

استاد لانه جاسوسی

شماره ۳۸

((پاریس پناهگاه جاسوسان آمریکا))

دانشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

SECRET 040310Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 488751

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN

WWINTEL RYBAT

REF: PARIS 11231

1. BAKHTIAR WAS IN MITTING CONTACT WITH SEVERAL STATION OFFICERS DURING THE EARLY 1960'S. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE RE-ESTABLISHING THAT CONTACT AT THIS TIME. ONE OR ANOTHER OF BAKHTIAR'S EARLIER CASE OFFICERS WHO HE MET IN PARIS WOULD WELCOME STATION'S COMMENT ON HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE BROUGHT ABOUT.

2. HAVE INFORMED STATE OF OUR INTEREST IN CONTACTING BAKHTIAR AND OBTAINED THEIR CONCURRENCE. ACCORDINGLY, AMEMB SAIGON MAY BE BRIEFED IF AND AS STATION DEEMS DESIRABLE.

3. FILE: 201-00833001. RVW 03 AUG 89 DRV D90 ALL SECRET

SECRET

BT

552

3 AUG 79 12 55z

LS, LONDON, STOCKHOLM.

IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER SHAHPUR
SS CONFERENCE GIVEN WIDE FRENCH
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE
FOLLOW KEY EXCERPTS OF
BLISHED IN 1 AUGUST ISSUE OF

PRESENT AT LEGITIMATE CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT
AND LEADER IN OPPOSITION TO THE ISLAMIC REGIME. ACCUSED
RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF PLUNGING COUNTRY INTO CHAOS AND SAID
MULLAHS SHOULD GO BACK TO THEIR MOSQUES. HE SAID HE IN
TOUCH WITH SUPPORTERS IN TEHRAN AND WITH HIS OWN INFLUENTIAL
BAKHTIAR TRIBE. CLAIMED HAS SUPPORT IN IRAN BECAUSE OF
GROWING FRUSTRATION OVER POLITICAL INCOMPETENCE OF RELIGIOUS
LEADERS BUT HAS NO INTENTION TRYING TO REGAIN POWER BY
LEADING UNDERGROUND STRUGGLE, PARTY OR GOVERNMENT IN EXILE.
SAID WOULD NOT PRESENT CANDIDATES IN COUNTRY'S FORTHCOMING
ELECTIONS. PRESENT "RELIGIOUS DICTATORSHIP" CHANGING IDEAS
EVERY FEW WEEKS, BANKRUPTING COUNTRY AND UNDERMINING GOVERN-
MENTAL CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN FACE OF MINORITY REVOLTS.
KHOMEINI HAS NO IDEA WHAT TO DO WITH POWER AND IN ONE YEAR
IRAN HAD NOW SQUANDERED AS MUCH AS IN 25 YEARS UNDER THE
SHAH. ATTACKED IRANIAN POLICIES OF SOVIET UNION WHICH WANTED
TO SEE AN IRAN UNDER MOSCOW'S INFLUENCE OR ELSE TOTALLY
CORRUPT. SUPPORTED DECISION OFF IRANIAN CUT OFF OF
NATURAL GAS SALES TO SOVIET UNION. KURDS SHOULD BE GIVEN
LOCAL AUTONOMY BUT WITHIN NATIONAL UNITY. REPEATEDLY
CRITICIZED FORMER ALLIES INCLUDING KARIM SANJABI OF NATIONAL
FRONT FOR THEIR ALLIANCE WITH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. IRAN
EXISTED BEFORE ISLAM.

ATE FRENCH AND IRANIAN
SDSLIPPERY/1, SDULTIMATE/1,
ADING/INFORMATION
ADDEES WILL RECALL THAT
MIR, WHO CLAIMED CLOSE
WITH BAKHTIAR WHILE HE STILL
24 DTD 30 JAN 79). IF ALAMIR
S HE CLAIMED IN PAST AND HAS
BERAL NON DOCTRINAIRE REVOLU-
ED SOME MONTHS AGO, WOULD SEEM
WILL EXPLORE WITH UNSOBER/1
UST.

ENTION TO FACT THAT FRENCH
AND UNKEY) ARE OBVIOUSLY
SURFACING IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE
ON (WITH ASSUMED APPROVAL OF
INCLUDING PRESIDENT), PROVIDING
PUBLICLY WITH ATTENDANT EXTENSIVE
MEDIA COVERAGE AS KHOMEINI ENJOYED DURING HIS DAYS AT
NEAUPHLE-LE-CHATEAU.

4. NO FILE. RVW 2 AUG 99 DRV D9C1.
S E C R E T
BT
#1231

28 SEP 79

CC ON F I D E N T I A L 271750Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUC
CITE LONDON 19198
TO: WASHINGTON INFO TEHRAN.
FOR: NE/IRAN INFO R/BC
SUBJECT: WNINTEL AJ JA IRANIAN EXILES

1. WISH TO CALL TO YOUR ATTENTION STATE TELEGRAM NO. 249717,
DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1979, SUBJECT CONTACT WITH IRANIAN EXILES,
WHICH STATES INTER ALIA THAT "IT IS CRUCIAL THAT NO IMPRESSION
BE LEFT THAT THE USG HAS ANY INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN INTER-
NATIONAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS OR OF SUPPORTING GROUPS PLOTTING AGAINST THE
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. PLEASE MAKE THIS EXPLICITLY CLEAR TO CALLEES"

2. NO FILE. RVW 27 SEP 79 DRV D9D.6.

S E C R E T

#819

4

190ct79 0433z

S E C R E T 190214Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUC
CITE WASHINGTON 535504.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL RYFAT - RUN-DOWN ON SDRAP/SDPEPPER OPERATIONS

REF: TEHRAN 54496

1. IN ORDER TO GIVE THE STATION A BETTER FEEL FOR THE
SDPEPPER/1 (P/1) AND SDRAP/1 (R/1) OPERATIONS WE ARE PROVIDING
THE FOLLOWING RUN-DOWN.

2. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, P/1 ARRANGED CONTACT WITH
REACTION INDIRECTLY VIA U.S. MILITARY CONTACTS. P/1 WAS MET BY--
AND IS HANDLED BY CUMMISSY. P/1 IS ONE OF THE UNFORTUNATES
FROM THE PREVIOUS REGIME (HIGH RANKING MILITARY OFFICER,
IMPORTANT EMBASSY JOB, ETC.) WHO APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN BASICALLY
FONEST AND AS A RESULT FACED FINANCIAL DISASTER WHEN THE SHAH'S
REGIME COLLAPSED. P/1 NOT ONLY LOST HIS JOB BUT ALSO HIS
RETIREMENT INCOME. HE NOW LIVES IN A MODEST APARTMENT IN THE
WASHINGTON AREA AND LIVES OFF HIS SMALL SAVINGS. HE HAD MAINTAINED
LIMITED CONTACT WITH OTHER IRANIANS UNTIL BAKHTIAR SURFACED IN
PARIS. ACCORDING TO P/1 HE WAS CONTACTED BY BAKHTIAR WHO WANTED
HIM TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN BAKHTIAR AND EITHER HIGH RANKING
USG OFFICIALS OR REACTION. P/1 CLAIMS BAKHTIAR HAS COMPLETE
TRUST IN HIM BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT ONLY LONG TIME FRIENDS BUT
ALSO CLOSE RELATIVES BY MARRIAGE. AFTER P/1 APPROACHED US WE
ADVISED HIM TO TELL BAKHTIAR THAT HE WAS FREE TO DO AS HE WISHED,
BUT THAT WE RECOMMENDED THAT HE USE P/1 AS A CHANNEL TO FORWARD
WHATEVER VIEWS HE WISHED CONVEY TO REACTION. WE MADE CLEAR TO
P/1 THAT HE SHOULD TELL BAKHTIAR THAT WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION
TO FUND, ASSIST, OR GUIDE HIS MOVEMENT, BUT WERE PROVIDING THE
CHANNEL AS A MEANS BY WHICH HE COULD PROVIDE US WITH INFORMATION
ON HIS INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES. THIS WAS THE MESSAGE THAT
P/1 CARRIED TO PARIS WHEN HE TRAVELLED TO SEE BAKHTIAR AT THE
END OF SEPTEMBER. BAKHTIAR'S RESPONSE WAS THAT HE APPRECIATED THE

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PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 535504 S E C R E T

CHANNEL AND WOULD KEEP US INFORMED. A SUMMARY OF P/1'S MEETING WITH BAKHTIAR WAS DISSEMED IN MEMO FORM AND IS BEING FORWARDED TO TEHRAN. WE CONSIDERED BAKHTIAR'S MESSAGE TO US TO BE VERY CANDID. HE IS AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES HE MUST OVERCOME WITH VERY LIMITED RESOURCES. HE FREELY ADMITS HE HAS NO REAL MOVEMENT AND IS ONLY IN THE EARLY PLANNING STAGES. HOWEVER, HE HAS HOPES.

3. P/1'S OWN MOTIVATION IS A COMBINATION OF VENGEANCE AGAINST THE PRESENT REGIME, A DESIRE TO HELP HIS FRIEND BAKHTIAR, THE HOPE THAT A FRIENDLY REGIME WOULD REINSTATE HIS PENSION, AND A DESIRE TO REMAIN IN WASHINGTON AS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN. HE APPEARS TO BE BASICALLY A DECENT FELLOW AND NOT ONLY CHANNELS MESSAGES BUT ALSO FREQUENTLY ACTS AS A UNILATERAL ASSET, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT FORMALLY RECRUITED HIM. WE ASSISTED HIM WITH A PORTION OF HIS TRAVEL EXPENSES AND MAY EVENTUALLY GIVE HIM A MONTHLY RETAINER.

4. R/1 WAS CONTACTED BY GLEGOROFF AND COMMISKY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN LATE AUGUST 1979. THE ORIGINAL CONTACT WAS TO DETERMINE IF REPORTS OF R/1 BEING INVOLVED WITH THE KURDS WERE TRUE. AT THE TIME WE WERE UNSURE OF R/1'S WHEREABOUTS AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH REACTION OFFICERS. SDENORMOUS/1 WAS USED TO BROKER THE INTRODUCTION AND HAS REMAINED IN THE CASE AS A GENERAL SUPPORT AGENT, INDIRECT CHANNEL BETWEEN R/1 AND HIS CASE OFFICERS, AND AS A USEFUL SOURCE OF FEEDBACK FROM R/1 ON THE RESULTS OF OUR MEETINGS WITH HIM. AT OUR FIRST SESSIONS WITH R/1 HE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING COOPERATING WITH BAKHTIAR, BUT MORE RECENTLY HAS BECOME INTERESTED IN RUNNING HIS OWN MOVEMENT. HIS BASIC BELIEF IS THAT THE ONLY MEANS TO RECTIFY THE SITUATION IN IRAN IS THROUGH SOME FORM OF MILITARY ACTIVITY LED BY OR AT LEAST ORCHESTRATED BY HIMSELF. ONCE THE CHANGE IS EFFECTED AND CONSOLIDATED THE RUNNING OF THE COUNTRY COULD BE TURNED OVER TO A POLITICIAN SUCH AS BAKHTIAR. R/1 PLANS TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO TEST SUPPORT FOR HIMSELF AMONG THE EXILES. AGAIN, WE HAVE EMPHASIZED TO R/1 THAT WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH HIM TO GAIN INFORMATION ON THE IRANIAN SITUATION, AND THAT THE CONTACT SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS AN INDICATION OF SUPPORT ON OUR PART. R/1 MAY NOT TOTALLY BELIEVE THIS.

5. UNTIL RECENTLY R/1 WAS IN DIRE FINANCIAL STRAIGHTS AND

PAGE 3 WASHINGTON 535524 S E C R E T

LIVED IN A VERY MODEST HOME IN A SMALL TOWN IN NEW JERSEY. RECENTLY HE HAS MOVED TO BETTER QUARTERS AND IS ABLE TO MAKE ENDS MEET. HE IS NOW BEING ASSISTED FINANCIALLY, IN A LIMITED WAY, BY WELL-TO-DO IRANIANS IN THE U.S. WHO PROBABLY SEE THE SMALL INVESTMENT AS AN INSURANCE POLICY. WE SEE R/1'S MOTIVATION CONSISTING OF A MIX OF PATRIOTISM, SELF-INTEREST, VENGEANCE, DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR, AND RETIREMENT IN THE U.S.

6. WE DO NOT YET KNOW IF AN EXILE MOVEMENT, LED BY BAKHTIAR, R/1, A COMBINATION OF THE TWO, OR OTHERS WILL EVER GET OFF THE GROUND. THE PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH R/1 IS BASICALLY TO BE IN BETTER POSITION TO MAKE THAT DETERMINATION. A POSITIVE SIGN IS THAT BOTH FIGURES APPEAR TO BE REALISTIC IN VIEWING THE DIFFICULTY OF THEIR TASK. IT HAS NOT YET BEEN SHOWN THAT THEY CAN COOPERATE TOWARD A COMMON GOAL, AND ALREADY THERE ARE SIGNS OF THEM DIVIDING THEIR EFFORTS BY OPPOSING ONE ANOTHER. REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME, ECS SEES IN THE EXILE OPPOSITION AN OPPORTUNITY TO GATHER USEFUL INTELLIGENCE ON IRAN. BOTH BAKHTIAR AND R/1 ARE AWARE OF THE NEED TO GATHER INFORMATION FROM INSIDE THE COUNTRY, AND BOTH ARE IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING LINKS INTO THE TRIBAL, MILITARY, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL SEGMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY. WE SEE IN THIS THE CHANCE OF PIGGYBACKING ON THEIR EFFORTS.

7. FILE: 221-962615; 201-106171. RWV 18 OCT 89
DRY D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

BT
#3457

58273 17 21 E

E C R E T 022356Z SEP 79 S AFF
SITE DIRECTOR 507357.
OO: TEHRAN.
#INTEL INTEL
REF: DIRECTOR 504036

U.S. GOVERNMENT

1. FOLLOWING OBTAINED BY GUMMISKY AND GERROFF IN REF MEETING 29 AUGUST AND DISSEMINATED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, SONDERS ONLY AS FIRDB-512/02121-79 31 AUG 81

WITH REGARD TO HIS OWN PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN OPPOSITION PLANNING, DEN REF (SUBJECT) SAID THAT HE ONLY RECENTLY HAD RESUMED AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN IRANIAN POLITICS. HE HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR BAHRI AND INVITED TO PARIS FOR MEETINGS. SUBJECT CLAIMS ALSO TO HAVE RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL TO FRANCE FOR TALKS WITH THAT GOVERNMENT. SUBJECT HAS BEEN IN PERIODIC CONTACT WITH ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE U.S. WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY, SINCE HIS ARRIVAL HERE AND HAS BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT CONTACT FROM AN ISRAELI OFFICIAL ARRIVING IN THE U.S. FROM LONDON ON 1 SEPTEMBER. SUBJECT IMPLIED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WAS WELL ALONG IN ITS CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR IRAN. HE HAS CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR THE ISRAELIS STEMMING FROM HIS DEALINGS WITH THEM AS A MILITARY COMMANDER IN IRAN. SUBJECT DENIES THAT HE HAD ANY CONTACTS OR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SHAH SINCE SUBJECT'S DEPARTURE FROM IRAN, ALTHOUGH HE DID ONCE RECEIVE PHONE CALL FROM EMPRESS FARAH DIBA.

ADDED FOLLOWING COMMENT FROM SDENOV \$/1: SUBJECT WAS HURT THAT THE SHAH NEVER PERMITTED TO CONTACT HIM IN THE U.S. AND AS A RESULT HAS BEEN BITTER TOWARD HIM. ACCORDING TO DEN RMOUS/1, SUBJECT HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY FUNDS FROM THE SHAH OR THE SHAH'S FAMILY. HE DID DISSEM.

ALL DIRECTOR 507357 S E C R E T
REF: 201-106171 RW 04 99 DRV 0-1 ALL SECRET.
E T

20 SEP 79

SECRET 200219Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 517075.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, ROUTINE
GENEVA.

UNINTL A. J. A. FORRES

REF: TDFIED-315/15020-79 (DIRECTOR 512112, NOT SENT)

1. SPREPPER/1 (P/1) (IDEN A) IN LATE AUGUST AND
US MILITARY CONTACTS THAT HE DESIRED MEET WITH P/1 ACTION
FAMILIAR WITH IRANIAN MATTERS. ON 31 AUGUST HQS OFFICE
P/1. P/1'S MESSAGE WAS THAT HE WANTED TO TRAVEL TO PARIS
BAKHTIAR AND WISHED TO BE CERTAIN HE COULD TRAVEL WITHOUT
DEPARTIZING HIS IMMIGRATION STATUS HERE. THIS LED TO HIS
THAT BAKHTIAR HAD REQUESTED HIM TO TRAVEL TO PARIS SO THAT
TALK TO HIM ABOUT ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH P/1 ACTION OR THE
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. P/1 EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS
THEIR FRIEND AND CONFIDANT OF BAKHTIAR AND HAD A SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP BY VIRTUE OF IDEN B.

2. TWO ADDITIONAL MEETINGS WITH P/1 HAVE BEEN HELD, ONE
WHICH RESULTED IN REF DISSEM. WE HAVE AGREED TO ASSIST P/1 WITH
IMMIGRATION PROBLEM SO THAT HE CAN TRAVEL, AND HAVE ADVISED HIM
THAT IF BAKHTIAR WISHES CONVEY MESSAGE OR INFO TO U.S. GOVERNMENT
HE MAY DO THIS THROUGH P/1. HE HAS BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE
SECURITY REQUIRED TO SAFEGUARD SUCH COMMUNICATIONS AND WILL IMPRESS
THE SAME UPON BAKHTIAR. P/1 HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT REQUIREMENTS
AND WILL BE GIVEN THE FOLLOWING PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE: STATE OF
BAKHTIAR'S FINANCES; INFO ON HIS CONTACTS INSIDE IRAN; RELATIONSHIP
WITH GEN JAMA; MEMBERS AND DETAILS HIS IMMEDIATE CIRCLE, INCLUDING
FRANK ADAMIA; BAKHTIAR'S VIEWS ON ASSOCIATED INTERNAL MATTERS.

3. P/1 PLANS TO TRAVEL PARIS LATE THIS WEEK OR EARLY NEXT
WEEK. WILL STAY THERE APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK. IF PARIS OR TEHRAN
HAVE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR P/1, PLEASE PROVIDE PRIORITY.

4. FILE: 231-962915. RWX 155899 DRW DEC.1 ALL SECRET

SECRET

20 SEP 79

SECRET 200107Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 517145.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, ROUTINE
GENEVA.

UNINTL A. J. A. FORRES

DIRECTOR 517075

1. IDEN A: GEN MOREFATEB RAHFI, FORMER CHIEF
EMBASSY SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON.
IDEN B: HIS SON WHO IS MARRIED TO BAKHTIAR

FILE: 231-962915. RWX 155899 DRW DEC.1 ALL SECRET

SECRET

S E C R E T 201544Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 542160

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY PARIS.

WNINTEL AJAJA

REF: DIRECTOR 517075

1. PARA TWO REF REQUIREMENTS COVER OUR INTERESTS. EFFORTS IN IRAN, WOULD SUGGEST SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON TRIBAL CONTACTS WITH THOSE WITH ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY.

2. NO FILE. RWV 20SEP99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 180020Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 534442.

TO: PARIS INFO LONDON, GENEVA, TEHRAN, FR/WASHINGTON.

WNINTEL AJAJA

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 521262 (NOT SENT/NEEDED TEHRAN, FR/WASH)
B. PARIS 12594 (NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON, GENEVA)

1. SDPEPPER/1 WAS MET AND DEBRIEFED ON 5 OCT AFTER HIS RETURN FROM EUROPE. HE HAD VISITED BAKHTIAR IN PARIS 28-29 SEPT AND GENERAL JAM IN LONDON 29 SEPT-1 OCT. IN SUM, HE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, WHICH BEING DISSEMED WASHINGTON IN PART IN MEMO FORMAT.

BAKHTIAR ACCEPTED P/1'S ROLE AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN HIMSELF AND RTACTION. BAKHTIAR'S MESSAGE TO US WAS THAT HE RUNS A SHOESTRING OPERATION WHICH IS NOT GOING TO GO ANYWHERE UNLESS HE RECEIVES FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FROM THE U.S. HE IS STILL IN THE PLANNING STAGE BUT EXPECTS TO HAVE ALL DETAILS READY IN ABOUT FIVE MONTHS, AT WHICH TIME HE WISHES TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR DIRECT DISCUSSIONS ON THE FUTURE OF HIS MOVEMENT AND HIS COUNTRY WITH USC OFFICIALS. (HE CONFIDED TO P/1 THAT IF HE DOES NOT OBTAIN U.S. ASSISTANCE, HE WILL PROBABLY TURN TO THE GULF ARAB STATES FOR AID.)

BAKHTIAR'S OFFICE IN PARIS CONSISTS OF HIMSELF, DR. YNU ETTEBAR, DR. ABDOR RAHMAN BOROUMAND, AND THE DAUGHTER OF FORMER SAVAK CHIEF PAKRAYAN ACTING AS A SECRETARY. IN LONDON HE WAS GEN JAM WORKING ON MILITARY AFFAIRS ASSISTED BY GEN MOHSEN MOBASSER, A FORMER COMMANDER OF POLICE, AND AMIR HOSEIN AMIR-PARVIZ, NOW A LONDON BUSINESSMAN. BAKHTIAR HAS HAD CONTACT WITH NUMEROUS OTHERS, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MUJAHEDDIN, BUT THE KEY INDIVIDUALS ARE THOSE NAMED ABOVE. BAKHTIAR SAID MANY SPEAK IN HIS NAME BUT WITHOUT HIS AUTHORITY. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAS NO PEOPLE ON THE GROUND

4

2 DIRECTOR 317622 S E C R E T
4. RYU: INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO OS I DI T B I
VARIOUS IRANIANS ARE ORGANIZED TO SUPPORT FOR A S T I A T I A
HAVE LITTLE HARD INFORMATION ON THESE GROUPS. THESE GROUPS
INTEL (S) WOULD BE DEVELOPED WOULD BE WARRI
5. PARIS: HQS ASSUMES PARIS WOULD BE
SOME ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING THESE ORGANIZATIONS
MAKING IN PARIS.
IN WIRE ADDRESSES COMMENTS ON TIMELY BASIS
221-212149. RYU-23 SEP 69 RM D9C

11 SEP 69
E O T 116537 SEP 79 ST FT
TE PAPA 43721. SECTION 1 OF 2
DIRECTOR INFO PARIS. TRAM
MINTEL RUBAT AJ AJA SDSTAY.

1. GUNION MET SDSTAY IN PA
INITIAL CONTACT MADE ON 5 SEPT
AT PARIS SEPARATION WHERE HE ST
CONTACT AT FIRST FACE-TO-FACE
OF MEETINGS. NOT EVEN BAKETIAR
ON 6 SEPT 1979. 7 SEPT 1979
GUNION'S ORIGINAL RELATIONSHIPS
CONVERSATIONS WERE IN FRENCH
IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED GUNION
CONTACTED.

2. SDSTAY SAID THAT DURING FRENCH
LIAISON WITH KHOMEINI AND WAS FORCED
GOVERNMENT FELL. HE SAID THAT FRENCH
PROTECTION FOR HE. SDSTAY, WHOSE SON
ATTEMPT. HE HAS BEEN IN FRANCE SINCE
AND YOUNG SON WHO LEFT IRA IN PARIS
WERE ALREADY IN UNIVERSLTH
LAUSANNE. HE HAS VILLA AT CANNES
FEBRUARY.

3. SDSTAY WAS TOLD THAT GUNION
NOT PERSONAL BUT CONTACT IS NO
TOLD THAT USC IRANIAN POLICE WANTED
AND THAT INFORMATION WAS WANTED
POLITICAL GROUPS. FENCE THIS A
4. SDSTAY WHO DESCRIBED HIS
AND POLITICAL STRATEGIST. SAY
ANALYZED IRANIAN SITUATION IN

ON 6 SEPTEMBER. (HOUSE) PE
FRENCH NO OTHER PE
PARIS. HE SAID HAD TOLD
HE WAS AVAILABLE FOR
HE HELD IN HT
HE WAS IN PARS
HE WAS FLUENT. HE
HE WAS DELIGHTED TO
HE WAS PREMIERSHIP FR
HE WAS WHEN FRENCH
HE WAS ASSASSI
HE WAS QUARTER IN WIT
HE WAS ELDER DAY
HE WAS SON IN UNIVE
HE HAS LIVED THE
ON CONTACT WAS OFFER
EQUIVALENT TO SUB
RECEIVING HIGH LE
HE WAS AND ACTI
HE WAS TO BIM.
HE WAS BAKETIAR
HE WAS AND BAKETIAR
HE WAS ACTUAL AN

43721 S E C R E T
 THOSE WHO WOULD OPPOSE BAKHTIAR REGIME
 WANT TO INTEGRATE INTO THEIR OWN
 RELIGIOUS LEADERS (KHOUMENI) ARE RELIGIOUS
 POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
 THEIR VISION IS SIMPLY TO
 RELIGIOUS FANATICS SUCH AS KHAKHAI
 FEDERALIN-KHAKHAI WHO ARE CONTROLLED BY MOSCOW, AND;
 MOJAHIDIN-KHAKHAI WHO ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONTROLLED BY
 BUT ARE MAHJIBI. EXCEPT SANJABI AND
 ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SUPPORTERS OF BAKHTIAR INCLUDE:
 ALL NATIONAL FRONT LEADERS WHO REFUSED SUPPORT FOR
 OF HIS CLOSE FRIENDS. SANJABI REFUSAL OF SUPPORT IS
 NAMED AS PRIME MINISTER. RATHER THAN SEE HIS
 FORMER MILITARY LEADERS WHO SUPPORTED SHAH. THEY
 HOPE FOR A RESTORATION OF MONARCHY BUT NOW REALIZE THIS
 IMPOSSIBLE AND SEE BAKHTIAR AS THE BEST POSSIBILITY FOR
 RESTORING ORDER IN IRAN;
 RELIGIOUS MINORITIES SUCH AS JEWS, ASSYRIANS AND
 ARMENIANS;
 ALL OF THE WEALTHY LAND-OWNING CLASS. THE TRADING
 FAMILIES;
 THE SMALL MERCHANTS. THE BAZARI;
 MANY RELIGIOUS LEADERS SUCH AS SHARIAT-MADRES (THE
 JECMI AND SEIRAZI FROM MERSEH, RAHMANI (SEIRAZ) AND NAJAFI
 MARACHI (COM). THESE NEUTRAL MULLAS BELIEVE THAT
 IS IN THE MOSQUE AND NOT IN POLITICS.

43721 S E C R E T
 MOST KURDS EXCEPT THOSE UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE
 THE KHUZISTAN ARABS DO NOT ESPECIALLY LIKE BAKHTIAR
 WOULD WORK WITH ANYONE AGAINST KHOUMENI
 A MAJORITY OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS ARE UNDER COMMUNIST
 KHOUMENI INFLUENCE BUT WORKERS IN KHUZISTAN AND ISFAHAN
 SUPPORT BAKHTIAR;
 ALL TECHNOCRATS;
 TRIBES (THE ONLY TWO WITH SUPPORT FOR TO BE
 IMPORTANT ARE BAKHTIARI AND QASHGAI. THEY ARE NO RELIGIOUS
 DO NOT SUPPORT KHOUMENI. BAKHTIAR HAS SUPPORT OF HIS
 QASHGAI AND QASHGAI ARE AWAITING APPEARANCE OF SOMEONE WHO LOOK
 LIKE A WINNER BEFORE TAKING SIDES;
 SDSTAY DISCOUNTS FARMERS AND ARTISANS AND CRAFTSMEN
 (BAZAR WORKERS) AS A POLITICAL FORCE.
 BASIC PREMISES OF ABOVE ANALYSIS THAT IRAN, AS A
 DIVERSE MIXTURE OF CULTURES, RELIGIONS AND CLASSES, CANNOT
 GOVERNED AS AN INTEGRATED DICTATORSHIP IN THE MANNER OF THE
 SHAH OR KHOUMENI. THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL GOVERNMENT WILL BE A
 LIBERAL, DEMOCRATIC, SECULAR REPUBLIC FOLLOWING FREEDOM AND
 DIVERSITY FOR ALL SEGMENTS OF POPULATION. THIS IS WHAT
 BAKHTIAR OFFERS AND TO THIS END HE HAS RAISED HIS STANDARD
 AND IS NOW WAITING TO SEE WHO WILL JOIN HIS SIDE. BAKHTIAR
 COMPLETELY REJECTS POSSIBILITY OF RESTORATION OF MONARCHY.
 AT THE MOMENT THERE IS NO BAKHTIAR ORGANIZATION
 HE HAS ANNOUNCED HIS WILLINGNESS TO GOVERN AND, WITH THE
 COLLEAGUES SUCH AS SDSTAY, IS TRYING TO DEVELOP SUPPORT
 INFLUENTIAL IRANIANS. AMIR PAVANI IS WORKING FOR BAKHTIAR
 LONDON. SDSTAY SAYS THEY ARE MAKING CONSTANT PHONE CONTACT
 IRAN IN EFFORT GATHER SUPPORT. THEY ARE SOLICITING INVESTMENT
 SUPPORT FROM ALL CONTACTS BUT STATE MOST CONTRIBUTORS
 BEEN SMALL AND THEIR FINANCIAL CONDITION IS POOR. BAKHTIAR
 NOT HAVE ANY PERSONAL FORTUNE. BAKHTIAR HAS NO POLITICAL
 BY
 #7806

GEA 03721 S E C R E T

THESE GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING FRENCH; HE IS DEALING WITH
ENO PLACE RE HIS PHYSICAL SECURITY BUT NOTHING MORE. THE
TIOAL FRONT NO LONGER EXISTS AS AN ORGANIZATION AND BAKHTIAR
NOT ATTEMPTING TO RESURRECT IT AS VEHICLE TO POWER. HE SEES
ED FOR MUCH BROADER POWER BASE THAN PROVIDED BY FORMER
TIOAL FRONT.

B. BAKHTIAR SEES NO POSSIBILITY OF WORKING WITH PRESENT
GIME. AZARGAN IS HIS FRIEND BUT BAKHTIAR SEES HIM AS WEAK.
PREDICTS TOOL OF KHOMENI INCAPABLE OF DEFENDING THE INTERESTS
OF IRAN. MAJOR INTELLECTUAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM IS THAT
AZARGAN IS DEEPLY RELIGIOUS AND THUS BELIEVES IN CONCEPT OF
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC WHILE BAKHTIAR FEELS IRAN MUST HAVE A SECULAR
REPUBLIC. BAKHTIAR WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN FORTHCOMING
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM OR SUBSEQUENT MAJLIS ELECTIONS ON
ASSUMPTION VOTE WILL NOT BE FREE. SDSTAY WAS NOT AWARE OF
EFFORTS OF AMBASSADOR ENTEZAM TO INDUCE IRANIANS TO RETURN TO
IRAN AND DOUBTS THAT ANYONE HAVING IMPORTANT ROLE IN PRE-
REVOLUTION IRAN WOULD NOW RETURN.

BAKHTIAR BELIEVES, FOR REASONS ALREADY STATED, THAT
KHOMENI REGIME CANNOT LAST. AS IT WEAKENS SOMEONE WILL PROVIDE
A "COUP DE FORCE" TO TOPPLE REGIME; THIS WILL BE EITHER THE
SOVIETS OR THE WEST AND SUBSEQUENT REGIME WILL BE MODELED
AFTER GOVERNMENTS SPONSORING THE COUP. BAKHTIAR BELIEVES THAT THE
USA, FRG, UK, FRENCH AND JAPANESE HAVE COMMON INTERESTS IN IRAN
AND SHOULD DEVISE A JOINT PLAN TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS. HERE
USA SHOULD LEAD IN FORMULATION OF OBJECTIVES AND GOAL OF PLAN BUT
BRITISH (WHO UNDERSTAND IRAN MUCH BETTER THAN THE USA) SHOULD
EXECUTE THE PLAN. ACCORDING TO SDSTAY THE QASBAI ARE THE BEST
TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COUP DE FORCE. NASSER KASSABAI
IS NOW IN USA SEEKING SIGNAL THAT USG WOULD SUPPORT A QASBAI
COUP. SDSTAY WAS RECENTLY IN USA WHERE HE SOUGHT USG SUP OF
FOR BAKHTIAR VIA BILL MILLER (SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
AFF). SDSTAY BELIEVES USG SHOULD WEAKEN IRANIAN REGIME BY
WITHHOLDING FOOD, MILITARY SUPPLIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
AND BY MOUNTING MAJOR CAMPAIGN TO PUBLICIZE SHORTCOMINGS OF
REGIME IN AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS. SDSTAY OF OPINION USG SHOULD DO
MUCH TO IMPROVE AND CHANGE SITUATION BY ASKING FRIENDS IN MILITARY
BUSINESS, TRIBES, ETC., TO SUPPORT BAKHTIAR.

PAGE 3 GEA 03721 S E C R E T

11. ABOVE REFLECTS PERSISTENT IRANIAN VIEW, DESPITE KHOMENI
EXAMPLE, THAT FOREIGN POWERS CONTROL IRAN AND CHANGE CAN COME
ONLY BY WORKING WITH THESE POWERS. SDSTAY ASKED WITH CONCERN
IF PRESUPPORTORS OF VIRTUAL DESTRUCTION OF IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
AND WAS ASSURED TO HEAR A CONTRARY VIEW. HE FEELS THAT ONLY
IRANIAN PERSONNEL UNDERSTAND IRAN AND THAT IT IS THE ONLY
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION WORTH CONTACTING. SDSTAY WAS GREATLY
IMPRESSED WITH IRANIAN OMNISCIENCE AS DEMONSTRATED BY FACT
HE HAD LOCATED HIM. HE HAD NO IDEA HOW WE HAD DETERMINED HIS
WHEREABOUTS.

