

<h1>DISPATCH</h1>	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO Chief of Station, Mexico City		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO.		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM Chief, WH Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT Renewal of LIENVOY		REVIEWED	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>1. Project LIENVOY is due for renewal on 1 February 1968. Would you please let us have a renewal request by 1 January 1968.</p> <p>2. LIENVOY was estimated at \$57,000 in our recent FY 1968 program exercise, so we must ask that you stay within this figure in the renewal. If you will be needing replacements for equipment for the LP, would it be possible to reallocate funds previously budgeted for LISALAD and for "purchase of information" to cover the cost of such procurement?</p> <p>3. Headquarters appreciates the carefully detailed renewals which you prepare on LIENVOY because they give such a good picture of what the project produces. Could you also include in the current renewal a brief description of the center and the equipment and how the management of the daily routine is shared between AREHART and his Mexican colleagues?</p>			
<p><i>T.H.B.</i> Theresa H. BACHARDY</p>			
<p>Distribution: 2-COS/Mexico City</p>			
<p><i>50-6-75/1</i></p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-15880	DATE 1 November 1967	
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-75/1	
<p>RI Chrono</p> <p><i>RI</i> <i>Chrono</i></p> <p>ABSTRACT <i>X</i></p>	ORIGINATING		
	OFFICE WH/1	OFFICER N. Perkins	TYPIST <i>at N Perkins</i>
			EXT. 6954
	COORDINATING		
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
RELEASING			
OFFICE SYMBOL C/WH/1	DATE 11/1/67	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE <i>W. J. Kaufman</i>	


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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief of Station, Mexico City			MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, MI Division			MICROFILM
SUBJECT LIEVVOY			
ACTION REQUIRED	REFERENCES		
<p>Project LIEVVOY was approved, with the following comment:</p> <p>"There is a weakness in the operation because of its size. The threat of mere numbers - transcribers, lines tapped, reports produced, leads exploited -- increases the mathematical probability of compromise. The Station appears to be fully aware of this problem and is maintaining tight security discipline."</p> <p>No changes were made in the project and the approving period is 1 February 1967 through 31 January 1968.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">THB Theresa H. BACHARDY</p>			
<p>Distribution: 2 - COS, Mexico City</p> <p style="text-align: right;">50-6-75/1</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
	HRM-15381	5 April 1967	0 APR 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	MOS FILE NUMBER	
	SECRET	50-6-75/1	
RI Chrono 	ORIGINATING		
	OFFICE MI/1	OFFICER N. Perkins	EXT. 6954
	COORDINATING		
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
RELEASING			
OFFICE SYMBOL C/MI/1	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE L. J. Kaufman	

SECRET

(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION				PROJECT CRYPTONYM					
				LIENVOY					
TYPE OF ACTION		X	FIELD	CA	OTHER				
NEW PROJECT APPROVAL		DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division							
AMENDMENT NO.		FIELD STATION Mexico City							
RENEWAL FY 196 7-68		BRANCH One		DESK					
EXTENSION		CASE OFFICER Charlotte Bustos-Videla			DATE 24 Jan 67				
TERMINATION		ROOM NO. 3B 4403	BUILDING HQS	FEL. EXT.	REQ. 9041	BLACK 6954			
CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS									
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)			In	DATE	Out	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE		
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman <i>W. J. Kaufman</i>			1/25		1/25	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> FUTURE ON PROJECT </div>		
C/WH/B&F	Robert Carter <i>Robert Carter</i>			1/25					
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson <i>George R. Thompson</i>			1/25		1/27			
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar <i>Thomas Polgar</i>					1/27			
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius <i>Donald C. Marelius</i>			FEB		1/27			
C/WHD	William V. Brock <i>William V. Brock</i>					1/27			
CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS									
				DATE		COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED		
				IN	OUT		YES	NO	DATE
FI Staff	-s/Robert E. Andersen			2/10	3/24		X		3/24
CI Staff	-s/Frank W. Hughes			2/10	2/27				
C/MPS/RC	<i>Don Lewis</i>			2/21	3/31				
APPROVAL									
PERIOD		ANT THIS ACTION		FY	REVISED TOTAL				
FROM	TO	\$		1967	\$22,470.00				
1 Feb 67	31 Jan 68	\$ 57,100.00		1968	\$34,630.00				
APPROVING AUTHORITY			SIGNATURE			DATE			
A/DDP			<i>T. H. ...</i>			31 Mar. 67			

MPS/BG/FI
28 Mar 67

PROJECT BRIEFING

PROJECT: LIENVOY WH - Mexico

ACTION : ADD/P approval of renewal 1 Feb 67 - 31 Jan 68

PURPOSE: Project supports a joint CIA-Mexican Government telephone tap unit and a non-official liaison relationship with access to the highest ranking Mexican officials.

PROGRESS: During the past year covered a total of 30 telephone lines simultaneously providing 8,644 reels of raw take. Of the 30 lines, at least 15 of them are exclusively for Station targets and the remaining targets are chosen by the Mexican authorities but are usually of interest to the Station. Station targets include the Cuban Embassy, the Soviet Embassy, Czech Embassy, Polish Embassy and the New China News Agency.

FI/INT files contain 107 positive intelligence reports produced during the review period. This production, although unavoidably uneven in quality and coverage, included a considerable amount of useful information relevant to priority needs of the community. LIENVOY coverage of Cuban and Soviet installations has been of particular usefulness as a check on Station operations. A set of voice samples of Soviet officials has been collected which assists the identification of unidentified speakers elsewhere. The channel established to the President of Mexico has been used to promote a close personal rapport between the President and Chester D. DAINOLD (p) and in consequence closer co-operation between the Government of Mexico and the U. S. Government and CIA in particular.

FUNDS : \$57,100 \$22,470 in FY 67 \$34,630 in FY 68

Programmed for \$50,000 FY 67

Salaries and Xmas bonus	\$38,816
Safehouse rental and utilities	3,900
Contingency for new agents or severance pay	2,284
LISALAD (mail intercept) expenses	1,800
Ops expenses	7,800
Supplies and equipment	2,500

PREVIOUS

APPROVALS:	1 Feb 66 - 31 Jan 67	\$55,698
	1 Feb 65 - 31 Jan 66	47,468
	1 Feb 64 - 31 Jan 65	26,538
	1 Feb 63 - 31 Jan 64	70,068
	1 Feb 62 - 31 Jan 63	43,240
	1 Feb 59 - 31 Jan 60	163,537

STAFF

COMMENTS: FI and CI Staffs concur in renewal.

FI STAFF: Observes that there is a weakness in the operation because of its size. The threat of mere numbers--transcribers, lines tapped, reports produced, leads exploited--increases the mathematical probability of compromise. The Station appears to be fully aware of this problem and is maintaining tight security discipline.

MPS/BG/FR:EBN:ehb

cc: FI/OPS; CI/OPS; Vit. Mat.; Projects

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24 MAR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: WFS/DC

SUBJECT: Project LIENVOY

1. FI Staff recommends renewal of project LIENVOY. The project will cost \$57,100 for the period 1 February 1967 to 31 January 1968. The cost covers salaries and support expenses for 12 Spanish-speaking local hire contract employees. Two staff agents and two other contract agents also work on this project, providing management and a Slavic translation capability. The staff agents are covered by other projects and the Slavic translators are paid on a piece-work basis. The desk estimates these additional costs to run about \$35,000 a year.

2. As in prior years, this is a three-sided project: it provides positive intelligence, serves as an operational instrument, and is a key element in a profitable liaison relationship between the Chief of Station and the President of Mexico. The intelligence product has declined in volume over the past few years but the project still yields more reports than any other CS audio operation anywhere. Most of the reports concerned Mexican Communists, covering topics of generally high interest as well as reports of moderate value on local political parties. Positive intelligence return on bloc targets was relatively meager. The attached FI/INT memorandum provides an analysis of the positive intelligence product.

3. The operational information produced by LIENVOY was significant this year as in the past. The information acquired on the Cuban target was particularly valuable. During President Johnson's visit the taps were very useful in the station's efforts to safeguard the President's personal security. Liaison with the President of Mexico was active and cordial this past year. The mail intercept was undertaken at his request.

4. The only weakness FI Staff observes in this well managed and excellently exploited operation is its size. The threat of more numbers--transcribers, lines tapped, reports produced, leads

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exploited - increases the mathematical probability of compromise.
The station appears to be fully aware of this problem and is
maintaining tight security discipline.

Robert E. ...

for W. LLOYD ...
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

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23 February 1967

Project LIENVOY -- Renewal Period 1 February 1967 - 31 January 1968

Comments and Recommendations (To be forwarded to the Division)

1. Our files contain 107 positive intelligence reports produced wholly or in part by LIENVOY and disseminated in the period 1 February 1966 - 31 January 1967. Over half of this production (60 reports) dealt with plans and activities of Mexican Communists and other leftists. Included were 17 reports which provided useful information on the unrest at the National Autonomous University (UNAM) and other universities. As our recent study of reporting on Mexico indicates, student unrest has been a subject of high interest to the community. Also included were 13 disseminations which contributed to the station's coverage, highly praised by all customers, of leftist activities in connection with President Johnson's visit. The other 30 reports in this group, primarily concerning the PCM, MLN, and PPS, varied considerably in quality but in general appeared to be of moderate value in relation to customer needs.

2. The disseminated production from foreign Communist installations was relatively meager. There were 9 reports on relations with the Soviets, mostly on cultural programs; 3 reports on commercial negotiations with Czechoslovakia and Poland; 7 reports concerned with Cuba; and 5 reports on Chicom (NCNA) activities in Mexico. With the possible exception of information on Mexican-Bloc trade -- a subject of much interest to ORR -- the LIENVOY coverage of official Communist installations did not provide positive intelligence of any great significance. Notably lacking was information on foreign subversive efforts against Mexico, for which customers have expressed an urgent need.

3. The rest of the production for the period included the following: 9 reports concerning Guatemalan exile activity, which appeared to be of value; 9 reports on activities of the press secretary of the Presidencia which contributed to coverage of the government's plans and activities -- an area on which the community has a high priority need for information; and one report concerning initiatives for a Vietnamese peace which was disseminated as an Intelligence Information Special Report to the Director. There were also 4 reports on right-wing Sinarchist activity, a subject of relatively little interest to customers.

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4. In summary, the positive intelligence production as a whole, though unavoidably uneven in its quality and coverage, included a considerable amount of useful information relevant to priority needs of the community. While this disseminated product in itself would hardly justify the total cost of the project, we assume that a substantial portion of the cost is warranted for purposes other than collection of positive information. Consequently FI/INT/RE recommends renewal.


John Reed Spicer
Chief, FI/INT/RE

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9 FEB 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans


SUBJECT : Renewal of the LIENVOY Project

1. Renewal is requested of the LIENVOY Project for the period 1 February 1967 through 31 January 1968 for a total of \$57,100, with \$22,470 for FY 1967 and \$34,630 for FY 1968. The LIENVOY Project was included in the 1967 Operational Program for \$50,000. The additional funds required for FY 1967 are available within WH Division.

2. The LIENVOY Project covers both access to high level Mexican Government officials, including the President, and a joint telephone tap operation run in cooperation with the Office of the President.

3. The phone taps produce FI, CE, and operational support information. According to Headquarters records, during the period 1 February through 31 December 1966, LIENVOY was the source of ninety-eight positive intelligence reports, seventy-nine of which were disseminated. These reports covered the following general subject categories: Soviet Embassy activities in Mexico, Mexican Communist Party activities, Communist front activities, the activities of the Chicom representatives in Mexico, and the activities of various extremist groups. Included in this reporting was that prior to and during President Johnson's trip to Mexico City in April 1966. The Station's reporting on this trip, which included LIENVOY, was highly praised by the customers. LIENVOY also provided some good coverage during the trouble at the National Autonomous University (UNAM) in the spring and useful information during disturbances at some of the other universities. The remainder of the LIENVOY coverage could be considered of medium-level interest and value. During the same period, LIENVOY

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-2-

provided information for ten CE disseminations to the FBI on Americans in contact with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico.

4. LIENVOY coverage, particularly of the Cuban and Soviet installations, was useful as a check on the Station's operations. It furnished information on double agents directed against the Soviets, for instance, and on several agents in contact with the Cuban Embassy. LIENVOY also identified leads into the Soviets, some of whom have since been recruited as access agents. (e.g. LIROAN and the LIROBBIN's) Another example of the usefulness of LIENVOY is the set of voice samples of Soviet officials which has been collected and which permits the identification of unidentified speakers on other coverage. For example, recently in LIFEAT a man speaking with Suzie PIERRE Charles, a Haitian Communist, was identified as Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH (KGB). LIENVOY is also the principal source of information on the travel of Soviets within Mexico and abroad. The Station has a standing requirement for informing the Office of the Legat Attache in Mexico of all travel performed by Soviet officials within the Republic of Mexico, and LIENVOY helps the Station to fulfill this request.

5. LIFEAT, the unilateral telephone tap operation, concentrates on individual Soviets, Cubans, Communists, and Americans who are of special WOFAC CE interest.

6. The channel established to the President of Mexico through LIENVOY permits direct contact by the Chief of Station. While there is also a channel through the LITEMPO Project, the President and the Station are both careful to select the proper channel which depends on whether there is an anticipated need for the cooperation of the LITEMPO Ministry, or whether the contact and problem should remain a matter of concern only to the President and his special advisor. As can be seen from the attached renewal request prepared by the Mexico City Station, the

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principal use of the LIENVOY liaison channel during the past year has been in the political action field. Chester D. DAINOLD contributed greatly to this effort with his briefing of the Mexican President. The briefings, held in December 1966, resulted in an agreement by the President to accept a Panamanian politician to study the Mexican Political Party (PRI) in the hope that Panama might benefit by PRI experience in gaining political stability. Hopefully through the use of a controlled CIA agent, the Agency will also benefit by obtaining information on the organization and inner workings of the PRI which has not been available through other sources. The President offered to send an experienced educator to Panama to review the situation at the University since DAINOLD expressed concern about the problems gnawing at the University of Panama.

7. The President of Mexico has also used his special LIENVOY channel to the Chief of Station to obtain advice on personal and communications security, and on the purchase of technical equipment. The Station, on the other hand, has used this special channel to pass to the President background information on Soviets and subversives in Mexico on whom the Mexicans expressed an interest, and against whom we hoped the Mexicans would take some action. One memorandum resulted in the cancellation of a foreign diplomatic assignment of a Mexican career diplomat who is a suspect Soviet agent.

8. It is believed that the close personal rapport established between the President and DAINOLD and the Chief of Station has contributed to better relations and closer cooperation between Mexico and the U.S. Government and CIA in particular. WH Division recommends renewal of the LIENVOY Project.

William V. Broe
 William V. Broe
 Chief

Western Hemisphere Division

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FILE, VR, 388, ADDP, FI, FI/INT 2, NPS/24 2

SECRET 240030Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0060

24 JUN 67 04585

DIRECTOR

1. UNDERSTAND THERE "CONCERN" AT HQS OVER "DROP" IN PRODUCTION OF LIENVOY. FOLLOWING SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

a) DURING 1965 POSITIVE DISSEMINATIONS NUMBERED 176 FOR TWELVE MONTHS AS REPORTED IN THE PROJECT RENEWAL.

b) DURING 1965 POSITIVE DISSEMS NUMBERED 122 FOR ELEVEN REPEAT ELEVEN MONTHS AS REPORTED IN THE PROJECT RENEWAL. ACTUAL COUNT NUMBER WAS LESS BECAUSE SEVERAL DAYS COVERAGE COMBINED INTO ONE REPORT TO MAKE IT MORE MEANINGFUL TO HQIR'S RATHER THAN REPORTING BITS OF INFORMATION FOR SAKE OF LARGER NUMBER OF DISSEMS.

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO DROP IN PRODUCTION BUT CHANGE IN REPORTING TECHNIQUE WHICH RESULTED IN FEWER NUMBER OF REPORTS. ALSO DURING 1965 THERE DECIDED INCREASE IN VOLUME OF OPERATIONAL AND CE DATA SOVIET BLOC OFFICIALS THANKS TO PRESENCE OF JONATHAN L. WEENING. SUGGEST DESK OBTAIN ASSESSMENT OF VALUE THIS INFORMATION FROM APPROPRIATE SOVIET BLOC DESK.

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BT

Lienvoy B.P.

ORIG: C. Rustos/nao
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 27 December 66

TOTAL COPIES: 1

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CONF INFO: VR, FILE RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) **SECRET** (DATE AND TIME FILED) 20 21 14 Z (REFERENCE NUMBER) CITE DIRECTOR 62588 (FISCAL)

TO: MEXICO CITY

INFO: LIMA

REF MEXICO CITY 9741 (IN 65788)*

REF

PASSING CASTELON LIENVOY STUDY REQUESTED

NO OBJECTION PROVIDED STUDY FOR LIMA STATION USE

ONLY. HOWEVER, HDQS IS PREPARING STERILE PUBLISHED VERSION WHICH WILL GO LIMA.//END OF MESSAGE//

* Requests permission pass to Hershhal Poake, COS Lima, sterile copy of study on LIENVOY.

William V. Broe
William V. Broe
C/WH/D

FI/INT/Campagna *(plane)*

W. J. Kaufman
W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PROCESSING

TO Chief, WRD

per CSN 43-43

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INFO

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Renewal of Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. CSI-F No. 230-60 Annex B

B. WH Field Memorandum No. 5-64, 17 March 1964

Attached is the LIENVOY Project Renewal submitted for the period 1 February 1967 through 31 January 1968 for a total of US 57,100. It is estimated that 22,470 will be spent in FY 1967 and the remaining 34,630 in FY 1968.

Willard C. Curtis
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:

Project Renewal (Original & 5)
Left hand side h/w
Right hand side U.S.C.

