

**In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful**

In the name of Allah,
the most merciful, the most compassionate.

The victory of the Islamic Revolution shocked the East and the West, so that U.S. became frustrated with the failure of its intelligence apparatus in deterring revolutions. Despite its sophisticated methods, extensive resources and huge amount of accumulated experience, the C.I.A. failed to render a timely and correct analysis on the growth of the Islamic Revolution, its organization, leadership, and how it influenced the masses. The unmatched unity of our nation and their faith in victory, under the leadership of the Imam, provided the world with a unique pattern on bringing about an Islamic Revolution.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Americans decided to correct their points of weakness, since their official sources including military and civilian officials of the former regime had lost their capabilities. Others like the Liberation Movement members who provided the U.S. wittingly or not, with all kinds of information in their official and unofficial meetings, were not able to satisfy the intelligence needs of the Americans.

Their growing enmity with Islam and the Islamic Revolution compelled them to hatch plots as a countermeasure, which in turn necessitated access to full and basic information on the integrity of the Revolution.

The counter-revolutionary forces move on to gain a better understanding of the social, economic, political and ideological gaps that may exist in revolutionary ranks. This pattern is not confined to counterrevolutionary forces in Iran, but all throughout the world popular movements face similar plots which aim at the following objectives:

A) Identifying revolutionary figures and those who have entered their ranks with unrevolutionary attitudes.

B) Use of all related information in their plots and conspiracies to divert the direction of a revolution. Western oriented figures are considered as the main hopes in this effort, and heavy investments are made for them to occupy key revolutionary positions.

C) Use of information in forcefully countering a revolution, which include: overthrow, military aggression and the assassination of revolutionary leaders.

D) Providing information to the political allies of the power whose interests are threatened. Similarity of interests and political goals in most cases urges the formation of an alliance of various countries and powers, to bring about a co-ordination which is essential in carrying out any common plot against a revolution. They exchange information in order to strengthen their co-ordination.

A document included in this book explains the issue clearly. It concerns the report of a briefing session held by C.I.A analysts for a Zeev Alon, MOSAD "Israeli Espionage Service" representative in C.I.A.

The close affiliation of MOSAD and C.I.A and their common espionage objectives in collecting information on the Palestinian revolution eliminates differences that may not only exist between America and Israel but also between their intelligence agencies, to enable them to function as one organization in carrying out a co-ordinated program.

Discovering, identifying and hiring of an information source within an organization are the most important and effective C.I.A measures, and the agency applies all sophisticated methods in this connection.

Usually other spies and sources identify a potential source, while necessary actions are taken to hire him only after full investigation is conducted on his personal background.

The agency pays a lot of attention to certain personal characteristics that compell the individual to collaborate with those whom he used to look at as his staunch enemies at one time. these characteristics are as follows:

1. Common political positions usually are the most important cause of their collaboration with C.I.A. they consent to act as a spy and an information source for the C.I.A due to their faith in the western political system and culture. Amir Entezam and Moghaddam Maraghei (see books No 10 and 24 of our publications) fall in this category, because they voluntarily placed all information at the disposal of the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. Ideological frustration: Those who find unattended flows in the ideological approach of their respective organizations gradually become attracted to the opposition pole. Many of the C.I.A sources are the former hardline communists who were employed by the Agency, after their frustration with their own school of thought.

3. Financial needs: Financial needs sometimes urge an individual to volunteer for espionage. While approaching their sources, even those who are not in financial needs, C.I.A. officials provide them with gifts or wages in order to insure their collaboration.

Although the above points do not include all techniques exploited by intelligence agencies, they provide the basis for the introduction of the present book titled "Palestine- (3) "

Book No. 44: PALESTINE (3)

This book contains documents related with a C.I.A operation aimed at collecting intelligence from within the Islamic Revolution. The main agent of this operation is unidentified, but the Central Intelligence Agency refers to him as " M.G.Barge/1 " or " B/1 ". The documents generally include following information on him:

1. Membership in Fatah Organization: B/1 is a high ranking Fatah official, being perhaps the main reason for the C.I.A's attempt to hire him. He is also an expert on military training. According to a document: " B/1 and M/1 are in a position to be aware of all Fatah military training."

M/1 is another spy code named " M.G.Martyr/1 " whose connection with B/1 will be explained in other sections.

2. The documents do not state when he was hired by the C.I.A, but reports indicate that he must have been a long time hireling. It should also be noted that the substantial part of these documents deal with Barge's activities in Iran, therefore his reports in other fields are not available at the Tehran intelligence collecting station.

3. How " Barge " came to Iran: following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Islamic Republic's support for the Palestinian Revolution paved the way for a serious co-operation between the Islamic Revolution and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Thus a PLO delegation arrived in Iran to provide the Islamic Revolution Guards corps with the essential military training. Barge was a high ranking member and probably the head of the delegation.

4. According to another document Barge is seriously anti-communist, but no clue is given as to the reason for his opposition or attitude. This, however, has been an effective factor in his collaboration with C.I.A.

5. Barge's salary prior to May 22, 1979 was about 2000 Lebanese Lira, but the Central Intelligence Agency considered his financial problems and increased his salary to 4000 Lebanese Lira which is equal to Rials 100,000.

6. Although Iran was his main area of operation in 1979, the C.I.A station in Tehran was not responsible for establishing contacts with him. but due to the sensitivity of his connections with the agency, Beirut station got in touch with him through a third party, code-named " M.G.Martyr/1 ". In his contacts, M/1 would receive the code-written messages from B/1 and later submit them personally to the C.I.A officials.

7. Because of his critical mission and his membership in Fatah, B/1 was also in contact with the Palestinian Embassy in Tehran.

8. B/1's work facilitated his contacts with different C.I.A sections for which he collected information. A glance at the documents indicate that the collected information are usually on the following issues:

A-Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, its organization, number of personnel, arms, training, its significant figures, and finally the social and geographical strata the Guards belong to.

Since the Guards Corps comprises the front liners of the Islamic Revolution in confronting the counter-revolutionaries, all other forces intending to attack or counter the revolution, find the Corps " Sepah " as a consolidated embankment before them. therefore, in the first instance, they must collect basic information about the Guards Corps.

C.I.A, as the main intelligence front for the foreign based counter-revolution launched an operation to gain necessary knowledge on this newly established revolutionary institution, through Barge's good contacts with the Guards Corps.

Based on the exchanged information, one must admit that Barge's lack of intelligence, his unfamiliarity with the culture and attitude of the muslim revolutionaries, and lack of correct guidance from the C.I.A did not bring the success C.I.A expected to have through him.

B. Power system and sovereignty in Iran: Differences between the Imam and the provisional government, and the important clergyman's attitude towards the leader of the Islamic Revolution.

The newly established structure of the Islamic Republic, the unique leadership of the Imam which endowed it with the gift of stability, and the surprising spread of it outside the Iranian borders were always the main source of confusion for those who intended to analyse the revolution.

These factors on the one hand, and the unrivalled unity of our nation in the arena of their struggle for victory forced the anti-revolutionary plotters to revise their standard and out-dated conspiracies. C.I.A analysts, therefore, appealed to individuals like Barge, to have access to basic and essential information on the revolutionary circles. But C.I.A did not gain much in this field either, because Barge did not approach events dynamically.

C. A general situation report on Iran, the revolution, Khuzestan-related issues, and Kurdistan situation.

Excluding the Khuzestan issues on which Barge could have a positive operation due to his contacts with the PLO office in that province, Other reports included in this part were nothing but routine agenda for B/1. Because all C.I.A agents must dispatch their comments on the environment, and the activities that take place around them. Even these comments reflect Barge's personal understanding and are plagued with numberless deficiencies.

The only case in which Barge rendered an interesting analysis was his report on Tudeh Party, the reason being his anti-communist attitude.

Overview

As stated in the above, this book is about the operations of a PLO, Fatah member for the Central Intelligence Agency of America.

If Brage's espionage operations, and his position in P.L.O. are scrutinized carefully, one would wonder why he did all this. Why should he pretend to be struggling against Zionism and its advocate U.S.A, but in reality act as a direct spy for America and an indirect one for Zionism? Is Zionism not the main enemy of the Palestinian nation and a usurper of their Lands?

The introduction of the book No. 42 titled Palestine (1) and its documents reflected the P.L.O functions and the prevailing attitude of its leadership.

Reliance on political games, foreign dependence, aimlessness and the absurd attempts of individuals and groups ruling over P.L.O forced the organization to invest on political maneuvers and to follow the same politics as those of the reactionary Arab regimes, instead of fighting the enemies of the Palestinian nation directly.

These groups will inflict a detrimental blow on the Quds liberating revolution. The C.I.A infiltration and the existence of agents such as Barge in the top decision-making echelons of these same Palestinian groups are the unquestionable results of the absence of an Islamic faith in the P.L.O's leadership hierarchy.

The Palestinian moslem revolutionaries must make a basic revision on groups that are acting as their representatives, otherwise, these same groups will further produce traitor elements like Barge and Martyr.

In the recent years, the activities of the above-mentioned elements have had a negative impact on the Palestinian revolution, and the following cases indicate that the revolution is being forced to make compromises:

- Abandonment of an armed struggle for political moves;
- Lack of a decisive stand against the Camp David conspiracy, and engaging, instead, in political rhetoric as the sole countermeasure;

Accepting the Fahad Plan as an implicit acceptance of the Camp David conspiracy;

Holding direct talks with U.S. puppets such as king Hossain on the formation of a joint Jordano-Palestinian confederation;

Evacuating Beirut and leaving it to the Zionist front;


Establishing close ties with the Egyptian regime which has signed Camp David accords;

Launching all efforts to facilitate the return of Egypt to the Islamic fold;

Opposing the progressive frontline states;

By looking at the vague future based on these efforts, the Palestinian nation will certainly feel disappointed, but Almighty-Allah's promise for help will undoubtedly come true, and the brave sons and the unknown herose of Palestine will finally launch their real struggle, which is according to our Imam based on "the use of machine-guns that are only dependent on faith" may we witness the final victory of Islam.

Moslem students following the
line of the Imam.



SECRET 1100Z MAY 79 STAFF

CITE 5289

TO DIRECTOR WFO/TEHRAN

INFO: INSTEL/ALB/GEORGE MJMARTYR

A DETROIT 53820

BT TEHRAN 53008

1. IN BRAWLY CAR MEETING WITH MJMARTYR/1 NIGHT OF 18 MAY, WE ASKED HIM TO CLARIFY STRENGTH OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (REPUBLICAN GUARD) PER REF B PARA 12 COMMENT.

2. MJMARTYR/1, BASING HIS COMMENTS ON CONVERSATIONS WITH GUARDS/1, CLARIFIED THE SITUATION AS FOLLOWS:

A. 300,000 FIGURE GIVEN REF A AS PLANNED STRENGTH FOR REPUBLICAN GUARD WAS ERRONEOUS. PLANNED STRENGTH (AFTER COMPLETE TRAINING OF PERSONNEL WHICH WILL TAKE TWO TO THREE YEARS), IS 100,000 MEN. OF THESE, 40,000 WILL BE FULLY SALARIED AND PERMANENTLY TRAINED. IN BARGE I WILL TRY TO ESTABLISH PLANNED LOCATIONS AND HOLDINGS ONCE HE RETURNS TO IRAN. THE REMAINING 60,000 WILL CONSTITUTE SOME SORT OF A RESERVE. MJMARTYR/1 CALLED IT A "MILITIA" WHICH WOULD BE CALLED UPON ONLY WHEN THE PERMANENTLY MAINTAINED FORCE WAS OF INSUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO COPE WITH HIS MISSION.

B. THE MISSION OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD WILL BE INTERNAL SECURITY WITHIN IRAN'S LARGE CITIES. WE DO NOT HAVE A LIST. HOWEVER, CONCEPT IS THAT THEY WILL BE USED MAINLY AGAINST "COMMUNIST" AND COMMUNIST BACKED LEFTIST "MILITIAS", BUT THIS STATEMENT MAY REFLECT SOME OF MJMARTYR/1'S ANTI-COMMUNIST PREJUDICE. CERTAINLY, THEY WILL BE USED TO COMBAT BOTH COMMUNIST LEFTISTS, AND, ACCORDING TO MJMARTYR/1, ALSO OTHER MINORITIES. THE REPUBLICAN GUARD IS ONLY TO BE USED IN THE CITIES, AND WILL NOT HANDLE TROUBLES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

C. THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS WILL NOT BE TRAINED ON NOR ISSUED

... ONLY UP TO 82 MM - NO
... THEY WILL HAVE MORTARS, BUT ONLY UP TO 82 MM - NO
... TANK WEAPONS WILL BE PSA'S. THEY WILL HAVE 12.7 MM
... TRAINING IS FOR THESE WEAPONS, PLUS STREET FIGHTING.
... HAVE MORE ON THE TRAINING AT A LATER DATE.)

... ALSO SAID THAT KHOMEINI IS KEEPING DIRECT CONTROL
... OVER THE REPUBLICAN GUARD, BUT ALSO OVER THE AIR FORCE.
... UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT.

... PLUS THOSE IN DIRECTOR ASSISEE, WERE
... FOR PASSAGE TO MUBARGE/I. WE HAD TRANSLATED
... INFO/ARAPIC.

A. FILE# 221-946977, 261-921451. RVW 11MAY59 RVW D9C.11 ALSCREF
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SECRET 221022Z MAY 79 STAFF

OTE BEIRUT 53948

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

SPINTEL INTEL ARJUICE MUBARGE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 58861
B. TEHRAN 53928

1. IN LAST MEETING WITH MUBARGE/I (B/I) WE WENT OVER
REQUIREMENTS POSED IN RFRS. HE WILL ENDEAVOR TO OBTAIN
INFORMATION ON THOSE HE COULD NOT ANSWER.

2. WHAT ARE THE LOCATIONS OF THE PLO TRAINING SITE
THE PLO TRAINING TEAM IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING TRAINING
IN THE "ABBASABAD ARMY CAMP. THIS LOCATION IS ONLY A TEMPORARY
HOWEVER, AND B/I EXPECTS THE PRIMARY TRAINING SITE TO BE
MOVED TO AN AS YET UNDETERMINED LOCATION.

3. WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF PLO OFFICE IN AHWAZI
KHUZESTAN? B/I DOES NOT KNOW THE EXACT FUNCTION OF THIS
OFFICE. B/I ALSO DOES NOT KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES
THE OFFICE IS ENGAGED IN OR HOW MANY PALESTINIANS HAVE
BEEN SENT THERE. B/I COULD ONLY MAKE GENERAL COMMENTS
PALESTINIAN ACTIVITIES IN KHUZESTAN, SAYING THEY WERE
PLAYING A "GOOD ROLE." IN GENERAL, B/I SAID THAT PALESTINIAN
EFFORTS IN KHUZESTAN HAD BEEN TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN
THE PEOPLE ON ONE SIDE AND KHOMEINI AND THE GOVERNMENT
ON THE OTHER. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN EFFORTS
WAS TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN FROM "BLOWING UP"
B/I DOUBTED THAT ANY EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE IN KHUZESTAN
TO GAIN IRANIAN ADHERENTS FOR FIGHTING IN PALESTINE
IN ANY CASE, B/I KNEW OF NONE. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO
B/I, "LARGE" NUMBERS OF IRANIS HAVE APPROACHED THE PLO
OFFICE IN TEHRAN VOLUNTEERING TO GO TO PALESTINE TO FIGHT.
THESE HAVE ALL BEEN REGISTERED, BUT THERE IS NO CURRENT
PLANS TO SEND THEM TO PALESTINE. CONTINGENT PLANNING

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FOR THEIR USE, HOWEVER, IS BEING MADE BY THE PLO. B/1
REITERATED THAT THERE WAS NO ACTIVE PLOW FOR THE PLO
KNOWN OF IN IRAN TO RECRUIT FIGHTERS. KHOMENI HAS OF COURSE
OTHER SUPPORT (WFI) TO THE PALESTINIANS, BUT ARABIA HAS
NOT ACCEPTED. B/1 HAS NOT DETAILS ON THIS. B/1 DID SAY
THAT MANY AL-HAYAN HAD ACTIVELY LOBBIED WITH KHOMENI
TO CUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT.

4. B/1 COULD NOT REALLY COMMENT ON YAZDI'S APPOINTMENT
AS FOREIGN MINISTER. B/1 DID SAY THAT YAZDI WAS CLOSE TO
BAZARGAN, WHO, IN TURN, HAD BEEN A GOOD FRIEND OF PRIOR
MINISTER SAJJAR, NONE OF WHOM WERE POPULAR WITH THE REVOLU
TIONARY GUARDS.

5. B/1 SAID THAT IN THE OPINION OF THE GOVERNMENT/
RELIGIOUS FIGURES NOTARI'S ASSASSIN WERE EITHER FORMER
MEMBERS OF SAVAK OR COMMUNISTS. B/1, HOWEVER, KNEW OF
NO HARD INFORMATION ON THEIR IDENTITIES. HE DID SAY THAT
THE GOVERNMENT/KHOMENI PLANNED "CRACK DOWN" (WFI) ON
THESE GROUPS.

6. B/1 SAYS THAT THERE ARE SOME SERIOUS DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN KHOMENI AND BAZARGAN, BUT THAT HE (S/D) DID NOT
KNOW THE EXTENT OF THESE DIFFERENCES. ONE OF THE PRIMARY
DIFFERENCES, HOWEVER, WAS OVER THE PRESENCE, USE, AND IN-
FLUENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY
COMMITTEES. BAZARGAN WANTED TO ELIMINATE THESE AS THE
GOVERNMENT WAS PRACTICALLY POWERLESS. KHOMENI, HOWEVER,
WOULD NOT GO TO BAZARGAN ON THIS. ALSO, B/1 SAID THAT
BAZARGAN WANTS TO DECREASE THE PLO'S INFLUENCE WITHIN
THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND ON KHOMENI. BAZARGAN ALSO
WANTS TO GIVE THE ARMY A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE. B/1 SAYS
THAT WHILE BAZARGAN IS NOT AN ARDENT PLO SUPPORTER,
NEITHER IS HE AGAINST THE PLO.

7. KHOMENI, ACCORDING TO B/1, APPEARS TO BE IN VERY
GOOD HEALTH. HE APPEARS ROBUST AND STRONG. B/1 BELIEVES
THAT KHOMENI WILL LIVE FOR A "LONG TIME". KHOMENI'S
DIET CONSISTS MAINLY OF MILK AND BREAD, AND LITTLE MEAT.
HE EATS VERY LITTLE MEAT.

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B/1 HAD NO INFORMATION ON AUTONOMY MOVEMENTS AMONG
THE MINORITIES. B/1 DID STATE THAT CURRENT PLO POLICY
WAS TO FAVOR KHOMENI AND NOT TO BACK THE MINORITIES.

8. THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ARE NOW BEING TRAINED
AT THE ABBASABAD COMPOUND. THERE IS ALSO SOME TRAINING
CONDUCTED AT THE WAR COLLEGE. ANOTHER TRAINING AREA IS
BEING PLANNED FOR WESHED, AND, EVENTUALLY, TRAINING
SITES WILL BE ESTABLISHED THROUGHOUT IRAN. AS MENTIONED IN
PARA 2, THE SITE AT THE ABBASABAD COMPOUND WILL SOON
BE TRANSFERRED.

9. NO PLO TRAINING TEAM MEMBERS ARE AT THE GULF
DISTRICT COMPOUND AND B/1 DOES NOT KNOW IT. CONCERNING
COMPOUNDS HE HAS SEEN ABBASABAD. B/1 STATES THAT ALL
OFFICES HAVE BEEN BROKEN INTO. BOMB SAFES HAVE ALSO BEEN
BROKEN INTO, BUT MOST HAVE NOT. ATTEMPTS USUALLY
CONSISTED OF TRYING TO SHOOT OFF THE COMBINATION LOCKS.
B/1 WILL TRY TO FIND OUT MORE.

10. THE PLO TRAINING TEAM IS CURRENTLY HOUSED IN THREE
LOCATIONS. ONE GROUP IS IN THE FAJRISH AREA, ANOTHER IS
IN THE SHENIRAN AREA, AND THE VILLA IN WHICH THE MISSION
HEADQUARTERS, AND IN WHICH B/1 LIVES, IS LOCATED ON
FRESHTEH STREET, AT THE TOP OF JORDAN STREET.

11. B/1 ALSO SAID THAT THE PLO DOES NOT ASK FOR
ANY INFLUENCE OVER THE ASSIGNMENT OF PALESTINIAN TECH-
NICIANS TO WORK IN THE OIL FIELDS, BUT THAT THE PLO IS
WORKING TO OBTAIN SUCH INFLUENCE. THEY EXPECT THAT
KHOMENI WILL GRANT THEM SOME SORT SAY ON THIS MATTER
IN THE FUTURE.

12. WE ARE PUTTING DETAILS OF TRAINING AND ORGANI-
ZATION OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS INTO SEPARATE CABLE.

13. FILE: 201-945977. RWV 20MAY 79 DRV DSC-1
SECRET
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SECRET 222341Z MAY 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 443685.

TO: IMMEDIATE BEIRUT INFO TEHRAN.