11. COMMENT: SDSTAY WAS CHEERED AND ENCOURAGED TO BE
CONTACTED AFTER LONG HIATUS AND FELT WERE FRUIT OF CONTACT
SIGNALLED CHANGE OF POLICY. HOWEVER, HIS BASIC MOOD WAS SOMEWHAT
DISCOURAGED AND DESPONDENT AND DOUBT HE REALLY BELIEVES BAKHTIAR
WILL RETURN TO POWER. AN EXAMPLE WILL SHOW LACK OF COORDINATION
AMONG IRANIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS WITH SIMILAR VIEW. PARIS
STATE UN SHOWED GUNION A FRENCH LANGUAGE NEWSLETTER, IRAN LIFE,
OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN. GUNION READ THIS BEFORE SEEING SDSTAY AND
SDSTAY'S PERSPECTIVE SEEMED COINCIDE ALMOST EXACTLY WITH HIS
IN THIS NEWSLETTER. AT CONCLUSION OF SDSTAY-GUNION MEET, HE WAS
SHOWN NEWSLETTER AND ASKED IF IT WAS HIS WORK. HE HAD NEVER
HEARD OF IT AND HAD NO IDEA WHO WAS BEHIND IT. HE PHONED
BAKHTIAR TO ASK IF HE KNEW AND BAKHTIAR GUESSED, BUT DID NOT
KNOW, THAT ITS ORIGINATOR MIGHT BE SAHARUJAM NAHAVANDI, FORMER
RECTOR OF TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AND ADVISER TO SHABANOU.

12. POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE CONTACT WAS DISCUSSED WITH
SDSTAY. HIS ACTIVITIES AND LOCATION DURING NEXT TWO OR THREE
MONTHS WILL DEPEND ON VIABILITY OF BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT. IF
GAIN ADHERENTS AND SUPPORT, HE WILL BE WITH BAKHTIAR IN
MOST OF THE TIME. IF BAKHTIAR INITIATIVE FOLDS, HE WILL BE
HOME IN CANNES. SDSTAY WAS GIVEN GUNION HOME TELEPHONE
PROVIDE HIS TELEPHONE IN CANNES, 00-18-13 REPEAT 90-13
AND THE NUMBER OF BAKHTIAR'S RESIDENCE IN PARIS, 548-1562
REPEAT 548-9262 WHERE HE CAN BE REACHED IF IN PARIS. SDSTAY
SHOULD PROBABLY BE RECONTACTED IN A FEW WEEKS TO DETERMINE
BAKHTIAR HAS SUCCEEDED IN LAUNCHING A CREDIBLE MOVEMENT.

AG 4 GENEVA 43721 SECRET
13L FILE: 201-212149. RVW 11 SEP
COMS COMMET: RELAYED INFO TEHRAN PER
SECRET

15 SEP 75 26z

SECRET 141612Z SEP 75 STAFF
CITE PARIS 12390 SECTION 1 OF 2.
TO: DIRECTOR INFO GENEVA, TEHRAN
FM: TEL RYBAT AJAJA SDUPBEAT
REF: PARIS 10928

RECENTLY, CRAMBES RECEIVED THROUGH THE MAIL A COPY OF A PUBLICATION CALLED "IRAN LIBRE", WRITTEN IN FRENCH (COPY BEING POUCHED UNDER TM 562894 AND 562895). ENVELOPE HAD RETURN ADDRESS, ONLY SDUPBEAT'S NAME. THINKING THAT SDUPBEAT MAY BE IN CONTACT WITH BAKHTIAR (IN FACT WE ARE NOT SURE), CRAMBES THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE BAKHTIAR'S PUBLICATION, STATION DECIDED TO RECONTACT SDUPBEAT. THIS WAS DONE BY CRAMBES AN HOUR-AND-A-HALF MEETING WAS HELD ON 12 SEPTEMBER.

FIRST, SDUPBEAT'S PERSONAL SITUATION: HE HAS OFFICIALLY BROKEN AWAY FROM PRESENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, REFUSED TO RETURN TO IRAN WHEN DIRECTLY ORDERED BY THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF. AS A RESULT, IRANIAN AMBASSADOR LOCKED HIM OUT OF HIS OFFICE AND ORDERED HIM TO VACATE HIS APARTMENT AND RETURN CAR, BOTH PROPERTY OF EMBASSY. SDUPBEAT, TO DATE, HAS REFUSED TO MOVE AND TOLD CRAMBES HE INTENDS TO STAY HERE. CRAMBES HAS BEEN TRYING TO SETTLE HIS CURRENT SITUATION AND PROCEDURE MAY WELL TAKE YEAR OR MORE. HE INTENDS TO RETURN TO HIS HOME COUNTRY, EVEN THOUGH STRIPPED OF HIS DIPLOMATIC STATUS. SDUPBEAT MAKES IT A POINT TO ATTEND MANY MILITARY DIPLOMATIC FUNCTIONS TO WHICH HE STILL RECEIVES OFFICIAL INVITATIONS SENT TO HIS HOME. FOR EXAMPLE, ON 12 SEPTEMBER HE AND HIS WIFE ATTENDED PARTY GIVEN FOR NEW YUGOSLAV MILITARY ATTACHE. CRAMBES NOTICED THAT SDUPBEAT WAS GIVEN A VERY COOL RECEPTION BY THE OFFICE. BUT OTHER DIPLOMATS SEEMED TO ENJOY TALKING TO HIM. HE ADMITTED THAT FINANCES ARE A PROBLEM. EVEN IF HE DOES NOT MOVE OUT OF APARTMENT, HE WILL HAVE TO PAY RENT, MUST BUY NEW CAR, AND AS HE PUTS HIS FRIENDS WHO HAVE BEEN HELPING HIM FOR PAST SIX MONTHS MAY BE GETTING TIRED OF LOANING HIM MONEY. HIS

PAGE 2 PARIS 12390 S E C R E T
TWO CHILDREN CONTINUE ATTEND FRENCH PRIVATE SCHOOL, BUT FOR
PRESENT DO NOT HAVE TO PAY ANY FEES.

3. SDUPEAT TOLD CRAMBES THAT HE IS HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH AN IRANIAN EMIGRE GROUP WHICH WHILE NOT YET IN TOUCH WITH BAKHTIAR, MAY EVENTUALLY CONTACT HIM. THIS GROUP RECEIVED SOME FINANCIAL BACKING, ENOUGH TO PUBLISH FIRST ISSUE OF "IRAN LIFE" IN FRENCH (EIGHT-PAGE PUBLICATION PRINTED ON GOOD PAPER, BUT CARRIES NO NAME OR ADDRESS AND ALL ARTICLES ARE UNSIGNED), AND ENOUGH TO PUBLISH SECOND ISSUE SOON WHICH, ACCORDING TO SDUPEAT, WILL BE PUBLISHED IN FRENCH, ENGLISH AND FARSI. THIS ISSUE WILL INCLUDE AN EDITORIAL WRITTEN BY SDUPEAT AND ADDRESSED TO THE IRANIAN MILITARY REMINDING THEM OF THEIR OATH MADE TO IRAN AND NOT TO FOREIGNERS. ALSO, CASSETTES WILL BE SENT TO SELECTED IRANIAN CONSULATE ON 12 SEPTEMBER IN SUPPORT OF THE KURDS.

4. SDUPEAT ALSO SAID THAT HIS GROUP WAS ACTIVE AND WAS ORGANIZING ITSELF EVEN BEFORE BAKHTIAR'S FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE SOME MONTHS AGO. IT ALSO HAS GOOD CONTACTS INSIDE IRAN AND IS IN DAILY CONTACT WITH SELECTED IRANIAN MILITARY, INCLUDING SOME KURDS. SDUPEAT FELT THAT BAKHTIAR DOES NOT HAVE MUCH SUPPORT IN IRAN AND THE SUPPORT, SUCH AS IT IS, COMES ONLY FROM SEGMENTS OF MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASS WHICH LOST THE MOST WHEN THE SHAH FELL, BUT HAS LITTLE SUPPORT EITHER AMONG THE WORKING CLASSES AND EQUALLY LITTLE AMONG IRANIAN MILITARY. IT WAS THE OPINION OF SDUPEAT THAT HIS GROUP, AND IN THIS THEY AGREE WITH BAKHTIAR, THAT MOHAMED REZAI'S REGIME CANNOT LAST. IN ORDER NOT TO BE SUCCEEDED BY A LEFTIST COALITION, TWO THINGS MUST TAKE PLACE. THE ARMY MUST SUPPORT A WESTERN-SUPPORTED MOVEMENT (SDUPEAT IS A BIT FUZZY ON WHO WOULD LEAD THE MOVEMENT, BUT IN HIS OPINION MODERATELY). USG'S SUPPORT OF SUCH A MOVEMENT IS ESSENTIAL, NOT ONLY MATERIALLY, BUT ALSO BY REDUCING RELATIONS WITH PRESENT IRANIAN REGIME. SDUPEAT SAID THAT HIS GROUP DOES NOT ENVISION THE RETURN OF THE SHAH, BUT DOES NOT RULE OUT RETURN OF MONARCHY BY ONE OF

PAGE 3 PARIS 12390 S E C R E T
THE SHAH'S SONS. THE GROUP HAS COMMUNICATED WITH THE SHAH, BUT SO FAR HAS NOT RECEIVED A DIRECT RESPONSE. HOWEVER, SDUPEAT AND OTHERS MET WITH FORMER AMBASSADOR ZAHEDI ON 14 JULY, WHO GAVE THE GROUP HIS TACIT APPROVAL.

5. WHEN CRAMBES RAISED QUESTION OF WHETHER SDUPEAT OR HIS GROUP HAVE ANY CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS, SDUPEAT REPLIED THAT HE AND HIS GROUP ARE TOTALLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF SOLICITING SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION. SDUPEAT ADDED THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, HE WAS ASKED TO DINNER BY THE SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE (GENERAL KAPALKIN), BUT NEVER ACCEPTED. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING THIS TURN-DOWN OF KAPALKIN'S, HE HAS BEEN INVITED, AND HAD DINNER, WITH THE CZECH MILITARY ATTACHE (COLONEL VALEHRACH) AND THE POLISH MILITARY ATTACHE (LTC DUNAJ). BOTH GENTLEMEN WANTED TO TALK ABOUT THE SITUATION IN IRAN, BUT DID NOT (IF WE CAN BELIEVE SDUPEAT) PRESS FOR ANY COLLABORATION.

6. THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, CRAMBES STRESSED THAT HIS CONTACT WITH SDUPEAT WAS IN NO WAY TO BE TAKEN AS SUPPORT BY USG. THAT CRAMBES WAS IN TOUCH WITH HIM AS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHOSE JOB WAS ONLY TO COLLECT INFORMATION FOR PASSAGE TO HIGHER LEVELS. CRAMBES AGAIN (AS WE HAVE DONE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE PAST) SAID THAT IN ORDER FOR USG TO BE WELL INFORMED, IT NEEDED SPECIFIC INFORMATION OF WHO, WHAT, WHERE AND WHEN, AND ANYTHING LESS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. FURTHERMORE, IF SDUPEAT WERE UNWILLING TO FURNISH OF ALL, PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION, AND SECONDLY, TO HOLD OUR CONTACTS CONFIDENTIAL, THERE WOULD BE NO SENSE IN MEETING AGAIN. CRAMBES SAID THAT IF WE WERE TO CONTINUE, SDUPEAT WOULD HAVE TO COME UP WITH NAMES, POSITIONS, ORGANIZATION, ETC. ALSO, NAMES OF THOSE IRANIAN MILITARY WHO FROM THEY ARE IN CONTACT INSIDE (UNDERSTAND ABLY SDUPEAT BALKED AT THIS ONE RIGHT AWAY), AND OTHER INFORMATION OF VALUE.

7. NOW, WHAT WOULD WE HAVE TO DO IN RETURN? SDUPEAT ADMITTED THAT HE IS IN SOMEWHAT TIGHT FINANCIAL STRAITS (SEE PARA 2). CRAMBES REPLIED THAT WHILE HE COULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF WITHOUT HIS HQS APPROVAL TO ANY FINANCIAL

PAGE 4 PARIS 12380 S E C R E T
SUPPORT. WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO COME TO SOME UNDERSTANDING
IN A TYPICAL MANNER. SDUPBEAT AT FIRST SAID THAT HE
CANNOT BE BOUGHT (HE ADDED THAT HE HAD REFUSED HELP OFFERED
BY GRAMBS BEFORE), BUT IT SEEMED OBVIOUS TO GRAMBS
THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT SOME PAYMENT IF OFFERED. THE ONLY
PROBLEM WE ENVISAGE IS THAT SDUPBEAT, WITH HIS VISION OF
GRANDUEUR, MAY NOT COME CHEAP. CERTAINLY IF HE FEELS THAT
WE WOULD SUPPORT HIS PRESENT LIVING STANDARD, HE WILL BE
DISAPPOINTED WITH WHATEVER WE CAN OFFER.

8. FOLLOWING IS STATION'S RECOMMENDATION AND REQUEST
FOR HQS VIEWS AND EVENTUAL APPROVAL. IF THERE IS AN INTEREST
IN MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THE EMIGRE GROUPS AND SPECIFICALLY
WITH THE ONE THAT SDUPBEAT IS ASSOCIATED WITH, WE PLAN TO
OFFER SDUPBEAT 2,500 FRANCS (CIRCA \$600) A MONTH FOR A
PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS TO BE RENEGOTIATED AT THE END
OF THAT PERIOD. IF SDUPBEAT FEELS THIS IS TOO LITTLE, WE
WILL THANK HIM FOR HIS TIME AND LEAVE. PLEASE REPLY BY
08 SEPTEMBER.

9. FILE: 201-959108. RWV 13 SEP 99. DRV D9C1. CL
SECRET. ALL SECRET.

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21 SEP 79 2045

S E C R E T 20 729 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 57493

TO: PARIS INFO CENTER, TERRAN.

MINTEL ANJAY SDUPBEAT

REF: PARIS 12390

1. BELIEVE ADEQUATE COVERAGE OF HIRWITAN FILE OF POSITIVE
ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE IS DEVELOPING AND SDUPBEAT (U/I) HAS NO
CONTACT IN OPS PLANNING THUS FAR. THEREFORE WE ARE DISSENTING
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT WITH U/I CENTERED ON THIS TARGET.
A PRECIPITATE GRAMBS EFFORTS AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE PERIODIC
ACT MAINTAINED THAT WOULD PERMIT U/I TO PASS UP WHATEVER IN-
FORMATIONS.

2. FBI: OVEISI HAS INFORMED HQS OFFICERS THAT HE PLANS TO
RE-ENTER SDUPBEAT AND U/I DURING A PLANNED TRIP TO PARIS IN
SEVERAL WEEKS.

3. FILE: 201-959108. RWV 13 SEP 99 DRV D9C1. ALL SECRET.

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31 OCT 79 07 14z

SECRET 302247Z OCT 79 STAFF
CITE DIRECTOR 542726.
TO: PRIORITY LONDON INFO THERAN.
WNINTEL AJAJA SDFACE GNSIGHT

REFS: A. LONDON 19960
B. LONDON 19113

1. IN VIEW OF CONTINUED NEED TO MONITOR EXPATRIATE ACTIVITIES, CONCUR STATION SUGGESTION TO RETAIN SDFACE/1 ON PAYROLL AT 150 POUNDS STERLING PER MONTH THROUGH END OF JANUARY 1980.

2. IN ABSENCE OF RECORD, SINCE OPERATION INITIALLY ONLY REQUIRED HAND HOLDING, KILTIGER BELIEVES COM PROBABLY NOT INFORMED. LEAVE IT TO STATION DISCRETION WHETHER COM SHOULD BE BRIEFED NOW.

3. FILE 201-977924. RVW 30OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET
BT
#3019

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-223-323

6 SEP 19 1979

SECRET 051515Z SEP 79 STAFF
CITE LONDON 17089
TO: DIRECTOR INFO THERAN.
WNINTEL AJAJA SDFACE EXT INTEL

1. ON 4 SEPTEMBER, ADLESICK ASKED SDFRETEXT/1 ABOUT WHAT HE HAD LEARNED ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF A PRO-BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT. SDFRETEXT/1 SAID THAT WHAT ORGANIZATION HAD BEEN DONE HAD BEEN DONE BY MOINZADEH AND A FEW OTHERS. THEY HAD BEEN DEVOTING ALL OF THEIR TIME TO ORGANIZING THE YOUNGER IRANIANS IN GREAT BRITAIN. SDFRETEXT/1 SAID THAT THEY ARE PAMPERED BY THE LACK OF FUNDS. HE SAID THAT TO DATE NO BIG GUNS HAD COME FORTH TO DECLARE FOR, OR OPENLY SUPPORT, BAKHTIAR.

2. SDFRETEXT/1 SAID THAT TO DATE ALL THE ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF BAKHTIAR WERE PROPAGANDISTIC IN NATURE AND NOT PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE OR WIDESPREAD. HE THOUGHT THAT IF THE WHEREWITHAL WERE AVAILABLE, BAKHTIAR WOULD BE ABLE TO ORGANIZE SOMETHING BECAUSE HE HAS A REPUTATION FOR BEING A GOOD ORGANIZER. SDFRETEXT/1 WAS UNABLE TO STATE WHETHER THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES IN ENGLAND WAS BECAUSE OF A LACK OF FUNDS, OR INDIFFERENCE ON THE PART OF THE IRANIAN COMMUNITY.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE MILITARY, SDFRETEXT/1 SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRANIAN MILITARY WAS TOO MUCH UNDER THE THUMB OF THE MULLAS TO ORGANIZE A COUP AGAINST BAZERGAN. HE HAS HEARD THAT MADANI IS GOING TO BE MOVED BACK TO TEHRAN FROM KHUZISTAN, BECAUSE BEING BOTH THE GOVERNOR AND MILITARY LEADER GIVES HIM AN EFFECTIVE BASE TO MOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IF HE SO CHOOSES. SDFRETEXT/1 DID NOT THINK MADANI WAS DOING ANYTHING, IT WAS JUST A QUESTION OF THE GOVERNMENT ACTING WITH CAUTION.

4. SDFRETEXT/1 SAID THAT HE SEES A LOT OF PEOPLE AND MERELY LISTENS. HE IS DEFINITELY STAYING ON THE SIDELINES WITH REGARD TO THE BAKHTIAR BOULEVARD. HE SAID THAT, FROM HIS OBSERVATIONS, IF BAKHTIAR ACCEPTS SUPPORT FROM FORMER ASSOCIATES OF THE SHAH, ETC., IT WILL BE A FACTUAL MISTAKE BECAUSE SHAH IS STILL ROUNDLY RESPICED BY MOST IRANIANS AND FOR BAKHTIAR TO ACCEPT SUPPORT FROM HIS QUARTER WOULD BE A MISTAKE.

PAGE 2 LONDON 17389 S E C R E T
5 ON 2 SEPT, ADLESICK AND KILTIGER WEN TO HYDE PARK TO SEE
THE HQ-BAKHTIAR DEMONSTRATIONS. ACCORDING TO SDPRETEXT/1 THERE
WERE ABOUT 3,000 AT THE DEMONSTRATIONS. ADLESICK AND KILTIGER
ESTIMATED THAT CROWD MAY HAVE NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND. MOST OF
CROWD APPEARED TO BE INDIFFERENT. THE HIGH POINT OF THE AFTER-
NOON CAME WHEN A YOUNG WOMAN WAS RAISED TO SPEAKERS BOX AND BEGAN
CALLING KECOMINI ALL KINDS OF NAMES. A WOMAN IN THE CROWD SHOUTED
THAT KHOMENI WAS ALSO AN AMERICAN SPY. (FROM ADLESICK AND
KILTIGER'S OBSERVATIONS OF THE CROWD, SDPRETEXT/1'S COMMENTS
MADE ABOVE WERE SUBSTANTIATED.)

6. FILE: 201-215177. RVW 05 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.

S E C R E T

BT
#7389

22 SEP 79 21:1

S E C R E T 191258Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE BERN 39543

TO: DIRECTOR INFO GENEVA, ZURICH, TEHRAN, PARIS.

UNINTEL AJAJA INGOT INK

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF INGOT REPORT 79594,
15 SEP 79 SOURCED IRANIAN TRAVELER IN EUROPE WITH DOI
AUG/SEP 79; WHICH MAY BE OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST
TO HQS.

"AT THE END OF AUGUST DIFFERENT IRANIAN, WHO HAD
OCCUPIED IMPORTANT POSTS UNDER THE SHAH, TRAVELLED SINGLY
TO EUROPE TO VISIT FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES. AMONG THE
TRAVELERS WERE THE FORMER RECTOR OF TEHRAN POLYTECHNIC SCHOOL
AND THE MINISTER OF WATER AND ENERGY OFFICE OF AHVAZ;
DURING THEIR EUROPEAN STOPOVER THEY HAD PERSONAL CONTACTS
WITH FORMER MINISTER-RESIDENT BAKHTIAR. IT IS CERTAIN THAT
THE FORMER RECTOR OF THE POLYTECHNIC SCHOOL FLEW BACK TO
TEHRAN."

2. FILE: DEFER. RVW 19 SEP 09, DRV D9B.1.
SOURCE: RELATED INFO TEHRAN, PARIS DIRECTOR 518694

S E C R E T

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E C I T 1555Z SEP 79 STAFF

ITE PARIS 12539

O: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, BONN.

NINTEL AJAJA SDJANUS

REF: PARIS 8005

1. MASSA GHAZI, IRANIAN LEFTIST WHO ST ARCHITECTURAL OFFICE IN PARIS AND WHO HQS PLACE INDICATED HAD CONNECTIONS WITH DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS ESPECIALLY IN SOUTH AMERICA. CURRENTLY IS MOVING IN TEHRAN. PER REF, GHAZI WENT TO TEHRAN OR HOME MAY BE TO OBSERVE SITUATION THERE BUT HAS STAYED HERE PROLONGED

2. CORNE TO GHAZI'S FRIEND, PAUL BALTA LE MONDE NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT. GHAZI HAS DECIDED TO RETURN TO TEHRAN BECAUSE HIS SON IN HIS LATE TEENS WANTS TO SETTLE IN TEHRAN. BALTA SAID THIS TO GHAZI IN MID JULY 1979 WHILE HE WAS VISITING IN SPAIN. BALTA SAID THAT HE SAW GHAZI IN PARIS AND THEN RETURNED AFTER ONLY FEW DAYS.

3. BALTA SAID THAT GHAZI PREFERRED LIVING IN TEHRAN FOR EDUCATING HIS SON AND WOULD LIKE HIS SON TO RETURN TO PARIS FOR SCHOOL. GHAZI WANTED HIS SON DESIRED BEING INVOLVED IN ORGANIZATION. BALTA SAID THAT HE SAW GHAZI IN PARIS AND THEN RETURNED AFTER ONLY FEW DAYS.

4. FILE: 201-0960213. RW 24 SEP 09 RW C.1

OS DO NOT DELAYED INFO TEHRAN PER DIR 5122

E C I T

9563

21 SEP 79

E O R E T 221422Z SEP 79 STAFF

ITE PARIS 12539

O: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, BONN.

NINTEL AJAJA SDJANUS

REFS: A. TEHRAN 55878 (NOT NEEDED BONN)
B. TEHRAN 55855 (NOT NEEDED BONN)

1. ON 12 SEPT SDJANUS/38 SAID HE JUST RETURNED FROM TURKEY WHERE HE HELPED EXFILTRATE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SAVAK FOR TEHRAN, GENERAL FARUKI AND F. SDJANUS/38 SAID THERE ARE STILL A FEW SAVAK OFFICERS IN HIDING IN TEHRAN BUT THE FBI LINE USING KURDS IS STILL WORKING WELL. HE PLANS ANOTHER TRIP TO TURKEY IN SEVERAL WEEKS.

2. SDJANUS/38 HAS NOT YET CONTACTED HIS COLLEAGUES CONNECTED WITH BAKHTIAR GROUP BUT SAW FNU TIA B A T A B A I, WHO PROTECTOR OF BAKHTIAR'S LAWYER. TABATABAI LEFT SDJANUS/38 WITH IMPRESSION BAKHTIAR GROUP ON DEAD CENTER AND THEY HOPING FOR SUBSTANTIAL AID FROM US TO OVERTHROW KHOMEINI, OTHERWISE WITHOUT US SUPPORT, BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT DEAD.

3. STATUS SDJANUS/38'S HOUSE REVIEWED AGAIN AND HE STILL WANTS SETTLE MATTER ASAP. SAID HE PERHAPS RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESENT SITUATION BY ASKING US TO STOP PAYMENTS. HAD HOPED, OF COURSE, THAT WE WOULD PAY HIM DIRECTLY, WITHOUT COMPLICATIONS, IN PARIS. PRESTERAU EXPLAINED WE DEALING WITH ANOTHER U.S. AGENCY AND WE DO NOT WISH TO ENDANGER HIS SECURITY. SDJANUS/38 THANKFUL AND AGREED RECEIVE CHECK FOR TOTAL AMOUNT STILL OWED HIM PER REF. PLEASE GETAL CHECK AND POUCH TO PARIS. IF THERE ANY WAY WE CAN GIVE HIS DOLLARS, HE WOULD PREFER IT TO REALS.

4. COULD TEHRAN PLEASE OBTAIN NAME OF MRAG ADMIN OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR MATTER SO THAT SDJANUS/38 CAN ADVISE HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW WHO TO CONTACT. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO WRITE SHORT LETTER TO THE ADMIN OFFICER ASKING FOR A FINAL DETAILED ACCOUNTING. CAN STATION HAVE THIS LETTER (WHICH WE WOULD POUCH TO YOU) TO THE ADMIN OFFICER? PLEASE ADVISE.

27 SEP 79 1117z

S E C R E T 261959Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 521399.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN, BONN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDJANUS

REF: PARIS 12539

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-325-323

1. ACCORDING TO HQS DOCUMENT NITA 26541, DATED 24 APR 73, WHICH WAS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE TITLED "SAVAK PERSONNEL CHANGES", A BRIG GEN GHASEM P A R V I A N F A R (PURNIYANFAR) DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF DEPT 3, SAVAK, WAS TO BECOME CHIEF SAVAK TEHRAN. SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO SAVAK IN 1968 AS A COLONEL. HIS FIRST ASSIGNMENT WAS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF DEPT 3. SUBJECT WAS LATER PROMOTED TO BRIG GEN AND BECAME A REGULAR SAVAK EMPLOYEE WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE GRADE OF 9. A RELIABLE SOURCE FURTHER MENTIONED SUBJECT WAS AN ACTIVE, ACCURATE AND HARD WORKING EMPLOYEE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME HE WAS AN AILING MAN, HOT TEMPERED, NERVOUS, HAD OLD FASHIONED IDEAS AND VIEWS AND HAD LIMITED AND SUPERFICIAL KNOWLEDGE.

2. HQS DESK CARDS INDICATE SUBJECT WAS CHIEF OF TEHRAN SAVAK OFFICE IN APR 75 AND HAD BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. SUBJECT WAS SELECTED AS AN ASSASSINATION TARGET BY QAZVIN TERRORIST. NO FURTHER HQS INFO AVAILABLE.

3. FILE: 201-962197. RVW 25SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#9861

AGE 2 PARIS 12539Z SEP 79
 RE: SDJANUS COLLEAGUE
 SAID THAT HIS SDJANUS COLLEAGUE
 DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOUR
 BUREAU PLANS TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. ON A BUSINESS
 TRIP. HE HAS ASKED SDJANUS TO ACCOMPANY HIM.
 SAID HE ATTEMPTED WITH DEPT 3 OFFICE MIGHT BE LUCRATIVE
 VENTURE FOR BOTH SDJANUS & MEANWHILE INTENDS ADVISE
 GENERAL PARNIANFAR TO TRAVEL TO WEST GERMANY AND OBTAIN
 REFUGEE STATUS THERE.

FILE: 201-962197 RVW 25 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1
 S E C R E T
 BT
 #2539

11 AUG 79

SECRET 110536Z AUG 79 STAFF
CITE DIRECTOR 493299.
TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.
WMINTEL AJAJA SDR00F
REF: PARIS 11450

1. CHALLA KIA ASSIGNED 201-962245. ONLY TRACES SOURCED TO PAST PARIS CABLES. DPOB: CIRCA 1943, TEHRAN, SECOND SECRETARY IRANIAN EMBASSY, PARIS. WORKS IN CONSULAR SECTION ON IRANIAN STUDENT AFFAIRS. (PARIS 37080, 23 MAR 78). IRANIAN EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER KNOWS SEVERAL AMERICAN DIPLOMATS (PARIS 96756, 5 MAR 79).

2. CONCUR STATION PLANNING OUTLINED REF

3. FILE: 201-962245. RVW 12AUG99 DRV 9C.1 ALL SECRET
SECRET

11 AUG 79

SECRET 110537Z AUG 79 STAFF
CITE DIRECTOR 493297.
TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.
WMINTEL AJAJA SDR00F
REF: PARIS 11418

1. WHILE DEFER TO TEHRAN RE REF LEAD, WE BELIEVE WE NEED BETTER ASSESSMENT SDR00F/1'S CR ID BROTHERS ACCESS TO PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE BEFORE SETTING UP CONTACT IN TEHRAN. BELIEVE BEST COURSE OF ACTION FOR PARIS AT THIS TIME IS TO ATTEMPT SEE R/1'S PURPOSE OF BROTHER WHEN HE RETURNS PARIS IN NOVEMBER WITH ACCESS TO NEEDED INFORMATION, BEGIN DEVELOPMENT/ VETTING PROCESS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO OUR TURNING OVER TO TEHRAN SITUATION FULLY RECRUITED AND TESTED ASSET.

2. THERE ARE NO HQS OR TEHRAN TRACES RE IDEN.

3. WE CONTINUE APPRECIATE PARIS' EFFORTS AGAINST IRANIAN TARGET AND ARE GRATEFUL FOR AGGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAM BEING PURSUED.

4. FILE: 201-0085145. RVW 10AUG 9 DRV 9C.1 ALL SECRET
SECRET

21 Sep 79

SECRET 201402Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12540

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDROOF

1. ON 18 SEP SDROOF/1 CONTACTED PRE TEHRAN AND REQUEST MEETING. DURING 19 SEP SESSION, SDROOF/1 SAID THAT HIS CLOSE FRIEND AND RELATIVE, LT. GENERAL SIAVOUCH B E H Z A D I, IS NOW IN PARIS. BEHZADI ESCAPED FROM IRAN ABOUT 2 MONTHS AGO AND WORKED HIS WAY THROUGH TURKEY. HE IS NOW "HIDDEN AWAY" AND WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO HIM. SDROOF/1 INQUIRED IF WE INTERESTED IN TALKING TO HIM. FYI, GENERAL BEHZADI IS RELATED TO SDROOF/1 THROUGH MATERNAL SIDE OF FAMILY.

2. IN ADDITION, SDROOF/1 SAID THAT HIS NIECE GHALLA B E H Z A D I DEPARTED PARIS ON 16 SEP FOR TEHRAN.

3. REQUEST HQS AND TEHRAN STATION TRACES ONLY GENERAL BEHZADI AS WELL AS EXPRESSION OF OPS INTEREST. ACCORDING TO SDROOF/1 GENERAL BEHZADI SPEAKS ENGLISH AND SOME FRENCH AND PARIS STATION TRACES BEHZADI.

4. FILE # 201-0085145. RWV 22 SEP 79 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET
BT
#2540

SECRET 251830Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 520403.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDROOF

REF: PARIS 12540

1. ONLY TRACES WE HAVE ON SUBJECT REF IS PROBABLE IDEN SIAVOUSH B E H Z A D I, DESCRIBED IN 1959 AS LIAISON OFFICER (PROBABLY BETWEEN ARMY AND SAVAK) TO WHOM SAVAK IDENTITY CARD ISSUED AT REQUEST OF ARMY JUDICIAL SECTION.
2. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DEBRIEF OF BEHZADI WITH GOAL OF SECURING SUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA, WORK HISTORY, LEVEL OF ACCESS TO TARGETS OF INTEREST AND WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE TO ALLOW US TO LEVY MORE SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL AND FI REQUIREMENTS.

3. FILE: DEFER. RWV 24 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET
BT
#7987

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978. 501328

60 Oct 79

SECRET OCT 08 21 2Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUC

BRUSSELS 7344
WASHINGTON INFO TEHRAN

TO: NE/IRAN INFO E/BNL/E

SUBJECT: MININTL INTEL AJAJA SDPRAWN

MEETING: SDPRAWN/1 PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT 3 OCTOBER

A. P/1'S FORMER BRUSSELS COLLEAGUE, IN K A D R A
WHO ASSIGNED PARIS HAS BEEN RECALLED TO TEHRAN. P/1 SPOKE DI
WITH KADRAN AND SAID RECALL WAS SOMEWHAT UNEXPECTED, BUT KADR
THOUGH HE WOULD EVENTUALLY BE REASSIGNED OVERSEAS. HIS WIFE
AND CHILDREN ARE STILL IN EUROPE BECAUSE CHILDREN ARE ATTENDING
SCHOOL. PER P/1, KADRAN PLANS TO LEAVE FAMILY IN EUROPE UNTIL
HE IS REASSIGNED.