Distribution:

3 - Chief/WRD w/atta h/w and U.S.C.

Removed from Project

CS Classification: 50-6-75/1

Ext: 73-125/24

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50-6-75/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

1. ATT.

HMMA-30903

19 December 1966

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

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50-6-75/1

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DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-43

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

PROJECT: LIENVOY

CASE OFFICER: Willard C. CURTIS (with)

STATION: Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION: Willard C. CURTIS (with)

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD RESTRICTION

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19 Dec 66

ATTN: 110 HMMMA 30903

50-6-75/1

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Reside ATT-14 HMMMA-30903

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PROJECT LIENVOY RENEWAL

A. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

The LIENVOY Project provides for a joint WOFAC-Mexican Government sponsored telephone tap unit and for a non-official liaison relationship with access to the highest ranking government officials of Mexico. The tap unit provides direct support necessary to cover targets and operational programs levied on the Mexico Station via the RMD as well as spot requests from Headquarters and other Stations. This project also produces considerable positive intelligence.

B. CHANGES

- (1) The LIENVOY Project was created in late 1958 and put into operation in early 1959 at the request of LITENSOR who appointed LIELEGANT as his special assistant to work with Willard C. CURTIS in the supervision and administration of the project. In mid-1964 it became evident that LIRAMA would replace LITENSOR in December 1964. (LIRAMA was then LITEMPO-2 and a clandestine liaison contact with Willard C. CURTIS under the LITEMPO Project but was not knowledgeable of the CURTIS/LIELEGANT/LITENSOR relationship in Project LIENVOY.) On 10 August 1964 LIRAMA met with CURTIS and LIELEGANT and advised them that LITENSOR had briefed him on the LIENVOY Project in detail and that it should be continued with the same personnel and the same manner of operation. Both LIELEGANT and LIENVOY-2 were given nominal positions on LIRAMA's staff with cover for daily contact with LIRAMA. Government credentials were also provided for Arnold P. AREHART (Staff Agent) as well as the local agents working in the LP. Since March 1960, the LP has remained in the same location. Inside the front doorway a credential, provided by LIRAMA, prohibits entry to anyone without special permission obtained from LIRAMA.

(2) Agents

For information of reviewing officials not familiar with this Project, there is enclosed as Attachment-1, a chart listing current LIENVOY targets as well as the functions of each agent. Two changes during the past project year can be noted: (a) LIENVOY-8 was rehired as a monitor by LIENVOY-2 at the request of LIRAMA and with the agreement of CURTIS. The request was also made for reactivation of his Operational Approval by the Station; and (b) LIENVOY-19 was given training in July 1966 in flaps and seals and set up the LISALAD unit at the request of LIRAMA.

Staff Agent Arnold P. AREHART has been with the project for seven years. His duties inside the LP are to maintain the technical equipment and protect WOFAC interest by observing activities of local agents and preventing negligent breakage or loss from theft. There has been no major mechanical breakdown during the past project year. AREHART also is there to see that WOFAC gets copies of all transcripts and gets reels of all conversations

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desired. The equipment in this LP has run over thirty-five thousand hours since installation and is still in excellent condition, due to the excellent care and maintenance by ARSHART.

C. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

The LIENVOY Project has proved a valuable source for positive intelligence on Mexican political figures on Communism and on activities of foreign Communists in Mexico or transiting Mexico. In addition, this project continues to satisfy the Station's support requirements for operational data and provides access to the highest echelons of the Mexican Government.

(1) FI information. From 1 January 1966 through 30 November 1966, this project was the source of 122 positive reports. The general subject categories within which these reports fall as related to objectives of the most recent RMD (RMDT-6852, dated 20 June 1966) are:

Priority A. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and Priority B. 1, 2, and 4.
 Cuban Embassy Activities in Mexico
 Soviet Embassy Activities in Mexico
 Communist Party of Mexico (PCM) Activities in Mexico
 Communist Front Activities (Movimiento Liberacion Nacional - MLN) in Mexico
 Activities of extremists on the Key Subversive Watchlist Program
 Activity of the Mexican Government in foreign and internal affairs
 Activities of Communist China representatives in Mexico

(2) CI/CE information. In addition to the general subject categories of FI interest, the LIENVOY Project continues to fulfill a standing requirement to provide CI/CE data on the following selected targets:

Cuban Embassy - six lines
 Soviet Embassy - five lines
 Chinese Communist New Agency (CCNA) - one line
 Czech Embassy - two lines
 Polish Embassy - two lines

Of the above coverage, neither the Czech nor the Polish Embassy targets are listed as a priority in the latest Related Mission Directive. They are covered for possible leads into the Soviet Embassy intelligence activity.

(3) LISALAD. This consists of a one-man intercept center run by LIENVOY-19 under the general supervision of LISLEGANT and LIENVOY-2 with targets selected by both the Station and LIRAMA. It began functioning in August 1966 and covered five addresses used by the Communist Party of Mexico. During the period through November 1966 this activity produced a large volume of fairly low-level information about PCM which was of value for

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background use only. It has been decided by Chief of Station, Mexico, and LIRAMA to keep this mechanism for future use rather than attempt to exploit it fully at this time since the Station does not have enough personnel to process all the paper it can produce. Further, it should be noted that LIRAKAK-2 is handling the Station requirements satisfactorily at this time.

D. EFFECTIVENESS

(1) During the past year (1 January 1966 through 30 November 1966) the LIENVOY Project covered a total of 30 (thirty) targets simultaneously which provided 8,644 reels of raw take. This was processed into 18,766 pages of transcripts (of this amount actual count by LIENVOY processors was 14,266 pages, an estimate by the outside Czech translator was 1,500 pages, the Russian translator 2,000 pages, and the Polish translator 1,000 pages). Enclosed as attachment number 2 is the 1966 Work Load Log for LIENVOY by month and target. Since this includes only the work done inside the LP, total figures vary according to additional work done by other Station (unilateral) agents.

(2) (a) Mexican Targets. Of the 30 lines covered, at least 15 of them are always exclusively for WOFAC, the remaining targets are selected by LIRAMA but are also of definite interest to WOFAC as sources of positive and CE/CI intelligence. The Mexican targets covered during the past project year were:

- 20 30 18 Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
(pro-Communist, anti-WOLADY ex President of Mexico)
- 38 00 16 Luis Macias Cardone
(Secretary General for Social Action and International Affairs, Instituto Nacional de la Juventud Mexicanos, youth activist in CTM)
- 23 85 25 Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
(Mexican Marxist intellectual, head of the MLN - Movimiento Liberacion Nacional, leader of Mexican Peace groups and other Communist fronts)
- 46 12 70 Vicente Lombardo Toledano
(Mexican Marxist labor leader)
- 35 59 82 Union Nacional Sinorquista
(Rightist Catholic group)
- 45 59 52 David Alfaro Siqueiros
(painter and Communist rabble rouser)
- 35 36 52 Politica
(bi-weekly Marxist, anti-WOLADY, pro-Cuba magazine)

- 4-
- 13 02 29 Prensa Latina
(Castro Cuban subsidized Press Agency)
- 43 15 06 Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
(Communist intellectual and member executive committee
MLN)
- 43 54 94 Victor Rico Galan
(Anti-WOLADY, pro-Castro, Spanish naturalized Mexican
Communist Journalist)
- 19 70 64 Jorge Lopez Tamayo Castillejos
(Mexican Marxist intellectual, peace committee leader
and contact of Cuban Embassy)
- 10 29 69 Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN)
(Anti-WOLADY, pro-Cuba Communist front group)
- 14 14 61 Cesar Tejeda
(Guatemalan exile)
- 28 77 85 Dominican Republic Embassy
(For leads into political activities of Dominicans
residing in Mexico)
- 23 86 79 Dr. Rolando Collado Ardon
(Guatemalan exile)
- 35 35 18 Sociedad Amigos de China
(Communist Chinese friendship society)
- 23 86 79 Mario Monteforte Toledo
(Guatemalan exile)
- 14 66 69 Revista Sucesos Para Todos
(Rapidly becoming the foremost political weekly in Mexico.
Owner and Director-General Gustavo Alatriate increased the
sales and popularity of SUCESOS in summer of 1960 by taking
a sharp turn to left in magazine's content. In September,
it featured a lengthy and praise-filled interview of Fidel
Castro Ruz. Next was a special issue on freedom of the
Catholic Church in Cuba. In early December it featured a
lengthy interview of leading Venezuelan guerrillas expounding
the line that the guerrillas are stronger than ever, have
suffered no serious setbacks and are fighting a just cause.)
- 18 62 09 Lic Ernesto Capoano
(Guatemalan exile)

48 20 06 Dr. Luis Quintanilla
(Mexican leftist intellectual who has travelled and is
planning further travel to Hanoi, North Viet Nam.)

The reels from the above targets are not all transcribed completely. LIENVOY monitors extract significant conversations and include them in a daily "resumen", the original of which is read daily by LIRAMA and a copy of which is delivered each morning to the Mexico Station. The reels are retained for about ten days for fuller transcripts if requested by LIRAMA or by the Mexico Station. The "resumen" is typed in four copies at the end of each day (covering conversations which occurred that day). On the following morning by 0800 hours, one copy is handcarried by LIENVOY-2 to LIRAMA. At the same time, Arnold F. AREHART delivers a copy to Robert B. RIGGS for delivery to Willard C. CURTIS. A third copy is delivered to LIELEDANT by LIENVOY-2. The fourth copy is retained in a chronological file in the intercept center.

(b) WOFACT Targets. The WOFACT targets have been limited mainly to CI/CE requirements. These include the Cuban Embassy, Soviet Embassy, Czech Embassy, Polish Embassy, and the Communist Chinese News Agency (NCNA). There follows selected significant examples of the LIENVOY product from each of these targets with a Station appraisal of its effectiveness.

1. Cuban Embassy. The six lines covered are:

14 42 37 The Ambassador's private telephone
25 07 95 The Chancery
14 13 26 The Chancery
25 09 14 The Commercial Office
11 28 47 The Consulate
25 07 77 Elena Vasquez Gomez

The Chancery and Consulate lines regularly identify foreigners in Mexico who contact the Cuban Embassy. Reels are usually transcribed within one day of the conversation; however, if the caller happens to be a U.S. citizen, the transcripts are prepared immediately which frequently permits the Station to arrange for unilateral surveillance and identification of the persons involved. The Commercial Office coverage provides information on Cuban Commercial activities in Mexico and identification of firms doing business with Cuba. The Elena Vasquez Gomez target was connected to support the sensitive AMROD operation. The AMROD Headquarters Case Officer, Thomas G. URQUHART (ps) visits Mexico on temporary duty in connection with this operation. His comments on this project are:

FORWARDED BY [unclear]
FILED [unclear]

14-00000

The take from LIENVOY continues to be of prime tactical value to the conduct of such operations as AMROD and JMROD. It enables us to know how to time our various moves, gives us the opportunity to know where the opposition figures are and gives us the general background we need to manage these operations properly. So important is this coverage deemed that carbons of the primary targets covered for JMROD and AMROD are regularly forwarded to Headquarters at Headquarters request so that it is possible to keep in touch with details of developments in Mexico on the tactical level. On the strategic level, LIENVOY coverage continues to provide one of the largest masses of maneuver of necessary fact for use not only in AMROD/JMROD but also in other operations of a similar nature mounted against targets outside Mexico from base points often outside Mexico as well.

The six lines against the Cuban target are fully transcribed by LIENVOY transcribers and delivered by Arnold P. AREHART to Robert S. RIGGS each morning. Lengthy conversations sometimes require additional time for transcription. A carbon copy of each transcription is pushed weekly to Headquarters for use of WH/C. The original is retained by the Mexico Station. A third copy is retained in the intercept center chronological files. LIRAWA does not read these transcripts unless some significant item appears in the "resumen" which causes him to ask to see a fuller transcript or to listen to the tape. Coverage of the Cuban Embassy target yields a good picture of daily activities, residences, personal habits and weaknesses of Cuban official personnel in Mexico. This is used by Station Case Officers in selection of targets for recruitment and in checking on activities of agents already recruited who are working inside the target or who are in contact with Cuban officials. In July 1966 LITENPO sources reported detection by Mexican police of a Cuban diplomat in connection with smuggling of arms through Mexico to Guatemalan guerrillas. The Cuban Embassy as well as Mexican Government reaction was monitored through this coverage.

2. Soviet Embassy. The Soviet Government has over fifty officials permanently stationed in Mexico (the largest foreign embassy in Mexico except for the U.S. Embassy). Thirty-five of these Soviets (70 percent of the staff) are intelligence officers. The five lines under LIENVOY provide details on the activities of most of these Soviets. These lines are:

15 60 55 Soviet Consulate and Chancery. This line is used by fifteen known or suspect KGB or GRU officers. It is also used by foreigners in Mexico attempting to make contact with the Soviets. When identifying leads appear and the contacts suggest clandestine meetings, the Station arranges for unilateral surveillance and has identified many contacts in this manner.

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-7-

- 15 61 55 Soviet Chancery. This line is used primarily by the Ambassador and provides more information on protocol contacts than leads of intelligence interest. However, it gives the Station a picture of the personalities being cultivated by Soviet diplomats and of Mexicans who are seeking contact with the Soviets.
- 15 61 07 Soviet Commercial Office. The Commercial Office is used by both the KGB and GRU as cover and of the eight present staffers, seven are considered to be intelligence officers. The volume of trade between Mexico and the USSR still does not justify a commercial staff of this size. The Mexico Station has had some success in running double agents against these officers. LIENVOY provides a helpful check on these cases. The take from LIENVOY also identifies intelligence officers as escorts for trade, scientific, commercial and tourist delegations who continue to travel between the USSR and Mexico, either on visits to Mexico or to and from other Latin American countries. Once these groups arrive in Mexico, their movements usually become known through LIENVOY.
- 15 12 64 Soviet Films Office. This leads into the residence and office of the distributor for Soviet Commercial Films in Mexico who is a suspect intelligence officer. There continue to be a number of calls suggesting clandestine contact with Central Americans. When identifications are made, the appropriate WOPACT Central American Station is notified immediately.
- 15 69 87 Soviet Military Attache. This line is seldom used by anyone. The military staff presently consists of (3) GRU colonels and (3) civilian GRU officers. It continues to be the line used by Americans, particularly servicemen trying to make contact with the Soviets.

As reported previously, the Soviet information is transcribed by the LIENVOY transcribers in the same way as the Cuban traffic except that the reels also contain a considerable volume of Russian language conversations. This requires that the reels be picked up daily and delivered to an outside (unilateral) translator (Staff Agent Douglas J. FIENGLASS) who translates the Russian conversations into English. From these transcripts it is apparent that the Soviets are not aware that their conversations in Russian are being overheard and understood. These daily exchanges between the Soviets and their wives (who also work in the Embassy) provide a good picture of personal habits, grievances, marriage relationships, and weaknesses of targets of interest to WOPACT.

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3. Czech Embassy. Two lines in the Chancery (45 30 91 and 45 30 12) are covered by LIENVOY. Reels from these targets are delivered daily by AREHART to RIGGS who delivers them to the ES Case Officer who arranges for transcriptions and translations to be done by David B. SCHLAGTER, field contract agent. This agent also prepares a monthly summary of information on the activities of Czech officials in Mexico. This Embassy has a staff of thirty-four (34) officials of whom (8) eight are known or suspect intelligence officers. LIENVOY has provided the great bulk of operational intelligence on this Embassy, its personnel and activities in Mexico.

4. Polish Embassy. The two lines covered are (11 43 52) in the Chancery and (25 32 38) which is the private line of the Polish Commercial Counselor. These reels are delivered daily by AREHART to RIGGS who delivers them to the Soviet Bloc case officer who arranges for translations and transcriptions to be done by Louise B. DRAGASIC (ps), a contract employee who prepares a monthly summary of information obtained from this coverage. This Embassy has a staff of fifteen (15) officials of whom eight (8) are known or suspect intelligence officers. LIENVOY has provided a considerable amount of operational intelligence on this Embassy and their Commercial Office in Mexico. In addition to personality data, this source provides a valuable check on access agents in contact with Polish officials. Most of the leads to access agents in this field have originated with the LIENVOY Project.

5. Communist China News Agency (MCNA). Until 4 November 1966 there were three representatives of the Communist China News Agency in Mexico. During the project year, LIENVOY covered this target as a parallel to a sensitive audio operation. On 4 November 1966 the three newspapermen packed up and left Mexico for Havana, Cuba, closing down their house and office in Mexico. A cold approach was made prior to their departure, by a Headquarters TDYer but was not successful.

The Mexico Station Case Officers responsible for established FI and CI/CE programs continue to feel that LIENVOY makes a very necessary intelligence support contribution. The facilities of this project, due to centralized tapping and transcribing, continue to produce three times the volume of raw audio and finished intelligence as LIFEAT at approximately one half the cost. As a semi-official liaison tap operation, LIENVOY continues to be able to place a tap on any phone desired whereas LIFEAT as a unilateral operation, does not always have immediate access to a desired target. The continued success of Station Mexico's operational program against the Cuban, Soviet and Soviet Satellite installations and personnel in Mexico is largely attributable to the continuous and thorough coverage of these targets by this project. Chief of Station, Mexico, recommends that the project be renewed for another year as an essential collection and support operation for the Mexico Station.

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E. PROBLEMS

There have been no significant security, cover, control, or liaison problems during the project year.

