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603.

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TOPICAL REVIEW PROGRAM


VII. SPECIALISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF NOSENKOA. Opinions on Intelligence and Personality1. Graphological Analysis


Three pages of penciled notes and jottings in Russian made by NOSENKO during an early debriefing session were submitted on 25 March 1964 to CIA handwriting analysts, together with a number of questions posed by the CIA officers handling NOSENKO. The graphologists were told only that the writer was a Russian male aged 36, that he had a university-level education, and that he was an intelligence officer by profession. Their report, which was qualified due to limitations on the amount of NOSENKO's handwriting specimens submitted to them, is quoted below.



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




2. Reports by Psychologist

a. Psychological Testing Results


A CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964. The psychologist's report, including answers to questions raised by the CIA handlers of NOSENKO is quoted in the following paragraphs.



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"Emotional Balance and General Stability: NOSENKO appears to



"Social Relations and Inter-Personal Effectiveness: NOSENKO





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


"Relations and Loyalty to His Parents: It is apparent







"Ideological Makeup and Loyalty to His Country: To a



*Psychopathic Personality Structure: Many volumes have been





b. Alternative Psychological Explanations



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





c. Psychological Interrogation:

For fourteen days between 3 and 21 May 1965, the same CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO on his entire early history, from birth until about 1953, when he said he entered the KGB. The main purposes were to collect additional information on this period,* to gain further psychological insights into NOSENKO's personality, and to find possible ways of obtaining a truthful account. Although conducted under the physical conditions of interrogation, the questioning was relaxed and followed no rigid outline. There were relatively few changes of story from previous versions; at the same time, however, NOSENKO described in detail some incidents which he has subsequently admitted to be untrue. An extract from the psychologist's report of these interrogations is given below.


* A comparison of information obtained during this series of interrogations with information given earlier and later by NOSENKO can be found in Part IV.






3. Report by Psychiatrist

During the year April 1964-April 1965 NOSENKO was under the medical care of a CIA psychiatrist who visited NOSENKO at regular intervals, usually weekly, to examine him physically and to listen to any comments NOSENKO might have about himself and his situation. The psychiatrist familiarized himself with available materials on NOSENKO, particularly with reports of his behavior in the months immediately following the defection. A report which he submitted on 20 December 1964 is given below.



~~TOP SECRET~~

614.



TOP SECRET

615.

B. Views of Intelligence Personnel

1. Statement by DERYABIN

a. Introduction

Former KGB officer Peter Sergeyevich DERYABIN has followed closely the entire course of CIA's investigation of NOSENKO and his information. He took part in the interrogations of NOSENKO in April 1964, January-February 1965, and October 1966 as an observer and consultant, and he personally questioned NOSENKO during July and August 1965 concerning certain aspects of his personal past and early KGB career. On the basis of his direct, personal knowledge of conditions within the Soviet Union and of KGB organization and procedures prior to his defection in February 1954, supplemented by continuing study of later information from a variety of sources, DERYABIN is of the opinion that much of what NOSENKO has said about himself and the KGB is purposefully false or distorted. Although DERYABIN has been able to offer authoritative comment on many aspects of NOSENKO's story, the following section of this paper is limited to his remarks concerning NOSENKO's entry into the KGB (then MVD) and his Communist Party affiliation, both of which fall into the period when DERYABIN was active as a KGB (then MVD) staff officer. DERYABIN personally interrogated NOSENKO on these topics in the summer of 1965. Since DERYABIN was a personnel officer of the KGB (then MGB and MVD) in Moscow, with long experience in Communist Party activities, at the time NOSENKO claims to have entered the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, he is particularly qualified to comment on these aspects of NOSENKO's story.

DERYABIN, as a Soviet Army officer, was graduated in 1945 from the higher counterintelligence school of Smersh (counterintelligence with the Soviet Armed Forces). Following this he worked in Naval Smersh in Moscow and in March 1947 began to work in the MGB as a case officer in the Central Personnel Directorate. Shortly afterwards, when his superior was appointed Deputy Chief of the Chief Guards Directorate for Personnel, DERYABIN transferred with him to the Guards Directorate. He served as a Guards Directorate personnel officer until May 1952, rising through the ranks from case officer to the position of Chief of Section. One of his responsibilities was the approval of personnel for service in various units of the Guards Directorate, and he was also in charge of supervising personnel and security matters concerning one of the Directorate's surveillance sub-sections.

After requesting a change from personnel to operational duties, DERYABIN was transferred in May 1952 to the Austro-German Department of the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Until December 1952 he served as the Deputy Chief of a sub-section in the Counterintelligence Sektor (desk) of the Austro-German Department. He was then appointed Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Sektor of the same department, a position he held until March 1953. From March until September 1953, DERYABIN was the Deputy Chief of the section in MGB Headquarters which was responsible for the security of Soviets stationed in Austria and Germany. In September 1953 he was transferred to Vienna, where he became Deputy Chief of the section in the MVD Legal Residency responsible for the security of Soviets in Austria. He defected to American authorities on 15 February 1954.

TOP SECRET

DERYABIN joined the Komsomol in 1936 and remained a member until 1940, when he became a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; he became a full Party member in August 1941. During his Party career he held a number of responsible posts. Before the war, when DERYABIN was a teacher in Altay Kray, he was the secretary of a local Komsomol unit and simultaneously served as a member of the Komsomol Plenum in the rayon where he lived. From October 1940 until November 1941 he was Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the 107th Engineer Battalion of the Red Army and from June 1945 until April 1946 held the same position in the Komsomol Committee of the Naval Smersh. This was the unit which had particular responsibility for counterintelligence work within the Naval GRU, which NOSENKO said he joined in 1951. In the MGB DERYABIN was a member of the Party Committee of the Personnel Section of the Guards Directorate and, after his transfer, was elected Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Austro-German Department of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. He held this post from January 1953 until his transfer to Austria in September 1953.

b. DERYABIN's Comments

The following statements by DERYABIN are based on his questioning of NOSENKO between 26 July and 13 August 1965. The questions asked and the statements attributed to NOSENKO (referred to as Subject) were during this period. Although the Soviet State Security Service did not become known as the KGB until March 1954, this term is used for convenience sake, except where the specific organization of the MGB or MVD is under discussion. DERYABIN's comments follow:

"NOSENKO's Acceptance into State Security"

"Taking NOSENKO's own statements at face value, it is highly improbable that a person such as he has described himself to be would be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State Security. The following factors are important in this regard:

a. It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring the children of high government officials.

b. Until STALIN's death in March 1953, KOBULOV, the man who supposedly helped NOSENKO gain entrance into the service, had no influence inside the MGB apparatus. From about 1948 until 9 or 10 March 1953, KOBULOV had no office inside the MGB or the MVD buildings. I know personally that in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad)** which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and later under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The office was located on Chkalova Street, near the Kurskiy Railroad Station (three blocks from my former apartment).

* See also Part V.B.

** WISMUT A.G. in Germany was subordinate to GUSIMZ; for a further discussion of KOBULOV's role in helping NOSENKO join the KGB, see Part V.B.

TOP SECRET

617.

c. It was physically impossible at the time for NOSENKO to be recommended for and accepted into State Security, as he has told us, all in one month, March 1953. (If one accepts his earlier version that he had his talk with KOBULOV in January or February, his account is similarly impossible because KOBULOV was not then in State Security.) It would normally have taken a much longer time, but in addition to this it was a period of reorganization and the personnel staff was not actively conducting their work at that time, and permanent staff officers were not sure that they would retain their positions.

d. In March 1953 NOSENKO was already twenty-five and a half years old and only a member of the Komsomol. He had no recommendation for Party membership and could not become a member for a full year because of his transfer from one service (GRU) to another. It is impossible that State Security would accept him knowing in advance that on his birthday he would be twenty-six years old and without either Komsomol or Party membership. Even for the son of a Minister, the Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the KGB would have to talk with the Personnel Office and would not give a recommendation for his acceptance, especially for the Internal Counterintelligence (Second Chief) Directorate. In the case of a son of a Minister and one who is recommended by KOBULOV, the secretary would request from NOSENKO a recommendation for Party membership from the members of the Communist Party where NOSENKO used to work, in this case the GRU. In this way the secretary of the Komsomol would be sure himself that NOSENKO would become a candidate member of the Communist Party during the next year.

"However, even accepting that despite these obstacles and contradictions the KGB would have accepted him, one must also remember (according to NOSENKO's own statements) that NOSENKO's file contained the following negative points.* They are serious factors and certain of them alone would be enough to cause the rejection; the totality makes it difficult to believe that at a time of crisis in the State Security organs anyone would take the responsibility of accepting him:

a. Subject was already married and divorced before entry into State Security.

b. He had been married to General TELEGIN's daughter and TELEGIN had been arrested by State Security and was in jail the day that Subject entered State Security.

c. NOSENKO said that there was a file on NOSENKO's father in which compromising material was collected on Subject's family. NOSENKO agreed that one piece of information that would have been in this file was the fact that his maternal grandfather died in a Soviet prison while under sentence as a counter-revolutionary.

d. The social status background in the life of Subject's mother was nobility.

* See also Part IV.B.

618.

e. The shooting incident in Leningrad during World War II and his desertion from the Naval School in Baku would have played a very negative role in any consideration of his acceptance into State Security.

f. Subject never completed high school in the normal fashion.

g. Subject was a poor student at the Institute of International Relations.

h. It should be added that the KGB would definitely know that NOSENKO was involved in an automobile accident in 1947 and was interrogated by the Militia (traffic court), found guilty, and fined. This would definitely play a negative role in NOSENKO's admission to the KGB.

i. NOSENKO would never be allowed to enter the KGB having just recovered from tuberculosis.* In fact, there was a rule at that time that no person who ever had tuberculosis (even twenty years earlier) would be permitted to work in the KGB.

"In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KOBULOV was a personal friend of Subject's father, as he has told us, would have been noted in the file and would have played a negative role in permitting Subject to continue to work in State Security after KOBULOV's arrest in June 1953.

"I asked Subject how he answered some of the questions in the anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questions on his former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry.** I then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's aristocratic ancestry, the fact that her father died in jail, the Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that Subject's former father-in-law (TELEGIN) was still in jail, and the fact that Subject was present when TELEGIN's apartment was searched--that he had been accepted into the KGB, particularly in 1953 during the confusion and changes after the death of STALIN. Subject admitted that the question was logical, and said that he could only assume that the influence of KOBULOV and the important and influential position of his own father outweighed these negative factors. He also cited his GRU experience in this connection.

"I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage to the KGB. He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned

* NOSENKO first mentioned having had tuberculosis during the June 1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he was under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mentioned his illness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a "glass of blood" at a time. Although DERYABIN's questioning covered this part of NOSENKO's life in detail, there was no mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1965. DERYABIN's comment is based on the 1966 information but is included here for purposes of context.

**The anketa and DERYABIN's questioning on this subject are discussed further below.

it briefly to GORBATENKO, and that he had unofficially run a name check on his prospective bride (which was 'clean'), and that after the marriage he had filled out another anketa in which he included all the required data on his wife and her relatives. After considerable prompting, Subject said that he had indicated that she and her parents had been in France, but that he had concealed the fact that her grandmother had been in German-occupied territory during the war. (He admitted that the KGB would have learned this in a routine check, however.) I then reviewed for Subject the negative security factors mentioned above, adding the arrest of KOBULOV, the fact that his new wife and her parents had been abroad, the fact that her grandmother was in German-occupied territory, the fact that Subject was now over-age for the Komsomol but not yet a Party member or candidate, and the fact that Subject received a 15-day sentence for misuse of cover documents and incurring venereal disease, and asked if he didn't think that his personnel file had been reviewed in 1954, and if so, what grounds there could have been for retaining him in the KGB. Subject said that he thought that his file probably was reviewed but that again the influence of his father had saved him. Subject added that another important factor was probably his language qualification and particularly his higher education. I pointed out to Subject that if his second wife and her parents had been abroad it was impossible that her name check could have been negative. He admitted it was illogical, but insisted that this was so.

"NOSENKO's Knowledge of KGB, 1953-54

"Entry Date into KGB: NOSENKO was reminded that he had previously given varying dates for his entry on duty in the KGB. He replied that he did not remember the exact date, but he was sure that it was in the middle of March 1953 - perhaps 13 or 15 March (15 March 1953 was a Sunday). He would give no explanation for why he previously claimed to have entered the KGB in 1952.* In fact it would be very unusual for a KGB officer to forget his exact entry-on-duty date to the very day because it is used to compute length of service and must be entered on various forms from time to time.

"Numerical Designation of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Directorates in 1953: Asked to describe what directorates existed in the MVD while BERIYA was Minister (March-June 1953), NOSENKO named the First Chief Directorate (FCD) and the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) which he said were the intelligence and counterintelligence directorates respectively. Asked if he were sure, NOSENKO said he was positive, and that the only change that took place was that later, under KRUGLOV, for a few months only, the FCD became the SCD, and vice versa. NOSENKO stuck to this even when told he was wrong; he did not say he did not know or did not remember, perhaps realizing that he could not claim not to remember what directorate he served in. (Actually, the change in numerical designations was instituted by BERIYA right after STALIN's death in March 1953 and persisted until the KGB was organized in March 1954. Thus, NOSENKO does not know what the correct designation of his own directorate was at the time that he allegedly entered on duty with Soviet State Security and for the entire first year of his alleged service there.

* NOSENKO on other occasions has given various reasons why he told CIA that he joined the KGB in 1952. See Part V.B.

"MVD Leadership, 1953-54: Asked to name the chiefs of the directorates and separate departments of the MVD under BERIYA and KRUGLOV, NOSENKO named nine out of 28. He was unable to name the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, saying that he remembered only SAKHAROVSKIY (PANYUSHKIN was chief until 1955). Asked to name KRUGLOV's deputies, NOSENKO named only ROMASHKOV and SEROV, and was ignorant of such prominent deputies as LUNEV and SHATALIN. Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was one of KRUGLOV's deputies at this time (SHATALIN), NOSENKO flatly denied that this was possible.

"Organization of KGB: NOSENKO did not know when the KGB was organized (March 1954). He said that it was in early 1955 or late 1954. Told that he was a year off and asked to think it over, NOSENKO insisted that he was right.

"Processing Procedures for Employment with KGB: NOSENKO's story about how he was processed for employment with the KGB in 1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used at that time. He does not know many of the things that he should know about entrance procedures; he is wrong about many of the things that he claims to remember. The disparities are so great that they cannot be explained (as NOSENKO attempts to do) by the claim that KOBULOV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance procedure for NOSENKO.

"The most important document filled out by prospective employees of Soviet State Security is a detailed personal history questionnaire, called in Russian Anketa spetsialnogo naznacheniya sotrudnika KGB. This exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long, and filling it out is an experience that one is not likely to forget. A background investigation is run on the basis of this questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent feature of the employee's personnel file. NOSENKO remembers filling out a questionnaire, but does not know its designation. He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long. He asserts that he filled it out at home, and submitted it in two copies shortly before entering on duty. Actually, this questionnaire was required in one copy only, and was never permitted to be taken home since it was a classified document (even when not filled in).*

"NOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical examination prior to entering the KGB. This is not possible. Such an examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing. I cannot think of any instance in which it would be waived.**

* DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements in August 1965. In his original biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO said that no anketa was required. He implied as much in his most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned by DERYABIN. This statement is given in Part V.B.

**See remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for tuberculosis from 1952 to 1958.

"NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreement that he signed when entering on duty with the KGB is completely unlike the agreement that was in use at that time for staff employees. It may be significant that NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreement he recalls signing resembles the secrecy agreements that were taken from agents.

"NOSENKO insists that he did not fill out any other forms, questionnaires, or papers when entering the KGB. Actually, there were a number of other routine forms that had to be filled out by applicants and new employees.

"Location of ROZHENKO's Office: NOSENKO says that all his entry processing was handled by a personnel officer named ROZHENKO and his staff. He asserts that ROZHENKO's office, which NOSENKO visited several times in early 1953, was located on the 6th floor, 8th entry, Building No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Street. In fact, neither ROZHENKO nor any officers or units of the Personnel Department were located in the 8th entry. They were all (including ROZHENKO) located on the 6th and 7th floors of the 7th entry of Building No. 12.*

"Rank Pay: Asked about his salary when he first started to work in the KGB, NOSENKO said he got a basic salary of 1700 rubles as a case officer, 500 rubles for his rank of lieutenant, plus secrecy, language, and longevity pay. He insisted that this was correct, even when told that KGB officers were no longer being paid for rank in March 1953, and said that although he remembered that there was one year--1954--when they were not paid for rank, he was sure that when he first entered on duty he received this pay. Salary for rank was taken away from State Security officers in September 1952 and was not restored until April 1954.

"Promotion to Senior Lieutenant: In giving the chronology of his promotion to various military ranks, NOSENKO claimed to have been promoted to senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB. Told that this was impossible, and that no one in the KGB was promoted at this time, NOSENKO replied that he couldn't say about anyone else but he was sure that he had received his promotion at that time. In fact, this is impossible: all promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time BĒRIYA took over as minister (March 1953) until late 1953.

"Visitor's Pass Procedures: In talking about his first visit to the KGB to process for employment, NOSENKO was unable to recall the procedures employed by the KGB Pass Office in issuing visitor's passes. Specifically, he maintained that the name of the interviewer was not indicated on the pass. In fact, the name of the interviewer did appear on the pass and the interviewer had full responsibility for the visitor while he was on KGB premises. While it is understandable that NOSENKO might have forgotten the details involved if he had only visited there a few times more than ten years ago, if he worked at KGB Headquarters for over ten years as a staff officer and particularly as a supervisor he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors, and thus should know visitor's pass procedures quite well.

*NOSENKO has since said that he spoke to no personnel officers prior to acceptance by the KGB or afterwards, thereby indicating that his statements to DERYABIN were untrue. See Part V.B.

TOP SECRET

622.

"Unescorted Entry into KGB Building with Visitor's Pass: In describing his first day at work, NOSENKO said that he went from the Pass Office, where he obtained a visitor's pass, to the 4th entry of the Building No. 2, where his pass was checked by the guards, and then went unescorted to KCBULOV's office on the third floor. Challenged on this point, he said he was sure that it was possible to enter without an escort. In fact, it was absolutely impossible to go through any entry of Building No. 2 without escort if you did not have a properly stamped KGB (MVD) identity document (see below).

"KGB Identity Document: NOSENKO was asked to describe the KGB identity document that he received when he first entered the KGB. He was then asked if there was anything unusual in connection with this document at that time. He replied that he knew of nothing unusual. He was then reminded that after STALIN's death and again after BERIYA's arrest it was necessary to have special stamps placed in the identity documents to validate them. Without the right stamp it was impossible to enter the KGB building. NOSENKO was ignorant of this and was unable to recall anything about it despite a number of hints and leading questions. Actually, during the period of upheaval following STALIN's death and again after BERIYA's arrest, all KGB identity documents were temporarily withdrawn in order to have special validation stamps placed in them, and it was literally impossible to get in the KGB buildings if one did not have the right stamp. This was the subject of numerous anecdotes at the time and is hard to believe that an officer who served in the KGB at the time could have forgotten it completely.

"Gastronom: Asked to describe the sign in front of the KGB Club, NOSENKO said that he did not remember any sign (there was one in 1953) but mentioned that there was a Gastronom (food store) next to the KGB Club. Asked when the Gastronom was opened, he said firmly that it was already there when he started to work in the KGB. In fact, this Gastronom was definitely not there as of 1954. It was opened sometime between 1955 and 1957, as Moscow directories show. The KGB Club is in entry No. 1 of Building No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Square, and NOSENKO would have had to pass it every day he went to work.