B. P/1 SAID HE LEARNED FROM FRIENDS THAT IRANIAN GO
SENDING SECURITY TYPES TO EMBASSIES TO MONITOR DIPLOMATS
ACTIVITIES. P/1 SAID THEY EASILY RECOGNIZABLE BECAUSE THEY US
EARED AND APPEAR OUT OF PLACE AT EMBASSY. P/1 COULD NOT
ONLUM SECURITY TYPE HAS ARRIVED BRUSSELS. DOES HQS HAVE ANY
INDICATION IRANIAN GOVT HAS SENT SUCH INDIVIDUALS OVERSEAS?

C. SHAHUR BAKHTIAR HAS ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT IRANIAN
IN BRUXELLES (THROUGH NOR P/1) FOR SUPPORT. P/1 EXPLAINED
BAKHTIAR NOT LOOKING FOR MONEY AS HE RECEIVING FUNDS FROM SEAR
BUT WANTS MORAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT. P/1 UNAWARE
BUT BAKHTIAR'S FUTURE PLANS ARE...

D. MEHRD CHAMRAN, NEW DEFENSE MINISTER, HAS LONG-TIME
S WITH PLO. PER P/1, CHAMRAN SPENT TEN YEARS BEFORE REVOLUT
IN PLO MILITARY CAMPS IN MIDDLE EAST BEFORE RETURNING
IRAN AFTER SHAH DEPOSED. P/1 LABELLED HIM LEFTIST, BUT COULD
WRITE HIS POWER BASE OR RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMENI. P/1 DID
KNOW CHAMRAN'S BROTHER, MOSTAFA.

11 SEP 15 1979

SECRET 11 10 1Z SEP 79 STAFF

PARIS 12 36

DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

TEL RYB AJAJA

PARIS 7827

1. HAMMAD AMIR KARDAN (201-957081) COUNSELOR
STER OF IRANIAN EMBASSY IN PARIS DEPARTED PCS FOR
IRAN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979. SINCE MAY, CRAMBES HAD
GENERAL STAFF CONTACTS WITH HIM, BUT KARDAN WAS UNWILLING
ENTER INTO ANY SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION AND REFUSED TO
HAVE ANY LONG MEETINGS. HE DID CALL CRAMBES PRIOR TO
S DEPARTURE TO SAY GOODBYE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT
WILL NOT RETURN AND WILL REMAIN IN BRUSSELS FOR THE
TIME BEING. CRAMBES ASKED THAT KARDAN LEAVE HIS FAMILY
HE SHOULD RETURN TO PARIS OR ANOTHER WESTERN CAPITAL.

2. FILE: 201-957081. RUM 11 SEP 79, DRN D901, C

SECRET

EXILED OPPOSITION

TEHRAN STATION.

IN SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER, SDROTTER/4 SAID THAT BAKHTIAR WAS SOLICITING HIS SUPPORT. R/4 SAID HE HAD RECEIVED MESSAGES (NUMBER NOT SPECIFIED), DELIVERED BOTH IN WRITING AND ORALLY. R/4 DID NOT IDENTIFY THE PERSON OR PERSONS WHO DELIVERED THE MESSAGES. HE SAID THAT BAKHTIAR OFFERED IMMEDIATE, UNLIMITED FINANCIAL SUPPORT. R/4 SAID HE HAD NOT REPLIED TO BAKHTIAR'S MESSAGES WE SAID WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT MIGHT BE BROKE AND ABOUT TO COLLAPSE, AND R/4 SAID HE ALSO DOUBTED THAT BAKHTIAR HAD THE RESOURCES HE CLAIMED.

HQS AND OTHER STATIONS.

1) THERE WAS DIRECT CONTACT WITH GENERAL JAM IN LONDON, PROBABLY IN SEPTEMBER. THE IMPRESSION WAS GIVEN THAT THIS WAS A ONE-TIME INTERVIEW, WITHOUT ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE FOR FUTURE CONTACTS, BUT THIS IS NOT RECALLED WITH CERTAINTY. DETAILS OF JAM'S REMARKS ARE ALSO NOT RECALLED, BUT IT IS BELIEVED THAT HE SAID HE WAS AVOIDING, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, ANY COMMITMENT TO BAKHTIAR. IT IS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT CERTAIN, THAT HE SPOKE OF HIMSELF AS A POSSIBLE OPPOSITION LEADER IN HIS OWN RIGHT.

2) SDPEPPER/1 IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN REPORTING ON THE BAKHTIAR GROUP WITHOUT BAKHTIAR'S KNOWLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT P/1 PROVIDED THE REPORTING ACCORDING TO WHICH BAKHTIAR WAS ALMOST BROKE AND HIS MOVEMENT ABOUT TO COLLAPSE. NO OTHER INFORMATION ON P/1 IS RECALLED BEYOND THAT CONTAINED IN THE TELEPOUCH SEEN IN EARLY MARCH.

3) SDSLIPPERY/1, THE LEBANESE BUSINESSMAN IN PARIS, REPORTED IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER THAT AN OPPOSITION ORGANIZATION WAS BEING CREATED IN PARIS BY REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE NATIONAL FRONT, MUJAHEDIN,
FEDAYAN, AND TUDEH. THE REPRESENT-
ATIVES WERE NOT IDENTIFIED BAKHTIAR
WAS TO BE THE CHIEF OF THE NEW
COMMITTEE, THOUGH EACH CONSTITUENT
ORGANIZATION WAS TO PURSUE ITS OWN
PROGRAM (NOT FURTHER DESCRIBED).
(SOME OF THIS INFORMATION SEEMED
IMPLAUSIBLE.)

15 SEP 79

SECRET 131728Z SEP 79 STAFF
CITE PARIS 12373
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO DEHRAN, AIRENS.
INTEL RYBAT AJAJA INTEL SDSLIPPERY
REF: PARIS 12374 (DFA-471)

1. REF WAS OBTAINED BY TIMKEN FROM JAWAD AL-AMIR, SPOKESMAN FOR SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR, OVER LIGHT LUNCH SERVED BY SDSLIPPERY/1 IN HIS OFFICE ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1979. SDSLIPPERY/1 INVITED AL-AMIR TO MEET SYMPATHETIC SENIOR OFFICIAL WITH MIDDLE EAST BACKGROUND WHO COORDINATES MATTERS INVOLVING UNITED NATIONS AND NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT FOR PARIS EMBASSY.
2. DURING LUNCH, SDSLIPPERY/1 MADE CLEAR THAT HE SEE COOPERATION BETWEEN HIS OWN SHI'ITE SUPPORTERS IN BEIRUT AND SUBURBS AND COORDINATING GROUP CITED REF, ON THE GROUND THAT PALESTINIANS (ARAFAT) WITH SYRIAN BACKING NOW HAVE THE MOST INFLUENCE OVER THE LARGE MASS OF UNEMPLOYED AND UNDEREMPLOYED SHI'AS IN BEIRUT AND SUBURBS TO DETRIMENT OF LEBANESE UNITY AND NATIONALISM. SDSLIPPERY/1 AND AL-AMIR BELIEVE IRANIAN SECURITY OFFICIAL MUSTAFA SHAMRAN, WHO IS PALESTINIAN, TO BE AN INSTRUMENT OF ARAFAT. SHAMRAN HAS BEEN KEY MAN IN ORGANIZING TRAINING AND DIRECTING AMALCELLAH HOMELI'S SECURITY APPARATUS. THEREFORE, SDSLIPPERY/1 CONCLUDES THAT ALL THE SHI'AS SHOULD WORK TOGETHER AGAINST THIS KHOMENI/FLO AXIS ON AS WIDE A FRONT AS POSSIBLE.
3. AL-AMIR TOLD TIMKEN THAT BAKHTIAR WAS NOT IN FRANCE, BUT WAS EXPECTED WEEK OF 16 SEPTEMBER FOR MEETING WITH HEDAYATOLLA MAFTAI AND A FEW OTHERS OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT. SEPARATELY, AL-AMIR TOLD SDSLIPPERY/1 THAT MEETING WOULD BE ARRANGED AT WHICH SDSLIPPERY/1 COULD DISCUSS LEBANESE SHI'AS COOPERATION WITH BAKHTIAR. AL-AMIR TOLD TIMKEN THAT BAKHTIAR TRAVELS ON HIS IRANIAN PASSPORT WHICH WILL NOT EXPIRE UNTIL FEBRUARY 1980.

PAGE 2 PARIS 12373 S E C R E T

4. SDSLIFFERY/1 OBSERVED PRIVATELY TO TIMEEN THAT, SINCE BAKHTIAR'S SON IS A FRENCH SECURITY OFFICIAL, THE SON COULD EASILY ARRANGE TO KEEP BAKHTIAR HIDDEN IN FRANCE AT TIME WHEN HE GETS OUT OF COUNTRY. (COMMENT: SDSLIFFERY/1 COULD NOT BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT BAKHTIAR'S SON'S POSITION, BUT AS REPORTED IN PARIS-11783, SUDJANUS/38 SAID THE SON IS A POLICE OFFICER IN PARIS, AND "L'EXPRESS" OF 11 AUGUST 1979 CITED HIM AS AN INSPECTEUR OF POLICE IN THE 13TH ARRONDISSEMENT. ALSO, PER PARA 4 PARIS-12105, UNVISIT/1 REPORTED SON WORKS AT UNDERBID. THUS, SON IS SOMEWHERE IN POLICE ESTABLISHMENT, BUT WE ARE UNABLE TO CONFIRM WHERE EXACTLY.)

5. FILE: 231-0962-27. INDEX AL-AMIR, RVW 13SEP99 DRV

D9C.1.
S E C R E T
BT
#2373

20 SEP 1979

C R E T 201340Z SEP 79 S-AMIR

ATHENS 60808

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY PARIS, TEHRAN.

INTEL AJAJA INTEL

INFO: A) ATHENS 60400 (NOT REPLY NEEDED: PARIS)
B) ATHENS 60400 (NOT REPLY NEEDED: TEHRAN)

1. FOR TEHRAN: REF ID ADVISED THAT SHOLROLLAH ALI ALI ABA BARI (SUBJECT OF A) WAS AGREED TO INFORM NEWS STATION OF EVENTS HE HEARS CONCERNING BAKHTIAR'S PARIS BASED ANTI-KHOMENI ACTIVITIES. IT ALSO ADVISED THAT AVAD ALI AMIR, AN IRANIAN JOURNALIST WORKING IN PARIS FOR LE MONDE IS A CLOSE FRIEND OF SUBJECT AND BAKHTIAR AND THAT ALAMIR IS IN POSITION TO HELP SUBJECT ADVISED OF BAKHTIAR'S ACTIVITIES.

2. ON 19 SEPTEMBER, SUBJECT PROVIDED FOLLOWING TWO ITEMS OF INFORMATION. THE FIRST (ITEM A) HE SOURCED TO JALAMIR WITH WHOM HE TALKED BY TELEPHONE MORNING OF 19 SEPTEMBER. SUBJECT CALLED ALAMIR. SUBJECT REFUSED TO IDENTIFY SOURCE SECOND BIT OF INFORMATION (ITEM B). HE SAID THAT INFORMATION CAME FROM FRIEND IN TEHRAN WHO IS MEMBER OF IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. FRIEND WAS ON RECENT TRIP TO HOLY CITY OF QOM FOR VISITING SUDANESE CONSUL GENERAL. SUBJECT'S FRIEND SELECTED TO ESCORT SUDANESE CONSUL GENERAL BECAUSE HE IS ARAB AND WAS TO SERVE AS TRANSLATOR FOR TALKS WITH KHOMENI. FRIEND LEARNED INFO IN IRAN FROM ONE OF ISLAMIC SERVING AT KHOMENI'S RESIDENCE. SUBJECT LEARNED ITEM B DURING TELEPHONE CALL FROM FRIEND IN TEHRAN TO SUBJECT ON 16 SEPTEMBER. SUBJECT CALLED FRIEND IN TEHRAN TO SUBJECT ON 16 SEPTEMBER. SUBJECT NOT ELABORATE ON EITHER OF TWO PIECES OF INFORMATION. HE BELIEVES INFO IS RELIABLE. HE WAS NOT ABLE TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS ON THIS INFORMATION BECAUSE THEY WERE USING TELEPHONES.

3. ITEM A, ALAMIR STATED THAT IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN WAS TO BE REPLACED WITHIN NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS.

PAGE 2 ATHENS 60803 (NUMBER) AND THAT REPLACEMENT WOULD BE
CIRCA 21 OR 22 SEP (FOREIGN MINISTER) OR AHMED BANI SADR
EITHER IBRAHIM YAKUBI (POLITICAL) SUBJECT DID NOT KNOW HOW
(ISLAMIC PARTY THEO INFORMATION.
ALAMIR LEARNED THIS HOLY CITY OF QOM, ISLAMIC GUARDS ARE B
ITEM 8, AT TACTIC TO BE USED IN SUPPORT OF ANTI
TRAINED IN GUERRILLA BANISTAN AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ISLAMIC
REGIME ACTIONS IN ARE ALREADY IN AFGANISTAN SUPPORTING
GUARDS TRAINED AT FORCES ENGAGED IN OPPOSITION FIGHTING.
THE AFGHAN ISLAMIC HANISTAN USED BY IRANIAN ISLAMIC GUAR
INGRESS ROUTE TO A HANISTAN USED BY IRANIAN ISLAMIC GUAR
IS VIA BALUCHISTAN OR FAZL KHAJONG PURPOSES ON PROBLEMS
TO BALUCHISTAN WAS OR FAZL KHAJONG PURPOSES ON PROBLEMS
IN MOVEMENT OF ISLAMIC GUARDS ACROSS THE BORDER INTO AFGH

SECRET

SECRET
FILE: 2 1962640 RVW 20 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1

21 SEP 79 21/2

SECRET 21 SEP 79 STAFF

PARIS 554

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, FR/WASH NET W.

MINTEL AJAJA FORRES

REF: DIRECTOR 217075

1. JAVAN AL-AMIR TOLD PARIS C/O AND SDSLIPPERY/1 ON
20 SEPTEMBER THAT GENERAL TARIRI ALI HAD ARRIVED PARIS
19 SEPTEMBER AT REQUEST OF AL-AMIR'S COORDINATING GROUP,
WHICH NOW CALLS ITSELF THE NATIONAL UNION KETIMAD E MELLID,
TO DIRECT MILITARY PLANNING FOR THE GROUP. AL-AMIR DESCRIBED
GENERAL JAVAN AS THE MOST POPULAR WITH TROOPS AND GENERAL ALI
AS THE MOST PROFESSIONALLY RESPECTED OF THE OLD-TIME IRANIAN
GENERALS. AL-AMIR DESCRIBED ALI AS HAVING BEEN CHIEF OF
GENERAL STAFF UNDER MOSSKDEGH, LATER AMBASSADOR IN MADRID,
AND AS HOLDER OF MATHEMATICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEGREES FROM
UNIVERSITIES IN EUROPE AND U.S.

2. IT WOULD BE USEFUL OPERATIONALLY TO PARIS STATION IF
SDSLIPPERY/1 COULD VERIFY INFO PARA 1 ABOVE AND DEFINE ALI'S
RELATIONSHIP TO BAKHTIAR AND AL-AMIR WHO REPRESENTS SELF AS
GENERAL COORDINATING FIGURE WHOSE CREDENTIALS DERIVE FROM
EARLY DAYS OF OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH, BAKHTIAR AS FIGURE-
HEAD, AND JAVAN AND SHARIAT-MADARI AS MEN WHOSE POPULARITY WAS HURT
BY AL-AMIR AND OTHERS IN THE OLD OPPOSITION.

3. AL-AMIR HAS NOW MET PARIS C/O, UNDER POLITICAL SECTION
COVER IN TRIP NAME, TWICE AT MEETINGS BROKERED BY SDSLIPPERY/1.
IN SECOND MEETING, AL-AMIR REFERRED TO POLITICAL SECTION
CONTACT WITH KHOMENI DURING NEAUFUE LE CHATEAU EXILE AND
IDENTIFIED MR. WARREN ZIMMERMANN ERRONEOUSLY AS CONTACT COS.
PARIS C/O CLAIMED MR. ZIMMERMANN AS HIS BOSS, AND CLARIFIED
THAT HE NOT COS, WHILE DENYING KNOWLEDGE OF ZIMMERMANN CONTACT
WITH KHOMENI. WE HAVE, AS YET, NO CONTROL OVER WHAT SDSLIP-
PERY/1 MAY SAY TO PRINCIPALS (SUCH AS AL-AMIR AND C/O) WHOM HE
WISHES TO BRING TOGETHER IN ORDER TO BUILD THE UP TO EACH
OTHER. SPSLIPPERY/1 SHOULD NOT, OF COURSE, BE RELIED ON OUR
CONTACTS WITH AL-AMIR (WHICH HAVE BEEN UNSOLICITED AND MAY NOT

SECRET
PARIS: [REDACTED] DEBRIERS HIM AFTER TRIP SHOULD BE AL-
Y ENDI [REDACTED] THAT SD SLIPPERY/11 HAS BEC[A] AWARE OF TH
TRY TO DISCOVER WHAT AL-AMIR MAY HAVE SAID ABOUT THEM.

4. FI: 201-962815; 201-962067. RW 21SEP99 DRV

SECRET

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
POL: S E R T / UNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
AN/FRANCE
CONTACT AND ACTIVITIES OF IRANIAN OPPOSITION
MOVEMENT IN FRANCE (DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER 1979)

ONE NON-IRANIAN SETITE BUSINESSMAN ABROAD WHOSE
RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE SPOKE TO
A MEMBER OF THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION MOVEMENT.

PARIS: THE PARIS COORDINATING GROUP OF IRANIAN
NISTS UNDER THE NOMINAL GUIDANCE OF FORMER IRANIAN
PRIME MINISTER KATIBI HAS NAMED ITSELF ITTIHAD-E-MELLI
(NATIONAL UNION). THEY PUBLISH A PARSII PUBLICATION CALLED
IN PARIS ON A WEEKLY BASIS. THEY HAVE ASKED FOR 123
BY, CHIEF OF STATE GENERAL/TARIQI ALL TO BE THEIR
STARY PLANNER, AND HAVE THE SUPPORT OF SEVERAL
AYATOLLAHS IN IRAN. THEY MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH
EMPLOYEES OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION
BEEN ABLE TO SPORADICALLY INTERRUPT SPEECHES BY
US BROADCASTS ON AN OCCASIONAL BASIS. THE NATIONAL
SUPPORTS THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-
INATION, AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BAKHTIAR, FAVORS
MY STATUS FOR IRANIAN MINORITY NATIONALITIES. THE
AL UNION HOPES CURRENT IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER MEDHI
CAN WILL RESIGN AND RETURN AT A LATER DATE AS THEIR
IDATE TO HEAD AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT ONCE KHOMEINI IS
VED. THEY HAD GNP CONTACT WITH A SOVIET OFFICIAL IN PARIS.
THEIR ATTEMPT TO GET TUDER PARTY SUPPORT HAS TO NO AVAIL.
SUMMARY.

1. THE PARIS COORDINATING GROUP OF IRANIAN OPPOSITIONISTS
MINALLY HEADED BY FORMER IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER SEAHPOUR
A K R T I A R AND COMPOSED OF MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL
FRONT, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT, MUJAHEDIN AND FEBAYEEN
E-KHALQ, HAS NAMED ITSELF THE ITTIHAD-E-MELLI (NATIONAL
UNION). THEY SPONSOR A WEEKLY PARSII LANGUAGE PUBLICATION
UNTTLED NAMEH, WHOSE MANAGING EDITOR IS A. A L B I G E S.
ONE OF NAMEH'S PRINCIPAL ORGANIZERS, IRANIAN JOURNALIST
AND FORMER TELEVISION PRODUCER JAWAD A L M I R, IS CURRENTLY
IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A WORLDWIDE LIST OF POTENTIAL
IRANIAN SUBSCRIBERS.

TRYING TO LINE UP SUPPORT FOR ITS EFFORTS. THE
NATIONAL UNION HAS ASKED GENERAL FARSI A. I., WHO SERVED AS
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE IRANIAN ARMY UNDER THE REGIME OF
MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLEVI, TO BE THEIR CHIEF MILITARY
ADVISOR. FARSI CAME TO PARIS ON 19 SEPTEMBER IN RESPONSE TO
REQUESTS FROM NATIONAL UNION LEADERS. GENERAL FARSI,
A MATHEMATICIAN AND ENGINEER, AMONG OTHERS, A DEGREE FROM
PARIS UNIVERSITY. THE RETIRED GENERAL WHO COMMANDS THE
PROVISIONAL RESERVE IN THE ARMY; WHEREAS THEY REGARD
FARSI AS AN IRANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL FARSI IS A MAJOR AS THE
LIEUTENANT OF THE RETIRED GENERALS. (FIELD COMMENT:
RDB-315/15877-79, 11 SEPTEMBER 1979. FROM AN OFFICIAL
SOURCE, WHICH STATES THAT FORMER IRANIAN PRIME
MINISTER BAKHTIAR AND FORMER GENERAL FARSI FOR HIS SUPPORT.
GENERAL FARSI DECIDED TO REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES FOR THE
MOMENT.)

THE NATIONAL UNION IS IN REGULAR COMMUNICATION WITH
SEVERAL ENLISTED THE SUPPORT OF AYATOLLAH SAIED YAZDI,
MIRZA A. P. M. A. D. A. R. I., HASSAN TEBATABAI, Q. O. V. I., AND
ABDOLBAH SEYED ABDOREZA F. I. R. A. Z. A. I. THE NATIONAL UNION IS
IN CONTACT WITH AYATOLLAH M. O. T. A. H. A. B. I. AND IS OPTIMISTIC
OF GAINING HIS SUPPORT. AYATOLLAH M. H. A. Y. I. ALSO
MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH THEM, BUT THEY CONSIDER HIM AN
OPPORTUNIST WHO WILL BACK THE POLITICAL ELEMENT WHICH SEEMS TO
BE WINNING AT THE MOMENT. RUBEANI IS CURRENTLY A LUKER-
FOLLOWER OF KHOMEINI. (SOURCE COMMENT: RUBEANI IS
GENERALLY OPPOSED TO KHOMEINI BUT CURRENTLY RELIES ON HIS
POSITION AS AN OVERT SUPPORTER AS A LEASE FROM WHICH TO ATTACK
THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, PRIMARILY FOREIGN MINISTER ABRAHIM
A. Z. D. I. RUBEANI PRESUMABLY BLAMES THE GOVERNMENT FOR FAILING
TO SUPPORT THE POSITION OF RUBEANI'S YOUNGER BROTHER, WHO
RESIDES IN PARIS, AS PREEMINENT MULLAH OF THE SHIITE COMMUNITY
IN EUROPE.)

THE NATIONAL UNION HAS CONTINUING CONTACT WITH A GROUP
OF EMPLOYEES OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION (NIRT)
WHO, ON 10 SEPTEMBER, CAUSED THE INTERRUPTION OF A KHOMEINI
SPEECH BEING RELAYED TO ONE OF THE IRANIAN PROVINCES AT 2100
HOURS, FOR THE THIRD TIME IN A TWO-WEEK PERIOD. THE NATIONAL
UNION ESTIMATES THAT NINETY PERCENT OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE
NIRT ARE OPPOSED TO THE KHOMEINI REGIME, AND ANTICIPATES NO
DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING A PLAN FOR THE OCCASIONAL SABOTAGE

FOR RELAYING OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS BROADCASTS
ON THIS IS A TECHNIQUE WHICH WAS EMPLOYED BY THE
WHICH PUT KHOMEINI IN POWER. THE NATIONAL UNION
BOTH KHOMEINI AND THE GENERAL POPULACE WILL VIEW
THIS AS A SIGN THAT THE OLD REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS
AGAINST KHOMEINI AS THEY WERE AGAINST THE SHAH.

POLICYMIST, THE NATIONAL UNION HAS NO CONTACTS WITH
IRANIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (FLO); BUT ITS POLICY
SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-
DETERMINATION. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BAKHTIAR, THE NATIONAL
UNION OPPOSES THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY VERSUS SEPARATION FOR
IRANIAN MINORITY NATIONALITIES. BAKHTIAR FAVORS
SEPARATION OF THE MINORITIES.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, THE NATIONAL UNION HOPES THAT
PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN WILL RESIGN
UNDER A SUITABLE INTERLUDE, BE ABLE TO INFILTRATE FROM IRAN
THE NATIONAL UNION CANDIDATE FOR INSTALLATION AS
AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO PREPARE ELECTIONS AFTER THE
FALL OF THE KHOMEINI REGIME. THE NATIONAL UNION BELIEVES
THAT IF BAZARGAN RESIGNS, KHOMEINI WILL REPLACE HIM WITH EITHER
MINISTER YAZDI OR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS ADVISOR ABDOUL HASSAN
F. I. S. A. D. R. I.

THE NATIONAL UNION HAS HAD ONLY ONE CONTACT WITH A SENIOR
SOVIET DIPLOMAT IN PARIS. THE NATIONAL UNION REPRESENTATIVE
WANTED THE SOVIET TO PREVAIL UPON THE USSR COMMUNIST PARTY
TO JOIN THE COORDINATING GROUP OR, AT LEAST, TO COME OUT
PUBLICLY IN OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL
REFUSED, CLAIMING THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NO CONTROL
OVER THE ACTIVITIES AND POLICIES OF THE USSR.

(R. 402; FRANCE, PARIS (21 SEPTEMBER 1979). FIELD
NO: CPA-4723.

FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT PARIS. SENT TO TEHRAN.
REPORT CLASS S/E/C R/E/T /WARNING NOTICE- INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINA-
TION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.
RVT 100109 DRV DDCI BY RECORD REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS
CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
BT
#2899

22 SEP 79

SECRET 2115 72 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS12610

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ATHE 3, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA INTEL

REF: A. ATHENS 98808
B. PARIS 12594

SECRET 2115 72 SEP 79 STAFF

1. ULTIMATE SOURCE OF ITEM A PARA 2 REF TOLD PARIS STATION C/O AND SDSLIPPERY/1 ON 20 AUGUST THAT, IN SOURCE OPINION, BAZARGAN WOULD BE THE BEST MAN TO HEAD AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO REESTABLISH PUBLIC ORDER AND PREPARE ELECTIONS AFTER KHOMEINI FALLS OR IS REMOVED FROM POWER. SOURCE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO PERSUADE BAZARGAN TO RESIGN FROM PRIME MINISTRY AND AWAIT FAVORABLE (TO THE OPPOSITION) EVENTS. C/O ASKED SOURCE WHO KHOMEINI WOULD PUT IN BAZARGAN'S PLACE, WERE THE LATTER TO RESIGN, AND SOURCE REPLIED PROBABLY YAZDI, POSSIBLY BANU SADR. SOURCE COMMENTED THAT YAZDI WANTED TO PLAY THE AMERICAN GAME, AND BANU SADR MIGHT PROMOTE HIS THEORY OF MONOTHEIST ECONOMICS WHICH, IN A NUTSHELL, IMPLIES DISPOSSESSION OF THE WEALTHY.

2. SOURCE AND SDSLIPPERY/1 CLAIM, PROBABLY CORRECTLY, THAT SOURCE IS IN TOUCH WITH A STEADY STREAM OF IRANIANS COMING AND GOING FROM IRAN AND FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES, SO IT USELESS TO SPECULATE WHETHER ONE, OR WHICH ONE, OF THEM MAY HAVE PREDICTED BAZARGAN FALL IN TWO OR THREE DAY TIME FRAME. HOWEVER, SOURCE DID SAY THAT MOST RECENT SIGNIFICANT ARRIVAL FROM IRAN, AT BEHES OF NATIONAL UNION, WAS GENERAL TARIHI ALI. PER REF B.

3. FILE 201962067. RWV 21 SEP 79 DAY D9C1.

SECRET
BT
#2610

5 Oct 79 08 52Z

SECRET 41734Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12609

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL INTE AJAJA SDSLIPPERY

REF: A. PARIS 12594
B. PARIS 12432
C. PARIS 12373
D. PARIS EMBTEL 026015 OF 17 AUG 79
E. PARIS 97163
F. PARIS 95826
G. PARIS 95824

1. REQUEST FULL TRACES AND ASSIGNMENT 201 AND CRYPT FOR AMIR (AKA DJAWAD ALAMIR) (AKA DJAWAD ALAMIR DAWALLOU) PDOB IRAN, TEHRAN 5 APRIL 35; CIT. IRAN; OCC. BUSINESS, COMMUNICATIONS ENTREPRENEUR; RES. FRANCE, PARIS, 3 BOULEVARD HENRI IV, SIXTEENTH ARRONDISSEMENT, TEL. 329 66 52; FATHER'S NAME MAHMUD AL-AMIR CAJAJAR OF EMTSEHAM-OL-SALTANEH. MOTHER'S NAME MA'SUMA LNU. OF AZAD-OL-ZAMAN. SUBJECT ATTENDED INSTITUT DUPUIGH IN BRUSSELS, INSTITUT D'ETUDES POLITIQUES IN PARIS; FACULTY OF LETTERS, UNIVERSITY OF PARIS (SORBONNE). SUBJECT SPEAKS FRENCH AND ENGLISH AT LEVEL 4. CLAIMS EQUAL FLUENCY IN FARSI, SPANISH AND GERMAN. SUBJECT IS MARRIED AND HAS FOUR CHILDREN.

2. SUBJECT EMPLOYMENT HISTORY, DATES NOT SUPPLIED: POLITICAL EDITOR, ETTALA'AT NEWSPAPER; CHIEF EDITOR, JOURNAL DE TEHRAN; PUBLISHER, JAME JAHAN-NEMA, IN HAFTER, THIS WEEK IN TEHRAN REPRESENTATIVE, ORTF (IRAN); CORRESPONDENT, LE MONDE (PARIS); NEWSWEEK (NEW YORK); ADVISOR ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POLITICAL COMMENTATOR, PRODUCER, NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO-TELEVISION (NIRT). CURRENTLY: PRESIDENT, TELEPRESS INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY.

3. INFO PARAS 1 AND 2 SUPPLIED BY SUBJECT TO SDSLIPPERY/1 WHO FURNISHED COPY OF PARIS C/O. SDSLIPPERY/1, AT C/O REQUEST, OBTAINED FOLLOWING FROM SDULTIMATE:

TRAMP

PAGE 2 PARIS 13009 S E C R E T
 A. SUBJECT'S TELEVISION PROGRAM PRODUCER. HE WAS
 PARIS DAILY MONDE CORRESPONDENT IN TEHRAN FOR TEN YEARS.
 B. SUBJECT ENJOYED A VERY FAVORABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH
 THE SHAH.
 C. SUBJECT'S FATHER, OR POSSIBLE GRANDFATHER, WAS AN
 IRANIAN SENATOR.
 D. SUBJECT HAS FOUR CHILDREN, TWO OF WHOM ARE IN SCHOOL
 IN CONGRESS. ELDEST OF WHOM IS A MALE BORN IN 1954.
 5. SUBJECT IS NOW AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF A COORDINATING
 GROUP FOR THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION IN EXILE WHICH HE CALLS THE
 NATIONAL UNION. HE HAS TWICE LUNCHEDED WITH PARIS STATION C/O/
 ERNEST N. TIMKEN AS THE GUEST OF SDSLIPPER. SUBJECT KNOWS
 TIMKEN IN HIS COVER CAPACITY, BUT MAY ASSUME THAT HE IS
 REACTION CONTROLLED. SUBJECT HAS TOLD TIMKEN THAT PARIS
 EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WARREN ZIMMERMANN WAS IN CONTACT
 WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI DURING HIS EXILE IN NEAUPHLE DE CHATEAU
 AND THAT ZIMMERMANN WAS THE REACTION CHIEF IN PARIS. (TIMKEN
 HAS ASSURED SUBJECT THAT ZIMMERMANN IS NOT A REACTION.) SUBJECT
 CLAIMS MANY DISTINGUISHED AMERICANS, FOR MOST OF WHOM
 AMBASSADOR RICHARD HELMS, AS CLOSE FRIENDS OF LONG STANDING.
 SUBJECT CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN AN OUTSPOKEN OPPOSITION OF THE SHAH
 FOR MANY YEARS PRIOR TO 1978. UNPOLO/1 HAS TOLD TIMKEN THAT
 SUBJECT CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN JAILED UNDER THE SHAH'S REGIME FOR
 OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES, WHEREAS HE WAS ACTUALLY CONFINED TO
 EIGHT YEARS INCARCERATION FOR RAPING HIS OWN NIECE, BUT
 RELEASED AFTER TWO YEARS THANKS TO HIS FAMILY'S INFLUENCE AT
 COURT. SUBJECT'S OWN VERSION OF THIS STORY IS RELATED IN
 REF C, PAR 7. UNPOLO/1 ATTRIBUTES HER STORY TO UNCONTESTABLY
 RELIABLE IRANIAN LAWYERS OF HER ACQUAINTANCE.

5. FILE: 201-962067. RWV 2 OCT 98 DAW D9C.

S E C R E T
 BT
 #3009

Chief, Near East Division
 Chief, European Division
 Chief, Persian Gulf Division
 Chief of Station, Paris
 Forwarding copies of Iranian publications
 Warnings, Notices - Intelligence Sources
 Attached are two copies (1 for UNJAN and 1 for RWV) of the National Union's publication, "Le Journal", which appears in Paris daily in Paris magazine. Station is unable to read the publication at Paris Station, but understands from IDEM who gave us these copies that the bulletin is a compendium of the most recent noteworthy events in Iran supplied by travelers, and includes letters from Iran.
 2. We recommend that ANJAN screen the publication for information of possible political interest to the United States, or of national interest to Tehran, and other stations.
 3. We recommend that RWV screen the publication for potential value as an outlet for material in support of perspectives, and retain it as of possible future use in support of grey or black propaganda activities. The publication was discussed with UNJAN during his visit to Paris.
 Attachment: as stated, u/s/c
 Distribution: 1 - Addressee, u/s/c; 1 - C, BUR, u/s/c; 1 - COM, Tehran, u/s/c; 1 - UNJAN, u/s/c; 1 - RWV, u/s/c
 DISPOSITION SYMBOL AND NUMBER
 OPAA-7147
 CLASSIFICATION
 S E C R E T
 201-962067
 61

2 Nov 79 11 38z

SECRET 020040Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 544703.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WINTEL INTEL AJAJA SDSLIIPPY

REF: PARIS 13009

1. SUBJECT REF ENCRYPTED SDLEADER/1, ASSIGNED 201-963116. TRACES CONTAINED DIRECTOR 508655, 6 SEP 79.

2. FILE: 201-963116. RWV 01NOV99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT #6668

1

SECRET 311922Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 465089.

PRIORITY PARIS INFO TEHRAN, RI I U

WINTEL BYBAT AJAJA

REF: PARIS 11226

1. MOSTLY SLIM ENCRYPTED IDEN A, ASSIGNED 201-963116 AND HAS BEEN ISSUED ONE VICE PIA FOR OPERATION IN IRAN AS HOSTILE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS HIS PROVEN. MAHDI RIHANI HAS BEEN ENCRYPTED IDEN A.

2. REF CASE CONTINUES TO BE INTERESTING AND WE BELIEVE THAT PARA 7 PROPOSAL WOULD BE FOLLOWED THROUGH MUCH PER IATE PARIS EFFORTS THIS CASE AND OUR DEVELOPMENT AIM TO INT BESS WE BEGINNING TO MAKE HEADWAY TOWARD ACQUIRING ILLIPING ASSETS IN IRAN. AT SAME TIME, BELIEVE WE MUST SOMEHOW GET IN CONTACT ON CONCERNING OUR DEALINGS WITH SLIM, WHO WE FEEL D. IN IRAN. LESS THAN FAVORABLE KNOWN TO OFFICERS WHO LEAVE TO BE WHILE NOT RECOMMENDING THAT WE NOT WORK WITH SLIM, COMPTON INTERM PENRUT STATION OFFICER RECOMMENDED THAT WE VERY BALT ICH AP AND THAT IT LIKELY SLIM WAS IN CONTACT WITH GRAPPA WITH REVI. PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE REVEALED HIS REACTI COMP. IN IRAN. SERVICE. IN SHORT, SLIM COMES ACROSS AS A RIVING AND CERTAIN WOULD WHO COULD, WHEN PROFITABLY GR. NECESS. GOING CONTACT WITH REACTION TO HIS OWN ADVANTAGE. HIS I S. FLOWING IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH US IS TO INCR SE HIS. PROFIT AMONG HIS LEBANESE CONTACTS AND INCREASE ABILITY TO AND HELM PROPER POLITICAL ACTION AMONG THE LEBANESE IT. IRANIAN COMMUNITY IN LEBANON AND EUROPE.

3. ACCORDINGLY, IN AGREEING TO PAR 7. REF CASE AL. 21. LIEVE PRUDENCE WOULD DICTATE THAT WE PERFORM MORE ANALYSIS AND REF PROPOSAL CALLS FOR CAREFULLY VETTING SLIM'S SOURCE ASSETS INFORMATION AS WE TRACK TOWARD ESTABLISHING REPAIRING ON HIS IN IRAN. BELIEVE WE SHOULD ALSO BE PLANNING TO SIS HARVEY CONTACT WITH THESE ASSETS. VETTING SLIM. T OR T GA

SECRET
RAG 2 DIRECTOR 485899 S F P R I E T
OM. FULLY AGREE WITH STATI PROPOSAL S S
CHANGE IN EFFECTIVE. KNOWING FO, AND MEA VE
WILL BE ESSENTIAL, AND AS E RLY AS POSSI E.
4. FILE: 221-2961724 221-2962067 R V
JUL 9 1979

ALL SECRET
SECRET
SECRET

AUG 79

SECRET 312026Z JUL 79 STAFF

TO DIRECTOR 486047.

: PRIORITY PARIS INFO TERROR, BEIRUT.

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA

TO DIRECTOR 485899

- 1. IDEN A IS SDSHIPPER /1.
- 1. IDEN P IS SDULTIMAT /1.

2. FILE: 221-0961724; 221-0962067 R V W 31 JUL 79 DRV D9C.1

SECRET
SECRET
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SECRET 182922Z SEP 79 STAFF

TEHRAN PARIS 12432 SECTION 1 OF 2

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

MINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDSLIPPERY

AL DIRECTOR 485999
BL PARIS 11078
CL PARIS 11096
DL PARIS 12269
EL PARIS 12374
FL PARIS 12373
GL PARIS 11096
HL PARIS 11078

1. SDSLIPPERY/1 RETURNED FROM BEIRUT 31 AUGUST; MET C/O A SEPTEMBER; LUNCHEd NESSIM KHURI, JOURNALIST WITH PARI
FRANC PAPER AL-MUSTAGBAL, AND HIS FRIEND KENISE MOURAD OF
NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR ON 5 SEPTEMBER; MET JAWADH AL-AMIR AND
SDULTIMATE/L ON 6 SEPTEMBER; SERVED LUNCH TO C/O AND JAWADH
AL-AMIR ON 8 SEPTEMBER; MET C/O ON 11 SEPTEMBER.

2. AT 4 SEPTEMBER MEETING, SDSLIPPERY/1 ASKED FOR
WASHINGTON REACTION TO HIS PAPER DESCRIBED PARA 7 REF C. C
TOLD SDSLIPPERY/1 THAT WASHINGTON HAD FOUND HIS ANALYSIS
GENERALLY SOUND, SO FAR AS THE LIMITED INFORMATION AVAILAB
TO US PERMITTED EVALUATION; THAT C/O WAS AUTHORIZED TO CONT
DISCUSSIONS WITH SDSLIPPERY/1 WITH A VIEW TO DETERMINING
WHETHER, WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY OUR POLICY OF ESTABLISH
ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER
NATIONS; AND SEVERE BUDGETARY RESTRICTIONS, IT MIGHT BE
POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH ANTENNAE (AS HE, SDSLIPPERY/1 CALLS
THEM) IN THE KEY AREAS OF QOM, NAJJAF (VICE TEHRAN, ERD
LY LISTED REF G) AND BEIRUT, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE CURRENT,
POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN IRA
IRAC AND ADJACENT AREAS WHERE SHI'A COMMUNITIES HAVE POLI
ACCESS AND INFLUENCE; AND THAT WE MIGHT BEGIN BY SPONSORIN
AN SDSLIPPERY/1 VISIT TO IRAN TO ASSESS AND DEBRIEF SEVERAL

AGE 2 PARIS 12432 SECRET

ATE 1 BROTHER AT QOM, AND SUBJECT REF H. SDSLIPPERY/1
NSM LINGLY ACCEPTED THIS, THEN ASKED WHETHER C/O COULD OFFER
SOME ASSISTANCE TO SDULTIMATE/1 WHO MIGHT BE THE KEY TO
OBTAINING HIS BROTHER'S COOPERATION AND WOULD BE
USEFUL AS SPOTTER, ELICITOR AND SOURCE OF INTRODUCTION TO
KNOWLEDGEABLE IRANIANS RESIDING IN OR PASSING THROUGH PARIS.
C/O REPLIED THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO MAKE HIS FIRST FINANCIAL
COMMITMENT TO SOMEONE MORE DEMONSTRABLY ABLE AND WILLING TO
REPORT USEFUL POLITICAL INFORMATION, ALTHOUGH SDULTIMATE/1
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT POTENTIAL WAS NOT TO BE DISCOUNTED. C/O
DECLINED TO MEET SDULTIMATE/1 AGAIN DIRECTLY FOR TIME BEING.
SDSLIPPERY/1 REPORTED THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO MEET MOURAD AND
AL-AMIR, RECOMMENDED THAT HE SET UP C/O MEETINGS WITH THEM.
SDSLIPPERY/1 SAID MOURAD, PAUL BALTA OF L'EXPRESS, AND ERIC
ROULEAU OF LE MONDE, WERE THE ONLY FRENCH JOURNALISTS WITHIN
OPINION MAKING ARTICLES ON IRAN - AND THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD
NOT MET BALTA, HE THOUGHT MOURAD MIGHT BE SORT OF TARGET FROM
POINT OF VIEW OF EXTRACTING OR (IN HIS CASE) PLANTING INFO.
C/O REPLIED THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE SDSLIPPERY/1 DEAL WITH
MOURAD WITHOUT INVOLVING C/O, POSTPONED RESPONSE RE AL-AMIR
LATER ADVISING SDSLIPPERY/1 THAT HE DID WISH MEET AL-AMIR.

3. SDSLIPPERY/1 ASSESSMENT OF MOURAD REPORTED IN PARA 2
REF D. HE RECOMMENDS THAT SHE, BALTA AND ROULEAU (WHOM HE HAS
KNOWN FOR YEARS) BE CULTIVATED AS SECONDARY SOURCES OF INFO
TION. SDSLIPPERY/1, OF COURSE, WOULD LIKE TO DO THIS WITH
OUR MONEY (SEE BELOW) AND COLLECT, FOR HIS OWN PURPOSE, A
BY-PRODUCT IN TERMS OF THEIR AVAILABILITY TO HIM AS CO
DUIT FOR INFO HE MAY WISH TO PLANT.

4. PERSE AND F COVER SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF DISCUSSIO
WITH AL-AMIR. CONSIDERABLE TIME WAS WASTED DISCUSSING IMAM
MUSA AL-SADR BECAUSE MEETING TOOK PLACE DAY AFTER ALITALIA
HIJACKING BY SHI'A GROUP. AL-AMIR CLAIMED THAT HIS ORGANIZ
TION HAD LOCATED MUSA SADR'S MANSERVANT WHO HAD IDENTIFIED
MUSTAFA SHAMRAN AS THE LAST MAN TO SEE SADR BEFORE HE WENT TO
LIBYA. SDSLIPPERY/1 EXPRESSED CONVICTION SADR DEAD. BOTH
AGREED THAT SADR HAD BEEN SAVAGELY AGENT OF INFLUENCE. AL-AMIR
IMPLIED IT MORE LIKELY THAT PALESTINIANS HAD PROBABLY DONE
SADR IN AT BEHEST OF KHOMEINY THAN THAT LIBYANS HAD KILLED OR

AGE 5 PARIS 12432 S E C R E T
DISCLOSURES NECESSARY TO INITIATE INVESTIGATION OF SDSLIPPERY
OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME, AND ESTIMATE WHAT CONTROL WE CAN
AND AT WHAT PRICE, IF WE DECIDE WE REQUIRE HIS SERVICES

8. SDSLIPPERY/1 IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO BEIRUT ON
22 SEPTEMBER. WILL VISIT IRAN ON WAY BACK TO PARIS CIRCA
12 OCTOBER. WIDE RANGE OF IRAN REQUIREMENTS IS AVAILABLE
AT STATION, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FROM
HEADQUARTERS AND TEHRAN AS TO REQUIREMENTS WHICH WOULD ENABLE
US CONFIDENTLY TO EVALUATE SDSLIPPERY/1 ACCESS AND RELIABILITY

9. FILE: 201-962067. RVW 17SEP98 DRW D9C1.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 198751Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54247

TO: PARIS INFO DIRECTOR.

UNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDSLIPPERY

REF: PARIS 12432

1. DO NOT BELIEVE WE ARE SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH
ESSENTIALLY LEBANESE OR LIKE BACKGROUND OF THE SDSLIPPERY/1
TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE KIND OF TAILORED REQUIREMENTS
REQUESTED REF. THEREFORE REFER TO HQS.

2. STATION HOLDING DO NOT INCLUDE IDENTITIES OF EITHER
ULTIMATELY OF HIS BROTHER. REQUEST PARIS PROVIDE.

3. NO FILE. RVW 13 SEP 98 DRW D9C1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

1
E CR T 2124 SEP 29 1969
DIRECTOR 5112
URGENT
TEHRAN 54147
PARIS 14132
DIRECTOR 48555

APPROPRIATE TO TIMKEN'S PROGRESS AGAINST IRANIAN
BEYOND PARAMETERS OF ORIGINAL PROPOSAL GOES CONSIDERABLY
WHILE WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER, HOWEVER.
SOURCE IN LOCATIONS INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHMENT FI REPORTING
SHIITE COMMUNITIES SUCH AS QOM OR NAJAF AND AMONG LEBANESE
TROUBLE SITUATIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY DO SO UNDER VERY CON-
SULTATION IS NECESSARY THIS WOULD NOT INCLUDE SDELIPPERY/1'S
OPERATION AS A PRINCIPAL AGENT. OUR AIM RE DEVELOPING S/1
WHICH WE KNOW HE WILL ACT AS SPOTTER TO TARGETS OF INTEREST
WE ARE WILLING TO MEET, ASSESS, VET AND DEVELOP AS FI SOURCES.
DEVELOP AND COMPENSATE HIM FOR THIS WORK WHEN SUCH LEADS
INTELLIGENCE WORTHY SOURCES OR INFORMATION HE PROVIDES IS USABLE
ARRANGEMENTS WE, OF COURSE, RECOGNIZE THAT SECURING S/1'S
CLEAR AND SUCH LIMITED COMMITMENT ON OUR PART EASIER SAID
(AND THAT S/1 VERY MUCH LOOKING FOR MORE FORMALIZED
INTERIM (OR TIME) ARRANGEMENT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IN OUR BEST
INTERESTS NOW TO ENTER INTO SUCH COMMITMENT.

EQS WILLING TO PROVIDE REIMBURSEMENT TO S/1 FOR SERVICES
DURING PAST THREE MONTHS SUCH AS INTRODUCTIONS TO SD-
/1 AND JAVAD AL-AMIN AND APPROVE PARA 7, REF B PROPOSAL
S/1 US\$1,000 FOR THIS WORK. WE ALSO WILLING APPROVE SIMILAR
FOR FUTURE SERVICES OF SAME NATURE. REMAINDER OF PARA 6
PROPOSAL NOT APPROVED. WE ARE ALSO UNABLE APPROVE AT THIS
THE S/1'S PROPOSED TRIP TO MID-EAST UNTIL S/1 ABLE PROVIDE US
WITH IDENTITIES PROSPECTIVE CONTACTS AND REASON BELIEVE THAT
THOSE CONTACTS WILL DEVELOP INTO PRODUCTIVE ASSETS. AGAIN.

JCN

AGE 2 DIRECTOR 19692/S/E C/R E
RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS FULLY UNDERSTOOD BUT WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY
WITH INDIVIDUAL OF S/1'S BACKGROUND.

4. WE HAVE NO FURTHER REQUIREMENTS OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY
PROVIDED STATION. WE ARE PREPARING REQUIREMENTS ON LEBANESE
SHIITE COMMUNITY AND THEY WILL BE FORWARDED ASAP AND SHOULD BE
SETUP.

5. WE DO NOT MEAN SOURCE TO NEGATIVE OUR REACTION REF B
PROPOSAL, BUT S/1 HISTORY AND HIS, AS PERCEIVED HERE, CURRENT
STYLE OF OPERATING, MAKES US VERY CAUTIOUS IN COMMITTING OUR-
SELVES IN ANY WAY TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS MUCH MORE TO GAIN IN
MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH US THAN WE FROM HIM.

6. FOR TEHRAN, S/1 ULTIMATE/1 IS IDEN A AND HIS BROTHER IS
IDEN B.

ALL SECRET
S E C R E T
BY
#459
FILE: 201-2952067, 201-295172A, RVW 21SEP69 DRV D

26 SEP 79 5 31z

S E C R E T 260342Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 521028.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN, BEIRUT.

FROM: CNE/IRAN INFO CNE/SLJ

SUBJECT: WNINTEL AJAJA SDSLIPPER INTEL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 518662
B. DIRECTOR 458600

1. AS PROMISED REF A, FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS ARE FOR USE WITH SDSLIPPERY/1 (S/1) TO COLLECT FROM HIS LEBANESE SHI'ITE CONTACTS IN EUROPE AND, IF A TRIP FOR S/1 TO BEIRUT SHOULD EVENTUATE, FOR USE IN TALKING TO CONTACTS IN LEBANON. PARIS SHOULD ALSO SEE REF B WHICH LEVIES STILL VALID REQUIREMENTS ON SHI'ITE TARGET IN MIDDLE EAST.

2. REQUIREMENTS ARE:

A. THERE IS A VIRTUAL DEARTH OF INFO ON THE "AMAL", THE SHI'ITE PARAMILITARY GROUP IN LEBANON. STRENGTH, LEADERSHIP, ARMS INVENTORY, WHAT SUPPORT FROM IRAN? AMAL SECTY/GEN WAS IN IRAN IN MID-APRIL AND AGAIN IN EARLY JULY PER PRESS REPORTS AND MET WITH IRANIAN LEADERS. PURPOSE/RESULTS THESE MEETINGS? WHAT DOES S/1 KNOW ABOUT HUSAYNI'S BACKGROUND AND RELATIONSHIP WITH IRANIAN LEADERS. S/1'S INFO IN PARIS 11096 THAT THE SHI'ITE FORCE IN LEBANON IS PAID FOR BY THE SYRIANS; TRAINED, COMMANDED AND LARGFLY STAFFED BY PALESTINIANS IS THE FIRST WE HAVE HAD ON EITHER SYRIAN OR PAL INVOLVEMENT. A SUBSTANTIVE EXPANSION OF THIS WOULD BE VERY DISSEMINABLE INFO.

B. ALSO PER PRESS, KHOMEINI'S GRANDSON (HUSAYN MUSTAFA KHOMEINI) ARRIVED BEIRUT 2 SEPT. WAS S/1 IN BEIRUT AT THE TIME. WHAT DOES HE KNOW OF THE PURPOSE OF THIS VISIT? THE HIGHER ISLAMIC SHI'ITE COUNCIL AND THE AMAL MOVEMENT WERE TO ORGANIZE A SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR HIS VISIT.

C. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE HIGHER ISLAMIC SHI'ITE

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 521028 S E C R E T
COUNCIL (WHICH OVERSEES SHI'ITE AFFAIRS IN LEBANON), CAN S/1 PROVIDE BACKGROUND ON EACH OF ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR SYMPATHIES/ALIGNMENTS, DEGREE OF INFLUENCE AMONG THE SHI'ITES EACH HAS. WHO IS THE MOST INFLUENTIAL. S/1 REPORTED IN PARIS 10911 THAT SHIA CLERGY NO LONGER EXERT MUCH INFLUENCE OVER SHIAS AND THAT COMMUNITY WAS IN PROCESS OF TRYING TO DEVELOP NEW LEADERSHIP. AN EXPANSION OF THIS WOULD BE OF GREAT INTEREST. WHY HAVE CLERGY LOST INFLUENCE, WHICH IS IN SUCH CONTRAST TO SITUATION IN IRAN? ANY SUCCESS IN DEVELOPING NEW LEADERSHIP?

D. ALSO OF INTEREST TO US IS HIS CONTACT WITH SALAH BITAR, WHO IS CO-FOUNDER OF BA'TH PARTY (WITH MICHEL AFLAQ) AND AN OLD LINE SYRIAN OPPOSITION LEADER. DOES HE KNOW WHETHER BITAR IS STILL POLITICALLY ACTIVE. CAN HE ELICIT BITAR'S COMMENTS ON HOW BITAR SEES THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SYRIA AND ASSESS THE VIABILITY OF THE ASAD REGIME THERE IN VIEW OF THE ESCALATING SECTARIAN CLASHES?

3. WE SOMEWHAT CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY THAT S/1 MAY BE IN TOUCH WITH ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. S/1 HAS SAID THAT HE WAS SYMPATHETIC WITH CAUSE OF ISRAELI-BACKED MAJOR SAAD H A D D A D, WHO NOW IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF MUCH OF SOUTH LEBANON AND HE HAS ADMITTED CONTACTS WITH ISRAELI EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

4. FILE: 201-0962067. RVW 25SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

BT

#9019

5 Oct 78 06 50z

EC T 041833Z OCT 79 STAFF
IT PARS 13023 SECTION 1 OF 2
O: DIRECTOR INFO TERRAN.
NINTH AJAJA SDSLIPIERY

REFS: DIRECTOR 518662
WASHINGTON 521028
PARIS 12452
DIRECTOR 466658
DIRECTOR 495999
DIRECTOR 455576

REFS A AND B DID NOT ARRIVE PARIS PRIOR TO SDSLIPIERY 1
WE ANTICIPATED REF C, WHICH AFFORDS US CONVENIENT INTER-
VIEW ASSESSMENT DATA AND REVISE OUR PLANS. BELIEVE
CORRECT TO LABEL SDSLIPIERY 1 PROPOSAL AS OFFER TO
AS PRINCIPAL AGENT. WE HAVE NOT YET MADE COUN-
POSAL TO HIM WHICH WOULD ALTER PRINCIPAL AGENT ROLE TO
SPOTTER AND ELICITOR, AND FIX FAIR RATE OF PAY.
WE DO SO, WE SHOULD CLARIFY PARAMETERS OF SDSLIPIERY 1
SETTLE ON FAIR COMPENSATION, AND, ABOVE ALL, DECIDE
WE TRUST HIM SUFFICIENTLY TO ENTER INTO CANDIDINE
NSHIP EVEN ON TRIAL BASIS. REF A EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDES
MOTION IN DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP AND
WE ARE IN NO HURRY, WE CANNOT REMAIN ON DEAD CENTER
ITELY WITHOUT RECOGNIZING THAT WE ARE FORFEITING
MENT OF CONTROL WE NEED TO PLACE RELATIONSHIP ON
CURE BASE.

REF A REFERS TO SDSLIPIERY 1 "HISTORY" AND "BACKGROUND"
WHICH INFERS THAT HIS BACKGROUND IS SENIOR. REVIEW
D, E, AND F (ALL THE RELEVANT INFORMATION ON SDSLIPIERY
AVAILABLE TO US) REVEALS:
A. THAT, IN JUNE 63, PESKOLAR/1 SAID SDSLIPIERY 1
WAS A SECOND RATE BRITISH AGENT. THE LATTER ALLEGA-
TION BEARS TO HAVE BEEN UNSUBSTANTIATED BY PESKOLAR/1 AND

PAGE 2 PARIS 13023 SECTION 1 OF 2
WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE BUSINESS BAITING WITHOUT ENDORSEMENT BY HIM
PRO-SHAW INCITEMENT, IN THE POLITICAL CLIMATE OF 63, CANNOT BE
REGARDED AS DEROGATORY. WHAT WAS PESKOLAR/1'S ACCESS, RELIA-
BILITY, AND MOTIVATION IN REPORTING THE INFO?

B. PETAKE, IN JANUARY 65, SAID THAT SDSLIPIERY 1 WAS
PAID AGENT OF HIS OWN NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE. WE CANNOT
REGARD THIS AS DEROGATORY BUT WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEAD-
QUARTERS EVALUATION OF PETAKE ACCESS, RELIABILITY, AND MOTIVA-
TION IN REPORTING THE INFO. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO PESKOFF
REPORTS THAT, IN THE EARLY SIXTIES, SDSLIPIERY 1 WORKED FOR THE
OWN GOVERNMENT'S POLICE AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THESE
THREE ALLEGATIONS, TAKEN TOGETHER, GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF A
MAN WIDELY SUSPECTED OF REPORTING TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES BUT
NOT KNOWN TO DO SO - HENCE THE CONFUSION ABOUT WHICH SERVICE
IT WAS. IN ANY CASE, IT WAS HIS OWN COUNTRY'S SERVICE. IF ANY

C. PESKOFF/1 HOWEVER, ALSO ALLEGED THAT LEBANESE G-
ARCHIVES (SHOWED SDSLIPIERY 1 WAS WORKING FOR SAUDI ARABIA (N
SERVICE, NOT EVEN THE EMBASSY IN BEIRUT, SPECIFIED) AS
COOPERATING WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY; AND AS HAVING A THIRD
WHO WAS A BRITISH OFFICIAL. CERTAINLY THERE IS NO NEED TO
PLACE A DEROGATORY INTERPRETATION ON ANY OF THESE ALLEGATIONS
AND, AGAIN, WE WONDER NOT ONLY ABOUT THE EVALUATION OF THE INFO
BUT WHETHER THE ENTRIES THEMSELVES MIGHT HAVE BEEN PUT IN THE
G-2 ARCHIVES WITH THE INTENTION OF COVERING THEIR OWN AGENT
IF, INDEED, SDSLIPIERY 1 WAS ONE.

D. FINALLY, AND AGAIN IN SIXTIES, SDSLIPIERY 1 IS
ALLEGED TO HAVE HAD A CONTACT, LASAR SIVULI, WHO WAS A YUGO
SLAV FIRST SECRETARY. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHETHER
SIVULI WAS INTELLIGENCE CONNECTED, A COMMUNIST, AND THE
FREQUENCY AND NATURE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO.

IN OBTAINING PRO I FROM SDSLIPIERY 1 C/D ASKED HIM WHETHER HE
HAD EVER ENJOYED CONTACT WITH PERSONNEL OR ANY INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE, THEN BRODDED HIM CONCERNING THE ISRAELI EMBASSY CONTACT
HE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED, AND CONTACTS WITH ANY SAVAK OFFICERS.
SDSLIPIERY 1 FIRMLY ASSERTED THAT HE HAD HAD NO INTELLIGENCE
CONTACTS, ALTHOUGH AMONG HIS MANY ARMY OFFICIAL FRIENDS THE

PAGE 3 PARIS 13023 S E C R E T
MIGHT HAVE BEEN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS LURKING UNDECLARED TO
HIM. WE HAVE, THUS, DEFINED AN AREA TO BE EXPLORED BY
GCSWIRE. SDSLIFFERY/1 HAS TOLD US THAT HE IS ABLE TO PRACTICE
LAW AND MAINTAIN A STUDIO IN PARIS WITHOUT FRENCH PARTICIPA-
TION THANKS TO THE INTERVENTION OF EDGAR FAURE. WE HAVE TASKED
UNUSU/1, A PROTEGE OF FAURE, TO GET US A RUNDOWN ON
WHO SDSLIFFERY/1 IS, HOW HE SUPPORTS HIMSELF, AND WHAT HIS
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ARE IN FRANCE AND THE ARAB WORLD. MEAN-
WHILE, COULD HEADQUARTERS BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT SUCH REF E
COMMENTS AS THAT SDSLIFFERY/1 WAS WELL AND LESS THAN FAVORABLE
KNOWN TO OFFICERS WHO HAVE SERVED IN BEIRUT; AND THAT HE IS
LIKELY TO BE IN CONTACT WITH ENGRAPE, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT
HAVE REVEALED HIS REACTION CONTACT TO THEM. SUCH REMARKS WOULD
THAT THERE ARE FACTS ABOUT SDSLIFFERY/1 WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN MADE
KNOWN TO US AND WHICH MIGHT FACILITATE FIELD INVESTIGATION OF
THIS POTENTIAL ASSET. TO KNOW SDSLIFFERY/1 IS TO MISTRUST HIM,
BUT ONE MUST ASK ONESELF WHAT ONE REALLY KNOWS. HIS PERSONALITY
IS REMINISCENT OF A ONCE GREAT AGENT, OPPOSED WHO WAS UNIVERSAL
SUSPECTED OF WORKING FOR THE ISRAELIS AND FOR MOST OF THE
WESTERN POWERS, INCLUDING US, AND WHO FINALLY DIED FOR IT.

3. ALTHOUGH SDSLIFFERY/1 HAS PROPOSED HIMSELF IN THE
PRINCIPAL AGENT ROLE, HIS COMPORTMENT TO DATE HAS INDICATED NO
RELUCTANCE TO INTRODUCE US DIRECTLY TO DESIGNATED
INFORMANTS, AS IN THE CASES OF AL-AMIR, SDULTIMATE, AND SEVERAL
OTHERS WHOM C/O HAS DECLINED TO MEET. DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL
BE DIFFICULT TO EXTEND THIS PATTERN BUT WE CANNOT TRANSFER IT
TO QOM AND MAJAP UNLESS WE FIRST SEND SDSLIFFERY/1 TO PICK UP
EXISTING CONTACTS (THOSE WHOM HE WOULD HAVE MET ON REF C TRIP
WERE DESIGNATED IN PARA 2 REF C) AND MAKE SOME OTHERS. ONCE THE
SPOTTING IS DONE, GIVEN WHAT WE ASSUME TO BE THE RELATIVE
OPERATIONAL INACCESSIBILITY OF THESE AREAS, IT WOULD SEEM THAT
SDSLIFFERY/1 WILL HAVE TO DRAW THOSE HE HAS SPOTTED ELSEWHERE
TO BE MET, ASSESSED, AND DEVELOPED BY US. IF WE HAVE SECURITY
RESERVATIONS ABOUT SDSLIFFERY/1, WE ASSUME THAT CANDIDATES WILL
TO BE DRAWN TO SOME PLACE WHERE WE HAVE LESS AT STAKE AND MORE
CONTROL OF THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT THAN WE BELIEVE TO BE THE
CASE IN TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, OR BEIRUT. THIS WILL REQUIRE A
PRETEXT AND, UNDOUBTEDLY, FUNDS. WELCOME HEADQUARTERS VIEWS.

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PAGE 4 PARIS 13023 S E C R E T
4. WE ARE CONSCIOUS THAT, IN DISPLAYING C/O'S OWN SENSI-
TIVITY TO SDSLIFFERY/1'S "ARAB IN PARIS" VIEW OF THE LEAN AND ITS
COSTS, AND TO THE IMAGE HE PROJECTS AS A SLIGHTLY SAIZING
PROMOTER, WE MAY HAVE OBSCURED SOME OF HIS MORE PRO- AS, IN OUR
OPERATIONAL GIETS AND UNDERPLAYED WHAT STATURE HE HAS. SDSLIFFERY
PREOCCUPATION WITH SECURITY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS. HOST OF
IS A JURIST OF SOME STATURE IN HIS WORLD. HE HAS MET ANYONE
POTENTIALLY USEFUL CONTACTS, AND ENOUGH BRASS TO NOT INSURE
WE ASK HIM TO MEET. THE OBSERVATION THAT HE DOES OR, SINCE
CONFIDENCE IN EVERYONE HE MEETS MAY WORK IN OUR FA- COUNT FOR
HE HIMSELF MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF THIS, AND IT MAY A- IONSHIPS
HIS READINESS TO INJECT HIS CASE-OFFICER INTO RELA- F HIS
WITH INFORMANTS. HE IS MORE AVARICIOUS THAN MANY PROEN HIMSEL
COUNTRYMEN, BUT NOT EXCEPTIONALLY SO - AND HAS PROM- HE IS
WILLING TO RISK A LITTLE MONEY TO MAKE SOME MORE. HE IS
HIGHLY INTELLIGENT, A SKILLFUL ELICITOR, AND SHREWD ASSESSOR
HIS FELLOW MAN. HE REPORTS, WHEN REMINDED OF OUR
WESTERN PREOCCUPATION WITH FACTS, ACCURATELY, IN DETAIL, AND
IN WRITING WHEN THIS IS REQUIRED. AT THIS MID-POIN- T IN OUR
FIELD INVESTIGATION, HE SEEMS DISCREET AND LOYAL. WHILE HE IS
CONCERNED WITH SELF-AGRANDISSEMENT IN THE POLITICAL L SPHERE, HE
SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY MOTIVATED BY THE DESIRE TO PUR-
THE INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON WHICH IS NOT INCOMPAT- BLE WITH OUR
INTERESTS. AT THIS POINT IN TIME, THEREFORE, OUR WORKING
HYPOTHESIS IS THAT SDSLIFFERY/1 CAN BE CONTROLLED AND THAT IT
IS PROBABLY WORTH A SERIOUS INVESTMENT OF TIME AND MONEY TO DO
SO, OR TO DETERMINE THAT OUR HYPOTHESIS IS WRONG.

5. OUR FIGURE OF US \$1,000 IN REF C WAS PRE- IATED ON THE
CONCEPT THAT IT WOULD BE OFFERED AS PART OF A TRI- L PERIOD
OFFER WHICH WOULD INCLUDE, AT LEAST, SOME TEMPORA- LY SALARY AND
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES. THE INTENT WAS TO SAVE MONEY BY MAKING
A PACKAGE DEAL. SDSLIFFERY/1 HAS SPENT AT LEAST \$400 ON OPERA-
TIONAL ENTERTAINMENT OF AL-AMIR AND SDULTIMATE/1. THE PROCS
OF BRINGING THEM TOGETHER WITH THE C/O. SDSLIFFERY/1 IS A
SUCCESSFUL ATTORNEY AND, IN FRANCE, EVEN A TYRO LAWYER MAKES
US \$50 PER HOUR. AT THIS RATE, SDSLIFFERY/1 LEG- TIMATE BILIM
TO US, HAD WE RETAINED HIM PROFESSIONALLY, WOULD BE ABOUT US
\$2,000 FOR TIME SPENT IN OPERATIONAL MEETINGS. WE DO NOT
SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD PAY SDSLIFFERY/1 AT LEGAL RATES, THOSE

10 Oct 79 03 54z

PARIS 1103
PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.
INTEL RYBA AJAU RANNER SDULTIMATE
PARIS 11099

1. SDULTIMATE/1 WAS CONTACTED PARIS C/O TO REPORT THAT ATOLLAR SADIQ AL-RUHANI'S PUBLIC THREAT TO INVESTIGATE SHI'A REVOLT IN BARRAIN WAS MADE IN RESPONSE TO CALL FROM RUHANI'S FOLLOWERS IN BARRAIN FOR SUPPORT IN THEIR STRUGGLE TO OBTAIN THEIR RIGHTS FROM AMIR OF BARRAIN. SDULTIMATE/1 SAID THAT POPULATION OF BARRAIN IS EIGHTY-FIVE PERCENT SHI'A AND HAS VAST MAJORITY OF SHI'A ARE FOLLOWERS OF RUHANI. SDULTIMATE/1 REPORTED THAT BOTH PRIME MINISTER AZARGAN AND AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAD URGED RUHANI TO SOFTEN HIS ATTACKS ON BARRAINI AUTHORITIES. RUHANI WILL REFLECT OR A WEEK OR SO. MEANWHILE, HAS ASKED SDULTIMATE/1 TO CHECK THE INTERNAL REACTION TO RUHANI'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST BARRAIN. SDULTIMATE/1 ASKED C/O FOR NYBLAZON REACTION AND REFERRED TO CONSOLE RUHANI IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHATEVER GUIDANCE NYBLAZON GIVES.

2. C/O TOLD SDULTIMATE/1 THAT REQUEST OF THIS NATURE WOULD HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO HIGHER AUTHORITY BUT THAT, PENDING C/O COULD CONFIDENTLY ASSURE SDULTIMATE/1 THAT A REVOLT IN BARRAIN AT THIS TIME MIGHT HAVE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF A MAGNITUDE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT OR CONTROL AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO FAVOR THE INTERESTS OF NYBLAZON OR OF ANY OF BARRAIN'S NEIGHBORS. C/O OPINED THAT WHAT THE AREA SEEMED TO NEED MOST WAS A PERIOD OF STABILITY IN WHICH TO DIGEST RECENT CHANGES. C/O PROMISED TO FURNISH OFFICIAL NYBLAZON RESPONSE TO SDULTIMATE/1 THIS WEEK. REQUEST HEAD-QUARTERS GUIDANCE.

3. C/O SUGGESTED TO SDULTIMATE/1 THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT IN ANY CASE FOR RUHANI TO CONTINUE HIS CAMPAIGN AT THE PRESENT LEVEL IN THE FACE OF KHOMEINI AND-IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION WITHOUT RISKING POLITICAL ISOLATION AT BEST.

PAGE 5 PARIS 13223 S E C R E T
A GLANCE AT THE LIFE STYLE OF THE PLO'S IBRAHIM SUSS WOULD SURFICE TO ESTABLISH THE ROUGH EQUIVALENCE OF AFFLUENCE BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS OF THE LAW AND THOSE OF FAIRER PROFESSIONS. HE WOULD PREFER TO CONTINUE AS LONG AS WE CAN WITHOUT COMING TO FINANCIAL TERMS, AND THEN TERMINATE THE RELATIONSHIP AMICABLY RATHER THAN MAKE SO UNFAIR A GESTURE AS SUGGESTED IN REF A PARA 3. SDSLIPPERY/1'S DIGNITY MAN REST ON SHAKY FOUNDATIONS IN OUR OPINION, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO HIM AND WE SHOULD NOT ASSAIL IT WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE MIGHT HAVE A VINDICTIVE REACTION. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS RECONSIDER WHAT WE MIGHT OFFER SDSLIPPERY/1 WHICH MIGHT INDUCE HIM TO SUBJECT HIMSELF TO OUR CONTROL. THE EXTENT OF DISCUSSING HIS SOURCES OF INCOME FRANKLY WITH US, SUBMITTING TO SGSWIRL, THEN FUNCTIONING AS SPOTTER AND SOURCE OF OPERATIONAL INFORMATION, WITH POSSIBILITY THAT WE WILL USE HIM AS SOCIAL BRIDGE TO TARGETS, NOT NECESSARILY IRANIAN, IN BARRAIN AND AS CONDUIT TO FEED MATERIAL IN SUPPORT OF RTAINA PERSPECTIVES ON NEAR EAST TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS. RELIEVE THE FIGURE WE FINALLY ARRIVE AT SHOULD BE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT IS AS REASONABLE FOR A MAN TO ASK FOR A FAIR WAGE FOR ESPIONAGE AND COVERT ACTION SERVICES AS IT IS FOR ANY OTHER TYPE OF SERVICE. MAKE ALLOWANCE FOR THE FACT THAT SPIES DO NOT PAY TAXES ON COVERED INCOME. LEVEL AND TYPE OF PAYMENTS SHOULD NOT REFLECT OUR RESERVATIONS ABOUT SECURITY. THE SINE QUA NON OF CONTINUING THE RELATIONSHIP AT ALL.

FILE: 201-962037. RWW 4OCT99 DRV Dpc1.

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19 Oct 79 04 00z

AG 03 PARIS 13133 E R H T
SDULTIMATE/1 REPLIED THAT AN AYATOLLAH OF RUHANI'S STATURE
WOULD NOT BE ISOLATED FROM HIS RELIGIOUS FOLLOWING WHICH
CONSTITUTES HIS POLITICAL BASE.

A. IN DISCUSSION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN, AFTER
THE EXTERNAL OFFER TO SDULTIMATE/1 SAID THAT ALTHOUGH
RECEIVING APPEALS ALMOST DAILY FROM IRANIANS IN DIASPORA
HE CLARE HIMSELF IN OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI, HE FELT THE TIME
AS NOT YET RIGHT. SDULTIMATE/1 OPINED THAT IN ANOTHER FIVE
MONTHS THE SITUATION IN IRAN MIGHT BECOME SUFFICIENTLY
EVIDENT, BECAUSE OF KHOMEINI REGIME'S INABILITY TO WORK
EFFECTIVELY AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT, INFLATION, AND NATIONAL
FRAGMENTATION. TO PERMIT ORGANIZATION OF EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION
IN SDULTIMATE/1 OPINION, THE LACK OF VIABLE POLITICAL INSTI-
TUTIONS IN IRAN DICTATES THAT NO OPPOSITION MOVEMENT CAN SUCCE-
ED WITHOUT RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. FOR THE SAME REASON, NO NIC-
HAIUS RELIGIOUS LEADER WILL BE ABLE TO ENSURE THE INSTA-
LATION OF A SOUND GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF IRAN-
IAN WESTERN TRAINED INTELLENTS AND GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FROM
WESTERN INDUSTRIAL POWERS, ESPECIALLY THE UNITED STATES.
SDULTIMATE/1 MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO RE-
STAY UNDER NYBELSON GUIDANCE IN SUCH AN EFFORT TO RESTOR-
E STABILITY IN IRAN, AND IMPLIED THAT UNDER NO OTHER CIRCUM-
STANCES WOULD HE TAKE ON KHOMEINI. SDULTIMATE/1
EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS FULLY EMPOWERED TO SPEAK FOR RUHANI
IN THE MATTER OF TEHRAN AND IMPLIED THAT RUHANI SHARED HIS
ONGOING ANALYSIS OF HOW TO PLAY THE POLITICAL SITUATION
IN IRAN.

5. FILE# 24-961724 RW 900199 DRV DDC
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S E C R E T 122341Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 535287.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WMINTEL AJAJA SDSLIPPERY SDULTIMATE

- REFS: A. TEHRAN 54496
- B. PARIS 13023
- C. PARIS 12959
- D. PARIS 12698
- E. PARIS 12833
- F. TEHRAN 54353
- G. DIRECTOR 512662
- H. PARIS 12612
- I. PARIS 12594
- J. DIRECTOR 517075
- K. PARIS 12432
- L. DIRECTOR 522655

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973-50-34

1. WOS APPRECIATES REF B SUMMARY OF PARIS THOUGHTS AND
CONCERNS OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN SDSLIPPERY/1 (S/1) AND SDULTIMATE/1
(U/1) CASES. AS REF A NOTES, THERE CONTINUES TO BE A GREAT DEAL
OF INTEREST OVER INABILITY OF BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT TO GENERATE ANY
DEGREE OF ENTHUSIASM AND ACTIVITY. NONETHELESS, THE MOVEMENT RE-
MAINS A VALID INTELLIGENCE TARGET AND ONE, WE BELIEVE, ON WHICH
BOTH S/1 AND U/1 MAY BE ABLE COLLECT VALUABLE PI. ANALYSTS HAVE
EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SCOPE OF S/1 REPORTING, DESPITE ERRORS, AND
WHELP MUCH OF INFORMATION TO DATE REMAINS UNSUBSTANTIATED, THEY
CONSIDER HIS REPORTING POTENTIALLY USEFUL. THEREFORE, BELIEVE
PARIS CORRECT IN ITS ASSESSMENT THAT S/1 COULD CONTRIBUTE AGAINST
WIDE VARIETY OF TARGETS.

2. HAVING SAID THIS, WISE REASSERT THAT WE ARE STILL VERY
UNCERTAIN AS TO RELIABILITY, VERACITY, AND MOTIVATIONS OF BOTH
S/1 AND U/1 AND THAT WE BELIEVE THAT WHILE CONTACT WITH BOTH OF
THESE SOURCES IS WORTHWHILE AND MAY EVEN BE PROMISING, CONTACT
SHOULD BE MAINTAINED WITH LEAST POSSIBLE COMMITMENT ON OUR PART.
OUR CONCERNS ABOUT EXTENT OF REACTION COMMITMENTS TO S/1 OR U/1

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 535287 S E C R E T
ARE REFLECTED IN SPECIFIC REPORTING PROBLEMS OUTLINED BELOW.
UNTIL PROVEN OTHERWISE, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT S/1 AND U/1
WOULD USE ANY COMMITMENT OR FORMALIZED RELATIONSHIP WITH STATION
TO FURTHER THEIR OWN INTERESTS WITH RESULTING COMPLICATIONS BEYOND
ANY ADVANTAGE WHICH WOULD ACCRUE TO US.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT S/1 AND U/1 VIEW THEIR RELATIONSHIP
WITH STATION AS ONE IN WHICH THEY HAVE "PRODUCT" TO SELL,
NAMELY, THEIR PARTICULAR FACTION OF ANTI-KHOMEINI
MOVEMENT AND THAT
THEY DESIRE AVELAZON BACKING, FOR WHICH THEY VIEW STATION AS
SOURCE OR INSTRUMENT OF THAT BACKING. WHILE THESE CASES NOT
UNIQUE IN THIS REGARD, THEY HAVE PRODUCED SOME INFORMATION WHICH
WOULD SEEM INDICATE THEIR ACCESS NOT RELIABLE. OF PARTICULAR
CONCERN IS S/1'S RELATIONSHIP WITH JAVAN ALAMIR D A V A L U, WHO
HAS EXTENSIVE CHECKERED BACKGROUND, IS SUBJECT REF 7, AND WHOSE
EFFORTS ON BAKHTIAR'S BEHALF HAVE, ACCORDING TO SDREPPER/1, BEEN
DISAVOWED BY BAKHTIAR HIMSELF (DIRECTOR 528726). MOREOVER,
NEITHER BAKHTIAR NOR ANY OF THOSE IN HIS IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE
KNOW OF FITEHADI-E MELLI NOR TARIKI ALI.

4. RECENT REPORTS HAVE ALSO SURFACED SEVERAL QUESTIONS
REGARDING ACCURACY S/1-AVALU REPORTING AS FOLLOWS:

A. AS NOTED REF E, MISIDENTIFICATION OF PEDAYAN-E SHALEH
FOR SUJAHEDIN-E SHALEH IN REF D REPORT.

B. REF D IDENTIFICATION OF AYATOLLAH MOTAHARI AS ONE
OF IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS WITH WHOM FITEHADI-E MELLI IN CURRENT
(SEPTEMBER 79) CONTACT. MOTAHARI WAS ASSASSINATED IN APRIL 1979
BY BERGIAN GROUP IN TEHRAN.

C. REF C'S DESCRIPTION OF MUSTAFA CHAMRAN'S POLITICAL
OPINIONS, WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH NFAC ANALYSTS' UNDER-
STANDING HIS IDEOLOGY. NOR IS ASSASSINATION HIS PALESTINIAN HERITAGE
CORROBORATED BY OUR RECORDS (TAKEN LARGELY FROM NVCANOPY DOCUMENTARY
RECORDS) WHICH SHOW HIS BORN IN TEHRAN AND HIS FIRST CONTACT WITH
PLO AND LEADERS CA. 1977.

5. AS TO INFORMATION DEVELOPED DURING MEETINGS WITH U/1,

PAGE 3 DIRECTOR 535287 S E C R E T
WE REMAIN CONCERNED THAT U/1 HAS AYE TO GRIND IN TERMS HIS TOWNS
TO ASSUME POSSIBLE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ANTI-KHOMEINI MOVEMENT.
TO DATE U/1'S PRIMARY VALUE HAS STEMMED FROM FACT THAT HIS BROTHER
PLAYS PROMINENT ROLE IN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN TEHRAN; WE ARE
VERY INTERESTED IN EXPLORING AND EXPLOITING THAT RELATIONSHIP
FOR INTEL COLLECTION. U/1'S ACCESS TO EUROPE-BASED IRANIAN DIS-
SIDERE OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES HAS NOT PROVEN PRODUCTIVE.

6. WE REMAIN WILLING TO REIMBURSE S/1 \$1,272 FOR HIS PAST
SERVICES AND TO REIMBURSE HIM FOR FUTURE SERVICES. HOWEVER,
BECAUSE OF CONCERNS NOTED ABOVE, PREFER TO REMUNERATE S/1 ONLY
FOR SERVICES ALREADY RENDERED. WHILE FIGURE OF \$1,272 DOES NOT
FULLY COMPENSATE S/1 AT GOING RATE FOR LAWYERS, HE IN FACT CON-
TACTED US AND CONTINUES TO HAVE HIS AND U/1'S REASONS FOR MAINTAINING
THAT CONTACT. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT REJECTION REFS
R AND X STATION OPS PROPOSALS WILL PROBABLY PRECLUDE ESTABLISHMENT
OUR CONTROL OVER S/1; WE NOT PREPARED MAKE COMMITMENTS
DESCRIBED AS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH SUCH CONTROL. ACCORDINGLY,
IF STATION BELIEVES \$1,000 REIMBURSEMENT FOR PAST SERVICES WOULD
IN AND BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, BELIEVE BEST COURSE WILL BE THAT
SUGGESTED PARA 5 REF A, WHICH IS TO CONTINUE CONTACT AS LONG AS
POSSIBLE ON NON-REMUNERATIVE BASIS.

7. SCOPE OF "WELL AND LESS THAN FAVORABLY KNOWN" COMMENT
(DIRECTOR 485999) IS HQS OFFICER WHO SERVED IN BEIRUT AND ONLY
THAT S/1 WAS IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS EMBASSY OFFICERS AND HAD
RATHER UNSAVORY REPUTATION AS INFLUENCE BROKER. THERE NO
SPECIFICS AND NOTHING CONCERNING S/1 IN RECENT HQS RECORDS TO
CONFIRM OR REFUTE ADMITTEDLY SUBJECTIVE RECOLLECTION.

8. JOSEPH W. ADERSICK, WHO WILL BE TRANSITING PARIS CIRCA
22-OCT 79 ON ANOTHER IRANIAN CASE WILL BE HAPPY DISCUSS S/1, U/1
AND OTHER CASES WITH STATION OFFICERS.

9. WE ARE RESEARCHING ANSWER TO PARA TWO 4, REF 5 QUESTION
AND WILL ADVISE.

10. FILE 201-982757; 201-981724. FWM 15OCT99 BRV DSC.1 ALL
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S E C R E T
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#015P

S E C R E T 231131Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 13712

TO: DIRECTOR INFC TRENZ

UNIDENTIFIED AJJJA SDSLIPEP/1 BUSY

REF: PARIS 13668

1979-10-31 12:00 PM U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975-353-314

1. ON 2 OCTOBER, UNBUSY/1 WAS ASKED TO DETERMINE THE RELATIONSHIP OF SDSLIPEP/1 TO ARCAD FAURE. UNBUSY/1 WAS TOLD THAT SDSLIPEP/1 WAS A JAPANESE EX-PARLIAMENTARIAN WHO MAINTAINED A LAW OFFICE IN PARIS WITHOUT BENEFIT OF FRENCH CITIZENSHIP AND WHO SAID HE AIMS TO DO SO THANKS TO INTERVENTION OF FAURE. UNBUSY/1 WAS ALSO ASKED TO DETERMINE (WITHIN LIMITS DICTATED BY A HEALTHY REGARD FOR HIS OWN SECURITY), WHAT SDSLIPEP/1 PRINCIPAL BUSINESS, CLIENTS, CONTACTS, SOURCES OF FUNDS AND REASON FOR ASSISTANCE WIGHT BE.

2. ON 19 OCTOBER UNBUSY/1 REPORTED, AFTER TALKING TO FAURE AND UNDESIGNATED ASSOCIATES OF FAURE, THAT:

A. FAURE ONLY SEES SDSLIPEP/1 ABOUT ONCE A WEEK, AND IS NOT FORTCOMING ABOUT THE REASON FOR THEIR RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER,

B. FAURE ASSOCIATE MICHEL ANTOINET SEES SDSLIPEP/1 FREQUENTLY;

C. SDSLIPEP/1 PUTS IT ABOUT THAT HE HAS CLOSE TIES TO THE AMERICANS;

D. SDSLIPEP/1 SPENDS A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY;

E. SDSLIPEP/1 IS CLOSE TO MUHAMMAD SHAEPI, A TUNISIAN CITIZEN WHO FUNCTIONS AS A CULTURAL ATTACHE OF THE QATAR EMBASSY IN PARIS. UNBUSY/1 SAID THAT SHAEPI IS A LEFTIST WHO WAS ONCE CONDEMNED TO DEATH IN TUNIS; WHO TRAVELS ON AN IRAQI PASSPORT; AND WHO IS CLOSE TO PID FIGURES FAYDUC FAHOUNI, SALAH HENAIAT, AND SAID EL-BESSAN. UNBUSY/1 ALSO SAYS THAT SHAEPI WORKS WITH A QATAR GROUP MOBILE IN BRANCH FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF. THIS GROUP IS HEADED BY UNCLIP/1 MOST PRINCIPAL ENVOY TO PERSIAN GULF PORTENTS IS NICOLAS LANG (IRAN) FORMERLY WORKS EMPLOYE

Abu byed

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PAGE 2 PARIS 13712 S E C R E T
AND DIRECTOR OF THE PUBLICATION PSE-QUEST. LANG, WHO FORMERLY WAS ACTIVE IN NEGOTIATING FRENCH ARMS SALES TO LIBYA IS NOW TRAVELLING REGULARLY TO TUNISIA ON SOME PROJECT HAVING TO DO WITH THE TUNISIAN TRADE UNIONS IN WHICH HE IS ASSISTED BY SHAEPI.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975-353-314

3. ON 17 OCT IN SDSLIPEP/1'S OFFICE, C/O ASKED SDSLIPEP/1 IF HE HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF A PERSONNAN NAMED FAURE WHO RESPONDED TO SHAEPI'S LIT IMPRISPS OF THE FRENCH ESTABLISHMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF. SDSLIPEP/1 SAID NO, PICKED UP THE PHONE AND IMMEDIATELY BOKE UP THE QUESTION TO SOMEONE WHOSE NAME HE IDENTIFIED AS NICOLAS LANG. SDSLIPEP/1 SAID THAT LANG HAD ASSURED HIM THAT NO SUCH PERSON WHO REPRESENTS THE ELYSSEE OR THE CHAI D'OCSEY AND SAID HE WOULD CHECK THE FOREIGN COMMERCE MINISTRY. SDSLIPEP/1 SAID THAT LANG WAS A MAN WHO DID REPRESENT THE FRENCH ESTABLISHMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, WHO WAS ASSOCIATED WITH UNCLIP/1 AND THE BANGU WORKS, AND WHO PROBABLY WAS CONNECTED WITH THE S.D.E.C.E.

4. PARIS HAS NO TRACES ON SHAEPI AND SHAEPI NOT LISTED IN FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY DIPLOMATIC LIST AS OFFICIAL OF QATAR EMBASSY.

5. FILE: 231-282267; 231-3947224; 231-728584. UNCLIP/1
100099 DRV-DC1.

S E C R E T
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S E C R E T 221171Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 13711

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

FM: RIYAT AJAJA SISLIIPPY WANEY

REF: PARIS 13712

IDEN IS UNRESPOND (BORN -LY WAS IST/14) WHO IDENTIFIED
IN MID-1975 BUT HIS JERUSALEM/IDENITY OF
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED IN PARIS AND EMIRATE
TRAVELS TO MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA.
BY 13 OCT 79 BY DEC.1.
CITE PARIS 13711

CITE PARIS 13711

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4 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1974-285344

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S E C R E T 111944Z SEP 79 STAFF

FM PARIS 1369

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR.

INTEL RIYAT AJAJA RTWINNER

1. PARIS STATION OFFICER TIMKEN (IDEN A FOR TEHRAN)
FUNCTIONALLY INTEGRATED AS (IDEN B FOR TEHRAN) HAS BEGUN
ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF IDEN C AS POTENTIAL CONDUIT
FOR SHELL TREATMENT OF NEWS ON IRAN, NAM, AND OTHER
EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN TOPICS. PARIS STATION ASSET
IDEN D FOR HEADQUARTERS) TOLD A FRIEND WHO IS CULTURAL
EDITOR OF IDEN C'S MAGAZINE THAT PERSON COVERING THIRD
WORLD FOR THIS MAGAZINE SHOULD MEET ASSET'S FRIEND TIMKEN
WHO COVERED SAME BEAT AND WAS A KNOWLEDGEABLE MATURICK TYPE
WHO CONSTANTLY DEPLORES THAT PROFESSIONAL ETHICS PRECLUDED
HIM FROM WRITING FOR PRESS WHICH, AT LEAST IN FRANCE, WAS
PROBABLY UNINFORMED ABOUT THIRD WORLD. OUR TENTATIVE
PLAN IS TO INDUCE IDEN C TO CULTIVATE TIMKEN AS POTENTIAL
SOURCE. TIMKEN HAS HAD ONLY ONE ENCOUNTER WITH
IDEN C, A DRINK AT HER PLACE WHICH WAS INTERRUPTED AFTER HALF-
HOUR BY ARRIVAL OF AFP CAMERAMAN WHO SEIZED TV FOOTAGE IN IRAN
DURING REVOLUTION. (HIS SISTER IS CULTURAL ADVISOR TO
FRENCH SERVICE OF RADIO PEKING.) TIMKEN WILL LUNCH IDEN C
ON 14 SEPTEMBER, AND SHE WILL DEPART FOR TEHRAN O/A
15 SEPTEMBER.

2. ACCORDING TO SDSLIIPPY/1, IDEN C BEGAN COVERING
IRANIAN OPPOSITION TO SHAH SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION
AND REMAINS ONE OF THREE FRENCH JOURNALISTS WHO WRITE OPINION
MAKING ARTICLES ON IRAN. HE ASSESSES IDEN C, WHOM HE HAS
MET ONLY ONCE HIMSELF, AS PROFESSIONALLY OBJECTIVE AND POLITI-
CALLY NOT NEARLY SO FAR TO THE LEFT AS THE RAG FOR WHICH SHE
WRITES. IDEN C CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY
EMBASSY PREVIOUSLY IN IRAN, BUT BELIEVES EVERYONE SHE KNEW
HAS LEFT. TIMKEN HAS GIVEN HER NAME OF PAO SHELLBERG AND
HAS SAID HE WOULD SEE WHAT HE COULD DO TO FACILITATE CONTACT
FOR IDEN C AT EMBASSY. GIVEN IDEN C LEFT WING CREDENTIALS

REF 2 PARIS 12269: S E C. IT SEEMS JUST POSSIBLE THAT.
D PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN I... CIRCUMSTANCES, STATION MIGHT GET
NEW UNDER CURRENT ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES, ADVISE PARIS IF
AND CONTACT WITH IDEN C. IF SO, ADVISE PARIS IF
IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE WITH IDEN C. AND COVER OF OFFICE. IF
NOT, IT WOULD FACILITATE OR DEVELOPMENT OF IDEN C. IF
BEHAW COULD ENSURE THAT SHELL TO HER THAT TIMELY APPROPRIATE
EFFECTOR SEES HER AND CONFIRMS THAT EMBASSY RECEIVED HER.
CT... IDEN B AND DID SUGGEST THAT EMBASSY RECEIVED HER.

3. PARIS STATION HAS REQUEST MADE
NUMBERS AND TEHRAN TRACES. NO TRACES IDEN C.
4. FILE DEFER. RW 11 SEP 99 DRV D9C1-

SECRET
26/3

SECRET 111645Z SEP 79 STAFF
PARIS 12270

IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR.
PARIS 12269

1. IDEN A REF IS EDWIN (TED) ATKINS. DEN. REF IS
DIPLOMATICAL SECTION OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR UNITED NATIONS AND
BILATERAL AFFAIRS. AND FOR NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. IDEN C
S ENISE MOURAD (HEN NAME) THIRD WORLD AFFAIRS EDITOR
FOR LEFTIST PARIS WEEKLY LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR. JOB: CIRCA
1941. FATHER IS INDIAN NATIONAL. OF SBT A MURKIN BIRTH.
MOURAD. A TURK. DIED WHEN MOURAD WAS TWO YEARS OLD. MOURAD
HAS RAISED IN FRANCE AND IS FRENCH NATIONAL. SHE SPEAKS
FRENCH AND ENGLISH. RW 11 SEP 99 DRV D9C1-
SECRET
22/0

23 SEP

SECRET 121523Z SEP 79 STAFF
PARIS 12317

PRIORITY TEHRAN, DIRECTOR
W/TEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER
A. PARIS 12269
B. PARIS 12270

1. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALS IDEN C REF B MA
ICAL SUBJECT 201-912772 WHO AKA DENIZE FUSSEIN
HEADQUARTERS REVIEW 201 AND ADVISE PARIS AND TEHRAN
PROPERTY ANY INFO PERTINENT TO SEE FIRM FOR DEVELOPMENT
OF ASSESSMENT DATA.

2. FILE DEFER. RVW 12 SEP 89. DRV D9C.1.
SECRET

3 SEP 79 1248

13 SEP 79 1250

SECRET 122105Z SEP 79 STAFF
CITE DIRECTOR 512138.
TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS, TEHRAN.
W/INTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER UNPOLO
REF: PARIS 12269

1. IDEN A IS UNPOLO/1, FORMER PARIS STATION RECRUITMENT
TARGET WHO WAS UNDER PARALLEL CULTIVATION IN 1973 BY STATION
CASE OFFICER CLYDE W. TRICHILO (IDEN B) AND BY UNSQUIB/1 AS
POTENTIAL FI AGENT ON CHINA AND NE TARGETS. UNPOLO/1 AS
RECRUITMENT, INCLUDING SALARY, IN NOVEMBER 1973 BUT RENEGED ON
MONTH LATER ON BASIS IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT. IN NOTE TO CASE
OFFICER SHE STATED: "THE IDEA SEEMED EXCITING, BUT I FINALLY
REALIZED IT WAS GOING DEEPLY AGAINST MY FEELINGS....IT WOULD BE
A CONSTANT STRUGGLE IN MY MIND. UNPOLO/1 WAS AWARE THAT SHE
WAS IN CONTACT WITH RTACTION IN PARIS AND IN ISLAMABAD. OPERA-
TIONAL APPROVAL WAS CANCELLED IN APRIL 1979.

2. ONLY RECENT INFO IN UNPOLO/1 201 IS SEPTEMBER 1978 DOCU-
MENT EXTRACT REPORTING UNPOLO MEMBERSHIP IN RADICAL OR TROTSKY
FICTION OF TUDEH PARTY AND HER PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITIES OF
IRANIAN STUDENTS IN PARIS. WE WILL REQUEST FULL TEXT OF DOCUMENT
AND ADVISE IF THERE ARE FURTHER DETAILS OF INTEREST TO REPORT.
WILL ALSO REVIEW RESTRICTED CI FOLDER ON UNPOLO/1.

3. IN LIGHT ABOVE, STATION MAY WISH REVIEW UNPOLO/1'S OPS
BACKGROUND BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH APPROACH TO HRR.
4. FILE: 201-912772. RVW 12 SEPT 89. DRV D9C.1. SECRET.

SECRET

S E C R E T 122122Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 512146.

TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS, TEHRAN.

WINTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER

REF DIRECTOR 512138

1. IDENTITIES ARE:

A. KENIZE MOURAD AKH KENIZE HUSSSEIN (201-912772), BORN CA 1944 IN INDIA. NATURALIZED FRENCH CITIZEN. SHE IS ALLEGED DAUGHTER OF INDIAN MUSLIM MAJARAJA HUSSEIN KHAWARA, AND TURKISH MOTHER. FATHER'S FAMILY MOVED TO PAKISTAN AT TIME OF PARTITION AND TOOK PAKISTANI NATIONALITY. MOTHER LEFT FATHER SOON AFTER MARRIAGE AND MOVED TO PARIS. KENIZE REARED BY CATHOLIC SISTERS FROM EARLY CHILDHOOD AFTER DEATH OF HER MOTHER. AT SOME POINT SHE WAS TAKEN UNDER WING OF SWISS DIPLOMAT WHO AMBASSADOR TO PEKING 1959-54. KENIZE HAS BEEN JOURNALIST FOR "LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR" SINCE 1972. PREVIOUSLY TRAVELLED FOR ONE YEAR IN INDIA TEACHING FRENCH AND WRITING FRENCH. PRIOR TO INDIA TRIP WAS STEWARDESS FOR AIR FRANCE FOR TWO YEARS. KENIZE HAS NEPHEW WHO IN LATE 1972 APPOINTED THIRD SECRETARY PAKISTAN EMBASSY IN PARIS. AT THAT TIME SHE ALSO HAD VERY WIDE ACQUAINTANCE AMONG INDIAN, PAKISTANI, AND BANGLADESH COMMUNITIES AND DIPLOMATS AND APPARENTLY SOME CHINESE CONTACTS AS WELL.

B. CHARLES A. MELTON.

2. FILE: 201-912772. RVW 12 SEPT 99. DRV D9C.1. SECRET.

S E C R E T

117

15 SEP 79 212

S E C R E T 141536Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12387 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR

WINTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER UNPOLO

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 512138

B. TEHRAN 54198

C. PARIS 12269

D. PARIS 12270

E. PARIS 12374

1. SUBJECT: REFS DEPARTS PARIS 14 SEP, ARRIVING TEHRAN 1400 LOCAL SAME DAY. SEE TRAVELLING ON FRENCH PASSPORT WITHOUT VISA AND WILL NOT SAY SHE JOURNALIST ON ENTERING COUNTRY UNLESS ASKED. HER FIRST MOVE WILL BE TO PHONE PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN WHO SHE SAYS IS OLD FRIEND. SHE ALSO KNOWS NASIR MIYACHI (WHOM SHE PROFFESSES PRIVATELY TO DEFEAT AND HOPES HE WILL ASSIST IN ASSURING SHE IS ALLOWED TO GATHER NEWS. SHE PLANS RETURN PARIS CIRCA 5 OCTOBER IF SHE IS NOT EXPELLED SOONER. SHE VOLUNTEERED TO BRIEF PARIS C/O ON IRAN WHEN SHE RETURNS.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE TEHRAN STATION REQUESTING THAT MR. GRAVES RECEIVE UNPOLO/1 AND EXTEND WHATEVER COURTESIES MAY BE NORMAL IN DIFFICULT TEHRAN EMBASSY SITUATION. YOU MAY TELL MR. GRAVES THAT UNPOLO/1 IS UNDER ASSESSMENT BY PARIS C/O (AS IDENTIFIED REF D) AS POTENTIAL SOURCE OF INTRODUCTION TO LEFTIST JOURNALISTS AND INTELLECTUALS IN PARIS, AND THAT C/O WOULD LIKE TO GAIN CREDIT WITH SUBJECT FOR WHATEVER COURTESIES MR. GRAVES CAN EXTEND. YOU SHOULD ASSURE MR. GRAVES THAT C/O HAS NOT BROKEN COVER WITH UNPOLO/1 YOU MAY ADD THAT UNPOLO/1 ON SHORT ACQUAINTANCE DOES NOT SEEM HOSTILE TOWARD UNITED STATES OR OUR INTERESTS. THE MAGAZINE FOR WHICH SHE WRITES IS SOCIALIST, BUT NOT COMMUNIST LEANING, AND NOT A KNEE-JERK OPPONENT OF OUR INTERESTS. UNPOLO/1 PLANS TRY TO DO PIECE ON HOW MAN IN STREET IS FEELING IN NEW IRAN. SHE IS, OF COURSE, ALSO ANXIOUS TO GAIN INSIGHT INTO STATE OF MINORITIES, MILITARY, AND LEFT.

PAGE 2 PARIS 12387 S E C R E T

3. FOR DIRECTOR: FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC AND ASSESSMENT DATA OBTAINED AT LUNCH 13 SEPTEMBER:
A. UNPOLO/1 SAID SHE WAS FRENCH BY VIRTUE OF HAVING BEEN BORN IN PARIS, AND COULD LEGITIMATELY OBTAIN PAKISTANI OR INDIAN PASSPORT BUT HAS NOT DONE SO IN ORDER NOT TO PREJUDICE HER FRENCH NATIONALITY. SHE SAID HER FATHER REMAINED IN INDIA AND ASSUMED INDIAN NATIONALITY BECAUSE HE OPPOSED PARTITION AND OWNED LAND IN WHAT BECAME INDIA, WHEREAS THE REST OF HIS FAMILY WENT TO PAKISTAN.

B. UNPOLO/1 SAID SHE WAS CLOSE TO MUHAMMED ALI BHUTTO FAMILY AND REGARDS ZIA AS BOMBICIDAL MANIAC WHO WILL FURNISH NUCLEAR BOMB TO SOME ARAB COUNTRY AS SOON AS HE GETS HIS HANDS ON ONE. WERE IT NOT FOR BHUTTO CONNECTION SHE MIGHT HAVE TAKEN UP OPTION FOR DUAL NATIONALITY LAST YEAR BECAUSE SHE SOUGHT AND ALMOST GOT JOB IN U.N. PRESS OFFICE NEW YORK WHICH SHE FEELS SHE MIGHT HAVE HAD IF SHE HAD BEEN CONSIDERED PAK INSTEAD OF FRENCH. SHE MUCH WANTED TO LIVE IN NEW YORK, AND PLANS VACATION THERE AFTER IRAN TRIP.

C. SUBJECT DESCRIBES LUTFALLAH'S U L A Y M A I N AS HER "BEST FRIEND". SULAYMAN IS AN OLD AND GOOD FRIEND OF TIMKEN WHO HAS NOT, HOWEVER, RECONTACTED SULAYMAN IN PARIS FOR LACK OF AN ADDRESS OR PHONE NUMBER. SHE SAYS SULAYMAN IS NOW WORKING AT PARIS ARAB LEAGUE OFFICE IN PUBLIC RELATIONS CAPACITY, BUT HE HAS AGED AND IS NOT WELL HEART TROUBLE. SULAYMAN, CO-FOUNDER WIFE HENRI C U R T E L OF ORIGINAL (HEADITU) EGYPTIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, WAS EXPELLED THEREFROM IN 1949 FOR TROTSKYITE DEVIATIONISM. UNPOLO/1 ASSOCIATION WITH SULAYMAN (NOT A TROTSKYITE, BUT TOO COMMUNIST TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY MODERN COMMUNIST PARTY) MIGHT HAVE LED HER INTO ASSOCIATION WITH OTHERS LABELED TROTSKYITES.

D. SUBJECT "COUSIN" (PERHAPS IDENTICAL TO OR FATHER OF NEPHEW CITED REF A) IS IQBAL AHMAD A K H U N D, PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR TO PARIS WHO, SHE SAYS, IS RESIGNING TO TAKE THE TOP UNITED NATIONS JOB CONCERNED WITH THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM.

4. WITH REGARD TO IRANIAN AFFAIRS, UNPOLO/1 MADE THE

PAGE 3 PARIS 12387 S E C R E T

FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

A. BAKHTIAR LEFT IRAN BY HELICOPTER THE DAY KHOMEINY RETURNED. HE IS HOPELESSLY FRENCH, EXCEPT FOR HIS INDULGENCE IN OPIUM, AND WILL NEVER UNDERSTAND THE IRANIAN PEOPLE WELL ENOUGH TO LEAD THEM. HIS POLITICAL REBIRTH IN PARIS IN AUGUST EXCITED NOBODY IN IRAN. HIS NOMINATION OF A DISREPUTABLE FIGURE LIKE JAWADH AL-AMIR AS HIS SPOKESMAN ALLENATED SO MANY EMIGRE IRANIANS THAT BAKHTIAR HAS NOW HAD TO DISOWN AL-AMIR.

B. AL-AMIR IS A FORMER MOVIE AND TELEFILM PRODUCER WHO WAS WIDELY BELIEVED, DURING THE SHAH'S REGIME, TO HAVE EXTENSIVE SAVAK CONNECTIONS. AL-AMIR NOW PRETENDS TO HAVE ENDURED IMPRISONMENT FOR OPPOSING THE SHAH BUT, IN FACT, AL-AMIR WAS SENTENCED TO EIGHT YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR RAPING HIS OWN NIECE, AND WAS RELEASED AFTER SERVING ONLY TWO. HE COMMANDS NO RESPECT. UNPOLO/1 ATTRIBUTED THIS ALLEGATION TO VERY RELIABLE IRANIAN LEGAL SOURCES.

C. THERE ARE CURRENTLY TWO IRANIAN OPPOSITION PERIODICALS PUBLISHED IN PARIS: IRAN LIBRE, PUBLISHED IN FRENCH BY THE MONARCHISTS; AND NAFEH ROUZ (THE DAILY LETTER) PUBLISHED BY AWAD AL-AMIR.

D. KARIM SAJADI IS IN THE UNITED STATES UNDERGOING MEDICAL TREATMENT. SUBJECT DESCRIBES HIM AS HALF "GAGA" AND UNACCEPTABLE TO MANY BECAUSE HE FAVORED A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY UNTIL HE WAS SURE KHOMEINY WOULD WIN.

E. HIDAYAT MAJID A F T A R I HAS OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL, BUT IS HIDING SOMEWHERE - AFRAID FOR HIS LIFE.

F. WITH THE DEATH OF AYATOLLAH T E L E G H A N I, THE IRANIAN LEFT HAS LOST ITS LAST BUFFER WITH THE REGIME. AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI CAN BE EXPECTED TO URGE REASON ON KHOMEINY, BUT IS A CONSERVATIVE AT HEART AND WILL SPEND HIS POLITICAL CAPITAL ONLY ON BEHALF OF HIS CONSTITUENTS IN AZERBAIJAN. THUS, THE LEFT IS EXPOSED AND IN DISARRAY. ONLY THE GUERRILLA GROUP SURVIVE AND THEY CANNOT SEIZE OR HOLD POWER.

BT
#2387

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT *file*

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY: IRAN UAR YUGOSLAVIA REPORT NO.
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE EFFORTS BY PRESIDENT TITO TO RESTORE IRANIAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. DATE OF REPORT: 6 AUGUST 1966
NO. PAGES
REFERENCES
DATE OF INFO: EARLY JUNE 1966
PLACE & DATE ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN /3 AUGUST 1966/ NIT -7163

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE; APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A LAYMAN WHO IS A TRUSTED CONFIDANT OF MANY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS. HE IS ALSO CLOSE TO POLITICAL OPPOSITION LEADERS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF IRAN. ALTHOUGH HE HAS SELDOM REPORTED ON POLITICAL OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES, HIS INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN RELIGIOUS CIRCLES HAS USUALLY BEEN ACCURATE. HE OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION DURING A CONVERSATION WITH AYATOLLAH HAJI MOHAMMAD TAQI QOMI, SHIA SECT REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO CAIRO. QOMI HAD TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABBAS ARAM ON 31 JULY 1966.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER ARAM STATED THAT DURING THE SHAH'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT TITO IN YUGOSLAVIA IN EARLY JUNE 1966, THE SHAH HAD COMPLAINED TO TITO THAT IT WAS NOT EASY TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH UAR PRESIDENT JAMAL ABD AL-NASIR. TITO ANSWERED THAT HE WAS SURE HE COULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO RE-ESTABLISH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND EGYPT. /FIELD COMMENT - NIT-7157 REPORTED THAT THE SHAH HAD TOLD QOMI THAT QUIET NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERWAY TO RESTORE IRANIAN-EGYPTIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE SHAH DID NOT SPECIFY, HOWEVER, THE CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BEING CONDUCTED./ TITO ADVISED THE SHAH TO EXERCISE MODERATION VIS-A-VIS NASIR.

2. ACCORDING TO ARAM, TITO ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE HOPED BOTH IRAN AND PAKISTAN WOULD EVENTUALLY JOIN THE RANKS OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS.

/END/

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

101

PAGE 4 PARIS 12387 **SECRET**
UNPOLO/1 OBSERVED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE AN EFFOR
ON THE PART OF SOME OF THE LEBANESE SHIA TO ESTABLISH A
WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION, WHICH SHE
DID NOT QUITE UNDERSTAND. (THIS UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTS
IMPRESSION GIVEN HER BY SDSLIPPERY/1) TO WHOM SHE WAS INTRO-
DUCED ON 4 SEP BY NESSIM KHURJI OF PARIS ARABIC PAPER AL-
MUSTAQBAL (A.L.). G/O OBSERVED THAT NATURAL INTERESTS OF
LEBANESE SHIA WOULD SEEM TO CALL FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH
KHOMEINI REGIME, BUT PERHAPS THIS REFLECTED RESISTANCE TO
PALESTINIAN INFLUENCE ON THE PART OF SOME FACTION OF
LEBANESE SHITES, PERHAPS ELEMENTS FROM SOUTH (WHICH WOULD
EXCLUDE SDSLIPPERY/1) ALIGNED WITH HADDAD FORCES.

5. WE NOTE THAT UNPOLO/1 COMMENT ON DATE OF BAKHTIA
INFILTRATION FROM IRAN IS AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT SDSTAY HAS
REPORTED AND WHAT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED. WE ALSO NOTE AL-
AMIR'S EXPLANATION (PARIS 95324) OF HIS SENTENCE FOR RAPE
AND UNSOBER/1'S FAVORABLE IMPRESSION OF HIM, AS WELL AS
AL-AMIR'S IMPOSSIBLE ASSERTION IN PARA 2 OF SAME MESSAGE
THAT BAKHTIAR HAD NO REAL CONTACTS IN PARIS IN JANUARY 79,
AND AL-AMIR'S CONFIDANT ASSERTION THAT KHOMENI HAD ENJOYED
PROTECTION OF SAVAK GENERAL TAYMUR BAKHTIAR WHICH MIGHT BE
SLANDER OR INDICATION THAT AL-AMIR HAD PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO
SAVAK HIMSELF. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO LEARN WHAT MAY BE AVAILABLE
FROM OPERATIONAL AND RESTRICTED CI FOLDERS ON UNPOLO/1 WHICH
BEARS ON ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR HER OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION
AS POTENTIAL UNWITTING CONDUIT FOR SELECTED LWSHELL
MATERIAL.

6. FILE: 201-912772; INDEX: LUTFALLAH SULAYMAN (201-
1); IZBAL AHMED AHUND, PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT RELATED
TO UNPOLO/1; LAWAD AL AMIR (PARAS 4 A. AND 6 SHOULD APPEAR ON
PAGE); NAMEE BROUZ AND IRAN LIBRE, IRANIAN OPPOSITION PUBLI-
CATIONS FOUNDED IN PARIS IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1979; KARIM
SANJABI; HIJABAT MATIN-DASTARI. RWV 14SEP69 DRV D9C1.

SECRET
BT
#2387

100

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY: IRAN/EGYPT
DOI : EARLY-MID-DECEMBER 1974
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO ENSURE COOPERATION
OF EGYPTIAN CLERGY DURING SHAH OF IRAN'S STATE
VISIT TO EGYPT

ACQ : IRAN, TEHRAN (2 JANUARY 1975) FIELD NO. NIT-9430
SOURCE : A LAYMAN WHO IS A TRUSTED CONFIDANT OF MANY IRANIAN
RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND FORMER POLITICAL OPPOSITION
LEADERS. HIS OCCASIONAL REPORTING ON POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS HAS USUALLY BEEN ACCURATE, BUT AT
TIMES IS BIASED AGAINST THE PRESENT REGIME. HE
OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A SENIOR IRANIAN
RELIGIOUS LEADER.

1. IN MID-DECEMBER 1974, NOTED IRANIAN SHI'A RELIGIOUS
LEADER, AYATOLLAH KHAH MUHAMMAD TAQI Q U M I, DEPARTED TEHRAN
FOR CAIRO AT THE REQUEST OF EGYPTIAN MINISTER OF STATE FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MUHAMMAD SAMIH A N W A R AND IRANIAN PRIME
MINISTER AMIR ABAS H O V E Y D A TO ASSIST IN WINNING THE
COOPERATION OF EGYPTIAN CLERICAL LEADERS IN CONNECTION WITH
THE UPCOMING STATE VISIT TO EGYPT BY THE SHAH AND EMPRESS
K OF IRAN.

2. IN EARLY DECEMBER 1974, QUMI RECEIVED A PERSONAL
LETTER FROM MINISTER OF STATE ANWAR. IN THIS LETTER ANWAR

REQUESTED THAT QUMI VISIT CAIRO BEGINNING IN MID-DECEMBER
1974 IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE 8-12 JANUARY
1975 VISIT TO EGYPT BY THE SHAH AND EMPRESS. QUMI WAS
ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, ESPECIALLY
THOSE AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM CLERGY WOULD
BE PRESENT. ANWAR ALSO ASKED QUMI TO ENCOURAGE THE EGYPTIAN
CLERGY TO ATTEND ALL THE PLANNED ACTIVITIES SO AS TO LEND
THE IMPRESSION THAT EX EGYPTIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD NO
MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE SHAH'S POLICIES.

3. SHORTLY AFTER RECEIVING THE ANWAR LETTER, QUMI
WAS CALLED TO AN INTERVIEW WITH IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER
HOVEYDA. HOVEYDA REVEALED HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTICULARS
OF THE ANWAR LETTER TO QUMI AND REQUESTED THAT QUMI COMPLY
WITH ANWAR'S REQUEST. HE ASKED QUMI TO DO EVERYTHING IN
HIS POWER ^{TO} ENSURE THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE EGYPTIAN
CLERGY ~~IN~~ DURING THE SHAH'S VISIT.

4. QUMI WAS RELUCTANT TO MAKE THE TRIP, BUT HE STATED
TO A CLOSE CONFIDANT THAT THE PRESSURE FOR HIM TO COMPLY
WAS SIMPLY TOO GREAT TO RESIST. QUMI TOLD THE CONFIDANT
THAT HE PLANS TO REMAIN IN CAIRO FOR A FULL TWO MONTHS.

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT TEHRAN: SENT TO CAIRO
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION
CATEGORY 5B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION.

PARIS 031100 MAY 79 STAFF

PARIS 98854

TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

TEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT

UNTROUT/1 MET WITH SON OF SDFORGIVE/1 ON 2 APRIL DURING THE MEETING, SDFORGIVE/1 PASSED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO UNTROUT/1.

SOMETIME AROUND THE IRANIAN (15-20 MARCH, UNTROUT/1), SDFORGIVE/1 WAS ARRESTED AND DETAINED FOR APPROXIMATELY HALF AN HOUR BY THE KOMITESH. KHALKHALE, A MULLAH, (COMMENTARY) WAS A PROMINENT MEMBER OF THE KOMITESH AND TOOK SDFORGIVE/1'S SPORTS BELONGINGS AND HIS DAUGHTER. UNTROUT/1 FIRMED THE EQUIVALENT OF USD 7,000 BELONGING TO THE HIGH-LEVEL MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING SDFORGIVE/1 AND INDICATED THAT KHALKHALE WAS STRIPPED OF HIS LEADERSHIP OF THE KOMITESH, BUT WAS GIVEN ANOTHER POSITION. SDFORGIVE/1 DID NOT MENTION THIS DEPARTURE FROM TEHRAN, BUT SPECIFICALLY HUMILIATED BY THE INCIDENT AND HE ADDED THAT SDFORGIVE/1 ALWAYS OPERATED MORE OR LESS PRIVATE PERSON AND THEREFORE, NOT WANT PUBLIC EXPOSURE.

TO DATE, SDFORGIVE/1'S PASSPORT HAS BEEN RETURNED. UNTROUT/1 IS DETERMINED TO LEAVE IRAN AND DO SO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNTROUT/1 STATED THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD OBVIOUSLY NEED SOME ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING

3 Aug 79

PARIS 0311425Z AUG 79 STAFF

PARIS 12014

TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

TEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

TEHRAN 54063

DURING 30 AUGUST MEETING WITH UNTROUT/1, MARINOS TOLD UNTROUT/1 THAT SDFORGIVE/1'S PHONE HAD BEEN TAPPED. UNTROUT/1 SAID THAT KHOMEINI WOULD NEVER OFFER THE POSITION OF REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR TO SDFORGIVE/1. UNTROUT/1 STATED THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD TURN DOWN THE JOB OFFER.

UNTROUT/1 REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS COMMENTS ON THE LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND SDFORGIVE/1. UNTROUT/1 SAID THAT KHOMEINI WOULD NEVER OFFER THE POSITION OF REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR TO SDFORGIVE/1. UNTROUT/1 STATED THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD TURN DOWN THE JOB OFFER.

UNTROUT/1 TOLD MARINOS IN APRIL 1979 THAT SDFORGIVE/1'S PHONE HAD BEEN TAPPED. HE BASED HIS OPINION ON THE FACT THAT SDFORGIVE/1'S TELEPHONE SERVICE HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED REPEATEDLY PRIOR TO THE TIME HE WAS ARRESTED AND DETAINED BY SADEGH KHALKHALE'S KOMITESH IN APRIL 1979 (SEE PARIS 98834, BEING RELAYED TO UNTROUT/1 ON THE DAY THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WAS DETAINED). HIS PHONE WAS OUT OF ORDER FOR THE ENTIRE DAY. IN ADDITION, SDFORGIVE/1'S SON (WHO WAS IN TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH HIS FATHER WHILE HE WAS IN PARIS) TOLD UNTROUT/1 THAT HE DID NOT CALL HIS FATHER AT HIS HOME. RATHER, HE CALLED A RELATIVE IN TEHRAN WHO PASSED MESSAGES TO BOTH PARTIES. UNTROUT/1 ASSUMED THAT THE TAPPING WAS DONE BY PRO-KHOMEINI ELEMENTS. WHILE ABOVE IS CERTAINLY NOT HARD EVIDENCE, UNTROUT/1 IS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THIS IS THE CASE.

FILE: 201-2279932. RWV 31 AUG 89 DAV D9C.1.

SECRET 311426Z AUG 79 STAFF
PARIS 12015
TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR
EL AJAJA UNTROUT SD ORG
PARIS 12014
IDENTITY IS: MOHAMAD TACH
R/T

SECRET 312220Z AUG 79 STAFF
CITE DIRECTOR 506277.
TO TEHRAN INFO PARIS.
WNA NTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFO GIVE
REFS: A. TEHRAN 54063
B. PARIS 11916

1. SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT SDFO GIVE/S/1 (S/1) WILL BE WILLING TO HAVE ANY SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH SDFORWARD/1 (F/1). HE WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO DO SO EVEN IN PRESENCE OF UNTROUT/1 (T/1) AND GIVEN EVENTS OF PAST SIX MONTHS, WILL PROBABLY DO LITTLE MORE THAN RECEIVE F/1. WE COULD WITH TEHRAN'S COMMENTS THAT S/1 IS STILL OF HIGH OPS INTEREST, BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES OF MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH HIM, WE LESS SURE WE ABLE MAKE ARGUMENT FOR MAJOR EFFORT AGAINST THIS TARGET.

2. AS ADDRESSES AWARE, PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH S/1 WAS THROUGH T/1 WHO WOULD, MONTHS AGO, TRIP FROM PARIS TO TEHRAN TO MAKE MEETINGS, BE DEBRIEFED BY STATION OFFICER AND RETURN TO PARIS. SUCH TRIPS WERE OBVIOUSLY BURDEN FOR AGING T/1 AND HIS BEING STUCK IN TEHRAN IN AFTERMATH OF FEBRUARY REVOLUTION FURTHER COMPLICATED PROBLEM. FOR ALL OF THAT, WE MUST REALISTICALLY CONCLUDE THAT T/1 REMAINS ONLY VIABLE ROUTE TO S/1 IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AND DO NOT BELIEVE S/1 VIABLE ALTERNATIVE. WOULD LIKE SUGGEST, PENDING TEHRAN'S CONCURRENCE, PARIS DETERMINE T/1'S WILLINGNESS FOR TRAVEL TO TEHRAN TO AGAIN SEE S/1. NO COMMITMENT TO SUCH TRAVEL SHOULD BE MADE IF RESULTS SUCH APPROACH T/1 POSITIVELY AND TEHRAN CONTINUES VIEW S/1 HIGH PRIORITY TARGET. WE WILL CONSIDER PROPOSAL HAVE T/1 RETURN TEHRAN FOR MEETING WITH AND DEBRIEFING OF S/1. T/1 WOULD, OF COURSE, ATTEMPT DETERMINE S/1'S RECEPTIVITY SUCH MEETING, PRIOR T/1'S DEPARTURE FROM PARIS.

3. HQS DID NOT RECEIVE REF A IDEN. PLEASE RETRANSMIT.

4. FILE: 201-2243-05; 201-0070932. RVN 31AUG99 DRV D9C

SECRET
BT
#2567

8 SEP 79

SECRET 05059Z SEP 79 STAFF
PARIS 12067
TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR
DE AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE
A. DIRECTOR 506277
B. TEHRAN 54102

1. ALTHOUGH PARIS WILL DETERMINE UNTROUT/1'S WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL TO TEHRAN TO MEET WITH SDFORGIVE/1, WE ARE NOT SURE HE WOULD BE AMENABLE TO SUCH A TRIP. IN ADDITION, UNTROUT/1 MAY BE A BIT RELUCTANT TO CONTACT SDFORGIVE/1 SINCE HE HAS HEARD NOTHING RECENTLY FROM SDFORGIVE/1. UNTROUT/1 WOULD HAVE INITIATED CONTACT IF DESIRED CONTACT WITH HIM, HE WOULD HAVE INITIATED CONTACT.

2. PARIS WAS RECEIVED NO FOLLOW-UP REPORTING ON SECURITY INCIDENT IN TEHRAN IN WHICH DOCUMENTS WERE LEFT IN EMBASSY COMMISSARY. DID REPORT ON THIS INCIDENT CONFIRM STATEMENT IN TEHRAN 526681 AT "THERE IS NO WAY UNTROUT/1'S IDENTITY WOULD BE DISCOVERED FROM COMPROMISED NOTES?" IF THIS WAS FINAL CONCLUSION REGARDING THIS INCIDENT, THERE SHOULD BE NO SECURITY PROBLEMS RELATED TO UNTROUT/1 TRAVEL TO TEHRAN.

3. BEFORE BRINGING UP SUBJECT OF FUTURE TRAVEL TO TEHRAN WITH UNTROUT/1, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION OF LOCATION AND POSITION OF SDFORGIVE/1. IT IS UNTROUT/1'S UNDERSTANDING THAT SDFORGIVE/1 IS IN TEHRAN, NOT MASHAD. UNTROUT/1 TOLD PARINOS ON 30 AUGUST THAT THERE ARE TWO AYATOLLAS WHOSE SURNAMES ARE SIMILAR OR IDENTICAL TO THAT OF SDFORGIVE/1. HE STATED THAT ONE OF THESE MEN WAS IN MASHAD. TIMMER OBTAINED IDENTITY AND POSITION OF SDFORGIVE/1 IS IN MASHAD. UNLESS THIS INFORMATION ON IDENTIFY FROM SDSUPPERY/1, UNLESS SDFORGIVE/1 IS IN A POSITION TO FURNISH SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION, SEE NO MERIT IN UNTROUT/1 TRAVEL TO TEHRAN.

FILE: 201-2079932. RVM 4 SEP 79 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET

SECRET 051100Z SEP 79 STAFF
PARIS 12068
TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR
DE AJAJA UNTR SDFORGIVE
REF: PARIS 12067
IDENTITY IS:

MASSAN Q O M I, COUSIN OF MAHDI RUHANI
THE IMAN OF THE SHI'A COMMUNITY IN
EUROPE. RVM 4 SEP 79 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET

1 SEP 79

SECRET 181535Z SEP 79 STAFF

SITE PARIS 12208

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

MINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

- REFS: A. DIRECTOR 509E25
- B. TEHRAN 54126

1. MARINOS MET WITH UNTROUT/1 ON 10 SEPTEMBER AND SECURED HIS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO RETURN TO TEHRAN FOR MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1. PRIOR TO MAKING FINAL DECISION, HOWEVER, UNTROUT/1 WOULD APPRECIATE ASSURANCE THAT REACTION WOULD BE WILLING AND ABLE TO FACILITATE HIS EXIT FROM IRAN IF HE SHOULD HAVE DIFFICULTIES IN LEAVING.

2. UNTROUT/1 LEARNED 10 SEPTEMBER THAT MINISTRY OF FINANCE HAS CONTINUED TO DEPOSIT HIS BASE SALARY INTO HIS TEHRAN BANK ACCOUNT IN SPITE FACT HE HAS DONE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING SINCE THE REVOLUTION. MINISTRY HAS DEPOSITED ABOUT US \$1000 IN UNTROUT/1'S ACCOUNT IN THE LAST FIVE MONTHS. BECAUSE OF THIS, UNTROUT/1 WILL HAVE TO OBTAIN MINISTRY APPROVAL TO WITHDRAW FROM TEHRAN. AS ADDEES RECALL, THIS WAS MAJOR PROBLEM ENCOUNTERED DURING UNTROUT/1'S LAST TRIP TO TEHRAN AND RETARDED HIS RETURN TO PARIS. AS MINISTRY PAYING UNTROUT/1, HE WANTS TO KNOW THERE POSSIBILITY THEY MAY ASK HIM STAY IN TEHRAN TO WORK AND REFUSE ISSUANCE REQUISITE PAPERS. IN THIS EVENT, UNTROUT/1 WOULD NEED ASSISTANCE IN EXITING THE COUNTRY. THIS ASSISTANCE IS WORST CASE SITUATION, BUT BELIEVE UNTROUT/1'S REQUESTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

3. UNTROUT/1 HAS ALSO AGAIN ASKED FOR REACTION ASSISTANCE IN REMOVING MONEY FROM IRAN. ASSUMING HE TRAVELS TO TEHRAN, REQUEST TEHRAN CONCURRENCE AND HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL TO MAKE ACCOMMODATION CONVERSION OF RIALS EQUIVALENT USD TO 200 TO FRENCH FRANCS FOR UNTROUT/1. CONVERSION COULD BE MADE IN SAME MANNER AS PREVIOUS TRANSACTION, I.E., UNTROUT/1 WOULD PASS RIALS TO TEHRAN CASE OFFICER WHO WOULD

SECRET 12208 SECRET

4. AMOUNT (ACCORDING TO EXCHANGE RATE AT THE TIME) TO PARIS WOULD IN TURN PASS CASH TO UNTROUT/1 FOR DEPOSIT IN HIS PARIS ACCOUNT. IF, FOR SOME REASON, UNTROUT/1 UNABLE TRAVEL TO TEHRAN, WOULD STILL APPRECIATE TEHRAN ASSISTANCE IN MAKING ACCOMMODATION CONVERSION. UNTROUT/1 MENTIONED HE COULD SEND PERSONAL CHECK TO SOMEONE IN TOUCH WITH TEHRAN STATION, SUCH AS SDFORGIVE/1, WHO WOULD THEN PASS CASH TO TEHRAN CASE OFFICER.

4. BELIEVE POSITIVE RESPONSES TO PARA 2 AND 3 ABOVE WILL ENSURE POSITIVE RESPONSES TO UNTROUT/1'S PART TO TRAVEL TO TEHRAN. ONE REMAINING PROBLEM IS SDFORGIVE/1'S WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH UNTROUT/1. UNTROUT/1 IS WILLING TELEPHONE SDFORGIVE/1 DIRECTLY FROM PARIS TO OBTAIN READING ON HIS FEELINGS ABOUT SUCH MEETINGS. UNTROUT/1 IS CONFIDENT CONVERSATION CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY DOUBLE-TALKED SO AS NOT TO RAISE SECURITY PROBLEM. SECOND OPTION IS HAVE UNTROUT/1 CONTACT SON OF SDFORGIVE/1 IN PARIS WHO WOULD IN TURN ADVISE US ON BEHALF OF UNTROUT/1. ALTHOUGH THIS OPTION WOULD BE LESS CONTROL OVER CONTACT, BELIEVE IT DOES HAVE MERIT, GIVEN THE MORE SECURE MEANS OF CONTACT BETWEEN SDFORGIVE/1 AND HIS SON THAN BETWEEN SDFORGIVE/1 AND UNTROUT/1. WILL INITIATE DIRECT CONTACT WITH SDFORGIVE/1. UNTROUT/1 WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS ON PREFERRED METHOD OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN UNTROUT/1 AND SDFORGIVE/1.

5. NEXT CONTACT WITH UNTROUT/1 IS 0930 HOURS LOCAL TIME. WOULD APPRECIATE RESPONSES TO ABOVE ITEMS BY COB 13 SEPTEMBER.

6. FILE: 201-6079932. RWW 10 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET

12 SEP 79

SECRET 121167 SEP 79 STAFF

CHIEF DIRECTOR 511343.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

WNTTEL AJAJA UNTR0UT SDFORGIVE

REFS: A. PARIS 12108
B. DIRECTOR 509828
C. TEHRAN 51190

1. UNTR0UT/1 (T/1) SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE TRIP TO TEHRAN UNLESS HE CAN CONFIRM SOME WAY THAT MEETING WITH SD- AS TO MEANS BY WHICH HE CAN CONFIRM SUCH MEETING.

2. REGRET WE ARE UNABLE COMMIT REACTION TO FACILITATING TRIP FROM TEHRAN IN EVENT HE HAS TROUBLE LEAVING. PRESUME T/1 WOULD BE WILLING TO FACILITATE TRIP IN SOME MANNER. BELIEVE TEHRAN SERVICES AT THIS POINT.

3. HQ CAN APPROVE ACCOMMODATION CONVERSION OF RIALS TO EURO CURRENCY. OTHERWISE, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE WOULD PREFER AVOID SUCH CONVERSIONS. WE WOULD OF COURSE PAY T/1'S TRAVEL EXPENSES AND A \$50 DOLLAR PER DAY BONUS.

4. FILE: 201-279932, RWV 11SEP99 DRV 90. ALL SECRET.

SECRET 121167 SEP 79 STAFF
CHIEF DIRECTOR 511343.
TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.
WNTTEL AJAJA UNTR0UT SDFORGIVE
REFS: A. PARIS 12108
B. DIRECTOR 509828
C. TEHRAN 51190

18 SEP 79

SECRET 171534Z SEP 79 STAFF

SITE PARIS 12419

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, LONDON.

WNTTEL AJAJA UNTR0UT SDFORGIVE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54190 (NOT NEEDED LONDON)
B. DIRECTOR 511343 (NOT NEEDED LONDON)

1. UNTR0UT/1 WILL NOT MAKE TRIP TO TEHRAN UNLESS SDFORGIVE/1 UNLESS REACTION WOULD BE ABLE TO ASSESS THE EVENT. IF HE IS FORCED TO REMAIN IN TEHRAN, UNTR0UT/1 IS UNWILLING TO TAKE THE RISK AT THIS POINT. IF HE COULD LEAVE TEHRAN UNDER HIS TRUE IDENTITY, HE WOULD OBTAIN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS FOR TRAVEL.

2. QUESTION OF UNTR0UT/1 TRAVEL TO TEHRAN AT THIS POINT AS HE HAS LEARNED FROM SDFORGIVE/1'S SOURCE THAT SDFORGIVE/1 PLANS TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE, POSSIBLY WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. SDFORGIVE/1 WILL INITIALLY GO TO GENEVA. SDFORGIVE/1 IS NOT SURE IF HE WILL TRAVEL TO PARIS. SDFORGIVE/1 DOES NOT KNOW HOW LONG HIS FATHER WILL BE ABLE TO STAY IN TEHRAN. UNTR0UT/1 CAN TRAVEL TO LONDON FOR MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1, IF LATTER WILL NOT COME TO PARIS.

3. LONDON: WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENT ON MEETING BETWEEN UNTR0UT/1 AND SDFORGIVE/1 IN LONDON. UNTR0UT/1 IS A BRITISH CITIZEN. IS CURRENTLY A PARIS STATION ACCOMMODATION OFFICER. HE WAS AN ASSET OF TEHRAN STATION FROM 1953 UNTIL 1971 WHEN HE MOVED TO PARIS. UNTR0UT/1 WORKED FOR ENGRAMMA FROM 1941 UNTIL 1945 (TERMINATION OF THIS RELATIONSHIP WAS INITIATED BY A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION OF UNTR0UT/1). SDFORGIVE/1 IS A PROMINENT CLERIC OF OPS INTEREST TO TEHRAN STATION. UNTR0UT/1 NOT FORESEE THE NEED FOR UNTR0UT/1 TO BE MET BY A LONDON CASE OFFICER, AS HE CAN SIMPLY RETURN TO PARIS TO DEBRIEFINGS AFTER MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1.

AG 2 PARIS 12419 S E C R E T

4. HEADQUARTERS: ASSUME WE ARE AUTHORIZED TO PAY UN-
TROUT/1'S EXPENSES AND FIFTY DOLLAR PER DAY FOR TRAVEL IF HE
TRAVELS TO LONDON TO MEET SDFORGIVE/1. IF SDFORGIVE/1 COME
TO PARIS, WE WOULD LIKE TO PICK UP ANY OPS EXPENSES UNTROUT
MIGHT INCUR DURING MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1. THIS IS A SUITABLE
BONUS AS HE WILL BE PERFORMING DUTIES WHICH GO BEYOND HIS
NORMAL DUTIES OF ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS.

5. PLEASE FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR UNTROUT/1 MEETINGS
WITH SDFORGIVE/1.

6. FILE: 201-2279932. RVW 17 SEP 99. DEC 1.

S E C R E T
BT
#2419

19 SEP 79

F O R E I G N 11443Z SEP 79 STAFF

TE LOND 0785Z

PARIS NM O DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

INTEL A MAJ UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

PARIS 2419

1. WE SEE NO NEED TO DECLARE UNTROUT/1 TO PERSON IF HE COMES
LONDON IF MEET WITH SDFORGIVE/1 AND IS BRIEFED IN PARIS
2. IF LONDON MEETING BECOMES FIRM, PLEASE ADVISE UNTROUT/1
SDFORGIVE/1 RELATIONSHIP, THEIR TRUE NAMES, AND OF PARI ALS, AND
WHERE THEY WILL BE STAYING.

3. FILE: 201-279932. RVW 18 SEP 99. DRV 90-1-

F O R E I G N
BT
#2419

S E C R E T 181127Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE: TEHRAN 54241

TO : PARIS INFO DIRECTOR, LONDON

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REF : PARIS 12419

1. FOLLOWING ARE OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS WE HOPE UNTROUT/1 CAN POSE TO SDFORGIVE/1.

A. WHERE IS F/1'S CURRENT RESIDENCE? IF NOT IN QOM, DOES HE VISIT THERE? HOW OFTEN?

B. WHO ARE F/1'S PRINCIPAL CONTACTS IN THE SENIOR CLERGY? THE MILITARY? THE GOVERNMENT? AMONG POLITICIANS NOT IN THE GOVERNMENTS? IN THE ETHNIC MINORITIES?

C. CAN F/1 NOMINATE A FRENCH OR ENGLISH SPEAKER TO SERVE AS INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN F/1 AND TEHRAN STATION?

2. INTEL REQUIREMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. IS THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL A FORMALLY ESTABLISHED BODY WITH A LIST OF ESTABLISHED MEMBERS? IF SO, WHO ARE THEY? IF THE COUNCIL OPERATES ON AN HQS BASIS, HOW IS MEMBERSHIP ON IT DETERMINED?

B. WHICH OF HIS ADVISORS EXERCISE SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE OVER KHOMEINI? ON WHAT ISSUES?

C. WHAT ARE CLERICAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE DRIVE FOR THEOCRATIC STATE BEING MANAGED (PRESUMABLY ON KHOMEINI'S BEHALF) BY AYATOLLAH HOSEIN ALI MOTAZERI? IF THIS ISSUE IS DIVIDING THE CLERGY, WHERE ARE THE LINES BEING DRAWN? IS THERE ANY SIGNIFICANT RESISTANCE TO THE THEOCRACY AMONG THE CLERGY AT QOM?

D. RELATED TO C ABOVE, WHAT FOLLOWING DOES AYATOLLAH KAZEM

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 54241 S E C R E T

SHARIAT-MADARI HAVE AMONG THE CLERGY? IS THIS FOLLOWING GOING UP OR DECLINING?

E. WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, WILL THE DEATH OF AYATOLLAH TALEGANI HAVE ON KHOMEINI'S ATTITUDES TOWARD AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SECULAR MIDDLE CLASS, THE ETHNIC MINORITIES (ESPECIALLY THE KURDS), AND THE LEFT (INCLUDING THE MUJAHEDIN-H- KHALQ)? WHY DID TALEGANI, IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS BEFORE HIS DEATH, ADOPT A HARDLINE STANCE AGAINST THE LEFT AND AGAINST THE PROPONENTS OF ETHNIC AUTONOMY?

3. IF F/1 IS WILLING AND ABLE TO NAME AN INTERMEDIARY FOR CONTACT WITH TEHRAN, WE HOPE CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE ON THE SPOT. IF F/1 NOT WILLING TRAVEL PARIS, THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY REQUIRE CONTACT (WITH U/1 IF NOT WITH F/1 HIMSELF) IN LONDON. CAN LONDON ACCOMMODATE THIS?

4. FILE: 201-079832. RWV 18 SEP 99 DRV D9C. ALL SECRET
SERET
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 202336 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE: DIRECTOR 517911

TO : PARIS, LONDON, INFO TEHRAN

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE GNSIGHT

REFS: A LONDON 17825
B TEHRAN 54241
C S 12419

- 1 MEETING ARE COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENT
EES. WEING ADD TO REF B REQUIREMENTS WHILE
.....
- 2 APPRECIATE LONDON AND PARIS ASSISTANCE THIS CASE
..... IMPORTANT WINDOW INTO RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY.

3 FILE: 201-079938 ; 201-243505 RVW 19 SEP 99

ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 21172 Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12629

TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR, LONDON,

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54241
B. LONDON 17825

1. AS OF 2 SEPTEMBER UNTROUT/I HAD RECEIVED NO
FURTHER WORD ON IT FROM SDFORGIVE/I TO EUROPE. AS SOON
AS PARTICULARS KNOWN WILL ADVISE.
2. UNTROUT PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN
RESPONSE TO REF A REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HE WILL DISCUSS WITH
SDFORGIVE/I WHEN THE LATTER. AS UNTROUT/I'S RESPONSES
TO INTEL REQUIREMENTS REPRESENT HIS VIEWS, WE ARE REPORTING
INFORMATION IN OPINION THAT.
3. REGARDING OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT SDFORGIVE:
A. SDFORGIVE/I'S PRESENT RESIDENCE IS TEHRAN. HE OWNS A
FARM BETWEEN TEHRAN AND QOM AND TRAVELS TO THE FARM ABOUT
ONCE A WEEK. TO THE BEST OF UNTROUT/I'S KNOWLEDGE
SDFORGIVE/I DOES NOT TRAVEL TO QOM. UNTROUT/I SAID
ANY SUCH VISITS WOULD SURELY BE REPORTED IN THE IRANIAN PRESS
SDFORGIVE/I DOES NOT TRAVEL TO QOM BECAUSE HE WOULD
BE EXPECTED TO PAY A TOLL ON ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL
RELIGIOUS FIGURES IN QOM. AS HE DOES NOT WANT TO VISIT
KHOMEINI, HE WOULD BE FORCED TO VISIT SHARIAT-MADAR, THUS
POLITICIZING HIMSELF.
B. SDFORGIVE/I IS IN TOUCH WITH ALL THE "MAJOR
MULLAHS", I.E. MEN WHO WERE ACCEPTED AS RELIGIOUS FIGURES
PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION AND WHO WERE NOT SIMPLY INSTALLED
AS MULLAHS BY KHOMEINI. UNTROUT/I WAS UNAWARE OF ANY CONTACT
SDFORGIVE/I HAS IN THE PRESENT IRANIAN MILITARY. UNTROUT/I
SAID THAT ALTHOUGH SDFORGIVE/I KNOWS BAZARAGAN, HE DOUBTS
IF HE MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH HIM. HE WAS UNABLE TO ADDRESS
HIMSELF TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT CONTACTS SDFORGIVE/I HAS.
SDFORGIVE/I IS FAVORABLE KNOWN TO SUNNI RELIGIOUS LEADERS
IN IRAN. PER UNTROUT/I'S SUNNI MULLAHS VIEW SDFORGIVE/I
AS THE MOST ACCEPTABLE OF THE SHI'A CLERGY.

C. UNTR0UT/1 IS CERTAINLY BRING UP THE IDEA OF ANOTHER INTERMEDIARY. HE IS NOT SANGUINE THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WILL BE WILLING OR ABLE TO INTERMEDIATE SUCH A PERSON. UNTR0UT/1 SUGGESTED THAT SDFORGIVE/1'S SON MIGHT BE WILLING TO SERVE AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN SDFORGIVE/1 AND TEHRAN STATION, WHEN THE SON IS IN TEHRAN. UNTR0UT/1 WILL MENTION THIS POSSIBILITY TO SDFORGIVE/1 PRIOR TO TAKING ANY ACTION ON SUCH A PROPOSAL.

4. UNTR0UT/1 RESPONDES TO INTEL REQUIREMENTS:

A. UNTR0UT/1 MAINTAINS THAT NO ONE KNOWS THE MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WHILE THERE MAY BE CERTAIN MULLAHS WHO ARE PERMANENT MEMBERS, KHOMEINI HAS THE POWER TO CALL A COUNCIL MEETING AT ANY TIME AND THE COUNCIL WOULD SIMPLY BE CONSTITUTED BY THE MULLAHS WHO ARE PRESENT AT THAT PARTICULAR MEETING. THE COUNCIL HAS LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS, BUT IT IS KHOMEINI HIMSELF WHO HAS THE LAST WORD IN ALL MATTERS.

B. ALTHOUGH UNTR0UT/1 DID NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THE MEN WHO EXERCISE INFLUENCE OVER KHOMEINI, HE OPINED THAT IT IS KHOMEINI'S FAMILY MEMBERS (HIS SON, SON-IN-LAW AND GRANDSON) WHO HAVE THE MOST INFLUENCE OVER HIM.

C. UNTR0UT/1 MAINTAINS THAT ALL THE BONA FIDE MAJOR CLERICAL FIGURES ARE OPPOSED TO A THEOCRACY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE A CLERICAL SPACE IS IN THE MOSQUE, NOT PARLIAMENT. THE ONLY PERSON WHO ACTIVELY AND VOICIFEROUSLY OPPOSES THE THEOCRACY IS SHARIAT-MADARI. THE MULLAHS THAT KHOMEINI CREATED AND INSTALLED AS MULLAHS SUPPORT HIS CALL FOR A THEOCRACY.

D. SHARIAT-MADARI'S SUPPORTERS AMONG THE CLERGY ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- 1. IN QOM: MOLPAYEGANI AND NAJAFI.
- 2. IN MASHHAD: KASSAN GOMI AND SHIRAZI.
- 3. IN TEHRAN: KHONSARI AND SDFORGIVE/1.

FOR THE MOST PART, THESE MEN DO NOT WISH TO MEDDLE IN POLITICS. UNTR0UT/1 BELIEVES THAT SHARIAT-MADARI'S FOLLOWING IS GROWING.

E. UNTR0UT/1 DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT TALEGANI'S DEATH WILL HAVE ANY EFFECT ON KHOMEINI'S POLICIES. HE BELIEVES THAT TALEGANI TOOK A HARD LINE STANCE AGAINST THE LEFT AND PROPONENTS OF ETHNIC AUTONOMY SIMPLY TO SUPPORT KHOMEINI, NOT BECAUSE OF HIS OWN CONVICTIONS. UNTR0UT/1 SAID THAT BARZAGANI AND TALEGANI WERE QUITE CLOSE. TALEGANI'S DEATH WILL GIVE KHOMEINI THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET RID OF BARZAGANI WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT OFFENDING TALEGANI.

4. FILE: 201-199-2 RWA 21 SEP 99 DRV D9C
SECRET

30 SEP 79

SECRET 291055Z SEP 79 STAFF
UNTR0UT/1 PARIS 12843

PRIORITY TEHRAN, DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

UNTR0UT/1 AJAJA UNTR0UT SDFORGIVE

RE: A. DIRECTOR 517941
E. TEHRAN 54241

UNTR0UT/1 ADVISED BACKUP STATION OFFICER MILICHO ON 25 SEPTEMBER THAT SDFORGIVE/1 HAD ARRIVED IN PARIS 25 SEPTEMBER. UNTR0UT/1 HAD SHORT MEETING WITH SDFORGIVE/1 EVENING 26 SEPTEMBER.

2. SDFORGIVE/1 TOLD UNTR0UT/1 THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE TIME FOR TALK HAS PASSED AND THAT IT IS NOW TIME FOR ACTION. HE WOULD LIKE UNTR0UT/1 TO GET A CLEAR STATEMENT AS TO WHAT U.S. POLICY IS TOWARDS THE KHOMEINI REGIME. IT SEEMS THAT SDFORGIVE/1 IS WILLING TO TAKE ACTIVE ROLE IN MOVEMENT FOR KHOMEINI BUT NOT INTERESTED IN SIMPLY PROVIDING HIS INFORMATION. THIS PROBABLY NOT A FIRM POSITION.

3. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN HOW LONG SDFORGIVE/1 WILL BE IN PARIS. HE WILL TRAVEL TO EGYPT FROM PARIS AS HE WAS INVITED TO VISIT SADAT BY AN EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICER LAST BEFORE THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY CLOSED IN TEHRAN. SDFORGIVE/1 EXPECTS THE EGYPTIANS TO SUGGEST HE HEAD OPPOSITION FROM BASE IN CAIRO. SDFORGIVE/1 PROBABLY NOT WILLING TO MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT SACRIFICES THIS WOULD MEAN FOR HIM AND FAMILY.

4. SDFORGIVE WILL NOT TRAVEL TO LONDON.

5. UNTR0UT/1 SAYS FOLLOWING QUOTE SUMS UP SDFORGIVE/1'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN: "AS FAR AS HE KNOWS, IN 25 CENTURIES OF HISTORY, IRAN HAS NEVER GONE THROUGH SUCH A PERIOD AS SDFORGIVE/1 HAS A FARM NEAR QOM THAT HE VISITS ONCE A WEEK. HE DOES NOT GO INTO THE CITY AND IS AVOIDING CONTACT WITH THE CLERGY AND CLERGY. WITHIN LAST FEW WEEKS HE TALKED TO SHARIAT-MADARI, WHO LIVES IN QOM. SHARIAT-MADARI TRAVELLED TO TEHRAN

2. PARIS 122843 S E I C R E T
SECRET. SHAH JAT-MADARA SAID THAT ALL REPEAT ALL MULLAHS
AGAINST KHOMEINI AND THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE TO
RID OF HIM.

SDFORGIVE/1 HAS BEEN SEEING A SOVIET IN TEHRAN ABOUT O
MONTE (UNTR0UT/1 SAID SDFORGIVE A TEMPTED TO IDENTIFY SOV
HAD USED A FALSE NAME), THE SOVIET IS BUT
UTTING THE LINE THAT UNITED STATES HAD ASSURED THE
IET UNION AT HIGHER LEVELS THAT UNITED STATES
PLAYED NO ROLE IN BRINGING KHOMEINI TO POWER. THE SOVIET
THAT IT IS NOW KNOWN THAT THE U THE SOVIETS ARE STEAMI
BEING DECEIVED. SOVIET SAID THAT WITHIN LAST FEW TEHRAN
KHOMEINI HAD CALLED IN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN
AND ASKED THE SOVIETS TO STOP INTERFERING IN AFGHANISTAN. UNTR0
ATED AS EXAMPLE OF HOW UNITED STATES USE KHOMEINI. UNTR0
AT REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE TRUTH M BE, THE BELIEF IS GRO
IN IRAN THAT THE UNITED STATES PUT KHOMEINI IN POWER (SIC.)

7. WILL PASS REF B REQUIREMENTS TO UNTR0UT/1 ON 29 SEPT
UNTR0UT/1 BELIEVES IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD
BE WILLING TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH PERCH OR ARABIC SPEAKING
STANCTION OFFICER IN PARIS. OTHERWISE WILL WORK TH
ADVISE IE H'S OR TEHRAN INTERESTED WILL USE STANDARD APP
UNTR0UT/1 UNLESS ADVISED OTHERWISE I.E. THAT POLICY IS NOT
IE PARA 2 QUESTION ON U.S. POLICY RELIABLE INFO UPON WHICH
HERE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUT NEEDS WILL BUY THIS BUT UNTR0
SOUND POLICY. HOPEFULLY SDFORGIVE/1
SECRET

FILE: 201-079932 RW 208
S E I C R E T
122843

SECRET. SHAH JAT-MADARA SAID THAT ALL REPEAT ALL MULLAHS
AGAINST KHOMEINI AND THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE TO
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SDFORGIVE/1 HAS BEEN SEEING A SOVIET IN TEHRAN ABOUT O
MONTE (UNTR0UT/1 SAID SDFORGIVE A TEMPTED TO IDENTIFY SOV
HAD USED A FALSE NAME), THE SOVIET IS BUT
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PLAYED NO ROLE IN BRINGING KHOMEINI TO POWER. THE SOVIET
THAT IT IS NOW KNOWN THAT THE U THE SOVIETS ARE STEAMI
BEING DECEIVED. SOVIET SAID THAT WITHIN LAST FEW TEHRAN
KHOMEINI HAD CALLED IN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN
AND ASKED THE SOVIETS TO STOP INTERFERING IN AFGHANISTAN. UNTR0
ATED AS EXAMPLE OF HOW UNITED STATES USE KHOMEINI. UNTR0
AT REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE TRUTH M BE, THE BELIEF IS GRO
IN IRAN THAT THE UNITED STATES PUT KHOMEINI IN POWER (SIC.)

7. WILL PASS REF B REQUIREMENTS TO UNTR0UT/1 ON 29 SEPT
UNTR0UT/1 BELIEVES IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD
BE WILLING TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH PERCH OR ARABIC SPEAKING
STANCTION OFFICER IN PARIS. OTHERWISE WILL WORK TH
ADVISE IE H'S OR TEHRAN INTERESTED WILL USE STANDARD APP
UNTR0UT/1 UNLESS ADVISED OTHERWISE I.E. THAT POLICY IS NOT
IE PARA 2 QUESTION ON U.S. POLICY RELIABLE INFO UPON WHICH
HERE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUT NEEDS WILL BUY THIS BUT UNTR0
SOUND POLICY. HOPEFULLY SDFORGIVE/1
SECRET

FILE: 201-079932 RW 208
S E I C R E T
122843

125

6 OCT 1979

25 655Z OCT 79 STAFF
PARIS 13264
DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.
AJAJA UNTR0UT SDFORGIVE
A. DIRECTOR 523226
B. DIRECTOR 523252
C. TEHRAN 64348
D. PARIS 12843

UNTR0UT/1 VISITED SDFORGIVE/1 AND ATTEMPTED EXPLAIN THAT RTACTION COULD NOT SUPPORT ANY KIND OF REVOLUTION WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM U.S. POLICY. SDFORGIVE/1 TOOK THE POSITION THAT IF THIS IS THE CASE, HE SAW NO POINT IN CONTINUING THE CONTACT WITH THIS. UNTR0UT/1 TRIED TO SERVICE OUR REQUIREMENTS BY OFFERING TO TRAVEL TEHRAN TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH SDFORGIVE/1 AND SUGGESTED THEY BE DISCUSSED NOW. SDFORGIVE/1 SIMPLY REFUSED TO DISCUSS ANY FINANCIAL MATTERS. UNTR0UT/1 WILL TRY TO GAIN USING THE TACTIC THAT IRANIAN PEOPLES INTEREST TO HAVE U.S.G. INFORMED IN ORDER THAT RTACTION POLICY CAN BE FORMULATED.

2. SDFORGIVE/1 IS CONVINCED THAT RTACTION WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KHOMEINI COMING TO POWER. AS PROOF HE CITES THE FACT HE HAD TWENTY YEARS AGO IN BEHRUT WITH AN RTACTION OFFICER (SIG) WHO SAID IT NOT PRACTICAL TO ATTEMPT BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN IRAN. TWO YEARS AGO HE CLAIMS AT U.S. EMBASSY EXT UH VISIT WITH A RTACTION OFFICER (SIG) WHO SUGGESTED THAT A POPULAR GOVERNMENT SHOULD REPLACE THE SHAH. MATTER THIS A VILLAGE PRIEST, KHOMEINI, COMES TO POWER. HE COMMENTS THAT RTACTION HAD TO LEAVE AND THIS POSSIBLE. HE SAYS THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER COOPERATING WITH RTACTION IF HE WAS PRESENTED WITH FACTS PROVING RTACTION HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH KHOMEINI COMING TO POWER. HOWEVER, IN HIS DOUBT HE WILL SEND A MESSAGE FROM TEHRAN TO CHANGE SDFORGIVE/1'S OPINION ON RTACTION INVOLVEMENT.

SECRET
2 PARIS 13254
3. SDFORGIVE/1 SIMPLY CANNOT BELIEVE THAT RTACTION CAN AND WILL NOT DO SOMETHING ABOUT KHOMEINI WHO SDFORGIVE/1 BELIEVES IS TURNING IRANIANS INTO BARBARIANS. HE CITES THE CASE OF GENERAL PAKRATAN, HEAD OF SAVAK THAT ARRANGED THE MURDER ALLOWING KHOMEINI TO GO INTO EXILE IN TURKEY. WHEN KHOMEINI CAME TO POWER PAKRATAN WAS ASSURED HIS PHYSICAL PERSON NOT IN DANGER. HE WAS ARRESTED FIVE DAYS LATER, TRIED IN A REVOLUTIONARY COURT AND EXECUTED. WHEN HIS BODY WAS WASHED FOR BURIAL AS IS THE CUSTOM, IT WAS NOTICED HE WAS NOT CIRCUMCISED AND THEREFORE NOT A MUSLEM AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE BURIED. UNTIL IT DISINTEGRATED INTO NOTHING. THIS KIND OF BARBARISM SDFORGIVE/1 CONSIDERS IS WHY KHOMEINI HAS TO GO BEFORE IT BECOMES THE NORM.

4. WILL ADVISE IF UNTR0UT/1 IS ABLE TO GET SDFORGIVE/1 TO COMMENT ON REQUIREMENTS. SUSPECT THIS IS A DEAD CASE.
5. NEW SUBJECT: SDJULEP/1 ARRIVED IN PARIS LAST WEEK. HIS WIFE WILL JOIN HIM IN A FEW DAYS AND STAY FOR AT LEAST TEN DAYS. UNTR0UT/1 IS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH SDJULEP/1. IT SEEMS THAT SDJULEP/1 IS IN CONTACT WITH A NUMBER OF IRANIANS IN PARIS BUT CLAIMS TO NOT WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN POLITICS. UNTR0UT/1 WILL CONTINUE TO ASSESS SDJULEP/1 WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF RECOMMENDING HOW BEST TO PUT RTACTION IN TOUCH WITH HIM. HE NOW BELIEVES A LITTLE MORE TIME IS NEEDED TO SET UP THE CONTACT BUT WANTS A LITTLE MORE TIME TO THINK ABOUT IT. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET
#3054

FILE: 201-243505. RVW 5 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.

10 OCT 79 9 02Z

SECRET 092112 OCT 79 STAFF

TELE DIRECTOR 52905

TO: PRIORITY PART INFO TEHRAN

VINTEL AJAJA UNTRU

SDFORGIVE

REF: PARIS 13054

1. REF IS UNFORTUNATE, AND WHILE AS NO THIS MAY BE
 I DEED DEAD CASE, WOULD APPRECIATE STATION WING UNTRU/1
 (1) TRY ONCE MORE TACTIC OF BURNING OUT SDFORGIVE/1 (E/T
 THAT IT NOT IN INTEREST OF THOSE LIKE HIMSELF THAT USG RECEIVES
 HIS INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES FROM OFFICIAL
 PDI SOURCES MAY LOOSEN THINGS A BIT. MOREOVER HQS PREPARED
 SEND SENIOR STAFFER (AND FARSI SPEAKER) MEET W/1 IF STATION
 BELIEVES THIS WOULD BE SALUTARY. THIS OFFICER MAY BE IN EUROPE
 ON OTHER BUSINESS: 41 A 20 OCTOBER. PLS ADVISE
 2. FILE 201-24325; 201-079932. RW 290

SECRET
SECRET
529

DRY DEC 11 ALL

10 OCT 79 15 09Z

SECRET 131700Z OCT 79 STAFF

TELE PARIS 13100

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

VINTEL AJAJA UNTRU SDFORGIVE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 529055
B. DIRECTOR 526936

1. MARINOS MET WITH UNTRU/1 12 OCTOBER. PRIOR RECEIPT
 UNTRU/1 AGAIN VOICED OPINION IT WILL BE NECESSARY
 TO DISCUSS SOME KIND OF PLAN OF ACTION WITH SDFORGIVE/1
 IN ORDER TO MOVE THIS CASE FORWARD. SDFORGIVE/1 IS SIMPLY
 WILLING TO BE AN "INFORMANT" UNLESS HE CAN BE CONVINCED
 THAT NUBLAZON WILL TAKE ACTION TO "BETTER THE SITUATION" IN
 IRAN. MARINOS POINTED OUT THAT NUBLAZON WOULD NOT CONSPIRE
 WITH SDFORGIVE/1 TO PLOT A COUP AGAINST KHOMEINI. UNTRU/1
 AGREES WITH US, BUT HE BELIEVES SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD REBUFF
 ANYONE WHO WOULD NOT GO SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT NUBLAZON IS IN
 THE PROCESS OF "STUDYING HOW THE SITUATION COULD BE
 IMPROVED".

2. UNLESS ABOVE TACK IS FOLLOWED IN FUTURE DEALINGS
 WITH SDFORGIVE/1, THIS WILL INDEED BE DEAD CASE. SDFORGIVE/1
 WAS UNPLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY NATURE OF REQUIREMENTS DISCUSSED
 WITH HIM; HE TOLD UNTRU/1 THAT THESE WERE QUESTIONS TO
 WHICH ANYONE COULD RESPOND. UNTRU/1 TRIED IN VAIN TO GET
 SDFORGIVE/1 TO DISCUSS REQUIREMENTS, BUT HE ADAMANTLY
 REFUSED. (IN VIEW OF SDFORGIVE/1'S REFUSAL TO DISCUSS
 REQUIREMENTS, REF B REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT PASSED TO UNTRU/1.
 THEY WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH HIM AT A LATER DATE.)

3. SDFORGIVE/1 HAS NOT COMPLETELY CLOSED DOOR TO FUTURE
 CONTACTS WITH NUBLAZON. IN FACT, HE TOLD UNTRU/1 THAT HE
 WOULD BE WILLING TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. AND MEET WITH
 APPROPRIATE NUBLAZON OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS COURSE OF ACTION.
 UNTRU/1 STRESSED THESE TALKS WOULD NECESSARILY BE "PLANNING
 SESSIONS" AND THAT NO ONE EXPECTS NUBLAZON TO AGIT IN THE
 IMMEDIATE FUTURE. UNTRU/1 SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT SOME
 OF PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AS A FIRST

APR 2 PARIS 1319Z S E C R E T
REF GIVEN ABOVE, STATION THINKS THERE IS MERIT IN HAVING
SENIOR FARSI-SPEAKING STAFFER FAMILIAR WITH IRAN MEET WITH
SDFORGIVE/1. BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT MEETING WOULD BE
UNINTERPRODUCTIVE UNLESS INTERLOCUTOR WILLING TO AT LEAST
ACCEPT THAT RESULTS THESE TALKS MIGHT LEAD TO A CHANGED
WELAZON POLICY TOWARDS IRAN. (FOR THE RECORD, UNTROUT/1
AS TOLD SDFORGIVE/1 ONLY THAT HE IS IN TOUCH WITH
WELAZON, NOT REACTION.)

4. SDFORGIVE/1 IS LEAVING PARIS IN NEXT TWO DAYS FOR
NETHERLAND AND GERMANY. UNTROUT/1 IS UNCERTAIN BUT THINKS
SDFORGIVE/1 MAY BE AWAY FROM PARIS AS LONG AS ONE MONTH.
SDFORGIVE/1'S TRIP TO EGYPT IS STILL IN THE PLANNING STAGES
AND HE HAS NOT INDICATED TO UNTROUT/1 WHEN HE WILL RETURN
TO TEHRAN.

5. SDFORGIVE/1 WAS CONTACTED TELEPHONICALLY BY AN
UNIDENTIFIED PERSON FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PARIS WHO
SUGGESTED A MEETING. SDFORGIVE/1 DECLINED, ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THERE ARE NO FARSI SPEAKERS AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN
PARIS. THE SOVIET OFFERED TO HAVE SDFORGIVE/1'S TEHRAN
CONTACT COME TO PARIS TO MEET WITH HIM. SDFORGIVE/1 SAID
HE WOULD THINK ABOUT THE PROPOSAL. HE HAS NOT YET DECIDED
WHETHER HE WILL MEET THE SOVIET. THE PARIS-BASED SOVIET TOLD
SDFORGIVE/1 THEY LOCATED HIM THROUGH HIS SON.

6. UNTROUT/1 OPINED SDFORGIVE/1 MIGHT BE WILLING WORK WITH
SDFORGIVE/1 IF HE FELT THEY WERE THE ONLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO
WELAZON POLICY. SDFORGIVE/1 THINKS IRAN BEING PUSHED INTO THE
CURRENT ORBIT BY WELAZON NON-ACTION. THIS VIEW IS HELD BY
VIRTUALLY ALL IRANIANS WITH WHOM UNTROUT/1 IS IN CONTACT
IN PARIS.

7. SDFORGIVE/1 HAS MET WITH BAKHTIAR DURING HIS
TRIP IN PARIS. HE BELIEVES THAT BAKHTIAR IS BEING SUPPORTED
BY THE FRENCH. (WILL DISCUSS THIS POINT IN MORE DETAIL
AT NEXT SESSION WITH UNTROUT/1.)

8. FILE: 201-243505, 201-079932. RWV 10 OCT 99 DRV

S E C R E T
130

S E C R E T 13032Z OCT 99

TO: DIRECTOR 530842

TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS INFO TEHRAN

UNINTEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT

REFS: A. PARIS 1319Z
DIRECTOR 529053

1. APPRECIATE REF A AND MARINOS' EFFORTS THIS CASE. WOULD
BE VERY GRATEFUL FOR PRIOR SDFORGIVE/1 (F/1)'S PRESUMED DEPARTURE
UNTROUT/1 (T/1) BROUGHT TO HIM POSSIBILITY OF MEETING WITH SENIOR
WELAZON OFFICER CIRCA 22 OCT 79 AND IF F/1 WILLING ALTER HIS
SCHEDULE ACCOMMODATE SUCH MEETING.

2. AS ADDRESSEES AWAY, POLICY QUESTIONS RAISED REF A
IN AREA WHERE WE HAVE LITTLE LEeway, BUT WILL ATTEMPT TO SEE WHAT
CAN DO TO IMPROVE SITUATION. WILL ADVISE.

FILE: 201-2243505, 201-079932. RWV 11 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.

30 Oct 79 03 40z

SECRET 121532Z OCT 79 STAFF
CITE PARIS 13273

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INF TEHRAN
WINTEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT
INFO: DIRECTOR 530240

1. UNTROUT/1 ADVISED THAT SDFORGIVE DEPARTED FOR
PARIS 11 OCTOBER. HOWEVER, UNTROUT/1 WILL ATTEMPT TO CONTACT
SDFORGIVE/1 AND ASK HIM TO RETURN TO PARIS FOR 22 OCTOBER
WITH STATION OFFICER. IF SDFORGIVE/1 UNABLE TO RETURN
UNTROUT/1 WILL ASCERTAIN IF HE WILLING TO MEET
IN GERMANY.

SDFORGIVE/1 TOLD UNTROUT/1 THAT HE COULD BE REACHED
BY J. A. J. A. H. A. N. I. IRANIAN RESIDING IN OBERLINGEN,
(SIC). ALTHOUGH JAMARANI NOT KNOWN TO UNTROUT/1,
FAMILIAR WITH JAMARANI FAMILY, WHICH IS PROMINENT
FAMILY IN IRAN. JAMARANI HIMSELF IS NOT A CLERIC.
UNTROUT/1 STRESSED THAT SDFORGIVE/1 IS EXTREMELY
ABOUT ANY DISCUSSIONS TO BE HELD WITH NVBIAZON REPS.
WITH SDFORGIVE/1 CAN BE ARRANGED. SUGGEST THAT
BETWEEN UNTROUT/1 AND HQS OFFICER WOULD BE MOST
FOR FACE-TO-FACE MEETING WITH SDFORGIVE/1.

4. WILL ADVISE RESULTS UNTROUT/1 CALL TO SDFORGIVE/1

FILE: 201-0243505 RWV 12 OCT 79 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET 170854Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54505

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO DIRECTOR.

WINTEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT

1. ADLESICK PLANNING LEAVE TEHRAN 19 OCTOBER, ALTHOUGH
DEPARTURE MAY BE DELAYED. REQUEST PARIS PROVIDE CONTACT
INSTRUCTION.

2. BELIEVE BEST DECIDE ON WHAT TO DO ABOUT MEETING SDFORGIVE/1
AFTER CONFERRING WITH UNTROUT/1. SINCE ADLESICK MOVING ON TO
NEW JOB, HQS MIGHT WISH CONSIDER HAVING SOMEONE ELSE MEET
SDFORGIVE/1 WHO WILL BE ABLE TO FOLLOW CASE.

3. HQS: PLS HAVE STATE AMEND TRAVEL ORDER.

4. FILE: 201-0243505. RWV 17 OCT 79 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
SECRET

S E C R E T

CITE: DIRECTOR 534834

TO : PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO PARIS

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT

REF: TEHRAN 54505

1- AGREE PARA TWO REF AND WE CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES.

2- STATE TRAVEL ORDERS BEING AMENDED.

3- FILE 201 - 243505: 201-079938. RVW 18OCT90 DRV D9C

S E C R E T 020153Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE: DIRECTOR 487315.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL SDJULEP

REF: PARIS 11104

SDJULEP/1 (SUBJECT REF) BECAME A RECRUITED RTACTICN ASSESSOR IN 1956. J/1 WAS TO BE AN FI ASSET FOR EXPLOITATION OF HIS WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL CONTACTS, AND A CIA ASSET FOR THE WRITING, EDITING, AND PLACEMENT OF ARTICLES FAVORABLE TO US INTERESTS. J/1 WAS, AND APPARENTLY REMAINS, A WRITER OF THE HIGHER CALIBRE, AND MAY WELL HAVE BEEN THE FINEST EDITOR IN IRAN. J/1 WAS HANDLED BY UNTROUT/1, EDWARD S. VALERIOUS, AND JOSEPH W. ADLESICK.

IN 1959, J/1 SIGNED A CONTRACT WITH RTACTICN FOR RE 15,000 PER MONTH; HOWEVER, HE SHORTLY THEREAFTER LEFT FOR THE UNITED STATES AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TERMINATED. WHILE J/1 WAS WILLING TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH RTACTICN ON CIA PROPAGANDA OPS, HE ALSO WAS MOST HESITANT TO UNDERTAKE ANY WORK IN THE FIELD.

ALTHOUGH REQUIRING SOME MEASURABLE DEGREE OF HANDHOOD J/1 WAS CONSISTENTLY EVALUATED AS POSSESSING SOLID LONG TERM POTENTIAL. NOW MAY WELL BE THE TIME TO CAPITALIZE ON THAT POTENTIAL. WHILE J/1'S VALUE AS AN FI SOURCE IS IN DOUBT (PERHAPS MORE TO HIS RELUCTANCE TO PURSUE CHANDESHINE ACTIVITY AND OTHER REASON), J/1 REMAINS OF HIGH INTEREST TO RTACTICN FOR HIS CAPOTENTIAL. TO THIS END, WE ENCOURAGE AND WELCOME HIS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH J/1. SPECIALLY, WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO KNOW WHAT J/1 IS AND WILL BE DOING, WHO HIS CONTACTS ARE, WHAT JOURNALS HE MAY BE EDITING OR PUBLISHING IN, AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VARIOUS ARTICLES IN IRAN AND THE USG. ADLESICK CURRENTLY AT HQS AND IS WILLING TO MEET WITH J/1 WHEN/IF NECESSARY. WE APPRECIATE HIS EFFORTS.

600

REF: PARIS 11230
DIRECTOR: 10403 72 AUG 79 STAFF
TELE DIRECTOR: 488745.
PARIS INFO THERAM, OSLO.
SDJULEP UNTROUT

1. IN REPLY TO REF, FOLLOWING IS FROM 1978 WHO'S WHO IN IRAN.
"BORN 1929, PROFESSION JOURNALIST, EDUCATION: LICENTATE IN LAW
FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY; M.A. IN JOURNALISM FROM COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
GRADUATED IN AN EDUCATIONAL COURSE FROM UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.
STARTED HIS JOURNALISTIC CAREER IN 1949; PARLIAMENTARY REPORTER FOR
"ETTELA'AT", EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF "ETTELA'AT-BARTEGI"; EDITOR-IN-
CHIEF OF THE MAGAZINE "ROUSHAN-BARI"; FOUNDER OF THE MAGAZINE
"ZAN-E-RUZ"; EDITOR-IN-CHIEF AND TECHNICAL EDITOR OF THE NEWS
MAGAZINE "ZAN-E-RUZ".

2. HQS LOOS FORWARDED TO UNTROUT/1'S RETURN AND ADDITIONAL
INFO RE PLANS OF SDJULEP/1.

3. NO INDEX FILE. 201-118671. RVW 3 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1
ALL SECRET.
SECRET
BT
#3554

138

0675 12 53z

DEVELOPMENTS IN SDJULEP/'1S
VACATION IN THE SOUTH
NOT EXPECT THAT WE WILL
EARLY SEPTEMBER.

2. SDJULEP/1, INCLUDING REVEALING OVERT TRACES ON
NO DATA AND DETAILS OF HIS
JOURNALIST CAREER.

3. IF SDJULEP/1 ELECTS TO REMAIN IN OSLO, THERE MAY BE
INTEREST IN CONTACTING HIM THERE. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT
DISCUSSED THIS WITH UNTROUT/1, IT IS NOT UNLIKELY THAT HE
WOULD BE WILLING TO EFFECT INTRODUCTION OF SDJULEP/1 TO
OSLO BASED RTACTION OFFICER.

4. DIRECTOR: PLEASE RELAY REF TO OSLO.

5. FILE: 201-118671. RVW 2 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1
SECRET
BT
#1230

PLUS GOVERNMENT PRINT

20 Oct 79 09 36z

S E C R E T 191813Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 438739.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN, OSLO.

UNINTEL AJAJA HARCOI SIJULEP

REF: PARIS 13199

1. NO EOS TRACES ON PARI S A K A N D A R Y.
2. WHILE DEFERRING TEHRAN, DO NOT BELIEVE SHE REPRESENTS FI OR CA TARGET W/TH SUFFICIENT ACCESS OR POTENTIAL W/REANI OUR EFFORTS. APPRECIATE REF.
3. FILE: 41-122-27. RVW 19OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
#9242

PJT

S E C R E T 071537Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 492488.

TO: PRIORITY FRANTECH INFO TEHRAN, DISTRO, AIR FORCE

UNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SBLUR AQUATIC

- REFS:
- A. DIRECTOR 438752
 - B. FRANTECH 37691
 - C. DIRECTOR 420474

1. PLANNING FOR SDDURE/1 OPERATION (WHICH UNDERWAY SIGNIFICANT REVIEW PER REF A) FOR IN FINAL STAGES AND GENY W. RUTHERFORD (P) WILL TRAVEL TO TEHRAN AIR AUGUST 79. RUTHERFORD NOW EQUIPPED WITH FULLY BACKSTOPPED LIVE COPORA AND TRAVELLING ON ALIAS U.S. REGULAR PASSPORT (IDEM).
 2. REQUEST FRANTECH PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO RUTHERFORD IN OF SAFEEKEEPING HIS TRANS-ATLANTIC AIR TICKETS AND PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION WHILE HE TRAVELLING TO IRAN. RENT IYU LEM FOR RUTHERFORD TO STOP OVER FRANKFURT AND CONTACT RENOVIA P RA S RET B AND PARA 5 RELOC INSTRUCTIONS. PLS ADVISE SOMES IS ARRANGEMENT ACCEPTABLE.
 3. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE WE NEED FOR ANY OTHER FORM OF ENNOY STANCE TO RUTHERFORD WHO WILL TDY FRANKFURT ONE FOR AS LONG AS TAKES TO EFFECT TURNOVER OF TICKETS (AND REDIE THEM ON HIS REY FROM IRAN).
 4. WILL ADVISE RUTHERFORD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- FILE: 201-959289. RVW 20 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET 170025Z AUG 79 ST
SITE DIRECTOR 492219
TO: PRIORITY CH INFO THER
INTEL REAT A PLURE AQU DT
REF: DIRECTOR 4
IDEN: WILLI POSTER.
VM 27 AUG 79 DRV DS L SECRET
SECRET
BT
11

SECRET 170025Z AUG 79 ST
SITE DIRECTOR 492219
TO: IMMEDIATE THERAN INFO IMMEDIATE FRANKTECH. ROUTINE
FRANKTECH. ATHTECH. ATHENS, NW DEL I.
INTEL REAT AJAJA LPGAVN TELUS PLURE
A. FRANKTECH 39042 (NOT SENT/NEEDED BONN. GERMANY)
ATHENS, NEW DELHI
B. THERAN 53781 (NOT SENT/NEEDED BONN. GERMANY)
FRANKTECH 39042 (NOT SENT/NEEDED BONN. GERMANY)
RUTHERFORD PRESENTLY EQS ARE FOR FINAL BRIEFING
TO IRAN. ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS BUT NOTE DATES ARE
TIME AND SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY OF AIRLINE SEATS, LEA
REQUIRED TO ACQUIRE VISAS IN EUROPE, ETC.:
9-12 AUG WASE D.C. (FINAL P
12-13 AUG FRANKFURT (DROPPING
11-15 AUG AND MISC ITEMS) TRANSATLANTIC AIR T
15-18 AUG ATHENS (ACQUIRE IND A/IRAN BUSINESSMAN'S
19 AUG-1 SEPT THERAN COVER WORK PURPOSES
RUTHERFORD TRAVELLING ON ALIAS (GREEN) FROM U.S. WELL
RECENT INTENSE MAINE RESERVATIONS FOR 2 WEEKS AT THERAN
KIDNAPERS. AS WELL ALSO CALL SPLUR (1) AND ADVISE HIM OF
S. F. RUTHERFORD HAS VISITED THERAN 2-3 TIMES AND
IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH CITY TO MAKE CAR PICK-UPS/PURSES
PROVIDE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS TO THERAN STATION FOR
FD WILL INITIATE CONTACT NEITHER TO ALLOW HIM TO
SUITABLE PERIOD OF TIME HAS PASSED WITH STATION NOR
COVER WORK MEETINGS AND OTHERS. IN AN ASSUME ALL
TRAVELLING BUSINESSMAN. IN AN CASE EXPECT THIS
D LONGER THAN 2-3 DAYS. WHO WILL MEET RUTHERFORD?
ON R FARA 3 REF B REASONING.

492219 S E C R E T

1. ANTICIPATE RUTHERFORD TRAVEL TO
TEHRAN. HE PLANS MAKE OWN ACCOMMODATION PLANS ON ARRIVAL
NUMBER/TIMES NOT YET KNOWN AND WILL CONTACT EZNOVA
ARRANGEMENTS.

2. PLS RELAY TEHRAN CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS TO RUTHERFORD

FOR NEW DELHI, ATHENS, BONN, GERMANY, GUY W. RUTHERFORD
STAFFER AND PRESENTLY ON CONTRACT. NO REACTION WILL
BE TAKEN IN ALIAS (IDEN) TO YOUR RESPECTIVE AREAS PER PARA
NO REACTION CONTACT OR SUPPORT IS REQUESTED OR ANTICIPATED
IS INVOLVED IN SENSITIVE IRANIAN CASE. NO OPERATIONAL
PLANNED EXCEPT IN TEHRAN. RVG 29 AUG 69 DRV D9C.1

E C R E T 100025Z AUG 79

DIRECTOR 492219

IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO
TECH. ATE TECH. ATHENS, NEW
EL RYBAT AJAJA L P AMIN

DIRECTOR 492219

MDRN: WILLIAM A FOSTER
399 DRV DEC.1 A L SEC AF
F T

11 Aug 79 3 3

SECRET 102251Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 49301Z.

TO: IMMEDIATE GERMANY INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, FRANTECH, DIRTECH, ATRTECH, ROUPINE BONN, ATHENS, NEW DELHI.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA LPGAMIN TECHS SDLURP

REFS: A. GERMANY 83634
B. DIRECTOR 492243

1. APPRECIATE REF. RUTHERFORD ALREADY HAS COMPLETE ALIAS DOCUMENTATION. NAME SEEMS COMMON ENOUGH, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY EDLURE/1, WHO TARGET IN THIS CASE, HAS ALREADY MET RUTHERFORD IN REF B ALIAS.

2. FILE: 221-969269. RWV 10AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET
ET
015

EMJ. 28 A. 198

SECRET 131029Z AUG 79 STAFF
FRANTECH 39093 (WIADUCK ACTING)
PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, G
INTEL RYBAT AJAJA (SDLURE) TECHS
REF: DIRECTOR 492219

1. RUTHERFORD ARRIVED FRANKFURT
TELEPHONE TEHRAN PROSPECT AFTERNOON

2. FILE: DEFER. RWV 13 AUG 99. D
SECRET

S E C R E T 31 AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 26225.

TO: TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT LPGAMIN SDLURE

REPS: A. TEHRAN 54224
B. TEHRAN 54225
C. TEHRAN 54222

1. PER REP B. LKYN GET INFORMED US MORNING 27 AUGUST. RUTHERFORD'S REQUEST FOR HOTEL CREDIT TRANSFER. WE APPROVED THIS ON THE SPOT IN ORDER THAT LKKNIGHT COULD ASK INTERCONTINENTAL NY MAIN OFFICE TO EFFECT TRANSFER EXPEDITIOUSLY. TRANSFER SHOULD CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN MADE BY NOW. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE HOTEL WILL INFORM RUTHERFORD OF THE TRANSFER WHEN RECEIVED. PLS. REMIND RUTHERFORD THAT IF HE HAS FURTHER NEED FOR FUNDS, REQUESTS THROUGH LKKNIGHT WILL BE HANDLED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND SHOULD TAKE A COUPLE OF DAYS AT THE MOST.

2. OOK FORWARD TO DEVELOPMENTS.

3. FILE: 221-96222. RVW 31AUG79 DBV D9C.1 ALL S

S E C R E T
BT
#3151

S E C R E T 040807Z SBP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54117

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT LPGAMIN SDLURE

1. FOLLOWING IS RUTHERFORD'S REPORT OF SECOND MEETING HELD WITH SDLURE/1 ON 3 SEPTEMBER. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH RUTHERFORD WAITED FOR SUBJECT ONE HOUR AT LATTER'S RESIDENCE ON 2 SEPTEMBER, SDLURE/1 (L/1) TELEPHONED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE IT AND SUGGESTED CHANGING TO NEXT DAY.)

2. L/1 HAS BEEN MAINTAINING A BUSY SCHEDULE SINCE HIS RETURN TO IRAN LAST FEBRUARY. BETWEEN ATTENDING DAILY SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS, MEETINGS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND PUBLISHING HIS PAPER, HE IS NORMALLY WORKING UNTIL AFTER MIDNIGHT ON A REGULAR BASIS. HE BROKE AWAY FROM A MEETING ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION TO MEET WITH RUTHERFORD FOR TWO HOURS ON 3 SEP AND PLANNED TO RETURN TO PARLIAMENT IN THE AFTERNOON TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION.

3. SUBJECT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO REVISIT PARIS SINCE HIS RETURN IRAN. TWO OF HIS CHILDREN CONTINUE TO STUDY IN PARIS. ASKED ABOUT HIS APARTMENT THERE, HE INDICATED THAT HE STILL RETAINS IT BUT HOPES TO TERMINATE IT BECAUSE OF THE FINANCIAL BURDEN. HE AND THE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY IN TEHRAN ARE LIVING WITH THREE MARRIED SISTERS WHO OCCUPY THE THREE APARTMENTS AT CHANAS STREET LOCATION.

4. IN DISCUSSING THE CENTER OF POWER IN THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVT OF IRAN, SUBJECT STATED THAT POWER RESIDES IN THE HANDS OF COUNCIL, THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR AND IN THE KOMITEHS. ACCORDING TO HIS EXPLANATION, THE KOMITEHS ARE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH LOCAL MATTERS BUT, NONTHELESS, ARE CAPABLE OF PROPOSING SPECIFIC STEPS OR ACTION BY THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF POWER. ALTHOUGH INCLUDING THE PRESENT CABINET AS A HOLDER OF POWER, SUBJECT NOTED ONCE AGAIN THAT IT TAKES ACTION ON RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT MATTERS SUCH AS THOSE CONCERNING EDUCATION, HEALTH, ETC.

5. SUBJECT WAS EITHER UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO NAME A LIKELY SUCCESSOR TO BAZARGAN WHENEVER HE STEPS ASIDE. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT " WE SHALL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE."

6. COMMENTING ON HIS OWN ESTIMATE ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTION, SUBJECT STATED THAT HE IS SATISFIED BY SOME OF THE PROGRESS MADE TO DATE BUT THAT HE IS FRUSTRATED AND DISCOURAGED BY THE STUMBLING BLOCKS WITHIN THE GOVT ITSELF. NOT SURPRISING, HE EXHIBITED OPTIMISM CONCERNING THE FUTURE.

7. WHILE MENTIONING FORMIN IBRAHIM YAZDI, SUBJECT NOTED THAT HE IS NO LONGER A MEMBER OF THE REV/ COUNCIL SINCE JOINING THE CABINET. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT YAZDI ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF KHOMEINI BUT IS NOT INCLINED TO REGARD HIM AS A POWERFUL INDIVIDUAL.

8. IN DISCUSSING THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BANKS, SUBJ STRESSED THAT THEY WERE DESPARATELY IN NEED OF REFORM MEASURES. FOR EXAMPLE, POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS IN THE BANKING FIELD MANIPULATED THE BANK FUNDS AND ARRANGED "SWEETHEART" LOANS. FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, KHOMEINI WANTED TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE BANKING SYSTEM AND THUS APPROVED THE NATIONALIZATION STEP. SUBJ STATED THAT WHEREAS WEALTHY IRANIAN BUSINESSMEN ARE OPPOSED TO NATIONALIZATION, THE SMALL BUSINESSMEN FAVOR IT AS THEY WILL BE ABLE TO.... RECEIVE LOANS MORE EASILY THAN HITHERTO.

9. ALTHOUGH CONCEDING THAT THE KURDESTAN PROBLEM OCCUPA.... THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESENT GOVT, SUBJ STATED THAT A MORE URGENT PROBLEM IS TO SET THE ECONOMY MOVING. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE OIL REVENUES ARE ONLY SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE REQUIRMENT OF THE DEFENSE PROGRAM AND TO ENABLE THE GOVT TO PAY ITS BIL.... ADDITIONAL FUNDS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE DEVELOPED TO STIMULATE THE FIELDS OF AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY. ATTACKING THE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES OF THE FORMER REGIME, HE NOTED HOW A SURPLUS ... NUMBER OF AUTOMATIVE FIRMS WERE ESTABLISHED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LIGHT INDUSTRY AND FARMING.

10. RUTHERFORD COMMENT: ON THE BASIS OF TWO SESSIONS TO DATE INCLINED TO BELIEVE WE CAN INTRODUCE SUBJ A USG OFFICIAL ALTHOUGH CALLED ATTENTION IN PASSING AT THE 3SPT MEETING THAT THE SHAH WAS "THE INSTRUMENT OF THE USG POLICY IN THE AREA" AND THAT US FIRMS WILL BE WELCOME IN IRAN AS LONG AS THEY DO NOTBLE IN THE COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, BELIEVE WE CAN GET AROUND THIS

11. FILE: 201-959282 RVW 4SEP99 DRV D9C. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 040807Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54118

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT LPGAMIN SDLURE

REFS: A, TEHRAN 54117
B, TEHRAN 54084
C, TEHRAN 5408?

1. RUTHERFORD'S NEXT MEETING WITH SDLURE/1(L/1) SCHEDULED FOR EVENING 5 SEP. STATION WILL SEE HIM JUST BEFORE IT TO PASS ON LAST MINUTE INSTRUCTIONS.

2. WE THINK THAT, IF RUTHERFORD IS GOING TO SURFACE AN EXTRACURRICULAR INTEREST IN L/1 DURING THIS VISIT, IT WILL HAVE TO BE DONE AT 5 SEP SESSION. REASONS ARE THAT COVER AGENDA WILL HAVE BEEN PRETTY WELL COMPLETED, AND THAT, IF THERE TO BE A RECRUITMENT WITH OR WITHOUT TURNOVER, HE WILL HAVE TO START ARRANGING THE MECHANICS OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP. RUTHERFORD SAID AT OUR 3SEP MEETING HE THINKS THERE 80 PERCENT LIKELIHOOD L/1 WOULD ACCEPT AN OSTENSIBLE PRIVATE COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP, WITH TURNOVER TO STATION OFFICER OSTENSIBLY MOON-LIGHTING AS COMMO CHANNEL BETWEEN RUTHERFORD AND L/1.

3. THIS ESTIMATE MAY WELL BE ACCURATE, BUT IS BASED ON L/1'S ACCESSIBILITY AND ON GENERAL TONE OF MEETING, NOT ... DEMONSTRATED L/1 WILLINGNESS TO SHARE PROTECTED INFORMATION ON EXPRESSION OF INTEREST, EVEN IMPLIED, IN EXTRACURRICULAR RELATIONSHIP. OUR OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT RUTHERFORD HAS NOW SPEND ENOUGH TIME WITH L/1 SO THAT L/1 WOULD NOT GREATE ... OVER A COMMERCIAL PITCH, EVEN IF HE REJECTED IT. WE DO NOT THINK THE ASSESSMENT HAS PROCEEDED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT AN ESTIMATE OF THE PROBABILITY THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT. THERE IS AT PRESENT EVEN LESS BASIS TO PREDICT HIS REACTION TO ::AN... AT FULL RECRUITMENT.

4. GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTIES WHICH ATTEND THIS THINK IT MAY BE USEFUL TO LAY OUT THE OPTION AS W....
..... THE PROS AND CONS OF EACH:

A, FULL RECRUITMENT WITH TURNOVER TO STATION. ADVANTAGE IS OBVIOUS: WE COULD LEVY REQUIRMENTS WITH REASONABLE EXPECTATION THAT L/1 WOULD DO WHAT HE CAN TO SATISFY THEM. THIS APPROACH ALSO HAS THE HIGHEST FLAP POTENTIAL. L/1 COULD YELL, AND FEED RUTHERFORD TO THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR. A MORE SUBTLE BUT STILL REAL DANGER IS THAT L/1 WOULD COVER HIS .ETS BY ASKING KHOMEINI AND/OR BAZARGAN TO ENDORSE A RELATIONSHIP WHICH HE WOULD DESCRIBE AS SOME KIND OF UNOFFICIAL LIAISON. THIS WOULD SIGNAL TO THEM THAT WE ARE NOT COTENT WITH THE SDPLOD/1 CHANNEL, AND SEEK MULTIPLE LINES INTO THE PGOI; IT

WOULD ALSO GIVE THE LIE TO OUR DENIAL TO SDPLOD/1 AND COMPANY OF A RESIDENT REACTION PRESENCE IN TEHRAN.

B, RUTHERFORD'S HYBRID AN APPROACH WHICH SOLICITS L/1'S COOPERATION AS PERSONAL ADVISOR TO RUTHERFORD AND ENDS WITH INSERTION OF STATION OFFICER AS OBSTENSIBLE COMMO CHANNEL HAS ADVANTAGE THAT, IF SUCCESSFUL, WE WIND UP WITH STATION OFFICER IN DIRECT CONTACT, WHILE HAVING PRESERVED SOME DEGREE OF DENIABILITY. RUTHERFORD, MEANWHILE, HAS BEEN ABLE TO PROCEED BY DEGREES UNTIL L/1 AGREES TO THE RELATIVELY INNOCUOUS ADVISORY FUNCTION, THE QUESTION OF NVBLAZON INVOLVEMENT NEVER COMES UP. POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES ARE: (1) L/1 MAY AGREE TO THE ADVISORY FUNCTION, IN RETURN FOR SPECIFIED COMPENSATION, BUT BALK AT DEALING WITH INTERMEDIARY, WE THEN GET LITTEL IF ANY QUID FOR OUR QUO. (2) AT THE MENTION OF EMBASSY CUTOUT, L/1 LOSES WHATEVER INNOCENCE HE MAY HAVE HAD ABOUT RUTHERFORD'S REAL PURPOSES. THERE IS LESS FLAP POTENTIAL IN THIS PHASED APPROACH THAN IN PARA 4 SCENARIO, BUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT WILL SEEK APPROVAL FOR THE SDPLOD/1 REALATIONSHIP THUS REMAIN ABOUT THE SAME.

C, OBSTENSIBLE COMMERCIAL RECRUITMENT. IF RUTHERFORD MAINTAINS THE OBSTENSIBLE COMMERCIAL MOTIVATION OF HIS OFFER RELYING ON PERSONAL CONTACT AND OPEN MAIL FOR COMMUNICATION RECRUITMENT RISK IS MINIMIZED. SO IS PRODUCT: THE RANGE OF PERMISSIBLE QUESTIONS IS LIMITED, AND COMMUNICATIONS ARE UNSATISFACTORY.

D, POSTPONEMENT UNTIL L/1 VISITS PARIS, RUTHERFORD'S RISK DECLINES TO ABOUT ZERO, AND L/1 MIGHT WELL BE CEPTIVE TO A PITCH MADE ON A NEUTRAL GROUND. DISADVANTAGES ARE THAT TIMING OF L/1 TRIP TO PARIS IS INDETERMINATE, AND THAT NO GURANTEE TEHRAN CASE OFFICER WOULD BE AVAILABLE WHEN DECIDES TO GO (RUTHERFORD ADVISES THAT RELATIONSHIP MORE TO PROSPER IF CONDUCTED IN FRENCH, BELIEVES COS IS ONLY TEHRAN OFFICER WITH ADEQUATE PROFICIENCY IN THAT LANGUAGE.)

5, AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE WE WOULD RATHER SEE A RECRUITMENT PITCH BY NOC OFFICER MADE ON NEUTRAL GROUND, AND WILL ACCORDINGLY INSTRUCT RUTHERFORD TO PROBE FURTHER RE POSSIBLE TIMING OF AN L/1 VISIT TO PARIS. IF THIS IS COMPLETELY INDETERMINATE, WE WILL HAVE TO DECIDE AMONG OTHER OPTIONS, OR ELECT TO WAIT FOR ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY. OF THE FIRST THREE OPTIONS, THE SECOND SEEMS MOST SUCCESSFULLY TO BALANCE THE RISKS VERSOS POTENTIAL BENEFITS,

REVEALING INTELLIGENCE INTERESTS ON A PHASED BASIS AND PRESERVING SOME DENIABILITY. HQS WILL PRESUMABLY WANT TO DEVOTE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE SDPLOD/1 LIAISON IN TAKING ITS RISK/BENEFIT CALCULATION, AS THIS IS AN EQUITY WHOSE EXISTENCE POSTDATES THE INCEPTION OF THE RUTHERFORD APPROACH TO L/1.

6, IF RECRUITMENT IS TO BE ATTEMPTED PER ANY OF FIRST TO THREE OPTIONS, SUGGEST WE OFFER USD ONE THOUSAND MONTHLY FOR TRIAL PERIOD OF THREE TO SIX MONTHS.

7, REQUEST HQS ADVISE BY ITS COB 4 SEPT HOW IT STATION TO PROCEED.

8, FILE: 201-959089. RVW 4 SEP9 DRV D9C.9. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET 042351Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 50734P

TO: IMMEDIATE TERRAN

UNINTL RYRAT LPGAMIN SDLURE

- REFS: A. TERRAN 54113
- B. TERRAN 54117

1. FOLLOWING IS RESPONSE TO REF A SCENARIO PROPOSALS:
2. PLANNING AT THIS POINT CONCERS ON RUTHERFORD'S ASSESS THAT SDLURE/L/1 MIGHT BE RECEPTIVE TO COMMERCIAL CONSULTANT RECRUITMENT PITCH. CONCUR WITH STATION THAT THIS DESIRABLE BE IT PROTECTS RUTHERFORD IN IRAN AND COULD OPEN WAY TO MORE FIRM PITCH ON NEUTRAL TERRITORY (I.E., PARIS) PER PARA 5 REF A PROP NOTE IN ANY CASE OUR JUDGMENT (WHICH FACTOR IN SDLURE/L/1 DEVELOPMENTS) THAT INTRODUCTION OF "EMBASSY" OFFICER INADVISABLE AT TIME.
3. ACCORDINGLY, WE ENVISAGE COMBINATION OF OPTIONS C AND PARA 4 REF A. CONCUR KEY ELEMENT OF THIS WOULD BE FOR RUTHERFORD TO PROBE INTO L/1'S INTENTIONS TO TRAVEL TO PARIS IN NEAR FUTURE. EXPLORE HIS INTEREST IN ACCEPTING CONSULTANT STATUS; IF HIS TRIP PLANS INDETERMINATE, SUGGEST RUTHERFORD INVITE L/1 TO PARIS (PAY OFFERING TO PAY HIS AIR FARE) FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. MAIN INVITATION IN THIS WAY WOULD BE USEFUL TEST OF L/1'S INTEREST IN PURSUING RUTHERFORD'S RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD IMMEDIATE DISCREET (CONSPIRATORIAL) CONTACT IN PARIS. BELIEVE PRESENCE OF L/1'S CHILDREN AND APARTMENT IN PARIS WOULD BE ADDITIONAL INCENTIVE AND BE SUFFICIENT REASON FOR L/1 TO OBTAIN PERMISSION TO TRAVEL THERE.
4. IF, HOWEVER, IT APPEARS L/1 UNABLE TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF IRAN OR FORESEEABLE FUTURE BUT HE MANIFESTLY ATTRACTED BY CONSULTANT CONCEPT, SUGGEST RUTHERFORD PROVIDE L/1 WITH REQUIREMENTS AND MAJOR SUBSEQUENT TRIP(S) TO TERRAN TO BRIEF AND DEBRIEF HIM UNTIL MORE PERMANENT AND SOPHISTICATED ARRANGEMENT CAN BE DEVISED. BELIEVE RANGE OF PERMISSIBLE QUESTIONS NEED NOT BE LIMITED TO THE INSIGNIFICANT OR SUPERFICIAL.

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 50734P SECRET

5. COMMUNICATION STATION COMPENSATION PROPOSAL PARA 5

6. WELCOMING STATION COMMENTS.

7. WE HAVE JUST BEEN NOTIFIED, VIA RYRAT, THAT RUTHERFORD IS SCHEDULED DEPART 11 SEPT. BELIEVE THIS TIME FRAME WILL ACCOMMODATE OUR PLANNING AND ALLOW ADEQUATE TIME FOR ONE OR TWO FINAL MEETINGS WITH L/1. IF THIS DOES NOT GIVE RUTHERFORD TIME, ASSUME HE CAN DEVISE APPROPRIATE REASON FOR DELAYING DEPARTURE FROM IRAN.

8. FILE 201-959289. RW 24 SEPT 79 DEW 09C.1 ALL

SECRET

#1149

REF ID: A66800
SECRET 12340 SEP 79 STAFF
DIRECTOR 512723.
TEHRAN.
INTEL RYBA LPPAMIN SDLURE

- A. TEHRAN 54174
- B. TEHRAN 54173
- C. TEHRAN 54165
- D. TEHRAN 54154

1. NO TRACES OR OTHER IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON SHANDAR.
2. CONCUR PARA 2 REF C PROPOSAL AS EARLIER AGREED. MI
FOR THIS TRIP IS ATTEMPT AT COMMERCIAL CONSULTANT ET
ASSESSMENT OF SDLURE/1'S PRESENT SITUATION AND FRAME OF
ASSESSMENT OF VERY MINIMAL BLOWBACK RISK THIS TRIP
GOOD LUCK.

OBJECTIVE
REF ID AS
REINFORC
APPROACH
SECRET
#3196

FILE: 201-959289. RVW 10 SEP 79 DRV DSC.1 ALL SECR

SECRET 120720Z SEP 79 STAFF
SITE TEHRAN 54194
TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL RYBA LPPAMIN SDLURE

- 1. PLEASE ADVISE RUTHERFORD COVER COMPANY:
 - A. COVER COMPANY CABLE OF 31 AUGUST ARRIVED 10 SEPT.
 - B. \$400 ADVANCE REACHED HOTEL 10 SEPT.
 - C. R UNABLE TO TELEPHONE AS PTT NOT PLACING LONG DISTANCE DURING TALEGHANI MOURNING PERIOD.
- 2. FILE: 201-959289. RVW 12 SEP 79 DRV DSC.1. ALL

SECRET

15 SEP 79

3215 Z SEP 79 STAFF

REF ID: A13 21.
FRANTECH INFO DIRTECH. ATHTECH.

INTEL AVAIL TO PC IN SCLURE, AQUATIC

- S: A. ERAS 4285
- B. ERAS 4195
- C. ERAS 4194
- D. ERAS 4193

WE ARE GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY REF A DEVELOPMENTS AND
 HISTORICAL PROGRESS CAN BE CONSOLIDATED INTO
 PRODUCTIVE COMMERCIAL RECRUITMENT IN NEAR FUTURE. WISH EXPRESS
 RECOMMENDATION TO RUTHERFORD FOR ADVANCING SCLURE/1 (L/1)
 SE ALONG TO THE STAGE AND TO STATION FOR ITS SUPPORT AND
 ID INE OVER PAST TWO WEEKS.

PLANNING WILL NOW FOCUS ON FUTURE HANDLING OF LA
 TH WHEN OVERNIGHT DURING HIM TO PARIS PER PARA 4 REF A.
 THAT THE STAGE WE ENVIAGE RUTHERFORD'S CONTINUED
 VOLUNTEER IN OPERATION AND WE SEE IT AS LIKELY ANOTHER
 IS (OR THIS) IN TEHRAN MAY BE IN ORDER TO DEBRIEF AND PAY
 71 AT LEAST UNTIL TIME L/1 FEELS HE ABLE TO BREAK AWAY
 OR THIS TRIP. DETAILED PLANNING AND PROCEDURES WILL FOLLOW
 RUTHERFORD'S REPLY DEBRIEF RUTHERFORD.

8. FRANTECH: APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT DURING THIS
 TAIL OF OIL REY OPERATION. PLS SUGGEST TO RUTHERFORD THAT
 L/1 IN TRAVELLING TO HIS HOME ADDRESS FOR PERIOD 15-16
 REPTER OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES PERMIT) AND WHEN TDY HAS AREA
 7-8 SEPTEMBER FOR DEBRIEFING/PLANNING SESSION. ANTICIPATE
 UTILITY FOR AGREEMENT WITH THIS TIMETABLE. IT HAVE MADE
 COLLECTING AIRLINE AND HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR HIM

DEPART BOSTON (KLOGAN) AT 154 HRS VIA
 NORTHWEST-ORIENT FL 79
 ARRIVE DULLES AT 1718 HRS

... FOR ... SE ... T ... 1610 HRS VIA NORTHWEST ORIENT ...
... DULL ... AT 1736 HRS ...
... ARRIVED ... AT 1736 HRS ...
... PICK UP TICKETS ... AT ROGAN AIRPORT ...
... HE SH ...
... CENTER ...
... DULLES ...
... HOLIDAY ...
... AT 17 ... THIS ROOM IS AVAILABLE UNTIL ...
...
... THESE ARRANGEMENTS INCONVENIENT ...
... TAKE, PLS RESPOND BY IMMEDIATE ...
... WITHERFORD ...
... OFFICE OR ...
... 1-9592 ... RW 13 SEP 99 DEVI ... ALL SECT ...

... 132 ... SEP 79 ST ...
... DIRECTOR ...
... PRIORITY ...
... DIRECTOR ...
... 1. ID ...
... 2. ID ...
... 3. FILE ...
... DIRECTOR ...

5 SEP 79

SECRET 41049Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 395E2

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ATH CH, DIRTECH

UNIMBET LPGAMIN SDLURE TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 513151
TEHRAN 54195

UNABLE TO PASS ALONG REF A INFORMATION TO
RUTHERFORD ARRIVED AFTER EZNOVA LAST CONTACT
RUTHERFORD DEPARTED FRANKFURT FOR NEW YORK 14 SEP
0200 VIA E 494.

Z: 201-959289. RVW 14 SEP 99, DRV D9C.1.

SECRET
958

6 OCT 79 09 34z

SECRET 060119Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 528124.

TO: TEHRAN.

ADMIN FINAN

1. TDY TRAVELER GUY W. RUTHERFORD HAS SUBMITTED ACCOUNTING WHICH LISTS \$300.00 ADVANCE RECEIVED FROM TEHRAN STATION ON 12 SEPTEMBER. PLEASE CONFIRM TYPE OF CURRENCY ADVANEED AND EXACT AMOUNT.

2. PLEASE ADVISE STATUS OF TEHRAN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER ACCOUNTINGS. RVW 5OCT99 DRV D9C.3 ALL SECRET.

SECRET
BT
#3044

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