON

MEMBER OF A PROMINENT KURDISH FAMILY WHO HAS
LONG-STANDING TIES TO KURDISH LEADERS. HIS
PRESENT CONTACTS WITH THESE KURDISH LEADERS,
HOWEVER, ARE LIMITED AND HIS INFORMATION HAS
TUS FAR BEEN UNSUBSTANTIATED BY OTHER REPORT
SOURCES REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED.

SIX-MAN DELEGATION OF KURDISH REPRESENTING BO
DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND OTHER KURDISH FRACTIONS E
TRAVELLED TO MOSCOW IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979 TO
MEET WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT SECURITY AND COORDINATI
ON THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN IRAN. THE
DELEGATION IS UNKNOWN, BUT IT DOES NO
OF THE MAJOR FIGURES IN THE IRANIAN KURDISH
ANY OF WHOM ARE NOW IN IRAN. THE
KURDISH POPULATION CENTERS IN THE
DOES, HOWEVER, HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR THE
EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF A REFLECTION OF
FINANCIAL AND ARMS SUPPORT FROM THE U.S. AND WESTER
O THE SOVIET UNION IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN AND
WELD KURDISH PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN THE
VE DECIDED TO BACK THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ONLY WITHIN THE
MAIN, THEY MUST TURN TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR SUPPORT.
STATE.

ACR (10 SEPTEMBER

FIELD DISSEMI: SEN

CLASS SECRET - WAR
METHODS INVOLVED - NOT REL
ABLE TO CONTRACTORS OF
AND EXTRACTION OF I

NOTICE FOREIGN NATIONALS IN
OF CONSULTANTS
CONTRACT CONTROLLED

STUTTGART 17937 S E C R E T
T/19 AGREED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POLICY,
THOUGH HE DIDN'T LIKE IT, AND HE AGREED THAT THREE-
TRIAL PERIOD SHOULD BE GOOD TEST. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO
DISCOURSE ON FACT THAT HE WAS GRADUALLY BEING SEPARATED
FROM HIS SOURCES AND WOULD SOON HAVE NOTHING TO REPORT. HE THEN
SAID THAT HE IS ABLE TO ENTER KURDISTAN SUCCESSFULLY AND SET UP
SOURCES AND ROUTES. HE ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
HE WOULD ASSIST HIM IN TWO MATTERS: (A) SUPPLYING HIM WITH SAFE
HOLDING FACILITIES, BETWEEN GERMANY AND IRAN,
AND (B) WHETHER HE WOULD HELP HIM SEND EUROPEAN NEWSPAPER TY-
PISTERS TO KURDISTAN "BLACK" IN ORDER TO PUBLICIZE TRUE STATE OF
AFFAIRS THERE. FOHLERNY REPLIED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER
QUESTIONS BEFORE REPLYING BUT MADE NO COMMITMENTS. T/19 CONT-
INUED THAT HE HAD CORRESPONDED PRIMARILY THROUGH (A) COURIERS AND
OTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS SISTER IN TEHRAN, WHO IS MARRIED TO
A MEMBER OF THE JAFI TRIBE AND SHE IN TURN HAD CONTACT WITH KURDISTAN BY PH-
OTOCOPY. NOW SISTER'S CONTACTS IN KURDISTAN HAD MOVED TO HILLS
AND SHE HAD MOVED TO BONN. MOREOVER, PUBLIC COMMO IN
KURDISTAN WAS INCREASINGLY CONTROLLED AS WAS THAT IN TEHRAN.
FOHLERNY INSISTED THAT HE STILL HAD PLENTY OF POTENTIAL SOURCES
IN KURDISTAN BUT HE HAD NO WAY TO REACH THEM FROM GERMANY AND
HAD TO DEVELOP NEW ROUTES AND COURIERS.

INTEL: T/19 HAD NO INTEL OTHER THAN GENERAL STATEMENT
IN SEPTEMBER THERE HAD BEEN FIGHTING IN MANY KURDISH
AREAS BUT HE HAD NO NAMES OR NUMBERS. FOHLERNY SYMPATHIZES
WITH THE PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED THAT HE TRY TO EXTRACT MORE
INFORMATION FROM TRUSTED KURDS IN GERMANY WHO ALSO HAD THEIR
OWN TARGETS. HE AGREED TO DO THIS.

TARGETS: FOHLERNY TOLD T/19 THAT FIRST THING WAS TO
OBTAIN LISTS OF NAMES, ADDRESSES AND BIO DATA ON KURDS IN
GERMANY. T/19 TRUSTED AND THOUGHT CAPABLE OF OBTAINING
THE INFORMATION FROM KURDISTAN. HE ALSO ASKED FOR SIMILAR
LISTS OF KURDS IN TEHRAN AND KURDS IN KURDISTAN. DEPENDING ON
RESULTS, WE COULD THEN HELP T/19 DETERMINE (A) WHO WAS
MOST IMPORTANT AND (B) IF IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR US TO ASSIST HIM
IN CONTACTING THEM. WE HAD TO KNOW FIRST WHOM HE MIGHT BE DEALING
WITH AND WHAT THEIR BACKGROUNDS WERE. T/19 AGREED READILY TO THIS.

PAGE 3 STUTTGART 17937 S E C R E T
AFTER THINKING IN OVER CAREFULLY AND AFTER BEING ASSURED WE
WOULD HANDLE INFORMATION IN SECURE MANNER. HE PROMISED TO
HAVE SOME INFORMATION AT NEXT MEETING.

6. SOVIET INFLUENCE: T/19 HAS NO HARD INFORMATION ON SOVIET
CONNECTIONS WITH NATIONALIST FORCES IN KURDISTAN, ESPECIALLY IN
RECENT WEEKS. HE POINTED OUT THAT ALMOST ALL KURDISH LEADERS
HAVE HAD SOME CONTACT WITH SOVIETS, USUALLY FOR A PURPOSE.
Q: EMIL, FOR EXAMPLE, HE KNEW AS COMMUNIST AND TUDER MEMBER.
BUT CASEMELU THEM BROKE WITH SOVIETS AND PERHAPS NOW IS BACK WITH
THEM. IN ABSENCE OF HARD AND CURRENT INFORMATION, ALMOST ANY KURD
COULD BE REASONABLY EXPECTED TO HAVE SOME SOVIET CONNECTIONS.
EVEN HIS FATHER, A DEEPLY RELIGIOUS MAN AND STRONG KURDISH
NATIONALIST, HAD ACCEPTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO ACHIEVE HIS
PURPOSE. T/19 WAS INSTRUCTED TO BE ESPECIALLY ALERT FOR
INFORMATION CONCERNING SOVIET INFLUENCE.

7. T/19 SOVIET CONTACTS: AT THIS POINT, TOHLERNY ASKED
T/19 ABOUT HIS SOVIET CONTACTS. HE HAD INVITED SOME MONTHS AGO
SOVIET THIRD SECRETARY ALEXANDER S. KULIN TO HIS PARTY AND
KULIN RETURNED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO UNEXPECTEDLY AND ASKED IF
T/19 WOULD BE ABLE TO HELP HIM WITH HIS PARTY AND ASKED IF
T/19 WERE ANYTHING HE COULD DO TO HELP T/19, REFERRING TO T/19'S
POS OF DIPLOMATIC POST. ACCORDING TO T/19, THEY TALKED AND
KULIN LEFT SAYING HE WOULD BE BACK, BUT HAS NOT YET RETURNED.
T/19 DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS A FAREWELL OR FUTURE PITCH
AND NOT, BUT EXPECTS KULIN TO RETURN AND TALK ABOUT T/19 AND
KURDISH SITUATION. T/19 PROMISED TO REPORT ABOUT T/19 AND
IMMEDIATELY AND IN DETAIL. HE WAS ALSO WARNED OF POSSIBLE
TELEPHONE AND PERSONAL SURVEILLANCE. T/19 THEN ASKED IF
TOHLERNY THOUGHT KULIN WAS CONNECTED WITH SUBJECT MENTIONED TO
BY HIS COUSIN, RAHM SAIF G H A Z I. PROBABLY MENTIONED TO
STORY AND CULTURE IN BAKU. T/19 MET COUSIN FOR FIRST TIME IN YEARS
MONTHS AGO IN BERLIN AND COUSIN MENTIONED THAT HE MIGHT
WONDERED HOW COUSIN WAS ALLOWED TO COME TO BERLIN, AS HE
NOT BEEN PERMITTED TO TRAVEL PREVIOUSLY OUTSIDE SOVIET UNION.
IS NOW NOT SURE WHETHER COUSIN MEANT BY SOMEONE: A KURD WHO
D INFORM HIM ABOUT KURDS IN SOVIET UNION OR SOVIET CONNECTIONS
KURDS OR WHETHER COUSIN MEANT SOMEONE REPRESENTING SOVIET
TOHLERNY SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW, AND T/19 ASKED IF HE
C R E T

STUTTGART 7937 S E C R E T
ASK COUSIN TO SEND "SOMEONE"

TOHLERNY ADVISED WAITING

T/19 REQUESTS; T/19 MADE SOME REQUESTS. (A) HE WANTED TO
BONN COULD ASSIST SISTER NOW IN BONN IN EDUCATION AT
SCHOOL, SINCE CHILDREN HAD PREVIOUSLY ATTENDED AMER CAN
IN TEHRAN. TOHLERNY SAID HE KNEW NOTHING OF BONN SCHOOL
WLD ACQUAINT HIMSELF WITH SITUATION. (B) T/19 WOULD LIKE
BOOK BY (FNU) EGGLETON ABOUT KURDS; AND (C) COPY OF
ARTICLE IN MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ABOUT KURDISH REPUBLIC
45. HE MADE NO MONEY REQUESTS, AND ALMOST FORGOT TO
MOMIES OWED HIM.

IN GENERAL MEETING WENT VERY WELL WITH GENUINE CORDIALITY
S AT END OF MEETING AND A SEEMING HAGGERS TO GET ON
BUSINESS. T/19 SUGGESTED MOVING NEXT MEETING UP TO 27TH FROM
ED 4 OCTOBER. JUST AS LEAVING, IT/19 MENTIONED THAT ON
MBER HE WAS GOING TO REGISTER IN BONN A GROUP TO BE
THE COUNCIL FOR KURDISH AUTONOMY. HE ALREADY HAD THE
DRAWN UP AND IT WOULD BE A BEGINNING OF HIS ATTEMPT TO
ETHER AN ORGANIZATION HE COULD USE. TOHLERNY WILL
COPY OF PAPERS AND ADDITIONAL DETAILS. T/19 NEXT MEETING.

COMMENTS: IN PRESENT SITUATION AND WITH PRESENT GUIDELINES
WE HAVE LITTLE TO OFFER T/19 AND HAS LITTLE TO OFFER
THEREFORE, WE SHOULD GET OUT SOON BEFORE WE GET BACK IN
EPLY THAN WE WANT TO BE. THREE MONTHS TRIAL SHOULD BE APLE
OTHER HAND, TOHLERNY BELIEVES THAT IF WE ARE WILLING TO TAKE
FIVE ROLE, BASED ON REWARDING ONLY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT,
T/19 MAY HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL, THOUGH SEEM TO BE NO
KURDS WITH FAMILY BACKGROUND AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
MAKE STRONG HIS FOR KURDISH LEADERSHIP AND PERHAPS T/19
NOT. BUT EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS IN BOTH IRAN AND
EN HAVE HAD A DEEP EFFECT ON HIM, PERHAPS ENOUGH TO ALLOW
OUT IT ALL TOGETHER FOR ONCE. TOHLERNY TOLD HIM BLUNTLY THAT
AS GOING TO AID HIM UNLESS HE EARNED IT AND HIS TRACK
S KURDISH NATIONALIST WAS VERY WEAK. HE HAD TO MAKE
INTO SOMEONE OTHERS WOULD COME TO. HE HAD TO MAKE
ES, URATHER THAN BEG FOR AID. T/19 TOOK THIS VERY SERIOUSLY
LLY AGREED THAT HE HAD TO WORK AND WORK HARD TO GET
WANTED. HE NOTED THAT KHOMEINI HAD DONE MUCH WITHOUT

28 SEP 71 7 34Z

C R E T 281652Z SZJZPB STAFF
BONN 84952

DIRECTOR, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY (TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANB
TEL AJAJA CATOMIC
A. STUTTGART 17957
B. BONN 84941

1. REF B REPORTED INTTEL FROM 27 SEP MEETING WITH CATOMIC
(19). SARDAR J A F, ONE OF LEADERS OF JAF TRIBE OF KURDS.

HE ULTIMATELY ARRIVED IN BAGDAD (REP A). AFTER FLEEING
KURDS WHO WERE SAFE-HAVENED IN IRAQ. WHERE HE BECAME
IRACI MILITARY GROUP AND TO MEET SARDAR AND HIS SISTER.
ARRANGE FOR TOBERNY TO MEET SARDAR.
SARDAR'S CHILDREN (3) HAVE BEEN ENTERED IN
SULTANAT WITH BONN. TOBERNY REQUESTED OUR ASSISTANCE.
IN RETURN FOR HIS CONTINUING COOPERATION. TARGETS
BOTH KURDS AND IRAQI SERVICE. METEOR OF COMMO WOULD
WHICH WE COULD UNDERWRITE. OTHERWISE, WILL ARRANGE FOLLOW-
UP TRAINING AND SCRWIRL.