"Chief Directorate of Militia: Asked where the Chief Directorate of Militia of the USSR was located in 1953-54, NOSENKO replied that he did not know, and knew only that later it was located on Ulitsa Ogareva. Actually, in 1953-54 it was located next to the main KGB building at Dzerzhinskiy No. 2. A staff officer in the counterintelligence directorate would have frequent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of Militia.

"K.I. (Committee of Information): Asked where the Intelligence Directorate of the MVD was located in 1953, NOSENKO replied that it was scattered between Dzerzhinskiy No. 2, the Agricultural Exhibition, the K.I. building, and Kiselniy Pereulok. This is a confused and incorrect answer. Asked for clarification, NOSENKO said that he had never visited either the K.I. or the First Chief Directorate building at the Agricultural Exhibition. Thus, NOSENKO seems to be unaware that the K.I. has not existed since 1951, and that the K.I. building and the building at the Agricultural Exhibition were one and the same place.

TOP SECRET

"NOSENKO's Claim to Have Been a Komsomol Secretary in the
Second Chief Directorate, KGB

"NOSENKO claimed to have become a member of the Komsomol Organization (K/O) of the KGB when he entered on duty in March 1953, to have been elected as Secretary of Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate in the fall of 1953, and to have served in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was removed because he used operational-alias documents in obtaining treatment for a venereal disease he had incurred. He claims to have been excluded from the Komsomol, without prejudice, when he attained his 27th birthday in October 1954.

"Asked to describe how he transferred from the Komsomol Organization of the Naval Intelligence Post in the Baltic to the Komsomol Organization of the KGB, NOSENKO gave an entirely incorrect description of this procedure, both as regards deregistration from the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the K/O in the KGB. He stated that he was issued a new Komsomol registration card by the KGB K/O, without reference to the previous K/O in the Baltic; this is impossible.

"NOSENKO gave an incorrect account of how a K/O secretary is elected, stating that he was elected at a meeting of the K/O. In fact, the K/O meeting can only select the K/O committee, which will convene separately to elect the Secretary.

"NOSENKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary in a specific manner.

"NOSENKO did not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB K/O. The secretary of the SCD K/O would be directly subordinate to him and would deal with him frequently.

"NOSENKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/O or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he dealt there.

"NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-54, the maximum age for a Komsomol member was 27. In actual fact, the maximum age was 26 (it was raised later). This point is important, both because NOSENKO should know exactly if he had served as a K/O secretary, and also because it refutes his story that he was excluded from the Komsomol for over-age in 1954.

"NOSENKO maintained that all the members of his K/O paid dues in the amount of 2 percent of their monthly salaries. This is incorrect, as monthly Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding scale determined by wage group: at that time, Komsomol members earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percent; those earning 500 to 1500 rubles paid 1 percent, and those earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent. The K/O secretary collects the dues, and must know the right amount.

"NOSENKO did not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress took place while he was K/O secretary, saying that they took place every year. In actual fact, the 12th Komsomol Congress which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948; at this 12th Congress a number of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules (Ustay). As secretary of a K/O NOSENKO would have been involved

in a good deal of preparatory work for this Congress, which was a big event in the life of every Komsomol worker at the time, and could not be forgotten."

Although DERYABIN's direct knowledge of the KGB ended in 1954, his detailed information of KGB procedures has been updated by his more recent examination of reports from other sources. With regard to what NOSENKO has said about KGB procedures, DERYABIN stated: "Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a Soviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embassy in 1953-54, NOSENKO gave a superficial description of how such checks were done. However, he resisted every attempt to get him to describe this process in detail, and he made several blunders which show that he never actually ran such a check himself. For example, he did not know where the records of all Soviet citizens who have been tried are kept, and he attempted to improvise an answer (completely wrong) that they would check with the Militia about this. NOSENKO correctly said that Archives were located on Kirov Street, but he was completely unable to stretch his limited knowledge to provide a description of how these various repositories were actually checked. NOSENKO was also asked to describe in detail how he ran such a check on a Soviet citizen in the 1956-59 period. Here again he was in difficulty and refused even to try. He did not even know the everyday term Spets-proverka, which means a check for clearance.

"It was particularly interesting that he did not feel able to dispute my challenges of his information, even though he undoubtedly knows that I do not have first-hand knowledge of procedures in this period. I even tested this on one occasion by asking NOSENKO the difference between the 1st Spets Otdel (Special Department - KGB cards and files) and the Operativno-Uchetny Otdel (Operational Reports Department - the functional name for the 1st Special Department). He answered that the 1st Special Department holds the files on Soviet criminal cases while the Operational Reports Department is for political and espionage cases. It seems he invented this answer on the spot. In addition, it is wrong that political and security cards are separate from criminal cases in the 1st Special Department. They were in my time and must still be compiled in one card file.

"NOSENKO states that he knows nothing about the files of the First Chief Directorate. It is unbelievable that in ten years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never saw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able to check information on foreigners, especially on American Embassy personnel? The first stage in such a check is an inquiry to the First Chief Directorate and a check of any files they may have on the subject. According to his own account, NOSENKO should have been doing this type of thing the whole of his ten years of service, without regard to whether he was assigned to the American Department or the Tourist Department."

2. Remarks by CIA Handlers**a. Introduction**

Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have recorded their personal observations on his behavior and actions. The principal case officer, the first CIA representative to meet NOSENKO in 1962, participated in all of the meetings and interrogations (either personally or monitoring from off-stage) since then:

A second case officer, who participated in the meetings in Geneva in 1964 and in all subsequent phases of the operation, has spent the

Three other officers, who began to work with NOSENKO after his arrival in the United States and conducted the bulk of both the debriefing and the hostile interrogations.

Among them, they command an extensive knowledge of the Soviet Intelligence Services, and they have had a variety of agent- and defector-handling experience.

NOSENKO was talked to and questioned in several types of circumstances:

- In five tightly organized meetings in 1962 in Geneva with limited time available for each of a wide range of topics, none of which could be ignored but none of which could be covered in detail.

- In concentrated but somewhat longer meetings in place in Geneva in January-February 1964, with the knowledge by all participants that items not adequately covered then could be dealt with after the defection.

- In routine debriefing sessions after his defection, first in a Frankfurt safehouse, then in a safehouse in the Washington area, where a special effort was made not to put pressure on NOSENKO or express doubts about his statements.

- Under detailed hostile interrogation (especially April 1964 and January-March 1965).

- In extended, detailed debriefing sessions which NOSENKO could not evade (May-November 1964, May 1965, July-August 1965, and October 1966).

Thus there were opportunities to note his performance and reactions under varied degrees of stress and control.

The features of NOSENKO's conduct, manner, and techniques discussed below are confined to those which were clearly and consistently observed by all of the officers involved.

b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings

NOSENKO in brief, superficial, uncritical debriefings (of the sort which characterized the 1962 and 1964 Geneva meetings and the debriefings prior to 4 April 1964) was reasonably convincing in his manner. For example, on the basis of the hurried sessions of June 1962 in Geneva, which did not allow time for systematic or detailed questioning, the CIA case officer in commenting on NOSENKO's conduct mentioned "the ease of his manner, the sureness of his knowledge of matters which he should have known, and the amount of checkable information he provided." NOSENKO seemed to that case officer to be "under little or no restraint as to the amount and nature of what he told us" and "made a convincing and good personal impression: a vigorous, temperamental and vital man." Similarly, nothing in NOSENKO's manner caused doubts on the part of the FBI representatives who took NOSENKO's reports in February, March, and early April 1964.

It became apparent, however, when the cases NOSENKO had mentioned briefly in early meetings were taken up in detail in leisurely debriefings after the defection, that he could not add facts consistent with what he had said before. He was unable to recall related incidents or additional circumstances which did not come to mind in the first telling, despite being aided by questioning from different angles or in different contexts. The same results were obtained in exhausting his store of operational leads (with a half dozen exceptions) and his information on KGB procedures, installations, and operational methods: Having once reported on these general topics, NOSENKO could offer nothing more when debriefed again, regardless of the method of questioning tried. Repeatedly he used the same stories to illustrate his points; new stories did not emerge. In a period of nine months, NOSENKO was drained of information on his personal and professional experiences and knowledge. Never before had the CIA case officers encountered a defector who was totally debriefed.

A technique NOSENKO has frequently used to explain his inability to supply details and to forestall further questioning has been to claim poor memory. "Different people have different types of memories," he has said on many occasions, or on others: "I have told what I remember." The case officers who have handled NOSENKO agree, on the other hand, that he has an excellent memory, although perhaps a peculiar one: NOSENKO did not always recall most easily those events which had occurred most recently, or those incidents which were most closely related to him. He was able, for example, to remember detailed information on the penetration of the Courier Transfer Station in Paris and to give a long, detailed, and ordered account of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, in neither of which he claimed any personal role; he has been able to name hundreds of KGB officers, to give the dates on which many of them transferred from one component of the Second Chief Directorate to another, and to describe their responsibilities at particular times. Yet NOSENKO forgot where he himself served in the GRU; he could not consistently describe the circumstances of his divorce; he failed to provide a consistent date for his entry into the KGB and for his transfer from the American Department to the Tourist Department in 1962. Likewise, NOSENKO remembered details of KGB operations which, like the "ANDREY" case in 1953, took place in the relatively distant past, but he could not recall the travels, friends, and activities of his own target, John V. ABLEMAN or details of operations against many American code clerks in 1960 and 1961.

TOP SECRET

627.

These limitations of knowledge and quirks of memory were evident not only during meetings when NOSENKO was being debriefed. They were also apparent in the interrogations which supplanted the debriefings.

c. NOSENKO's Behavior Under Interrogation

(i) Introduction

In the many and long interrogation sessions there emerged habits of behavior noticeable to each of the CIA officers present. These characteristics of NOSENKO were his manner of recounting events and his evasiveness, improvisations, and other defensive techniques. They are reviewed below.

(ii) Manner of Recounting Events

Typical of NOSENKO's performance in the interrogations were the following points:

- Talking about operations he supervised and about his personal role in the KGB Headquarters aspects of other operations, NOSENKO habitually used the passive voice ("it was decided") or indicated that he was not alone in these activities ("there was no accounting on who was working on any code clerk case--it was GRYAZNOV, KOSCLAPOV, NOSENKO, and also working was KLYPIN, GRIBANOV," or "We made the decision--I and KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV," or "I and GRYAZNOV discussed this with him.") When asked where a particular conversation took place, he rarely located it in his own office ("I was in KOVSHUK's office when KOSLOV called him about the trip" or "I was in KLYPIN's office and he was talking to KOVSHUK").

- At the other extreme from being impersonal, NOSENKO sometimes quoted conversations in which he took part ("I then said," "he said to me," etc.), but it was in just such matters that NOSENKO most often contradicted himself (e.g., his relationship with GRIBANOV and his part in the recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORSBERG).

- In repeating certain stories (the CHEREPANOV case and the provocation against Professor Frederick BARGHOFFN are examples) NOSENKO gave them in precisely the same order, without addition or omission. In relating the PENKOVSKIY story, which he stressed he learned "little by little" from several different sources, he presented the facts each time in nearly identical order. Asked for more details on these cases, he invariably insisted--often with irritation--that he knew nothing more and if he did, he would have reported it. Other factors contributed to the impression that in such instances NOSENKO had delivered his information by rote: Statements like "I don't remember what I told you before" when queried again on a particular case; detachment and a lack of emotion when describing the compromise of Soviets who, like himself, had cooperated with American Intelligence: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV; an inability to correlate dates and events in different operations which he said he was handling (such as conflicts in the timing of his approach to W.E. JOHNSON and in the date he gave for John V. ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, and conflict between the dates of his participation in the MCRONE case and his travel to Cuba).

TOP SECRET

628.

- NOSENKO, with a few exceptions (notably the compromise of PENKOVSKIY and the ABIDIAN visit to the dead drop site), could not supply specific or approximate dates for operational activities during the period of his service in the U.S. Embassy Section. Beyond recourse to the phrase "1960, 1961," he refused to estimate the dates or to associate these activities with the time of the year or events in his personal life.

(iii) Evasion, Improvisation, and Other Defenses

In the debriefings before the interrogations, NOSENKO avoided questions and topics not of his own choosing, saying that he would give full details "later," when systematic debriefing began. When the question or topic came up anew in a later debriefing, he would plead fatigue or boredom and propose: "This morning we drink; tomorrow we work." Prior to 4 April 1964 he provided only accounts of operations selected by himself; it was only after 4 April 1964 that he could be constrained to reply to detailed questioning on other matters.

From that point on, other evasive tactics became familiar to his interrogators. He would try to change the subject or to shift from the specific event to a generalized account of how such things were done in principle. He would claim bad memory on grounds that, for example, operations against U.S. Embassy personnel were hopeless and useless anyway. He would dismiss the details or the entire operation as unimportant (for example, the microphones in the U.S. Embassy). He would set out reasons for his ignorance of things he admittedly should have known (his own "poor performance," preoccupation with other matters, inattention to duty, absence from the KGB while on vacation, lack of time to master details because he was a supervisor). Unable to name or talk about KGB indigenous agents working against Americans, including those in operations under his supervision, NOSENKO disparaged the quality of such agents ("they never reported anything of interest on anyone"); he cited their low educational level and their inferior status as servants and employees as one reason none of them could give the KGB operationally useful information. In fact, the record of many indicated previous employment which would demand at least the equivalent of a college degree or certificate from a technical institute. Numerous maids were former school teachers, one was formerly a chemist.

When evasion failed, it seemed to the interrogators that NOSENKO improvised his answers. Some of these evident improvisations led him into unacceptable statements or positions. To use his responses to the questioning on John V. ABIDIAN as an example: Not knowing about ABIDIAN's car, he said the KGB could not get at it. (In fact, the car was held by Soviet customs for two weeks, and later NOSENKO himself spoke about the way the KGB used Embassy chauffeurs for access to cars.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN's trips out of the USSR, he claimed that the KGB had no way to find out where Embassy officers went when they made trips out of the country. (In fact, ABIDIAN had told his language teacher each time and she, as NOSENKO said, was a KGB agent; also, ABIDIAN arranged his trips by long-distance phone from Moscow to his destination abroad, and the KGB can cover such calls.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN's trip within the USSR, he spoke of a vacation which he later admitted to be false. Asked why he did not know personal

TOP SECRET

629.

data on ABIDIAN from the State Department Biographic Register, he said "only the First Chief Directorate" uses it; when the interrogator pursued the point, NOSENKO said he remembered that KOVSHUK did have a copy in his office, "but an old one, 1956, which didn't list ABIDIAN." Under pressure about ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street, NOSENKO said the KGB thought that ABIDIAN may not have entered the building on Pushkin Street; yet he had earlier given extensive details about how the KGB had analyzed the precise number of seconds ABIDIAN had been inside, to determine where the drop, if any, might be. As another example, when he was initially asked about George BLAKE, the KGB agent in MI-6, the context of the question was a discussion of Second Chief Directorate operations. NOSENKO labeled it as such and said it "was not as important as VASSALL." Later, when the name was mentioned again, he asked: "Who's BLAKE?"

On other occasions, when his self-contradictions were pointed out or when he admitted ignorance of matters he acknowledge he should have known, NOSENKO would fall back upon one of the following lines of defense:

- "What I know I tell you; what I remember I tell you," or "I don't know," "I can't explain," -- or a shrug.

- The details, even if confused or contradictory, are not important. What is important is the "whole" or entirety of the facts, their importance and their "reality." It is this that American Intelligence should evaluate, not details.

- He must be genuine because otherwise "how could I have been working with 'SARDAR' and 'PROKHOR'?" (Johan PREISFREUND whose KGB cryptonym was "PROKHOR," did confirm NOSENKO's role.) "How else could I tell you about STORSBERG?" "The KGB would not use a staffer as a provocateur," nor would the KGB supply information on "live cases" such as the Paris case (JOHNSON) and VASSALL, and reveal the names of its officers abroad.

- If American Intelligence checked his story "fully," it would learn that despite all this confusion, he was genuine. He repeatedly urged that his interrogators check via an independent penetration of the KGB--there it would verify that his name is registered as the case officer who opened, held and turned over the ABIDIAN file and thus that he was a KGB officer.*

NOSENKO referred to this method of corroborating him at least 20 times during the interrogations of January-March 1965. He said on 1 February 1965 that "maybe the day will come when you have a source to check and you will find out" (that he was ABIDIAN's case officer). Later in the same interrogation session, he added: "I see how poor and miserable I'm looking with regard to ABIDIAN's file, but anyone who can check in [KGB] Archives will see." On 9 February he said, "I greatly wish that you will have as soon as possible an agent in the KGB. It is simple to look at the

* was the only such source at the time.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

630.

file on ABIDIAN. On the first page is written that 'I, NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, opened this file.' On 16 February he said: "Time will show I am what I say." On 3 March he referred nine times within one hour to a check via such a source. He repeatedly stated that "time will show" that he is not a provocateur. At one point he engaged in the following dialogue with his interrogators:

NOSENKO: I'm telling you that, if you check, you'll find that I'm right.

INTERROGATOR: We're not disputing that you worked for the KGB. We're disputing that you held the positions you say you held in the KGB.

NOSENKO: That's what I'm saying. If you could check you would find that I was only in these two departments and only in these positions...

(later in the session)

NOSENKO: I can't tell you anything more. I can't prove anything. Maybe the future will show.

INTERROGATOR: What can the future show?

NOSENKO: I don't know. But from what I understand the checking has not gone very far. Maybe you can check further... I mean, if you have any possibility now, I mean by chance, have anyone in the KGB or out of the KGB, with any of my acquaintances, friends.

INTERROGATOR: You mean our acquaintances, don't you?

NOSENKO: Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check with someone, because anyone in the KGB should know that, yes, there was a NOSENKO.

INTERROGATOR: Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV or SUSLOV?

NOSENKO: No, of course not, because I gave you their names. Check someone else, not known to me, so you can be sure.

d. Additional Observations

(1) Inquisitiveness About CIA

NOSENKO's questions about CIA and its activities seemed to his interrogators to be beyond the interest or curiosity expected of Soviet Intelligence defectors. Frequently he asked, even while discussing his own KGB responsibilities: "You tell me about a case, and I will remember details." Other examples of NOSENKO's inquisitiveness include the following:

- When shown the CIA publication "Checklist of Soviet Officials Abroad" during the 1964 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO made inquiries about what organization prepared it and to what part of the U.S. Government that organization is subordinate.

TOP SECRET

631.

- In January 1964, entirely out of context, he asked whether [redacted] (He was not able to explain in later questioning why he had not informed CIA about the case before he made the foregoing inquiry.)

- NOSENKO asked precisely how American Intelligence collection in the USSR is directed and coordinated. The CIA case officer responded: "What was that question?" NOSENKO thereupon said: "It was not a question--just general interest." When the case officer urged him to repeat the question, he refused to talk about it and diverted the conversation to other matters.

- He asked where CIA secretaries resided in the Washington area.

- NOSENKO tried to find out the grades of the CIA officers in contact with him.

- NOSENKO inquired in early 1964 whether the CIA officer who met him in Geneva two years earlier had received a medal for that phase of the operation.