F. LIAISON

This Project encompasses an unofficial liaison relationship with high-level Mexican government officials and contributes to the friendly attitudes of these officials toward ~~LIRAMA~~. Some examples of this liaison are:

1. Prior to a trip to Central America in early January 1966, LIRAMA was briefed by Chester D. DAINOLD in Mexico on 20 December 1965. In February 1966, after his successful trip, LIRAMA contacted Willard C. CURTIS to express his appreciation for this briefing and commented that "the briefing was exactly right on all countries."
2. In March 1966 LIRAMA via LIENVOY-2 asked the Station for assistance in monitoring the activities of Victor RICO Galan who was subsequently arrested and is being held by Mexican Government authorities for various subversive activities.
3. On 12 March 1966 CURTIS visited LIRAMA to give him a birthday gift and a letter from Chester D. DAINOLD thanking him for a silver tray sent as a gift by LIRAMA.
4. On 25 April 1966, CURTIS called on the Chief of LIRAMA's security guard at the request of LIRAMA. They asked for WOPACT guidance in providing selected security and communications equipment. This equipment was obtained through WOPACT facilities but paid for by LIRAMA. WOPACT technicians came to Mexico in December 1966 to supervise its installation and provide training for its use.
5. During April 1966, CURTIS saw LIELEGANT on several occasions and obtained reactions of LIRAMA to the student strike at the UNAM.
6. CURTIS and LIELEGANT met with LIRAMA on 16 June 1966 at LIRAMA's request to discuss LISALAD, a postal intercept unit set up at the request of LIRAMA. Walter W. CORNEBURY came to Mexico the first week in July 1966 to train the agent (LIENVOY-19).
7. On 30 June 1966, CURTIS met with LIELEGANT to get his views on LIRAMA's approval of sending a Mexican to North Viet Nam on "an information collecting" mission. On 11 July 1966 CURTIS saw LIRAMA and received his approval for such an operation.
8. On 22 July 1966, LIRAMA via LIENVOY-2 requested Station traces on Soviet officials in Mexico suspected by them of conducting espionage activities against the Mexican Government.

- 10-
9. In July 1966, LIRAMA asked for CURTIS' assistance in obtaining cartographic studies of Mexico. These were given to LIRAMA in December 1966.
 10. CURTIS met with LIRAMA on 14 September 1966 and discussed the physical condition of LITENSOR, details of which were reported by cable to Headquarters.
 11. In late September 1966, in response to a request from LIRAMA, Headquarters technicians conducted a security survey of the private telephonic facilities used by LIRAMA.
 12. Chester DAINOLD and Willard C. CURTIS met with LIRAMA on 16 December 1966 and DAINOLD briefed him on student reform and university programs; also, on world problems. A record of this briefing by DAINOLD has been sent to Headquarters. Stefan LABANON came with DAINOLD and acted as interpreter.
 13. In addition to the above, selected intelligence approved by Headquarters is regularly passed to LIRAMA.
 14. During the visit of GPLOGIC to Mexico, LIENVOY assets worked closely with the Station, providing all assistance requested. Their role was a significant factor in making this visit a success (security-wise).

G. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION.

No formal coordination is required in this Project. Chief, LNPURE, Mexico, is the only LNPURE official in Mexico outside WOPACT who is aware of this project and its provision for a special channel to LIRAMA. Chief, LNPURE, was briefed by Headquarters prior to his arrival in Mexico City on LIENVOY. CURTIS advises Chief, LNPURE, of significant and pertinent subjects which are discussed in meetings between CURTIS and LIRAMA. LIRAMA does not know that Chief, LNPURE, knows of LIENVOY or of CURTIS contacts with LIRAMA; he continues to request that (on) ones in LINGOLD know of either.

H. PLANS.

The Station plans to continue the intercept program without change for the next project year. In view of LIRAMA's request for a postal intercept asset connected with this project, this operation will be kept available as an auxiliary unit. It is intended to continue the contacts with LIRAMA and service to him.

I. FUNDS.

1. For the past period.

The cost of the LIENVOY Project (paid by the Mexico Station exclusive of Headquarters costs) from 1 February 1966 through 30 June 1966 was approximately US\$ 17,000 and from 1 July 1966 through 31 January 1967 another US\$ 32,000.

2. During the next project year.

During the period 1 February 1967 through 31 January 1968, an estimated amount of US\$ 57,100 will be required with US\$ 22,470 to be spent in FY 67 and the remaining US\$ 34,630 in FY 68.

3. Agent Salaries.

	FY 67	FY 68
LIENVOY-2	2,400.00	3,360.00
LIENVOY-4	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-5	1,520.00	2,128.00
LIENVOY-6	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-7	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-8	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-11	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-12	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-14	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-15	400.00	560.00
LIENVOY-16	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-18 (salary paid by LIELEBANT)		
LIENVOY-19	1,200.00	1,680.00
English/Spanish Translator to be hired	1,200.00	1,680.00
Christmas bonus one month's pay for 1967		2,528.00
Contingency fund for new agents or severance pay	950.00	1,334.00
Operational expenses, purchase of information	2,000.00	2,800.00
Local purchase supplies/equipment	1,000.00	1,500.00
Safehouse rental	1,000.00	1,500.00
Safehouse electricity and other utilities	600.00	800.00
LISALAD Operational expenses	800.00	1,000.00
Entertainment & gifts for Mexican officials	1,000.00	2,000.00
TOTAL	\$22,470.00	34,630.00

J. ANNEX.

None.

K. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

There has been no change in emergency conditions arrangements since the last project renewal request in which they were reported.

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L. OTHER.

WOPROP in the renewal review for LIENVOY Project in 1966 commented that this project in their view was a model for imitation by others, particularly in the area of efficient processing and exploitation of raw take. On 21 November 1966, Samuel K. CASTELON (ps) arrived in Mexico for a briefing on the LIENVOY mechanism and processing procedures for use in setting up a similar installation in Lima, Peru. In addition to the Station briefing, CASTELON was escorted through the LP late in the evening by Willard C. CURTIS and LIENVOY-2 so that CASTELON could see the equipment in operation as well as the type of files maintained in the LP.

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 WORK LOAD FOR 1966
 (THRU 31 OCTOBER ONLY)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
RESUME PAGES	62	71	87	87	86	76	102	105	84	78			838
CZECH TAPES	45	41	49	38	47	46	44	50	42	37			439
RUSA TAPES	119	127	155	159	156	161	163	155	156	154			1505
RUSA PAGES	596	591	645	612	671	613	574	589	567	698			6156
POLACA TAPES	45	45	53	40	45	38	38	45	41	41			431
CUBANA TAPES	197	159	193	164	193	178	161	155	180	160			1751
CUBANA PAGES	514	437	479	459	490	492	414	450	446	481			4662
A.N. CHINA TAPES	22	21	25	19	24	23	22	3	21	20			200
A.N. CHINA PAGES	46	55	50	34	52	65	47	6	49	88			492
DOMINCANOS TAPES	--	20	24	19	49	40	37	36	7	--			232
DOMINCANOS PAGES		90	79	123	219	219	160	184	26	--			1100
MISC ITEMS	57	36	43	27	40	58	58	71	86	88			564
OTHER TAPES USED	342	328	363	350	327	361	287	344	299	327			3327
TOTALS	2045	2021	2245	2151	2399	2370	2107	2204	2003	2172			21697

FORMED BY THE DIRECTOR, ON
 10 FEB 66


FOUCH ET
 TO DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

Approved: F. ARZUAGA

LIENVOY PROJECT

COST: U.S. \$7,000.



MONITORS

LIENVOY-4
LIENVOY-5
LIENVOY-11
LIENVOY-12
LIENVOY-8

TRANSCRIBERS

LIENVOY-6 CUBAN TAPES
LIENVOY-7 CUBAN TAPES
LIENVOY-16 RUSSIAN TAPES (Spanish)

WATCHMAN

LIENVOY-15

FILES

LIENVOY-14

TARGETS

WFOFACT:

5 - Cuban Embassy (14 42 37, 25 07 95, 25 09 14
11 28 47, 14 13 26)
1 - Vazquez Gomez (25 07 77)
5 - Soviet Embassy (15 60 55, 15 12 64, 15 61 55,
15 69 87, 15 61 07)
2 - Czech Embassy (45 30 91, 45 30 12)
2 - Polish Embassy (11 43 52, 25 82 38)

MEXICANS:

1 - Gen Cardenas (20 30 18)
1 - Prensa Latina (46 60 15)
1 - Galindo Ochoa (42 06 97)
1 - Lic. Aguilar (23 85 25)
1 - Lic. Lombardo Toledano (46 12 70)
1 - Alfaro Siqueiros (45 59 52)
1 - Politica (35 36 52)
1 - Lic. Gonzalez Pedrero (43 15 06)
1 - Sociedad Amigos Con China (35 35 18)
1 - Mario Monteforte Toledo (23 86 79)
1 - Lic. Ernesto Capoano (18 62 09)
1 - Revista Sucesos (14 66 69)
1 - Jorge L. Tamayo (19 70 64)
1 - Movimiento Liberacion Nacional (10-29-69)
1 - Luis Quintanilla (48 20 06)

RECEIVED BY SPENT TRANSMISSION
NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION

30 November 1966
MEXICO DF

SECRET

TOUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION

ES COPY

RESIDE RTT. 22 HMMH-30903

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(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION						PR. 1 CRYPTONYM	
						LISNOY	
X	TYPE OF ACTION	X	FY/CI	CA	OTHER		
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division					
	AMENDMENT NO. 1	FIELD STATION Mexico City					
	GENERAL FY 196	BRANCH WII/1			DESK Mexico		
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER C. Bustos-Videla				DATE 24 October 66	
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 332	BUILDING Ames	TEL. EXT.	RFU	BLACK 3654	
CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS							
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)			DATE	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE		
C/WII/1	W. J. Kaufman <i>[Signature]</i>						
C/WII/B&F	Robert Carter <i>[Signature]</i>			25/10/66			
C/WII/SS	George R. Thompson <i>[Signature]</i>			25/10/66			
C/WII/ET/fo	Thomas Polgar <i>[Signature]</i>			25/10/66			
WII/EXO	Donald C. Marelius <i>[Signature]</i>			25/10			
C/WHD	<i>[Signature]</i>			25/10			
CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS							
	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED				
			YES	NO	DATE		
C/FL/CS	<i>[Signature]</i>						
CI/OPS	<i>[Signature]</i>						
C/MPS/BG	<i>[Signature]</i>						
APPROVAL							
PERIOD		AMT THIS ACTION	FY	REVISED TOTAL			
FROM	TO		1966	\$20,960			
1 February 66	31 January 67	\$5,000	1967	34,738			
APPROVING AUTHORITY		SIGNATURE		DATE			
A/DDP		<i>[Signature]</i>					

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25 OCT 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans


SUBJECT : LIENVOY Project Amendment

1. Amendment of the LIENVOY Project is requested for an additional \$5,000 for FY 1967. The Project was last approved for the period 1 February 1966 through 31 January 1967 for a total of \$50,698; \$20,960 for FY 1966 and \$29,738 for FY 1967. This amendment would bring the total project approval to \$55,698. Funds are available within WH Division.

2. The Project amendment is necessary in order to provide for unanticipated expenses revolving around an increase in the telephone tap LP personnel and the establishment of a new joint letter intercept program now referred to as LISALAD. Regarding the first, Headquarters has recommended for some time that additional monitors be hired because of the heavy workload in the telephone tap LP. There are 30 lines running into the center and the monitors who work on a shift basis, monitor all telephone calls received on all 30 lines. This monitoring is only to determine the importance of the call and in order to make notes and a log for the transcribers. This serves two purposes. First, any extremely valuable information can be detected immediately and action can be taken by the Station or the Mexicans with no time lag. Secondly, it makes the work of the transcribers much easier. They must process all the tapes overnight so that a briefing paper is on the President's desk the next morning outlining all information of value received the previous day through the telephone intercepts. The Station has rehired LIENVOY-8 at a salary of \$240/month. This is the same salary the other monitors receive. LIENVOY-8 had previously resigned after returning to the regular army.

3. In addition to hiring a new monitor, the Station has made LIENVOY-5 the Supervisor of the LIENVOY listening post. He has responsibility for 4 monitors and one file clerk. Prior to this time there has been no real supervisor with whom the CIA Staff Agent, Arnold F. AREHART could discuss day-to-day problems in the tap center. He had to wait until LIENVOY-2, the Mexicans' principal representative in the LIENVOY project, was available. LIENVOY-5 has been given a raise

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in salary of \$128/month, bringing his total salary now to \$368/month. Headquarters feels that the addition of the extra monitor and the establishment of a supervisor in the LP are good moves and are worth the additional funds required.

4. The history of the LISALAD phase of LIENVOY goes back to the summer of 1966 when the President of Mexico decided that he needed access to a letter intercept program which would give him better results than he had previously gotten through CIA's LIBIGHT/LERUD Program. (The LERUD Program is essentially a unilateral CIA operation, but LERAMA had adopted the practice of giving LIKAYAK-2 several names of persons whose mail he wished personally to receive). Therefore, in June the President designated LIENVOY-2 and his father, LIELEGANT, to establish a new intercept program. The President authorized the Minister of Communications to cooperate with LIELEGANT in this endeavor. In preparation for instituting actual mail coverage LIELEGANT selected an individual to conduct a thorough study of the Mexican postal system. While the study has not yet been completed, so far a complete list of subscribers to all post office boxes in Mexico City has been accumulated. LIELEGANT is making available to the Mexico City Station all information he gathers as a result of his survey. LIELEGANT plans to hire several postal inspectors who will personally extract that mail which the President wants. LIENVOY-19, who has previously been used under the LIENVOY Project as a spot informant, is now being hired on a full-time basis to do flaps and seals work and to make copies of all of the intercepted items. CIA will pay LIENVOY-19's new salary of \$240/month. LIELEGANT has rented a small bookstore which LIENVOY-19 will manage. He will actually sell books and stationery items. He will do his flaps and seals work in the rear of the store where he will also have a copy machine. The copy machine is to be purchased by the Mexicans.

5. According to present arrangements the Mexico City Station will receive copies of all the take from the Mexican postal intercept program. LIENVOY-2 will secure the take and will pass to the President those items of interest at the same time he passes a copy of the telephone tap resume each morning. CIA has an opportunity of taking advantage of this letter intercept program for specific coverage if we need.

6. No new changes are planned by the Station in the handling of the LIBIGHT/LERUD letter intercept program.

7. WH Division recommends approval of the amendment for an additional \$5,000 to be used for salaries of LIENVOY-8, LIENVOY-5, LIENVOY-19,

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and other expenses such as rent and supplies for the new LISALAD joint letter intercept unit. A cable for your signature is attached informing Mexico City of the approval of the amendment.

William V. Broe
for William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

MPS/BG/FI
27 Oct 66

PROJECT BRIEFING

PROJECT: LIENVOY

WH - Mexico

ACTION : ADD/P approval of amendment

1 Feb 66 - 31 Jan 67

PURPOSE: Project supports a joint CIA-Mexican government telephone tap operation against ChiCom and Soviet Bloc installations and Mexican Communist targets. (The project was renewed 29 Apr 66.)

AMENDMENT: To meet unanticipated expenses created by an increase in telephone tap LP salaries and personnel and by the establishment of a new joint mail intercept program. Headquarters has recommended additional monitors to meet the heavy workload in the tap LP. The Station has rehired an asset who had previously resigned to return to the regular army. Further, a position of supervisor for the LP has been created and LIENVOY/5 has been appointed to the position and given an appropriate raise.

The mail intercept program has been inaugurated at the request of the President of Mexico. CIA will pay the costs of LIENVOY/19 who will perform flaps and seals work and make copies of all intercepted items. The Station is to receive copies of all the take from the intercept program.

FUNDS : \$5,000 additional for FY 67

(Programmed for FY 67 \$50,000)

\$55,698 total \$20,960 in FY 66

\$34,738 in FY 67

PREVIOUS

APPROVALS:	1 Feb 66 - 31 Jan 67	\$50,698
	1 Feb 65 - 31 Jan 66	47,458
	1 Feb 64 - 31 Jan 65	26,533
	1 Feb 63 - 31 Jan 64	70,000
	1 Feb 62 - 31 Jan 63	43,240
	1 Feb 59 - 31 Jan 60	163,537

STAFF

COMMENTS: FI and CI Staffs have concurred in this amendment.

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(When filled in)

CT CRYPTONYM

SECRET

PROJECT ACTION

TYPE OF ACTION	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Eastern Pennsylvania Division			
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Scranton City			
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RENEWAL FY 1967	BRANCH NSA	DESK Scranton		
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER C. [unclear]		DATE 2 October 66	
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 332	BUILDING Ames	TEL. CAT.	BLACK 354

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
C/AS/1	W. J. [unclear]		
C/AS/202	Robert Carter		
C/AS/SS	W. E. [unclear]		
C/AS/71	Thomas [unclear]		
AS/ASO	Donald C. [unclear]		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED		
			YES	NO	DATE
FI/OPS					
CI/OPS					

APPROVAL

PERIOD	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	REVISED TOTAL
1 February 66 to 31 January 67	\$ 3,000	6	27,900
		1967	34,730
APPROVING AUTHORITY N/AS	SIGNATURE	DATE	

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans


SUBJECT : LIENVOY Project Amendment

1. Amendment of the LIENVOY Project is requested for an additional \$5,000 for FY 1967. The Project was last approved for the period 1 February 1966 through 31 January 1967 for a total of \$50,698; \$20,960 for FY 1966 and \$29,738 for FY 1967. This amendment would bring the total project approval to \$55,698. Funds are available within WJ Division.

2. The Project amendment is necessary in order to provide for unanticipated expenses revolving around an increase in the telephone tap LF personnel and the establishment of a new joint letter intercept program now referred to as LISALAD. Regarding the first, Headquarters has recommended for some time that additional monitors be hired because of the heavy workload in the telephone tap LF. There are 30 lines running into the center and the monitors who work on a shift basis, monitor all telephone calls received on all 30 lines. This monitoring is only to determine the importance of the call and in order to make notes and a log for the transcribers. This serves two purposes. First, any extremely valuable information can be detected immediately and action can be taken by the Station or the Mexicans with no time lag. Secondly, it makes the work of the transcribers much easier. They must process all the tapes overnight so that a briefing paper is on the President's desk the next morning outlining all information of value received the previous day through the telephone intercepts. The Station has rehired LIENVOY-8 at a salary of \$240/month. This is the same salary the other monitors receive. LIENVOY-8 had previously resigned after returning to the regular army.

3. In addition to hiring a new monitor, the Station has made LIENVOY-5 the Supervisor of the LIENVOY listening post. He has responsibility for 4 monitors and one file clerk. Prior to this time there has been no real supervisor with whom the CIA Staff Agent, Arnold F. ARSHOFF could discuss day-to-day problems in the tap center. He had to wait until LIENVOY-2, the Mexicans' principal representative in the LIENVOY project, was available. LIENVOY-5 has been given a raise

SECRET



SECRET

in salary of \$125/month, bringing his total salary now to \$369/month. Headquarters feels that the addition of the extra monitor and the establishment of a supervisor in the LF are good moves and are worth the additional funds required.

4. The history of the LISALD phase of LIENVOY goes back to the summer of 1966 when the President of Mexico decided that he needed access to a letter intercept program which would give him better results than he had previously gotten through CIA's LEBIGH/LINUD Program. (The LINUD Program is essentially a unilateral CIA operation, but LIRAMA had adopted the practice of giving LIRAYAK-2 several names of persons whose mail he wished personally to receive). Therefore, in June the President designated LIENVOY-2 and his father, LIELEGANT, to establish a new intercept program. The President authorized the Minister of Communications to cooperate with LIELEGANT in this endeavor. In preparation for instituting actual mail coverage LIELEGANT selected an individual to conduct a thorough study of the Mexican postal system. While the study has not yet been completed, so far a complete list of subscribers to all post office boxes in Mexico City has been accumulated. LIELEGANT is making available to the Mexico City Station all information he gathers as a result of his survey. LIELEGANT plans to hire several postal inspectors who will personally extract that mail which the President wants. LIENVOY-19, who has previously been used under the LIENVOY Project as a spot informant, is now being hired on a full-time basis to do flaps and seals work and to make copies of all of the intercepted items. CIA will pay LIENVOY-19's new salary of \$240/month. LIELEGANT has rented a small bookstore which LIENVOY-19 will manage. He will actually sell books and stationery items. He will do his flaps and seals work in the rear of the store where he will also have a copy machine. The copy machine is to be purchased by the Mexicans.

5. According to present arrangements the Mexico City Station will receive copies of all the take from the Mexican postal intercept program. LIENVOY-2 will secure the take and will pass to the President those items of interest at the same time he passes a copy of the telephone tap resume each morning. CIA has an opportunity of taking advantage of this letter intercept program for specific coverage if we need.


6. No new changes are planned by the Station in the handling of the LEBIGH/LINUD letter intercept program.

7. WH Division recommends approval of the amendment for an additional \$5,000 to be used for salaries of LIENVOY-8, LIENVOY-9, LIENVOY-19,

SECRET

SECRET

and other expenses such as rent and supplies for the new LISALAD joint letter intercept unit. A cable for your signature is attached informing Mexico City of the approval of the amendment.



William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

MPS/BO/FI
27 Oct 66

PROJECT BRIEFING

PROJECT: LIENVOY WH - Mexico
ACTION : ADD/P approval of amendment 1 Feb 66 - 31 Jan 67
PURPOSE: Project supports a joint CIA-Mexican government telephone tap operation against ChiCom and Soviet Bloc installations and Mexican Communist targets. (The project was renewed 29 Apr 66.)

AMENDMENT: To meet unanticipated expenses created by an increase in telephone tap LP salaries and personnel and by the establishment of a new joint mail intercept program. Headquarters has recommended additional monitors to meet the heavy workload in the tap LP. The Station has rehired an asset who had previously resigned to return to the regular army. Further, a position of supervisor for the LP has been created and LIENVOY/5 has been appointed to the position and given an appropriate raise.

The mail intercept program has been inaugurated at the request of the President of Mexico. CIA will pay the costs of LIENVOY/19 who will perform flaps and seals work and make copies of all intercepted items. The Station is to receive copies of all the take from the intercept program.

FUNDS : \$5,000 additional for FY 67
(Programmed for FY 67 \$50,000)
\$55,698 total \$20,960 in FY 66 \$34,738 in FY 67

PREVIOUS APPROVALS:	1 Feb 66 - 31 Jan 67	\$50,698
	1 Feb 65 - 31 Jan 66	47,469
	1 Feb 64 - 31 Jan 65	26,538
	1 Feb 63 - 31 Jan 64	70,068
	1 Feb 62 - 31 Jan 63	43,240
	1 Feb 59 - 31 Jan 60	163,537

STAFF COMMENTS: FI and CI Staffs have concurred in this amendment.

SECRET

PROJECT ACTION		ORGANIZATION			
TYPE OF ACTION		FICE	FA	OTHER	
NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION				
AMENDMENT NO. 1	FIELD STATION Boston City				
RENEWAL FY 1967	BRANCH WV/A	DESA 122100			
EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER C. Heston-Ticola			DATE 24 October 66	
TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 332	BUILDING Academy	TEL. EXT.	FPO	PLAK 354
CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS					
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)		DATE	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	
CI/2/1	W. J. Keenan				
CI/2/107	Edward Carter				
CI/HR/28	W. B. Brown				
CI/11/71	Thomas Holzer				
WV/2/0	Donald C. Hoelias				
CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS					
	DATE	COMP. NO.	MEMO ATTACHED		
			NO.	NO.	DATE
FI/025					
CI/076					
APPROVAL					
	PERIOD 1 February 66	UNTIL THIS ACTION 31 January 67	FY 6	TOTAL 26,900	
		\$ 3,000	107	34750	
APPROVING AUTHORITY N/S	SIGNATURE		DATE		

SECRET


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans
SUBJECT: LIENVOY Project Amendment

1. Amendment of the LIENVOY Project is requested for an additional \$5,000 for FY 1967. The Project was last approved for the period 1 February 1966 through 31 January 1967 for a total of \$50,678; \$20,960 for FY 1966 and \$29,718 for FY 1967. This amendment would bring the total project approval to \$55,698. Funds are available within WH Division.

2. The Project amendment is necessary in order to provide for unanticipated expenses revolving around an increase in the telephone tap LP personnel and the establishment of a new joint letter intercept program now referred to as LIBALAD. Regarding the first, Headquarters has recommended for some time that additional monitors be hired because of the heavy workload in the telephone tap LP. There are 30 lines running into the center and the monitors who work on a shift basis, monitor all telephone calls received on all 30 lines. This monitoring is only to determine the importance of the call and in order to make notes and a log for the transcribers. This serves two purposes. First, any extremely valuable information can be detected immediately and action can be taken by the Station or the Mexicans with no time lag. Secondly, it makes the work of the transcribers much easier. They must process all the tapes overnight so that a briefing paper is on the President's desk the next morning outlining all information of value received the previous day through the telephone intercepts. The Station has rehired LIENVOY-8 at a salary of \$240/month. This is the same salary the other monitors receive. LIENVOY-8 had previously resigned after returning to the regular army.

3. In addition to hiring a new monitor, the Station has made LIENVOY-5 the Supervisor of the LIENVOY listening post. He has responsibility for 4 monitors and one file clerk. Prior to this time there has been no real supervisor with whom the CIA Staff Agent, Arnold F. AREBART could discuss day-to-day problems in the tap center. He had to wait until LIENVOY-2, the Mexicans' principal representative in the LIENVOY project, was available. LIENVOY-5 has been given a raise

SECRET



SECRET

in salary of \$123/month, bringing his total salary now to \$363/month. Headquarters feels that the addition of the extra monitor and the establishment of a supervisor in the LP are good moves and are worth the additional funds required.

4. The history of the LISALAD phase of LIENVOY goes back to the summer of 1965 when the President of Mexico decided that he needed access to a letter intercept program which would give him better results than he had previously gotten through CIA's LIGHT/LMUD Program. (The LMUD Program is essentially a unilateral CIA operation, but LIRANA had adopted the practice of giving LIRAYAN-2 several names of persons whose mail he wished personally to receive). Therefore, in June the President designated LIENVOY-2 and his father, LIELEGANT, to establish a new intercept program. The President authorized the Minister of Communications to cooperate with LIELEGANT in this endeavor. In preparation for instituting actual mail coverage LIELEGANT selected an individual to conduct a thorough study of the Mexican postal system. While the study has not yet been completed, so far a complete list of subscribers to all post office boxes in Mexico City has been accumulated. LIELEGANT is making available to the Mexico City Station all information he gathers as a result of his survey. LIELEGANT plans to hire several postal inspectors who will personally extract that mail which the President wants. LIENVOY-19, who has previously been used under the LIENVOY Project as a spot informant, is now being hired on a full-time basis to do flaps and seals work and to make copies of all of the intercepted items. CIA will pay LIENVOY-19 a new salary of \$240/month. LIELEGANT has rented a small bookstore which LIENVOY-19 will manage. He will actually sell books and stationery items. He will do his flaps and seals work in the rear of the store where he will also have a copy machine. The copy machine is to be purchased by the Mexicans.

5. According to present arrangements the Mexico City Station will receive copies of all the take from the Mexican postal intercept program. LIENVOY-2 will secure the take and will pass to the President those items of interest at the same time he passes a copy of the telephone tap results each morning. CIA has an opportunity of taking advantage of this letter intercept program for specific coverage if we need.

6. No new changes are planned by the Station in the handling of the LIGHT/LMUD letter intercept program.

7. WH Division recommends approval of the amendment for an additional \$5,000 to be used for salaries of LIENVOY-3, LIENVOY-5, LIENVOY-19,

SECRET

and other expenses such as rent and supplies for the new LISALAD joint letter intercept unit. A cable for your signature is attached informing Mexico City of the approval of the agreement.

Willis V. Droe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

TO: C. Bustos/mhf
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3694
DATE: 24 October 1966

FILE RID
 INDEX
 FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-75/1

SECRET

ROUTE			
1		5	
2		6	C
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY: 25/1

DESTROY RETURN TO BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

COPIES: WH/8 RID COPY

INFO: VR FILE MPS/RG 3, CI/OA, CCS 3

(CLASSIFICATION)
SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) ADP

(REFERENCE NUMBER)

20 19 34 Z

CITE DIRECTOR

47728

TO: MEXICO CITY

REF: MEXICO CITY 8894 (IN 20114)*

PROJECT LIENVOY AMENDED FOR ADDITIONAL \$5,000 FOR FY 1967
BRINGING TOTAL PROJECT APPROVAL TO \$55,698.

END OF MESSAGE

*Ref requested cable approval of LIENVOY Project Amendment. See memorandum attached justifying project amendment.

MPS/BG smokes

WH/FI B Fuller

T. Kanan
A/DDP

W. J. K.
C/VE/1

Cheriton
C/WED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INCENT YES NO
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____
 X-REF TO FILE NO. _____
 FILE RID REF. TO BRANCH
 DESTROY SIG. _____

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ^{B3} TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY *Di. SS. [Signature]*

ACTION *W/H-8* RID COPY ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED TUBED

UNIT _____ TIME _____ BY _____

INFO FILE *DR. MFS/BG-2, CI/OA, CC: 3*

SECRET 182026Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8894

DIRECTOR

18 OCT 65 20114

LIENVOY

1. REQUEST PROJECT LIENVOY AMENDMENT FOR FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS TO PROVIDE FOR ADDITIONAL ANTICIPATED EXPENSES LP AND LISALAD UNIT. LIENVOY-8 REHired BY LIENVOY-2 AS NEEDED EXTRA MONITOR AT 2,000 MN PER MONTH ON RECOMMENDATION PRESIDENTIAL STAFF. REQUEST REACTIVATE OA BEING POUCHED. LIENVOY-5 BEING RAISED TO GENERAL LP SUPERVISOR WITH INCREASE 1,500 MN SALARY MONTHLY. OTHER EXPENSES ARE RENT AND SUPPLIES FOR NEW LISALAD UNIT.

2. REQUEST CABLE AMENDMENT APPROVAL.

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BT

SECRET

100/128/1-8/3-68

Henry D. [Signature]

B

SECRET

7 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CCS
FROM : WH Division
SUBJECT : Project Funding Plan/Project LIENVOY (FI)

A. Identification of Activity

1. Project cryptonym: LIENVOY
2. Approved for: 1 February 1966 - 31 January 1967;
\$50,608
FY 1966 - \$20,960
FY 1967 - \$29,738
3. Proposed successive fiscal year budget: Same
4. Brief statement of project aims, character and structure:

The purpose of this project is to provide for joint telephone tap operations run in cooperation with several high Mexican Government officials. This phase of the project is run through a CIA Staff Agent and a Mexican agent who handle the base-house and the employees there. This Mexican agent also has direct contact with the Station Case Officer. This Project also provides for a channel for direct contact between the COS, Mexico and high government officials. These latter officials are not paid any salary, retainer, or expenses.

B. Funding History

1. The Staff Agent passes money received directly from the Mexico Station to the Mexican principal agent for his own salary and to pay all the Mexican agents their salaries (total salaries average \$2,600/month). Replacement equipment for the tap center is minimal, and money for operational expenses and supplies is given to both the Principal Agent and the Staff Agent directly by the Station. The salary of the Staff Agent is deposited to a U.S. bank account directly by Monetary. He also receives a field allotment and his allowances in the field from the Station.
2. Funds have always been handled in this manner. The original equipment was installed by CIA, not paid for by the Mexicans.

SECRET

WH/1

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT	<input type="checkbox"/> CA	<input type="checkbox"/> PROPRIETARY
LIENVOY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FVCI	<input type="checkbox"/> SUBSIDY
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
<input type="checkbox"/> NEW PROJECT		DIVISION
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AMENDMENT		WH
<input type="checkbox"/> RENEWAL		BRANCH
<input type="checkbox"/> TERMINATION		WH/1
<input type="checkbox"/> EXTENSION		OFFICE
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER		Mexico
		CASE OFFICER
		C. Bustos-Videla
		EXTENSION
		3654

AUTHORIZATION			
APPROVING AUTHORITY	TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED	FY	AMOUNT
ADD/P		196	6 \$20,960
PERIOD OF APPROVAL	\$55,698	196	7 \$34,738
FROM 1 Feb 66 TO 31 Jan 67	FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL	6135 - 1010	

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

\$5,000 additional for FY 67

LIENVOY
ADD/P

SIGNATURE	DATE
MPS/BG	

DISTRIBUTION									
1	FINANCE DIVISION	1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1	CASE OFFICER	2	MPS/BG

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Acting Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIENVOY Project Renewal

DISPATCH ACTION

INDEXED

FILED

SEARCHED

SERIALIZED

EXTENDED

REFERENCE: HMMA-28032

1. The LIENVOY Project was renewed on 29 April 1966 for the period 1 February 1966 to 31 January 1967 for a total of \$50,698; \$20,960 for FY 1966 and \$29,738 for FY 1967. The allowance for upkeep of a QP vehicle in the Station's submission was dropped, and the contingency fund for new agents for FY 1966 was changed to \$900.
2. KUTUBE commented during the renewal review, that the Project is, in their view, a model for imitation by others, particularly in the area of efficient processing and exploitation of raw tako. They stated that the presentation was excellent. The office which reviews the intelligence product commented that in their opinion the LIENVOY coverage of internal subversive activities had shown considerable improvement over previous years.
3. Your Branch heartily endorses the above commendations.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
0 & 1 - COS, Mexico City

5 May 1966

50-675/1
for
40

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA 14552	DATE 09 MAY 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-75/1
RI Chrono	ORIGINATING OFFICE WH/1/Bustos-Videla:mep	
	COORDINATING OFFICE	
	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	<i>Ch...</i>	<i>W.J. Kaufman</i>
	REPORTING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE W.J. Kaufman	

Stamp: *W.H. PCC*

DISPA

SECRET

PROJECT ACTION						LIENVOY				
M	TYPE OF ACTION	XX				OTHER				
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere								
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Mexico City								
	RENEWAL FY 1966	BRANCH 1				DESK Mexico				
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER C. Bustos-Videla				DATE 2 Feb 66				
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. GH-43	BUILDING Hdqs	TEL. EXT.	D/O 9325	BLACK 4506				
CONCURRENCIES OF DIVISION										
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)					DATE	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE			
C/WH/I	W. J. Kaufman <i>W. J. Kaufman</i>									
C/WH/B&F	Robert Carter <i>Robert Carter</i>					2-4				
C/WH/SS	W. E. Brooks <i>W. E. Brooks</i>					2-11-66				
C/WH/PI	Thomas Polgar <i>Thomas Polgar</i>					2-18-66				
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius <i>Donald C. Marelius</i>					24/2/66				
C/WH/D	William V. Broe <i>William V. Broe</i>					25/2/66				
CONCURRENCIES OF OTHER COMPONENTS										
						DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED		
							YES	NO	DATE	
FI Staff	s/Robert E. Andersen					15 Mar 66		X	15	Mar 66
CI Staff	s/Frank W. Hughes					19 Apr 66				
C/MPS/BG	<i>London</i>									
APPROVAL										
	PERIOD		AMOUNT OF ACTION		BY	TOTAL AMOUNT				
	FROM	TO								
	1 Feb 66	31 Jan 67	50,698.00			6 20,960.00				
						7 29,738.00				
APPROVING AUTHORITY			SIGNATURE			DATE				
ADDP			<i>W. Karau</i>			28 APR 66				

15 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Project LIENVOY Renewal

1. LIENVOY supports the joint telephone taps in Mexico City run in cooperation with high officials in the government. The lines are shared equally--15 targets selected by the station and 15 by the Mexicans. The operation also provides a channel to the Mexican President.

2. This operation is still the largest single producer of positive intelligence at the station. Noteworthy this year among the 176 reports and mass of operational information collected was the product from the six Cuban lines. Indispensable assistance to other operations was provided. Other targets were the Soviets (five lines), NCNA (one), Czech and Polish (two each), plus several CP targets. The staggering amount of nearly 20,000 pages of transcripts were produced in 1965 from this operation.

3. The operational intelligence produced by LIENVOY is copious. It is exploited in very active Cuban, Soviet, Satellite, and Chinese operational programs.

4. The LIENVOY Project provides one of two active channels of contact between CIA and the President of Mexico (the other is LITEMPO, the channel through the Mexican security apparatus). Through LIENVOY we pass the President a summary of the day's taps, and the weekly PBBAND summary, which must have a beneficial effect on Mexican foreign policy. The contact has also given the DDP himself two opportunities to brief the President on Latin American affairs, has given us access to all unlisted phone numbers, and has given our Chief of Station direct access to the President on internal security problems. We have trained the President's bodyguard, made him an effective gift of five colorful desk phones, gotten police credentials for two more agents of ours, and generally strengthened the long-standing and intimate friendship between the President and CIA.

14-00000

5. At \$50,698, the project costs \$3300 more than was asked last year, but \$2800 of this is for an additional bilingual monitor to help handle increased production. Operational entertainment is up from \$4000 to \$5000 (including gifts), and QP vehicle maintenance at about \$800 has disappeared.

6. FI Staff recommends renewal. This project is, in our view, a model for imitation by others, particularly in the area of efficient processing and exploitation of raw take. Its presentation is excellent.

Robert E. Anderson
for W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

SECRET

MPS/BG/PI
20 Apr 66

PROJECT BRIEFING

PROJECT: LIENVOY WH - Mexico

ACTION : ADD/P approval of renewal 1 Feb 66 - 31 Jan 67

PURPOSE: Provides for joint telephone tap operations run in co-operation with several high Mexican Government officials. There are 30 lines covered, 15 of which are on targets specifically selected by the Station.

PROGRESS: This project continues to be the largest producer of intelligence information for the Station. It is credited with 176 disseminations last year. In addition, requirements for CI/CE information are satisfied by the following taps:

Cuban Embassy - six lines Czech Embassy - two lines
Soviet Embassy - five lines Polish Embassy - two lines
New China News Agency - one line Several Mexican Communists

In volume, there was 8,541 reels of raw tske which was processed into 19,960 pages of transcripts. The continued success of the Station's operational program against the Cuban, Soviet and Satellite installations and personnel in Mexico is largely attributable to the coverage by this project. In addition to the tap portion of this project, it also provides a channel to the President of Mexico for passage of information and for providing him with appropriate services.

FUNDS : \$50,698 \$20,960 in FY 66 \$29,738 in FY 67
(Programmed FY 66 \$50,000)

Salaries (12) and bonuses	\$33,664
Operational expenses	4,800
Supplies and equipment	2,500
S/H rental	2,500
Entertainment and gifts	5,000
Contingency fund	2,234

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PREVIOUS APPROVALS:

1 Feb 65 - 31 Jan 66	\$47,468
1 Feb 64 - 31 Jan 65	26,538
1 Feb 63 - 31 Jan 64	70,068
1 Feb 62 - 31 Jan 63	43,240
1 Feb 61 - 31 Jan 62	59,690
1 Feb 59 - 31 Jan 60	163,537

STAFF

COMMENTS : FI and CI Staffs concur.

4 March 1966

Project LIENVOY

Comments and Recommendations (To go forward to the Division)

1. FI/INT/RE files contain 144 positive intelligence disseminations produced by Project LIENVOY and disseminated during the period 1 February 1965 and 31 January 1966. The bulk of the reporting dealt with the Communist Party of Mexico or Communist front activities. There was also reporting on activities of Chinese Communist, Cuban, Soviet, and Eastern European officials in Mexico. A handful of reports dealt with Mexican rightists of the National Sinarchist Union.

2. While reporting from this type of operation is necessarily uneven in quality, the production in general provided valuable information on activities of subversive groups and other political elements which oppose the present type of government in Mexico. It is our opinion that LIENVOY coverage of internal subversive activities has showed considerable improvement over previous years.

3. Renewal is recommended.


Jim Reed Spier
Chief, FI/INT/RE

SECRET

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Project LIENVOY Renewal

1. Approval is requested of the LIENVOY Project for the period 1 February 1966 through 31 January 1967 for a total of \$50,698; \$20,960 for FY 1966 and \$29,738 for FY 1967. This Project was programmed for \$50,000 for FY 1966, and funds are available within WH Division.

2. The LIENVOY Project provides one of two telephone tap operations for the Mexico City Station. LIENVOY is run in cooperation with several high Mexican government officials, and always has coverage of 30 lines, 15 of which are on targets specifically selected by CIA, the other 15 also being of interest but selected by the Mexicans. The LIENVOY Project is an efficient and effective operation, where all the taps run into one center, which has a capability of switching a tap to almost any phone in the city. The connections are made in the main telephone company. LIENVOY is used for all of Mexico City Station's phone coverage except against agents and sensitive intelligence and security targets, which are covered by the unilateral LIFEAT Project.

3. The LIENVOY Project is the largest single producer of positive intelligence at the Station. The LIENVOY reports satisfy requirements in the Priority A and Priority B categories of the most recent Related Mission Directive. The subjects covered include Mexican political developments, Mexican Communist and Leftist parties and leaders, and travel and activities of foreign Communists in Mexico or transiting Mexico. Almost all of the intelligence gathered under this Project is not available through other Station assets. From 1 January through 31 December 1965 this Project was the source of 152 positive reports, of which 130 were disseminated. The 22 reports which were not disseminated were considered fragmentary (7), of little or no value (9), overtaken by events (2), or overt (4).

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

4-00000

SECRET

4. In addition to positive intelligence, LIENVOY provides information in support of going and proposed operations, as well as a wealth of CE information. Particularly valuable in the last category is the information on Americans, including U.S. servicemen, who have tried to contact the Soviet and Cuban embassies and the NCNA office.

5. In addition to the telephone tap portion of LIENVOY, this Project also provides a channel to the President of Mexico, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, through his special advisor, LIELEGANT, who is the Mexican principal in the joint telephone tap effort. The Chief of Station is in direct contact with LIELEGANT, and often receives messages from the President via LIELEGANT, or LIELEGANT arranges a personal meeting. It is this channel which is used to pass extracts from the weekly PBBAND summaries to the President. It was also through this channel that many CIA services are made available to the President; i.e., telephones, training of the bodyguard detail, etc. (See paragraph F of the attached Project Outline.) Access to the President is also obtained under the LITEMPO Project.

6. WH Division recommends renewal of the LIENVOY Project as presented in the attached renewal request submitted by the Mexico City Station.

Wm. V. Broe
William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

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PROJECT LIENVOY RENEWAL

A. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

The LIENVOY Project provides for a joint KUBARK-Mexican Government sponsored telephone tap unit and for a non-official liaison relationship with access to the highest ranking government officials of Mexico. The tap unit provides direct support necessary to cover targets and operational programs levied on the Mexico Station via the RMD as well as spot requests from Headquarters and other Stations. This project also produces considerable positive intelligence.

B. CHANGES

(1) Operational Mechanism

The LIENVOY Project was created in late 1958 and put into operation in early 1959 at the request of LITENSOR who appointed LIELEGANT as his special assistant to work with Willard C. CURTIS in the supervision and administration of the project. In mid-1964 it became evident that LIRAMA would replace LITENSOR in December 1964. (LIRAMA was then LITEMPO-2 and a clandestine liaison contact with Willard C. CURTIS under the LITEMPO Project but was not knowledgeable of the CURTIS/LIELEGANT/LITENSOR relationship in Project LIENVOY.) On 10 August 1964 LIRAMA met with CURTIS and LIELEGANT and advised them that LITENSOR had briefed him on the LIENVOY Project in detail and that it should be continued with the same personnel and the same manner of operation. Both LIELEGANT and LIENVOY-2 were given nominal positions on LIRAMA's staff with cover for daily contact with LIRAMA. Government credentials were also provided for Arnold F. Arehart (Staff Agent) as well as the local agents working in the LP. During the past project year, the LP has remained in the same location. Inside the front doorway a credential, provided by LIRAMA, prohibits entry to anyone without special permission obtained from LIRAMA's office.

(2) Agents

There have been no changes in agent personnel during the past two project years; however, for information of reviewing officials not familiar with this project, there is enclosed as Attachment-1, a chart listing current LIENVOY targets as well as the functions of each agent. Staff Agent Arnold F. Arehart has been with the project for six years. His duties inside the LP are to maintain the technical equipment and protect KUBARK interest by observing activities of local agents and preventing negligent breakage or loss from theft. There has been no major mechanical breakdown during the past project year. Arehart also is there to see that KUBARK gets copies of all transcripts and gets reels on any and all conversations.

C. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

The Chief of Station Mexico considers the LIENVOY project as a valuable source

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for positive intelligence on Mexican political figures on Communism and on activities of foreign Communists in Mexico or transiting Mexico. In addition this project assists in satisfying the Station's support requirements for operational data and in providing access to the highest echelons of the Mexican Government.

(1) FI information. From 1 January 1965 through 31 December 1965 this project was the source of 176 positive reports. (Of the 641 positive reports sent by the Mexico Station to Headquarters between 1 January and 31 December 1965, 176 (or 27%) of them came from LIENVOY.) The general subject categories within which these reports fall as related to objectives of the most recent RMD (HMMS-4218 dated 27 July 1965) are:

- Priority A. 1, 2, 3 and Priority B. 1, 2, and 3.
- Cuban Embassy Activities in Mexico
- Soviet Embassy Activities in Mexico
- Activity of Mexican Government with regard to intentions and strategy in domestic and foreign affairs
- Communist Party of Mexico (PCM) Activities in Mexico
- Communist Front Activities (Movimiento Liberacion Nacional - MLN) in Mexico
- Activities of Communist, Leftist, or outspoken Anti-PEPRIME political figures
- Activities of Communist China representatives in Mexico

(2) CI/CE information. In addition to the general subject categories of FI interest, the LIENVOY Project continues to fulfill a standing requirement to provide CI/CE data on the following selected targets:

- Cuban Embassy - six lines
- Soviet Embassy - five lines
- Chinese Communist News Agency (NCNA) - one line
- Czech Embassy - two lines
- Polish Embassy - two lines
- Several Mexican Communists

Of the above coverage, neither the Czech nor the Polish Embassy targets are listed as a priority in the latest Related Mission Directive. They are covered for possible leads into the Soviet Embassy intelligence activity.

D. EFFECTIVENESS

(1) During the past year (1 January 1965 through December 1965) the LIENVOY Project covered a total of 30 (thirty) targets simultaneously which provided 8,541 reels of raw take. This was processed into 19,960 pages of transcripts (of this amount actual count by LIENVOY processors was 14,460 pages, an estimate by the outside Czech translator was 1,500 pages, the Russian translator 2,000 pages, and the Polish translator 1,000). Enclosed as attachment number 2 is the 1965 Work Load Log for LIENVOY by month and target. Since this includes only the

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work done inside the LP, total figures vary according to additional work done by other Station (unilateral) agents.

(2) (a) Mexican Targets. Of the 30 lines covered, at least 15 of them are always exclusively for KUBARK the remaining targets are selected by LIRAMA but are also of definite interest to KUBARK as sources of positive and CE/CI intelligence. The Mexican targets covered during the past project year were:

- 20 30 18 Lazaro Cardenas Del Rio
- 40 19 18 Lazaro Cardenas Del Rio
(pro-Communist, anti-PEPRIME ex-President of Mexico)
- 46 22 19 Lic. Armando Castillejos Ortiz
(leader of the Partido Comunista Bolchevique, Partido Comunista Mexicano - PCM splinter group)
- 23 85 25 Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
(prominent Mexican Marxist intellectual, titular head of the Movimiento Liberacion Nacional, MLN, member of Comite Mexicano por Paz - Mexican Peace Committee, former head of the Circulo Estudios Mexicanos - CEM - Communist Front Cultural Group.)
- 46 12 70 Vicente Lombardo Toledano
(Mexican Marxist labor leader)
- 35 59 82 Union Nacional Sinarquista
(Rightist Catholic group)
- 45 59 52 David Alfaro Siqueiros
(painter and Communist rabble rouser)
- 35 36 52 Politica
(bi-weekly Marxist, anti-PEPRIME, pro-Cuba magazine)
- 42 06 97 Francisco Galindo Ochoa
(Press Secretary for the Presidencia).
- 46 60 16 Prensa Latina
- 46 60 15 (Castro Cuban subsidized Press Agency).
- 43 15 06 Lic Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
(Communist member of National Executive Committee of Movimiento Liberacion Nacional - MLN)
- 19 70 64 Jorge Lopez TAMAYO Castillejos
(Mexican Marxist intellectual and a leading member of the Comite Mexicano por la Paz - CMP - Mexican Peace Committee and father of Jorge TAMAYO Portillo, secretary of the School of Economics at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and contact of the Cuban Embassy)

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- 10 29 69 Movimiento Liberacion Nacional - MLN
(anti-PEPRIME, pro-Cuban Communist Front Group)
- 21 80 65 Movimiento Civico Nacional
(Rightist group of industrialists)
- 43 54 94 Victor Rico Galan
(Anti-PEPRIME, pro-Castro, Spanish, naturalized Mexican
Communist Journalist)

While the above lines were covered at various times during the past project year, the LIENVOY intercept center has the capability of connecting machines to any line which has been covered in the past since once a tap is made running the line into the center, it stays there after the machines have been put on other targets.

The reels from the above targets are not transcribed completely. LIENVOY monitors extract significant conversations and include them in a daily "resumen", the original of which is read daily by LIRAMA and a copy of which is delivered each morning to the Mexico Station. The reels are retained for about ten days for fuller transcripts if requested by LIRAMA or by the Mexico Station. The "resumen" is typed in four copies at the end of each day (covering conversations which occurred that day). On the following morning by 0800 hours, one copy is hand-carried by LIENVOY-2 to LIRAMA. At the same time, Arnold F. AREHART delivers a copy to Robert B. RIGGS for delivery to Willard C. CURTIS. A third copy is delivered to LIEBEGANT by LIENVOY-2. The fourth copy is retained in a chronological file in the intercept center.

(b) KUBARK Targets. The KUBARK targets have been limited mainly to CI/CE requirements. These include the Cuban Embassy, Soviet Embassy, Czech Embassy, Polish Embassy, and the Communist Chinese News Agency (NCNA). There follows selected significant examples of the LIENVOY product from each of these targets with a Station appraisal of its effectiveness.

1. Cuban Embassy. The six lines covered are:

- 14 42 37 The Ambassador's private telephone
- 25 07 95 The Chancery
- 14 15 26 The Chancery
- 25 09 14 The Commercial Office
- 11 28 47 The Consulate
- 25 07 77 Elena Vasquez Gomez

The Chancery and Consulate lines regularly identify foreigners in Mexico who contact the Cuban Embassy. Reels are usually transcribed within one day of the conversation; however, if the caller happens to be a U.S. citizen, the transcripts are prepared immediately which frequently permits the Station to arrange for unilateral surveillance and identification of the persons involved. The Commercial Office coverage provides information on Cuban Commercial activities in Mexico and identification of firms doing business with Cuba.

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The Elena Vasquez Gomez target was connected to support the sensitive AMROD operation. The AMROD Headquarters Case Officer, Thomas G. URQUHART (ps) visits Mexico once a month on temporary duty in connection with this operation. His comments on this project are:

"The LIENVOY Project continued through 1965 to be of great importance to the conduct of the AMROD and certain related Operations. It enabled case officers to know which of the PERUMEN target personalities were in town, who their contacts were and gave an insight into the operational situation that affected AMROD. The LICLOVE-1 phase of this operation was of particular value in giving an inside fully documentary view of opposition efforts to counter certain phases of the AMROD operation and helped planning the tactical moves in the LICLOVE operation itself. LIENVOY, thus has contributed materially to our handling of the tactical phases of an important operation and has given valuable intelligence information concerning various phases thereof."

The six lines against the Cuban target are fully transcribed by LIENVOY transcribers and delivered by Arnold P. ARSHART to Robert B. RIGGS each morning. Lengthy conversations sometimes require additional time for transcription. A carbon copy of each transcription is pouched weekly to Headquarters for use of WH/C. The original is retained by the Mexico Station. A third copy is retained in the intercept center chronological files. LIRAMA does not read these transcripts unless some significant item appears in the "resumen" which causes him to ask to see a fuller transcript or to listen to the tape.

Coverage of the Cuban Embassy target yields a good picture of daily activities, residences, personal habits and weaknesses of Cuban official personnel in Mexico. This is used by Station Case Officers in selection of targets for recruitment and in checking on activities of agents already recruited who are working inside the target or who are in contact with Cuban officials.

2. Soviet Embassy. The Soviet Government has over fifty officials permanently stationed in Mexico (the largest foreign embassy except for the U.S.). Thirty-five of these Soviets (70 percent of the staff) are known or suspect intelligence officers. The five lines under LIENVOY provide details on the activities of most of these Soviets. These lines are:

15 60 55 Soviet Consulate and Chancery. This line is used by fifteen known or suspect KGB officers. It is also used by foreigners in Mexico attempting to make contact with the Soviets. When the contacts suggest clandestine meetings, the Station arranges for unilateral surveillance and has identified many contacts in this manner.

15 61 55 Soviet Chancery. This line is used primarily by the Ambassador and provides more information on protocol contacts than leads of intelligence interest. However, it gives the Station a picture of the personalities being cultivated by Soviet diplomats and of

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Mexicans who are seeking contact with the Soviets.

- 15 61 07 Soviet Commercial Office. Five (5) known or suspect GRU officers use this number. They are Military intelligence officers using Commercial Office cover and in some instances actually performing commercial functions or trade negotiations. The volume of trade between Mexico and the USSR does not justify a Commercial Office staff of ten (10) Soviets. The Mexico Station has had some success in running double agents against these GRU officers. LIENVOY provides a helpful check on these operations. The take from LIENVOY also identifies the GRU officers as escorts for trade, scientific, commercial and tourist delegations who continue to travel between the USSR and Mexico, either on visits to Mexico or to and from other Latin American countries. Once these groups arrive in Mexico, their itineraries usually become available. LIENVOY.
- 15 12 64 Soviet Films Office. This leads into the residence and office of the distributor for Soviet Commercial Films in Mexico who is a suspect intelligence officer. There have been a number of calls suggesting clandestine contact with Central Americans but the Station has not yet been successful in identifying the callers.
- 15 69 87 Soviet Military Attache. This continues to be the least productive of the coverage in terms of volume because the Soviet Military officers either will not answer the telephone or spend very little time where it rings. It is usually the number called by U.S. ANOL servicemen trying to make contact with the Soviets, and by other Americans who for one reason or another want to work for the Soviets or go to the USSR. There are three (3) GRU colonels and six (6) civilian GRU officers who use this line.

The Soviet information is transcribed by the LIENVOY transcribers in the same way as the Cuban traffic except that the reels also contain a considerable volume of Russian language conversations. This requires that the reels be picked up daily and delivered to an outside (unilateral) translation (Staff Agent Douglas J. FIENGLASS) who translates the Russian conversations into English. From these transcripts it is apparent that the Soviets are not aware that their conversations in Russian are being overheard and understood. These daily exchanges between the Soviets and their wives (who also work in the Embassy) provide a good picture of personal habits, grievances, marriage relationships, and weaknesses of targets of interest to KUBARK.

3. Czech Embassy. Two lines in the Chancery (45 30 91 and 45 30 12) are covered by LIENVOY. Reels from these targets are delivered daily by ARBUHART to RIGGS who delivers them to the EE Case Officer who arranges for transcription and translations to be done by David B. SCHLAJHTER, field contract agent. This agent also prepares a monthly summary of information on the activities of Czech officials in Mexico. This Embassy has a staff of thirty-six (36) officials of whom eleven (11) are known or suspect intelligence officers. LIENVOY has provided the great bulk of operational intelligence on this Embassy, its personnel and activities in Mexico. Although no exploitable

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have come to the Station's attention during the past year, this coverage has provided invaluable basic information on the target.

4. Polish Embassy. LIENVOY covers two lines in this Embassy. One of them (11 25 49) is in the main Chancery. The other (25 32 33) is the private line of the Polish Commercial Counselor. These reels are delivered daily by AREHART to RIGGS who delivers them to the EE case officer who arranges for translations and transcriptions to be done by Louise B. DRASASIC (ps), a contract employee who prepares a monthly summary of information obtained from this coverage. This Embassy has a staff of twelve (12) officials of whom seven (7) are known or suspect intelligence officers. LIENVOY has provided a considerable amount of operational intelligence on this Embassy and their Commercial Office in Mexico. Invaluable information has been obtained regarding the relationships between various Polish officials. LIENVOY also provides a very valuable check on various access agents who are in contact with Polish officials. Practically all leads to access agents in this field have originated with the LIENVOY Project.

5. Communist China News Agency (CCNA). Three representatives of the Communist China News Agency are in Mexico. As a result of a briefing of LIRAMA by Williard C. CURTIS on 18 December 1964, LIRAMA requested coverage of the line which goes into a building used by these Chinese as a combination residence and office. This information has been useful for travel data, identification of contacts of the Chinese Communists in Mexico and some background on the three Chinese news representatives. Using leads from this source, several unsuccessful efforts have been made to place a Chinese speaker in touch with one of the three Chinese newsmen to make a cold approach (during international travel from Mexico to London).

The Mexico Station Case Officers responsible for established FI and CI/CS programs feel that LIENVOY has made a very necessary intelligence support contribution. The facilities of this project, due to centralized tapping and transcribing, continue to produce three times the volume of raw audio and finished intelligence as LIFEAT at approximately one half the cost. As a semi-official liaison tap operation, LIENVOY continues to be able to place a tap on any phone desired whereas LIFEAT, as a unilateral operation, does not always have immediate access to a desired target. The continued success of Station Mexico's operational program against the Cuban, Soviet and Soviet Satellite installations and personnel in Mexico is largely attributable to the continuous and thorough coverage of these targets by this project. Chief of Station, Mexico, recommends that the project be renewed for another year as an essential collection and support operation for the Mexico Station.

S. PROBLEMS

There have been no significant security, cover, control, or liaison problems during the project year.

F. LIAISON

This Project encompasses an unofficial liaison relationship with high-level

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Mexican government officials and contributes to the friendly attitudes of these officials toward ODVCKE. Some examples of this liaison are:

- a) Chester D. DAINOLD (ps), Cedric T. PAPATS (ps) and KENNETH H. LEGENTINO (ps) came to Mexico on TDY from 30 January to 3 February 1965 and met with LIRAMA on 1 February 1965 to give him a briefing on the political situation in Central America and to provide technical guidance in the selection of sensitive inks for LIRAMA use.
- b) At the request of Willard C. CURTIS, LIRAMA instructed a high official in the telephone company on 2 February 1965 to make available unlisted telephone numbers for two of his agents to copy. The two agents were LIENVOY agents from the LP who had been instructed in the use of a miniature camera. Headquarters subsequently provided the Mexico Station with a reverse listing of these numbers.
- c) In March 1965 Willard C. CURTIS visited LIRAMA to discuss a possible Mexican Government FNO operation against an official of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico who was known by the Mexico Station to be conducting espionage operations involving a Mexican citizen.
- d) In early May LIRAMA asked via LIELEGANT for a physical security specialist to conduct a survey of LIRAMA offices and make recommendations for improvement of the security of these premises. Headquarters provided the services of Clarence G. PANKNIN (ps) on TDY for the period 16 May - 2 June 1965. As a result of this survey, and at the request of LIRAMA, three LIRAMA bodyguards were sent to PUPRIMS for special training.
- e) In late May 1965 the Mexico Station passed names of 14 Chinese Communist basketball players to LIRAMA via LIELEGANT and asked that these players be denied visas to enter Mexico. As a result, LITEMPO-S (acting on instructions from LIRAMA) denied them visas to transit Mexico.
- f) At the request of LIRAMA, Headquarters provided special telephones for the five lines in LIRAMA's private offices.
- g) At the request of Willard C. CURTIS to LIRAMA, two agents under the LIPIRE Project were given special credentials in July 1965 which documented them as being on assignment from LIRAMA's offices. These credentials give these agents access to important travel control data from the international airport.
- h) In September 1965 two representatives of KURICF visited Mexico and trained LIRAMA in the use of a highly sensitive writing medium.
- i) Beginning on 1 September 1965, Philip G. NUPATT (ps), KUBARK specialist, spent ninety days in Mexico training LIRAMA's Security Forces.
- j) In December 1965 LIRAMA asked for a KUBARK briefing on the political situation in Central America which might be helpful prior to his visit

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to these countries in early 1966. On 18 December Chester D. DAINOLD (ps) and Stefan LABANOW (ps) came to Mexico and met with LIRAMA on 20 December. DAINOLD conducted the briefing with LABANOW acting as interpreter.

G. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION.

No formal coordination is required in this Project. Chief, PBSWING, Mexico, is the only ODYSSEY official in Mexico outside KUBARK who is aware of this project and its provision for a special channel to LIRAMA. CURTIS advises Chief, PBSWING of significant and pertinent subjects which are discussed in meetings between CURTIS and LIRAMA. LIRAMA does not know that Chief, PBSWING knows of LIENVOY or CURTIS contacts with LIRAMA; he has repeatedly specifically requested that no one in ODACID know of either.

H. PLANS.

The Station plans to continue the intercept program without change for the next project year. As previously noted, LIRAMA has asked that the project continue without change in personnel or in the manner of operation.

I. FUNDS.

1. For the past period.

The cost of the LIENVOY Project (paid by the Mexico Station exclusive of Headquarters costs) from 1 February 1964 through 30 June 1965 was approximately US\$ 20,000 and from 1 July 1965 through 31 January 1966 another \$27,000 is estimated.

2. During the next project year.

During the period 1 February 1966 through 31 January 1967, an estimated amount of US\$ 50,898.00 will be required with US\$ 20,960 to be spent in FY 66 and the remaining \$ 29,738 in FY 67. This represents an increase of approximately US\$ 3,830 over the last project year. This is needed to cover the increasing cost of entertainment and gifts for Mexican officials plus a salary estimate of US\$ 2,880 for an additional English/Spanish translator/monitor.

3. Agent Salaries.

	FY 1966	FY 1967
LIENVOY-2	2,400.00	3,360.00
LIENVOY-4	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-5	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-6	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-7	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-11	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-12	1,200.00	1,680.00

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LIENVOY-14	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-15	260.00	364.00
LIENVOY-16	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-18	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-19		
(paid by LIENVOY-2 on basis of production)		
English/Spanish Translator to be hired (contract without bonus)	1,200.00	1,680.00
Christmas bonus one month's pay 1966		2,320.00
Contingency fund for new agents or severance pay	900.00	1,334.00
Operational expenses	800.00	1,200.00
Local purchase supplies/equipment	1,000.00	1,500.00
Safehouse rental	1,000.00	1,500.00
Entertainment & gifts for Mexican officials	3,000.00	2,000.00
Purchase of information via LIENVOY-2	1,200.00	1,600.00
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL \$	20960.00	29,738.00


J. ANNEX.

None.

K. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

There has been no change in emergency conditions arrangements since the last project renewal request in which they were reported.

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MONITORS

LIENVOY-4
LIENVOY-5
LIENVOY-11
LIENVOY-12

TRANSMISSIONS

LIENVOY-6 CUBAN TAPES
LIENVOY-7 CUBAN TAPES
LIENVOY-16 RUSSIAN TAPES (Spanish)

WATCHMAN

LIENVOY-15

FILES

LIENVOY-14

TARGETS

ELBARS:

5 - Cuban Embassy (14 42 37, 25 07 95, 25 09 14
11 23 47, 14 13 26)
1 - Vazquez Gomez (25 07 77)
5 - Soviet Embassy (15 60 85, 15 12 64, 15 61 55,
15 69 27, 15 61 07)
2 - Czech Embassy (45 30 91, 45 30 12)
3 - Polish Embassy (11 25 49, 25 22 38)

MEXICANS:

1 - Gen. Cardenas (20 50 18)
2 - Prensa Latina (46 60 16, 46 60 15)
1 - Galindo Ochoa (13 02 28)
1 - Lic. Aguilar (23 85 25)
1 - Lic. Lombardo Toledano (46 12 70)
1 - Sinarquista (35 59 92)
1 - Alfaro Figueiros (45 59 52)
1 - Politica (35 56 52)
1 - Lic. Gonzalez Pedrerc (43 15 06)
1 - M.L.N. (10 29 69)
1 - Castellanos Ortiz (45 22 19)
1 - Movimiento Civico Nacional (21 90 65)
1 - Jorge L. Tamayo (19 70 64)
1 - Victor Rico Galan (45 54 94)

31 December 1965
MEXICO DF


ATTACHMENT NO. 1 TO LIENVOY PROJECT RENEWAL REQUEST

LIBRARY PROJECT

----- WORK LOAD 1965 -----

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
RESUME PAGES	101	75	125	97	125	101	82	75	74	55	67	71	1046
TECH TAPES	42	40	46	41	43	44	44	39	42	45	45	46	517
DATA TAPES	111	112	132	129	111	121	143	135	140	138	122	115	1508
RUSS PAGES	530	533	504	467	518	487	628	568	561	562	537	534	6519
FORN TAPES	39	41	49	41	42	45	46	51	22	39	44	50	509
CUBANA TAPES	177	136	174	156	163	192	188	182	172	174	197	174	2075
CUBANA PAGES	567	512	653	460	487	603	619	480	490	574	509	485	6305
A.S. CHINA TAPES	=	=	24	21	19	20	22	18	20	22	16	23	204
A.S. CHINA PAGES	=	=	2	=	=	=	=	=	=	30	35	44	109
WIRE ITEMS	46	34	37	34	54	35	27	52	33	41	53	35	481
OTHER TAPES USED	326	280	336	238	349	303	333	341	221	340	296	305	3728
TOTALS:	1939	1763	2175	1743	1909	1841	2132	1941	1775	1980	1921	1882	23001

ATTACHMENT NO. 2 TO LIBRARY PROJECT RENEWAL REQUEST


 ARNOLD F. ARENANT

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ACTION

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TIME

BY

INFO

FILE VE, C/CA, PG 2

ACTION

10 FEB 68 52519

SALC R EIT 1817326

DIR SITE MEXI 6225

LIENVOY

REF: DIR 73326

PLEASE OUT 532 REQUESTED FOR UPKEEP OF MV 2631, SLOT 1-0-29.

AREHART VEHICLE FUNDED THROUGH STATION SUPPORT.

SECRET

W AGENTS WERE TO PAY

CFN 25 73326 622 OF MV 2631, SLOT 1-0-29. AREHART

OWN UPKEEP ON AUTOS.

BT

SECRET

Henry/K.P.

CBT

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief, WHD	SECRET DECLASSIFIED BY 5843	<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED <input type="checkbox"/> ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN ASSESS INDEXING <input type="checkbox"/> MICROFILM
INFO			
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City		
SUBJECT	Renewal of Project LIENVOY		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>References: A. CSI-F No. 230-60 ANNEX B B. WH Field Memorandum No. 5-64, 17 March 1964</p> <p>Attached is the LIENVOY Project Renewal submitted for the period 1 February 1966 through 31 January 1967 for a total of US\$ 20,510.00^{51,248.00} 21,160^{30,148} for FY 1966 and 29,550 for FY 1967.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Willard C. Curtis</i> WILLARD C. CURTIS</p> <p>ATTACHMENT: Project Renewal (Orig & 5) Left hand side h/w Right hand side USC.)</p> <p>Distribution: 3- Chief WH w atts h/w and USC 2- Files</p> <p>Removed from Project <i>KOB-0600</i> CS Classification: <i>10-6-75/</i> JOB # <i>23-175/74</i> Box: <i>27</i> Fold: <i>2</i></p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
		EMMA-28092	7 January 1966
		CLASSIFICATION	HC'S FILE NUMBER
		SECRET SECRET	50-6-75/1

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

TO

CC

Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT

LIENVOY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMW 13537

The LIENVOY Project expires on 1 February 1966. Please forward your renewal request so that it arrives at Headquarters by 1 January.

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:

Orig. & 1, COS, Mexico City

1 Nov 1965

50-6-75/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW 14093	DATE 11/1/65
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CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-75/1
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RI Chrono	ORIGINATING		EXT.
	OFFICE SYMBOL WH/1/Bustos-Videla:bp	OFFICER bp	TYPIST 4506

COORDINATING		
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WHD	11/1	William V. Broc

AN/	FI	11/04/65
TO	DEST	

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSED BY THE ACTION

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

XX

CLASSIFICATION
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIENVOY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUESTED REFERENCES

REF: HDMA-25141

1. The LIENVOY Project was renewed on 2 April 1965 for the period 1 February 1965 through 31 January 1966 for a total of \$47,468; \$19,010 for FY 1965 and \$28,458 for FY 1966. These figures differ from those submitted by the Station in reference because we transferred money for the Christmas bonus from the FY 1965 column to FY 1966 (see page 10 of Project Renewal Request).

2. The renewal request prepared by the Station was excellent and was submitted without change.

3. KUTUBE staff made the following comment which will be further elaborated in discussions with Station officers:

"This operation has long been one of the best of its kind, as a producer both of positive intelligence and viable CI operational leads. We are only beginning to explore the exploitation of taps and other surveillance activities as sources of sophisticated assessment data on selected targets. An operation as effectively managed as this should be readily adaptable to such exploitation. Conversations with Branch officers give promise that this added objective will be worked into this and other Mexico station operations within the coming year."

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
0 & 1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-75/1
8 APR 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH NUMBER AND NUMBER HDMW-13537	DATE 8 April 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-75/1
Distribution: 1 -RI 1 -Chrono [Handwritten initials and marks]	ORIGINATING	
	OFFICE SYMBOL WH/1	OFFICER C. Bustos-Videla
	COORDINATING	
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
	OFFICER'S NAME [Signature]	
RELEASING		
OFFICE SYMBOL C/WHD	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME Desmond Fitzgerald

DISPATCH

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STAFF REVIEW OF FI/CI PROJECT				DDP/PG/FI-CI Projects	
PROJECT		VALUE		PROJECT NO.	
LIDZVOY		\$97,468		3 C 43	
PICTURE OFFICER		EXTENSION		RECEIVED DDP/PG	
Charlotte Bustos-Videla		4506		24 Feb 65	
		ROOM		FORWARDED	
		3 D 2607		25 Feb 65	
DIVISION		STATION		STARTING	
WH		Mexico City		11 Mar 65	
		TARGET AREA		RETURNED	
		Mexico			
ACTION		APPROVAL LEVEL		REVIEWING COMMENTS	
APPROVAL		DIVISION OR STAFF		X	
X GENERAL		X ODP		X	
AMENDMENT		DCI			
EXTENSION					
TERMINATION					
ROUTING OFFICE COMMENTS					
COMMENT FOR INTERNAL STAFF USE (Not to go forward to the Division)					
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (To go forward to the Division)					
<p>The CI Staff concurs in the renewal of this extremely productive and valuable project.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">CC SENT DIV. DATE <u>19 Mar 65</u></p>					
DATE		REVIEWING OFFICER			

14-00000

17 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/EX *h*


SUBJECT : Project LIENVOY

1. The LIENVOY Project is submitted for renewal in the amount of \$47,468, which is approximately the same amount allocated for this project last year. The project covers a joint telephone tap operation with the GOM and also provides the COS with unofficial access to the highest GOM officials, including President DIAZ Ordas. The telephone tap operation is extremely complex, involving four outside case officers who handle translations and transcriptions, 10 assets plus a case officer in the LP, and covering 30 lines. CIA directs the placement of one half of these taps, and our coverage is directed against Cuban, Soviet, and Satellite installations and personalities. These taps produced almost 150 disseminated intelligence reports last year, plus a vast amount of CI/CE data on these targets, which are of the highest Station priority. It is perhaps of interest to note that this project produced about three times the volume of raw audio take as LIFEAT, our unilateral telephone tap operation, at only about one half the cost. The Station renewal request provides an excellent detailed breakdown of the mechanics of this operation and of the individual targets covered.

2. In an operation as involved as this there are obviously a lot of areas where problems could crop up. One particular possibility is LIENVOY-2, the son of LIELEGANT. LIELEGANT is DIAZ's principal advisor on intelligence and security matters and he works closely with the COS on this project. LIENVOY-2 was inserted to run the LP at LIELEGANT's direction and there apparently is nothing that we can do about it. LIENVOY-2 is apparently thoroughly corrupt, more of a burden in the LP operation than anything else, and generally a dangerous person with whom to be operationally involved. However, the Desk feels that his father, with whom our relations have been excellent, will keep LIENVOY-2 in line.

3. This operation was highly praised by reviewing Headquarters echelons last year and no major changes or setbacks have occurred since that time. President DIAZ Ordas has personally asked that the operation be continued with the same personnel and modus operandi, and his satisfaction with this project provided the ancillary benefit of helping to establish excellent personal rapport between the COS and him. Although several high-level GOM officials are aware of this operation, there is no evidence that there has been any compromise to any of the targets monitored.

4. Recommend that Project LIENVOY renewal be approved.


GERARD DROLLER
G/WH/POA

SECRET

DDP/PQ/FI
1 Apr 65

PROJECT BRIEFING

PROJECT: LIENVOY

WH - Mexico City

ACTION : ADD/P approval of renewal

1 Feb 1965 - 31 Jan 66

PURPOSE: To provide a joint CIA-Mexican Government telephone tap operation and a non-official liaison relationship with access to highest ranking government officials of Mexico.

PROGRESS: From 1 Feb 1964 through Dec 1964 the LIENVOY project covered a total of 30 targets simultaneously which provided 7,462 reels of raw take. Of the lines covered, fifteen were exclusively for CIA. The top CE targets are the Soviets, Cubans, Satellites and Chicoms. Through this coverage we have learned of several attempts of U.S. citizens to contact the Soviet Embassy or the Cuban Embassy. Costa Rican concurrence to an approach by the Czech Government to open an Embassy in Costa Rica was uncovered by LIENVOY. This move by the Czechs was thwarted through the efforts of the U.S. Department of State. While the greatest value of LIENVOY lies in the channel it provides to the Presidency and the CI/CE information it provides, the positive intelligence production is greater than that of any other source of the Station.

FUNDS : \$47,468 \$19,010 in FY 65 \$28,458 in FY 66

Salaries (11)	\$28,464
Xmas bonus	2,320
Entertainment and gifts	4,000
Safehouse	2,500
Vehicle maintenance	600
Supplies and equipment	2,500
Ops expenses	4,800
Contingency fund	2,284

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PREVIOUS APPROVALS:	1 Feb 64 - 31 Jan 65	\$26,538
	1 Feb 63 - 31 Jan 64	70,068
	1 Feb 62 - 31 Jan 63	43,240
	1 Feb 61 - 31 Jan 62	59,690
	1 Feb 60 - 31 Jan 61	53,840
	1 Feb 59 - 31 Jan 60	163,537

STAFF COMMENTS : FI and CI Staffs concur in renewal.

FI STAFF: The possibility of exploiting these taps as sources of sophisticated assessment data on selected targets has been discussed with Branch officers and this objective will be included during the coming year.

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2

PROJECT ACTION				PROJECT CRYPTONYM			
				LIENVOY			
TYPE OF ACTION	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION		X	FIELD	CA	
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION		Mexico City			
	GENERAL FY 1965-66	BRANCH	DESK	1 Mexico			
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER		Charlotte Bustos-Videla			
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	4506		
			6B2607	Langley			
CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION							
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)			DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED	
	YES	NO	DATE			YES	NO
C/SH/L	W. J. Kaufman <i>W. J. Kaufman</i>			28 Jan			
RH/B&F	Robert Carter <i>Robert Carter</i>			1 Feb 65			
WH/SS	W. E. Brooks <i>W. E. Brooks</i>			2/2			
C/RH/POA	Gerald Droller <i>Gerald Droller</i>			2/16/65			
RH/EXO	Samuel Halpern <i>Samuel Halpern</i>			19 Feb 65			
C/RHD	Desmond FitzGerald <i>Desmond FitzGerald</i>			20 FEB 1965			
CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS							
PI Staff	-s/J. R. Baine			29 Mar 65	X		29 Mar 65
CI Staff	-s/Frank W. Hughes			12 Mar 65			
C/DDP/PG	<i>Tom Hines</i>			22 Mar 65			
APPROVAL							
PERIOD		TOTAL AMOUNT		FY	AMOUNT		
FROM	TO			195	\$19,010.00		
1 Feb. 1965	31 Jan. 1966	\$47,468.00		1966	\$28,458.00		
APPROVING AUTHORITY		SIGNATURE		DATE			
ADD/P		<i>T. Karan</i>		2 April 65			

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29 MAR 1965


MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans
THROUGH: DDP/PG
SUBJECT: Project LIENVOY Renewal

1. FI Staff recommends renewal of Project LIENVOY.
2. This operation has long been one of the best of its kind, as a producer both of positive intelligence and viable CI operational leads. We are only beginning to explore the exploitation of taps and other surveillance activities as sources of sophisticated assessment data on selected targets. An operation as effectively managed as this should be readily adaptable to such exploitation. Conversations with Branch officers give promise that this added objective will be worked into this and other Mexico station operations within the coming year.

W. Lloyd George
W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

SECRET



27 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans
SUBJECT : Project LIENVOY Renewal

1. Approval is requested of the LIENVOY Project for the period 1 February 1965 through 31 January 1966, for a total of \$47,468; \$19,010 for FY 1965 and \$28,458 for FY 1966. This project was programmed for \$50,000 for FY 1965, and funds are available within WH Division.

2. The LIENVOY Project provides one of two telephone tap capabilities for the Mexico City Station (the other one being LIFEAT which is unilateral) and one of two unofficial liaison projects with top level Government officials. While the Government officials differ between this Project and Project LITEMPO, LIRAMA can be reached through both projects. LIELEGANT, who is the principal Mexican in Project LIENVOY, has been named by LIRAMA as his Consejero Principal (Principal Adviser) on intelligence and security matters. LIRAMA plans to work closely with LIELEGANT on the various aspects of Project LIENVOY to ensure its continued success. Examples of useful liaison through LIENVOY to top Government officials is set forth by the Station in paragraph "F" on page 8 of their renewal request.

3. The telephone tap aspect of this project provides very valuable information in connection with the CI/CE program of the Mexico City Station. The top CE targets are the Soviets, Cubans, Satellites and Chicoms. Through our coverage of the Soviets, KUBARK and OBYOKE has learned of several attempts of U. S. citizens or known intelligence agents to contact the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Upon identification of the persons involved, our Station has worked closely with the FBI and top U. S. Government offices in investigating any possible threats these contacts may have on the security of the U. S. Government. U. S. citizens have also been identified attempting to contact the Cuban Embassy.

4. LIENVOY is an extremely productive positive intelligence project. Its main importance in the intelligence field is its capability of providing indications of the plans and the intentions of the people who form its target. Perhaps one of the most important pieces of intelligence gathered from LIENVOY during 1964 occurred on 15 July 1964 when it was learned that the Costa Rican Government had concurred in an approach by the Czech Government to open an Embassy in Costa Rica. Although it appeared recognition had already taken place, this Agency through its high-level Government contacts and the Department of State through the Ambassador to the Costa Rican President, were successful in thwarting this attempt by the Czechs. In August the Foreign Minister told our Ambassador that Costa Rica was not considering diplomatic recognition of Czechoslovakia.

5. The project's limitations, from the intelligence point of view are twofold: (1) the significance of fragmentary conversations is not always apparent, and (2) telephone lines do not accept follow-up requirements. According to Headquarters records, production figures in 1964 were as follows:

LIENVOY tap:	Total Fouched Reports	- 156
	Not Disseminated	- 49
	Total Cabled Reports	- 50
	Not Disseminated	- 9

The subjects of these reports were on Cuban activities in Mexico and developments in Cuba; Communist and leftist personalities in Mexico; Soviet and Satellite activities in Mexico. Reports originating from agents under the project are as follows:

LIENVOY-1: 2 reports on Mexican Government officials.

LIENVOY-2: 9 reports (4 not disseminated), on Mexican Communist and Communist front organizations, and rightist organizations.

LIENVOY-19: 1 report on Communist front organizations.

6. One customer evaluation was requested during the last year on a report on a Communist front organization. The report was considered by the State Department to be of moderate value and useful as new information.

7. While the greatest value of the LIENVOY Project undoubtedly lies in the channel it provides to LIRAMA and the CI/CE information it provides, the intelligence product is also of value as evidenced by the fact it produces more positive reports than any other source of the Mexico City Station. It is hoped that the processing of the raw material can be improved so that marginal reporting which resulted in the large number of undissemminated reports will soon disappear. The LIENVOY take also provides a very important support mechanism for checking on other reports received from independent sources, and for following developments related to certain operational activity of the Station.

8. WH Division recommends renewal of the LIENVOY Project as presented in the attached renewal request submitted by the Mexico City Station.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

~~SECRET / KAPOK~~

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

PROJECT: LIENVOY

CASE OFFICER: Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

STATION: Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION: Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

Jan
11 1965

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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~~SECRET / KAPOK~~

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R.S. DE SE HT. #12 44444-23141

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PROJECT LIENVOY RENEWAL

A. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

The LIENVOY Project provides for a joint KUBARK-Mexican Government sponsored telephone tap unit and for a non-official liaison relationship with access to the highest ranking government officials of Mexico. The tap unit provides direct support necessary to cover targets and operational programs levied on the Mexico Station via the RMD as well as spot requests from Headquarters and other Stations. This Project also produces positive intelligence.

B. CHANGES

(1) Operational Mechanism

The LIENVOY Project was created in late 1958 and put into operation in early 1959 at the request of LITENSOR who appointed LIELEGANT as his special assistant to work with Willard C. CURTIS in the supervision and administration of the project. In mid-1964 it became evident that LIRAMA would replace LITENSOR in December 1964. (LIRAMA was then LITEMPO-2 and a clandestine liaison contact with Willard C. CURTIS under the LITEMPO Project but was not knowledgeable of the CURTIS/LIELEGANT/LITENSOR relationship in Project LIENVOY.) On 10 August 1964 LIRAMA (LITEMPO-2) asked CURTIS and LIELEGANT for a conference (reported to Headquarters in MEXI-0521 dated 10 August 1964). At this meeting, LIRAMA advised that LITENSOR had briefed him on the LIENVOY Project in detail and that it should be continued with the same personnel and manner of operation. LIELEGANT and LIENVOY-2 have been given nominal positions which provide cover for daily reports to LIRAMA. Government credentials are also being provided for Staff Agent Arnold F. AREHART and the local agents working in the LP. LIRAMA has requested that the LP remain in its present location and has provided a credential for the inside of the front doorway which prohibits entry to anyone without special permission obtained from his office.

(2) Agents

During the last project year there have been no changes in the agent personnel. For the information of reviewing officials there is enclosed as Attachment-1, a chart listing current LIENVOY targets as well as functions of LIENVOY agents. Arnold F. AREHART, Staff Agent, has been responsible for maintenance of the technical equipment for the past five years. His work continues to be outstanding and accounts for the fact that after almost six years' use, the equipment is in good working order and has sustained a minimum of loss through negligent breakage or theft (both very common in Mexico). There has been no major mechanical breakdown since AREHART has been supervising the maintenance of the equipment.

C. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

While telephone tap operations are commonly classified as "support operations", the LIENVOY Project by nature of some of its targets, has produced considerable

SECRET / LIENVOY

- 2 -

positive intelligence. It has been reviewed both at Headquarters and in the Mexico Station as one of the most productive telephone tap projects in KUBARK of both FI and CI/CE information.

(1) FI information. From 1 February 1964 through 31 December 1964, this project was the source of 240 positive reports. The general subject categories within which these reports fall as related to objectives of the most recent RMD (HMNS-3190 dated 21 October 1963) are:

Priority A. 1, 2, 3, and Priority B. 1, 2, and 4.
 Cuban Embassy Activities in Mexico
 Soviet Embassy Activities in Mexico
 Activity of Mexican Government with regard to intentions and strategy in domestic and foreign affairs
 Communist Party of Mexico (PCM) Activities in Mexico
 Communist Front Activities (Movimiento Liberacion Nacional - MLN) in Mexico
 Activities of Communist, Leftist, or outspoken Anti-PBPRIME political figures
 Activities of Communist China representatives in Mexico

(2) CI/CE information. In addition to the general subject categories of FI interest, the LIENVOY Project fulfills a standing requirement to provide CI/CE data on the following selected targets: Cuban Embassy - six lines; Soviet Embassy - five lines; Czech Embassy - two lines; Polish Embassy - 2 lines; Yugoslav Embassy - two lines (disconnected in April 1964); and the Communist Chinese News Agency (NCHA) - one line (being installed as of January 1965).

D. EFFECTIVENESS

(1) From 1 February 1964 through December 1964 (eleven months) the LIENVOY Project covered a total of 30 (thirty) targets simultaneously which provided 7,462 reels of raw take. This was processed into 21,504 pages of transcripts (of this amount actual count by LIENVOY processors was 17,004 pages, an estimate by the outside Czech translator was 1,500 pages, Russian translator 2,000 pages, and Polish translator 1,000). Enclosed as Attachment-2 is a copy of the work load log and list of targets which Arnold F. ARRIANT provides the Station on a monthly basis. This log, of course, includes only the work done inside the LP and variance of monthly figures is accounted for by additional work done by other Station (unilateral) translators.

(2) (a) Mexican Targets. Of the 30 lines covered, 15 of them are always exclusively for KUBARK. The remaining targets are selected by LIRAMA but are usually of interest to KUBARK as sources of positive intelligence. The Mexican targets covered during the past project year were:

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- 3 -

20 83 46 Lazaro Cardenas Del Rio
 20 30 18 Lazaro Cardenas Del Rio
 (pro-Communist, anti-PEPRIME ex-President of Mexico)

24 18 18 Braulio Maldonado Sandes
 15 80 29 (pro-Communist, former Governor of Baja California,
 anti-PEPRIME, organizer of the Movimiento Liberacion
 Nacional, MLN, anti-PEPRIME, pro-Cuba Communist front)

23 85 25 Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
 (prominent Mexican Marxist intellectual, titular head
 of the Movimiento Liberacion Nacional, MLN, member of
 Comite Mexicano por Paz - Mexican Peace Committee,
 Former head of the Circulo Estudios Mexicanos - CEM -
 Communist Front Cultural Group.)

46 12 70 Vicente Lombardo Toledano
 (Mexican Marxist labor leader)

35 59 82 Union Nacional Sinarquista
 (Rightist Catholic group)

45 59 52 David Alfaro Siqueiros
 (painter and Communist rabble rouser)

35 36 52 Politica
 (bi-weekly Marxist, anti-PEPRIME, pro-Cuba magazine)

13 21 14 Francisco Galindo Ochoa
 35 66 54 (Press Secretary for the Partido Revolucionario
 Institucional - PRI)

46 11 30 D.F.S. (private line of the Director, Manuel Rangel
 Escamilla)

46 60 16 Prensa Latina
 46 60 15 (Castro Cuban subsidized tabloid)

43 15 06 Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
 (member of National Executive Committee of Movimiento
 Liberacion Nacional - MLN)

11 16 48 Ignacio Acosta Lagunes
 (pro-Communist aid to General Lazaro Cardenas Del Rio
 and leader in the Movimiento Liberacion Nacional - MLN)

10 29 69 Movimiento Liberacion Nacional - MLN
 (anti-PEPRIME, pro-Cuban Communist Front group)

SECRET / W/PROX
 SECRET / W/PROX

SECRET

46 22 19 Armando Castillejos Ortiz
(leader of the Partido Comunista Bolchevique, Partido
Comunista Mexicano - PCM splinter group)

10 27 24 Juan Ortega Arenas
(leader of Frente Obrero - Workers Front - a dissident
splinter group of the Partido Comunista Mexicano)

Of the 19 targets listed above, 15 were covered simultaneously depending upon Mexican interest in the individual at the time; however, lines to all the above run into the intercept center and can be connected as machines become available when other lines are out of order or disconnected for one reason or another.

The reels from the above targets are not transcribed completely, LIENVOY monitors extract significant conversations and include them in the "resumen" the original of which is read daily by LIRAMA and a copy of which is delivered daily to the Mexico Station. The reels are retained usually for ten days for fuller transcripts if requested by the Mexican consumers of the "resumen" or by the Mexico Station. The "resumen" is typed in four copies at the end of each day (covering conversations which occurred that day). On the following morning by 0800 hours, one copy is hand-carried by LIENVOY-2 to LIRAMA. At the same time, Arnold F. AREHART delivers a copy to Robert E. RIGGS for delivery to Willard C. CURTIS. A third copy is delivered to LIELEGANT by LIENVOY-2. The fourth copy is retained in a chronological file in the intercept center.

(b) KUBARK Targets. The Mexico Station CI/CE requirement is partially fulfilled by LIENVOY which during the past project year covered the telephone lines of the Cuban Embassy, Soviet Embassy, Czech Embassy, Polish Embassy, Yugoslav Embassy, and made preliminary installation for the Communist Chinese News Agency (NCNA). There follows selected significant examples of the LIENVOY product from each of these targets with a Station appraisal of its effectiveness.

1. Cuban Embassy. The six lines covered are:

- 14 42 37 The Ambassador's private telephone
- 25 07 95 The Chancery
- 14 13 26 The Chancery
- 25 09 14 The Commercial Office
- 11 28 47 The Consulate
- 25 07 77 Elena Vasquez Gomez

The Chancery and Consulate lines regularly identify foreigners in Mexico who contact the Cuban Embassy. Expeditious processing of the transcripts frequently permits the Station to arrange for unilateral surveillance and identification of other contacts. The Commercial Office coverage provides information on Cuban Commercial activities in Mexico and identification of firms dealing with Cuba.

The Elena Vasquez Gomez target has been of interest in connection with the AMROD operation. The AMROD Headquarters Case Officer, Thomas

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SECRET / MAPCON

G. URQUHART (ps), presently in Mexico on temporary duty has provided the Station with the following evaluation of the LIENVOY product: "The LIENVOY production on the Cuban Embassy traffic in Mexico City has been one of the basic elements contributing to the success of the AMROD operation, directed against the CJIS for CA purposes. The LIENVOY operation has been of value in two general senses: a. The documentary material derived from the texts has formed some of the basis for reconstruction of historical facts needed for the operation. b. The day to day coverage has enabled the case officer on the AMROD operation to sense the climate inside the target, to keep track of the movements of key opposition personnel, to check on the bona fides of certain agents, to check the work of others for veracity and to live monitor portions of the reactions to the AMROD operation itself. Being able to keep track of the shifts and movements of the opposition and their personal relations has been of vital importance to this operation. On two occasions the AMROD Case Officer also used the LIENVOY base as his command post when engineering personal contacts between a KUBARK staffer and the opposition. This type of close support did much to determine the success of those meetings and contributed greatly to the success of the operation. These transcripts provide one of the best sounding boards for the AMROD operation and are regularly forwarded to me at Headquarters."

The six lines above are fully transcribed by LIENVOY transcribers and delivered by AREHART to RIGGS each morning. Lengthy conversations sometimes require an additional day for transcription. A carbon copy is pouched weekly to Headquarters for WH/SA use. The original is retained by the Mexico Station. A third copy is retained in the intercept center chronological files. LIRAMA does not read these transcripts unless some significant item appears in the "resumen" which causes him to ask for a fuller transcript or listen to the tape.

The coverage of this target also yields a good picture of daily activities, residences, personal habits and weaknesses of Cuban official personnel in Mexico. This is used by Station Case Officers in selection of targets for recruitment and in checking on activities of agents already recruited and either working for or in contact with Embassy officials.

2. Soviet Embassy. The Soviet Government has over fifty officials permanently stationed in Mexico (the largest foreign embassy except for the U.S.). Thirty-four of these Soviets (almost 70 percent of the staff) are known or suspect intelligence officers. The five lines under LIENVOY provide details on the activities of most of these Soviets. The lines are:

SECRET / MAPCON

- 15 60 55 Soviet Consulate and Chancery. This line is used by fifteen (15) known or suspect KGB officers. It is also used by foreigners in Mexico attempting to make contact with the Soviets. When contacts suggest clandestine meetings, the Station arranges for unilateral surveillance and has had some success in identifying contacts.
- 15 61 55 Soviet Chancery. This line is used primarily by the Ambassador and provides more information on protocol contacts than leads of intelligence interest. However, it gives the Station a picture of the personalities being cultivated by Soviet diplomats and of Mexicans who are seeking contacts with the Soviets.
- 15 61 07 Soviet Commercial Office. Four (4) known or suspect GRU officers use this number. They are Military intelligence officers using Commercial Office cover and in some instances actually perform commercial functions of trade negotiations but the volume of trade between Mexico and the USSR does not justify a Commercial Office staff of eight (8) Soviets. This produces some information useful to check on double agent operations run by the Station against the GRU officers. In addition, the LIENVOY product usually identifies the GRU officers as escorts for trade, scientific, commercial, and tourist delegations who now are constantly on trips from the USSR to Mexico. LIENVOY also provides details of the itineraries of these groups once they arrive in Mexico.
- 15 12 64 Soviet Films Office. This leads into the residence and office of Vladimir Petrovich OBRUBOV, a suspect GRU officer, who distributes Soviet Commercial Films in Mexico. There have been several calls from what appear to be Central Americans but the Station has not been successful in identifying the callers or determining the nature of the calls.
- 15 69 87 Soviet Military Attache. This is the least productive of the coverage simply because the Soviet Military officers either won't answer the telephone or spend very little time where it rings. Nevertheless, U.S. AWOL servicemen try this number to make contact. There are three GRU colonels and six (6) civilian GRU officers who use this line.

The Soviet information is transcribed by the LIENVOY transcribers in the same way as the Cuban traffic except that the transcripts are delivered daily with the reels from which an outside translator (Douglas J. FEINGLASS) transcribes the Russian conversations into English. These Russian conversations are of considerable value and it is apparent that the Soviets are not aware that these conversations are being overheard and understood. There have been conversations identifying code room personnel; one conversation between two Soviet children revealed the entire layout of the Soviet Commercial Office; personality clashes and grievances are also aired.

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In June 1964 the SR Division made available personnel for temporary duty in Mexico to analyze and collate personality and background data collected by LIENVOY but which had accumulated in Station files on Soviet officials. These Soviet Personality Reports (SPR) should be useful on a world-wide basis as Soviet officials are transferred from post to post, in providing the KUBARK representative with a summary of the Soviet's past work pattern, intelligence activities as far as known, physical description, weaknesses, and vulnerability toward recruitment by a Western service. Not all but a large percentage of this data is received from LIENVOY.

3. Czech Embassy. Two lines in the Chancery (45-30-91 and 45-30-12) are covered by LIENVOY. Reels from these targets are delivered daily by ARNHART to RIGGS who delivers them to the EE Case Officer who arranges for transcription and translations to be done by David B. SCHLAGHTER, field contract agent. This agent also prepares a monthly summary of information on the activities of Czech officials in Mexico. During September 1964 LIENVOY revealed important information on the establishment of a factory equipped with Czech machinery to produce dyes in Mexico (ANYL MEX). In addition to the significance of this information in assessing Czech economic activities in Mexico, there was operational benefit in dealing with DISOBER, a Czech official on temporary duty in Mexico in connection with the opening of this factory.

4. Polish Embassy. LIENVOY covers one line (11 25 49) in the main Chancery which produces data on the activities of Polish officials stationed in Mexico. The second line (25 82 38) is the private line of Polish Commercial Counselor, Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWIEZ, in whom the Mexico Station has a definite operational interest as a recruitment target. Reels (without transcripts) from these targets are delivered daily by ARNHART to RIGGS who delivers them to the EE Case Officer who arranges for translations and transcriptions to be done by Norma Q. RYMINSKY, a contract employee.

5. Yugoslav Embassy. During part of the project year LIENVOY covered two lines in this Embassy. The lines were disconnected by LIENVOY in April 1964 and transferred to LIFEAT. The reason for this termination was to conceal interest in DMPETAL, an agent recruited as a result of a follow-up of a lead supplied through LIENVOY coverage. During the time this target was covered, LIENVOY transcribers provided transcriptions of the Spanish conversations. The reels were then delivered to Victor W. OBOLD, a career agent who provided translations.

6. Communist China News Agency (NCNA). On 18 December 1964 Willard C. CURTIS briefed LIRAMA on the presence in Mexico of representatives of Communist China using journalist cover for an intelligence mission. LIRAMA agreed to install LIENVOY coverage of this line and share the take with the Mexico Station. This will be a Mexican line and replace the present coverage of the D.F.S. The Station hopes to use this information to influence LIRAMA to declare these persons persona non grata. LIFEAT has been taken off of this target.

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In summary, the Station Case Officers responsible for established FI and CI/CE programs feel that LIENVOY has made a very necessary intelligence support contribution. It should be noted that LIENVOY facilities during the project year produced about three times the volume of raw audio take as that produced by LIFEAT over the same length of time at approximately one half the cost. This is possibly due to the centralized tapping and transcribing facilities of LIENVOY as compared with the widely scattered ones of LIFEAT. LIENVOY as a liaison tap operation is able to tap any phone desired whereas LIFEAT, as a unilateral operation, must take greater security precautions. The Chief of Station Mexico feels that the success of Station Mexico's operational program against the Cuban, Soviet and Soviet Satellite installations and personnel in Mexico is largely attributable to the continuous and thorough coverage of these targets provided by LIENVOY. COS recommends that the project be renewed for another year as an essential collection and support operation for the Mexico Station.

E. PROBLEMS

There have been no significant security, cover, control, or liaison problems during the project year.

F. LIAISON

This Project continues to encompass an unofficial liaison relationship with high-level Mexican government officials and contributes to the friendly attitude of these officials toward OBYOKE.

Some examples are:

- a). In January 1964 CURTIS met with LITENSOR to discuss Communist China and was told by LITENSOR that the Mexican Government would not recognize Red China during his administration.
- b). CURTIS had several meetings with LIELEGANT during April 1964 when LIELEGANT provided information from LITENSOR on Communist agitation throughout Mexico.
- c). In August 1964 CURTIS and LIELEGANT met with LIRAMA to discuss the continuation of the LIENVOY Project.
- d). In September 1964 CURTIS at the request of Chief, PRSWING, saw LIRAMA to deliver an invitation to visit the home of GPLOGIC. Several other meetings were held between CURTIS and LIRAMA prior to this trip.
- e). On 7 November 1964 Chester D. DAINOLD and Cedric B. PAPATE accompanied CURTIS to a meeting with LIRAMA where DAINOLD and PAPATE gave briefings on the Cuban situation and on Latin America. Full details of these briefings were reported to Headquarters in HMMA-24700 RYBAT dated 9 November 1964.

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SECRET / MARK

f). On 9 December 1964 LIRAMA asked CURTIS for assistance in providing a special ink for the exclusive use of LIRAMA in signing important documents. Headquarters KURIOT fulfilled this request by supplying the ink and sending a specialist to Mexico to instruct LIRAMA in its use.

g). On 16 December 1964 CURTIS met with LIRAMA and provided him with information on Cuban Embassy activities and association with members of Mexican universities, Personalities in the S.N.T.E. and pro-Cuban associations, Capture of guerrillas, arms and documents in Guatemala, Chinese Communists in Mexico, and Communist Activities in Chihuahua. Copies of information given to LIRAMA were pouched to Headquarters.

G. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION.

No formal coordination is required in this Project. Chief, PESWING, Mexico, is the only ODYOKE official in Mexico outside KUBARK who is aware of this project and its provision for a special channel to LIRAMA. Special briefings are cleared with PESWING before KUBARK representatives meet with LIRAMA. CURTIS advises Chief, PESWING of significant and pertinent subjects which are discussed in meetings between CURTIS and LIRAMA.

H. PLANS.

The Station plans to continue the intercept program without change for the next project year. As previously noted, LIRAMA has asked that the project continue without a change in personnel or in the manner of operation.

I. FUNDS.

1. For the past period.

The cost of the LIENVOY Project (paid by Mexico Station exclusive of Headquarters costs) from 1 February 1964 through 30 June 1964 was US \$19,415.22 and from 1 July 1964 through 31 December 1964 \$23,677.68 and for January 1965 \$5,000.00 is estimated.

2. During the next project year.

During the period 1 February 1965 through 31 January 1966, an estimated amount of US \$47,468.00 will be required with US \$19,010 to be spent from 1 February 1965 through 30 June 1965 and \$28,458.00 to be spent from 1 July 1965 through 31 January 1966.

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3. Agent Salaries.

	<u>FY 1965</u>	<u>FY 1966</u>
LIENVOY-2	\$ 2,400.00	\$ 3,360.00
LIENVOY-4	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-5	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-6	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-7	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-11	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-12	1,200.00	1,680.00
LIENVOY-14	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-15	260.00	364.00
LIENVOY-16	800.00	1,120.00
LIENVOY-18	1,200.00	1,680.00
Christmas bonus one month's pay 1965		2,320.00
Contingency fund for new agents or severance pay	950.00	1,334.00
Operational expenses	800.00	1,200.00
Local purchase supplies & equipment	1,000.00	1,500.00
Upkeep of QP vehicle (1)	200.00	400.00
Safehouse rental	1,000.00	1,500.00
Entertainment & gifts for Mexican officials	2,000.00	2,000.00
Purchase of information via LIENVOY-2	1,200.00	1,600.00
	<u>TOTAL \$ 19,010.00</u>	<u>\$ 28,458.00</u>

J. ANNEX.

On two occasions during the Project year, the Station requested KURIOT assistance in making a technician available for temporary duty replacement for Arnold F. AREHART. Newton T. RUTSAY came to Mexico in May and September 1964 to supervise the tap center and maintain the equipment. The Headquarters support furnished this project was timely and commendable.


K. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

There has been no change in emergency conditions arrangements since the last project renewal request.

SECRET / KAPOK

LIENVOY PROJECT

COST: U.S. 47,468. per annum



MONITORS

- LIENVOY-4
- LIENVOY-5
- LIENVOY-11
- LIENVOY-12

TRANSCRIBERS

- LIENVOY-6 Cuban Tapes
- LIENVOY-7 Cuban Tapes
- LIENVOY-16 Russian Tapes (Spanish)

WATCHMAN

- LIENVOY-15

FILES

- LIENVOY-14

TARGETS

KUBARK:

- 5 - Cuban Embassy (14 42 37, 25 07 95, 25 09 14
11 28 47, 14 13 26)
- 1 - Vazquez Gomez (25 07 77)
- 5 - Soviet Embassy (15 60 55, 15 12 64, 15 61 55
15 69 87, 15 61 07)
- 2 - Czech Embassy (45 30 91, 45 30 12)
- 2 - Polish Embassy (11 25 49, 25 82 39)

MEXICANS:

- 2 - Gen. Cardenas (20 30 18, 20 83 46)
- 2 - Prensa Latina (46 60 16, 46 60 15)
- 2 - Galindo Ochoa (55 66 54, 13 21 14)
- 1 - Lic. Aguilar (23 85 25)
- 1 - Lic. Lombardo Toledano (46 12 70)
- 1 - Sinarquista (35 59 82)
- 1 - Alfaro Siqueiros (45 59 52)
- 1 - Politica (35 36 52)
- 1 - Lic. Gonzalez Pedrero (43 15 06)
- 1 - M.L.N. (10 29 69)
- 1 - Castillejos Ortiz (46 22 19)

ATTACHMENT No. 1 to
LIENVOY Project Renewal
Forwarded in HMMA-25141

1 JANUARY 1965
MEXICO DF

1954 NEW YORK FOR LIENVOY PROJECT

MONTH	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
RUCHE PAGES	102	119	116	120	131	122	144	107	121	78	92	98	1350
CZECH TAPES	55	41	20	24	26	46	40	45	44	45	41	44	471
RUCA TAPES	110	118	94	123	137	112	110	108	109	115	104	119	1359
RUCA PAGES	753	864	700	825	862	735	805	737	753	803	633	495	9135
POLSKA TAPES	8	39	25	45	36	54	52	50	49	47	50	40	496
CZECH PAGES	104	147	154	144	167	162	197	138	147	130	180	175	1956
CZECH PAGES	670	706	713	664	670	743	879	612	553	634	714	460	8124
LIBS PAGES	22	32	15	28	37	37	21	19	14	28	41	41	325
LIBS PAGES	113	401	380	394	314	236	269	304	345	272	303	315	3550
TOTAL	1347	2559	2116	2268	2489	2402	2517	2154	2145	2202	2158	1788	26776

ATTACHMENT No. 2 to
 LIENVOY Project Renewal
 Forwarded in HMMMA-25141

Arnold F. Arubart

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

12

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CP

84 SECRET

FROM	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1	5	
MEXICO CITY		2	6	
		3	7	
		4	8	R
ACTION	ADVANCE COPY	TIME	BY	
W.H.8	<input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> BLOTTED <input type="checkbox"/> TUBED			
INFO	VR, FILE, PG 2			

13 JAN 65 IN 58568

S E C R E T 130046Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2163

LIENVOY

DETAILED REVIEW AND PROJECT RENEWAL REQUEST HMMA-25141 BEING
POUCHED 15 JAN 65.

S E C R E T

CFN

Handwritten signature/initials

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

AAA

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM Chief, EMD

MICROFILM

SUBJECT LIENVOY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: EMMN-12494

1. The LIENVOY Project expires on 1 February 1965. Please forward the request for renewal no later than 1 January 1965.
2. Your attention is directed to paragraph two of reference wherein the Station was asked to submit a more complete renewal request than that forwarded in EMMN 22679.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

5. NOV 23 1964

50-6-25/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	EMMN-13066	
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-75/1
1 - CS 1 - ECHFORC EMD [Handwritten initials] [Handwritten initials] [Handwritten initials]	ORIGINATING	
	OFFICE	OFFICER
	EMM/1	C. Bustos-Videla:krc
	COORDINATING	
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
EMM/1	2 Nov 1964	Desmond Fitzgerald

DISPATCH