THIS FIGURE CHECKS) T/19 HAS RECEIVED OVER \$4,000
PROGRAM WITH SARDAR SUGGESTING A PAY-AS-YOU-GO
BOTH KURDS AND IRAQI SERVICE. COOPERATION. TARGETS
WHICH WE COULD UNDERWRITE. OTHERWISE, WILL ARRANGE FOLLOW-
UP TRAINING AND SCRWIRL.

REQUEST TRACES SARDAR. ALSO REQUEST HQS APPROVAL THIS
BY 5 OCT.

201-0306414. RWV 28SEP71 DRB DBC.1

11 Oct 79 05 09z

REF T 131755Z OCT 79 STAFF

BONN B5222

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN
ART.

AL AJAJA CATOMIC

BONN B5221

PURSUANT REF OPS INTEL CABLE, KEITH L. TOHLERNY MET
CATOMIC/19 (T/19) AND SARDAR J A F 13 OCTOBER 1979 FOR
MATTERS, WHICH WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SORT OUT ALL OPEN MATTER
BUT MAXIMUM TIME JAF AVAILABLE. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED
WITH T/19 ON 24 OCTOBER.

TOHLERNY ATTEMPTED TO ASSESS JAF WHILE EXTRACTING INFO
M, PRIMARILY BY ASKING HARD QUESTIONS. JAF CAME ACROSS
VERY OPEN KEY, WITH STRONG IDEAS ABOUT WHAT HE KNEW AND DIDN'T
HAD ON, DATES (WHICH IS FAIRLY COMMON), VERY CAREFUL WITH
NAMES AND ALTHOUGH HE DROPPED A FEW, HE WAS NOT SELLING
IS A SOLID, STOCKY MAN WITH ALMOST A DISTINGUISHED APPEARANCE
DROWN SKIN AND GRAY HAIR AND AN AIR OF CONFIDENCE.
TOHLERNY SENSED THAT HE HAD COME TO THE MEETING WITH AN
ATTENTION TO T/19, WHO HAD PROMISED HE WOULD BE BRINGING
DISCUSSION CONTINUED, HE BECAME MUCH MORE EASY AND
NO PLEA FOR ANY KIND OF ASSISTANCE, EVEN FOR HIS CHILD-
HOODING, WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED, IN FACT, BY T/19
RAISED THE ISSUE TO OFFSET THEIR RAISING IT, AN
DIATELY TOLD THAT JAF HAD DECIDED TO TAKE HIS FA-
BAGHDAD WITH HIM, THAT HE COULD NOT AFFORD TO KE-
BONN. TOHLERNY POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE BET-
HERE THAT IRAQ COULD BE DANGEROUS. JAF AGRE-
HAD NO CHOICE AND THAT TOHLERNY DIDN'T HAVE TO W-
E. THANK YOU JUST THE SAME. HE MAY BE CLEVER
WHAT WE MIGHT WANT TO TRADE AND DIDN'T WANT TO INVOLVE
Y. TOHLERNY CLOSED BY SAYING THAT IF THINGS DID
WELL FOR HIS FAMILY IN BAGHDAD, TO PASS THE WORL-

Jul 7-

SECRET 11466Z JUL 79
CITE FR LOS ANGELES 20589 (AGI) PACTINGO
TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO DEB
WINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES SITHA
REFS: A. FR LOS ANGELES 20589
B. FR LOS ANGELES 20583

FINAL BRIEF MEET WITH SENSITIVITY (T/I) ON 9 JULY
RESULTED IN T/I ADVISING THAT HE NOT DEPARTING LOS ANGELES
UNTIL 15 JULY. ALL MEETING ARRANGEMENTS REMAIN THE SAME.
REASON FOR DELAY WAS CALL FROM T/I'S CLOSEST FRIENDS
WHO ADVISED HIS FATHER HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM TEHRAN. FATHER,
GENERAL (POLICE) FNU S H A H R. T/I WAS RECENTLY
RETAINED BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WHEN HE BECAME 55. THIS
MAN IS ONE OF THREE COUSINS; EACH WITH SAME FAMILY NAME
AS THE RECENT MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER POSITIONS
S DESCRIBED IN PARA 3 REF B. T/I HE WAS MOST RECENTLY IN
CHIEF OF THE HIGHWAY PATROL. MORE IMPORTANTLY HE IS CLOSE FRIE
R THE PRESENT CHIEF OF POLICE IN WHOM ALSO DESCRIBED IN PARA 3
REF B AS FRIEND OF T/I FAMILY. T/I WAS INVITED FOR DINNER
10 JULY, HE WANTED TO POSTPONE DEPARTURE UNTIL NEXT IRAN AIR
FLIGHT SO HE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST LETTER OF INTRO-
DUCTION AND RECOMMENDATION FROM T/I'S BROTHER AND TO THE POLICE CHIEF

- 2. T/I SAW NO PROBLEM IN MAKING HIS FIRST CAR PICK UP
ON 20 JULY AND WILL BE AT SITE.
- 3. FILE: 201-2961045. RW 2 199 DRV D90.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

S E C R E T 251652Z JUL 79 STAFF

28 Jul 79

CITE DIRECTOR 482379

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

UNINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTRANSIT

- REFS: A. TEHRAN 53765
- B. FR/LOS ANGELES 20581
- C. TEHRAN 53506

1. SUBJECT REF A WHO CALLED IS SDTRANSIT/1. FOLLOWING WAS CONTACT PLAN:

A. TELEPHONE COMM: T/1 WILL CALL STATION OPS NUMBER 850399 EXT 800399 AND WILL SAY HE IS MIKE. THIS IS MIKE. CAN I SPEAK TO CHARLES. WHEN CHARLES COMES ON PHONE HE WILL EXCHANGE IDENTITIES AND THEN MENTION THEY SHOULD GET TOGETHER FOR COFFEE OR TEA. THE PLACE OF CONTACT WILL BE CAR PICKUP SITE LISTED BELOW. ANY OTHER PLACE MENTIONED BY EITHER PARTY IS MEANINGLESS AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BECAUSE IF INCLUDED IS ONLY FOR CONVERSATION PURPOSES. THE DATE/TIME CAN BE SUGGESTED BY EITHER PARTY AND WORKED OUT ON THE PHONE. NO MATTER WHAT AGREED, THE DATE/TIME WILL BE TWO DAYS AND TWO HOURS PRIOR TO TIME AGREED UPON; I.E., IF IT AGREED MONDAY NIGHT AT 2200, THE CAR PICKUP WOULD BE SATURDAY NIGHT AT 2000 HOURS. IN EVENT STATION SHOULD WANT TO CALL T/1, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PRE-ARRANGED BY SW OR AT PERSONAL MEETING. THE TIME OF CALL WILL BE BASED ON SAME TWO/TWO SYSTEM. IF T/1 IS ADVISED THAT HE WILL BE CALLED, DATE AND TIME MUST BE GIVEN. HE WILL ARRANGE TO BE AT HIS PARENTS HOME AT TIME CALL EXPECTED. THE NUMBER TO CALL IS IDEN A AND CALLER SHOULD ASK FOR IDEN A. BEST IF CALL MADE IN PERSI.

B. CAR PICKUP: T/1 HAD REQUESTED THAT FIRST DAY OF HIS CAR PICKUP BE 20 JULY EXT 23 JULY AT 2100 WITH ALTERNATE OF 2200 HOURS. IF THIS CONTACT NOT MADE HE WILL REVERT TO 24 AND 15TH OF EACH SUBSEQUENT MONTH. USING WESTERN CALENDAR HIS WILL BE SAME CAR PICKUP SITE ALWAYS USING 2100 AND 2200 HOURS. HE WILL WAIT AT SITE FOR MAXIMUM OF TEN MINUTES. T/1 WILL

2 TEHRAN 53827 S E C R E T
JULY, 30 JULY: T/I'S FAMILY HAD KNOWN FOR 2-
DID WAS A MEMBER OF THE FEDAYAN (CHARIKS),
HING SPECIFIC ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES. THEY D
HE DIED. ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT BELIEVE A VER
H HAS BEEN DECLARED BY THE PAST APAN REVOLU
HIMSELF IS A SUPPORTER OF THE MUJAHEDIN. BU
FEDAYAN WHO WERE HIS BROTHER'S CONTACTS. H
FROM THESE FRIENDS TO ACCOMPANY THEM TO V
HOW THE FEDAYAN ARE SUPPORTING THE KURDISH
C/O TOLD T/I THAT WE ARE RELUCTANT TO L
CONTACT HIM FROM GOAL OF OBTAINING JOB IN NIOC
KURDISTAN. HOWEVER, COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KU
BE AN IMPORTANT REPORT, IF HE COULD ARRAN
IT WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH HIS EMPLOYMENT
HE BELIEVES THAT HE CAN DO SO AND WILL REPORT
THE FEDAYAN INVOLVED AND THEIR PLANS AT THE NE
WOULD LAST ABOUT ONE WEEK AND COULD NOT TA
OF AUGUST. IN DISCUSSING THE TRIP, C/O LEA
IS MURDER HIMSELF.

5. FROM HIS BROTHER AT THE KOMITEH IN A
HEARD ABOUT LABOR PROBLEMS AT NIOC. THE WORKER
CONCERNED ABOUT RATION PRIVILEGES FOR FOOD WHICH
IN PAST YEARS, WHICH HAVE BEEN CANCELLED. COOP
THE NIOC GUARD FORCE AND THE PASDARAN GUARDS IS
T/I WILL BE RETURNING TO ABADAN ON 2 AUGUST TO
FINANCE (IDENTITY) BEFORE RETURNING TO TEHRAN VI
EMPHASIZED THAT WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN ALL D
BY HIS BROTHER IN ABADAN AND THAT T/I SHOULD PA
ALL OF HIS BROTHER'S REMARKS ON LABOR PROBLEMS.
LATER, T/I ALSO KNOWS AN ARAB SHEIKH, WHO WAS
BOSS IN KHMZESTAN IN THE SHAH'S EPAC. C/O TOLL
INTERESTED IN LEARNING ABOUT ARAB ACTIVITIES AND
PLANS, CONCENTRATING ON ARAB-PARSI POLITICAL
RELATIONS.

6. FOR NEXT MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR 15
T/I WILL REPORT ON HIS SEARCH FOR PROSPECTS
T/I HIS BROTHER AT THE ABADAN KOMITEH, AND ON

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9 OCT 79 12 58Z

C R E T 09 12 06Z OCT 79 STAFF

BONN 05 00 A
PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, C
MTEL AJAJA SDFICKLE

1. SDFICKLE WAS RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO TURKI
ANIAN KURDISTAN. FELTHOUSE CONTACTED HIM ON THE EVE
OCT AND SET UP A DEBRIEFING SESSION FOR 9 OCT IN DUE

2. ONE OF THE REASONS SDFICKLE'S RETURN WAS DEN
HAT HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY IRANIAN (MILITARY)
AUTHORITIES IN SALMAZ. HE WAS ACCUSED
SHAHRI AND DETAINED FOR FOUR DAYS. HE WAS ACCUSED
ILLEGALLY CROSSING THE TURKISH-IRANIAN BORDER AND FAI
HAVE LEGAL DOCUMENTS. SDFICKLE SAID THAT HE HAD LEFT
PORT OF PURPOSE IN TURKEY. FORTUNATELY
THE LOCAL JUDGE AND THE AUTHORITIES
IN IRAN WERE KURDS AND FRIENDS OF SDFICKLE'S FATHER
FORE, LET HIM GO. A NEWS ITEM ENTITLED "SON OF SHAH
ARRESTED" APPEARED IN THE TEHRAN DAILY "YEMHAN" NO.
DATED 18 SEPT. WE ARE FORWARDING THE NEWSPAPER CLIP
CONCERNING SDFICKLE'S ARREST TO HQS VIA TM NUMBER 44

3. RESULTS OF THE DEBRIEFING SESSION WILL BE
SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. FILE: 096095L. RVW 09 OCT 79 DRW D.S. CI.
S E R E

13 SEP 75

C. C. R. E. T. 1223042 SE 79 STAFF
THE DIRECTOR 512232-

PRIORITY WESTPORT AND PRIORITY GERMAN MUNICH.
ROUTINE TEHRAN, ANKARA
INTEL HYBAT AJAJA

REF A. WESTPORT 48610
B. DIRECTOR 31148

1. FOLLOWING IS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR USE WITH SUBJ 201-872561:
 - A. WHAT SPECIFIC EFFECTS ARE THE KURDISH DISTURBANCES HAVING ON THE IRAQI KURDISH COMMUNITY. SPECIFIC REPORTING ON IRAQI KURDISH OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS IS OF INTEREST AND, IF POSSIBLE, SOME KIND OF APPRAISAL OF HOW REALISTIC THESE OBJECTIVES ARE AS WELL AS DETAILS OF KURDISH PLANS TO OBTAIN AUTONOMY, ETC.
 - B. OMITTED BARZANI'S. WOULD INCLUDE LIST AS WELL AS BIO DATA OF ALL KDP LEADERS HE CAN PROVIDE.
 - C. SOURCE'S COMMENTS ON POSSIBILITY THAT BARZANI AND TALABANI FACTIONS WILL MERGE. PLUS DETAILS OF ANY RECENT MEETINGS BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS AND A RUN DOWN OF ANY POSSIBLE SUPPORT THEY MAY BE EXTENDING TO EACH OTHER.
 - D. DETAILS OF ANY POSSIBLE LIAISON BETWEEN THE KDP AND THE IRAQI SHI'ITE GROUPS.
 - E. DETAILS ON NUMBER OF KURDISH VILLAGES, WHERE CAMPS ARE LOCATED AND COMMENTS ON HOW WELL ARMED THEY ARE, AS WELL AS ANY INFO THEY GETTING OUTSIDE SUPPORT AND IF SO WHAT TYPE.
 - F. WHAT IF ANY SUPPORT ARE THE KDP OR TALABANI FACTIONS GETTING FROM THE KURDISH GOVERNMENT.
 - G. DETAILS PLUS DOCUMENTATION OF CHARGES THAT SOVIETS ARE

SECRET 15 SEP 59 STAFF

SECRET 15 SEP 59

DIRECTOR.

INTEL LWSHELL OR SDPLSTP

2 DIRECTOR 51 173

1. WE CANNOT RECALL SEEING INTEL REPORTS OF SOVIET MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE BANIAN KURE'S ALLUDE TO PARA SIX REF. REQUEST FOR CREDIBLE REPORTING FROM SOURCE IDENTIFIED FOR USE AND ADVISED HERE IF NOT ALREADY IDENTIFIED.

2. CREDIBLE REPORTING OF SUCH SUPPORT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE IDEAL FOR USE WITH SDPLD/A. IF NOT IN CONTACT WITH KURE IS NOT IMMINENT, MATERIAL MIGHT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH SDPLD/A FOR ATTRIBUTION WITH SDURN/1, SDPLC/A OR SDTRAMP/V.

3. NO FILE. RW 15 SEP 59 DR 190

SECRET

19 SEP 79 140 272

S E C R E T 09 5Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE ISTANBUL 33 65

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, ANKARA, STOCKHOLM INFO TEMP
WNINTEL INTEL

1. BASE REQUEST ANY AVAILABLE HQS AND ADDEE INFO
RECENT ESTABLISHMENT IN STOCKHOLM OF A KURDISH ASSOCIATION
AS SPOKESMAN FOR KURDISH SEPARIST MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY
IRAN. BASE IS CURRENTLY PREPARING INTEL DISSEM ON
TO THIS ASSOCIATION AND WOULD APPRECIATE INFO ASAF

2. NO FILE FROM 9 SEP 79 DRV D9C3 ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

29 Sep 79 7 22

SECRET 282349Z SEP 79 STAFF

TO DIRECTOR 523487

AMMARA, TEHRAN

FROM AJAJA RTWNNR INTEL

1. HQS CURRENTLY LOOKING FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON
 POSSIBLE SUPPORT OF KURDISH AND OTHER MINORITIES IN IRAN WHO
 WANT AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. WE CONTEMPLATING POSSIBLE
 ACTION TO EXPLOIT SUCH SUPPORT. HOWEVER, AS THIS IS DEFINITELY
 A DANGEROUS SWORD SITUATION, WE INVITE STATIONS COMMENTS/OPINION
 FROM POLICY AUTHORITY AS CONTAINED IN PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET
 INTERESTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES' AFFAIRS. AND NO NEW PRESIDENTIAL
 ACTION WOULD BE REQUIRED.

2. NO FILE. RVM 28SEPT99 DRW D90.3 ALL SECRET

SECRET

75

... FOR THE TRAINING OF THE OFFICERS AND THEIR DE-
PENDENT IRAQ, AS HE IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT.
OF IRAQ GENERAL MOBASSER IS THINKING OF SENDING COLONEL HASSEIN
SHEH AIN TO U.S.A. PARATROOPER AND THE FORMER COMMANDER OF AN ANTI-
TERROR GROUP IN THE GROUND FORCES. TO BE ONE OF THE CHANGERS.
COLONEL SHAMLOU IS AN IRANIAN OFFICER WHO RECENTLY WENT TO LONDON
FROM IRAN. (SOURCE COMMENT: COLONEL WHO RECENTLY WENT TO LONDON
LEAVE IRAN. COLONEL SHAMLOU IS SUSPECTED OF COOPERATING WITH THE
NEW REGIME. ONLY AFTER HE HAS BEEN CLEARED OF SUSPICION OF CO-
OPERATION WITH THE FORCES OF SEYEDTOLLAH KHOMEINI WILL HE
BE INTRODUCED TO THE KURDISH LEADER.)

3. BECAUSE OF THE URGENT NEED FOR THE UNITY OF KURDS. THE
KURDISH LEADER HAD TO JOIN THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP).
HE HAS DEMANDED THAT HE BECOME LEAD OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT. HOW-
EVER, AND THAT THE KDP JOIN HIM. HE HAS ALSO REQUESTED THE FORMA-
TION OF A NEW INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN LONDON IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FOR FIGHTING THE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT. AFTER
HIS ARMY IS TRAINED AND HE HAS BEEN PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT
INFORMATION TO INITIATE AN ATTACK AGAINST THE KHOMEINI REGIME.
HE BELIEVES THAT A SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK SHOULD TAKE PLACE THROUGH-
OUT IRAN, OR AT LEAST IN SEVERAL PROVINCES. (SOURCE COMMENT:
GENERAL MOBASSER THINKS THE KURDISH LEADER IS TRYING TO PLAY THE
ROLE OF THE LATE MULLAH MUSTAFA SADEGH MULLI BY ATTEMPTING TO
OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF A WESTERN GOVERNMENT.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, LONDON, PARIS, ANKARA
ISTANBUL.

5. WASHINGTON DISSEM:
TO STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, INR
TO DIA EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA
REPORT CLASS SECRET - WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCE AND
METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS - NO RE-
LEASE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACT CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINA-
TION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DINWID DRN DEC 1 CLASSIFIED BY 1000000 REPORTING OFFICER
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT

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2 Nov 79

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SECRET UMBRA 020246Z NOV 79 SPECIAL CHANNELS

IR SC WASHINGTON 06594.

SCHEHRAN.

INTEL BY THEO

BELOW PUBLISHED AS 3/AA/CS173-

IRAQI MILITARY ATTACHE, LONDON

M.O.D., BAGHDAD

INFO: ARCA/ISIS; ROME

FROM 'AYED I) TO 'ALI (I)

SHAPUR BAKHTIAR HAS SENT HIS DUSIN RUSTAM BAKHTIAR TO
 LONDON TO MEET SIRDAR (I) TO DISCUSS THE MATTER OF THE CONTACT
 HE TOOK PLACE WITH BAKHTIAR ON THE PART OF BARZAN (II)
 THIS MEETING OF BAKHTIAR BY BARZAN TOOK PLACE DAILY
 MEETING WITH BAKHTIAR.
 THE MEETING WITH BARZAN LASTED THREE HOURS. AND BARZAN
 WANTED TO FACILITATE BAKHTIAR'S MISSION IN EVERY WAY
 BAKHTIAR AGREED TO TAKE THIRTY OFFICERS WITH HIM TO IRAQ.
 HE WILL LEAVE FOR IRAQ DURING THE NEXT TEN DAYS.

NOTE (1) NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED. HEAD OF KURDIS AND DEMOCRACY
 (1) POSSIBLY MAS'UD BARZAN. DRUGS ALL INFORMATION SECRET
 PARTY OF IRAN. RWA @INOV

SECRET UMBRA