WINTEL ARJUICE MJBARGE

REF: BRIOT 53949

1. PROPOSE ASSIST MJBARGE/1 IN HIS FINANCIAL MATTERS AS FOLLOWS:

A. DOUBLE HIS SALARY (RET OACTIVE TO THE TIME HE ARRIVED TEHRAN) TO LL 4,000 RPT LL 4,000 FOR THE TIME HE REMAINS IN IRAN.

B. ADVANCE HIM THE 30,000 RIYALS (APPROX US\$ 10,000) HE BE PAID FROM HIS MONTHLY SALARY.

C. HAVE HIM REPAY SALARY ADVANCE FROM IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WHILE IN TEHRAN, AT THE RATE OF LL 2,000 RPT LL 2,000/MONTH. HE RETURNS PCS FROM TEHRAN BEFORE ADVANCE BE PAID. NEGOTIATE THE TERMS FOR THE REPAYMENT OF THE BALANCE OF HIS SALARY FROM HIS NORMAL LL 2,000/MO SALARY.

2. IF ABOVE ACCEPTABLE TO STATION AND MJBARGE/1, ADVISE HIS MOC TO REFLECT ABOVE. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-94677. RVW 22MAY 1979 DUC/1

SECRET

BT
#2459

SECRET 230925Z MAY 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 53953

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WINTEL INTEL AJAJA MJBARGE

REF: DIRECTOR 455108

1. MJBARGE/1 (B/1) RESPONSES TO PARA 2 REF REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING ACTIVITIES OF KHOMEINI SUPPORTERS IN LEBANON, ARE SET FORTH BELOW. B/1'S KNOWLEDGE IN THIS SUBJECT IS RATHER LIMITED.

2. B/1 IDENTIFIES THE "AL-AZAR" LEBANON GOVERNMENT AS BEING AN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT MADE UP OF FARSI FOLLOWERS OF KHOMEINI. HE WOULD NOT PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH "AMAL" OR DETAILING ITS SUPPORT FROM KHOMEINI.

3. OTHER THAN SAYING THAT HUSAIN-AL-HUSAYNI HAD A "GOOD" RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMEINI, B/1 WOULD NOT PROVIDE ANY DETAILS OF THAT RELATIONSHIP.

4. B/1 SAYS THAT KHOMEINI, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, PLAN TO EXPORT THEIR REVOLUTION TO ALL MUSLIM COUNTRIES. B/1 HAS HEARD KHOMEINI SPEAK ON THE SUBJECT AND KHOMEINI HAS MENTIONED EXPORTING THE REVOLUTION NOT ONLY TO LEBANON, BUT ALSO TO IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, PAKISTAN, AFRICA (IN GENERAL) AND EVEN TO THE PHILIPPINES. B/1 DOES NOT KNOW KHOMEINI'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, NOR DOES HE HAVE AN IDEA AS TO THE ROLE WHICH KHOMEINI ENVISIONS FOR LEBANON'S SH

5. B/1 SAID THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE COORDINATION OF GOOD MILITARILY BETWEEN FAJAN AND "AMAL". POLITICAL ISSUES ARE SLIGHTLY STRONGER, BUT ARE STILL VERY SLIGHT. B/1 SAID HE COULD NOT ESTIMATE THE STRENGTH OF "AMAL", BUT HE DOES KNOW THAT IT HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MUSA SADR.

6. B/1 BELIEVES THAT IRANIAN SHAYKH ARE CONTINUALLY VISITING

29 May 79 422

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LEBANON IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE SITUATION, BUT HE HAS NO OFFICIAL
INFORMATION THAT THIS IS TRUE.

7. KHOMEINI DOES NOT HAVE ANY OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES IN
LEBANON, ACCORDING TO B/1. HOWEVER, LEBANESE SHIA (B/1
HAS NO IDENTIFICATIONS) ARE REPORTING TO KHOMEINI ON THE
SITUATION IN LEBANON. THESE SHIA COME FROM BOTH WITHIN TAMA
AND FROM WITHOUT THAT ORGANIZATION.

8. KHOMEINI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SYRIA IS NOT VERY FAVORABLE
AS HE CONSIDERS THE ALAWITES HERETICS. B/1 SAYS HE WAS TOLD
BY HANI AL-HASAN THAT THE PURPOSE OF AHMAD AHMAD AHMAD'S MID-
APRIL TRIP TO TEHRAN WAS TO ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETW
SYRIA AND KHOMEINI. HASAN WAS AT THE AIRPORT TO GREET AHMAD
B/1 COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIP.

9. B/1 ALSO SAID THAT KHOMEINI IS NOT PLEASED WITH IRAQ.
THIS DISPLEASURE IS BASED ON IRAQ'S COOPERATION WITH THE SHAH
OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. KHOMEINI ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE
IRAQI SHIA ARE THREATENED BY THE IRAQI REGIME.

10. WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE B/1 ATTEMPT TO SERVICE REF
REQUIREMENTS IN MORE DETAIL.

11. FILE: 221-946977. RVW 23 MAY 89 DRV DPG. 1 ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

SECRET 241100Z MAY 79 STAFF

CIT BEIRUT 53957

FOR DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

TEL AMUNICE TO ARCH

INFO: A. DIRECTOR 245669
P. BEIRUT 53949

WE GREATLY APPRECIATE PROMPT REPLY AND HEADQUARTERS PROGRESS
ON LARGER (B/1) FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. PLEASE AMEND B/1'S
TO REFLECT REF A PROPOSAL, WHICH BOTH STATION AND B/1
ACCEPTABLE.

B/1 TOLD US TODAY THAT HE HAS NOW BEEN AWARDED TO RETURN
TEHRAN IN TEN TO TWENTY DAYS. OUR NEXT MEETING IS SCHEDULED
FOR 11 JUNE, AND B/1 WILL USE CALL IN SYRIA IF HE LEAVES BEIRUT
BEFORE. HE WILL TRY TO CALL IN THREE OR FOUR DAY PRIOR TO

12. FILE: 221-946977. RVW 24 MAY 89 DRV DPG. 1 ALL SECRET
SECRET

SECRET 110702Z AUG 79

CITE TEHRAN 03724

TOP SECRET INFO DIRECTOR

UNINTEL MESSAGE

REF: 01 JUL 79 24214

1. IT POSSIBLE THAT SOME OF FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WILL BE ASKED PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF INCIDENT COS TEHRAN. ALSO, WOULD APPROPRIATE REPLY TO ASMITTING APPROPRIATE CORRESPONDENCE. SOME QUESTIONS NOT YET ANSWERED, AND WHICH YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE.

A. WITH WHOM IN PG01 AND/OR ST GOV. DOES MURDERER DEAL? WITH BOTH SIDES WHICH ONE MAKES POLICY DECISIONS? COORDINATION WITH VARIOUS IRANIAN AUTHORITIES, DOES EXIST? IS THERE INFLUENCE RISING OR DECLINING WITH RESPECT TO KHOMENI? IS THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE MORE THAN SEVERAL LOCAL COUNCILS THAT HAVE RECENTLY BEEN INSTALLED AT ST. CABINET LEVEL AND/OR AT PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL LEVELS? HOW DO THEY RELATE TO EACH OTHER?

F. WHAT IS THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR PASDARAN? HOW MANY PASDARAN ARE THERE AND WHERE? IS THERE A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR MEN AND WOMEN? WHAT ARE THEIR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND ARE THERE SIGNIFICANT INTERESTS IN US AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES AND KNOWLEDGE WHO?

C. WHAT ARE RELATIONSHIPS (ARMY AND POLICE) WITH OTHER FORCES (PASDARAN, ARMY, AND POLICE) AND CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (E.G. REF)?

D. HOW IS PASDARAN DISCIPLINED? WHAT IS PASDARAN OPINION TOWARD DEPLOYMENT AGAINST ETHNIC DISSENTS IN KURDISTAN AND BALUCHISTAN?

E. WHAT ARE IDENTITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF ALL FLOWERS (MUSLIM) BY EYE TO BE WORKING IN IRAN?

F. WHAT ARE THE IRAQI'S DOING TO INCREASE IRANIAN SECURITY?

G. NO FILE - ADV 26 JUL 79 - DRV DS - ALL SECURITY

SECRET 110702Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH
CITE WASHINGTON 493393L SECTION 1 OF 2.

TOP TEL AVIV INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, TEHRAN.

FM: NE/ISR INFO NE/EL, NE/EL, NE/PAL, NE/INTEL, NE/IRAQ, NIO/NESEA, OPA/ME

SUBJECT: UNINTEL - MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING.

1. THE MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING WAS HELD AT HEADQUARTERS ON 9 AUGUST 1979 FOR MOSCOW REP ZEEV ALLON. LIAISON AGENDA YK/2A/836/79 WAS USED AS BASIS FOR THE BRIEFING.

2. PRIOR TO THE MEETING, C/NE/ISR EXPLAINED TO ALLON THAT WE WANTED TO OMIT DISCUSSING THE SECTION ON EGYPT AND UN RESOLUTION 242 AS THIS WAS A POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUE BEING HANDLED AT HIGHER ECHELONS AND IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR US TO COMMENT.

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

3. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION PENDING FROM THE LAST MEETING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN TURKEY, THE UNFAC ANALYST SAID THAT THIS EXISTENCE CANNOT BE CONFIRMED IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. THE BROTHERHOOD'S POTENTIAL FOR EXISTENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF AND THE NATIVE ALAWITE POPULATION IN TURKEY. THERE ARE RELIGIOUSLY CONSERVATIVE SUNNI ELEMENTS THAT WOULD LIKE THE BROTHERHOOD TO EXIST. HOWEVER, THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IS A VERY FRAGILE ONE THAT DEPENDS ON HETERODOX ALEVI, WHICH ARE SHIITE ORIENTED, FOR SUPPORT. IF THE PRESENT TURKEY GOVERNMENT WERE TO GIVE ASYLUM OR HINT OF ASYLUM TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD THE GOVERNMENT WOULD LOSE SUPPORT OF THE ALEVI GROUP. THE REASON THE ALEVI ARE SO SENSITIVE IS BECAUSE THE CURRENT STATE OF MARITAL LAW WAS ACTUALLY SPARKED BY CLASHES BETWEEN SUNNIST AND SHIITE EXTREMISTS AND THE ALEVI IN EASTERN TURKEY. SHOULD THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY COLLAPSE AND SHOULD A MORE

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 493393 S E C R E T
CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT BE INSTALLED. THE CHANCES FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ARE EQUALLY POOR BECAUSE
OF THE MILITARY, WHICH IS A HIGHLY SECULAR FORCE AND WHICH WOULD
RAISE BEHIND-THE-SCENES OBJECTIONS.

4. ACCORDING TO THE NFAC ANALYST, SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD
HAS FELT THAT THE CLASHES IN TURKEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO SUNNI-
ALAWITE TENSIONS IN SYRIA. THE ALEVI IN TURKEY AND THE ALAWITE
FORM THE LARGEST NON-SUNNI ELEMENT. THIS ELEMENT IS VERY VISIBLE
AND IS NOT LOST ON ASSAD. BOTH SYRIA AND TURKEY HAVE A SUNNI
MAJORITY. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THAT ANY UNOFFICIAL SHELTER
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD MIGHT FIND IN TURKEY EXISTS IN THE
SOUTHERN PROVINCE AREA THAT BORDERS SYRIA DIRECTLY. SMUGGLERS
LOCATED IN THIS AREA PROBABLY CONSIDER THEMSELVES NEITHER
TURKS NOR SYRIANS AND WOULD LIKELY BE THE GROUP TO GIVE ASYLUM.

PLO

5. REGARDING LIAISON'S QUESTION ABOUT THE PLO'S
INVOLVEMENT IN MOVES/FEELERS TO INTEGRATE INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS,
THE ANALYST SAID WE SEE CURRENT PLO INVOLVEMENT IN A BROADER
CONTEXT. WE FEEL THE INITIATIVES AT THE UN AND IN WEST
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED CHIEFLY BY ARAFAT, WHO
HAS ACTED WITH VERY LITTLE CONSULTATION WITH OTHER PLO LEADERS.
ONE OF ARAFAT'S GOALS IS TO HAVE AS MANY OPTIONS AS POSSIBLE
DURING THE PEACE PROCESS. EVEN IF THE UN INITIATIVE IS ACCEPTED
AND THE RESOLUTION IS PASSED, WE MAY NOT SEE ANY IMMEDIATE MOVES
TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THERE ARE LIKELY
OTHER ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED FIRST. ARAFAT'S VIEWS MAY DIFFER
WITH THOSE OF OTHER PLO LEADERS, BUT WE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL
THE RESOLUTION WERE ACTUALLY PASSED BEFORE WE COULD KNOW WHAT
THE VIEWS ARE OF OTHER PLO OFFICIALS.

6. ON 11 AUGUST THE PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL WILL MEET.
ACCORDING TO THE NFAC ANALYST, ARAFAT REALIZES THAT A PROPOSAL
FOR PLO INVOLVEMENT IN PRESENT AUTONOMY TALKS WOULD SPILT THE
PLO. WE DO NOT THINK THIS WILL EVOLVE. WE THINK ARAFAT WANTS
TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF ADVANCING PALESTINIAN POLITICAL
RIGHTS SHOULD THE AUTONOMY TALKS NOT WORK OUT. ARAFAT'S GOALS
ARE TO GAIN WIDE RECOGNITION AND INCREASED CONTACTS WITH THE

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WEST. LOOKING BEYOND THE MAY DEADLINE FOR THE AUTONOMY TALKS,
ARAFAT SEES TWO POSSIBLE OUTCOMES SHOULD THE TALKS FAIL TO GAIN
AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT FOR THE PALESTINIANS: A) A STRONGER
REJECTIONIST STANCE, DIRECTED ALSO AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
AND B) ACQUIESCENCE, WHICH WOULD MAKE ARAFAT APPEAR TO BE A WEAK
LEADER WHO DID NOT DIRECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS. FOR THESE
REASONS ARAFAT WANTS TO EXPLORE MEANS OF CONTINUING HIS
INVOLVEMENT AND ENHANCING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCEPTABLE
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AT A FUTURE DATE. HENCE, ARAFAT'S EFFORT
TO GAIN U.S. RECOGNITION AND TO INCREASE CONTACTS WITH WEST
EUROPEAN LEADERS.

7. AS FOR ACTIONS BEING TAKEN BY ORGANIZATIONS THAT OPPOSE
ARAFAT'S INITIATIVES, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THE STANCE OF
OPPOSITION GROUPS IDEALS NOT WITH CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BUT WITH
RESOLUTION BUILDING ON 242. REGARDING THE QUESTION OF WHAT
OPPOSITION GROUPS WOULD JOIN WITH ARAFAT, THE NFAC ANALYST
SAID THIS WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT CONCESSIONS WERE MADE BY THE
WEST SHOULD ARAFAT ACCEPT RESOLUTION 242. SYRIA AND SAUDI
WOULD BE THE KEY TO PLO ACCEPTANCE OF ARAFAT'S PROPOSAL ON
242. WITHOUT SYRIA AND SAUDI, ARAFAT WOULD NOT HAVE A
MAJORITY. BUT IF SYRIA ACCEPTS, THE CHANCES ARE GOOD THAT
THE UN RESOLUTION WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE PLO.

8. AS FOR THE MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM OBJECTIVES OF ARAFAT'S
INITIATIVE, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID U.S. RECOGNITION--OR SOME
DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE PLO--IS MAXIMUM. WITHIN THE
UN, RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION AND
INDEPENDENT STATE IS MAXIMUM. RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHT
TO SELF DETERMINATION IS MINIMUM. ANY WORDING MORE GENERAL
THAN THIS WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR ARAFAT TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE
AMONG THE PLO.

9. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID WE HAVE NOT SEEN MUCH REACTION
AMONG THE PLO OR THE ARAB STATES IN REGARD TO THE UN INITIATIVE
THE BREAKDOWN, HOWEVER, WOULD BE LOGICAL. CONSERVATIVE STATES
WOULD SEE IT AS BUILDING ON SOMETHING WORTHWHILE, BUT THERE
WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL OF DEBATE OVER WORDING. IRAQ, WE WOULD
IMAGINE, WOULD MAINTAIN ITS REJECTIONIST STANCE. AS FOR SYRIA
THE WORDING WOULD BE CRUCIAL. IN EFFECT, THERE IS NO CHANCE

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OF IRAQI SUPPORT, BUT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF SYRIAN SUPPORT
IN THE SENSE THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT ACTIVELY OPPOSE THE
INITIATIVE. WE THINK THE SOVIET UNION HAS REACTED NEUTRALLY
TOWARD ARAFAT'S INITIATIVES AT THE UN AND IN WESTERN EUROPE.
THE SOVIETS WOULD FEAR THE PLO BEING DRAWN CLOSER TO THE
UNITED STATES AND THE REGION OF THE ARAB BLOC THAT OPPOSES THE
CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. ARAFAT WOULD LIKE TO GET ENOUGH SUPPORT
TO CONTINUE INITIATIVES WITHOUT RISKING AN OUTRIGHT SPLIT
WITHIN PLO RANKS.

11. ALLOAN ASKED THE QUESTION OF WHO IS ARAFAT'S MAIN ENEMY
AT THE UN, AND THE NFAC ANALYST SAID MOST LIKELY IT IS THE
KIMAITIS SINCE THEY ARE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ALLON ASKED
IF THERE WERE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PLO AND EGYPT ON THIS POINT.
THE NFAC ANALYST ANSWERED WE WOULD SUSPECT SO AT LEAST IN THE
FORM OF INFORMAL CONTACTS BUT THAT WE HONESTLY DON'T KNOW HOW FAR
THE RECHERONS THESE CONTACTS WENT.

IRAC-SYRIA

11. REGARDING RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ, THE NFAC ANALYST
SAID WE SEE THESE EVENTS AS A POLITICAL CONFRONTATION RATHER
THAN AS A COUP PLOT. THESE EVENTS HAVE ALREADY HAD A COOLING
EFFECT ON IRAQI-SYRIAN RELATIONS. ACCORDING TO OUR INTERPRETATION
OF EVENTS, WE THINK THIS WILL BE SHORT TERM. A POLITICAL
CONFRONTATION WOULD BE A DOMESTIC PROBLEM, AND SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT
WOULD NOT BE A MAJOR ELEMENT. WHAT IS DIFFICULT TO DISCOVER IS
IRAQI, AND SPECIFICALLY SADDAM HUSAYN'S PERCEPTION. UP TO
LAST OCTOBER, EACH COUNTRY WAS IN CONTACT WITH AND SUPPORTING
THE OPPOSITION GROUPS OF THE OTHER COUNTRY. BOLD SUSPICIONS
DIE HARD, AND WE ASSUME HUSAYN SUSPECTS SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR
OPPOSITION GROUPS IN IRAQ. WE DO NOT BELIEVE ASSAD RECENTLY
HAS BEEN ACTIVELY SUPPORTING IRAQI DISSENT. OUR LACK OF
SUCH EVIDENCE LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT SUCH IRAQI-SYRIAN
SPONSORSHIP OF OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER CEASED
WITH THE RAPPROCHEMENT LAST FALL. THE REASONS THAT BROKE
SYRIA AND IRAQ TOGETHER LAST FALL STILL EXIST, BUT THIS LATEST
INCIDENT INDICATES THE FRAGILITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP. THE
RESIDUE OF PAST ANIMOSITY IS STILL THERE. AN OPEN BREAK
BETWEEN THE TWO WILL NOT SERVE EITHER'S INTEREST, AND IRAQ

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SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE THIS BY REFUSING TO NAME THE FOREIGN ELEMENT
EVEN THOUGH EVERYONE ASSUMES THE UNIDENTIFIED FOREIGN ELEMENT
IS SYRIA.

12. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE
LONG-TERM IMPACT. AS FOR THE SHORT TERM, OUR ASSESSMENT IS:
AS LONG AS SERIOUS TENSION BETWEEN THE TWO EXISTS IT WILL BE
DIFFICULT TO ORGANIZE ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT. THEREFORE,
CONCERTED ARAB ACTIONS FOR NEW MEASURES, SUCH AS ADDITIONAL
SANCTIONS AGAINST EGYPT WILL BE UNLIKELY TO OCCUR. THERE
IS AN ARAB CONSENSUS, HOWEVER, ON CURRENT SANCTIONS. THERE IS
NOTHING TO STOP UNLATERAL EFFORTS TO MAKE ARAB MODERATES
HOLD THE LINE, AND THESE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE THE SAME NET EFFECT
CONCERTED PRESSURE.

13. IN THE MID-TERM, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID OUR TENTATIVE
ASSESSMENT IS THAT RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ WILL HAVE LITTLE OR
NO EFFECT ON IRAQI INTER-ARAB POLICY. ALSO, EVENTS WILL HAVE
NO EFFECT ON SYRIAN POLICY IN LEBANON AS THE REASONS FOR
STAYING OR WITHDRAWING DO NOT DERIVE FROM RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.
LIKewise WE FEEL EVENTS IN IRAQ WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON SYRIAN
ATTITUDE TOWARD THE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN THOUGH
RELATIONS WITH IRAQ ARE IMPORTANT FOR SYRIA, THE QUESTION OF
SYRIANS JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS IS SO IMPORTANT THAT SYRIA
WOULD ACT WHEN IT WAS AS RIGHT FOR SYRIA--REGARDLESS OF IRAQI
OBJECTIVES.

14. FILE: 5-2-8/6. RVW 9A18G9 DRV D9B.2.
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 0209 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 5410

TO: IMMEDIATEBEIR DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL MJBARGE INTEL

REF: BEIRUT 54880

1. IN ADDITION TO REQUIREMENTS ALREADY FURNISHED, WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN AN IN MJBARGE/I HAS OF GAN ACQUIRE ON THE SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY, ONE TWELVE OF WHOSE ALLEGED MEMBERS HAVE BEEN SENTENCED T DEATH IN AHVAZ. DOES THE PARTY HAVE ANY PALESTINIAN--P RHA S FLP--CONNECTIONS? WHAT ARE ITS CURRENT MEMBERSHIP, OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES?

2. WE HAVE HEARD THAT O OFFICE IN AHVAZ WAS CLOSED CIRCA MID-JULY. CAN B/I CONFIR AN PROVIDE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CLOSURE? ANY CHANGE OFFICE WILL RE P N

3. NO FILE. RVW 2 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

Note: This is a typed text of a shredded document which was reconstructed;

the reason being its opacity which makes it unfit for printing purposes.

Between-the-letters' space in dicates that the shreds were either incomplete

or they were fully un intelligible.

5 Sep 79

S E C R E T 0209 15Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 54563

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, LONDON.

WNINTEL INTEL PEEFFORT

1. PEEFFORT/I HAS PASSED US INFORMATION WHICH HE OBTAINED FROM HANNA BIR F I D I OF PHALANGE PARTY G-2, CONCERNING THE TRAINING OF IRANIANS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON BY PALESTINIANS. ACCORDING TO BREIDI, A MESSENGER FROM MAJOR SAAD H A D D A D, LEADER OF THE RIGHTIST MILITIAS IN SOUTH LEBANON, TOLD THE LEBANESE FRONT'S MILITARY COUNCIL ON 19 AUGUST THAT 150 IRANIANS WERE BEING TRAINED NEAR THE LITANI RIVER BY FATAH. THE IRANIANS WERE DESCRIBED ONLY AS BEING PRO-KHOMENEI.

2. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY QUERIED MJBARGE/I, MJMARTYR/I AND MJBRIDGE/I ABOUT PALESTINIAN TRAINING OF IRANIANS IN LEBANON. ALL THREE DENY THAT ANY SUCH TRAINING IS GOING ON. MJBARGE/I AND MJMARTYR/I ARE CERTAINLY IN A POSITION TO BE KNOWNLY GABLY OF ANY FATAH TRAINING, AND THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN RELUCTANT TO SUPPLY US WITH ANY INFORMATION ON IRAN, OR ON FATAH TRAINING OF OTHER GROUPS. MJBRIDGE/I TRAVELS TWICE A WEEK TO SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND HE SAYS THAT ALL TRAINING SITES IN THE SOUTH HAVE BEEN CLOSED BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELI SHELLING AND BOMBING CAMPAIGN THERE, WHICH HAS BEEN CONTINUAL SINCE APRIL. MJBARGE/I SAYS THAT IF ANY TRAINING OF IRANIANS IS GOING ON IT WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED IN SYRIA OR IN NORTHERN LEBANON (THE BID'AN VALLEY FOR INSTANCE) AS IT IS NOT CURRENTLY FEASIBLE IN THE SOUTH.

3. FRANKLY, WE DOUBT THAT PARA 1 INFORMATION IS TRIF.

4. PARA 1 MAY BE PASSED TO GNGRAPH.

5. FILE: DEFER. RVW 5 SEP 99 DRV D9C. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

5 SEP 79

REF: 51230Z SEP 79 STAFF

TEHRAN 54565

DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

TEL: MJBARGE

1. A. TEHRAN 54474
B. BEIRUT 54482
C. DIRECTOR 475714

1. AT SEPTEMBER MEETING, MJMARTYR/1 INFORMED US THAT APPROX 100 MEMBERS IN LIBYA REPRESENTING FATMA AT A MEETING OF REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BECAUSE OF THIS, WE COULD NOT COVER WITH MJBARGE/1 HIS WRITTEN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS. THE CO-INFORMER WILL BE ABLE TO ELABORATE ON HIS ANSWERS. WE WILL BE ABLE TO ELABORATE ON HIS ANSWERS. WE WILL BE ABLE TO ELABORATE ON HIS ANSWERS. WE WILL BE ABLE TO ELABORATE ON HIS ANSWERS.

2. AT MEETINGS, MJMARTYR/1 ALSO PASSED ON ADDITIONAL WRITTEN REPORTS ON EVENTS IN IRAN WHICH MJMARTYR/1 HAD PREPARED PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR LIBYA. WE ARE CURRENTLY ORGANIZING THESE IN OPS FORMAT.

3. MJMARTYR/1 SAYS THAT MJBARGE/1 STILL EXPECTS TO TRAVEL TO TEHRAN UPON HIS RETURN FROM LIBYA. WE PASSED ON REQUIREMENTS FOR MJBARGE/1 TO GIVE TO MJBARGE/1.

4. FILE: DEFER. RVM 5 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

6 Sep 79

REF: 51230Z SEP 79 STAFF

TEHRAN 54565

DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

TEL: MJBARGE

1. DIRECTOR 475714
B. BEIRUT 54482
C. TEHRAN 54565

THE FOLLOWING IS MJMARTYR/1'S (1/1) WRITTEN RESPONSE TO ONE OF THE QUESTIONS POSED IN REF.

1. POLITICAL DYNAMICS

A. DECISIONS IN IRAN ARE MADE BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH AYATOLLAH MONTAZARI AND OTHER AYATOLLAHS IN KHOMEINI'S INNER CIRCLE. KHOMEINI IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE SPIRITUAL FATHER OF THE STATE, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND THE STATE IS THAT THE STATE TO IMPLEMENT DECISIONS WHICH KHOMEINI HAS MADE. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IS DIRECTLY UNDER KHOMEINI IN AUTHORITY AND PARTICIPATES IN THE DECISION MAKING. THE STATE DOES NOT HAVE DECISION-MAKING POWER; IT ONLY EXISTS TO IMPLEMENT THE DECISIONS MADE BY KHOMEINI AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND PRIME MINISTER MURDI IS A 7 A 7 C A N IS LUKAWAN AT TIMES. BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENT ON SOME POINTS, AND IS GOOD AT OTHER TIMES. IN GENERAL, THE RELATIONSHIP COULD BE DESCRIBED AS "NOT BAD". THE POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND BAZARGAN ARE:

(1) THE INTERVENTION OF THE "RELIGIOUS MEN" IN ALL MATTERS LARGE AND SMALL.

(2) BAZARGAN'S OPPOSITION TO THE EXECUTIONS, WHICH ARE THE RESULT OF CONTINUED PROSECUTIONS BY THE "RELIGIOUS MEN".

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(3) THE PRACTICES (MFT) OF ELEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS.

(4) KHOMEINI'S INSISTENCE THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS BE THE ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY.

(5) KHOMEINI'S PRO-PALESTINIAN STANCE, HIS ATTITUDE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AND HIS STAND ON EGYPT.

(6) THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY AND THE REORGANIZING THEM BY BAZARGAN HAS ONE OPINION AND KHOMEINI ANOTHER.

(7) THE SEVERE DECISIONS MADE BY KHOMEINI, WHICH BAZARGAN CONSIDERS, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, REACTIONARY.

C. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS ITS HEADQUARTERS AT THE CENTER OF ITS ACTIVITY IS IN TEHRAN. IT HAS A PRESENCE IN ALL REGIONS IN IRAN. IT IS COMPOSED OF AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PERSONS, BUT A NUMBER SUFFICIENT TO COVER ALL THE REGIONS. IT IS HEADED BY KHOMEINI. OTHER RANKING MEMBERS ARE: AYATOLLAH MONTAZARI, AYATOLLAH (? AL-TAYS ?), AHMAD AL-KHOMEINI, AYATOLLAH KHALIHALI, ESHRAFI (PROBABLY ESHRAQI), COLONEL (MUTID) NAMTU, AND AHMAD MONTAZARI, AND OTHERS WHOSE NAMES ARE NOT KNOWN. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEETS AS NECESSARY. SOME MEETINGS A MONTH IS HELD WITH KHOMEINI PRESENT.

3. KHOMEINI:

A. KHOMEINI'S PERMANENT BASE IS IN QUM. HE IS USUALLY FOUND IN THE SCHOOL (MADRASAH). HE IS WELL GUARDED, AND HIS GUARDS ARE WELL TRAINED. A LARGE PORTION OF THESE GUARDS ARE FORMER ARMY FORCE PERSONNEL. THERE IS A BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION, A SECURITY OFFICE AND A COMPLAINTS OFFICE.

F. KHOMEINI IS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS SON AHMAD AT ALL TIMES. OTHER PERSONS USUALLY WITH KHOMEINI ARE: MALKHUNI (SIC), MONTAZARI, BEHESHTI, AND ESHRAFI (ESHRAQI). THERE ARE ALSO OTHERS WITH HIM.

G. THE FEDAYEN-T-ISLAM ARE A VERY EXTREMIST SECT. KHOMEINI HAS A VERY STRONG RELATIONSHIP TO THEM, AND COULD BE THEIR

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LEADER. THEIR AIM IS TO INVALIDATE EVERY ONE WHO HAD WORKED WITH THE SHAH, AND TO INSIST ON GETTING KHOMEINI TO MAKE "MORE POSITIVE DECISIONS". THEIR NUMBER IS NOT LARGE.

D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND SHARIAT-MADARI IS NOT GOOD. THEY DIFFER A LOT IN THEIR VIEWPOINTS.

E. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND MARASHI-NAJAFI IS "NOT BAD".

F. EVERY AYATOLLAH HAS HIS OWN BASE, WHERE HE RESIDES, AND HIS OWN MADRASAH (SCHOOL). HIS OWN PUPILS, SUPPORTERS AND OPINIONS. EACH HAS HIS OWN PERSONAL GUARDS. THERE IS HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF GUARDS, BUT IT IS WELL HIDDEN AND NOT READILY APPARENT.

G. KHOMEINI SENDS OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS AND OFFICIAL VISITORS ON SMALL MEETINGS. HOWEVER, PRIOR APPROVAL MUST BE OBTAINED AND AN APPOINTMENT MADE.

H. KHOMEINI'S HEALTH IS "NOT BAD". HE IS 79 YEARS OLD.

I. IF KHOMEINI WERE TO SUDDENLY DIE, IT WOULD BE A STRONG SHOCK TO THE PEOPLE AND TO THE REVOLUTION. HE WOULD, HOWEVER, NOT BE SUCCEEDED BY ANY ONE PERSON. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WOULD TAKE OVER FOR KHOMEINI, AND THE REVOLUTION WOULD CONTINUE IN ITS PRESENT COURSE. THOSE WHO WOULD PLAY THE PRINCIPAL ROLE WOULD BE: AYATOLLAH MONTAZARI, AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI, AHMAD AL-KHOMEINI, KHALIHALI, AND ESHRAFI (ESHRAQI).

J. THE BASE (SIC) OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS IS IN QUM. THEY ARE TRAINED BY FORMER MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES.

4. OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI:

A. SHARIAT-MADARI IS VERY CLOSE TO BAZARGAN AND IS DISSENT FROM KHOMEINI. SHARIAT-MADARI IS AN ASTUTE POLITICIAN, AND A MAN OF LAW AND THEOLOGY. THERE IS NOT BIG HANGER TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM SHARIAT-MADARI BECAUSE HE FEARS CONFRONTATION. HE DOES NOT LIKE ADVENTURE (SIC) AND IS NOT A BODY.

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SECRET
E. BRIND 54566 S.E. SECRET
E. KHOMENI IS NOT A LEFTIST, BUT HE IS SYMPATHETIC WITH THE LEFT. HIS CHILDREN ARE MEMBERS OF LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE LEFT IS EXPLOITING THE STANDS OF TALEGHANI.

C. THERE ARE MOVEMENTS AROUND THE PAZARI LEADERSHIP (NFI), BUT THEY WILL CONVERGE INTO KHOMENI'S POSITIONS.

D. ACTIVITIES AND DESIGNS AGAINST THE REVOLUTION DO NOT BEYOND DEMONSTRATIONS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF TRACTS, AND OCCASIONAL ASSASSINATIONS.

E. THE IRANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (TUDER) IS MAKING NUMEROUS COMPLICATED EFFORTS. THEY ARE INFILTRATING TUDER PERSONNEL INTO ALL LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS INTO THE RANKS OF THE WORKERS AND STUDENTS. THEY ARE ALSO INFILTRATING INTO THE RANKS OF THE ARMY, WHERE THEY ARE CONCENTRATING ON SOILING DISSENT AMONG AND RECRUITING OFFICERS AND NCO'S. TUDER IS BELIEVING ITSELF WITH ALL LEFTIST GROUPS, WHEREVER THE OPPORTUNITY ARISES. TUDER'S ATTITUDES AND AIMS ARE MANY, THE MOST IMPORTANT BEING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION TO A FRONT WITH IRAN OPENLY STANDED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL LEFT AND THE SOVIET UNION. TUDER MEMBERS ARE BEING TRAINED ON ALL TYPES OF WEAPONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM THE EASTERN BLOC. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF TUDER MEMBERS ARE TRAINING OUTSIDE IRAN IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THEY MAINTAIN SECRET COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PARTY IN IRAQ THROUGH EMBASSIES IN TEHRAN AND ACROSS THE IRAQI AND AFGHANISTAN BORDERS.

5. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES:

A. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES ARE THE BRIDGING CONNECTION BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE PEOPLE. THE COMMITTEES CONTROL AND DIRECT THE SECURITY AFFAIRS IN IRAN AND HELP TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF THE PEOPLE.

B. THERE IS NO HIERARCHY OF COMMITTEES. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT COMMITTEES IS A MATTER OF COORDINATION. EACH COMMITTEE IS TIED TO THE PRINCIPAL COMMITTEE IN TEHRAN, THROUGH WHICH ALL THE COMMITTEES ARE TIED TO DUM.

E. BRIND 54566 S.E. SECRET
C. PART OF EACH COMMITTEE IS MADE UP OF FULL TIME MEMBERS, THESE RECEIVING A MONTHLY SALARY. ALL THE COMMITTEE HEADS ARE TIED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN TEHRAN, AND THROUGH IT THEY CAN COMMUNICATE WITH KHOMENI AFTER GOING THROUGH THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. ALL THE EXISTING REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES ARE ULTIMATELY LINKED WITH KHOMENI.

D. KHOMENI, DESPITE MANY UNPOPULAR DECISIONS, STILL REMAINS THE STRONGEST FACTOR INFLUENCING THE IRANIAN MASSES. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMITTEES ARE SUPERFICIAL AND DO NOT REACH FUNDAMENTAL LEVELS. IN SPIKE OF THE PRACTICES (NFI) OF SOME INDIVIDUALS TO STIR UP TROUBLE, THESE INDIVIDUALS INCLUDE FORMER AGENTS OF A NUMBER OF "EVIL LEFT" AND THEY EXAGGERATE THE SIZE OF MISTAKES AND "EXPLODE" PROBLEMS IN ORDER TO CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE REVOLUTION. (COMMENT: THE BANNING OF DEMONSTRATIONS IS A PRELIMINARY STEP TOWARD THE DOMESTICATION (SIC) OF THE LEFT IN IRAN.)

G. DEFER TO HEADQUARTERS FOR ANY DISSEMINATION.

FILE: DEFER. HW 4 SEP 69 DRY DOC.1 ALL SHEET
SECRET
44565

6 Sep 79 07 57z

SECRET 061734Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 54587

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TERAAN

MINTEL INTEL MJBARGE

REF: BEIRUT 54585

1. MJMARIYR/1 PASSED US THE FOLLOWING WRITTEN REPORT FROM MJBARGE/1 ON IRAN IN LATE AUGUST.
2. FOLLOWING THE RECENT ELECTIONS AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE PRO-KHOMEINI CANDIDATES, THE OPPOSITION FORCES, REPRESENTED BY THE LEFT, THE TUDEH PARTY, SOME MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENTIA AND THE PRO-SHARIAT-MADARI ELEMENTS (WHICH ARE BACKED BY SOME POLITICIANS, INCLUDING KAZEM KAZEMIAN WHO HAS YET TO FACE AN OPEN SHOW MADE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN IRAN. THE FORCES WHICH MANIPULATED THESE DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO COORDINATED WITH THE TUDEH AND URGED THEM TO MOVE. THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO STRAIN THE AUTHORITY AND TO WEAKEN IT, PARTICULARLY KHOMEINI, WHO IS STILL CONSIDERED TO BE THE DOMINANT FORCE IN IRAN.
3. AS A RESULT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, KHOMEINI ORDERED QUICKLY AND ORDERED THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TO CONFRONT THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE TURDS. THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS THEN ATTACKED THE OFFICES OF THE LEFT IN TEHRAN, WHICH ARE CONSIDERED TO BE THE PRIMARY CENTERS OF DISSENT AGAINST THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. IN THESE OFFICES, THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CONFISCATED TRACTS, PRINTING PRESSES AND WEAPONS. ORDERS WERE THEN ISSUED FORBIDDING DEMONSTRATIONS AND INSTRUCTING THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TO CONFRONT ANY DEMONSTRATIONS WITH VIOLENCE.
4. KHOMEINI ALSO INSTRUCTED THE ARMY TO LIQUIDATE THE TURDS REBELLION AT ANY PRICE. THE BORDERS WITH IRAQ WERE CLOSED TO PREVENT ANYONE FLEEING IRAQ FROM ENTERING THAT COUNTRY, AS WELL AS TO PREVENT ARMS FROM BEING SMUGGLED TO THE TURDS BY IRAQ (WHICH
5. FATAH'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN IS THAT

PAGE 2 BEIRUT 54587 SECRET
KHOMEINI REMAINS THE STRONGEST FACTOR IN IRAN, AND THAT HE CRUSH THE REBELLION, AS WELL AS THE LEFT IF IT PERSISTS IN BEING A CAUSE OF ANNOYANCE TO HIM. FATAH ALSO BELIEVES THAT KHOMEINI WILL CALL UPON THE SHIA POPULATION OF IRAQ TO MOVE AGAINST THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IF IRAQ PERSISTS IN BACKING THE TURDS. THE REBELLION IN SANANDAJ WILL ALSO BE CRUSHED. KHOMEINI IS FEARFUL OF MOVES BY THE ARAB MINORITY IN ARABISTAN, BUT FATAH ESTIMATES THAT KHOMEINI STILL ENJOYS FAST POPULARITY WITH THE MASSES WHICH WILL ENABLE HIM TO STAND AGAINST ALL PLOTS AND EVENTS.

6. AT THE SAME TIME HE PASSED US THE REPORT CONTAINING PARAGRAPHS 2-5. MJMARIYR/1 ALSO PASSED US ANOTHER WRITTEN REPORT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING TID-BITS ON IRAN:

- A. A NEW ORGANIZATION NAMED ASHRAF YAWAD 17 TAL ZA'EH HAD BEEN FORMED BY ELEMENTS THAT WERE FORMERLY IN AN IRANIAN REJECTION FRONT WHICH LATER JOINED WITH TUDEH. IT IS THE ORGANIZATION WHICH CARRIES OUT TERRORIST OPERATIONS, VIOLATIONS, ASSASSINATIONS, AND WHICH LATELY TRIED TO MURDER THE REVOLUTIONARY PUBLIC ATTORNEY.
- B. THERE IS WRATH AND CONDEMNATION BY THE MEN OF THE PRESS BY THE PUBLISHERS AGAINST THE REVOLUTIONARY PUBLIC ATTORNEY HAJATOLISLAM "ALI K AND" D. S. WHO IS CLOSING THE NEWSPAPERS AND THE MAGAZINES. HE WILL PROBABLY BE ASSASSINATED.
- C. THE EDUCATED CLASS IS PRO-SHARIAT-MADARI. THEY ARE SO FAVOR BAKTIAR. HIS GROUP, HOWEVER, WILL NOT TAKE ANY POSITIVE ACTION, RATHER IT WILL REMAIN PASSIVE. IT IS HEADED BY SEYED ADARI, WHO DOES NOT BELIEVE IN VIOLENCE AS A WAY TO SOLVE THINGS.
- D. THE COMMANDER OF THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAS BEEN RECENTLY REPLACED BY A PRO-KHOMEINI GENERAL. (NYI).
- E. MANY ELEMENTS FROM AFGHANISTAN ARE BEING TRAINED IN KIZIL, NORTH OF TEHRAN, BY CADRES AND EXPERTS FROM THE IRANIAN ARMY WHO WERE FORMERLY IN THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMY. THESE EXPERTS INCLUDE GUYVERA, ABU SHARAF, ABU AL-QASIM AND

PAGE 3 BEIRUT 54567 S E C R E T
OTHERS.

F. ALSO, IN ALL THE REGIONS OF IRAN, JUNIOR OFFICERS OF THE IRANIAN ARMY ARE TRAINING ELEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN INSTRUCTORS REMAIN IN IRAN, BUT, MJEAR3E/1 THINKS THEIR NUMBER WILL INCREASE SOON.

G. THE SITUATION IN AHMAZ IS NOT STABLE AND COULD CHANGE. THIS COMMENT WAS MADE BY MAJOR MUHAMMAD T H A B I T, THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE PLO OFFICE IN AHMAZ.

7. DEFER TO HEADQUARTERS FOR ANY DISSEMINATION.

9. INDEX PHABIT.

C. FILE: DEFER. RW 5 SEP 80 DRV D9C.1 ALL SEC 1

S E C R E T
BT
#4567

5 SEP 80 08Z

S E C R E T 96855Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 94572

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TIRHAN.

UNRES, INTEL MUBARGE

REF: BEIRUT 54563

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE REPORT ON IRAN FROM MUBARGE/1 WHICH MUBARGE/1 PASSED TO US ON 3 SEPTEMBER.
2. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO BAHAM, IRAQ IS SUPPORTING THE KURDISH REBELS IN FIGHTING IN THE LATTER. FIGHT TO GAIN AUTONOMY. NOT ONLY IS SAJJAD MUSAVID DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SUPERVISING THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, BUT IRAQ HAS RELEASED (SIC) HIGH RANK AND OTHER OFFICERS AND ASSIGNED THEM TO WORK WITH THE KURDISH REBELS. ALSO, JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO LEAD THE KURDISH TROOPS.
3. AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH AL-KHOMAYNI HAS SENT OUT A GENERAL CALL TO CRUSH THE REBELS AND THE IRANIAN ARMY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ENTERED MOST OF THE KURDISH AREA. FIGHTING THE ROPE AROUND THE NECK OF THE KURDS. A GREAT NUMBER OF KURDS WERE KILLED AND WOUNDED AND THERE WERE NUMEROUS EXECUTIONS. THE REMAINDER OF THE REBELS HAVE FLED TO THE MOUNTAINS AND OTHER DIFFICULT TO GET TO AREAS FROM WHICH THEY WILL WAGE A GERRILLA WAR BACKED BY IRAQ.
4. IN ORDER TO SAVE THE REST OF THE KURDS, SOME OF THEIR "WISE MEN" AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS CONTACTED AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. WHO, IN TURN, CONTACTED KHOMEINI. AS A RESULT OF THESE CONTACTS, A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF HIGH-LEVEL PERSONAGES WHO ARE CLOSE TO KHOMEINI WAS DISPATCHED TO THE AREA OF THE FIGHTING. THIS COMMITTEE WAS ABLE TO CALM CONDITIONS IN THE AREA WITH THE PROMISE THAT KURDISH CLAIMS WILL BE REVIEWED PROMPTLY AFTER ALL FIGHTING HAS FULLY CEASED.

PAGE 2 REFIRIT 54972 SECRET
THE AYATOLLAHS MONTAZARI, KHAL KHALI,
T A B T A S I A N I (SIC), AND ESMATI KSIC, HOWEVER, KHOMEINI
ROLE IN CALMING THE SITUATION IN KURDISTAN. HE ALONE CAN PLAY WITH ALL THE
IRAN AND THE PRINCIPLE LEADER. HE ALONE CAN PLAY WITH ALL THE
CARDS WITHOUT BEING (SIC).

6. BUT THE LEFTIST FORCES LED BY TUJEB AND THE FEDAYEEN
KHALC IRAN ARE SETTING IN ORDER THEIR MILITARY AND ORGANIZATIONAL
AFFAIRS. THIS IS BEING DONE IN SECRET, AND THEY ARE NOW GOING
UNDERGROUND FOR FEAR OF BEING HIT AND LIQUIDATED BY KHOMEINI.

7. THERE ARE MANY CHANGES (NFI) THAT WILL TAKE PLACE IN
THE ARMY AND ON THE CIVIL AND GOVERNMENTAL LEVELS. THE
REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND EXPECTS SOME PROBLEMS IN ARABIAN AND
BELIEVES THAT IRAN WILL ALSO BE "HOURISHING" THESE EVENTS.
HOWEVER, THE SITUATION IN IRAN STILL REQUIRES WORK BASED ON
A STUDY OF THE SITUATION AND CAREFUL PROGRAMMING FOR THE FUTURE
BECAUSE THINGS ARE STILL SHROUDED WITH VAGUENESS.

8. THE SITUATION OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
(PLO) IN IRAN IS VERY GOOD, AND RELATIONS WITH THE COMMAND
IN QUM ARE VERY STRONG. THE LAST LETTER (NFI) FROM (PLO) EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN YASIR ARAFAT TO KHOMEINI HAD A VERY
GOOD EFFECT AND HELPED TO CALM THE SITUATION IN KURDISTAN.
THE MEETING OF THE PLO'S REPRESENTATIVE WITH TALEGHANI AND
HE WAS MET WITH SATISFACTION FROM THE KURDISH SIDE. THEREFORE
THE PLO IS ABLE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE CURRENT EVENTS
IN IRAN AND IS ABLE TO MAKE FAIL (SIC) THE "PLOTS OF THE PLOTTE
WHO CONSTANTLY WORK TO STRIKE THE IRANIAN AND PALESTINIAN
REVOLUTION".

9. ALSO, FATAH HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
A. SHARIAT-MADARI IS CONDUCTING INTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH
ALL THE FORCES WHICH ARE INVOLVED WITH THE EVENTS AND WHICH
ARE NOT WITH KHOMEINI.

B. (FORMER PRIME MINISTER) BANIKIAR IS IN CONTACT WITH

PAGE 3 REFIRIT 54972 SECRET
SHARIAT-MADARI AND THEY ARE COORDINATING THEIR ACTIONS. THEY
ALSO COMMUNICATE WITH SOME ARMY ELEMENTS (NFI).
FATAH (HOWEVER, ESTIMATES THAT KHOMEINI KNOWS ABOUT
THESE THINGS) SA AND BY, AND SHALL CRUSH THEM BEFORE
FATAH BELIEVES THIS BECAUSE IN TALKING TO FATAH REPRESENTATIVES
(NFI) IN MID-AUGUST KHAL KHALI SAID, "WE SHALL FINISH WITH THE
KARDS BUT OTHER PROBLEMS WILL EMERGE. THIS HAS BEEN TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT, AND I SHALL CRUSH ANY CONSPIRACY AND EVERY CONSPIRACY
WHEN HE WAS ASKED ABOUT BANIKIAR'S RENEWED ACTIVITY, KHAL KHALI
SAID THAT BANIKIAR "ONLY POSSESSES HIS TONGUE, AND HE WILL NOT
BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN
PEOPLE ARE WITH THE REVOLUTION".

17. DEFER TO DIRECTOR FOR ANY DISSEMINATION.
18. FILE DEFER. HVW 6 SEP 69 DRV D9C. ALL SECRET
SECRET

SECRET 110750Z SEP 79 STAFF

17 SEP 79 13 50Z

CIT BEIRUT 54606

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEMAN, TRIPOLI.

VNITEL INTEL MJBARGE

1. IN VERY BRIEF CAR MEETING WITH MJBARGE/1 (M/1) NIGHT OF 18 SEPTEMBER, B/1 TOLD US THAT HE WILL LEAVE FOR TEMAN ON 12 SEPTEMBER. HE EXPECTS TO RETURN TO BEIRUT IN EARLY OCTOBER. BEFORE RETURNING TO BEIRUT, B/1 WILL TRAVEL TO PDY AND SPAEN.

2. B/1 HAD JUST RETURNED FROM LIBYA. WHILE THERE HE SAID HE WAS STRUCK BY THE AMOUNT OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY HE SAW. HE SAYS HE PERSONALLY SAW NINE MIG-27'S, AS WELL AS NUMEROUS MIG-25'S AND 23'S, PLUS MISSILES (NFI) AND LARGE AMOUNTS OF T-72 TANKS. ADDITIONALLY, B/1 WAS AMAZED AT THE AMOUNT OF CUBANS HE SAW IN LIBYA. WHEN PRESSED FOR A NUMBER HE COULD ONLY SAY, "MANY, MANY." HE SAID THAT THERE WERE BOTH ADVISORS AND CUBAN MILITARY UNITS PRESENT. THE CUBANS ARE HEAVILY INVOLVED IN TRAINING AFRICANS IN LIBYA. B/1 SAYS THAT HE WAS TOLD BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE LIBYAN ARMED FORCES THAT 30,000 AFRICANS WERE IN LIBYA UNDERGOING MILITARY TRAINING. THESE INCLUDED PERSONS FROM UGANDA, CHAD, ZIMBABWE, SPANISH SAHARA, AND THE REMNANT AFRICAN EMPIRE. B/1 SAID.

3. B/1 ALSO TOLD US THAT FATAH NOW HAS 25 IRANIANS IN LEBANON BEING TRAINED AT THE BURJ AL-BARAJNAH COMMANDO TRAINING FACILITY. THESE IRANIANS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY KHOMEINI'S COMPANION (RAFID) UN: BUNTAZAR (NOT RELATED TO THE AYATOLLAH OF THE SAME NAME.) BUNTAZAR, WHO ACCORDING TO B/1 WAS IN PARIS WITH KHOMEINI AND VERY CLOSE TO THE AYATOLLAH, TOLD B/1 THAT KHOMEINI HAS DECIDED THAT PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN WILL HAVE TO GO. WE HAVE MORE DETAILS AT THIS POINT.

4. FILE: 201-946977. RVW 11 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

SECRET

12 SEP 79 140Z

12 SEP 79 140Z

TO: STAFF

FROM: TEMAN

INFO: MJBARGE

REF: 140Z

MJBARGE/1 INFORMED US EVENING 11 SEPTEMBER THAT HE WOULD LEAVE FOR TEMAN ON 12 SEPTEMBER. MJBARGE/1 IS ACCOMPANIED BY BRIGADIER SAID SA'AD (L. LABU WALAD), FORMER MILITARY OPERATIONS ROOM. THEY SHOULD REMAIN A WEEK OR TEN DAYS.

MJBARGE/1 ALSO PASSED US WRITTEN REPORTS FROM MJBARGE/1 ABOUT STAFF TO LIBYA AND ON IRAN. WE ARE HAVING THESE REPORTS.

REF: 201-946977. RVW 12 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

SECRET

11 OCT 79

S E C R E T 101730Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 54836

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL INTEL SDVALID

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 528725
B. TEHRAN 54407

1. IF ESFAHANI OF REFS HAS ARRIVED LEBANON SINCE 1 OCT HE HAS KEPT VERY LOW PROFILE. TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE THERE HAS BEEN NO PRESS COVERAGE OF HIS GREAT EMINENCE. QUERIED MJBRIDGE/1 AT 10 OCT MEETING AND HE HAD NOT HEARD OF ESFAHANI. MJBRIDGE/1 WILL CHECK TO ENSURE WE NOT MISSING OUT ON VISIT.

2. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PRESS COVERAGE FOR VISIT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DR. SADEQ TABATABA'I, WHO ARRIVED IN LEBANON ON 7 OCT AND DEPARTED ON 9 OCT. WE HAVE TASKED APPROPRIATE ASSETS TO REPORT ANY SIGNIFICANT NON-PUBLIC DEVELOPMENTS RE THIS VISIT, AND WE'LL PROVIDE RESULTS TO ADDRES IF OBTAINED.

3. PLS ADVISE IF SUMMARY OF TABATABA'I'S PUBLIC ACTIVITIES HERE WOULD BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE.

4. NO FILE. RVW 10 OCT 99 DRV D9C.] ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

WHAT STATION CONSIDERED...
WHENEVER POSSIBLE IT BE SENT...
CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN DISSEMINATING...
AND ALL TOO OFTEN IT ULTIMATELY IS NOT DISSEMINATED...
THE COMMUNITY BUT IS SIMPLY RELEASED TO NFAC FOR FACTS...
SUGGEST STATION CONTINUE TO ZRWAP00 ALL B/I REPORTS FOR HEADQUARTERS...
REVIEW OF OTHER COUNTRY CONTENT.

2. HAVE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON REF:

RE PARA SIX: ALTHOUGH THE PGOI HAS MADE CLEAR ITS INTENTION OF SPREADING THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE, AND ALTHOUGH LIBYAN LEADER MU'AMMAR QADHAFI IS ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN THE PROPAGATION OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY, WE HAVE NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THE ALLEGATION THAT LIBYA AND IRAN HAVE ENTERED INTO A "BINDING COOPERATION" TO SPREAD MUSLIM IDEAS, NOR CAN WE VERIFY THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WAS THE PURPOSE OF MOHAMMAD MONBAZERI'S EARLY JULY 1979 VISIT TO LIBYA. IN FACT, ACCORDING TO TRIPOLI EMBTEL 1277 DATED 5 JULY 1979, "MONBAZERI TALKED AT LENGTH, BUT SAID LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE".

RE PARA NINE: WE KEEP HEARING RUMORS OF THE IRANIANS ALIEN...

WHOSE NAME APPEARS TO

3. INFORMATION ON IRANIAN SCENE
OCR WAS ESPECIALLY APPRECIATIVE FOR THE INFORMATION ON
CHAMPAM. ANY ADDITIONAL BIO ON HIM WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

4. WIFE B/1'S ESTABLISHED ACCESS TO SENIOR RELIGIOUS FIGURES
INCLUDING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, SUGGEST STATION SELECT APPROPRIATE
REQUIREMENTS FROM FOLLOWING, WHICH UPDATED BY NFAC:

A. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
KHOMEINI AND SHARIAT-MADARI? WILL SHARIAT-MADARI MORE
ACTIVELY SUPPORT A MODERATE OPPOSITION GROUP NOW THAT
ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION APPEARS TO INSTITUTIONALIZE
CLERICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT? WITH WHOM IN THE
MOSLEM PEOPLES ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY DOES SHARIAT-MADARI
WORK? IS SHARIAT-MADARI IN CONTACT WITH BAKHTIAR? IF SO,
DOES HE THINK OF BAKHTIAR'S ACTIVITIES?

E. WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF TALAGANI'S DEATH ON THE
CLERICAL COMMUNITY? ARE THERE MORE OPEN CONFLICTS NOW
BETWEEN THE SENIOR QOM AYATOLLAS (SHARIAT-MADARI,
GOLPAYGANI, MARASHI-NAJAFI) AND KHOMEINI'S CAMP? WHAT HAS

FOLLOWERS NOW INTEND TO DO FOR THE
NEW ISLAMIC REPUBLIC BY FAR
ARE IN THE MAJORITY IN GOVERNMENT
POSITIONS SUCH AS THE MAJLES AND THE PRESIDENT
THEY DETERMINED TO FORCE THE MORE SECULAR, MODERATE
PRAGMATISTS (LIKE NAZIF) OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND RUN THEM
THEMSELVES? IF SO, HOW DO THE SENIOR CLERICAL LEADERS SUCH
AS SHARIAT-MADARI PLAN TO RESPOND?

F. WHAT KIND OF PRESSURE HAS KHOMEINI PUT ON OTHER
CLERICAL LEADERS? WHAT, FOR EXAMPLE, ACCOUNTS FOR THE
CHANGE IN TALAGANI'S POSITION BEFORE HIS DEATH?

F. IS KHOMEINI DELIBERATELY TRYING TO CONVINCE PEOPLE
THAT HE IS THE 14TH ZAMAN?

5. REQUEST STATION RESUBMIT REY A IN INTEL FORMAT, WITH
ANY CLARIFICATION/AMPLIFICATION MJMARIYR/1 AELS PROVIDE AT 18 OCTOBER MEETING.

6. FILE 221-246277. WWW 120CT99 DRV DRC.1 ALL SEC.57.

FI
#2325

25 OCT 79 07 54Z

SECRET 250643Z OCT 79 INTEL

CITE BEIRUT 54965 ZNY XXXXX

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, TEHRAN.

UNINTEL INTEL MJBARGE

SUPDATA: ZRW400 FOR APPROVAL OF OMISSION OF PLACE ACQUIRED,
AND APPROVAL OF SOURCE DESCRIPTION. OPACT: ARLEAT.
SOURCE: MJBARGE/1. SEE BEIRUT 54964 WHICH DOES NOT
AFFECT DISSEM. (UNILATERAL). DAMASCO OBTAINED
OO: D-I NO LIAISON. NO INDEX: DEFER TO DIRECTOR FOR
MILITARY DISSEM.
CL BY: 038464. FIELD NO.: NLB-18,692. FILE: DEFER.

FILED: 250643Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET--UNINTEL--NOFORN--NO CONTRACT--CHCON
EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI ON TRANSFER
OF ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS FROM IRAN TO ARAB COUNTRIES
(DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN ARAB MILITARY OFFICER WHOSE PAST REPORTING ON
OTHER AREAS HAS OFTEN BEEN SUBSTANTIATED.
HE HAD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION REPORTED.

1. IN LATE SEPTEMBER, SUBSEQUENT TO THE 24 SEPTEMBER AIR
BATTLE OVER LEBANON BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI AIRCRAFT, IRANIAN
RELIGIOUS LEADER AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI COMMENTED
ON THE POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF ADVANCED AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING THE U.S.
MANUFACTURED F-14S AND F-16S, FROM IRAN TO SYRIA OR OTHER ARAB
COUNTRIES CONFRONTING ISRAEL. KHOMEINI SAID THAT THE TRANSFER
OF SUCH AIRCRAFT COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED SO LONG AS THE KURDISH
PROBLEM CONTINUED IN IRAN, BECAUSE IRAN ITSELF NEEDED THE AIRCRAFT.
KHOMEINI ADDED THAT ONCE THE KURDISH PROBLEM WAS DISPENSED WITH,
HOWEVER, THEN HE WOULD "THINK ABOUT" SUCH A TRANSFER OF AIRCRAFT.
KHOMEINI ALSO SAID THAT IF THE AIRCRAFT WERE TRANSFERRED, THE
MOVE WOULD ALSO INCLUDE PILOTS, GROUND SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE
PERSONNEL.

2. ACQ: (24 OCTOBER 1979)

3. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, TEHRAN
(FOR CHIEF OF MISSION, DEFENSE ATTACHE ONLY)

4. WASHINGTON DISSEM:

TO STATE
TO DIA

EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, INR
EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--

EXTRACTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
ORIGINATOR.
RVA 25 OCT 99 DRV DSC.1 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER.
ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

SECRET
CLASS
DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE

DURING OUR 29 OCTOBER VISIT WITH
HIM ABOUT IRANIAN AID TO SAUDI ARABIA
SPECIFICS, HE SAID THAT IRANIAN
IRANIAN WITH SOME WEAPONS DELIVERED
, MINES AND EXPLOSIVES. UNDER QUESTIONING
AS NOT PLANNING TO PROVIDE FATAH WITH
S, SUCH AS TRUCKS, PERSONNEL CARRIERS OR
ID THAT NO HEAVY ARTILLERY WOULD BE PROVIDED
ALTHOUGH A GOOD SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND
BUILT UP ITS MUNITIONS STOCKS. HE ALSO SAID THAT
IN FATAH WAS TRAINED ON WESTERN WEAPONS, THAT
FOR SUCH WEAPONS WOULD BE A PROBLEM IF THEY
HE PALLADIUMS' INVENTORY.

W/AL PLANNING THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO APPRECIABLE
IAL PLAN TO FATAH TO DATE, AND THAT NONE WAS PLANNED,
IN THE WEAPONS FIELD.

SECRET DEFER. RVA 25 OCT 99 DRV DSC.1 ALL SECRET
SECRET

2 Nov 79 11 39z

S E C R E T 311357Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 54635

TO: WASHINGTON INFO BEIRUT.

POP: C/NE/IRAN INFO C/NE/SLJ

SUBJECT: WNINTEL INTEL -- PLO DELEGATION TO IRAN

1. COMPLETE LIST OF NAMES OF MID-OCTOBER PLO DELEGATION TO IRAN WAS NEVER PUBLISHED HERE. SDTRAMP/J PROVIDED THE LIST ON 29 OCTOBER; IT IS FORWARDED FOR THE RECORD.

ABU J E H A D, SECOND IN COMMAND TO ARAFAT.

ABU W A L I D, DESCRIBED AS MEMBER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS BUREAU OF "THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION."

SAKHAR ABU N A Z A R, DESCRIBED AS MEMBER OF THE DIRECTORY BOARD OF FAIAH RESPONSIBLE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTH LEBANON.

COLONEL FAKHR AL H U S S E I N I, DESCRIBED AS A COMMANDER IN SAIGA.

HANI A L - H A S S A N, PLO REP IN TEHRAN.

2. I/J SAID THE Wafa CORRESPONDENT IN TEHRAN TOLD HIM THAT HOMEINI HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN PROVIDING FINANCIAL HELP TO THE PLO (NFI).

3. NO FILE. RVW 31OCT99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 212220Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 544529.

TO: BEIRUT INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL MJBARGE INTEL

REF: NLB-18,692 BEIRUT 54365

1. WISH CONGRATULATE BANASCO ON OBTAINING REF REPORT. IT IS ON A SUBJECT OF HIGH INTEREST AND WAS VERY TIMELY. THE REPORT WAS USED IN THE DCI MORNING NOTES, IN A MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF NFAC, AND IN A PDB ANNEX. IT WILL BE GRADED A "10". NEEDLESS TO SAY, WELCOME CONTINUED REPORTING ON THIS TOPIC.

2. FILE: 201-946977. RVW 21NOV99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#6342

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