(ii) Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other Sources

Under interrogation, even when accused of lying, NOSENKO rarely challenged the validity of CIA's information nor claimed superior knowledge. The only facts he challenged strongly were incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN's defection, the date of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSOLAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960 trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all times that he accepted that CIA knew more than he did on topics including conditions in the USSR and cases and people for whom he claimed direct responsibility. He never challenged DERYABIN's statements about KGB procedures, although aware that his own information was more recent.

(e) Discussions with NOSENKO on His Own Performance

After admitting his inability to respond to questions about operations in which he said he participated, NOSENKO sometimes gave a general appraisal of his own performance. He would admit that it was "impossible to have such memory breaks" and agree that his response was neither reasonable nor acceptable ("In your place I wouldn't believe it either," or on another occasion, "It will look bad to your boss"). Admitting that the questions were fair, logical, and clearly put, he acknowledged at least a dozen times during the January-March 1965 interrogation that his performance under questioning was bad and unacceptable.

He also admitted that most of the leads he had passed were largely useless. Out of the 150 or so he said he had provided, he stated that the great majority were "no good," unimportant, or people with whom the KGB had not worked ("Maybe 'ANDREY' became not interesting to KGB, changed jobs, and was not so important any more"; "some of the agents recruited by the Seventh Department weren't meeting the KGB"; etc.) He consistently estimated, however, that there were about 20 to 25 "good" leads.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

632.

C. Polygraph Testing

1. Test in April 1964

Shortly after his defection, NOSENKO agreed to undergo a polygraph examination which the CIA handlers had told him was a routine part of his defector processing. He was informed on 3 April 1964 that the test would be administered the following morning, and that it was therefore advisable for him to get a good night's rest and to refrain from alcoholic beverages. NOSENKO drank heavily on the night of 3 April, did not enter his bedroom until 0300 hours on 4 April, and following breakfast at 0730 hours on 4 April consumed several gin-and-tonics. Subsequently, when NOSENKO thought he was not being observed, he was seen to remove his hand from his lips hurriedly.*

Following a medical examination by a physician who noted that NOSENKO had been drinking, he was introduced to the CIA polygraph operator. An experienced interrogator, fluent in the Russian language, this polygraph operator conducted the test in Russian from 1045 to 1515 hours on 4 April. His report is quoted below.

"The question of Subject's (NOSENKO's) willingness to participate in the polygraph test was one of minor consideration, since he had, on previous occasions, agreed that he would take the test. However, whether Subject would continue with the polygraph testing if confronted with attempted deception after an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Consequently, in order to preclude the possibility of Subject's terminating the test prior to its completion, it was decided that a minor deviation from the accepted polygraph technique would be used during the polygraph testing; specifically, to insure that a polygraphic record of Subject's reactions to all the pertinent questions be obtained prior to challenging him on any significant polygraphic deception indications his charts might reflect... This plan was followed throughout the polygraph interview...

* On 18 May 1964 a report was received on the chemical analysis of six types of tablets which had been taken from NOSENKO's personal effects. In this report, a CIA chemical expert made the following remarks based on chemical, microscopic, and instrumental analysis including the use of X-ray: "Sample No. 4238 consisted of three (3) gray tablets wrapped in a piece of paper with the name 'Phenomin' written in Russian. Microscopic analysis of these tablets established the presence of a small amount of dl-amphetamine sulfate, a large amount of lactose, and a small amount of corn starch; dl-amphetamine is a sympathomimetic agent employed mainly as a central nervous system stimulant. The effect of taking amphetamine as a drug in conjunction with a polygraph test could exaggerate deception responses especially for a weak reactor. No phenothiazine (a tranquilizer) which is the active ingredient in 'Phenomin' was present in these tablets. The tablets do not appear to be of U.S. manufacture. ...As a result of the above examinations it was established that none of the items submitted are of the barbiturate family. Although either sulfaguanidine (Sample No. 4242) or aspirin (Sample No. 4240) could be used (and indeed have been used) as secret ink, they are also normal medicinals which a traveler might carry, and there is nothing in the formulation of the tablets to suggest

"Although the Subject had used both alcohol and some unknown drug prior to testing, there is no question, based both on analysis of Subject's polygraph charts as well as personal observation during the interview, that Subject has attempted deliberate deception in the specific pertinent areas which are mentioned below in this report.

"It is [my] conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific mission or missions.

"According to the plan, the different phases involving various pertinent areas were covered with Subject polygraphically. Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect and 'soft.' On no occasion did Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the possible causes for his polygraph reactions. He continually denied and refused to admit that there was anything to any of the questions which were asked of him. When the final test questions were completed and a record was obtained of all of Subject's polygraphic responses, the nature of the challenge and probing was changed.

"Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent questions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation to [my] direct accusation was that he could not be a dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volunteered to American Intelligence.

"Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected complete self-control and composure, now exhibited a completely different picture. His composure was non-existent, his eyes watered, and his hands trembled. Prior to being confronted with [my] opinion that Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject was asked on one of the last test runs (a) if he were sent to penetrate American Intelligence and (b) if Subject received instructions from KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given in a voice that actually trembled...

"Listed below are all of the questions asked of Subject.

"Series #1:

Were you born in the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you born in the city of Nikolayev? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you born on 30 October 1927? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you deliberately give any kind of misinformation when you told us your autobiography? No. (Reaction)

Is NOSENKO the surname which you had at time of birth?
Yes. (Reaction)

Are you concerned about the fact that the polygraph test may discover that you are hiding the truth from me? No.
(No reaction)

Was your father the Minister of Shipbuilding? Yes.
(No reaction)

634.

Were you a member of the Communist Party before 1956? No.
(No reaction)
(Subject stated that he applied for candidacy to the Communist Party in 1956, and in mid-1957 was accepted as a member.)

Did you deliberately give any misinformation about your work and service in the KGB? No. (No reaction)

Besides your children, is there anything in your life on the basis of which someone may blackmail you? No. (No reaction)
(Subject stated that his love for his children was the only thing that is of any consequence which the Soviets might use for blackmail purposes. However, Subject said he was not worried, because regardless of threats against the welfare of his children, he would not allow himself to be blackmailed or controlled.)

Have you ever engaged in any homosexual activity? No.
(Reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your education? No. (No reaction)

Did you ever commit a major crime? No. (No reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your military service? No. (No reaction)

"Series #2:

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in January 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you voluntarily defect to the Americans? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you ask for the right of political asylum from the Americans? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you sent to the Americans by the organs of Soviet Intelligence (with a special mission)? No. (Reaction)

Do you have a sincere desire to fight against the KGB and all other punitive organs of the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence on orders of the KGB? No. (Reaction)

Did anyone know of your intention to defect to the Americans? No. (No reaction)

Does the KGB have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact with you in America? No. (Reaction)

TOP SECRET

635.

Do you have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact with Soviet Intelligence? No. (No reaction)

Do you have a concrete plan to return to the Soviet Union sometime in the future? No. (Reaction)

Are you performing a special mission for Soviet Intelligence in connection with your defection? No. (Reaction)

Are you deliberately hiding penetrations made by Soviet agents into American Intelligence about which you are aware? No. (Reaction)

Are you witting of other recruitments made by Soviet Intelligence of American Embassy personnel which occurred after RHODES and 'ANDREY'? No. (No reaction)

Are you an agent of the KGB or other Soviet Intelligence organs? No. (No reaction)

Was there any pre-arranged signal included in the letters you wrote to your wife (since your defection)? No. (No reaction)

"Series #3:

Did you defect to the Americans in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans in Geneva? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment of uncovering plans of American Intelligence against USSR? No. (Reaction)

- Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment to find out more about the structure and methods of operation of American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of penetrating American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans because you were dissatisfied with the Soviet system? Yes. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of discrediting Soviet officers of the KGB who defected earlier? No. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of giving misinformation about Soviet agents' penetration of American Intelligence? No. (No reaction)

"Series #4:

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Geneva in 1962? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Geneva in 1964? No. (No reaction)

TOP SECRET

636.

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Cuba in 1960? No. (Reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1957? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1958? No. (No reaction)

Did you personally participate in the search for CHEREPANOV in December 1963? Yes. (Reaction)

Is it true that KOVSHUK visited the United States in 1957? Yes. (Reaction)

Did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1962? No. (No reaction)

To your knowledge, did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1964? No. (No reaction)

Was GUK in Switzerland in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

*Series #5:

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey OSWALD? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you tell us the truth about Yuri KROTKOV? Yes. (Reaction)

Were the CHEREPANOV papers especially prepared and passed to the Americans by the KGB? No. (Reaction)

Is it true that Soviet Intelligence has an agent, whose name is unknown to you, among the American representatives in Paris? Yes. (Reaction)

Did you bring with you personal identity documents which were fabricated by KGB? No. (Reaction)

Did you give truthful information about the structure of the First and Second Chief Directorates of the KGB? Yes. (No reaction)

Are you misinforming American Intelligence according to a specially developed KGB plan? No. (No reaction)

Is it true that AGAYANTS is the Chief of Department D (Disinformation)? Yes. (Reaction)

To your knowledge, was PEDOSEYEV the Chief of the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1963 and 1964? Yes. (Reaction)

TOP SECRET

637.

*Series #6:

Did you drink more than you told me? No. (Reaction)
(Subject admitted to having only one gin and tonic prior to testing.)

Did you know that American Intelligence uses the polygraph? Yes. (No reaction)

Did anyone in the Soviet Union explain to you anything about American Intelligence's use of the polygraph. No. (No reaction)

Did anyone in the KGB explain anything about the polygraph to you? No. (No reaction)

During the last twenty-four hours, did you take any medicine or pills? No. (Reaction)

Did you receive instructions from the KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph? No. (Reaction)

Were you ever hypnotized by anyone? No. (No reaction)

Did you bring any types of medicine or pills with you (from abroad or from the Soviet Union)? No. (Reaction)

Do you have any pills or medicine about which you have not told me? No. (Reaction)

"Although Subject later admitted that he had two types of pills with him which he brought from Moscow and which [were] in his portfolio, he declined to admit that he had had more liquor than he told [me], that he had received specific instructions about the polygraph from the KGB, or that he had taken any type of pills during the last twenty-four hours."

2. Test in October 1966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD

a. Introduction

CIA conducted a polygraph examination of NOSENKO on 18 October 1966 on the subject of Lee Harvey OSWALD.*

Since the previous polygraph test in April 1964, NOSENKO had been under close security guard, his movements restricted, and in the interim had been interrogated in detail and accused of bad faith in dealing with U.S. Government authorities. NOSENKO had not been interviewed by CIA during the six months prior to October 1966. He had had no access to alcohol or drugs, his food consumption had been normal, and his sleep had been adequate.

NOSENKO was given no advance notice of the polygraph examination. Upon entering the room where it was to take place, he immediately recognized the officer present as the person who administered the first CIA polygraph test two and one-half years earlier. NOSENKO correctly said that they had first met on 4 April 1964.

In the pre-test interview, questions on the OSWALD case were put to NOSENKO in Russian, his answers (also in Russian) were recorded, the operation of the machine was explained, and clarifications of the questions and his answers were made. The three series of questions pertaining to the OSWALD case are given below in their entirety, and they are followed by the conclusions of the polygraph expert.

b. Results

"Series No. 1

1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD ever in the Soviet Union?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

2. Was OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

3. Did you receive special instructions about what to tell the Americans about the OSWALD case?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

4. Did you personally meet OSWALD?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

5. Was OSWALD recruited by KGB as an agent?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

6. Were you glad that President Kennedy was killed?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

7. Other than what you told me, did you actively participate in the OSWALD case prior to 1963?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

* See Part V, D, 6 for details on OSWALD.

TOP SECRET

639.

8. Did you see a photograph of OSWALD in 1963?
Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
9. Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
- 9a. Before her marriage to OSWALD?
Answer: No. (Reaction)
- 9b. After her marriage to OSWALD?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
10. Did you personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
11. Did OSWALD have any kind of contact with the 13th Otdel of the First Chief Directorate?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
12. Did KGB prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
13. Was OSWALD prepared (trained) by KGB to kill President Kennedy?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
- 24.* Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?
Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

"Subject's (NOSENKO's) most significant reactions on this test series were to questions 3 and 24--other reactions of a lesser significance were evident to questions 6, 8, 9a, and 10.

"Series No. 2

20. Is the name OSWALD familiar to you?
Answer: Yes. (No reaction)
21. Did you ever read the OSWALD case?
Answer: Yes. (No reaction)
22. Was this the full and official KGB case on OSWALD?
Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
23. Did you give us any kind of information about OSWALD?
Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

*Before the beginning of the examination, the polygraph operator

TOP SECRET

640.

24. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

24a. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) only after President Kennedy's death?

Answer: Instead of the usual yes or no answer, Subject answered: 'Before and after.' When the question was repeated, he again answered: 'Eefore and after.' Only when the question was asked a third time on a subsequent test did he answer 'No.' (Reaction) (Subject reacted when he answered 'Before and after,' and when he answered 'No.')

25. Did the KGB consider OSWALD abnormal?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

26. As far as you know, did Marina OSWALD know about her husband's plan to kill President Kennedy?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

27. To your knowledge did OSWALD talk with a KGB officer in Mexico?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

28. Did OSWALD return to the United States in 1961?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction) Subject's reaction to this question was inconsistent when he answered 'Yes.' hence the (No reaction) notation. However, it is noteworthy that Subject did not attempt to correct the date of OSWALD's departure to the U.S.; OSWALD returned to the U.S. in June 1962 and not in 1961.

29. Is your contact with the OSWALD case part of your legend (cover story)?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

30. Did you really take part in the OSWALD case in 1959?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

"Subject's most significant reactions were to questions 22, 24, 24a, 29 and 30.

"Series No. 3

TOP SECRET

641.

16. Did you personally order RASTRUSIN, in 1959, to collect material on OSWALD?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

18. Did you personally talk on the V. Ch. with Minsk about the OSWALD case in 1963?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

17. Were you instructed on the OSWALD case by one of the KGB operational officers?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

17a. Did the KGB instruct you to tell us OSWALD was a bad shot?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

18. Do you know definitely that OSWALD was not of operational interest to KGB?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

18c. Did KGB give the OSWALDs any kind of help in their departure from the Soviet Union?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

3a. Did you receive special instructions from the KGB about what to tell the Americans about OSWALD?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

"Subject's reactions to the questions so indicated were about equal in consistency and significance.

"On the basis of an analysis of the polygraph charts obtained during Subject's polygraph interrogation and testing during the 18 October 1966 session, it is [my] opinion that:

a. Subject was not personally or actually involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 to 1961 while OSWALD was in the Soviet Union.

b. Subject heard of OSWALD only after Kennedy's assassination; however, he was not an active participant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably briefed on the case by a KGB officer.

c. Subject received special instructions (from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to tell American authorities about it."

TOP SECRET

SECRET

VIII. NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONSA. Introduction

It is standard procedure to assess the bona fides of each intelligence and counterintelligence source, and special care is required in assessing sources of information relevant to the security of the United States.


A much more prominent factor in this assessment, however, is NOSENKO's own testimony. CIA has exhaustively debriefed and interrogated NOSENKO, his leads were checked, his information was studied, and a large body of facts pertinent to his bona fides was thus assembled. These details, as well as direct evidence from other sources and the views of specialists affiliated with CIA, have been presented in Part III. through Part VII. of this paper.

The basic questions with regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO are the following:

- Is there reason to question the general accuracy and completeness of NOSENKO's accounts of his situation and motivations in contacting CIA and later defecting, his personal life, military service, positions in the KGB, personal participation in KGB operations, knowledgeability about KGB activities and the way he learned of them, and his associations with KGB personnel?

- If there are grounds for doubting the general accuracy and completeness of these accounts, then what are the explanations for NOSENKO's actions, for the nature of the information he has provided, and for other Soviet sources having authenticated his personal life and KGB career?

In assessing the bona fides of NOSENKO, the classic method has been used: evaluating his production and sourcing, examining his autobiography, and appraising him and the circumstances of this operation. These points, with the conclusions drawn from each, are reviewed below. The discussion continues with a survey of the sources who have corroborated NOSENKO's background and status, and this is followed by argumentations on the various hypotheses which could explain NOSENKO as a source. The final portion is a summary of conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides.

B. Evaluation of Production1. Introduction

There are several standards which may be applied to the assessment of a source's production. Each of them is qualified; none is likely to be conclusive by itself; and all of them together may not permit a definite conclusion, although they do contribute to a broader assessment of bona fides. The standards are:

First, how does the information equate [redacted]

[redacted] (In this, one judges the internal [redacted])

Second, does the information [redacted] (This point is risky to judge, for a genuine source [redacted])

[redacted] Also, information which seems [redacted] may not actually be such in Soviet eyes; for example, the loss of an apparently valuable agent [redacted]

Third, is the information important or useful to us? (This point may in some cases be irrelevant [redacted] information may not balance against the time and effort required to process and investigate it.)

These standards have been applied in evaluating the production of NOSENKO on the topics discussed below.

NOSENKO's production is exclusively in the field of counter-intelligence information. As described in Part VI.A., he did not have any useful positive intelligence. This does not necessarily affect the question of his bona fides, however, for NOSENKO claims to have been a KGB internal counterintelligence officer. [redacted]

[redacted] Therefore, nothing of positive intelligence consequence is expected of NOSENKO, although some question might be raised about his inability to report on the leadership of the Soviet regime in view of his father's position and NOSENKO's continuing contacts with the leadership after his father's death. The failure of NOSENKO to respond to questionnaires along positive intelligence lines is not considered unusual.

NOSENKO's counterintelligence production includes all of his information on the Soviet intelligence and security organs:

- their structure, functions, methods, and procedures;
- their officers and their agents of Soviet citizenship;
- their operational activities inside and outside the USSR.

For the most part this portion of the paper (as in Part VIII.C. through Part VIII.P.) follows a format in which the evidence is summarized, the facts interpreted, and conclusions presented.

2. KGB Organization, Personalities, Methods

Ability to discuss the structure of his service in general and at least some of its components in particular is an absolutely minimal requirement for anyone who claims to have been employed within that service. At the same time, current information on the organization of an intelligence service is of classic interest to opposing intelligence and security services. Organizational changes are indicators of policy and planning trends in the service; short of a penetration of the service's leadership, such changes are perhaps the most reliable reflection of changes in operational emphasis and tactics.

Had NOSENKO's information on the organization of the KGB been novel in this sense, it would have been of considerable value, while the exposure of this information--although perhaps not a major loss to the Soviets--would nonetheless have been against the KGB's best interests. NOSENKO's reports on the organization of the KGB in 1964 (Pages 352-358) agree with and are a logical extension of that framework of KGB organization newly revealed by the 1961 sources, but this weighs neither for nor against him as the source: In the absence of contradictory information, he cannot be subject to criticism or to suspicion because his reports show no redirection of the thrust of the KGB. Furthermore, NOSENKO's statements indicating that there have been no major changes in the years between the 1959 re-organization and 1964 are acceptable in the light of available information from other sources. The information which NOSENKO provided on the KGB's organization therefore neither supports nor discredits his bona fides.

NOSENKO's information on some 1,000 Soviets connected with intelligence and security activities is an impressive achievement of memory. These identifications, however, must be evaluated according to the damage inflicted upon the Soviets by his exposure of these personalities. In this respect, the discussion must concern new identifications, for intelligence personalities previously exposed could not be damaged any further by a repetition of their compromise. This discussion must be further restricted to new identifications of staff personnel, because the entire Soviet population is available to the KGB for occasional use as it sees fit, with the loyalty and discretion of the individual as the only limiting factors; to learn that a Soviet employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is an agent reporting to the KGB is to learn nothing that has not already been taken for granted, and besides, no action on such information can be taken. Finally, the new identifications also

must be among persons who are identifiable and accessible, or the information is useless to Western services and is no loss to the Soviets. On this basis, only KGB First Chief Directorate as well as GRU identifications merit inclusion in this evaluation, since these are the officers who normally appear abroad and participate in agent operations. Although KGB Second Chief Directorate personnel have in the past transferred to the First Chief Directorate, this is not a predictable event and cannot be considered in discussion of current damage.

NOSENKO identified 165 First Chief Directorate personnel, [redacted]

[redacted] Of 37, there were 24 who either resided abroad at the time of NOSENKO's defection or were sent abroad since that time.* Assuming that NOSENKO was correct in his identifications of all 24 members of the KGB who were accessible,** it cannot be said that the number is so large that the damage to KGB agent operations was substantial. None of NOSENKO's unique GRU identifications were abroad at the time of his defection or have been since. These personality identifications hence do not serve as evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. At the same time, his inability to do further measurable harm to the KGB in this regard cannot be held against him, either, for he has claimed service only in the Second Chief Directorate throughout his career and so cannot be expected to know a high percentage of the First Chief Directorate complement. Therefore, NOSENKO's intelligence personality identifications do not constitute a factor in finding for or against his bona fides.

NOSENKO has been the source of many interesting details and examples of KGB modus operandi (Pages 359-360), but while useful for illustrative purposes and valuable because of the fact that the material was easily collatable for study purposes, none of the methods described could be considered new and revealing, and their exposure in any event would not prevent their continued use in the future. NOSENKO's discussion of the only double agent case in which he claimed to have played a role, however, demonstrates his lack of knowledge of the principles and purposes of such an operation. This case, BELITSKIY, is a subject of separate

sensitive sources [redacted]

* Of these 24, ten were identified by [redacted] as KGB [redacted] and thereafter, and two became prominently active in insecure KGB operations shortly after NOSENKO identified them.

**Other evidence has contradicted statements by NOSENKO to the effect that certain Soviets were not affiliated with the KGB; in Geneva, for example, where he had daily access to the KGB Legal Residency for months and claimed nearly complete knowledge of KGB personnel, he named 15 of a KGB staff which he said totalled at the most 18; [redacted]

[redacted] as many as 55 of the approximately 120 Soviets stationed there (a proportion which is consistent with other areas and defectors' estimates). NOSENKO was not entirely accurate concerning even KGB officers on his own delegation in Geneva, as noted on Pages 12 and 13. Therefore, the accuracy of NOSENKO's original identifications, positive or negative, cannot be accepted without question.

TOP SECRET

646.

discussion below. This subject, too, must be considered neutral evidence in the bona fides assessment.

NOSENKO has shown himself to be both uninformed and inaccurate in his answers to questions on KGB Headquarters staff procedures (Page 360 and Pages 619-624). He has been unable to contribute any new information, although there has been no detailed reporting on the subject since 1954. (GOLITSYN in 1962 provided some new material on procedures but was never comprehensively debriefed on the topic.) Thus, information on the more up-to-date forms, coordination requirements, mechanization of records and tracing mechanisms, etc., could have been a singular contribution to our knowledge; NOSENKO could not describe anything of this sort. When he replied to questions about such matters for the period covering his entry into the KGB, on which previous reporting is available in detail, he answered incorrectly on numerous points. NOSENKO's tendency to improvise when he did not know the correct answer or when he had forgotten has been characterized by a CIA psychologist as the behavior of a pathological liar saving face in a tight psychological situation. When he could not produce a correct answer in this area of reporting, NOSENKO may have improvised because he is a liar or because he is concealing an ignorance based on not having been a KGB Headquarters officer.

3. Operational Leads

a. Introduction

Consideration of NOSENKO's operational leads must take into account the KGB positions and personal associations (with attendant access to information) which NOSENKO has claimed for himself. He indicated that the breadth of his knowledge about KGB agent operations and development cases increased as he rose from case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955 and in the American Tourist Section in 1955-1958 to become Deputy Chief of the latter section in 1958-1959, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960-1961, and finally Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from 1962 until his defection. Simultaneously he established lasting contacts with his KGB colleagues so that, for example, even after leaving the U.S. Embassy Section for the second time, in December 1961, NOSENKO kept abreast of its most important activities. On these grounds NOSENKO presented himself as an authoritative source, one who could detail the successes and failures of the KGB in recruiting Westerners--especially Americans--in the USSR over the years from 1953 through 1963. Repeatedly NOSENKO asserted that his leads to KGB agents constituted proof of his bona fides.

b. Operations Involving Americans

NOSENKO drew a picture of the recruitment scene in Moscow showing that:

- Since the "ANDREY" case of the early 1950's* the KGB recruited no Americans on the U.S. Embassy staff, succeeding only in recruiting one contract employee who was in Moscow on TDY. NOSENKO reported on recruitment approaches to six American officials stationed in Moscow, all of whom

* NOSENKO placed the recruitment date prior to his entry into the KGB in early 1951, but Baylo W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY") said he became a KGB agent in November or December 1953.

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TOP SECRET

647.

refused to collaborate with the KGB. He discussed 14 development cases which never culminated in recruitment approaches to these U.S. Government employees in Moscow, and he named 11 officials at the Moscow Embassy who were investigated by the KGB. These operations, NOSENKO asserted, comprised the total KGB activity against Embassy personnel with the exception of the technical penetrations (see Part VIII.B.4.).

- Seven American correspondents in Moscow had been recruited by the KGB, four of them known to NOSENKO from the years 1953-1954 when he was working against U.S. newspapermen. Another two were under development by the KGB during that period.

- The American Express Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL, had become a KGB agent in 1959; NOSENKO was the case officer.

- The number of American visitors recruited by the KGB in 1962-1963 was 14, and if there had been others, NOSENKO would have known about them in light of his senior position in the Tourist Department during that period. Moreover, for the years before 1962, NOSENKO provided leads to 19 other American tourists whom the KGB recruited, plus one who was serving the GRU when he came to Moscow. NOSENKO also described 18 development cases and nine investigations in which the targets were American tourists.

As for KGB operations outside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO gave leads to four recruited Americans about whom he learned through conversations with KGB associates: a U.S. intelligence officer having the KGB cryptonym "SASHA" (still unidentified), a penetration of Orly Courier Transfer Station (identified as Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON), and two agents in Geneva (names not given and as yet not positively identified). NOSENKO learned of the KGB agent status of (Horace G. LUNT), an American professor, because he took part in LUNT's recruitment while on TDY in Sofia, and of the [REDACTED] Legal Residency agent [REDACTED] because of the connection between [REDACTED] and Bernard KOTEN, an American tourist with whose case NOSENKO was personally involved. In addition, NOSENKO described two development cases with U.S. citizens. From his knowledge of the "SASHA" operation, NOSENKO also knew that the KGB had no agent sources able to supply information concerning the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

(i) Completeness, Accuracy, Detail and Consistency of Reporting

If he occupied the various KGB positions as claimed, if his access were as broad as he said it was, NOSENKO has provided a comprehensive review of KGB operations involving Americans in the USSR.

Other information, however, contradicts NOSENKO's assurances that he reported on all major cases involving Americans working at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow:

- GOLITSYN's reports indicate that a U.S. military code clerk was recruited in 1960, and other factors point toward this person being James STORSBERG or possibly William HURLEY (Pages 166-182). NOSENKO, the supervisor of operations against Embassy code clerks in 1960-1961, stated that

TOP SECRET

648.

STORSBERG rejected the recruitment approach, and when interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, STORSBERG confirmed this. Both agree the approach was made in the latter part of 1961.

- GOLITSYN's reports cover six other operations (Pages 595-598) which NOSENKO has not mentioned: The KGB's recruitment of a female employee at the Embassy in 1957, the presence of a code clerk in the Embassy in 1960 who was a KGB agent, an unsuccessful recruitment approach to a female secretary at the Embassy prior to July 1960, the KGB plan to complete the recruitment of an American diplomat following his reassignment from Moscow in 1959, the KGB's recruitment of or planned recruitment approach to a U.S. Embassy employee (possibly a code clerk) prior to April/May 1960, and a KGB officer's trip to Helsinki to accompany an Embassy code clerk travelling by train to Moscow. (There is documentary evidence to support the accuracy of GOLITSYN's statements about the last of these cases; see below.)

On the basis of available information, NOSENKO cannot be faulted on the completeness of his reporting about American tourists recruited, approached, and under development by the KGB, but he could cite only one instance of KGB investigations uncovering tourists dispatched to the USSR by American Intelligence (Pages 145-150).*

[redacted] a year in which NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. These documents were placed in the hands of the KGB by George BLAKE of MI-6 in July 1959 (before the end of the tourist season) and in 1960; NOSENKO was not familiar with any aspects of the KGB operation with BLAKE.

[redacted] where NOSENKO's reporting on American tourist cases is checkable, therefore, it has been found to be incomplete.

* NOSENKO reported that of nine other tourists investigated by the KGB, eight were suspected of having current connections with American Intelligence. The KGB was correct with regard to Thomas BARTHELEMY and Robert CHRISTNER, who were on CIA missions, and Alfred SLESINGER, an FBI informant who nevertheless had no American Intelligence mission when he visited the USSR in 1961 and 1962. Frederick BARCHOORI, arrested in the USSR in 1963,

[redacted] Concerning the rest reportedly suspected by the KGB--Donald ALBINGER, Bernard KOTEN, and Gabriel REINER--none was associated with American Intelligence in any way.

NOSENKO's reporting on individual cases wherein he was a personal participant or supervisor is not, with few exceptions, contradicted by information available from other sources. Nearly all of his statements have proven accurate when they could be compared with collateral information: In fact, the Americans whom he cited did visit or live in the Soviet Union, and many of them are known to have been of operational interest to the KGB, as NOSENKO said. The exceptions to his general accuracy of reporting, however, are of major importance in themselves and in reference to his claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy Section during 1960-1961:*

NOSENKO

Collateral

U.S. Embassy Security Officer John V. ABIDIAN, for whom NOSENKO was the responsible KGB officer, visited the Pushkin Street dead drop site in 1960 or at the beginning of 1961. Later that same day KOZLOV, Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, went to the scene.

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CIA records on the PENKOVSKIY case, in which the Pushkin Street dead drop was used, show that ABIDIAN visited the site only once, on 30 December 1961 at 1130 hours. KOZLOV left New York City on the same day, travelling via France, at the completion of a TDY in the United States. (Pages 231-235; this subject is discussed at greater length in Part VIII.B.6.)

KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's direct subordinate, made but one TDY to Helsinki in the 1960-1961 period; NOSENKO would have known about if not approved other TDY's in these years when he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.

Travel records show that KOSOLAPOV was twice in Helsinki during 1960, in March-April and again in November. (Pages 186-200).

Returning from his single TDY to Helsinki, KOSOLAPOV was abroad the same train as his target, the American military code clerk Paul JENNER; as supervisor of all operations against code clerks at the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO was familiar with the details of all such major activities.

Travel records show that JENNER and KOSOLAPOV travelled on separate days. (Pages 186-200)

The KGB knew that the U.S. military code clerk James KEYSERS, whom NOSENKO personally contacted in an effort to persuade him to defect, did not report the earlier recruitment approach by the KGB.

KEYSERS reported the recruitment approach immediately after it occurred, and the report was submitted in an Embassy room later found to have a concealed microphone. (NOSENKO stated that he was a customer for microphone intercepts at the time and that this microphone was monitored on a continuous basis by KGB personnel.) (Pages 213-219)

* An example of NOSENKO's inaccuracy on events during his later service in the Tourist Department related to his accounts on the arrest of American Professor Frederick BARGHOORN: According to NOSENKO, the approval for this KGB action in which he had a personal part was obtained from BREZHNEV in KHRUSHCHEV's absence from Moscow, and the arrest was made a few hours later; BARGHOORN was arrested on 31 October 1963, and on that day and the day before KHRUSHCHEV made public appearances in Moscow. (BREZHNEV was not seen in Moscow between 29 October and 2 November

TOP SECRET

650.

In addition, a number of Americans--e.g., Walter RASK, Adam BROCHES, Henry APISSON, Herbert HOWARD, Vasiliy VOLKOV, William WALLACE, Thomas Whitney, and Stanley ZIRING--denied having been recruited by the KGB, as NOSENKO said they had been.

The only noteworthy internal inconsistencies in NOSENKO's reporting on KGB operations involving Americans appear in the HARMSTONE case, where he has given conflicting information on the KGB's ability to obtain photographic evidence of his homosexuality, and in his advice on how to identify "ANDREY"--that he was the only witness to testify in Roy RHODES' trial and that he did not testify at Roy RHODES' trial but was only interviewed in the pre-trial investigation once. Part VIII.D. covers the extent of his knowledge about American cases in which he took part personally or as a supervisor. Regarding others to which his official positions did not give him access, NOSENKO has indicated that it was his personal contact with KGB colleagues which enabled him to report on nine recruitments (Herbert HOWARD, Sam JAFFE, the KGB agent in France, the YOUNGER couple, "SASHA", and two unnamed agents in Geneva); three development cases (George VAN LAETHEN, Attorney General Robert KENNEDY, and Stephen HOFFMAN); three unsuccessful recruitment approaches (Richard HARMSTONE, Peter BINDER, and Collette SCHWARZENBACH); and three investigations (Thomas BARTHELEMY, Lewis BOWDEN, and George WINTERS). NOSENKO's alleged associates in the KGB thus gave him the names of four recruited agents and sufficient details for one more to be identified by subsequent investigation, JOHNSON. All of the NOSENKO leads to developmental operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and investigations have been identified.

(ii) Damage to the Soviets

Three criteria can be used in assessing the harm to Soviet interests caused by NOSENKO's operational leads to Americans:

First, the originality of his information on recruited agents and unsuccessful recruitment approaches;

Second, the agents' access to classified information at the time he reported on them; and

Third, the possibility of identifying them on the basis of the details provided or in combination with details received from other sources.

There is no reason to believe that NOSENKO's information on 22 Americans under investigation while in the USSR could have damaged the KGB, especially since all of them had left the Soviet Union before the NOSENKO leads were received (Pages 402-410). In another category, NOSENKO's leads to 35 Americans under development (Pages 379-397), there is no means for evaluating their importance to the KGB because it is impossible to estimate with confidence the likelihood of the KGB recruiting some or any of these targets; vulnerability and assessment data, when coupled with spasmodic or even continuing KGB access to the target, would be no guarantee that he is recruitable. Nevertheless, following the criteria listed above, NOSENKO's statements on KGB operational interest stemming from their homosexuality did bring about the recall of Robert ARMSTRONG and Stephen HOFFMAN from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

TOP SECRET

651.

NOSENKO was the first source to report on the KGB recruitments of 22 tourists (none with access to classified materials and on 11 of whom there was previous derogatory information); four correspondents (one said by NOSENKO to have become inactive and on two of whom there was previous derogatory information); the American Express Company representative in Moscow; a contract employee of USIA who had earlier declared his intent to marry a Soviet national; and two agents whose names were not known to NOSENKO but who were identifiable. The latter two agents were:

- Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY"), a cipher machine mechanic at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow recruited in 1953. Despite NOSENKO's statement that "ANDREY" was currently supplying valuable information in June 1962, SMITH lost his access to classified information through retirement from the U.S. Army on 30 November 1961, or about six months before NOSENKO first reported on him (Pages 413-426).

- U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, who with his wife Hedwig began collaborating with the KGB in 1952 and who made James MINTKENBAUGH an agent of the KGB in 1953 (Pages 427-462). Hedwig JOHNSON discontinued her role in the operation in 1953, although thereafter remaining knowledgeable of the KGB activities of her husband and MINTKENBAUGH; according to MINTKENBAUGH, who lost access to classified information in 1954, he had no direct contact with the KGB after the late summer or early autumn of 1963 (about three to five months before NOSENKO first gave the lead on JOHNSON); JOHNSON was still on active duty with the U.S. Army and in contact with the KGB when NOSENKO reported in January 1964 about the existence of this agent.

Thus from a total of 30 original and identifiable leads, only one agent had access to classified information as of the date when NOSENKO's reporting on him began. By the criteria given in the preceding paragraph, the single operational lead from NOSENKO which could have damaged Soviet interests was that which uncovered JOHNSON.

It is debatable, however, whether the JOHNSON lead constituted a serious loss to the KGB. In the first place, if JOHNSON can be believed, he gave the Soviets but one classified document while in charge of the "Classified Control Center" at Camp Des Loges between August 1963 and May 1964. His KGB case officer later told him, JOHNSON said, that the information he could provide was not worth the risk involved and that no future attempts of this sort should be made. JOHNSON also stated that he felt his espionage work at Camp Des Loges had not been very profitable for the Soviets, adding that his case officer had shown disinterest in his proposal to obtain for the KGB a top secret document he (JOHNSON) thought of greater importance than any other to which he had access. (NOSENKO indicated that JOHNSON lost his access in the spring of 1963, while at the Orly Courier Transfer Station.) In the second place, as the KGB knew, the behavior of Hedwig JOHNSON, a mental case, was unpredictable. Finally, the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH repeatedly disregarded the KGB's instructions to compartment their activities and to observe other routine security precautions. The KGB seems to have avoided full exploitation of JOHNSON in the latter stages of the operation, to have been concerned over Hedwig's mental condition as early as 1962, and to have regarded the

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

652.

threesome as difficult handling problems. Given these apparent factors, the NOSENKO lead may have been considered expendable by the KGB, without long-lasting adverse effect on the fulfillment of its overall intelligence requirements.

NOSENKO was the first source to identify James STORSBERG, a U.S. military code clerk stationed at the Moscow Embassy, as a target who had rejected the KGB's recruitment offer (Pages 165-185). The information was received from NOSENKO after STORSBERG was discharged from the U.S. Army, and when interviewed on the basis of this information, STORSBERG generally confirmed NOSENKO's reporting on the case. GOLITSYN had earlier reported on what may have been the same KGB operation, but GOLITSYN believed the military code clerk had been recruited; from what GOLITSYN had previously told CIA and from later investigations, it seems possible that the KGB recruited either STORSBERG or William HURLEY (who NOSENKO said was not recruited or approached by the KGB). If it is assumed that STORSBERG was not recruited in the approach described by NOSENKO and in the operation discussed by GOLITSYN, the KGB suffered no loss in the American services learning of this case. If it is assumed on the other hand that STORSBERG or HURLEY was recruited, the reporting by NOSENKO assisted the KGB--not the American services--by deflecting security investigations from a recruited agent of the KGB.

(iii) Importance or Usefulness

The American leads from NOSENKO enabled U.S. security authorities to:

- Confirm previous information on the recruitments of 13 tourists and three correspondents;
- Verify previous derogatory information on 11 tourists, two correspondents, and perhaps one military code clerk, STORSBERG;
- Remove two homosexuals from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow; and
- Identify 32 KGB agents including Hedwig JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH.*

One or possibly two of these 32 agents (SMITH and possibly HOWARD) in the past had been in a position to pass classified information to the KGB, and a third (JOHNSON) had current access to classified information and current contact with the KGB; the two homosexuals at the Moscow Embassy (ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN) presumably also had access to classified information. From the standpoint of protecting the security of the U.S. Government, NOSENKO brought to an end the JOHNSON operation and the KGB's potential for recruiting ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN.

Against this product of NOSENKO's reporting must be balanced the amounts of money and manpower that were needed for U.S. security authorities to exhaust and investigate NOSENKO's information on 49 recruitments, 35 developmental targets, seven unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and 33 investigations by the KGB--a total of 113 operational leads. CIA carried the burden of the debriefing and interrogation of NOSENKO on these cases, but the investigative

* Among these 32 agents were many whom the KGB had not recontacted after their return to the United States from the Soviet Union, others who had broken contact with the KGB, some who were known

TOP SECRET

653.

work in the United States was accomplished mostly by other agencies. It would seem, however, that the JOHNSON operation was the only NOSENKO lead to be important or useful.

(1v) Remarks

Judged by his major inaccuracies and by the demonstrable incompleteness in some of his reporting, NOSENKO is not an authoritative or reliable source of information on operations against Americans by the U.S. Embassy Section and the American Tourist Section. Proven untrustworthy in other categories of operational leads, there is no reason to accept at face value NOSENKO's statement that SMITH was the only Moscow Embassy employee working with the KGB from 1953 through 1963; indeed, evidence to the contrary exists. The same may be true regarding American tourists and correspondents in Moscow, i.e., other recruitments not mentioned by NOSENKO could have occurred. Furthermore, with the questionable exception of the JOHNSON case, the KGB lost nothing of great value in consequence of NOSENKO's leads but gained an advantage by occupying the attention and facilities of American security authorities.

It is therefore concluded that NOSENKO has withheld information on recruitments of Americans in Moscow, or he is unable to provide a comprehensive review of such activities because he did not hold the claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy and American Tourist Sections. Either explanation forces strong reservations about the bona fides of NOSENKO as a genuine source, and these reservations are reinforced by the relative costs to the KGB and U.S. security authorities of the NOSENKO leads. By itself, this evaluation of his production on American cases suggests the possibility that the KGB dispatched NOSENKO to report to CIA, and that the KGB did so for the purpose of misleading the U.S. security services.

TOP SECRET

c. Operations Involving Other Westerners(i) Introduction

As already indicated, NOSENKO's principal knowledgeability of KGB operations is related to Americans in the Soviet Union. With the exception of one German and one Norwegian tourist case, his only other personal participation in third-national (i.e., non-American) operations stems from his association with the section of the Tourist Department concerned with United Kingdom and Canadian, as well as American, tourists. Where he has commented on sources for the rest of his third-national leads, he indicated his knowledge was acquired either through conversations with other officers or through his position as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department in 1962-1963. Thus he made no claim for completeness of his coverage, nor necessarily for absolute accuracy and full details on any one case. No attempt will be made here, therefore, to compare his information with other sources, except in terms of whether NOSENKO's reporting harmed the Soviets and assisted American security.

(ii) Discussion

Of the 90 third-national recruitment leads (Pages 474-502), 22 have not yet been positively identified. These cannot be evaluated at all except to point out that only two of them are potentially significant, the NATO penetration in Belgium in 1962 (which may be the same as a lead from another source) and a code clerk in the West German Embassy in Moscow in 1961. Without knowing the status of these two operations at the time NOSENKO told CIA about them, it is not possible to measure the value to us or the damage to the Soviet Union through the compromise of these cases.

Of the remaining 68 known or possible agents who have been identified, 35 were unique leads when NOSENKO provided them. No conclusive investigation results have yet been obtained on 30 of these, but the majority were said by NOSENKO to be travel agency employees (guides, bus drivers, etc.). Five of the 30 held positions of trust in their respective governments; these five leads are discussed below in terms of potential value to U.S. security and potential damage to the KGB. Of the five who have been interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO information, four denied being recruited by the KGB, including [REDACTED] (the only one of those interviewed holding a government position), discussed below. Reporting on the one remaining lead, a Dutch woman, is unclear and inconclusive--she admitted only to having been questioned while in the USSR.

Among the 35 new leads from NOSENKO, a total of five had positions of trust, with known or presumed access to sensitive information, in their respective governments:

- [REDACTED]: NOSENKO said in 1962 that the KGB was working on him when he was [REDACTED] in Moscow, but he did not know whether [REDACTED] was recruited or not.

- [REDACTED]: In 1963 he told CIA of his contacts in Moscow with Soviets whom he suspected of being intelligence officers, and in 1964 he reported a social visit in Vienna by General GORBUNOV (an operational alias of GRIBANOV), whom

he had known in Moscow. He has not been interviewed directly on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, nor has he reported a recruitment approach.

French
[REDACTED]

NOSENKO reported that [REDACTED] is either an agent or a "solid contact" of the KGB. [REDACTED] Indian

NOSENKO has identified him as a KGB agent, with no further information. Stationed at the Indian Embassy in Moscow from 1947 to 1951. [REDACTED] there is no derogatory information on him in CIA files.

Indonesian
[REDACTED] in Moscow. In 1961 NOSENKO reported that prior to 1960 or 1961 the KGB recruited the Indonesian [REDACTED]. Although NOSENKO had spelled out the name in 1962, in 1964 he could recall no such case but thought this must have been a mistake for the case of [REDACTED] who had been the [REDACTED] at that time.



Thus of the third-national leads originating with NOSENKO, five might be considered to be important because of their position in government. In two cases [REDACTED] he was not able to say whether there was a recruitment, however, while a third (assuming that there was no further confusion on NOSENKO's part) cannot be considered an important lead because of the Communist bias of the Indonesian Government. [REDACTED] position as an agent or contact loses significance in view of his previously reported support of a powerful leftist political figure. The possible importance of the [REDACTED] lead cannot be assessed without investigation results.

The William VASSALL case (Pages 503-507) was the one third-national lead which NOSENKO himself considered most important. He invariably included this lead when talking about the importance of his reporting. The British security services neverthe-

TOP SECRET

656.

less were well on their way to identifying the source of the Admiralty documents identified by GOLITSYN, having narrowed their list of suspects to 20 (including VASSALL) by 11 June 1962. When they received the fragment of NOSENKO information which focused on the British Embassy in Moscow, the number was reduced to VASSALL and one other. Although the NOSENKO information apparently confirmed the already solid suspicions of VASSALL, there is reason to believe that the identification would have been accomplished without this information. The lead was therefore not new or exclusive information, and NOSENKO himself admitted in 1964 that he knew that GOLITSYN had known of the case from the latter's work in the Information (Reports) Department.

Of the identified third-nationals whom NOSENKO said were being targetted or investigated by the KGB, none held positions of significance, with the sole exception of the then member of the British Parliament, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ whose personal life and career the Soviets subsequently attempted--with considerable success--to destroy through a campaign of scandal.

(iii) Remarks

On the basis of the above examination, NOSENKO's information on KGB operations against third-nationals cannot be considered a positive factor in the assessment of his bona fides. As a possible negative factor in consideration of his bona fides, the insignificance of NOSENKO's reporting on third-national leads must be measured against the criteria of his claimed access and contrary evidence. In the case of foreign tourists his leads show--and he himself has commented--that such recruitments were of no particular value; assuming that NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, he should be able to make such a statement without challenge. To date no independent evidence of foreign tourist recruitments has emerged which contradicts him. Operations against other Western embassies in Moscow are a slightly different matter. NOSENKO's information, or lack thereof, cannot be evaluated on the basis of completeness because he has made no claim to full access to such information or to positions which would have given him better access. Except for those he said he was informed of in connection with possible use against U.S. Embassy targets, he has usually sourced such third-national leads as he did have to particularly close relations with the responsible case officer. It would not be valid to argue that a source of one lead should have told him of others, or that he should have had more close friends in the KGB. Thus on all applicable criteria, the NOSENKO leads to operations against third-nationals must be excluded as a factor weighing for or against his bona fides.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

657.

4. Technical Operations Against the U.S. Embassya. Discussion

In reporting on KGB microphones in the U.S. Embassy (Pages 248-269), NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were at that time "four or five points," later adding a sixth, from which conversations were heard. They included the offices of the Minister Counselor, the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Air Attache, one (unidentified) "State Department employee," and the Agricultural Attache. He also referred to a non-productive microphone in the code room but did not count this as one of the points. NOSENKO did not supply details of the information which the KGB obtained from any of these microphones except to make general allusions to the importance of the materials from those in the offices of the Minister Counselor and the Military Attache. He stressed that the existence of these microphones was the KGB's "biggest secret" and that only a very few people knew of them. In 1964 NOSENKO gave more details and provided a written list of the offices where microphones were actively monitored in 1960 and 1961.

NOSENKO's information on the microphones would appear, on the basis of the findings of the sweep team in 1964, to be generally accurate. Where NOSENKO reported there was no production but microphones were found audible, the discrepancy could be explained by KGB technical failure to receive the intercepts after they left the point at which the sweepers tested; where NOSENKO reported materials were obtained (such as from the Air Attache's office) and the sweepers found the microphone inaudible, it could be conjectured that the microphone died between early 1962 and the date of the sweep in 1964. However, NOSENKO's reporting did not harm the Soviets, because GOLITSYN knew and had reported on one specific microphone, and another earlier (and probably compromised) source had also reported that the microphones were there. The microphone known to GOLITSYN, when located and traced back to the point where its wires left the building, would lead to the uncovering of all the other microphones, as in fact happened with the find in Room 1008 (Page 256).

NOSENKO was unable to expand on his microphone information after his defection. Questioned repeatedly for details of the operation or examples of the product of these microphones, he gave almost no operational details* and could supply only the same three generalized examples of their product which he had already given in 1962: the unproductivity of the code room microphones;

* One of the few concrete incidents which NOSENKO recounted connected to the microphone operation (with the exception of the North Wing planning, see below) was the loss of a document reporting the product from one of the microphones; GOLITSYN had already told the same story (Page 255). GOLITSYN said he was present during the search for this document and it was under these circumstances that he learned specifically that there was a microphone in the office of the Minister Counselor. NOSENKO in 1962 stressed that this microphone was the most important in the Embassy.

TOP SECRET

the Minister Counselor's dictation, including fitness reports which NOSENKO said were of operational interest to the KGB but could not say how many of them there were or whom they concerned; and the Military Attache's planning of trips which permitted the KGB to seize equipment in Stalingrad in 1955. Of these three examples given by an officer who said he culled all the microphone materials for two years, one concerned a non-operating and therefore useless microphone, the second concerned a microphone (in the Minister Counselor's office) already reported by a previous defector, and the third concerned a well known incident which took place years earlier (and which NOSENKO should have planned and helped conduct, according to his claimed position in 1955; NOSENKO said he played no such role).*

In 1964 NOSENKO brought to CIA a sheet of paper which he said was in KOVSHUK's handwriting and which had been obtained in 1960 or 1961 during a conference (Pages 250-251): This, he said then, was how he knew of the exact locations of all the actively

* A comparison between NOSENKO's third example and a 1956 message from a sensitive source [redacted]

[redacted] reveals similarities which may not be coincidental.

- NOSENKO (11 June 1962; see Page 260): "We are listening to your Military Attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machinery and what targets interest them... Some of the things they say are surprising. They discuss, among other things, where to go, what to see, what to take with them - electric equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely certain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955..."

- Sensitive source, 1956 (see Page 254): "... All rooms are being monitored by the KGB... The 'flap' involving the American direction - finding specialists in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955 was organized by the KGB because conversations were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valuable direction-finding equipment from the American Intelligence officers..."

It is possible that both NOSENKO and the sensitive source were reporting a well-known event, because GOLITSYN reported in 1962 that the 1955 Stalingrad incident was written up in KGB training materials as an example of Second Chief Directorate work. The training version may have included the role of the microphone information (although GOLITSYN did not report that it did), which may thus have come naturally to the attention of NOSENKO and the sensitive source. However, this would call into question NOSENKO's allegation of direct access to all of the microphone product.

monitored and productive "points" in 1960-1961. NOSENKO was not able to explain why he would need this list to know the locations of the microphones when he had been daily receiving, selecting, and distributing the product of all of them for two years. Similarly, it was never clear why NOSENKO did not remember in 1962 that there were eleven points--as the list showed--rather than the four-to-six NOSENKO reported on in 1962.

NOSENKO's account of how the product from the microphones was distributed and exploited would inevitably mean that all KGB case officers who had served in the U.S. Embassy Section since the microphones were installed would know of their existence--despite any effort to paraphrase and disguise the product as "agent reports." NOSENKO nonetheless maintained in 1962 that "it is a tremendous secret that we are listening to you," and that the microphones were known to so few that any countermeasures the Americans might take on the basis of NOSENKO's statements could reflect dangerously on him as the source.*

Accepting at face value NOSENKO's claimed lack of aptitude and interest in technical matters, and therefore his inability to provide specific technical details concerning electronic operations against the American Embassy, it is still noteworthy that:

- NOSENKO did not know the purpose of the so-called "Moscow beam," sometimes saying it was to jam Embassy communications and at other times that it was used to monitor them.

- Although he claimed to have personally participated in the planning for the installation of audio devices in the North Wing of the Embassy, he did not know of the existence or the purpose of the coaxial cables and grill found there by American technicians in 1964. (NOSENKO insisted that there were no audio devices installed in the North Wing at the time of its renovation for occupancy by Americans.)

- NOSENKO knew nothing of the general lines of research and development to substitute for or improve the fading microphone coverage of the U.S. Embassy.

These three points relate to aspects of the KGB's audio-technical attack on the U.S. Embassy in which the reporting of a source in NOSENKO's claimed position, no matter what his technical aptitude, could have been detrimental to Soviet interests.

* Both GOLITSYN and the 1956 source cited on Page 254 were First Chief Directorate officers. That they both knew of the microphones suggests that NOSENKO exaggerated the sensitivity of the microphone operation, which had moreover always been assumed by the Embassy to be active.

TOP SECRET

b. Remarks

NOSENKO's sourcing of his information on electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was unclear and unlikely. His knowledge of the location and production of these microphones, as well as the existence, nature, and purpose of other electronic operations directed against the Embassy, was not commensurate with his alleged position in the U.S. Embassy Section and his particular responsibility for audio operations. Significantly, the essential element of the information which NOSENKO did report, the existence of the microphone in the Minister Counselor's office, would presumably have been considered by the KGB to have been compromised six months earlier, with the defection of GOLITSYN. Discovery of this microphone, as an outgrowth of action on GOLITSYN's information, would have led to all the others. Thus the Embassy microphones must have been considered by the KGB to have been compromised before NOSENKO first spoke of them in 1962. Added to this is the fact (supported by NOSENKO himself) that the efficiency of the Embassy microphone installation as a whole had seriously diminished by late 1961 or early 1962 due to, first, normal deterioration of equipment and wiring and, second, the installation of secure rooms and the implementation of more stringent security precautions at the Embassy. For these reasons and in the absence of any information concerning other forms of electronic attack against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, it cannot be considered that the information provided by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1964 was harmful to the interests of the KGB nor helpful to American authorities. NOSENKO's denial of any installations in the north wing, in the light of the later discovery there of coaxial cables, the purpose of which appears serious and is as yet unclarified, and in the light of NOSENKO's specific claim to have been responsible for the operational planning for the north wing at the time it was being prepared for American occupancy, would appear to be purposeful deception.

TOP SECRET

5. The BELITSKIY Case

a. Introduction

NOSENKO reported to CIA in June 1962 (as one of the two items he wanted to sell) that one of its agents, the Soviet interpreter BELITSKIY, was in fact a KGB double agent who had been planted on CIA (Pages 517-529). NOSENKO said that this was a case run by the Second ("Active Line") Section, but that he personally had a role in the management of the case in May 1962 in Geneva. NOSENKO was able to give certain inside information on this case; for example, he knew the nicknames used by the CIA case officers with the agent.

b. Discussion

NOSENKO's information, at least in its general outlines, was correct. CIA had been running BELITSKIY as an agent, and the CIA case officers (alias "Bob" and "Henry," the latter from Washington as NOSENKO said) had just completed a series of meetings with BELITSKIY in Geneva. Important aspects of his information were inaccurate: BELITSKIY had been recruited a year before NOSENKO's date of 1959, and in Brussels, not London. Also, NOSENKO's claim that this was a Second Chief Directorate operation aimed at enticing CIA into meetings in the USSR was not borne out by the history of the case or by BELITSKIY's conduct, although it cannot be excluded that this was a long-term objective which the KGB still sought without appearing to. NOSENKO's account of the case thus is not as accurate as could be expected if his own role in it had been as claimed.



NOSENKO's description of his own involvement is not consistent with observed Soviet practice or with operational logic. NOSENKO said in both 1962 and 1964 that he had had orders to supervise the handling of this case in Geneva in the spring of 1962. The reason was that the case officer for BELITSKIY in Geneva (ARTEMEV) was young and inexperienced and had not even worked on the BELITSKIY case before. NOSENKO was saying in effect--with the authority of direct knowledge and official responsibility--that BELITSKIY, a prominent Soviet citizen having personal contacts with well placed members of the Soviet Government, a man who had been under the ostensible control of a hostile intelligence service (CIA) for four years, was sent by the KGB to Geneva for the purpose of recontacting CIA, with prepared information, but that the KGB did not send with him the responsible case officer or any member of the section responsible for the operation. Instead, the KGB turned over the responsibility to a young and inexperienced KGB officer who happened to be in Geneva to protect the security of a delegation and who had had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even local knowledge of Geneva conditions; then, after BELITSKIY was already in Geneva, the KGB had cabled instructions that NOSENKO, who had no need to know of the case and had learned of it only unofficially from conversations in 1960-1961 with the Section Chief responsible, who had no experience or training in handling double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva

by chance with delegation security functions, should guide the other "less experienced" case officer.* As NOSENKO showed under questioning, he did not know the contents of any of the positive intelligence BELITSKIY was to pass to CIA as disinformation; he did not know BELITSKIY's Moscow or Geneva pattern of movement or contacts; he did not know in detail how or when the operation started; he did not know the nature or degree of British involvement, nor the operational details and contact arrangements. NOSENKO said that BELITSKIY had been placed on a Geneva delegation in the hope that CIA might be able to "find" and recontact him.**

c. Remarks

The circumstances above not only cast doubt on NOSENKO's version of the case and his own access but also suggest that NOSENKO did not have a theoretical appreciation of how double agents are handled. The examples he gave of his "guidance" to ARTEMEV are few in number. NOSENKO also stated in 1964 that he had arranged the actual introduction to BELITSKIY of KISLOV, the TASS man, to provide for BELITSKIY's need of a notional subsource for some of his disinformation; NOSENKO by October 1966 had apparently forgotten this event, for he stated unequivocally that KISLOV had had no connection whatever with the BELITSKIY case. NOSENKO claimed to have met BELITSKIY, but did not recognize his photo when shown it in 1966.

Did NOSENKO's report to CIA on the BELITSKIY case harm the KGB? It was useful to CIA, since despite frequently expressed doubts of BELTSKIY's bona fides, CIA was handling the operation as if it were genuine (but not intending to go to the extent of exposing to BELITSKIY CIA assets inside the USSR). (The KGB is

* NOSENKO has reported that he handled only one American agent (FRIPPEL); he had practically no knowledge of CIA nor even vicarious exposure to the substance of any other double agent operations. ARTEMEV had had extended contact with a CIA tourist agent as early as August 1958, a role in other operations against American tourists in 1959--including clandestine search (see Page 148), and continuous American Department service since then. NOSENKO did not know of the 1953-1959 operational activities of ARTEMEV, although they fell in the operational area NOSENKO claimed to have supervised at the time as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section.

** NOSENKO was seemingly unaware that BELITSKIY had contact arrangements which would presumably guarantee recontact.

aware, as Soviet Bloc counterintelligence guidance demonstrates, of the dangers inherent in having disinformation recognized as such.) The meetings in Geneva in May 1962 would have made it clear to the KGB that CIA had no intentions of meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR, and, in KGB eyes, the case may have reached the point of diminishing returns. It is perhaps significant that NOSENKO did not contact CIA and report on the BELITSKIY case until 10 days after BELITSKIY's series of meetings with CIA in Geneva had been completed, which would have given the KGB time for final appraisal of the operation's potential.

NOSENKO's account of his own role in this operation appears to have been false, and nothing in the available evidence would preclude Soviet sacrifice of this already tired operation. Since NOSENKO provided some inside details of a sensitive KGB operation which could have been known to only a few, it is difficult to find any other explanation of NOSENKO's access to this information except that the KGB briefed him about it.

TOP SECRET

6. KGB Investigations*a. Compromise of POPOV(i) Introduction

Fixing the date and cause of the compromise of POPOV, the CIA penetration source in the GRU (Pages 530-534) could affect the evaluation of NOSENKO's production. If what NOSENKO has said is basically true, his story of POPOV's compromise (which has also been reported by other sources) is not particularly important and has not harmed the KGB nor measurably assisted CIA: The KGB assumes an awareness by CIA that it conducts surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel, especially those having known or suspected American intelligence connections (as with LANGELE and WINTERS). If NOSENKO on the other hand has been incomplete or inaccurate in his statements about the compromise of POPOV, then his claims to knowledgeability on this subject must be questioned.

(ii) Discussion

The information from NOSENKO and other sources on the POPOV compromise may be collated and summarized in tabular form:

<u>Cause</u>	<u>Date Implied</u>	<u>Source</u>
KGB surveillance of WINTERS	21 January 1959	NOSENKO**
KGB surveillance of WINTERS	21 January 1959	CHEREPANOV document
KGB intercept of WINTERS letter	21 January 1959	POPOV message of 18 September 1959***
KGB surveillance of U.S. Embassy officer	none	 sensitive source
KGB surveillance of LANGELE	4 January 1959	GOLITSYN, from the KGB orientation paper on the POPOV case *****
KGB agent	prior to 23 November 1957	GOLITSYN*****

* Under this heading, only the compromises of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV are considered; there is insufficient collateral material available for an evaluation of NOSENKO's information on Vladimir KAZAN-KOMAREK (pages 569-570) and Alfred SLESINGER (Pages 571-575).

** NOSENKO reported that the KGB observed WINTERS mailing a letter which, upon being checked, was found to be addressed to POPOV; he has contradicted himself about whether the KGB applied metka to this letter.

*** POPOV is believed to have been under KGB control in composing this letter.


(Footnotes continued on next page.)

TOP SECRET

The only other evidence available is analytical. POPOV was transferred to the Illegals handling unit in Berlin on 28 June 1957, an assignment of high sensitivity. Until mid-August he handled five Illegals, thereafter only one, TAIROVA, in October 1957. Following home leave from 12 December 1957 to 19 January 1958, he was again transferred, this time to a position where Illegals and productive GRU sources of intelligence were not exposed to him. Between March and November 1958 there were signs of a KGB investigation of the Illegals handling unit where POPOV formerly served, and he was recalled to Moscow in November of that year. These facts can be interpreted as follows:

- POPOV's status as a CIA source was not compromised before his transfer to the Illegals handling unit.

- POPOV's status was compromised before his recall to Moscow in November 1958, probably before his reassignment from the Illegals handling unit in January 1958, and possibly some time earlier. The latter possibility is apparent from the Soviets' knowledge that the TAIROVA couple was under surveillance in December 1957 (and until March 1958); it is also noteworthy that, after having met five Illegals in less than one and one-half months prior to 13 August 1957, POPOV subsequently was involved personally with only one other, TAIROVA, in October 1957.

- The KGB, realizing that POPOV was a CIA source, chose to keep him in Berlin until November 1958 in order to investigate the possibility of his operating in conjunction with other CIA sources.

This line of reasoning, if accepted, would confirm GOLITSYN's information that a KGB agent compromised POPOV prior to the arrival of ZHUKOV in Berlin, an arrival date falling some time before 23 November 1957.

(Footnotes from preceding page.)

*****Since such orientation papers are written for general circulation within the KGB, it is doubtful that KGB security practices would permit their contents to reveal sensitive information; other sources have indicated that orientation papers sometimes are sanitized; this particular paper, however, reportedly did state that the KGB learned from an agent in about 1957 (GOLITSYN's estimate) that American Intelligence had a source which had provided GRU information.

*****This date, which is consistent with that cited in the final sentence of the preceding footnote, was derived from the time when POPOV reported the presence of the KGB officer ZHUKOV in Berlin; according to GOLITSYN, ZHUKOV was sent to Berlin after POPOV had been identified by a KGB agent as being a source of CIA.

TOP SECRET

(iii) Remarks

The completeness and accuracy of NOSENKO's information on the compromise of PCPOV, supported as it is by [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV document and POPOV's message but contradicted by GOLITSYN and analytical evidence, cannot be finally evaluated. Only with resolution of the bona fides of NOSENKO can a judgment be made on this part of his production.

TOP SECRET

b. Compromise of PENKOVSKIY*(i) Introduction

Because his direct responsibility for coverage of ABIDIAN is an essential element in NOSENKO's story of his 1960-1961 career, because he insists that the KGB had no idea of U.S. involvement in the PENKOVSKIY case until Richard JACOB went to the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962, and because he is adamant on the point that the KGB until almost the end of the PENKOVSKIY case knew of no connection between PENKOVSKIY and the Pushkin Street site which ABIDIAN visited, NOSENKO's story of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY appears to bear directly on the question of NOSENKO's bona fides. Each of the various versions of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY must be examined and compared with NOSENKO's story and with the established facts.**

(ii) Discussion

[redacted] sources agree on the cause, and two on the timing. NOSENKO, [redacted], and the "official KGB report" attribute the compromise to the fact that surveillance detected a meeting between Mrs. CHISHOLM and the Soviet whom the KGB later identified as PENKOVSKIY. NOSENKO dated this as around November or December 1961, the official report stated this occurred on 30 December 1961, and [redacted] did not give a date.

[redacted] gave the cause as surveillance, but of Greville WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY rather than Mrs. CHISHOLM, and stated that the compromise dated from May 1962. [redacted] gave two different accounts, one that PENKOVSKIY was investigated for reasons unrelated to any suspicions of espionage and was thereby found out as a spy, the other that his excessive spending and sale of foreign merchandise led to an investigation which resulted in detection of his espionage activities. She placed the timing of the first version in 1961, without citing the time of year; in the second, she associated the timing with a warning against association with PENKOVSKIY which she and her husband received in about November 1961.

[redacted] Since

* See Pages 535-547 for discussion of this case.

**It does not seem unusual for several sources to have reported on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY: Presumably this was the subject of widespread discussion within the two Soviet services, for it was covered in the Soviet press and in at least one "official report" disseminated by the KGB. Although their differing situations within the Soviet services could partially explain the differing versions that these sources have given, some of them nevertheless have claimed either direct knowledge of the compromise or specially informed sub-sources. Therefore the discrepancies among the reporting of NOSENKO on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, the accounts by other sources, and the facts on the handling of the case by CIA and MI-6 are pertinent to the question of NOSENKO's bona fides.

TOP SECRET

DATE 4/12/94

LOST/MISSING MATERIAL

THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.

DOCUMENT NO. _____ DATED: _____

OR

PAGE(S) ~~667~~ 667

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CIA JOB NO. _____

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FOLDER NO. 2

PENKOVSKIY that he had visited the site after he chose it in 1960, although it is possible, especially as he had not been informed of ABIDIAN having been sent to check on a possible signal from him about the dead drop. sensitive source



[redacted] however, makes it clear that the ABIDIAN visit was not the first observed activity at Pushkin Street to stir KGB investigative interest in the site. As the report states, when massive surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected an American visiting this address the first time, he was not followed inside by surveillants, but on the second occasion he was followed closely and the surveillant observed that he was kneeling down apparently tying his shoe. * [redacted] went on to say that, although this was not very unusual, it was sufficient to arouse suspicion in view of the fact that this American had been observed visiting the same address on two occasions for no apparent reason. There is no question about the fact that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street drop site on one occasion only, and that was on 30 December 1961. The reference to this as a second visit to this address by an American from the Embassy is a clear indication that the KGB had surveilled the first such visit, which was made by the CIA officer MAHONEY** in January 1961, and not by ABIDIAN. Thus where [redacted] erred by indicating one American went to Pushkin Street twice, the KGB must have known that MAHONEY went there first, in January 1961 and ABIDIAN went there next, on 30 December 1961. [redacted] said that the 24-hour fixed surveillance resulted from the second visit, and because of it PENKOVSKIY was subsequently observed to enter the vestibule of this address but did not visit anyone there. It was determined that no one living at that address knew PENKOVSKIY and he became a target of KGB suspicion and investigation.

The rest of the [redacted] story is completely in disagreement with the facts of the case and does not warrant discussion here. It must be noted, nonetheless, that this is the only instance among all the versions which places the compromise on the American side of the case, and the only one which makes a direct connection between the Pushkin Street dead drop and the KGB detection of PENKOVSKIY. (All others attribute the compromise to surveillance of British Embassy personnel, and NOSENKO claimed that the KGB was unaware of American Intelligence participation until the operation was terminated.) It is also in direct conflict with NOSENKO, who had no knowledge of any U.S. Embassy official visiting the Pushkin Street site prior to ABIDIAN. In this regard, NOSENKO insisted that the date of ABIDIAN's visit

* ABIDIAN reported that a woman entered the vestibule behind him while he was in there, and he knelt down pretending to tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and on up the stairs.

**NOSENKO was not aware that MAHONEY had been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer well before MAHONEY's October 1960 arrival in Moscow.

was the end of 1960 or the very beginning of 1961. Whereas in fact MAHONEY's visit was in January 1961. Despite the errors relating to loadings and unloadings of deaddrops at the Pushkin Street location after the second (ABIDIAN) visit there, this story from [REDACTED] establishes KGB knowledge of MAHONEY's casing of Pushkin Street.

Greville WYNNE's testimony concerning his interrogations by the KGB also introduced elements contradicting the versions of NOSENKO, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. As indicated in discussion of NOSENKO's story of the [REDACTED] conversation with DULACKI (Pages 536-538), the KGB was convinced that PENKOVSKIY's question about his girlfriend "ZEP" was an important allusion and they demanded that WYNNE explain it. WYNNE either had forgotten the name or had never known it, and he was unable to tell the KGB who "ZEP" was. The fact that the KGB had a recording of this 27 May 1961 conversation shows also that the KGB was at least suspicious of the relationship before that conversation took place and must have then become aware of the conspiratorial aspect of the PENKOVSKIY-WYNNE relationship by virtue of the cryptic nature of that conversation. The additional fact that the KGB surveilled WYNNE to the apartment of an unidentified officer of British Intelligence on the same day the "ZEP" conversation between WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY was monitored is evidence that both WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY were under strong suspicion of espionage as of that day, if not earlier. Nor could those suspicions have been explained away by the fact that PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE had legitimate cover reasons for contact, in view of the content of their conversation--there was nothing in their overt relationship which required secrecy or even caution in conversation.

The indication from [REDACTED] that the KGB was aware of MAHONEY's visit to the inside vestibule of the Pushkin Street site in January 1961 is not only missing from all other versions, but conspicuously so from NOSENKO's story; he claimed to know everything the KGB knew about this American dead drop site, because of ABIDIAN's visit there. NOSENKO on one occasion said that he thought an American tourist (not a U.S. Embassy officer) might have visited the site a year or two earlier than ABIDIAN.

(iii) Remarks

NOSENKO did not know or did not report to CIA that the only other American who had visited the Pushkin Street dead drop area was MAHONEY. This fact suggests that either NOSENKO was deliberately withholding from CIA information of vital importance in the PENKOVSKIY compromise, or he was unaware of the KGB's possession of this information, despite his claimed position in the U.S. Embassy Section and responsibility for coverage of ABIDIAN. The fact that his story on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, like the "official report" of the KGB, does not show the seriousness of the evidence in the KGB's possession as of 27 May 1961 additionally points to his withholding of information on the subject of the timing of PENKOVSKIY's compromise, which was definitely no later than this date. If NOSENKO was deliberately withholding information on this subject and lying about the PENKOVSKIY compromise, then he is not a bona fide defector. If he is unaware of the information which the KGB has in its possession, then he was not in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 or 1961 as claimed, and hence his bona fides would be disproven.

c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV(i) Introduction

NOSENKO's stories on the compromises of POPOV and PENKOV-SKIY were examined for their accuracy as to timing and cause. In the case of CHEREPANOV (Pages 548-568), there is no question about when the so-called CHEREPANOV papers were passed, nor how the KGB openly learned of the U.S. Embassy's possession of the papers. The chief question is the authenticity of the documents themselves, with the subsidiary implications, if they are not authentic, that the passage of the papers was instigated by the KGB, and that there could have been neither a compromise of nor a search for CHEREPANOV, as described by NOSENKO and attested to by his travel authorization (see also Part VIII.D.8.).

(ii) The Operational Plan in Draft

Examination of one draft document--the operational plan against the CIA officer WINTERS--reveals the following points related to form:

- Although only a draft, the title of the case officer, the designation of his office, the title of his supervisor as approving authority, and the designation of his office component as well as the title of the confirming authority (the head of the department) are spelled out in full, even including the subordination of the KGB to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. KGB practice, as reported by other sources and as logic would dictate, does not require that this be done, cumbersome as these designations are, and the typist routinely fills them in as the official copy is typed from the draft.

- Although only a draft, this document has been signed by KOVSHUK as being approved, which is against common sense and KGB practice. NOSENKO himself noted this discrepancy, asking himself aloud why KOVSHUK had done this.

- Although only a draft, the name of the target of the plan appears several times, but earlier KGB defectors have stated and NOSENKO himself has confirmed that the name is left out of drafts so the typist in the typing pool will not know the identity of the subject of the report; a blank line is used wherever the name is to appear to be filled in by hand by the case officer after the document comes back from the typist.

- On the basis of references to LANGELLE and POPOV, this plan (which is not dated) would have to have been drafted sometime after October 1959. WINTERS by this time had been in Moscow since August 1958, had been detected in operational letter-mailing, and had been associating with KGB officers, etc. Neither this

TOP SECRET

operational plan nor any other of the drafts included in the CHEREPANOV package cited a KGB cryptonym for him, and he is always referred to in true name, but this is contrary to the usage in the other operational plans in the package. It is also contrary to KGB practice, as described by NOSNIKO and other sources.

- The draft cited several technical aids to be used in the clandestine study of WINTERS. It not only gives the KGB cryptonym of metka and "Neptun-80" for two of these techniques, but immediately thereafter explains for what purpose each one of them is used. In the other operational plans from CHEREPANOV, and in conformance with the established KGB practice of inserting cryptonyms for such devices, these preparations are not only not described, but the blank line typed by the typist has been filled in by hand after typing.

In addition to the above points of form, this same document contains statements which run counter to rigid KGB practice and which are internally contradictory, especially noteworthy in an approved draft. One of the objectives announced in the plan is to investigate two Soviet citizens who were detected in contact with WINTERS in Moscow; one of the two is identified parenthetically as having gone abroad. This document, if genuine, would be an admission on the part of the case officer, and an approval thereof by his supervisor, that a Soviet citizen who had been observed in contact with an identified officer of American Intelligence had been cleared by the KGB for travel abroad before the nature of that contact had been satisfactorily determined by the KGB. This is in contradiction to all available information concerning KGB travel clearances, which are denied on the basis of unauthorized contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in the Soviet Union, not to mention Western Intelligence officers. The draft, which consists of only three paragraphs, can be summarized briefly by paragraph to demonstrate the internal contradictions:

- To establish the nature of WINTERS' intelligence activities in the USSR, six special tasks will be carried out, including round-the-clock surveillance, metka, "Neptun-80," hidden microphones, other audio-devices, and investigation of already identified Soviet citizens.

- Because he already been identified as an intelligence operator, and he has a hostile attitude toward the USSR, there is no basis for recruitment; therefore the actions outlined in the first paragraph will not be carried out because they might alarm him and cause him to leave the USSR prematurely.

- Despite the statements of the second paragraph, which indicate that recruitment is out of the question and which precludes putting into effect the measures outlined in the first paragraph, this third paragraph sets forth the expectation that just before WINTERS' scheduled departure and depending on further accumulation of materials on WINTERS and the prevailing political climate at the time, an opportunity is likely to arise which will permit testing the possibility of recruiting him.

If the WINTERS operation plan were a draft like the others in this collection, the above conflicting and confusing paragraphs might be explained as variations jotted down as possible approaches to presenting a plan for the future, as yet undecided in direction. This document, however, is the one which--to NOSENKO's puzzlement--had been approved and signed in draft by KOVSHUK, as Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate. The preparing case officer, KUSKOV, had furthermore indicated to the typing pool that it was to be typed in one copy, which gives the document the appearance of a draft which had been or was about to be made a matter of official KGB record.

The foregoing review of errors, contradictions, and disregard for security considerations in preparation constitutes evidence that this is not a genuine KGB draft document.

(iii) The Summary on LANGELLE

A second document, a handwritten note in what NOSENKO identified as CHEREPANOV's own handwriting, also is pertinent to the authenticity of the papers and of NOSENKO's account on CHEREPANOV. This is a short summary of the operational activity of the CIA officer LANGELLE, covering the compromise of POPOV. The document says in part: "In January 1959 a letter with secret writing mailed by a co-worker of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow, WINTERS, was intercepted and was addressed to a Soviet citizen, POPOV, a worker of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. According to the contents of the letter, it was clearly established that POPOV was an American agent..."

This coincides precisely with NOSENKO's account of POPOV's compromise (see Pages 532 and 663). Unlike GOLITSYN's recollection of the official report which he read, there is no reference in this document to the report of about 1957 from an agent source that there was a leak of GRU information; nor is there reference to the indication that the KGB knew that LANGELLE had been posted to Moscow in order to handle a special agent, for this reason placing LANGELLE under heavy surveillance. If both of these items were in the official report which GOLITSYN read, their omission from the summary report in what purports to be CHEREPANOV's handwriting is noteworthy, particularly since CHEREPANOV was supposed to have been in the same office (room) as the case officer working against LANGELLE during the time the LANGELLE/POPOV operation was investigated by the KGB. The latter position should lend authority to CHEREPANOV's version of the compromise and termination of the case; yet GOLITSYN--informed only from the official, and presumably sanitized, account--had more detail, as well as conflicting information, on the same case. While it is reasonable that a sanitized case summary would conceal an agent source of a lead by imputing the discovery to surveillance, it seems less likely, and indeed unnecessary, to conceal a detection via surveillance by imputing it to an agent source. In thus supporting NOSENKO and others as to the cause of POPOV's compromise, and contradicting GOLITSYN (who is supported by other evidence accumulated independently), this document too appears to be a KGB fabrication.

The authenticity of another passage in the same document is likewise open to question. This is the description of LANGELLE's two visits to Lenin Hills, which the documents stated were for

TOP SECRET

the purposes of casing a drop site and putting down the dead drop, respectively. The document further stated that the dead drop had been put down for REPNIKOV, an agent of American Intelligence who had recently been arrested by the Moscow KGB. Two errors of fact in this passage belie KGB practice as known from many sources:

- There is no reason to doubt that the KGB observed LANGELLE on the two occasions of his visits to Lenin Hills, both times to case a proposed dead drop site. Both sites involved staircases, but they were two different staircases in the same general area of the Lenin Hills park. Since it is a fact that LANGELLE did not put down a dead drop on either occasion, KGB surveillance could not have seen him do so. If the KGB had reason to suspect that he had done so, but could not locate it (since it was not there), the KGB would feel the necessity--even more than in the case of ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street drop--to put 24-hour surveillance on the area for a reasonable length of time, in order to apprehend the agent for whom it was intended. The dead drop was not actually put down until 7 June 1958 (during twilight), ten days after the second casing. Assuming the KGB had not stopped its coverage of the area after only ten days, the CIA agent who did put down the dead drop must have been observed doing this. CHEREPANOV's note thus erred by attributing to LANGELLE an action which the KGB knew he had not taken and which the KGB almost certainly knew someone else had taken.

- At the time the dead drop was put down, it had not been designated for any agent, REPNIKOV included. It was a contingency dead drop, to be activated at some time in the future as necessary; the agent for whom it might have been designated could conceivably not even be recruited until long after the dead drop was loaded. REPNIKOV, identified in the document as the person intended to unload it, was not a recruited agent of American Intelligence either at the time of the drop-loading, or at any time thereafter; neither was any dead drop contemplated for him in the event that he might be recruited. Nothing that was in the drop could have suggested REPNIKOV as the intended recipient. Again, CHEREPANOV's note erroneously and groundlessly assigned the dead drop to REPNIKOV whereas in fact this dead drop was unassigned by CIA.

If this document were or purported to be the official version of the activities of LANGELLE, in typed or printed form, these errors in fact could be interpreted as intentional and part of the sanitization, or part of an effort to make the KGB investigative work look better than it was. As it is a handwritten copy, supposedly in the writing of the person who intended to give the document to the U.S. Government and harm the KGB, and since CHEREPANOV supposedly would have had access to the true facts, the absence of some comment further indicates that the document was intentionally inaccurate and incomplete.

(iv) Remarks

That at least two of the documents were not authentic is evidence that the CHEREPANOV papers were designed by the KGB for American Intelligence consumption.

There is no sensitive information contained in any of the documents; that is, they are not worth the risk of stealing either in helping the West or damaging the KGB. It is further questionable how CHEREPANOV was able to steal drafts destined for destruction which are dated August 1958, March 1959, and so on, if he had not acquired his motivation of bitterness against the KGB until 1961, as indicated by NOSENKO and other sources. It is also possible to question numerous other aspects of the CHEREPANOV case, some dating from the earliest known history of the man and others more recent. This seems unnecessary in view of the analysis of the WINTERS document and the LANGELLE summary.

It follows that the CHEREPANOV incident was a provocative plan of the KGB. NOSENKO's story about CHEREPANOV, a mutually confirming source on KGB affairs, must be interpreted as an indication that he has deliberately lied in reporting on the CHEREPANOV case and his part in the investigation, now shown to have been spurious. He has also lied in attesting to the validity of the CHEREPANOV documents and thereby to the validity of his own information on the same topics which those documents also covered.

TOP SECRET

NOSENKO claimed to have had a direct role as the supervising case officer in the BELITSKIY case in its 1962 Geneva phase. As a first-hand source, however, he was wrong about the origins of the operation and ignorant of the content and the operational planning of the 1962 meetings he was supposedly supervising. In this instance, as in the Edward SMITH case, NOSENKO's information is inadequate for his sourcing.

NOSENKO provided leads to nine KGB operations which had originated with the First Chief Directorate. Six of these he claimed to have learned about through his friend in that Directorate, GUK, who was personally involved in most of these operations.* Of the other three, two--the Paris agent (JOHNSON) and the Brussels/NATO case--he said he picked up in bits and pieces from technicians of the Second Chief Directorate's Special Section who had assisted in them. For both of the latter operations, numerous coincidences were alleged by NOSENKO to have enabled him to obtain the fragmentary information from his sub-sources, and he was never able to clarify what parts he learned from which of the four technicians he named as sub-sources.

In describing his acquisition of information on the ninth case, "SASHA," NOSENKO has contradicted himself: He first said he had learned about "SASHA" from SHALYAPIN, providing lengthy and involved explanations of how he became acquainted with SHALYAPIN at the time of the latter's retirement from the KGB in 1962. Later, under interrogation, NOSENKO did not recall his statements that SHALYAPIN was the original source of the "SASHA" story, first attributing it to others and later saying that he could not remember when and from whom he first heard it, but SHALYAPIN and others had talked about it. This was despite the fact that by the time he heard of "SASHA" he had already met and agreed to cooperate with CIA; furthermore, when asked if "SASHA" was an important lead, he agreed that it was a serious matter. Except for this one occasion he had consistently failed to appreciate the significance of such a lead, indicating that it was not considered important in the KGB.

Also casting doubt on his sourcing of "SASHA" is the fact that, in his first reference to "SASHA" and the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, NOSENKO said he had learned of this item from SHALYAPIN, whereas later he said it was not from SHALYAPIN (but he could not identify another source from whom he had heard this detail).

Regarding NOSENKO's leads to other Westerners, the case of the "illegal" in Canada--~~the RCMP's~~ the RCMP's ~~source~~ is particularly ~~relevant~~ as to sourcing. NOSENKO first said his friend GUK had told him of the case unofficially, GUK having been involved in the operation in Moscow. When asked why GUK should be involved in a Canadian case in 1963 when he was supposedly working in the First Chief Directorate's American Department against American targets, NOSENKO retracted his initial statement and said that GUK somehow got in contact with him, not as a KGB officer but simply as an acquaintance. Despite the non-official nature of GUK's relationship as thus implied by NOSENKO, GUK was able to tell him all the operational details concerning ~~the case~~ except his name. This case has an odd

*Although he had met GUK many years before, NOSENKO indicated that they did not become friends until his visit to Geneva in 1962, and only then did GUK begin to reveal operational details to him.

TOP SECRET

aspect which NOSENKO failed to see: He said that this man had come to Moscow on a Soviet visa issued on a separate piece of paper, rather than entered in the man's passport, so that there would not be a permanent record of his travel to the USSR. This implies, and [REDACTED] confirmed, that he travelled under his true name to Moscow. [REDACTED] furthermore confirmed that he had gone as a tourist, entering the USSR on a Soviet tourist ship. In view of the First Chief Directorate's operational jurisdiction in this otherwise normal tourist, there was an obvious necessity for coordination between the First Chief Directorate's American Department and the Second Chief Directorate's Tourist Department, to prevent any slippage (such as NOSENKO described in the SHUBIN case, when the CRU failed to coordinate with the KGB). Yes despite logical professional need-to-know on NOSENKO's part, he first made his own knowledge unofficial, and then his subsource's knowledge unofficial as well.

NOSENKO was unable to explain how he had learned of the case of [REDACTED] French [REDACTED]. When pressed for a subsource, he claimed that he had attended a reception at the Indian Embassy in 1953 or 1959 with GRIBANOV, and when GRIBANOV told him to take a glass of wine to [REDACTED] he understood somehow that [REDACTED] was an agent of GRIBANOV's.

His sourcing for the case of the French businessman, [REDACTED] (Page 484), is not unlike that of [REDACTED]. He said he had known that there was a French businessman who was an agent. On one occasion when NOSENKO was duty officer for the Second Chief Directorate a call for GRIBANOV came in and he asked who was calling. When he was told it was [REDACTED] then he knew somehow that this was GRIBANOV's agent.

3. Remarks

NOSENKO's errors concerning "ANDREY" (particularly his early insistence that "ANDREY" had left Moscow years before NOSENKO entered the KGB) make it impossible that NOSENKO could have learned of the case in the way he later said he did.

NOSENKO's accounts of how he learned of the "Paris agent" are vague and vary with each telling; they also depend heavily on coincidence. It is noteworthy too that he claimed to have been told of this one operation by no less than four individuals, whereas the rest of what he learned of First Chief Directorate operations in eleven years of KGB service came from only two other individuals. Furthermore, his knowledge of "SASHA" stemmed from elaborate and apparently contrived sourcing which he himself was unable to reconstruct when pressed for exact details. NOSENKO's inability to give any clear and consistent account of how he heard of either the "Paris agent" or "SASHA" must be judged in the light of the fact that he first heard of both cases only just after promising to collect such information for CIA. Because these were among the most important and the most fortuitous items he ever picked up, it could reasonably be expected that he would remember how he did so, especially since only a little over a year elapsed until his next meeting with CIA.

NOSENKO's sourcing for the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] leads seems illogical and fabricated. It also appears that NOSENKO has given an inaccurate version of the way in which he would have learned of [REDACTED] (not an illegal as NOSENKO indicated, but an agent).

TOP SECRET

D. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career

1. Introduction

What follows is an examination of NOSENKO's accounts of his Soviet Intelligence career, beginning with the years 1951 and 1952, in the naval GRU and continuing with his 11 years in the U.S. Embassy Section and the Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO's naval service opens the discussion primarily because, according to his story, it provided a springboard for his entrance into the KGB in 1953 with the rank of lieutenant.

The discussion of each period in his career has two central topics: First, NOSENKO's own description of his positions, responsibilities, and access; and second, an assessment of this description from the point of view of internal consistency, accuracy, and the commensurability of his knowledge, operational activities, and performance with his claimed senior and responsible posts with the KGB and his rise to these posts. This assessment is based on a comparison of the information supplied by NOSENKO with collateral information from a variety of overt, official, defector, and clandestine sources.

NOSENKO's accounts of the various periods in his career are, of course, cumulative in that his claimed positions and activities during one stage necessarily affect those of succeeding periods. Insofar as possible, each period is evaluated within itself and independently of conclusions earlier reached.

TOP SECRET

2. Naval GRU Service

a. Introduction

NOSENKO's accounts* of his naval GRU service (Pages 64-77) have been reviewed for their internal consistency and credibility, and examined for accuracy against information from other sources.

b. Discussion

Briefly, the outlines of NOSENKO's account of his military service are about as follows:

- He studied for the equivalent of 7th, 8th, 9th and part of 10th school years in naval schools in Kuibyshev, Baku and Leningrad. This would normally have nothing to do with military service, except that NOSENKO says he took the military oath at the Baku School in the fall of 1943, at the age of 16. (According to available collateral information, the oath--formal entry into the military forces--was at no time given before the age of 17, and never for purposes of "show" or "morale" as NOSENKO claimed it was here.) He claims to have deserted this school after taking the oath. Also, he shot himself in the hand only about two months after starting anew later the same year in the naval school in Leningrad and never finished school properly.

- He was commissioned in the "reserves" in 1947 after completing his second year at the Institute of International Relations in Moscow. However, he cannot remember what branch of the service he was in, except that it was not the navy. He avoided active military duty thereafter by voluntarily doing military translations at the Institute. While at the Institute he contracted venereal disease at least twice and this went on his record.

- In the spring of 1950, he was assigned to the Navy by a mandate commission at the Institute. However, he failed one of his examinations ("Marxism-Leninism") upon completion of the Institute of International Relations later in 1950 which delayed his diploma--and hence entry into the service--until successful re-examination later that year. (At about the same time, he was considered and turned down by the KGB [then MGB] because of his school record, drunkenness, and other bad marks in his record.)

- He was processed for entry into the naval GRU in 1950. He said he visited the GRU personnel office several times for interviews and to fill out questionnaires and write his personal history in connection with the required security check. He was accepted into naval GRU despite a record which showed desertion, self-inflicted wound in

* There is no single account of this period of NOSENKO's life which can be examined because NOSENKO has altered the circumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next.

wartime, drunkenness, venereal disease, still-valid marriage to a State criminal's daughter, rejection for MGB employment, and a bad academic record including failure of a course in Marxism-Leninism just at this time.

- He was called to active duty as a senior lieutenant on 12 March 1951, and without any indoctrination or training, he departed four or five days later in civilian clothes for his first duty station, Sovetskaya Gavan' in the Soviet Far East. NOSENKO claims to have chosen this post, considered generally to be the least desirable of all naval assignments, on his own initiative, to prove to his father that he was a man. (The above was his account in 1966, in all earlier accounts he said he went to the Soviet Far East in the fall of 1950, and in fact said that he had two months' leave in 1952, one for each of two years there. However, according to the 1956 account, his service there lasted only one year.)

- In Sovetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO's job was to extract information from American publications reporting naval developments. Asked in April 1964 for any personal account of his own work, NOSENKO was able to think of only "four or five trips" on small ships to the coast of Sakhalin,* and three to Hokkaido, to drop or pick up agents. His own role, he said, was as a trainee; he was taken along only "to learn how it was done;" he himself never trained or dispatched any agents, nor did he know the identities or missions of any others. He also could not describe the ships he had travelled on. Questioned on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan' in 1965, NOSENKO insisted that this city is located in Primorskiy Kray, although it is actually located in Khabarovskiy Kray.**

- NOSENKO said he returned on routine leave (or, according to other accounts, because of having contracted tuberculosis) in April 1952. He then spent two months either in his parents' Moscow home or, according to other accounts, in a sanatorium near Moscow under treatment for tuberculosis. He said he was coughing up "half a glass of blood at a time." (X-rays and medical examinations from February 1964 have detected no indications that NOSENKO ever suffered from tuberculosis.)

- At this time, the summer of 1952, NOSENKO said he was offered in Moscow an opportunity to attend the GRU strategic intelligence school, the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but turned it down because he had already studied most of the course matter in the Institute of International Affairs; Besides, NOSENKO said in October 1966, he failed the physical examination when sugar was discovered in his faeces.

- NOSENKO was then transferred--without returning to the Far East--to the Intelligence Staff of the Baltic Fleet at Baltiysk. He invented a story in 1964 about going there

* In October 1966 NOSENKO was asked whether he had ever been to Sakhalin; his answer was no.

** This is the equivalent of being stationed for a year in Portland, Oregon and thinking oneself in California.

681.

via Naval Intelligence Points in Berlin, Rostock, and Sassnitz, but then said this was a lie he told because he felt his interrogators would not believe him if he had said he successfully turned down an assignment to these points, then closing down, and had travelled directly to Baltiysk. (As pointed out to NOSENKO, the assignment to the cold, damp Baltic climate of a recent TB-sufferer appears unthinkable, particularly when that person is a Government Minister's son; he acknowledged this but said, "There were no other positions available.")

- He could not remember the name of the place he served near Baltiysk. He had named it as Primorsk in 1962 (which fitted his description of its size and location) but from 1964 on insisted it was Sovetsk. There is no such village in the area, but there is in the region a well-known city by that name (the former Tilsit) far inland and far away. He did not know (as contemporary Soviet maps show) that a rail line went to Baltiysk from Primorsk.

- In the Baltiysk area, he claimed in 1962, he had trained agent teams to be sent behind enemy lines in time of war. Under interrogation in 1964 he changed his description of his functions, saying he merely prepared training materials and delivered supplies, never having direct contact with or knowledge of the agent work. His service there was limited to about six months, since he said he left there at the beginning of 1953. He either had had one or two leaves from there, depending on which telling is accepted: In 1964 NOSENKO said that in August or September 1952 he was given a special leave from his duties in Sovetsk to travel to Moscow in order to formalize his divorce from his first wife; in April 1966 he wrote that he was divorced during his leave before going to Sovetsk.

- NOSENKO said he returned to Moscow on his own initiative and against the wishes of his commanding officer at the end of 1952 and began steps to get out of the GRU. He has told conflicting stories of where he stayed and in what leave status. It was during this period, he said, that his conversation with KOBULOV led him to shift to the KGB.

- In April 1966 NOSENKO wrote that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Services while stationed in Sovetsk. In earlier accounts he said that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while stationed in the Soviet Far East.

c. Remarks

The notes above on NOSENKO's career do not treat most of the changes of story, contradictions, corrections, or inaccuracies in NOSENKO's accounts: Variations of dates may be attributable to faulty memory, changes in the story might have resulted from his own elaborations and exaggerations, and inaccuracies might be explained by his inattention or indifference to detail. If all the details were to be considered, the story would become even more confused.

Certain general aspects stand out, however:

(1) If his story of his personal life is true [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], NOSENKO would, according to all available information, not have been accepted into the naval GRU, one of the particularly sensitive parts of the navy. Either the life history is false, or the GRU officer service is, or both.

(2) The story is vague, unsubstantial, and contradictory; no substance has been added to the base outlines of the story despite frequent questioning. One might expect of an educated or reasonably intelligent person some recollection of military service completed 10 years earlier--the locations where he served, whether he did or did not have TB, how and when he entered or transferred from one place to another, and what he did or what he experienced.

(3) NOSENKO's knowledge of military procedures, of the navy, and of the units with which he served is practically non-existent. He has provided no reason whatever to make one believe that he actually was a naval officer.

(4) The functions he claims to have fulfilled involved no direct involvement or personal responsibilities: They sound like the bare outlines of a legend, not like real life or personal experience.

That this period is fictitious is supported by the findings of the psychologist (Pages 605-611).

NOSENKO's description of his naval GRU service cannot be accepted as true. On the basis of his statements, it appears moreover that he was never a naval officer, nor an officer of any other regular military service.

Since NOSENKO claims that his GRU status and service provided him the platform for a transfer into the KGB (without such formalities as medical examination, personnel interviews or questionnaires), this conclusion is relevant to his claim of KGB staff status from 1952 or 1953.

3. Entry into the KGBa. Eligibility

The previous section discussed NOSENKO's eligibility for admission to the naval GRU and concluded with the remark that, on the basis of what NOSENKO has told CIA about his earlier life, he could not have been accepted for service in Naval Intelligence. According to information available to CIA from several knowledgeable sources, the KGB has more stringent entry requirements than any other Soviet organization. The candidate's family background, personal conduct, and Party or Komsomol record must be impeccable. NOSENKO would have American Intelligence believe that in his case the KGB--specifically the officers responsible for signing their names to the approval--accepted a person whose record showed (as noted on pages 679-680 above) desertion from the armed forces, self-inflicted wound in wartime, drunkenness, venereal disease, previous marriage to the daughter of a state criminal, a bad academic record including failure of a course in Marxism-Leninism, and a prior rejection by the KGB itself. The only change since the earlier rejection had been, according to NOSENKO, two years of undistinguished military service in the Naval GRU.

Moreover, during this naval duty NOSENKO said he had contracted tuberculosis, for which he was still under treatment at the time he entered the State Security Service. NOSENKO has indicated on separate occasions that his illness was a matter of record with the GRU, and that the reason he did not have to take a physical examination for entry into the KGB was the availability of GRU records. According to DERYABIN, however, KGB regulations at that time would have precluded admission to KGB ranks if there was a recent history of tuberculosis even though already arrested.

b. Date of Entry

NOSENKO has given a variety of dates for his entry on duty with the KGB and has provided several reasons for his changes of story (Pages 86-89). During his first meeting with CIA, when NOSENKO gave a brief personal and professional autobiography, he said that he had joined the KGB in February or March 1953. In 1964, however, first while still attached to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation and later when reviewing and signing a biographic history prepared by CIA on the basis of his own account, NOSENKO set this date back a year, to early 1952. During the interrogations of April 1964, after naming several other dates, NOSENKO returned to the original one, March 1953, and has remained with this version since that time. NOSENKO has given two different reasons for this change of dates (which, he said in October 1966, was conscious deception). In the April 1964 interrogations, he explained that he had failed his examination in Marxism-Leninism at the Institute of International Affairs, which forced him to take all his exams over again and delayed his career: This was "unpleasant," NOSENKO said, and he was attempting to conceal it from CIA. In the October 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO gave a new and different reason. He described how he had been rejected for employment by State Security while at the Institute and was trying to cover up for this because he thought CIA would not believe that he had first been rejected and then, later, accepted by the KGB.

NOSENKO's change of story took place in 1964 while still in the relatively relaxed circumstances of an operational meeting in Geneva; he came back to his original account only during the April 1964 interrogations. NOSENKO's explanations of why he revised the story have been inconsistent and have forced him into

further inconsistencies. Because of this and, in the absence of any pressure of any kind (including any apparent psychological pressure) to lie about his date of entry, the most logical explanation for this change is that NOSENKO forgot in early 1964 either when he joined the KGB and/or what he had told CIA in 1952. DERYABIN has commented on the significance which the date of entry holds for a KGB officer. He expressed the opinion that it would be unusual for a KGB officer to forget this date.

NOSENKO was questioned at length by DERYABIN (Pages 616-619) concerning the timing of his entry on duty with the KGB. As a result of this interrogation it was determined that NOSENKO was unaware that at the time he said he joined the KGB, the present First Chief Directorate was designated the Second Chief Directorate and vice versa. Therefore, NOSENKO would have joined a component entitled the First Chief Directorate in March 1953, not the Second Chief Directorate as he says. NOSENKO did not know or had forgotten various other facts, including the date that the MVD was redesignated the KGB, and misstated the locations and existence of various buildings and offices in the vicinity of the KGB Headquarters building in early 1953.

In June 1962 NOSENKO said several times, in different meetings, that the KGB agent "ANDREY" (Pages 413-414) had been recruited and had left Moscow before he, NOSENKO, entered the KGB. He estimated the date as 1949-1950. NOSENKO knew that "ANDREY" was associated in Moscow with RHODES and when told that RHODES was there from 1951 to 1953, admitted that the date he gave might be wrong. NOSENKO continued to say, however, that "ANDREY" was recruited before he (NOSENKO) became a KGB officer, and later reverted again to his estimate that "ANDREY" was recruited in 1949-1950. When he returned to Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO changed this story and said that during his 1953-1955 tour in the U.S. Embassy Section he saw cipher specialist SELEZNOV, who had come there to consult on the then-active "ANDREY" case. NOSENKO was unable to explain how he could have been sure in 1962 that the "ANDREY" case was before his time; when he said in 1964 that this was not so. Dayle SMITH confessed that he was recruited by the KGB in late 1953, and records show that he left Moscow in early 1954.

c. Circumstances of Entry

NOSENKO has consistently related his entrance into the KGB to discussions he had with General KOBULOV in early 1953 in Moscow, after returning from the Baltic. However, he has changed the date of these discussions with KOBULOV virtually every time he has told this story. In June 1962, NOSENKO said he talked with KOBULOV at the NOSENKO dacha while on leave in March 1953; during the April 1964 interrogations he changed the date to February 1953; in April 1965 NOSENKO said he spoke to KOBULOV at the KOBULOV dacha in January 1953 while on leave and that he lived at home and was at the "disposal of GRU personnel" during February and March. Finally, in April 1966, NOSENKO said he first spoke to KOBULOV at KOBULOV's dacha on New Years Day 1953, that he was subsequently "resting" at a sanatorium connected with his tuberculosis of the year before, and that he spoke again to KOBULOV on the day of STALIN's funeral, while home for a few days from the sanatorium. It was at this second encounter with KOBULOV that the latter promised to concern himself with NOSENKO's entry into the KGB.

In 1962 NOSENKO described the simple procedure by which he entered the KGB, volunteering that there was no need to fill out a questionnaire (anketa) as the KGB already had his files from the GRU. In April 1964 when asked if he had not been required to fill out any questionnaires or other documents, NOSENKO described the anketa and other forms he completed (saying he took them home to do so) and his various interviews with KGB personnel officers. He was interrogated in detail on these claims by DERYABIN in 1965, to whom he gave descriptions, albeit inaccurate, of the various forms and of his visits to KGB Personnel. In 1966 NOSENKO wrote in his autobiography that there were no talks with KGB Personnel before or after his acceptance and implied that there were no forms to fill out.

d. Remarks

According to all of NOSENKO's stories, his GRU service was the springboard for his acceptance into the KGB. He met KOBULOV while home in Moscow from Primorsk/Sovetsk, he entered the KGB as a lieutenant since this was his naval rank, his admission according to the early version was facilitated by the availability of his GRU personnel file; yet CIA has concluded that NOSENKO was never a GRU officer and it appears highly improbable that he was ever in Primorsk under any circumstances.

On the basis of generally available information concerning Soviet realities at the time of NOSENKO's claimed entry into the KGB, supported by the expert testimony of DERYABIN (who was in the KGB, then MVD, in Moscow at the time and had been himself a KGB personnel officer until less than a year earlier), a person with the background NOSENKO has given could not be accepted into the KGB in the manner he claims. His health alone would seem to have precluded this, but in addition, NOSENKO described a series of incidents in his life equally likely to cause rejection. NOSENKO's mistakes, changes of story, and apparent fabrications add to the unlikelihood of his account.

It is concluded that, as in the case of NOSENKO's GRU service, either NOSENKO and those who have supported aspects of his story have seriously distorted his past life, or he did not enter the KGB.

4. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section

a. Introduction

NOSENKO claims to have served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, during the period from his entry on duty with the KGB until June 1955. His targets during these two years were at first American correspondents in Moscow and later American Army Attaches at the Embassy.

NOSENKO sought to avoid discussion of his own or other KGB activity during this period and on occasion he has tried to dismiss the whole period as "not relevant" and "of no consequence." NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he "found himself" only after his initial service in the U.S. Embassy Section. (He variously dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955, when he transferred to the Tourist Department; in June 1956, in connection with his participation in and award for the BURGI case; and after August 1956, when the death of his father forced him to pull himself together.) Before this, NOSENKO said, he was a wastrel and "did not pay attention to the work."

b. Work Against American Correspondents

NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-1954 (Pages 93-96) by saying that, as a new, very junior employee he had no access to operational files and did not participate personally in the handling of any of the correspondents. Although able to identify four correspondents in Moscow who were then recruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in conversations with his superior KOZLOV or at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer was working against these targets. NOSENKO's early months in the job were spent reading personality (not operational) files on a number of the correspondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's developmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the "agent network" of drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four of the correspondents (two of whom were recruited KGB agents at the time); he met with them periodically to determine whether they had developed any important information. Even here, however, NOSENKO appears to have been given very little responsibility: His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NOSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward whenever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents even when there was a "hint" that something of interest might develop. NOSENKO has been able to identify some of these agents, but for all but a few he recalled neither their names nor personalia concerning them.

c. Work Against Army Attaches

Regarding NOSENKO's work against American Army Attaches, he claimed a specific area of KGB responsibility, one for which he alone was accountable and one about which something was previously known from U.S. records. Only 20 months at the longest, it is

the last period in which NOSENKO had no supervisory responsibility to divert his attention from personal operational duties.

NOSENKO could not remember when he took over responsibility for the Army Attaches, and he named two other KGB officers before settling upon BUDYLDIN as the person from whom he received the Attaches' files. When belittling his earlier responsibilities for correspondents, he has said several times that he had been in that job "only about six months." Assuming that NOSENKO entered the KGB in the middle of March 1953, this would date his transfer to work against the Attaches in the fall of that year. In discussing this transfer itself, however, NOSENKO has consistently said that it took place in 1954. Asked when in 1954, NOSENKO has variously replied "at the beginning of 1954," January 1954, and May 1954. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO refused to estimate when he took over this responsibility. He has always said that he turned over these duties and transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in June 1955, when the Tourist Department was established within the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American Department case officer responsible for operations against the U.S. Army Attaches he received and was responsible for assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned information received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; microphones which were emplaced about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department*; a network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and other agents in the Embassy who together provided little useful information; permanent and roving surveillance patrols outside the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by the Attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military. The point of collecting and assimilating this information, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the Attaches were doing in Moscow and thereby to control their intelligence collection activities. Far less important was the goal of recruiting Military Attaches; NOSENKO knew of only several instances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts failed.

The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the backgrounds and personal lives of his targets--such information, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of

*On some occasions NOSENKO has said that the microphones in the Army Attache offices were his most valuable source of information on his targets of 1954-1955; at other times he has said that he knew nothing of these microphones until he reentered the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960; and at still other times he claimed to have known only of their existence during 1953-1955 but not where any were located.

control.* He has also used this explanation to support his claim that there were no recruitments of military attaches during this period.

An exception, wherein the KGB did carefully compile a great deal of vulnerability data on an Army Attache, was described by NOSENKO in connection with the approach to Walter MULE (Page 104). On the basis of these explanations, NOSENKO's knowledge of the official and unofficial activities of his alleged targets in this period deserves attention.

NOSENKO knew almost nothing about the personal backgrounds and families of the eight members of the Army Attache Office whom he identified as his targets (Pages 99-106). Although he was able to identify each by rank and position in the Embassy--sometimes inaccurately--and in a few cases to describe certain of their operational activities, he was unaware of or had forgotten such facts as:

- Colonel Earl L. MICKELSON, the Army Attache in 1954 and 1955, was arrested twice by the Militia outside of Moscow in 1954.

- Assistant Army Attache Ira RICHARDS was a language student of GROMOKOVA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent); by RICHARDS' account she sought to elicit biographic data from him during the lessons.

- William STROUD, the Assistant Army Attache, travelled to Kharkov in May 1955 to interview an American defector. (NOSENKO has identified Frank SISCOE, who accompanied STROUD, as a suspected CIA officer; he was coopted by CIA.)

NOSENKO, furthermore, was ignorant of important events, known independently to CIA, which were within the sphere of what he claimed was his direct, personal responsibility:

- NOSENKO claimed direct personal responsibility for the file of and operational activity against Lieutenant Colonel Howard FELCHLIN (Pages 101-103). He claimed to be receiving agent information on him but could not recall the names or cryptonyms of any such agents. (He said, for example: "I think FELCHLIN must have had a maid, and she would have been a KGB agent.") NOSENKO described FELCHLIN as by far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the object of special interest; yet he did not know or remember

* NOSENKO himself, when giving the reason why he did not know more details about the U.S. Embassy Section's targets while he was its Deputy Chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy overseeing subordinates; hence, NOSENKO continued, he could not be expected to remember as many such details as would be possible had he been a case officer working daily with only four or five files. In another context, NOSENKO explained why he was unable to supply the details of planning and organizing operations against tourists in the period 1955-1959; he contrasted operations against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a few days, to the work against the Military Attaches and diplomats stationed in Moscow on permanent assignments, who could be studied systematically and slowly.

TOP SECRET

anything about FELCHLIN's background, presumably well documented by the KGB because FELCHLIN had been to the USSR in two different capacities, merchant seaman and diplomatic courier, prior to arriving in Moscow as the Assistant Army Attache; also FELCHLIN had had prior official association with GRU officers in Austria, Germany, and the United States, and he continued to be in liaison with one of them in Moscow. NOSENKO could recall nothing about FELCHLIN's intelligence activities in the USSR or his trips about the country, or what had been done about them by the KGB. In speaking of FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, NOSENKO reported the KGB file noted that FELCHLIN had been caught taking photographs on some occasion, but he did not know that FELCHLIN in June 1954 was arrested in Kiev with another Assistant Army Attache, F.J. YEAGER. (Erroneously identified by NOSENKO as an Air Force Attache, YEAGER likewise should have been NOSENKO's target.) NOSENKO also did not know that FELCHLIN, with another Army Attache and two Air Force Attaches, in September 1953 had made an unprecedented train trip throughout Siberia and that six months later, at the end of March 1954, had been the subject of a newspaper article which charged that they had lost "spy documents" on the train. NOSENKO was unable to provide a date for FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, and he knew nothing of the unusual circumstances of FELCHLIN's departure from Moscow; he insisted that nobody else was declared persona non grata along with FELCHLIN. In fact, FELCHLIN was expelled along with Air Force Major Walter MCKINNEY, and the Soviets refused to permit the two to leave Moscow aboard the Ambassador's personal plane until Ambassador BOHLEN himself protested. Confronted by his lack of knowledge of the persona non grata action, NOSENKO said that he could not be expected to know the details because this incident occurred after he transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO was then told the recorded date of the expulsion, 3 July 1954, and he replied that this was not true.

- Discrepancies appeared in NOSENKO's account of one of the best known incidents in the history of KGB operations against the American officials in the Soviet Union, the subject of reports by GOLITSYN and other CIA sources and the subject of training materials. This was the seizure of sensitive technical collection equipment on 5 May 1955 in Stalingrad from three Assistant Military Attaches from the U.S. Embassy--Major John S. BENSON, Captain STROUD, and Captain MULE--and their expulsion from the Soviet Union two days later. NOSENKO claimed direct responsibility for KGB work against these officers (Pages 103-105); he described an earlier attempt to defect MULE, his own plans for seizing this equipment at a railroad station outside Moscow, and his role in developing plans for the successful operation in Stalingrad. When NOSENKO was pressed under interrogation to give the entire story of the equipment seizure and the persona non grata action, he said that the operation was carried out after he was in the Tourist Department and therefore he knew no more about it. When told that the operation took place at least a month before his alleged transfer, NOSENKO could offer no explanation for his lack of knowledge.

TOP SECRET

- NOSENKO identified George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant Air Attache in 1953 or 1954; he was a target of another U.S. Embassy Section officer, and an unsuccessful KGB development operation was carried out against him. NOSENKO did not know that VAN LAETHEM was actually an Assistant Army Attache, who left Moscow in March 1953 and was succeeded by NOSENKO's own target Walter MULE (see above). What NOSENKO additionally did not know is that in Moscow VAN LAETHEM was the Attache cryptographic security officer, the superior of Dayle SMITH (the subject of NOSENKO's "ANDREY" lead--see below) and a friend of the motor pool sergeant Roy RHODES, a KGB agent. NOSENKO furthermore did not know that on 19 March 1955, again as an Army Attache, and only two years after being transferred from Moscow, VAN LAETHEM was again sent to Moscow, ostensibly on a PCS assignment but actually on temporary duty. During this latter assignment, when NOSENKO by his own account should have been responsible for him, VAN LAETHEM was in Moscow to review the entire electronics program at the Embassy. (VAN LAETHEM's second tour in Moscow involved the planned use of the electronic equipment which was seized in Stalingrad while VAN LAETHEM was still in Moscow.)

d. Additional Reporting

His information on two other operations involving Americans was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the U.S. Embassy Section. One was the recruitment of the military cipher machine mechanic having the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see Pages 413-426 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C.). NOSENKO in 1962 was sure not only that this recruitment took place before he joined the KGB but that "ANDREY" had left the USSR by then as well; he repeatedly estimated "ANDREY's" recruitment date as "1949-1950." At all times he has claimed certainty that "ANDREY" was the last KGB recruitment in the Embassy until the time of NOSENKO's defection in January 1964. In 1964, however, NOSENKO changed his story and said "ANDREY" was active while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1954-1955. The other operation was an unsuccessful recruitment approach to the U.S. Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see Pages 468-469 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C. above) at a meeting with the KGB arranged through letters which had been sent to SMITH. This occurred in 1954 or 1955; NOSENKO said, and in support of the recruitment approach, he handled the surveillance phone-watch. SMITH admitted to U.S. authorities having received four letters from the KGB between 2 and 5 June 1956 (a year after NOSENKO dated his departure from the U.S. Embassy Section), but he denied having had any personal meetings with KGB officers.

e. Remarks

NOSENKO's accounts of the 1953-1955 period are confused, contradictory, and, when compared with collateral information, incomplete and inaccurate. He has been inconsistent in dating his shift of responsibilities within the U.S. Embassy Section, in dating his departure from the Section (viz., the timing of the Stalingrad incident and the approach to SMITH), and in dating his first knowledge of the microphones in the Embassy. Having

few new details of importance on the American correspondents, NOSENKO has proven unreliable regarding his work against Army Attaches: He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and activities of the others; and he lacked even the most important details on security affairs involving the majority of his eight alleged targets. In addition, NOSENKO has told CIA almost nothing about the work of his colleagues in the U.S. Embassy Section.

The statements by NOSENKO about this period therefore hold so little substance and the manner of his reporting was so unconvincing, that his claim to have been an officer of the U.S. Embassy Section in the years 1953-1955 cannot be true.

5. Tourist Department (June 1955 to January 1960)

a. Introduction

NOSENKO's activities from June 1955 to January 1960, his first period of alleged service with the American-British-Canadian Section of Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, are described in Pages 107-151. For the purposes of the following discussion, it is convenient to divide this period into two parts. The first of these covers the years from June 1955 to June 1958, when NOSENKO said he was a staff case officer, handling and recruiting agents and planning and managing operational activity. The second part covers NOSENKO's service from June 1958 to the beginning of 1960 as Deputy Chief of this section. Apart from his personal involvement in a number of recruitment operations in the latter period, it is this service which provides a basis for NOSENKO to claim awareness of all important arrests of spies and recruitments from among American tourists visiting the Soviet Union; it is also this service as Deputy Chief of Section which NOSENKO cites as a basis for his involvement in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALL inside the Soviet Union.

b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958)

(i) General

According to NOSENKO's story, he was among the first case officers in the Tourist Department. He arrived there just as the Department was being formed and took part with other officers assigned in the acquisition of an agent network from within inturist, in the establishment of facilities and methods, and in generally "getting things going." Several months later he participated in what he says was his first operation against an American tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-the-scenes (and hence unconfirmed) organization of an unsuccessful attempt to compromise Martin MALIA (Pages 112-113). NOSENKO's next case (the first operation in which his participation is confirmed) took place a year later, in June 1956, when he assisted in the homosexual entrapment and recruitment of Richard BURG (Pages 113-120). This recruitment, which occurred close in time to the Minister NOSENKO's death, was by NOSENKO's account a turning point in his personal and professional life. With it, NOSENKO began to acquire a sense of self-confidence and responsibility and began to "grow" from a wastrel into an effective and successful KGB officer. As a result of this operation, the first successful recruitment in the then short history of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO first came into personal contact with General GRIBANOV. According to all accounts prior to October 1966, when he retracted the claim, NOSENKO received the first of a series of KGB awards for operational performance because of the BURG case--a letter of commendation. Within a month of this operation, NOSENKO said, he was promoted from the rank of lieutenant to captain, his last promotion prior to defecting eight years later.

NOSENKO's direct operational activity in the next two years, before his appointment as Deputy Chief of the Section, was described by NOSENKO as follows: Sometime in 1957 he was involved in the attempted recruitment of the German businessman ~~XXXXXXXX~~ (Pages 120-121); after surrounding him with agents, NOSENKO

TOP SECRET

personally spoke to him. NOSENKO explained his (unconfirmed) participation in this case, which was not among the responsibilities of his section, by saying there was no KGB officer available who spoke German but [redacted] was known to speak "a little English," a language in which NOSENKO had fair fluency. In 1957 NOSENKO was also involved in the sexual and blackmarket entrapment of [redacted] