

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

In the name of Allah  
the most  
Compassionate and Merciful

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*Consulate Section*

ADMIN, ECON, OR, USIS, *Consulate Section*

June 5, 1969

FOL - John A. Armitage

Foreign Affairs Manual - Political

Attached is a copy of the latest regulations on Conversations with Communist Nations Diplomats or Nationals. You will note that this instruction should be brought to the attention of all American personnel.

Attachment:  
As Stated (Confidential)

FOL: CMcCaskill:sgl

ROUTING

	Info	Initials
CON	✓	<i>JA</i>
ISI	✓	<i>JA</i>
NSA	✓	<i>JA</i>
PPF	✓	<i>JA</i>

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POL



# Foreign Affairs Manual

VOL. 11 - POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Transmittal Letter: POL-20

Date: May 23, 1969

## UNIFORM STATE/AID/USIA/ACDA REGULATIONS

### CONVERSATIONS WITH COMMUNIST NATIONS DIPLOMATS OR NATIONALS

Significant conversations with Communist diplomats or nationals are to be reported by all State, A.I.D., USIA, and ACDA employees at Foreign Service posts and at Washington. The importance of these reports was originally set forth in CA-1471 dated August 6, 1964.

The caption "COMTALK," which has been established for distribution of these reports, will be included in section 212.4 of revised 5 FAM 200 to be issued soon.

#### Action Required

Administrative officers are to bring this instruction to the attention of all American personnel.

#### Filing Instructions

Insert the attached page 243.4 immediately after page 243.2.

Cancel CA-1471, August 6, 1964, Joint State, USIA, A.I.D., USIA instruction, subject: Contacts with Soviet and Communist Bloc Nationals.

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## UNIFORM STATE/AID/USIA/ACDA REGULATIONS

### 243.4 Conversations with Communist Nations Diplomats or Nationals

a. For substantive and other reasons, it is important that a prompt report be made by all employees of significant conversations or contacts with Communist diplomats or nationals of Communist countries, and

- (1) should include those either of official or personal nature;
- (2) may pertain to political, economic, or other official matters;
- (3) may be extensive or close personal contacts such as dinner parties, theater trips, outings, etc.

Contacts are, in every case, to be considered significant after several seemingly insignificant contacts have been held over a period of a few months. Contacts should be reported when it is apparent they are going to be of a continuing nature and/or it is obvious the Communist nations representative, by his continuation of the contacts, considers them significant.

b. The above instructions are not intended in any manner to discourage contacts with Communist nations representatives for normal purposes or for the reasons set forth in the manual.

### 243.4-1 Employees at Foreign Service Posts

If the substance of contacts of this type is not such as to warrant submission by telegram, the memorandum of conversation must be submitted under cover of an airgram in accordance with section 263.2-8. Telegrams and airgrams covering such contacts should be captioned "COMTALK" and sent through the communications channels of the parent agency. USIA employees forward IA-394, Memorandum of Conversation, to the Agency, Office of Security (IOS).

### 243.4-2 Employees in the United States

In order to assure an over-view of all Communist nations activities vis-a-vis employees of the Department and Foreign Service, the type of contact described under paragraph a of section 243.4 should also be reported by all employees in Washington. These reports, similarly entitled and captioned, are transmitted as follows:

For State by Form DS-1254, Memorandum of Conversation, directly to OPR/RS for reproduction and distribution.

For A.I.D. by memorandum to the Director, Office of Security, through the employees' supervisors.

For USIA by Form IA-394, Memorandum of Conversation, to the Agency, Office of Security (IOS).

For ACDA by Form DS-1254, Memorandum of Conversation, to OPR/RS through the Executive Director.

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downgrading and declassification

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POLITICAL AFFAIRS

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Department. Briefings should also give equal emphasis to the fact that an individual can become an intelligence target without being involved in misconduct, etc.; that often approaches are made due to his position at a post or due to his knowledge of or participation in classified operations.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Office of Security

OFFICE LETTER NO. D-70/5

DATE: January 21, 1970

TO : Regional Security Supervisors  
Regional Security Officers  
Security Officers (Technical)

FROM : Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security *JKS*

SUBJECT: Security Briefings - Summaries of Recent Significant SAS Cases

(FILE: ~~2270~~)

REF. : SY "D" Lett. NO. 69/47 dated August 19, 1969

*PER 9-3*

In connection with cited reference, there are attached eight summaries of recent significant SAS cases involving actual and/or suspected attempts by hostile intelligence services to compromise and recruit Foreign Service personnel of the Department and other U.S. Government agencies.

During the July 1969 Regional Security Officer Seminar, a number of RSOs requested information on recent personnel recruitment/penetration attempts for use in initial post security briefings of newly-arrived personnel as well as for re-briefings. The attached SAS summaries are the result of these requests. As will be noted, names and places have been omitted in order to avoid speculation as to the identity of the individual concerned and to preclude possible embarrassment to those individuals who came forward and reported the attempts to proper officials, including the RSO. It is obvious that an RSO could, without too much difficulty, determine the identity of each, however, such speculation must be avoided.

It is significant to note that hostile intelligence forces continue to employ age-old tactics to exploit individual personal vulnerabilities in their efforts to compromise/recruit our personnel or gain their cooperation. Blackmail through threat of exposure of both normal and abnormal sexual indiscretions, involvement in blackmarket operations, and offers of personal enrichment are among the principal methods used in approaches. Obviously, the success of such methods encourages their continued use.

I consider a good security briefing/re-briefing to be one of the most important counterintelligence countermeasures and I personally urge each Security Officer to give them appropriate time and attention. During such briefings, all personnel should be strongly admonished to report their contacts with personnel of Communist nations as required by regulations as well as to report any actual or suspected effort at compromise/recruitment, emphasizing the fact that they will receive a sympathetic hearing both from the RSO and the

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Attachments:  
Eight SAS Summaries

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In 1968, a married Foreign Service Officer, attached to the American Embassy in an East European country, was photographed unclothed in a compromising situation with an unemployed local actress at the instigation of the local security intelligence agency. The subsequent blackmail/recruitment approach failed.

DETAILS:

This Foreign Service Officer was assigned to an "Iron Curtain" U.S. Foreign Service post. He had served previously at this post, spoke the local language fluently and, in general, was considered a conservative conscientious officer not given to intemperate behavior, etc. For these reasons and because he had previous experience, he was assigned in late 1968 as Escort Officer to a visiting high-level U.S. Government official. They were to visit together a number of cities in the foreign country concerned. The trip began with an airplane flight to the first city on the tour. While in flight, an attractive lady (local national) sitting next to the Foreign Service Officer engaged him in conversation. She claimed to be an unemployed actress on vacation destined for the same city where the Foreign Service Officer was going. Upon arrival, the Foreign Service Officer learned that the unemployed actress was staying at his hotel. That evening after he had completed his escort duties, the Foreign Service Officer called on the young lady and had an enjoyable dinner with her. He later escorted her very properly to the door of her hotel room where, while tempted to engage in illicit relations with her, he excused himself. The latter aspect was not easy as the unemployed actress tried without success to have the Foreign Service Officer remain overnight in her bed. He agreed, however, to meet her again for dinner the following evening. Against his better judgment, the Foreign Service Officer kept the dinner engagement and again escorted the local actress to her hotel room. As he was saying "Good night", the actress grabbed the key to his hotel room from his hand, and before he could stop her, ran to his hotel room and was waiting, disrobed in his bed when he arrived. The Foreign Service Officer joined her in the bed where they remained until morning. In the morning while the actress was still there, the Foreign Service Officer conscientiously examined his hotel room in an effort to see if the local security/intelligence agency had secreted there any cameras or microphones. To his relief he found none and thought that ended the matter. He left that day to continue his escort duties and never again saw the above unemployed actress. On returning to the Embassy, the Foreign Service Officer considered briefly discussing the actress incident with the Regional Security Officer, but then thought it prudent not to do so. After all, he had not been further contacted, so it must mean the local intelligence/security unit was not aware of the incident.

In early 1969, while attending a dinner party given by a well-known local author/playwright, he was taken by his host into the library, where in private he was allowed to examine several photographs showing himself and the actress lying disrobed in bed. In substance, the Foreign Service Officer was told that either he cooperated with local security intelligence

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agency, or the photographs would be made public. The Foreign Service Officer went immediately to the Regional Security Officer (American Embassy) and shortly afterwards was transferred from Post.

On return to the Department, this Foreign Service Officer was given a hearing and because of his unacceptable conduct at his previous Post of assignment and known disregard for pertinent Department regulations, serious consideration was given by a Departmental Personnel Panel to terminating his services. The Office of Security however, reminded the Panel members (Personnel) that such action would be in conflict with Secretary Rusk's letter of July 27, 1961 to all Mission Chiefs. This letter, in substance, explains that a Department employee who comes forward of his own volition and admits an indiscretion is to receive a sympathetic hearing. The punitive aspect is to be used only as a last resort. The Foreign Service employee here concerned continues to date to give creditable service to the Department/Foreign Service, albeit true that he chose to remain with the full knowledge that his career in the Foreign Service would be in a state of limbo for an indefinite period.

\* \* \* \* \*

In 1968, a Foreign Service Staff Employee employed as Communications Supervisor at an Iron Curtain Post was approached by local intelligence officers in a recruitment attempt. He was offered assistance of a personal nature which conflicted with his official duties in the Embassy and could, therefore, later be used as "blackmail". Recruitment attempt failed.

DETAILS:

The Communications and Records Supervisor at an East European Post went alone to the local Government Ministry of Communication to inquire again about some clearance permits needed in connection with some alterations and installation of equipment in the Embassy Communication unit. As background information it should be noted that this work could not proceed until all import clearances etc. were obtained from the local government. Several companies which sell and install communications equipment were bidding for the work contract which on this date had not as yet been awarded.

One week before above visit, this Embassy Communications Supervisor had met in a local hotel room with a representative of one of the bidding communication equipment companies (U.S. owned), and inquired concerning employment for himself after his retirement in a year's time. Nothing definite came of the meeting and there was no reason to believe the Embassy employee had offered any influence, etc. regarding the pending work contract in the Embassy.

To continue, when the Embassy Communications Supervisor arrived at the Office in the Ministry of Communications where he usually conducted his official liaison/business he was received by two local civilians unknown to him who claimed to be employed there. They inferred that they had major responsibility in granting the necessary work/import clearances.

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In very direct terms they further advised that they knew that he had inquired concerning employment after retirement with one of the companies bidding on the Embassy work contract not yet awarded. The Communications Supervisor was told that in return for his cooperation (not specified) the two local officials would use their alleged considerable influence to expedite all necessary requested clearances and also pass on needed clearances in such a way that only the one communications company of interest would prove acceptable and capable of receiving the pending Embassy work contract. The Communications Officer was told that this action would earn him favorable recognition and guarantee his receiving the solicited employment after retirement. The Communications Supervisor politely but firmly declined the proposition and shortly afterwards returned to the Embassy where he reported the incident to the responsible Regional Security Officer. This ended the matter.

Subsequent investigation and analysis established that the local intelligence organization was attempting to entice the Communications Supervisor with an attractive offer which, if accepted, could force his cooperation (recruitment) via blackmail.

\* \* \* \* \*

In early 1967 a Communications Clerk assigned to an American Embassy in a West European country was approached on three occasions with social invitations by a Russian Trade Mission Officer who was later identified with Russian Intelligence (KGB).

DETAILS

This true account concerns an American Foreign Service employee serving as a Communications Clerk at an American Embassy in a West European country. Initially he had shared an apartment with a co-worker. In 1966 when this co-worker was transferred he was unable to find someone suitable to move in and help pay the rent. Therefore the Communications Clerk moved to a small apartment in a building favored by lower ranking staff employees of the Diplomatic community. These foreign Embassy tenants included two American Embassy FSS secretaries and one Russian Trade Mission Officer and his family.

A few days after moving into his apartment the American FSS employee went after work to a prearranged meeting to his local landlady's apartment located in the same building. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss matters pertaining to which days of the week he was allowed to use the washing machine, when he could dispose of his garbage, etc. On entering the landlady's apartment he was introduced to a Russian Trade Mission Officer residing in the same city. The landlady explained that her Russian guest was a former tenant who just happened to be visiting a co-worker of his residing there in the same building. To explain his presence the

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Russian stated he was just paying a courtesy call on the landlady. After the American Embassy FSS employee completed his business with the landlady he thought it only polite to engage the Russian visitor in conversation for a few minutes and then depart. Contrariwise the Russian engaged the American in conversation for approximately one hour discussing mutual cultural interests, civil unrest in the U. S., American intervention in South Viet Nam, etc. With some difficulty the FSS employee finally terminated the meeting. Before breaking contact the Russian offered a dinner invitation, a chance to drive our Embassy employee around town to see places of tourist interest, and last, but not least, a ticket to attend a Russian cultural film showing. In each instance the American FSS employee politely but firmly declined, claiming to have another engagement.

During the next month this Russian Trade Mission Officer approached the FSS Communications Clerk at his building on two occasions with invitations to socialize but in both instances he was politely rebuffed. After the initial approach in the landlady's apartment the FSS employee, as instructed, reported the matter to his Embassy superiors and later to a Regional Security Officer. Subsequent investigation established that the Russian Trade Mission Officer was also a KGB (Russian Intelligence) Officer. The American FSS employee shortly afterwards departed post on normal transfer without further incident.

NOTE:

Never resolved to the complete satisfaction of the responsible Regional Security Officer was why the KGB Officer made such persistent efforts to cultivate this Embassy Communications Clerk almost from the day of his moving into the building and yet supposedly overlooked two American FSS secretaries who had lived there in separate apartments for over one year.

\* \* \* \* \*

In 1967 a Visa Officer assigned to an Eastern European country became socially involved with some local nationals, including sexual relations with one of them under suspect circumstances. All evidence pointed to an attempt by local intelligence to entrap/recruit the above American Visa Officer.

DETAILS:

In 1967 a Foreign Service Officer serving as a Visa Officer at an American Embassy in a Eastern European country attended a semi-official cocktail party hosted by an American co-worker. At this party he made the acquaintance of two men who claimed to be employed with the local Ministry of Trade. Our Visa Officer discovered that he had much in common (socially speaking) with these two locals and when the cocktail party broke up he accompanied them to a local hotel bar for more drinking and good fellowship. The Visa

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Officer discovered that his two newly-made friends had no interest in his work but were only interested in socializing with him in the future and while not soliciting, they claimed to have easy access to local women offering illicit sexual relations.

One week later the Foreign Service Officer at the invitation of his above two local friends went to a bar which was a known habitat for prostitutes. The American had been there previously on two occasions and while he had spoken with the bar girls he had never engaged in any extracurricular activities with them. After an evening of good cheer and considerable drinking the party broke up with the American agreeing to drive his two friends and one of the bar girls to their homes. He drove the girl to her home last. Instead of a polite goodbye at her door the girl dragged the Foreign Service Officer into the apartment where she quickly disrobed and attempted to engage him in sexual relations. The American later claimed he only engaged in some sex play with her for a few minutes and then left the apartment going immediately to his own apartment.

The following day the Foreign Service Officer, after recalling the pertinent security lectures and the Post prohibition against personal socializing with local nationals, went to the Embassy Security Officer. Without too much counseling he also realized from what had transpired with the local nationals that he was possibly being set up for a blackmail/recruitment attempt. In conclusion, the Foreign Service Officer declined future social invitations with the local nationals and that, in this case, ended the matter.

\* \* \* \* \*

In mid 1969 at an African post, a Soviet Intelligence Officer, using a news correspondent cover, attempted to recruit a Foreign Service Staff Employee by suggesting that he resign and establish a center in Canada for U. S. deserters and draft dodgers.

DETAILS:

During the fall of 1968 a Foreign Service Staff Officer attached to the American Embassy in an African country attended a press cocktail party given by a Swiss National News Service correspondent where he met a Soviet National who claimed to be employed there with the Russian Press Service. The American FSS Officer and the Soviet news correspondent discovered they had many interests in common and in the subsequent six months they met often together, generally at local restaurants. The Soviet National generally picked up the bills and, in fact, even presented small amounts of vodka and beer to the American FSS Officer. These meetings together in public were noticed by some of the American's co-workers at the Embassy but he was never cautioned or questioned as to the Soviet's intentions. This Soviet news correspondent, in conversing with this American FSS employee, displayed

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great interest in American Embassy employees, their work, their likes and dislikes, how they reacted to civil unrest in the U.S., their views on continued U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, etc. From this line of questioning the Soviet news correspondent learned that the American FSS Officer did not favor the "draft system" in the U. S. which sent young U. S. soldiers to Viet Nam. Subsequent events would make it appear that the Soviet newsmen assumed the American FSS Officer's sentiments concerning the U. S. draft system were such that he would actively work or aid activities which would hinder or disrupt it. In mid 1969 at a public restaurant meeting the Soviet news correspondent made a direct approach by offering financial support to the American FSS Officer if he would resign and go to Canada and open a center for U. S. deserters and draft dodgers. As further inducement he offered to provide funds to allow the American FSS Officer to travel to Sweden with the object of observing how centers there were aiding and harboring U. S. deserters. The American FSS Officer, due to having difficulty at this juncture to disengage himself and with the realization that he might have become involved in a suspect situation, reported the whole matter to his superiors and later to a Regional Security Officer. Soon afterwards the American FSS Officer was transferred to another post and there has to date been no report that he was further contacted by the Soviet news correspondent.

The Embassy and the responsible Regional Security Officer at the conclusion of his investigation were of the strong opinion that the above Soviet National was a KGB-Russian Intelligence Officer who was attempting to recruit for his purposes an American Foreign Service Staff Officer.

\* \* \* \* \*

During late 1967 and early 1968 a Foreign Service Staff employee attached to an American Embassy in an East European country engaged in indiscreet social behavior with an Embassy local employee whose general actions made it appear that she was most likely controlled by a local intelligence agency.

DETAILS.

This Foreign Service Staff employee was assigned from approximately September 1967 to January 1968 to the Administrative Section, American Embassy in an East European country. He was described as being a competent and conscientious worker but his actions away from work left much to be desired. This American Embassy FSS employee separated from his wife just prior to coming to post; he generally drank more than was acceptable and when under the influence of alcohol did, on several occasions, make indiscreet advances to both single and married females at Embassy semi-official parties. Of particular concern was that this Embassy employee, although lectured not to, did engage surreptitiously in an illicit relationship with a local language teacher attached to the Embassy. She had been included at some small Embassy parties which made it possible for the American FSS employee to openly pursue her. After the parties he would take her to her apartment or to his Embassy furnished apartment

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where from the beginning, according to his claim, he engaged in normal sexual relations with her. On two occasions when driving her home the American FSS employee observed local surveillance cars accompanying him. While the American FSS employee did not intend a serious affair to develop, it appeared that the local language teacher at least by her overt actions was of another mind. She claimed to be in love with him and on a number of occasions in private and in public with others listening, claimed to be disgusted and against the local government and would, if given the opportunity, flee to a West European country or the USA. The American FSS employee, recognizing his indiscretion, attempted to break off his liaison by making excuses for not seeing her further. The local language teacher actively pursued him finding excuses to be in the Embassy at such times when the American FSS employee would be coming to or going from work and, on one occasion, she sent him an open letter by another employee in which she again claimed to be hostile to the local government and she also offered to provide a "hide-away" apartment where she and the American FSS employee could meet without being observed. The American FSS employee, after counseling with his superiors and the responsible Regional Security Officer, was transferred from post without further incident.

In view of the local language teacher's voiced anti-local government sentiments and other indiscreet conduct and the fact that she was not supposedly questioned or harassed by the local security police, there is a strong suspicion that she was directed by the local intelligence services who were attempting to compromise and recruit the American FSS employee.

\* \* \* \* \*

In late 1967 a Marine Security Guard assigned to an American Embassy in a West European country was approached socially by a Russian KGB Officer in what appeared to be a recruitment attempt.

DETAILS:

In early 1966 a Marine Security Guard arrived and took up his duties at an American Embassy in a West European country. This Marine was a continuous source of concern to his supervisor (Marine NCOIC) as he was found in general to be immature, showed poor judgment, was continuously committing infractions of rules, regulations, and in general, was considered a "weak link" in the post security program.

One evening in November 1967, the Marine Security Guard was sitting alone at the bar in a small cafe he was known to visit with some frequency. Soon after his arrival a man occupied the bar stool next to him and started a friendly conversation. Without giving his name, the man identified himself as being a Russian National employed as an English translator with an International Organization. The Russian was generous in that he paid for a number of the Marines' drinks while explaining very

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convincingly that he and his wife liked everything about the United States and the American people and in substance he would like nothing better than to have the Marine come to dinner at his (Russian) home the next evening. The Russian also offered to show his coin collection to the Marine. The dinner invitation was pressed several times but each time the Marine declined due to having another engagement. After several drinks the Russian bragged concerning his knowing where the Marine was employed and that the Marine and his co-workers (Marines) bowled at the AMF Bowling Alley three times a week. By this time two hours had gone by and the Marine decided it would be better for him to break off contact with the Russian. The Marine excused himself claiming he had to go to work and that he could not accept a dinner invitation the following evening as he had a bowling date. The Marine left the bar alone without further incident.

The following day the Marine Security Guard reported his talk with the Russian of the previous evening to his supervisor (Marine NCOIC) and the responsible Regional Security Officer. He was instructed to stay away from his favorite cafe and the unidentified Russian if seen again. That same evening the Marine joined the other members of the Marine Security Guard Detachment at the AMF Bowling Alley. Shortly after bowling started, the Russian of the previous evening entered and approached the Marine. He again invited the Marine to come to his home when bowling terminated and have dinner with him and his wife. The Marine declined by explaining he was having dinner with his Marine co-workers. The supervising Marine NCOIC was standing near-by giving moral support. The Marine politely broke off conversation and continued to bowl. The Russian left soon afterwards and no further contact has been reported.

The responsible Regional Security Officer was later able to identify the Russian as being a Russian Intelligence (KGB) Officer.

\* \* \* \* \*

During the period 1966 - April 1967, an Officer of USIA attached to the U.S. Embassy in an East European country became involved in indiscreet acts controlled by local intelligence, which culminated in a "blackmail" approach designed to recruit him. The approach failed, and the USIA Officer concerned was transferred without further incident.

DETAILS:

In 1965 a USIA Officer was assigned to the Cultural Section of the American Embassy in an East European country. Due to his previous commendable work experience at another Iron Curtain post and his ability to speak the local language, this Officer was often assigned to escort duties with U.S. Government delegations visiting the post and surrounding cities. It was believed that he was also especially security conscious and more than aware of what the local intelligence/security police were capable of regarding entrapment, etc.

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During the late Summer of 1966, this unmarried USIA Officer, while accompanying a group of U.S. officials on a tour of several cities, met several evenings in succession for dinner and drinks with two local news correspondents whom he met initially at a semi-official local government cultural cocktail party two months before. During their initial dinner party, which included amenable women, the USIA Officer drank too much and he could recall later only that he had to be carried to his hotel bed. On the following day when he inquired of the two local correspondents, he was told that his drunken conduct was so bad that it came to the attention of the local police. In addition, some photographs apparently taken the night before showing him lying unclothed in bed with one of the girls from the previous evening were displayed to him. He was told not to worry, however, and the photographs were destroyed in his presence. It was made to appear that the two local news correspondents had also conducted themselves improperly and had just as much to lose if the above photographs came to the attention of the police. The USIA Officer thought this ended the matter.

In the succeeding months the USIA Officer joined one or both of the above local news correspondents on an average of once every ten days for a night on the town. The USIA Officer believed he could trust his local companions; but he was careful not to drink to excess as he did at the initial party.

In February 1967 while again on escort duty away from Post, the two local news correspondents paid the USIA Officer a surprise visit at his hotel. Over drinks in his hotel room, the USIA Officer was told by his visitors that the police were still investigating him for his participation in the previous drunken party (August 1966). In addition, the police had been furnished, by unknown sources, the photographs showing the USIA Officer unclothed in bed with a local bar girl. The proposition was finally offered that the USIA Officer would have to cooperate with local intelligence security police (details not given) or the local police would soon be arresting him for disturbing the peace, etc. The USIA Officer was understandably shaken by what his two "friends" were offering him. The USIA Officer managed to end this evening get-together by politely declining to cooperate and on his return to the Embassy two days later, he reported the whole matter to the responsible Regional Security Officer. A few days later the USIA Officer was transferred away from Post without further incident.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF SECURITY  
S E C R E T

OFFICE LETTER NO. 1-71/11

DATE: April 15, 1971

TO: Regional Security Supervisors  
Regional Security Officers  
Security Officers (Technical)

FROM: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security *LS*

SUBJECT: Debriefing of East European FSLEs

PER-9-3

Within the past few years, more and more Foreign Service Local Employees of our Eastern European missions have been allowed to exit their native countries to visit the West, either on official Embassy business or for pleasure. Some chose not to return, but to apply for refugee status at locations in Western Europe - usually Austria, Germany or Italy. Since these individuals, while employed at our missions, have been pressured in varying degrees by the intelligence services of their respective countries to report on American Embassy operations, personnel, and their activities, and to perform other collection functions, they have become excellent sources of information to us concerning attempted penetrations of our installations and weaknesses in our security systems. Consequently, it is highly desirable that these individuals be contacted and debriefed as soon as possible following their defection to the West. For purposes of this instruction, a FSLE is considered to be any direct-hire or contract employee of the mission to include USIS, DAO, Agriculture, etc., plus individuals employed from time to time at trade fairs, exhibits, and special projects. In addition, domestics are of interest and will be debriefed along the same lines as FSLEs.

RSOs in East Europe are instructed to closely monitor the movements of FSLEs to the West, both at their posts of residence and constituent posts, and to notify SY/SAS by cable when travel by these individuals is contemplated and confirmed, providing, if possible, their points of destination. In cases where FSLEs are allowed to immigrate legally, a summary of the information listed on their visa applications should be provided to include the names of sponsors in the West. In addition, copies of pertinent documents contained in their post security files and the most recent Forms DSP-33 available should be immediately pouched to SY/SAS.

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RSOs serving in countries in which refugee centers and voluntary refugee organizations are located, are urged to maintain close liaison with appropriate officials of these agencies to insure prompt notification when FSLEs from Communist countries (or their near relatives) are being processed for immigration or re-settlement.

Upon evaluation and appropriate coordination by SY/SAS, the RSO into whose area of jurisdiction the FSLE is expected to arrive will be immediately alerted and requested to conduct an in-depth debriefing. Special instructions will be issued to the RSO in each case depending on the FSLE's status, i.e., refugee, immigrant etc., and pertinent information contained in SY or CAS files at headquarters level will be provided.

Points of interest in such a debriefing are, but need not be limited to, those outlined in Attachment A. Also attached is a sample report of debriefing to facilitate the comprehensive reporting of the large quantity of useful information that invariably results from such debriefings. (Attachment B). Inapplicable captions may be deleted or modified as required.

Timely reporting to SY/SAS on matters pertinent to this instruction is considered essential.

Attachments:

A & B

S E C R E T

SPECIFIC POINTS OF INTEREST

- 1) Background and personal history.
- 2) List of relatives, their occupations and present locations.
- 3) Marital status and background, education and employment of spouse.
- 4) Education and employment background in detail.
- 5) Travel, especially that outside Eastern Europe and how it was accomplished. (It is essential that all periods of time up to employment at U. S. Mission be accounted for).
- 6) Dates of employment with U. S. Mission, positions held, American supervisors and method of obtaining employment.
- 7) First contact with local intelligence service. Method of contact, place of meeting and method used to solicit cooperation, i.e., pressure or appeal to patriotism.
- 8) Length of association with local intelligence service (exact active periods), name and description of agent handler, method of communication with agent handler and meeting places.
- 9) Frequency of contact with agent handler and special training if any provided.
- 10) Specific requirements levied by agent handler against the mission proper and specific information requested regarding American and local employees. (In this regard a list of Americans at the Post during the time in question will be provided. Specific assessment and other pertinent information regarding each should be obtained). Also, knowledge of audio penetrations or attempts and surveillance capabilities at locations around the Embassy.
- 11) Actual information provided to the local intelligence service and what areas of interest within the mission appeared of concern to the agent handler.
- 12) Knowledge of the reporting requirements of other FSLEs and the nature and extent of interest shown in these individuals by the agent handler.
- 13) Knowledge by the local intelligence service of individuals departure to the West. Was special permission required from intelligence service and were any special requirements levied after arriving in the West.
- 14) The degree of difficulty in acquiring passport and exit visas.
- 15) Contacts with native country officials since in the West. The nature and degree of such contact should be explored in detail.
- 16) Present and future plans to include intermediate and final destination.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

1014 05-838 4-26-56				DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF SECURITY			
TITLE NONANSKI, Jerzej				CASE CLASSIFICATION Special Inquiry			
FIELD OFFICE Regional Security Office		DATE REPORTED March 10, 1971		DATES INVESTIGATED March 2,3,4,7, 1971		REPORTING AGENT	
SYNOPSIS							
Subject, FSLE American Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, from September 1963 to June 1970 debriefed and provided details regarding background, employment, cooperation with UB (Polish Intelligence Service) and characterizations of American and local employees. Narrative presentation of debriefing set forth herein.							
- CLOSED -							
REFERENCE: Special Request from Chief, Special Assignments Staff dated February 2, 1971							
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APPROVED				DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE			
Regional Security Officer (Special Agent in Charge)				DATE RECEIVED			
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REVIEWED BY AGENT SUPERVISOR							
(Date)				(Initials)			

S E C R E T

GROUP I  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification.

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CONTENTS MUST NOT BE DISCLOSED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS.

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DETAILS:	

The following is a detailed narrative of information elicited from Subject during interviews with the reporting officer on March 2,3,4, and 7, 1971.

PERSONAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND:

Under this heading Items 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of attachment A should be reported chronologically in detail. It should include background of parents, cities of residence, schools attended, participation in youth organizations, nature and degree of academic endeavors, employment history, marital background, travel and hobbies.

RELATIVES:

A list of all maternal and paternal relatives and siblings, to include their present whereabouts, occupations and activities.

CLOSEST POLISH FRIENDS:

A list of associates, their whereabouts, occupation and activities, and the nature of their association.

CASE OFFICERS:

A list of case officers, names used, description and length they acted as Subject's handler.

DETAILS OF RECRUITMENT; PLACE AND FREQUENCY OF CONTACTS:

Under this heading items 7, 8, and 9 of attachment A should be reported in detail to include first approach, cultivation, recruitment method, frequency of meeting, place of meeting, methods used to arrange meetings, surveillance enroute to meetings, and special intelligence training. This should also be reported chronologically as with respect to each case handler and dates (month and year) ascertained.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: (Items 10 and 11 in attachment A)General:

Items of general interest to case officers (examples set forth below) usually based on oft-repeated questions by case officer in his instructions to have Subject glean information through conversations with Americans, through personal observations and from "gossip" within the American community.

S E C R E T

- a) Background: General Biographic Data
- b) Cultural and General Interest: To include sports, hobbies and preferences in reading material.
- c) Travel: Both past and proposed; place and purpose of travel; traveling companions; mode of transportation.
- d) Previous Assignments: Location and nature of work.
- e) Health Factors: Temporary or permanent maladies or afflictions both physical and emotional.
- f) Weaknesses: Drinking habits, marital problems, known or suspected extra marital relationships or paramour affairs among single personnel.
- g) Relationships Among American Personnel: i.e., whom among the American staff are close friends; among whom are their "antipathies".
- h) Attendance Lists at Cocktail and other Social Functions:
- i) Subjects of Conversation with Americans: Specifically what questions they asked of Subject and the general substance of their interest in her.

Specific:

Specific reporting requirements levied by Subject's case officer and the degree to which Subject complied.

(Examples)Physical

- A) Determine if the grilled gate between the Consular Section and Administrative Section is equipped with an alarm device.
- B) Determine the contents of room 312 and persons having access.
- C) Provide the patrol schedule of the MSG on the 4th floor.

Personnel

Dorothy White: White's opinion of the post non-fraternization policy, her desires regarding future assignments, and her comments regarding her supervisor Tom Jones.

Albert Green: His comments regarding mini-skirts in the office, the degree of his wife's arthritic condition, and the feasibility of his making an advance toward Subject or other women at post.

S E C R E T

Mary Blue: The nature and degree of her interest in Zen Buddhism; the prospect of her use of narcotics and the nature of the conflict with her husband FSO B. Blue, over these issues.

Etc.

CHARACTERIZATION OF AMERICAN EMPLOYEES:

Characterizations based on Subject's personal observations and suspicions of Americans with whom she has had some degree of association.

(Examples)

Mr. & Mrs. Ralph Brown: Subject met them only at Embassy social functions and considered them "friendly and sociable people" well liked and respected by the American staff. No interest was shown in the Browns by her agent handler except to report any comments among the Americans regarding Mrs. Brown's automobile accident in 1969.

George Black: Believed him to be a Visa Officer. Very gregarious with FSLEs and traveled frequently to consular districts in Poland. Case officer interested in relationship with wife, travel itinerary, and travel companions.

Eleanor Pink: Homely middleaged secretary, quiet and a loner. Took no interest in Embassy functions and appeared to have no real close associations among Americans. Rumored to have dated the 2nd Secretary of the Turkish Embassy, but of no interest to case officer.

CHARACTERIZATION OF POLISH EMPLOYEES:(Examples)

Nichol Popapski: Chauffeur to the Ambassador. Very arrogant, surly and anti-American. Subject suspicious that he is closely associated with UB. While Subject possesses no specific information in this regard Subject has recollection of several comments made by case officer which could have only been gleaned from Popapski (Explain).

Mira Lowaska: Receptionist; well liked by Americans and local staff, however appears somewhat nervous and apprehensive. Subject once observed her at a local coffee shop talking to a man Subject believed to be from the UB. This she assumed from the cut of his clothes and the fact that he appeared to be doing all the talking and Lowaska looked "glum and frightened".

Etc.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

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DETAILS OF DEPARTURE FROM POLAND:

Report results of items 13 and 14 in attachment A.

CURRENT REQUIREMENTS:

Report results of item 15 of attachment A to include specific and general requirements, if any, levied by case officer to accomplish in the West.

MISCELLANEOUS:

Report results of item 16, of attachment A and any other information of possible counterintelligence significance.

POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION:

In special cases at the direction of SY Headquarters a polygraph examination may be requested. The results of that examination should be reported here in detail.

CLOSING OBSERVATIONS:

Comments of the Reporting Officer to include his evaluation of the veracity of Subject's declarations, results of corroborating or record check information and personal observations.

EXHIBITS OR ATTACHMENTS:

At a minimum there should be attached a photograph of Subject and a copy of her latest Form DSP-33.

S E C R E T

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Office of Security

S E C R E T

OFFICE LETTER NO. D-77/6

DATE: August 3, 1977

TO: Regional Security Supervisors FILE NO: INT-6  
Regional Security Officers  
Regional Technical Officers

FROM: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security *JAP/SL*

SUBJECT: KGB Collection Requirements on American Embassy  
Installations and Personnel Abroad

Attached is a listing of the 1977 KGB collection requirements on American Embassy installations and personnel abroad. This information has been made available to the Office of Security by SRF. Due to the source, it is sensitive intelligence information and not releasable to foreign nationals.

The attachment is being furnished for specific use by security officers and must be handled on a strict "need to know" basis. The "Third Agency Rule" applies; therefore, the attachment may not be furnished other agencies or departments without the prior concurrence of SRF.

Attachment should not be removed from this letter.

Attachment:  
KGB Collection Requirements  
(3 pages).

S E C R E T  
(XGDS-2 - Derivative)

**SECRET**

**I. Internal structure, methods of work, communications of the installations.**

- 1) Structure of management and functions of the installation.
- 2) Data about departments, subunits, their tasks.
- 3) Information about the subordination and authority of organizational units.
- 4) Data about the structure of secret units.
- 5) The organization of work at the installation. The internal communications of the various units.
- 6) Methods of planning and managing the activity of the installation, as well as of representations and missions subordinate to it.
- 7) Contacts of the installation with leaders of the country of assignment, with representatives of the Army and of the intelligence services.
- 8) Contacts of the installation with other state organs, ministries and departments.
- 9) Contacts with leaders of former/i.e. opposition/ parties and organizations of the country of assignment.
- 10) Contacts with educational institutions
- 11) Contacts with enterprises in the services sphere.
- 12) Contacts with mass information media and with individual journalists.
- 13) Contacts of an official nature with individual persons.
- 14) Contacts with international organizations represented in the country of your assignment.
- 15) Official or personal contacts of employees of the installation with representatives of the USSR and other socialist countries.

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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**SECRET**

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**II. Personnel Staff and Requirements of the Installation**

- 1) The number and distribution of the installation's staff by subunits.
- 2) Personnel policies of the installation's management.
- 3) The system of employment of the /various/ categories of employees of the installation, their qualifications, average length of work.
- 4) The rights and obligations of the installation's employees.
- 5) Data about individuals, information of a biographic nature, about contacts, political views, chances for promotion, habits, attitudes, weaknesses, distinguishing characteristics, etc.
- 6) Personnel needs of the installation and its individual elements at the present time and in the future.
- 7) The system of selecting and hiring new local employees.
- 8) Principles of compensation and system of advancement.
- 9) Advancement barriers for individual categories of employees.
- 10) Demands of a disciplinary nature.
- 11) Possible transfers of employees within the installation.
- 12) Manifestations of workers turnover and its causes.
- 13) The system of making TDY assignments, data on individual persons.
- 14) Educational institutions of the country of assignment and other institutions used /as a source/ for the selection of personnel.
- 15) Participation of the staff of the installation in clubs.
- 16) Employment bureaus used for hiring personnel.

**SECRET**  
**NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

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3

- 17) The social structure of the installation's employees.
- 18) The political structure of the personnel, party membership.
- 19) The working atmosphere in the installation.
- 20) Places where employees live.
- 21) Places frequented by employees of the installation (cafes, beaches, etc.).

III. Situation and Supply of the Installation

- 1) Characteristics of buildings and their condition.
- 2) Technical equipment (power-supply, sewerage, communications net, location of cables.)
- 3) Special-purpose equipment of the installation (location of the SShO /cryptographic section/, switchboards, teletype, antennas, etc.)
- 4) Rented mail box and the system for distributing mail.

# AIRGRAM

Return CRY  
 P790057-0691  
 ChRou

DEPT. DISTRIBUTION ORIGIN ACTION SY				HANDLING ROUTINE	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	MESSAGE REFERENCE NO. A-1299
AI	AI/A	BI/BR	CU	ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AND US SFM  FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE  E.O. 11652: RDS-3 3/30/85 (ACKERMAN, Karl D.) TAGS: ASEC SUBJECT: Guidance Regarding Personal Relationships With Nationals of the Soviet Union and Certain Other Communist Countries.  REF: INTRODUCTION  (C) This airgram states the Department's policy concerning personal contacts with nationals of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba. The instructions set forth herein are designed to help avoid situations which could be exploited by a hostile intelligence service. A separate airgram concerning the Peoples Republic of China will be published.  (U) The success of the Foreign Service rests in part on the ability of our personnel to establish effective business and social relationships with the officials and citizens of other countries. In our dealings with the countries listed above, we have, in most instances, had the benefit of increased contacts during recent years. It has been possible for officers at our posts in most of these countries to expand their official and unofficial contacts, enhancing their ability to represent U.S. interests and report on host country attitudes.		
DI/DA	DI/LOS	EA	EB			
EUR	FADRC/DR	FADRC/LR	FBO			
ICA	INR	IS	L			
M/MI	MC	NEA	DES			
PER	PM	PPI	S/IL			
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CURRENT SITUATION

(C) Efforts by the Soviet Union and other communist countries to gain advantage through the use of traditional intelligence methods continue. Although during the first half of this decade there was a diminution of reported recruitment attempts directed against Americans, the year 1975 signalled an upturn in hostile intelligence activity. In 1975 there were more reported instances of hostile intelligence developmental operations or recruitment attempts than in the previous three years combined. The years 1976 through 1978 have kept pace with 1975. It appears that the prospect of having a recruitment attempt fail is no longer viewed by these hostile intelligence services with as much concern as was apparently the case in the early 1970's.

(U) Experience demonstrates that an intimate social relationship between an American and a citizen of a country specified in the introductory paragraph cannot be maintained without risk to both parties. One can still be certain that such contacts will be observed, that the non-American will be carefully watched, investigated, and that he or she will probably be eventually questioned to gain information about the American friend. It is, in fact, still standard procedure for the KGB and the intelligence services of other communist controlled countries to co-opt their citizens for the purpose of exploiting friendships with foreigners. This "exploitation" sometimes only takes the form of reporting on the movements and activities of the American; in other instances, the non-Americans have been asked or coerced to participate in the compromise of foreigners. The KGB and its allies have a long and successful history of exploiting foreigners based upon romantic involvement and sexual activities with nationals of their countries.

STATEMENT OF POLICY

(U) It is expected and desired that officers seek out and maintain business and social contacts with officials and citizens of the countries noted above, as may be necessary to facilitate the efficient performance of their official duties. The extent of that contact will be determined by objectives established by Chiefs of Mission and the Department. All personnel should, however, avoid one-to-one relationships, which could lead to difficulties for these foreign nationals from the cited countries or could form the basis for intelligence activity directed against the American.

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- 3 -

(C) Experience has demonstrated that the most common occurrences exploited by hostile intelligence services are violations of U.S. or host country law, personal involvement by American employees in internal social or political issues, and sexual involvement between American employees and citizens from the countries cited above. As a general rule, official and acceptable social contact with citizens of the cited countries should only be pursued in those instances when the contact clearly supports foreign policy objectives. This policy applies no matter where the national resides or the American employee is assigned.

(U) Any questions concerning specific social relationships with diplomats or citizens of the cited countries can be discussed with the Ambassador, Principal Officer, or Section Supervisor, as well as the Security Officer at your post of residence. Any suspicious incident or contact occurring abroad which may be construed as a foreign intelligence approach must be reported immediately to the Principal Officer and Regional Security Officer. Department personnel must report such information to their Section Supervisor (as appropriate) and to the Special Assignments Staff of the Office of Security, Room 2236, Main State, telephone 632-1040. USICA-Washington, AID-Washington, and ACDA-Washington personnel must contact their respective Offices of Security. Employees reporting such incidents can expect an understanding and professional response.

(U) Failure to exercise good judgement in avoiding personal relationships that can increase vulnerability to foreign intelligence efforts is obviously not conducive to a successful career in the Foreign Service. The failure to report foreign intelligence approaches will be viewed with the utmost seriousness and violations will be dealt with accordingly.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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OFFICE LETTER NO. D-79/17

DATE: September 13, 1979

TO: Regional Security Supervisors  
Regional Security Officers  
Technical Security Officers

FROM: Karl D. Ackerman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Security

SUBJECT: (U) Guidance Regarding Personal Relationships  
with Nationals of the Soviet Union and Certain  
Other Communist Countries

REFERENCE: (U) Airgram 1299, dated April 20, 1979 subject  
as above

FILE: SY-1

Purpose:

(U) Airgram 1299 (copy attached) was written to establish a Department-wide policy governing acceptable levels of contact between Foreign Service personnel (to include ICA and AID employees) and communist country nationals. For many years a definitive Department policy has not existed and each post to a greater or lesser extent established a localized "non-fraternization" policy to fit its own needs. The Airgram establishes uniform guidelines.

Scope:

(U) As noted in the Airgram's Statement of Policy, the normal test for determining if a relationship with a communist country national should be pursued rests on whether that relationship facilitates the performance of official duties and is consistent with objectives established by the Department and Chief of Mission. For officers with reporting and representational responsibilities, it is understood that such contact will be pursued. However, in those instances when a relationship develops between an employee and a communist country national which is not considered advisable and does not clearly fulfill a foreign policy

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RDS-3 8/29/85 (ACKERMAN, Karl D.)

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objective, the Airgram provides the basis for directing the employee to discontinue that contact. Such a policy is particularly helpful in dealing with those instances when employees are reluctant to discontinue a relationship with a communist country national or question the authority of the post to direct that a relationship be terminated.

(LOU) It is believed that the Airgram offers sufficient flexibility and latitude to allow for a case by case evaluation of the merits of any given social contact between Foreign Service personnel and communist country nationals as well as providing a basis for discouraging those contacts which represent a security threat. Implicit is the concept that romantic involvement and sexual intimacies with communist country nationals, worldwide, represents a failure to exercise good judgement and is not permitted. Posts, particularly those in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, should include in post policies an explicit statement regarding sexual intimacies with nationals of those countries identified in the Airgram.

(C) The Airgram also addresses the proper procedure for reporting suspected intelligence approaches. Once reported at post and dependent upon urgency and sensitivity, that information should be immediately transmitted to the Department via SY Channel for the DASS and SY/SAS only or via memorandum Eyes Only to the Chief, SY/SAS. Initial telegraphic reporting is preferred.

(C) Other special channels such as Roger Channel should not be used for reporting recruitment attempts, hostile penetrations or similar occurrences. These channels receive much wider dissemination within the Department and can result in unnecessary disclosure of sensitive information involving American citizens.

Implementation:

(LOU) RSOs should discuss the concepts outlined in Airgram 1299 with appropriate personnel at resident and constituent posts. Questions regarding the guidance provided in the Airgram should be directed to the Chief, SY/SAS. As in the past, specific security and counterintelligence related threats resulting from relationships with communist country nationals should be reported on a timely basis to the Chief, SY/SAS.

Attachment:  
A-1299

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3 AUG 79 02 07

R E T 218Z AUG 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 207883

ARMENIAN

INTEL CKTOP

TEHRAN 53827

SUBJECT REP IS LEVON PARUIRONICH VARTANIAN (21-819588). (PER SUBJECT, NAME SOMETIMES/RUSSIFIED AS VY PAVLOVICH BY SOVIETS.) DPOB: 31 MAR 29, YEREVAN (ARMENIA). WIFE, SOFIA NIKOLAYEVNA, DPOB: 29 SEP 30, Leningrad. SON, SUREN, DOB 58. DAUGHTER, NATALYA, DOB 53 (POSSIBLY DOCTOR/SURGEON; WAS ATTENDING MEDICAL SCHOOL IN MID-70'S).

2. SUBJECT RECEIVED ADVANCED DEGREE FROM UNIVERSITY OF MOSCOW IN ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY. MAJOR FIELDS OF INTEREST WERE ISLAM AND PERSIAN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE. PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS. SPEAKS VERY GOOD FARSI, POOR ENGLISH, GOOD RUSSIAN AND MINIMAL ARMENIAN. IN 69 SUBJECT BECAME MEMBER OF "BIG" COUNCIL OF MUSCOVITE WRITERS (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED BY SOURCE OF INFO, BUT POSSIBLY UNION OF WRITERS. THIS WOULD ACCOUNT FOR PERKS, SUCH AS ACCESS TO DACHA, ETC.) SUBJECT RECEIVED "ORDER OF LENIN" IN 1970.

3. SUBJECT WAS TASS REP IN TEHRAN MAY 67 - OCT 71. SERVED AS FIRST SECRETARY, KABUL, SEP 75 - AUTUMN 77.

4. SUBJECT'S BROTHER, IGOR (221-785634), DOB 25 JAN 36, FORMERLY SERVED AS SOVIET CONSUL, IRAQ (BASRAN), AND W. OF OCT 72 WAS SECOND SECRETARY, OTTAWA, PER PDS/ATISFY. IGOR CARRIED AS KNOWN KGB. SUBJECT IS CARRIED AS SUSPECT RIS, PROBABLY GRU, DUE TO CAREER/ASSIGNMENTS AND PAST ASSOCIATIONS WITH KNOWN RIS OFFICERS. FYI, PER PDS/DRAGLE A L.P. VARTANIAN WAS CAPTAIN, THIRD RANK, GRU, AND PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO SUBJECT.

5. SUBJECT WAS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO TEHRAN SUMMER OF 79 AS PRAVDA REP (LATER CHANGED TO TASS REP). VISA DENIED BY COI BASED ON LIATSON/RITACTLOW TRACES INDICATING SUBJECT SUB

SECRET 301353Z JUL 79 STAFF

TEHRAN 53807

DIRECTOR

INTEL CKTOP

1. SDTRAMP/I ADVISED 29 JULY THAT (FNU) VARTAMIAN HAS RETURNED PCS TEHRAN AFTER FOUR YEARS KABUL. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN IRAN. SPEAKS FLUENT PERSIAN. BELIEVE I/I SAID HE ASSIGNED HERE WITH VESTIA, BUT IT MIGHT BE TASS. I WILL CONFIRM.

2. I/I SAID VARTAMIAN'S WIFE IS OR WAS A KOSYGIN MISTRESS. VARTAMIAN'S APPARENTLY ENJOY PERKS ACCRUING TO THIS KIND OF IMMACY, DACHA, ETC.

3. SEEMS LIKELY THAT, EVEN WITHOUT FIRST NAME AND PATRONYMIC, VARTAMIAN'S COLORFUL BACKGROUND MAY SERVE TO IDENTIFY HIM. IS HE KNOWN TO HCS?

4. FILE: DEFER. RWV 30JUL79 DRU D9C.1. ALL SECRET

SECRET

DIRECTOR 487888 S E C R E T  
IN JANUARY 1977, SUBJECT WAS PROPOSED AS SOVIET CONSUL GENERAL  
ANNUL NOMINATION COMPLETED SUSPENSION NOTED IT MIGHT BE  
DUE TO ARMENIAN NAME AND TABULIATION NOTED IT MIGHT BE  
ORDERED IN AFFRONT TO THIS POST SOVIET ARMENIAN TO ESTABLISH  
CASE, SUBJECT APPARENTLY DID NOT ARRIVE ISTANBUL, AND PASS BLY  
TURNED DOWN BY GOVT OF TURKEY.

6. WHILE IN TEHRAN PREVIOUSLY, SUBJECT WAS PRIME TARGET  
UNTIL ULTIMATELY DECISION WAS MADE THAT HE DISPLAYED  
RELIABILITY. VARIOUS UNILATERAL (AND LIAISON) SOURCES WERE  
CONTACTED WITH SUBJECT, INCLUDING SDY CAMP/1 WHO WAS SOURCE OF  
INFORMATION. SUBJECT HAD STATED THAT HEER WAS ASSOCIATE OF LENIN,  
HIS WIFE WAS FORMERLY SECRETARY OF MISTRESS OF KOSTGIN,  
OTHER COMMENT HAS REAPPEARED FROM OTHER SOURCES IN CONTACT WITH  
SUBJECT.

7. TEHRAN STATION PREPARED SPR (SOVIET PERSONALITY  
REPORT) ON SUBJECT IN 1972. SUBJECT CHARACTERIZED AS AFFABLE  
D NOT DOGMATIC, BUT WIFE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF RECRUITMENT  
GENERALITY. SUBJECT PRESENTLY IN FOND OF WIFE AND CHILDREN  
THROUGH HE PERSONALLY ENJOYED FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS, PARTICULARLY  
MIDDLE EAST. HIS WIFE WAS UNHAPPY DURING TOURS. WIFE SPEAKS  
HEAVILY RUSSIAN WHICH WAS SOLICITING FAULTS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND POSTS  
BROAD.

8. IS SUBJECT ACCOMPANIED BY WIFE OR PRESENT TOUR  
ARRIVAL DATA, PLEASE ADVISE WHO POSITION SUBJECT NOW HOLDS.  
RECEIVING SPR. INDICATION OF INTEREST IN

9. FILE: 281-819458 RVW 2AUG69 DRV D901.

ALL SECRET  
S E C R E T  
#161

PAC R 14014203 AUG 78 DEFERRED TELEPHONE  
WASHINGTON 482527.  
KUALA LUMPUR INFO TEHRAN.  
SF/X/NE VIA (IRAN, LA/ME)  
SUBJECT: WMINFF OYTOP - NEKRASOV, PRIN IVANOVICH  
KUALA LUMPUR 42074

SUBJECT (281-255369), DPO 11 JAN 25, 1977, NEAR MOSCOW  
EXTENSIVE FILE. HE IS NOT, HOWEVER, REPORTED CURRENTLY  
IN TEHRAN. LAST INFORMATION (1977) LISTS SUBJECT AS IN  
INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT ALL-UNION SOCIETY "ZNAVITH" (THE  
SEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN /C/ SOCIALIST COUNTRIES).

SUBJECT SERVED IN KABUL 57-58 AND 64-66, AND IN TEHRAN  
SUBJECT KNOWN 1968, AND WAS PREVIOUSLY RESIDENT IN TEHRAN  
LAST SENIOR OFFICER (IF NOT RESIDENT) OF AGE IN KABUL.  
TWO REFERENCES TO FRITZ DIEM. DOI: 8; DIEM/HE  
OFFICER, KABUL, THAT SUBJECT WAS PLACING ORDERS TO GR  
FIRM. DOI: 57; DIEM TOLD "MINKING STORY" TO AMBASSY  
OFFICER, KABUL, ABOUT SUBJECT'S REQUEST FOR  
IN RENDERING PAYMENT TO WEST GERMAN MAIL ORDER FIRM F  
HEAD. IN TEHRAN, SUBJECT WAS CONSIDERED AMERICAN TARGET  
OFFICER. ALSO HAD UNSPECIFIED CONTACTS WITH A WEST GERMAN  
OFFICER.

SUBJECT DEPARTED TEHRAN JULY 77 FOR HOME LEAVE. HE DID  
HOWEVER, AND WROTE TO ASSOCIATES THAT HE HAD REQUESTED  
RETURN TO ASSASSINMENT SINCE HE WAS "CONSTANTLY ILL WITH HYPERTENSION"  
TEHRAN. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD LIKE A POSTING  
TO RETIREMENT. SUBJECT WAS A MEMBER OF THE  
WORLD PEACE COUNCIL IN COLOMBO, SRI LANKA, IN JAN  
SUBJECT TRAVELLED FROM THE USSR TO WEST GERMANY  
OWN, NOR WHETHER THIS WAS ASSIGNMENT. TDY, OR AS  
OF DEPARTURE.



2 Nov 79 11 34z

31 Oct 79 07 13z

S E C R E T 302133Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 542633.

TO: PRIORITY WWSB (XMT PORT AU PRINCE, BANGUI, KAMPALA),  
BRAZZAVILLE, MAPUTO, NDJAMENA, JOHANNESBURG.

BOOK CABLE

WNINTEL RYBAT PLAFRONAUT PDQUICK

1. STANISLAV ALEKSANDROVICH LEVCHENKO, NOVOYE VREMYA  
CORRESPONDENT IN TOKYO, DEJECTED TO USG IN TOKYO EVENING 23 OCTOBER.  
HE IS NOW IN HEADQUARTERS AREA. INITIAL DEBRIEFINGS APPEAR TO  
SUBSTANTIATE HIS CLAIM TO BE KGB STAFFER. HE HAS NOT SERVED OVERSEAS  
OTHER THAN IN JAPAN AND HIS KNOWLEDGEABILITY APPEARS TO BE LIMITED  
TO KGB OPERATIONS IN JAPAN, AS WELL AS KGB ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE  
AND PERSONALITIES. WE WILL KEEP STATIONS ADVISED AS DEVELOPMENTS  
WARRANT.

2. YOU MAY CONFIRM TO LIAISON, IF ASKED, THAT LEVCHENKO IS IN  
OUR CUSTODY. PLEASE DO NOT COMMENT ON HIS INTEL STATUS. AT THIS  
TIME WE OBVIOUSLY DO NOT WISH TO SOLICIT REQUIREMENTS FROM LIAISON  
SERVICES AND WOULD APPRECIATE STATIONS FENDING OFF SUCE REQUESTS.  
WHEN AND IF WE DEVELOP ANY INFORMATION WHICH IS OF DIRECT AND  
SIGNIFICANCE IMPORTANCE TO A PARTICULAR SERVICE, WE OF COURSE WILL  
MAKE IT AVAILABLE.

3. RVW 26 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

BT  
#2860

S E C R E T 020336Z NOV 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 544888.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: SE/X/NE VIA NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL CITOP OZRAM TRACE

REF: TEHRAN 54613

1. NO HQS TRACES FLORIAN GRECU.

2. CANNOT DETERMINE OPS INTEREST OR MOTIVATION UNTIL  
GENERAL SOCIAL CONTACT ESTABLISHED, EITHER BY C/O OR OTHER EMB  
OFFICER. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE  
IN FUTURE -- ANY NAME VARIATIONS, PREVIOUS POSTINGS, ETC. -- AND WE  
WILL RETRACE. (FYI, DUE TO LIMITED FIELD INPUT ON SE PRESENCE  
SINCE LATE 1978 HQS APPRECIATES INFO SUCH AS REF TO UPDATE OUR  
HOLDINGS ON SOV AND BLOC PERSONNEL ASSIGNED IRAN.)

3. FILE: 41-8-2. RVW 31OCT99 DRV D9C1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T  
BT  
#6993

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976-204-810

USSR Eastern Europe

### WEAPONS STORAGE CAPACITY INCREASED AT SEVEROMORSK (U)

(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN) The Severomorsk Weapons Storage Facility was constructed between 1970 and late 1972 and became operational about mid-1973. On the eastern shore of Kolskiy Zaliv, or Kola Inlet, 0.5 nautical miles east of the finger piers at Severomorsk Naval Base, this facility, which is served by roads, has the mission of supporting the naval surface combatants at Severomorsk Naval Base. SS-N-14 surface-to-surface missile crates, canisters, and other associated equipment have been observed here since early 1975; this missile system is believed to be the primary weapon handled at the Severomorsk installation. These ship-launched antisubmarine cruise missiles are carried on KRESTA II guided missile cruisers and KRIVAK I and II guided missile frigates, which constitute the largest portion of the naval complement based at Severomorsk. The missiles are an antisubmarine warfare acoustic homing torpedo with a 90-kilogram warhead.


(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN) The Severomorsk Weapons Storage Facility is an almost rectangular installation, occupying approximately 4 hectares and secured with a perimeter fence and four guard towers, one at each of the four corners. Some of the buildings include a weapons assembly and maintenance building, a weapons handling and maintenance building, and several support buildings. In April 1978, an expansion of the storage capacity at the facility was undertaken. One large arched-roof bunker appearing in 8 Jul 79 photography reflects the



current status of the expansion. This bunker, now almost completed, measures approximately 45 meters x 12 meters and will probably be used to store SS-N-14 missiles. A second, similar bunker is in the early stages of construction in the southeast corner of the facility, where the ground is being leveled in preparation for laying the foundation.

SECRET

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(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN) Previous limited storage at this facility had been limited. The addition of these two bunkers will provide a significant increase in the number of ready-issue weapons systems that may be stored. Taking into account the measurements of the almost-completed bunker and assuming only one-level stacking with a central aisle for maneuvering will be utilized, about 60 SS-N-14 missiles may be stored. Further, assuming the second bunker to be constructed will be the same size, a similar number of stored missiles would bring the total capacity to 120. This level would almost permit two reloads for the KRESTAS and KRIVAKs at Severomorsk Naval Base. (Classified by multiple sources; review on 14 Oct 99)

Ellis Joseph, DB-1C

### SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP WITH UNUSUAL ANTENNA (U)

(U) The USSR's KAVKAZ class supertanker introduced in 1976 carries a large, high frequency communications antenna that bears the NATO code name, VEE BAR. This same antenna carried on the Soviet Navy's KIEV Class aircraft carrier. The fitting of such an unusually capable communications antenna on merchant marine ships is unique to this class, although some Soviet Academy of Science ships are equipped with VEE CONE, a predecessor of VEE BAR.



SECRET

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S E C R E T 311543Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 54642

TO: WASHINGTON INFO HELSINKI.

FOR: EUR/SC/F INFO C/NE/IRAN, C/NE/S/NE, EUR/AS/A

SUBJECT: WNINTEL CKLEG - ERKKI HUITTINEN

REF: A. WASHINGTON 543129  
B. TEHRAN 51051

1. REF B NO LONGER IN STATION FILES.

2. STATION HAS JUST REACHED PROGRAMMED STRENGTH, AND WE ARE NOW IN A POSITION TO LOOK MORE ACTIVELY FOR ACCESS TO THE SOVIET MISSION HERE. WE ARE NOT PRESENTLY IN TOUCH WITH HUITTINEN, BUT PROPOSE TO FIND HIM IF HE STILL HERE AND DETERMINE HIS POTENTIAL UTILITY AS ACCESS AGENT. PLS EXTEND POA.

3. FILE: 201-959395. RWV 31OCT99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.  
S E C R E T

31OCT79 07 24z

S E C R E T 310333Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 543129.

TO: TEHRAN INFO HELSINKI.

FROM: EUR/SC/F INFO NE/IRAN; SE/X/NE; EUR/AS/A

SUBJECT: WNINTEL CKLEG - ERKKI HUITTINEN

REF: THERAN 51051

1. POA FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FINNISH DIPLOMAT ERKKI HUITTINEN AS A SOURCE ON SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON AND ASSESSMENTS OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION HAS EXPIRED. POA WAS ORIGINALLY ISSUED ON 12 FEB 79 AT THE REQUEST OF TEHRAN STATION OFFICER DIMITROFF, WHO HAD ESTABLISHED A SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HUITTINEN AND CONSIDERED THAT HE HAD THE QUALITIES NECESSARY TO PERFORM EFFECTIVELY AS AN ACCESS AGENT TO THE SOVIET COMMUNITY. BEFORE COMING TO TEHRAN IN 1978, HUITTINEN HAD SERVED A TOUR IN VIENNA, WHERE HE WAS FOR EIGHTEEN MONTHS A SOCIAL CONTACT OF AN RTACTION OFFICER AND ACTED AS AN UNWITTING INFORMANT ON A SOVIET OFFICIAL OF INTEREST TO THE STATION.

2. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER YOU ARE PRESENTLY IN TOUCH WITH HUITTINEN AND WISH US TO EXTEND POA.

3. FILE: 201-959395. RWV 26 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

BT

#3623

SECRET

Lt. Colonel Leonid Vasilyevich DOVBNYA

Known GRU

DPOB: 1939, Ukraine

OCC: Assistant Military Attache, Soviet Embassy, Tehran

ARRIVED: 2 October 1975

PPT: Diplomatic No. 021874

FAMILY: Wife - Nataliya Viktorovna DOVBNYA; Daughter - Marina, born 1966;  
Son, Valeriy, born 1968

MISCELLANEOUS:

DOVBNYA has stated that his father was "killed in Germany," that his mother was also dead, he has been married for ten years and this is his first tour abroad.

Subject has been described as friendly and outgoing. He is well built, has blue eyes, reddish blond hair with slight receding hairline and laughs easily. His wife is described as pretty and outgoing.

DOVBNYA does not speak Farsi, but makes a valiant effort to keep up conversations in his limited English. He is studying Farsi at the Maktab-e-Zaban language school.

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**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DISTRICT 72  
APO NEW YORK 09205



REF ID: A60217  
HQRD227-582

22 Aug 76


SUBJECT: LARRY GIEL (U)

SRF, Tehran

1. (S) Per our previous discussions, the above file and cover name has been established to record results of an operation initiated to direct SUBJECT's activities in controlled social relationships with various personalities in Iran.
2. (S) Initial activity will be directed toward further developing already established relationships with ANATOLIY SAZANOV and Lt Col LEONID DOVENIA for the purpose of acquiring detailed biographical data and establishing a basis for the introduction of other controlled assets to these personalities.
3. (U) Your office will be advised of significant operational developments, as they occur, and written reports as they are prepared.

(SIGNED)

FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Commander



**SECRET**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

227-582

RC 21

24 Aug 76

Title: LARRY GIEL (U)

1. Date and Time of Contact: Sunday/23 Aug 76/0900.
2. Location of Contact Site: U.S. Army Hospital, Tehran, Iran.
3. Location of Hi Site: SUBJECT's office, U.S. Army Hospital, Tehran, Iran.
4. Duration of Meeting: 0900 - 0950
5. Persons Involved in Meet: SUBJECT and the CO.
6. Vehicles Used: The CO utilized an official vehicle assigned to AFOSI Dist 72, a 1973 Plymouth Fury, white in color, registration #73B03498, Tehran license #95239, for travel to the U.S. Army Hospital. The vehicle was left parked in the hospital parking lot, as the CO was also conducting other official business.
7. Purpose of Contact/Meet: Further assessment and to maintain rapport and CO control.
8. Identification of Collateral Reporting: AR (HEARING WITH ASSEA).
10. Future Meet Arrangements: SUBJECT was told he would be telephonically contacted within the next 10 days to arrange a future meeting.
14. RC Prepared by: SA RONALD M. PHILLIPS
15. Distribution: HQ AFOSI/IVOE - 1  
District 72 - 1

CLASSIFIED BY: Comdr AFOSI,  
per AFOSIR 205-3, 12 Apr 74  
Exempt from GDS of E.O. 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1A2  
DECLASSIFY ON: 31 Dec 2006

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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IVOE HW  
cc AWA

FILE

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: Dist 72  
PREPARED BY: SA RONALD M. PHILLIPS

FILE NO: HQD227-582  
DATE: 25 Aug 76

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:

(COORDINATION)

1. (S) On 22 Aug 76, SRF/Tehran requested an urgent meeting with the Case Officer (CO), the purpose of which was to reemphasize SRF's interest in AFOSI developing a controlled social relationship operation, utilizing SUBJECT, to obtain specific information regarding ANATOLIY SAZANOV, Third Secretary, Soviet Consulate, Tehran. SRF furnished the following information they have developed to date, regarding SAZANOV, which they feel must be verified and possibly exploited for subsequent defection considerations:

SAZANOV is probably KGB and this is his first foreign assignment. It is believed that his current position is the First Chief Overseas Directorate in Tehran. For the past six months to one year, SAZANOV has definitely been somewhat troubled/bothered and discontent. He has not been very successful in Tehran, and to SRF's knowledge he has had only 16 contacts with individuals of other than Communist bloc countries. He has apparently "dried up". He is sloppy, disorganized, and he lacks aggressiveness. He frequently breaks these appointments he does accept, or he is quite late if he does show up. He has had a number of automobile accidents while in Tehran. He probably drinks heavily, and he has been observed drunk in public at least twice. SAZANOV is obviously not satisfied with either life or his working conditions in Tehran. Although he does not particularly dislike "going abroad," he definitely wants to leave Tehran. In this regard, he has written correspondence to a former superior with Intourist in Minsk, USSR; he has petitioned the USSR Ambassador to Tehran; and he has even directed correspondence to Foreign Minister GROMYKO, all in an attempt to be relieved from his current assignment.

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SENSITIVE SOURCES & METHODS  
INVOLVED



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PER AFOSIR 205-3, dtd 12 Apr 74  
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EXEMPTION CATEGORY: TWO  
DECLASSIFY ON: 31 DEC 2006

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SRF does not believe that SAZANOV is experiencing any grave family or marital problems, although SAZANOV reportedly left an 11 year old son in the USSR. They feel the marriage is basically stable, even though the wife's characteristics would tend to reveal otherwise. SAZANOV's wife, NATASHA, is described as very flashy, gook looking, juicy, saucy, flirtatious, humorous, and in good command of the English language. She has, however, never been known to seek outside male companionship. SAZANOV and his wife became acquainted while SAZANOV was assigned in Doshambe, Tajikistan, USSR. Their relationship developed as a result of NATASHA, who was a teacher of the English language, giving English lessons to SAZANOV. SAZANOV recently spent nearly all of his foreign exchange certificates for the purchase of a new Volga automobile to be delivered in the USSR. SAZANOV reportedly did this without his wife's full knowledge; he expected some trouble with his wife as a result, and he reportedly did receive some trouble from her, which subsequently "blew over".

Notwithstanding the above, of greater importance is the following:

SAZANOV has confided to several individuals that he is suffering from a radiological poisoning; that he has a blood disease affecting his liver; and that he fully expects to die a young man. He has mentioned previously being assigned in Doshambe, Tajikistan, "where the very ground he walked on seeped with radiation". Although it has been suggested to SAZANOV that he enter a hospital for his ailments, SAZANOV reportedly will not allow himself to be hospitalized because he does not trust Soviet doctors or their hospital facilities. He is believed to be a hypochondriac in this regard, yet refuses Soviet medical advice.

2. (S) SRF advised they have attempted to interpret all of the above into meaningful thought. In view of the fact that SAZANOV is reportedly departing on home leave during Nov 76, and will not return until Jan 77, they feel the time is ripe to attempt to verify and/or explore SAZANOV's physical/mental condition prior to his departure, for obvious reasons. SRF believes that SUBJECT is or could be a key individual to accomplish what they desire.

SRF has offered to be present during, and/or provide, initial in-depth briefing to SUBJECT regarding SAZANOV's problems, wholly dependent upon the views of AFOSI. SRF readily noted that they would in no way, however, attempt to preempt AFOSI control of SUBJECT.

3. (S) SRF has offered any assistance necessary, and they suggest that since SUBJECT is already acquainted with SAZANOV, it would not be unusual for SUBJECT to approach SAZANOV at any social gathering to initiate conversation.

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4. (S) It was mutually agreed operational planning would commence ASAP to arrange contact between SUBJECT and SAZANOV.

DISTRIBUTION: HQ AFOSI/IVOE - 1; DIST 72 - 1

APPROVED:

*Frank M. Huey*  
FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander

**SECRET**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AF-OSI)  
APO New York 09205



AGENT REPORT

PREPARING OFFICE: Dist 72 FILE NO: HQD227-582  
PREPARED BY: SA RONALD M. PHILLIPS DATE: 1 Sep 76

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:

(COORDINATION)

(C) On 1 Sep 76, the matter of SUBJECT's utilization and role in this operation was coordinated with SRF/Tehran by the Case Officer (CO) and Alternate Case Officer (ACO). It was agreed that direction of SUBJECT's activities and matters of control would be vested in AFOSI. At the CO's request, a representative of SRF/Tehran will present SUBJECT with an initial in-depth briefing on the target personality, in the presence of the CO. Tentative arrangements were made for a joint meeting, with SUBJECT, to be held 7 Sep 76. At the conclusion of this meeting, SRF/Tehran provided biographical sketches of the target personalities.

DISTRIBUTION: HQ AFOSI/IVOE - 1; DIST 72 - 1

APPROVED:

*Frank M. Huey*  
FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander

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EXEMPTION CATEGORY: TWO  
DECLASSIFY ON: 31 Dec 2006



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16 SEP 1976

STATEMENT OF APPROVED OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

77H00345-32

Larry Giel(U)

1. (S) Develop a social relationship between Subject and Anatoliy Sazanov, 3rd Sec., Soviet Embassy, Teheran and LtCol Leonid Dovbnia, Asst. Military Attache, Soviet Embassy, Teheran.
2. (S) Collect biographical and personality assessment data on Sazanov and Dovbnia.
3. (S) Determine the nature of Sazanov's alleged medical complaint (i.e., radiological blood poisoning).
4. (S) Exploit where possible Sazanov's expressed dislike of Iran and his distrust of Soviet medical expertise by promoting the advanced medical techniques in use in the United States.
5. (S) Analyze the personalities of Sazanov and Dobnia for likes and dislikes for the purpose of introducing additional access agents to them.
6. (S) Attempt to develop and encourage contacts between Subject and members of the Chinese Embassy, Teheran so that access agents can be directed against the Chinese in Teheran.

*Classified by AFOSI per AFOSIR*  
*Classified by: 2053 dtd 12 APR 74*  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE  
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY: TWO  
DECLASSIFY ON: 31 DEC 2006

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CERTIFICATE OF UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENT

Seymour Levine, VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO ASSIST THE AFOSI IN A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTER IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO MAINTAIN ABSOLUTE SECRECY CONCERNING THIS RELATIONSHIP. I UNDERSTAND THAT ALL INFORMATION, EQUIPMENT, FUNDS OR OTHER MATERIAL OBTAINED FROM AN OPPOSITION SERVICE AS A RESULT OF THIS OPERATION ARE THE PROPERTY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. I FURTHER AGREE TO VOLUNTARILY UNDERGO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION IN CONNECTION WITH THIS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTER AT SUCH TIMES AS DETERMINED NECESSARY BY AFOSI.

THIS RELATIONSHIP MAY BE TERMINATED AT ANY TIME BY MUTUAL CONSENT BY EITHER ME OR THE AFOSI. AFTER TERMINATION I WILL NOT DISCLOSE THIS RELATIONSHIP OR ANY INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY ME DURING IT WITHOUT THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF AFOSI.

Seymour Levine  
(SIGNATURE)

29 Sept 1976  
(DATE)

Ronald M. Phillips  
(WITNESS)

CONFIDENTIAL

PSEUDONYM AGREEMENT

IN RECOGNITION OF THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF MY ASSOCIATION WITH THE AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, (AFOSI), HAVING PLEDGED TO MAINTAIN ABSOLUTE SECRECY CONCERNING THIS RELATIONSHIP, I, Seymour Levine, HAVE CHOSEN THE NAME, Paul Windsor, AS A PSEUDONYM TO PROTECT THIS RELATIONSHIP.

EXCEPT AS MAY BE SPECIFICALLY AGREED BETWEEN MYSELF AND MY CASE OFFICER ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS IN THE FUTURE, I WILL SIGN ALL DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS RECEIPTS FOR PAYMENTS AND EQUIPMENT, OR SIMILAR ITEMS, IN PSEUDONYM. I AGREE THAT THE PSEUDONYM SIGNATURE, AS INDICATED BELOW, WILL BE LEGALLY BINDING IN THE SAME MANNER AS MY TRUE NAME SIGNATURE. I WILL NOT DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE AFOSI.

PSEUDONYM

TRUE NAME

TYPED OR  
PRINTED: Paul Windsor

TYPED OR  
PRINTED: SEYMOUR LEVINE

SIGNATURE: Paul Windsor

SIGNATURE: Seymour Levine

WITNESS:

TYPED OR  
PRINTED: Ronald M. Phillips

SIGNATURE: Ronald M. Phillips

POSITION: SPECIAL AGENT, OSI

DATE: 29 Sep 76

CONFIDENTIAL

## OPERATIONAL PLANNING

1. (S) Of necessity, concentration of efforts at this time must be directed toward further establishing SUBJECT in his relationships with SAZANOV prior to the latter's departure for home leave in November. Specifically, SUBJECT will be directed to exploit and take any opportunity to meet with SAZANOV and, where possible, insure the meetings are on a one-to-one basis. During these meetings, SUBJECT will, playing on SAZANOV's natural desire to discuss his medical problems and empathizing with SAZANOV's stated dislike of Iran, establish his sincere interest in and offer to assist in promoting SAZANOV's well being. While possible, it is not probable SAZANOV's feelings about attempting to have his tour curtailed will be drastically altered prior to his departure. It is believed, however, SAZANOV may be more receptive to overtures of friendship by SUBJECT upon his return to Tehran should his bid to be curtailed be unsuccessful. Further, the possibility exists SUBJECT may persuade SAZANOV to submit to a complete physical examination which may resolve many questions for AFOSI and SAZANOV. SUBJECT is planning to invite SAZANOV to his home for dinner during the week of 16 - 22 Oct 76 and will follow through from that point in accepting a reciprocal invitation or, if appropriate and without being too obvious, will suggest another get together prior to SAZANOV's departure.

2. (S) Simultaneously, SUBJECT will be directed to maintain/further establish his relationships with DOVBNIA, ASHURKO and WANG through attendance at the various official and non-official social functions. As appropriate, based on his success with these contacts, consideration will be given to directing SUBJECT into one-on-one meetings with one or more of these personalities. As a result of these meetings, biographic data will be acquired and personality assessment made with a view toward introduction of selected, additional assets as the situation dictates.

3. (S) To provide for more indepth reporting, it is planned to have SUBJECT's wife debriefed concerning her contacts and observations of the target personalities. Initially, she will be provided a limited briefing on AFR 205-57, AFOSI's interest in the targets and SUBJECT's cooperation with AFOSI. The briefings will stress the acquisition of biographical and personality data. As additional contacts transpire and are reported, she will be assessed for potential in fulfilling an operational role directed toward the respective targets' wives, when and if such a situation warrants and is approved by AFOSI/IVOE.

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CLASSIFIED BY: AFOSI COMINT
PER AFOSIR 205-3
ON 12 APR 74
Exempt from GDS of E. O. 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY I
DECLASSIFY ON 31 DEC 2006

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## OPERATIONAL PLANNING (cont.)

4. (S) To facilitate continued acquisition of timely personality data on SUBJECT and also provide for a means of impersonal communication, where necessary, it is planned, with AFOSI/IVOE approval, to wittingly utilize the CO's wife in this operation. The CO's wife is employed at SUBJECT's facility in a position affording daily access to all areas of the facility and personal contact with staff personnel, including SUBJECT. Specifically, she is a secretary in the Patient Administration Division. Recent comments, and observations concerning SUBJECT, favorable and unfavorable, pertaining to his personality and his relationships with the staff that have been made to and or noted by the CO's wife indicate a potential wealth of information is available which will materially assist in further assessing SUBJECT. In essence, limited source coverage will be provided. Also, the utilization of the CO's wife as a cut-out can be done in the course of her normal duties. (NOTE: Additional impersonal communications methods, personal meet and security procedures are being evaluated for use in this operation. Special mention of this is made in our operations planning as the environment here presents unusual asset handling security challenges). To securely use the CO's wife in the operation, it will be necessary to provide her a limited briefing and, if appropriate, have her execute a Security Pledge. Specifically, she would be told only that:

"SUBJECT is assisting AFOSI in a sensitive counter-intelligence project. To preclude disclosure of AFOSI's interest in SUBJECT to the general public due to over-exposure of the CO at the facility, she will, from time-to-time, be requested to convey messages and personally hand carry sealed envelopes between SUBJECT and the CO. Further, it is necessary for the CO to be aware of any information, favorable or unfavorable, concerning SUBJECT's associations/relationships with his staff and/or other persons with whom SUBJECT has contact due to his position, which she can monitor during the course of her daily duties."

It is believed that utilization of the CO's wife in the dual role of cut-out and source will also provide opportunities for operational testing of SUBJECT in an inconspicuous manner. It is stressed that this course of action is not to be considered the "primary" or "only" means of impersonal communication.

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**SEVEN DOORS**

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OPERATIONAL PLANNING (cont.)

5. (S) Regarding personal meets with the asset, it is planned to identify selected individuals for use as safe site keepers and to arrange use of their residences on a one-time or infrequent basis. Used in conjunction with PM's at varied local restaurants and possible meeting sites at the local contract hotel facility, it is believed adequate operational security will be afforded. Use of commercial hotel facilities, since these require passports for registration, and moving vehicular meets, due to the enormous traffic problems, pose special problems here in Tehran.

- 3 -

**SECRET**

**SEVEN DOORS**

**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205



AGENT REPORT

PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA Ronald M. Phillips  
REFERENCE: RC #5

FILE NO: HQD227-582  
DATE: 23 Oct 76

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(COORDINATION)

1. (S) On 3 Oct 76, this operation was coordinated with representatives of SRF/Tehran by the CO and ACO, during which SRF was briefed on the cocktail party hosted by SUBJECT on 28 Sep 76. As SAZANOV and his wife attended the party and tentatively accepted SUBJECT's offer of a future get together, it was mutually agreed the operation was proceeding smoothly. Of significance were comments by SRF concerning a contact by one of its' representatives with SAZANOV on 2 Oct 76, during which SAZANOV stated he had attended a party at SUBJECT's home. SAZANOV also stated he was not quite sure why he had been invited. The SRF representative was not sure in what context SAZANOV made the remark (i.e. why was he (SAZANOV) invited to a party hosted by SUBJECT or why was he (SAZANOV) invited to a party with such a diverse group of people, particularly since most of the other attendees were individuals with whom SAZANOV had nothing in common).

CLASSIFIED BY: *C. mds, AFOSI*  
*per AFOSIR 205-3, 211124-7*  
Exempt from GDS of E. O. 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
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OPS *[Signature]*  
CC *[Signature]*

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2. (C) On 4 and 5 Oct 76, this operation was coordinated with ERIC F. vonMARBOD, Defense Representative - Iran (the senior DOD personality in Iran) and KENNETH P. MILES, MG, Chief, Armish-Maag, by the CO and Commander AFOSI District 72. Mr. vonMARBOD and General MILES were provided a brief summary of this operation and SUBJECT's activity to date. They were appreciative of the briefing, posed no objection to SUBJECT's participation and both indicated their understanding of this matter.

DISTRIBUTION: HQ AFOSI/IVOE - 1; District 72 - 1

APPROVED

  
FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander

SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations  
Washington, DC 20314



23 NOV 1976

REPLY TO: IVOE (HQD227-582)  
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: LARRY GIEL(U)(Your Fm 96, 27 Oct 76, Op Plans)(U)

-TO: AFOSI District 72/IVOE

1. (S) There is no reason, per se, why Subject's spouse could not be used as a witting asset in this operation. The SUSSEL operation (HQD227-458) was run at your location with a husband and wife team, and worked extremely well. Two things should be taken into consideration before the final decision is made to make her a witting asset. First, whether or not you consider her capable of playing the role must be decided. In other words, what is your assessment of her capability and security consciousness? Second, you should attempt to ascertain in an indirect way, what GIEL's opinion would be of his wife's participation. Since GIEL has not as yet developed a one-on-one relationship with any hostiles, there should be sufficient time to assess his spouse and determine her capabilities, and at the same time feel out Subject on his opinion about his wife's participation. In the meantime, you can continue to debrief her IAW AFR 205-57 on a case by case basis. At such time you determine GIEL's wife can be recruited, please notify this HQ.

2. (S) Use of the CO's wife as a witting source would be an unnecessary disclosure of AFOSI operational interest. Information on GIEL is evidently being obtained through informal conversations. To date, there have been no indications of suspicious or abnormal behavior by GIEL which would affect the operation, and which would require extensive inquiry by a witting source. Therefore, there does not appear to be anything to be gained by making the CO's wife witting.

Comdr AFOSI per AFOSIR  
Classified by: 205-3 dtd 12Apr74  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE  
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY TWO  
DECLASSIFY ON 31 Dec 2006



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3. (S) Use of the CO's wife as a witting cutout presents too many potential problems to be considered except as a last resort to circumvent monumental security problems in Asset - CO communications. It appears from Items 6 thru 9, Part IX of the CIP that GIEL has legitimate reasons for openly contacting and being contacted by AFOSI (i.e., he is a unit commander).

FOREST A. SINGHOFF, Colonel, USAF  
Director of Counterintelligence

JOINT MESSAGE FORM						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
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01 OF 02		RR		AAAA		DATE	TIME	MONTH	YR
						241130Z		OCT	76
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS									
FROM: AFOSI DIST 70 LINDSEY AS GERMANY/IVO									
TO: HQ AFOSI WASH DC/IVO									
SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR IVO									
SEVEN DOORS									
SUBJECT: LARRY GIEL (U) (HQD227-582)									
REF: DO 72 LTR, 9 OCT 76 AND OSI FM 96, 10 OCT 76									
1. (S) ON 19 OCT 76 DO 70/CC AND IVO COORDINATED WITH USAREUR DCSI/CI REPRESENTATIVE AND BRIEFED MGEN MCCABE PER DO 72'S REQUEST.									
2. (S) GEN MCCABE FULLY CONCURRED WITH THE USE OF SUBJECT AS OUTLINED IN REF. HOWEVER, GEN MCCABE ALSO REQUESTED THAT WE DETERMINE IF ANY CONFLICT EXIST BETWEEN SUBJECT'S ACTIVITIES AND GENEVA CONVENTION. SPECIFICALLY, THE GENEVA CONVENTION REQUIRES MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO TREAT INDIVIDUALS OF ANY NATION, AND THAT ANY MEDICAL ASSISTANCE OFFERED SHOULD BE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PATIENT AND NOT FOR OTHER REASONS. WE ADVISED THAT SUBJECT IS SERVING AS A "DOOR AND WINDOW" AND WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO BECOME INVOLVED IN CI ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER, WE WOULD CONFIRM THIS									
DISTR:									
FILE - 1 - IVOE									
AFOSI DIST 72, TEHRAN, IRAN (POSTAL)									
UNATTYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS			
FRANCIS R. DILLON, MAJ, CH/IVO, 3769,						CLASSIFIED BY: AFOSI/CC			
27 OCT 76/LST						EXEMPT FROM GDS OF E.O. 11652			
ATTYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE						EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2			
FRANCIS R. DILLON, MAJ, CH/IVO, 3769						DECLASSIFY ON: 27 Dec 2006			
SIGNATURE						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
						SECRET			

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U.S.GPO:1975-O-372-962/711

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AGENT REPORT //633

PREPARING OFFICE: Dist 70  
PREPARED BY: SA FRANCIS R. DILLON  
REFERENCE: DO 72 Ltr, 9 Oct 76  
TITLE: LARRY GIBL (U)

FILE NR: 76HQD227-582  
DATE: 29 OCT 1976

DETAILS

(COORDINATION)

1. (S) On 26 Oct 76, Colonel C. L. MARTIN, Commander, AFOSI District 70, provided background information concerning this operation to the following USAREUR/DCSI (Deputy Chief of Staff - Intelligence) personnel:

Colonel DEAN SCHANCHIE, USAREUR/Deputy DCSI  
Colonel JOHN C. ROGERS, Jr., USAREUR/ODCSI/CI Division Chief  
Mr. THOMAS C. HUGHES, USAREUR/ODCSI/Special Assistant to CI Div Chief  
Lt Col DOUGLAS HALDANE, USAREUR/ODCSI/Chief Special Operations Branch

a. Upon review of our briefing paper for MGen MCCABE, Commander, U.S. Army Medical Command - Europe, both Colonels SCHANCHIE and ROGERS advised they saw no problems in the coordination. However, under their current operating procedures both the Chief of Staff (CofS) and CINC USAREUR should also be briefed concerning this operation. A copy of the briefing paper was left with Colonel ROGERS so that either he or MGen DILLARD, USAREUR/DCSI, could personally brief the CofS and the CINC.

b. Colonel SCHANCHIE inquired as to the propriety of briefing the EUCOM J-2 since most military personnel stationed in Iran are under the Theater control of EUCOM. Colonel SCHANCHIE was advised that with concurrence of HQ AFOSI we would arrange to brief the EUCOM J-2.

c. The question of follow-on information for appropriate USAREUR personnel was also discussed by Colonel ROGERS. He was advised that appropriate summaries would be furnished his office in order to keep the DCSI and CINC USAREUR apprised of significant developments involving SUBJECT.

2. (S) On 26 Oct 76, MGen MARSHAL MCCABE was briefed in the presence of Lt Col HALDANE by Col MARTIN and Major DILLON. General MCCABE fully concurred with the use of SUBJECT as outlined in the briefing paper at Attachment 1. However, Gen MCCABE also requested that we determine if any conflict exist between SUBJECT's activities and the Geneva Convention. According to Gen MCCABE, the Geneva Convention requires medical personnel to offer medical assistance to individuals of any nation and that this assistance should be offered solely for the benefit of the patient and not for other reasons.

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										ZOCT 76
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS										
FROM:										
TO:										
THROUGH OUR HEADQUARTERS AND ADVISE GEN MCCABE OF THEIR RECOMMENDATION.										
3. (S) IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH DCSI REPRESENTATIVE CONCERNING GEN MCCABE'S REQUEST, DCSI DESIRES OSI COORDINATION WITH ARMY AGSI AND HQ SRF. DCSI SURMISED THERE MUST BE PRIOR PRECEDENT FOR SITUATIONS SUCH AS THIS ONE. DCSI ALSO ADVISED THEY REQUIRED TO BRIEF USAREUR CHIEF OF STAFF AND CINC. A COPY OF OUR BRIEFING PAPER WAS GIVEN TO DCSI FOR THAT PURPOSE.										
4. (S) DCSI ALSO REQUESTED WE CONSIDER BRIEFING EUCOM J-2 BECAUSE OF THEIR PREROGATIVE CONCERNING MILITARY PEOPLE ASSIGNED TO DO 72'S AREA. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS AND APPROVAL FOR BRIEFING EUCOM J-2.										
5. (U) A LETTER REPORT TO DO 72 AND HQ AFOSI/IVO WILL FOLLOW.										
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DD FORM 173  
1 DEC 70

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76HQ227-582 (COORDINATION)

General MCCABE was not certain that a conflict existed in this specific case, but requested this be considered at higher levels to insure no diplomatic repercussion over medical personnel becoming involved in intelligence activities. We advised Gen MCCABE that SUBJECT would be serving as a "door and window" and would not in any fashion be required to involve himself in intelligence activities. Furthermore, that any medical treatment provided by SUBJECT would be solely for the benefit of the patient. General MCCABE was advised we would query our Headquarters to insure this consideration was coordinated through appropriate agencies at the Washington level, and we would advise him of their answer.

3. (S) In a subsequent discussion with DCSI representatives concerning General MCCABE's request, Col ROGERS recommended that HQ AFOSI coordinate this matter with Army ACSI and HQ SRF. Colonel ROGERS surmised there must be prior precedent for using medical personnel on the periphery of intelligence operations. Colonel ROGERS was advised we would coordinate the response to Gen MCCABE's request with his office prior to a follow-on meeting with Gen MCCABE.

ATTACHMENT

1. Briefing Paper (S), 26 Oct 76, 2 Pg (1)

DISTRIBUTION: HQ AFOSI/IVOE - 1; Dist 70 - 1; Dist 72 - 1

APPROVED

  
ALVIN B. HERSHON, Lt Col, USAF  
Deputy Commander for  
Investigative Operations

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205

AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA RONALD M. PHILLIPS  
REFERENCE: RC #14

FILE NO: HQD227-582  
DATE: 29 Dec 76

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(COORDINATION)

(S) On 14 Dec 76, this operation was coordinated with SRF/Tehran by the Case Officer (CO) and SA CURTIS S. MORRIS, JR for the purpose of planning SUBJECT's future operational activity with regard to SAZANOV and other target personalities.

WALDIMIR SKOTZKO, SRF representative, advised he was very appreciative of GIEL's operational efforts. In addition, he believed that GIEL's activities in consonance with several other SRF access agents have been very useful in getting a better picture of SAZANOV. In view of SAZANOV's failing to make the 14 Nov 76 dinner engagement with GIEL and a 16 Nov 76 contact with an SRF operative, SKOTZKO stated that this may have been precipitated by actions of a SRF operative, the TDY of SAZANOV or in fact by SAZANOV's apparently normal practice of forgetfulness and poor personal organization. The latter two reasons are most likely responsible for the "no show". In the recent past, other persons in contact with SAZANOV who were building a close relationship found themselves periodically and abruptly cut off. "Standing-up" the other party was not uncommon. SKOTZKO advised that an SRF operative met SAZANOV on 11 Nov 76 and told him that he was different from the other Soviets in Tehran. Specifically SAZANOV seemed to be sensitive, a private man, but more approachable. Also, that the SRF operative valued SAZANOV's friendship. This general theme was pushed throughout their meeting with the intent of making SAZANOV realize he was different. Ostensibly, this tact coupled with SAZANOV's contacts with GIEL might promote closer relationships. Ideally, this could be a positive factor to influence SAZANOV to accept a "pitch" if it were ever decided to offer one in the future. (There are no plans to do so at this time and AFOSI will be advised if such an action is contemplated). The "I am different tact" could also put SAZANOV in an awkward position. If SAZANOV told anyone else in the Soviet Community in Tehran he would then be identified as a "weak sister", i.e. a potential security risk and would be prevented from contacts with foreigners.

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HQD227-582

In short, his effectiveness, stature and reputation as a "loyal comrade" would be irreparably damaged. Because of SAZANOV's intelligence it was a virtual remote possibility that he would tell anyone about the "I am different" theme. Understandably, he would realize the personal hardship of being identified as a security risk. Subsequent to telling SAZANOV of this on 11 Nov 76, he then failed to make GIEL's dinner party on the 14th and one with the SRF operative on the 16th. For all practical purposes, SAZANOV seemed to drop contact with members of the official diplomatic circuit. However, as the result of discreet inquiries made by GIEL and SRF it was determined that SAZANOV had apparently been on a trip.

It was learned that SAZANOV attended a large reception (approximately 700 guests) at the United Arab Emirates Embassy, Tehran on 12 Dec 76, during which he was engaged in a brief conversation with an SRF representative. SAZANOV stated he had been on a trip to Isfahan, Iran and had been busy preparing for his home leave. SAZANOV also stated his departure for home leave had been delayed until 23 Dec 76 due to the number of end-of-year reports requiring completion prior to his departure. While he was cordial, SAZANOV appeared more reserved than usual and was evasive in his answers as to his activities during recent weeks. As SAZANOV had indicated he would take about six weeks leave, SRF/Tehran did not really expect him to return to Tehran until the last week in February or the first week in March, 1977. Further, because SAZANOV was at the reception and had been TDY plus working on reports, it is doubtful he told anyone about the "I am different" theme. It was mutually agreed SUBJECT should not make any further initiatives to contact SAZANOV even after he returns from home leave but that SUBJECT should remain receptive to contacts by SAZANOV, if they occur. SUBJECT should attempt to re-establish a basis for continued contacts. SRF expressed interest in SUBJECT's contacts with RYABAVALOV, whom they suspect may be affiliated with the GRU. It was agreed to have SUBJECT attempt to re-establish contact with him as well as re-establish and pursue contacts with DOVBANIA.

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APPROVED

*Frank M. Huey*  
FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander

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OPS *[Signature]*  
cc *[Signature]*

FILE IVOE

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
DISTRICT (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205



AGENT REPORT

PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA RONALD M. PHILLIPS  
REFERENCE: RC #5

FILE NO: HQD227-582  
DATE: 3 NOV 76

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(FINANCIAL AGREEMENTS)

(C) During the meet on 29 Sep 76, (reference AR, MEETING WITH ASSET) SUBJECT was recruited as the Asset in this operation and, in conjunction with his recruitment briefing, was told that all expenses he incurred while assisting AFOSI in support of this operation would be reimbursed by the CO. It was explained and SUBJECT acknowledged understanding that only those expenses incurred at AFOSI's direction would be paid for and that SUBJECT would be required to keep an accurate accounting of his expenditures. With regard to the cocktail party on 28 Sep 76, the CO offered to reimburse SUBJECT for expenses he incurred as he had assisted the operation by extending invitations to the target personalities which had established a basis for additional contacts and provided a means to further develop his relationships with the targets. SUBJECT indicated he was not concerned about reimbursement, saying he "did not desire to fill out a bunch of paperwork just for a few dollars". The CO explained the probability of SUBJECT having more and more social functions in the future, all of which, over a period of time, would add up significantly. It was suggested that SUBJECT be reimbursed each time an expenditure is made to preclude having to research and compile all this data at some time in the future. SUBJECT said he would "sleep on it", explaining he had no way of knowing for sure how much the party had cost him. The CO told SUBJECT to compile a list of expenses as accurately as possible and the matter would be further addressed at a future meeting, to which SUBJECT agreed.

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APPROVED

*Frank M. Huey*  
FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Commander

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OPS *[Signature]*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205

AGENT REPORT

PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA JIMMY L. STOUT  
REFERENCE: RC #6

FILE NO: HQD227-582  
DATE: 6 Nov 76

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(COORDINATION)

1. (S) On 24 Oct 76, SA CURTIS S. MORRIS, JR, and the ACO discussed this operation with SRF/TEHRAN. Specific reference to GIEL's efforts to contact ANATOLIY SAZANOV were mentioned. SRF was informed that GIEL had not reestablished contact with SAZANOV to date, although attempts had been made. A meeting between the CO and GIEL regarding the situation was scheduled.

SRF then advised that a representative of their office has been and was currently enjoying weekly - semimonthly association with SAZANOV. To their dismay, however, recent attempts to establish personal contact had also been unsuccessful. As a result of telephonic contact with the Soviet Consulate, Tehran, (SAZANOV's office telephone number) during the past week, the SRF representative learned that SAZANOV had not been available for duty due to hospitalization for an undisclosed illness.

2. (S) On 28 Oct 76, the representative of SRF/TEHRAN referred to above, advised the ACO that he had reestablished contact with SAZANOV. SAZANOV explained that he had just been released from the Soviet hospital after a week to 10 days of recuperation following a mild heart attack. The SRF representative advised he had invited SAZANOV and his wife to accompany him to a sporting event on 29 Oct 76, during which time he would attempt to determine the specifics of SAZANOV's recent illness.

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HQD227-582

3. (S) On 29 Oct 76, SRF/Tehran advised SAZANOV and his wife had accepted the above invitation and had subsequently visited the home of the SRF representative. SAZANOV repeated his reason for hospitalization was because of a mild heart attack. SRF feels, however, that SAZANOV may not have been entirely truthful; SAZANOV was smoking cigarettes continually and he did not hesitate to accept mixed drinks during the social call. When queried by the SRF representative as to SAZANOV's continued use of tobacco and alcoholic drink, in view of an admitted heart attack, SAZANOV merely smiled and shrugged off the comment.

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APPROVED

*Frank M. Huey*  
FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Commander

- 2 -

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**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DISTRICT 70  
APO NEW YORK 09633

**AGENT REPORT**

PREPARING OFFICE: Dist 70  
PREPARED BY: SA BURTON A CASTEEL, JR.  
REFERENCES: None  
TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

FILE NR: HQD227-582  
DATE: 2 Feb 77

**DETAILS**

**(COORDINATION)**

(S) On 27 Jan 77, SA BURTON A. CASTEEL, JR., coordinated this operation with Lt Col D. W. HALDANE, Chief, CINCUSAREUR/AEAGB(CI)-SO, Heidelberg, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and also provided HALDANE with a summary of GIEL's activities through 26 Dec 76. HALDANE was pleased with the progress of this operation; however, he expressed a slight concern as to whether or not GIEL was being actively tasked to seek out and make/develop associations over and above his normal activity. HALDANE was informed that because of GIEL's military rank, position, and social status, he was not being actively tasked to conduct any outwardly aggressive/offensive activity to cultivate any individual which would be out of the ordinary. HALDANE was further informed that his office would be provided additional summaries on a timely and regular basis.

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APPROVED

*Robert P. Lukens*  
ROBERT P. LUKENS, Major, USAF  
Chief, CI Operations Branch

SEVEN DOORS

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per AFOSIR 205-3, 12 Apr 74  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA RONALD M. PHILLIPS  
REFERENCE: RC #24

FILE NO: 77HQD345-32  
DATE: 19 April 1977

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

**DETAILS:**

(Material Issued For Operational Use)

(S) On 15 Mar 77, during a personal meeting between SUBJECT and the Case Officer, SUBJECT was provided a black/white portable television set, Panasonic Model TR-2388F, Serial Nr. 0021535, as authorized in AFOSI/IVO msg 081915Z Mar 77. It was explained that SUBJECT present the set to Dr. ANATOLIY RAMKOV, Deputy Director, Soviet Hospital, Tehran at a time the latter visits SUBJECT at his home. SUBJECT was told the set would be stored in a manner appropriate to a "second hand item." Further, SUBJECT was told that at the time the set is given to Dr. RAMKOV, SUBJECT should relate essentially the following, in explaining his acquisition of the set:

At the time of SUBJECT's arrival in Tehran he and his family spent about three months in a local hotel until their residence was ready. During this time he purchased the television as a convenience for his children since it provided them some entertainment which was not available at the hotel. After moving into his residence and receiving his household furnishings, including four television sets he had previously purchased in the United States, this set just got put away and has not been used.

SUBJECT was also instructed to accept any nominal payment offered by Dr. RAMKOV in the event such were offered. In the event Dr. RAMKOV exhibited a reluctance to accepting the set as an outright gift, SUBJECT was told he may suggest a nominal price and stress to Dr. RAMKOV that the set is really of no use and it is just "taking up space." At the conclusion of the meeting SUBJECT executed a true name receipt, for the set, which is being retained by the Case Officer for future reference. A copy of this receipt has been forwarded to HQ AFOSI/IVOE under separate cover. (see Dist 72 messages 131300Z Feb 77, 071301Z Mar 77).

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APPROVED:

*Frank M. Huey*  
FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Commander



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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: AFOSI District 72      FILE NO: 77HQD345-32  
PREPARED BY: SA O'DEAN L. HAMMETT JR      DATE: 13 February 1978  
REFERENCE: AR (MWA), 12 Feb 78

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(COORDINATION)

(S) On 12 Feb 78, this operation was coordinated with FRANK JOHNSON, Chief, Operations Division, SRF/Tehran. JOHNSON advised that SRF/Tehran views recent developments in this operation as being highly significant, in view of the obvious high level levies for information that ANATOLI RAMKOV appears to be placing on SUBJECT. SRF/Tehran feels that there is no doubt that RAMKOV is an intelligence cooptee probably for the GRU, but they have not ruled out the possibility that he could be working for the KGB. SRF/Tehran believes there are also other aspects of the way RAMKOV conducts himself that give raise to the possibility that he would be vulnerable to a possible recruitment approach for in place defection (IPD) but the entire operation would have to be given much more evaluation before any firm decision could be made in this regard. SRF/Tehran is of the opinion that if SUBJECT responds to these recent levies (or any future levies), it is possible the SIS may view SUBJECT as an excellent target for espionage recruitment. This would obviously negate any immediate hopes of a possible IPD regarding RAMKOV. SRF/Tehran therefore suggested SUBJECT remain "cool and aloof" to future contacts by RAMKOV with regard to levies for such things as anti-metabolite drugs until additional evaluation can be made. At the present time, SRF/Tehran would like to explore the possibility of introducing either a German or Russian speaking individual into the operation, through SUBJECT, in order that contact with RAMKOV could be preserved if SUBJECT leaves Iran in Jun 78 as scheduled.

JOHNSON was advised that before we could proceed any further with a change in direction that this operation is taking, the entire matter would have to be coordinated with HQ AFOSI to secure necessary approval to redirect SUBJECT's role from that of "a window and door" and his collection of biographic and personality assessment data on opposition personalities.

DISTRIBUTION: HQ AFOSI/IVOE - 1; DISTRICT 72 - 1

APPROVED

*Frank M Huey*  
FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Commander

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Per AFOSIR 205-3, 19 Apr 77  
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<p>FROM: COS TEHRAN</p> <p>TO: AFSO USAFER (YFQNAH)</p> <p>INFO: AFSO USAF (YEKNIA)</p> <p>S E C R E T LIMDIS SEVEN DOORS FROM DIST 72/IVOE.</p> <p>AFSSO USAFER FOR DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS TO AFOSI</p> <p>DISTRICT 70. AFSO USAF FOR DELIVERY TO AFOSI/INS PASS TO</p> <p>IVOE DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.</p> <p>SUBJECT: LARRY GIEL (U) (HQD345-32)</p> <p>REFERENCE: A) PARA 6-9, AFOSIR 124-32</p> <p>B) AR (MWA), 4 JAN 77</p> <p>C) AR (MWA), (REF. RC 12 &amp; 13), 28 DEC 76.</p> <p>1. (S) DURING FIVE ZERO, 25 APR 77, WITH BILL WOTH (CN),</p> <p>A 436 PERSONALITY FURTHER IDENTIFIED REFERENCE BRAVO, DIS-</p> <p>CUSSION TURNED TO PROFESSIONAL MATTERS SUBJECT STATED HE</p> <p>WOULD BE ATTENDING A PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCE IN NEAR FUTURE</p> <p>IN DISTRICT 70'S AREA, COMMENTING HE WISHED WOTH COULD ATTEND</p> <p>AS WOTH WOULD FIND IT PROFESSIONALLY REWARDING. WOTH INDICATED</p> <p>HE WOULD LIKE TO ATTEND BUT DID NOT BELIEVE HE COULD EVER GET</p> <p>PERMISSION TO DO SO. WOTH THEN ASKED IF SUBJECT WOULD PICK</p>										
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FRANK M. HUEY, LT COL. CC, 244037						EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2				
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<p>FROM:</p> <p>TO:</p> <p>UP ANY AVAILABLE PROFESSIONAL LITERATURE REGARDING NEW TECHNIQUES, PROCEDURES, EQUIPMENT. SUBJECT EXPLAINED MOST INFORMATION WOULD BE PRESENTED ORALLY BUT IF PRINTED LITERATURE WERE AVAILABLE HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE SOME. FOLLOWING ON THIS DISCUSSION, SUBJECT PRESENTED WOTH WITH A PROFESSIONAL PAMPHLET CONTAINING ARTICLES SUBMITTED BY VARIOUS SPECIALISTS IN THEIR PROFESSION WHICH APPEAR TO INTEREST WOTH. THE PAMPHLET, A U.S. ARMY, UNCLASSIFIED, UNCONTROLLED DOCUMENT PUBLISHED MONTHLY, CONTAINED AN ARTICLE WRITTEN BY SUBJECT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT PRESENTATION OF THIS PAMPHLET WAS A SPONTANEOUS ACT ON SUBJECT'S PART. THE CO HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED SUBJECT CONCERNING THE NEED TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR SUCH ACTIONS, THEREFORE SUBJECT REACTED IN A NATURAL MANNER COMMENSURATE WITH HIS PROFESSIONAL POSITION.</p> <p>2. (S) PAMPHLET REFERRED TO IS A RECURRING PUBLICATION WHICH WE NOW BELIEVE MAY BE OF VALUE TO US IN SUSTAINING AND FURTHER PROMOTING THE CONTINUING 345 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBJECT AND WOTH. ACTION, PER REFERENCE ALPHA.</p>											
DISTR:											
DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS					
TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE FRANK M. HUEY, LT COL, CC, 244037											
SIGNATURE <i>Frank M. Huey</i>						DATE TIME GROUP					
<b>SECRET</b>											

DD FORM 173  
1 DEC 70

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 JUL 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM										SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
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PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASEE TIME	PRECEDENCE ACT INFO	LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY				DATE - TIME	MONTH YR
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<p>FROM:</p> <p>TO:</p> <p>FOR CONTINUING BLANKET AUTHORITY FOR FUTURE ISSUES OF THIS PAMPHLET IS BEING SUBMITTED UNDER SEPARATE COVER. XGDS-TWO-31 DECEMBER 2007.</p>											
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TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE FRANK M. HUEY, LT COL, CC, 244037											
SIGNATURE <i>Frank M. Huey</i>						DATE TIME GROUP					
<b>SECRET</b>											

DD FORM 173  
1 DEC 70

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 JUL 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b> SPECAT					
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<p>FROM: AFOSI DIST 72 TEHRAN IRAN//IVOE</p> <p>TO: HQ AFOSI WASH DC//IVOE</p> <p>S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR IVOE</p> <p>SEVEN DOORS MSG</p> <p>SUBJECT: LARRY GIEL (77HQD345-32) (U)</p> <p>REFERENCES: A. AR (MWA) 9 MAY 77.</p> <p>B. PARA 6-7, AFOSIR 124-32.</p> <p>C. ATCH TWO, AFOSIR 124-34.</p> <p>1. (S) SUBJECT RECENTLY RETURNED FROM TDY CONFERENCE IN 439, WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MEMBERS OF SUBJECT'S PROFESSION. DURING CONFERENCE, SUBJECT ACQUIRED TEN PROFESSIONALLY RELATED PAMPHLETS, PREPARED AS ADVERTISEMENTS BY 105 PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS. THESE PAMPHLETS ARE UNCONTROLLED AND OF NON-OFFICIAL ORIGIN. THEY ARE EASILY OBTAINABLE FROM ANY ACTIVITY RELATED TO SUBJECT'S PROFESSION, BY ANY INTERESTED PERSON REGARDLESS OF THE INTERESTED PERSON'S PROFESSION OR NATIONALITY.</p> <p>2. (S) WE VIEW FORTY-NINE ACTION AS ADVANTAGEOUS TO CONTINUITY OF CURRENT FORTY-THREE. BARRING ANY OBJECTIONS FROM YOUR OFFICE, WE WOULD LIKE TO PROCEED WITH FORTY-NINE, VIA AUTHORITY OF REF</p>											
DISTR:											
<b>SEVEN DOORS</b>						CLASSIFIED BY: Comdr AFOSI Per AFOSIR 205-3, 19 APR 77 Exempt from GDS of E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1 DECLASSIFY ON 31 DEC 2007					
DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE JIMMY L. STOUT, SA, USAF						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS					
244037, 11 Jun 77											
TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE FRANK M. HUEY, LT COL, CC, 244037						SIGNATURE <i>FMH</i>					
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DD FORM 173  
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REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 JUL 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.

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<p>FROM:</p> <p>TO:</p> <p>BRAVO. PLEASE ADVISE.</p> <p>XGDS-TWO, 31 DECEMBER 2007</p>											
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TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE FRANK M. HUEY, LT COL, CC, 244037						SIGNATURE					
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DD FORM 173  
1 DEC 76

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 JUL 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205

AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA JIMMY L. STOUT

FILE NR: 77HQD345-32  
DATE: 30 August 1977

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS  
(COORDINATION)

1. (S) On 29 Jun 77, SAs FRANK M. HUEY and CURTIS S. MORRIS, JR., met with Mr VLADIMIR SKOTZKO, SRF/Tehran. SKOTZKO was provided a short briefing on the latest developments. It was pointed out that SUBJECT had been authorized to pass certain kinds of low-level, unclassified medical papers/reports in response to RAMKOV's levies. Also, that RAMKOV's fairly recent request for written medical material seems to parallel an increase in Soviet requests for medical information at various leading USAF medical centers in Texas. This may suggest a new Soviet emphasis on medical collections, as well as, the fact RAMKOV may be more than just a doctor. SKOTZKO agreed with this plus the fact that RAMKOV is filling a position formerly held by a GRU member.
2. (S) SKOTZKO advised that SAVAK, the Iranian National Intelligence Agency, had provided SRF a short memo, dated 16 May 77, which was only recently received. The memo stated that SUBJECT was associating with RAMKOV and had talked to him on the telephone. Further, the matter should be investigated. Upon receipt of the memo, the SRF Ops Chief, WILLIAM WARNELL, as previously agreed in such matters, told SAVAK that U.S. officials were aware of the situation and that SUBJECT had reported the matter to U.S. military authorities from the outset. This satisfied SAVAK and no additional probing by the host services is expected. Security of this operation does not appear to have been endangered. The memo seems to also confirm the fact SAVAK has a telephone tap ostensibly at the Soviet Hospital, Tehran, plus periodic physical surveillance of RAMKOV. SKOTZKO related SRF will advise AFOSI immediately if they receive any further inquiries from SAVAK or other host services regarding this operation.
3. (C) On 13 Jul 77, this operation was coordinated with MGen KENNETH P. MILES, Chief, ARMISH-MAAG, Tehran, Iran, by SAs HUEY and MORRIS. General MILES was provided a summary of SUBJECT's activities to date in this operation, including appreciative comments for the manner in which SUBJECT has assisted. General MILES indicated understanding, interposed no objection to SUBJECT's continued participation, and he expressed appreciation for the briefing.

AMERICAN REVOLUTION  
1776-1976  
MINNIE  
**SEVEN DOORS**

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4. (C) On 28 Jul 77, SA HUEY briefed MGen MARSHALL MCCABE, Commander, U.S. Army Medical Command-Europe, regarding the pertinent portions of this operation to date. General MCCABE was informed that AFOSI was highly pleased with the progress of developments and very appreciative of the support and assistance provided by SUBJECT. General MCCABE indicated understanding and he interposed no objection to SUBJECT's continued participation.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72                      FILE NO: 77HQD345-32  
PREPARED BY SA O'DEAN L. HAMMETT, Jr              DATE: 31 October 1977  
REFERENCE: AR, MEETING WITH ASSET, 19 Oct 77

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(PASSAGE OF MATERIAL)

(S) On 7 Oct 77, Dr. ANATOLI RAMKOV, Deputy Director, Soviet Hospital, Tehran, Iran visited SUBJECT's residence. At the conclusion of that visit SUBJECT provided RAMKOV with the July and August 1977 issues of the Pamphlet 40-50-169 "USAREUR Medical Bulletins." Authority for passage of this material was previously obtained from AFOSI District 70, per AFSSO USAFER Message 081230Z JUN 77.

a. USAREUR Medical Bulletin, Vol. 34, No 7, July 77 edition, 28 pages, unclassified and uncontrolled.

b. USAREUR Medical Bulletin, Vol. 34, No 8, August 77 edition, 28 pages, unclassified and uncontrolled.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: AFOSI Dist 72  
PREPARED BY: SA JIMMY L. STOUT  
REFERENCE: AR (MMA), 24 Dec 77

FILE NR: 77HQD345-32  
DATE: 24 December 1977

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(PASSAGE OF MATERIAL)

(S) On 16 Nov 77, Dr. ANATOLI RAMKOV, Deputy Director, Soviet Hospital, Tehran, Iran, visited SUBJECT's residence. At the conclusion of that visit SUBJECT provided RAMKOV with the Sep/Oct 1977 issue of the Pamphlet 40-50-171, "USAREUR Medical Bulletin." Authority for passage of this document was previously obtained from AFOSI District 70, per AFSSO USAFER Message 081230Z Jun 77. It is to be noted that the document is not responsive to any particularly levied EEI from RAMKOV; but, passage of the document, which was initially a spontaneous gesture on the part of SUBJECT, has now become a "customary gesture" by SUBJECT.

a. USAREUR Medical Bulletin, Vol. 34, No. 9, Sep/Oct 1977 edition, 24 pages, unclassified and uncontrolled.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: AFOSI Dist 72 FILE NO: 77HQD345-32  
PREPARED BY: SA CURTIS S. MORRIS, JR. DATE: 3 January 1978  
REFERENCE: AR (MWA), 26 Dec 77

LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(COORDINATION)

(C) On 26 Dec 77, Lt Colonel JACK C. STUCKEY (USA), Acting Commander, U.S. Support Activity-Iran (USSA-I) and Lt Colonel ROBERT (NMI) SHANNON, (USA), Provost Marshall, USSA-I were briefed on the following by SA CURTIS S. MORRIS, JR.:

a. A official status Soviet citizen (RAMKOV) may try to attend a social function at the Tehran Officer's Club, to be held on either the 28th or 29th of Dec 77. He will more than likely come as a guest to a cocktail party sponsored by a Mr MCKENNA, General Manager for Bell Helicopter International Operations in Iran.

b. STUCKEY and SHANNON were queried as to whether they had any objections to the Soviet's visit. Both voiced no objections. SHANNON advised he would discreetly attempt to obtain copies of the party guests list and also the ARMISH-MAAG Community Center gate guard's guest list for AFOSI.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: AFOSI District 72 FILE NO: 77HQD345-32  
PREPARED BY: SA O'DEAN L. HAMMETT JR. DATE: 13 May 1978

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(COORDINATION)

(S) On 8 May 78, during a coordination meeting with SRF/Tehran, the following biographic data on DMITRIY SYRAK was provided. SRF/Tehran advised that SYRAK was the new director of the Soviet Hospital, Tehran, who replaced Dr. PETR ASHURKO.

Name: DMITRIY LEONTIYEVICH SYRAK  
DPOB: 1924, Vnitskiy Oblast  
Number & Type of Passport: #702538, Regular, issued 23 Nov 77 in Moscow.  
Nationality: Soviet  
Position: Director, Soviet Hospital, Villa Ave., Tehran, Iran  
Date of Arrival: 6 Apr 78  
Spouse: YEVGENIYA LUGYANOVNA SYRAK (also a practicing physician)

SRF/Tehran further advised that SYRAK is supposedly a close relative of a man named BALTISKY, who is the Chief of the Soviet Red Cross.


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Commander

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
AFD New York 09305  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: AFOSI DIST 72 FILE NO: 77HQ0345-32  
PREPARED BY: SA O'DEAN L. HAMMETT JR DATE: 7 January 1978

HARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(COORDINATION)

(S) On 20 Dec 77, SAs FRANK M. HUEY, JIMMY L. STOUT and O'DEAN L. HAMMETT JR met with FRANK JOHNSON, Operations Chief, SRF/Tehran. JOHNSON advised that SRF views this operation with a great deal of interest in that they feel that through RAMKOV a great deal of information about known Soviet IOs could be obtained. Specifically, JOHNSON was of the opinion that RAMKOV would be in a position to report on medical problems the Soviet IOs might be receiving treatment for, such as alcoholism. JOHNSON was advised that in the past, all information received from SUBJECT via RAMKOV regarding known IOs has been provided SRF and as future information becomes available, it too will be passed. JOHNSON further advised that SRF would like to see SUBJECT start levying RAMKOV with medical EEIs that would be increasingly difficult for RAMKOV to fulfill. If RAMKOV does in fact respond to the levies, then consideration could be given to levying him with EEIs on specific Soviet target personalities. JOHNSON was advised that these suggestions will be discussed with SUBJECT in the near future in order that a course of action can be mapped out, because SUBJECT will be departing PCS in the summer of 1978.

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Commander



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ANATOLIY MIKHAYLOVICH RAMKOV

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per AFOSIR 205-3, 19 Apr 77  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA RONALD M. PHILLIPS  
REFERENCE: RC #24

FILE NO: 77HQD345-32  
DATE: 23 April 1977

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(Admonishments/Control Problems)

(S). On 15 Mar 77, during a personal meeting with the Case Officer, SUBJECT was reminded of instructions furnished to him at the time of his recruitment. Specifically, SUBJECT was reminded of the need to follow instructions of the Case Officer in decisions bearing on the direction of operational matters and particularly to matters of expenditures. Concerning discussions with Dr. ANATOLIY RAMKOV, Deputy Director, Soviet Hospital, Tehran on 23 Feb 77 during which SUBJECT made the offer of providing RAMKOV a television set, SUBJECT was reminded that this commitment had been made without prior consent from the Case Officer and resulted in short notice actions that could have been better programed if he had not made the commitment at that time. The Case Officer told SUBJECT that while no apparent damage had been done as RAMKOV had not yet visited him or contacted him regarding the TV, such a situation, had it occurred, would have reflected unfavorably on SUBJECT's credibility with RAMKOV and may have had an impact on future operational endeavors. SUBJECT acknowledged his position in this matter and, in the Case Officer's opinion, situations of this nature should not occur again.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA O'DEAN L. HAMMETT, JR.

FILE NO: 77HQD345-32  
DATE: 5 March 1978

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(COORDINATION)

(S) On 28 Feb 78, recent details of this operation were coordinated with FRANK JOHNSON, Chief, Operations Division, SRF/Tehran. JOHNSON was advised that HQ AFOSI concurred to the utilization of SUBJECT for the purpose of introducing an SRF Case Officer to Dr ANATOLI RAMKOV in an attempt to effect an in-place defection on the part of RAMKOV. JOHNSON advised that a cable had already been sent to Hq SRF, outlining the proposed plan and requesting an SRF Case Officer fluent in the German language to be sent to Tehran to assist in the defection approach. JOHNSON further advised that the final scenario had not been worked out, but it would be in the near future and AFOSI would be kept apprised. JOHNSON was of the opinion that the approach to RAMKOV should be made prior to 22 Mar 78, the reported date of departure from Iran on the part of RAMKOV's supervisor, Dr PETR ASHURKO. Essentially, SRF feels that the mere presence of ASHURKO in a supervisory position over RAMKOV creates a definite psychological advantage in favor of the defection approach, based on RAMKOV's intense dislike for ASHURKO; hence, the approach prior to 22 Mar 78 is favored. JOHNSON agreed to further discuss SRF rationale regarding the contemplated in-place defection approach on 1 Mar 78, in the company of the Assistant Chief of Station, SRF, and DO 72 supervisory staff.

At the conclusion of the above discussion, JOHNSON noted that certain information has come to the attention of SRF, which they felt constituted a breach of security on the part of SUBJECT. JOHNSON then identified Mr FRED JENNY, a Swiss Embassy officer, who was also in contact with RAMKOV and who was providing SRF/Tehran additional insight into the personality assessment of RAMKOV. JOHNSON explained that the security breach consisted of SUBJECT approaching JENNY on the evening of 27 Feb 78, and verbally inferring to JENNY that SUBJECT was aware that JENNY and RAMKOV had been seeing each other. JOHNSON remarked that the harm done was not insurmountable, however, he feared that any additional breach of security on the part of SUBJECT could very well abort attempts to effect an in-place defection with RAMKOV.

At this point, JOHNSON was advised that AFOSI wholeheartedly agreed that SUBJECT's action was a serious breach of security and that AFOSI in no way



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knew SUBJECT had planned on making such a comment. JOHNSON was assured that SUBJECT would be appropriately admonished for his action, and firmly instructed on the need for absolute security regarding his association with RAMKOV.

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*Frank M. Huey*  
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Commander

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA O'DEAN L. HAMMETT, JR.  
REFERENCE: AR (COORDINATION), 5 March 1978

FILE NO: 77HQD345-32  
DATE: 5 March 1978

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(ADMONISHMENT/CONTROL PROBLEM)

(S) On 1 Mar 78, during a personal meeting with the Case Officer (CO), SUBJECT was asked to explain his activities on the evening of 27 Feb 78. SUBJECT advised that he and Mrs GIEL attended a photographic exhibition at the Swiss Embassy, Tehran, from approximately 1930 to 2030. While at the exhibition, SUBJECT spoke with several officers of the Swiss Embassy, to include Mr FRED JENNY. At one point in his conversation with JENNY, SUBJECT commented that he had run into a friend of JENNY's. JENNY asked SUBJECT who he was referring to and SUBJECT replied Dr ANATOLI RAMKOV. With the mention of RAMKOV's name, JENNY became visibly upset but remained composed for the most part and replied that he did in fact know RAMKOV and they had visited on one or two occasions. After JENNY's response, the topic of conversation was changed back to the photographic display and no more was said about RAMKOV. SUBJECT advised that he asked JENNY about RAMKOV purely out of idle curiosity in as much as RAMKOV has mentioned visiting with JENNY on several occasions. SUBJECT further advised that after he had mentioned RAMKOV's name to JENNY, he realized that he had made a gross error in judgement.

SUBJECT was admonished for security negligence. He was informed that the prerogative to unilaterally disclose his association with RAMKOV was not his and had never been his; it was solely an AFOSI prerogative. This breach of security with a third country national, while not insurmountable, was nevertheless very serious and should never occur again. SUBJECT was specifically reminded of the need to follow the instructions of the CO because if the instructions are not followed then the chance of success in any future operational endeavors would be greatly reduced. SUBJECT acknowledged complete understanding.

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AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PHOTOGRAPHERS  
1776-1976

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205

AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA O'DEAN L. HAMMETT, JR.  
REFERENCE: AR (COORDINATION), 5 March 1978

FILE NO: 77HQD345-32  
DATE: 7 March 1978

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(COORDINATION)

(S) On 1 Mar 78, this operation was coordinated with SRF/Tehran. Individuals in attendance were SAs FRANK M. HUEY, CURTIS S. MORRIS JR., JIMMY L. STOUT and O'DEAN L. HAMMETT JR. SRF/Tehran was represented by JAMES HIGHAM, Assistant Chief of Station and FRANK JOHNSON, Chief, Operations Division. HIGHAM advised that SRF was in the process of putting together the proposal that would be presented to Dr ANATOLI RAMKOV at the time the in-place defection approach is attempted, which will hopefully take place prior to 22 Mar 78. SRF envisioned the proposal being presented in increments. Initially, SRF would like to see GIEL tell RAMKOV that he (GIEL) had spoken to a very close friend of his about RAMKOV's problems and GIEL's friend was sure he had a solution to these problems. At this point, the yet unidentified, German speaking SRF Case Officer would be introduced to RAMKOV through GIEL in the hope that a dialogue can be established between SRF and RAMKOV. If RAMKOV agrees to meet with the SRF Case Officer, then the first increment of the defection proposal would be presented. Depending on how receptive RAMKOV is to the initial approach, SRF would attempt to continue their dialogue so additional increments of the proposal could be presented, until such time as the entire proposal has been presented and RAMKOV either accepts or rejects it. Obviously, SRF would so structure the proposal so if RAMKOV rejects it at any point, both GIEL's non-combatant status and SRF's identity would be protected.

HIGHAM was then asked if SRF's rationale for making the defection approach prior to 22 Mar 78 was based solely on the tentative departure date (22 Mar 78) of RAMKOV's supervisor, Dr PETR ASHURKO. HIGHAM advised that the departure of ASHURKO was only part of SRF's rationale; he then explained that SRF was collecting information on RAMKOV independently of that provided by GIEL. From their other source of information (FRED JENNY of the Swiss Embassy), SRF had determined that RAMKOV is responsive to clandestine direction and still wants to continue contacts with foreigners. RAMKOV has presented himself as being extremely materialistic, and as a man who loves his freedom. When these factors are coupled with RAMKOV's recent display of emotion in front of Mrs GIEL (Reference AR, MEETING WITH ASSET, 5 Mar 78), SRF believes that now is the most opportune time to make the defection approach.

**SEVEN DOORS**  
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
1976-1978

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HIGHAM further advised that prior to making any approach to RAMKOV, SRF would present this proposed course of action to both WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, and to Major General PHILLIP C. GAST, Chief, ARMISH-MAAG, for their concurrence. In addition, HIGHAM advised that SRF also has two contingencies in mind in the event RAMKOV totally rejects the approach and attempts to publicly embarrass the U.S. Government. The first of these contingencies would be to remind RAMKOV of the type of information he had provided to JENNY, which, should his superiors learn of, would surely mean charges of treason being preferred against RAMKOV. The second of the contingencies would be to go to SAVAK and advise them that RAMKOV, whom they consider as a Soviet Intelligence Officer, is attempting to gather intelligence material from a U.S. military doctor. This would result in RAMKOV being immediately expelled from Iran.

HIGHAM concluded by saying that as soon as the final defection proposal is worked out and forwarded to HQ SRF, he will suggest that HQ SRF coordinate directly with HQ AFOSI for the sake of expediency.

DISTRIBUTION: HQ AFOSI/IVOE - 1; DISTRICT 72 - 1

APPROVED

*Frank M. Huey*  
FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Commander

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA O'DEAN L. HAMMETT, JR.  
REFERENCE: AR (COORDINATION), 7 March 1978

FILE NO: 77HQD345-32  
DATE: 9 March 1978

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:  
(COORDINATION)

(S) On 9 Mar 78, this operation was coordinated with SRF/Tehran. Individuals in attendance were SAs FRANK M. HUEY, CURTIS S. MORRIS, JR., and O'DEAN L. HAMMETT, JR. SRF/Tehran was represented by JAMES HIGHAM, Assistant Chief of Station and FRANK JOHNSON, Chief, Operations Division. SRF/Tehran advised that through a source of information independent of LARRY GIEL (FRED JENNY of the Swiss Embassy, Tehran), they were gathering additional information on Dr ANATOLI RAMKOV. To date they had learned that on 4 Mar 78, the Soviet Ambassador to Iran, VLADIMIR VINOGRADOV had persuaded Dr PETR ASHURKO, Director of the Soviet Hospital, Tehran, to sign the necessary paperwork that would extend RAMKOV's tour in Iran for one more year. It was also determined that RAMKOV's desires are to spend one more year in Iran, then return to Moscow and work for one year at the No. 26 Clinic (not further identified). After completing this year in Moscow, RAMKOV hopes to obtain a position with the World Health Organization in Geneva, Switzerland.

SRF/Tehran's suspicions that RAMKOV is an intelligence cooptee for the GRU has been more or less confirmed by a blunder committed by RAMKOV. Recently, RAMKOV was asked by JENNY why he was always trying to gather military/medical information, since he was a civilian doctor. Without thinking, RAMKOV replied, "Oh, that's for DOVENIA" (Lt Colonel LEONID DOVENIA, Assistant Military Attache and a known GRU agent). After making the statement, RAMKOV realized the mistake he had made and he immediately changed the subject of conversation.

SRF/Tehran further advised they feel that now is the most opportune time to make an in-place defection approach to RAMKOV. They have been advised by SRF Hq that the German speaking SRF Case Officer that was requested to assist in the defection approach will arrive in Tehran during the week of 19 Mar 78. After the SRF Case Officer is briefed on the operation and has met with AFOSI and LARRY GIEL, SRF/Tehran would like to see the introduction of the SRF Case Officer to RAMKOV made on or about 24 Mar 78. SRF/Tehran concluded by stating that as soon as the requested SRF Case Officer arrives



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they will advise AFOSI so further coordination meetings could be scheduled.

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Commander

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13 Nov 78

77000345-32  
MC 869

Title: LARRY GIEL (U)

1. Date and Time of Contact: 12 Nov 78/1955/Sunday/Telephonic.  
13 Nov 78/0900/Monday/PM.
3. Location of PM Site: U.S. Army Hospital, Tehran, Iran.
4. Duration of Meeting: 1955-1958, 12 Nov 78, Telephonic.  
0900-1005, 13 Nov 78, PM.
5. Persons Involved in Meet: 12 Nov 78, Telephonic, SUBJECT and the CO.  
13 Nov 78, PM, SUBJECT, Mrs GIEL and the CO.
7. Purpose of Contact/Meet: SUBJECT telephonically contacted the CO at the CO's residence to indicate he had returned from hospitalization in Germany. SUBJECT requested the CO meet with he and Mrs GIEL on 13 Nov 78. The PM on 13 Nov 78 was for the purpose of discussing with SUBJECT & Mrs GIEL the current civil unrest situation in Iran; and to maintain control and rapport with the GIELs.
8. Identification of Collateral Reporting: AR (COLLATERAL ACTIVITY)
10. Future Meet Arrangements: Will be initiated by SUBJECT and/or Mrs GIEL subsequent to significant contact with the opposition, at which time a PM will be arranged.
12. Operational Security Evaluation: SUBJECT's 12 Nov 78 telephone call to the CO was handled by SUBJECT under the guise of inquiring regarding the CO's daughter's medical condition. He subsequently indicated he had been air-evacuated to Germany for medical reasons, had just returned, and he desired an AFOSI briefing on the current civil unrest situation in Iran. No adverse impact on the security of this operation was believed to have been created by SUBJECT's call to the CO or the CO's 13 Nov 78 visit to his office.
14. RC Prepared By: SA JIMMY L. STOUT, CO
15. Distribution: HQ AFOSI/IVOE - 1  
AFOSI DIST 72 - 1

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4 Jul 78 03 10 2

R E T 040023Z JUL 78 RESTRICTED HANDLING  
HEADQUARTERS 2916.  
PRIORITY TEHRAN (EYES ONLY PADDIN).  
TEL MECQUE AYONT CKCONE

- A. HEADQUARTERS 1245
- B. TEHRAN 52447
- C. TEHRAN 53584

1. SAFE COMBINATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS GIVEN REF A ARE CORRECT  
YES, I.E., COMBINATION FOR SAFE CONTAINING LNEASE MATERIAL ON  
CKCONE OPERATION IS 5-18-40 VICE 13-28-56 (AS INCORRECTLY GIVEN  
IN PARA 3A REF B). COMBINATION FOR SAFE ACROSS THE HALL IS CORRECT  
S GIVEN IN PARA 3A REF B. YOU MAY DRAW ON INFO CONCERNING DET 72  
AREA PROVIDED IN PARA 1 REF A IN RESPONSE TO GEN GAST'S QUERIES.  
IRLINT WILL BE SENDING COMMAND CHANNEL MESSAGE IN RESPONSE TO REF C  
PROVIDING DEFINITIVE DESCRIPTION OF ENTIRE DET 72 AREA FOR ARMISH/  
MAG'S BENEFIT.

2. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED, IT WOULD SEEM JUST AS  
WELL THAT THE ARMISH/MAG REFS WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL IN OPENING ANY  
OF THE SAFES. ALTHOUGH REF B DESCRIPTION OF DET 72 LAYOUT IS SOMEWHAT  
DNEFUSED, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT OPENED SAFES IN AREA THEY DESCRIBE  
END OF PARA 1 BELONGED TO CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION UNIT AND  
ARTIC UNIT OF DET 72. I.E., THE A-DRAWER AND TOP SECRET SAFES  
DESCRIBED IN REF A ARE STILL SECURE AND INTACT. WE RECOMMEND THAT  
THESE TWO SAFES NOT BE OPENED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS MATERIAL REMAINING  
THEM CAN BE RETRIEVED WITHOUT IRANIAN'S KNOWLEDGE.

3. AS FAR OUR KNOW, CKCONE WAS IDENTIFIED BY SDPRTT/1'S SOURCE  
AS A STAFF OFFICER, AND IF THIS IS TRUE, HE COULD WELL HAVE BEEN  
DEVELOPING LNEASE ACCESS AGENT LARRY GIEL FOR  
S PURPOSES. CONSEQUENTLY  
VIEWING THE LNEASE MATERIAL ON THEIR OPERATION AGAINST HIM  
NOT CRITICAL. THE ASSET WE ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO PROTECT IS  
GEN/1, WHO IS IDENTIFIED IN TRUE NAME IN AN LNEASE COORDINATION  
MEMO IN THE "LARRY GIEL" FILE. THIS MEMO IS DATED 9 MARCH 78

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA JIMMY L. STOUT

FILE NO: 78150340-136  
DATE: 20 December 1978

TITLE: BILL CRAIN (U)

DETAILS:  
(COORDINATION)

1. (S) On 16 Dec 78, a coordination meeting was held with SRF/Tehran to discuss the status of this operation. It was noted that SUBJECT's last contact with a member of the Soviet Intelligence Service (SIS) was on 21 Aug 78, that the scheduled meeting during the month of Oct 78 did not materialize, and that the SIS has taken no further initiative to recontact SUBJECT since Aug 78. It was also noted that the current civil unrest situation in Iran, and the imposed martial law curfew hours of 2100 until 0500, was more than likely the reason for the lack of initiative on the part of the SIS. SRF agreed and suggested that initiative on the part of SUBJECT to reestablish contact was not particularly warranted at this time. It was mutually agreed that if recontact was not initiated by the SIS by the scheduled meeting dates in Jan 79, future planning regarding this operation should be discussed.

2. (S) Following the above, SRF provided several photographs of known/suspected members of the SIS, requesting that SUBJECT review the photos in an attempt to identify "GEORGE," the individual whom SUBJECT met on 21 Aug 78. SRF noted that from the description furnished by SUBJECT, "GEORGE" was probably identifiable as YURIY M. DENISOV, 2nd Secretary, Soviet Embassy, and a known KGB 'American Targets Officer.'

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PAGE 2 HEADQUARTERS 2816 S E C R E T IT REPORTS ON A  
AND IS ADDRESSED TO LNEASE HQS FROM DET 72. IT REPORTS ON A  
9 MARCH 78 MEETING WITH STATION OFFICERS PERRELLANT AND DEIMA  
(IN TRUE NAME), AND IDENTIFIES CKCONE IN TRUE NAME. IT ALSO DESCRIBES  
INSET/1 AS AN STATION SOURCE, AND AS BEING POSTED TO HIS COUNTRY'S  
EMBASSY IN TEHRAN. SECURE RETRIEVAL AND DESTRUCTION OF THIS MEMO  
IS OUR PRINCIPAL REASON FOR WANTING TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE LNEASE  
SAFE, I.E., IT IS THE ONLY ITEM IN THE HARRY EYEL FILE INDICATING  
STATION INVOLVEMENT IN THE CKCONE CASE AND IDENTIFYING OUR ACCESS  
CENT.

4. FILE: 74-6-939/3. RVW 3JUL89 DRV D901 BY 032081  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
District 72 (AFOSI)  
APO New York 09205  
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72  
PREPARED BY: SA JIMMY L. STOUT  
REFERENCE: RC #34

FILE NO: 78HQD340-136  
DATE: 20 December 1978

TITLE: BILL CRAIN (U)

DETAILS:  
(MEETING WITH ASSET)

(S) On 19 Dec 78, SUBJECT was met by the Case Officer in Tehran, Iran. Although the majority of the meeting was spent maintaining control and rapport with SUBJECT, and discussing the current civil unrest situation in Iran, SUBJECT was reminded that he was still to take no initiative at this time in reestablishing contact with "GEORGE," a member of the Soviet Intelligence Service in Tehran.

SUBJECT was given general instructions on how to react should "GEORGE" telephonically contact, or visit SUBJECT at his residence. Basically, SUBJECT was instructed to consider such a contact as "starting all over again with GEORGE;" i.e., he was to proceed to such a meeting "empty-handed" and insist on knowing precisely what "GEORGE" expected of him.

Prior to the conclusion of the meeting, SUBJECT reviewed several photos on file in AFOSI District 72, of officials assigned to the Soviet Embassy/Consulate, Tehran. During this review, SUBJECT tentatively identified YURIY M. DENISOV, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Tehran, as being a very close likeness to "GEORGE".

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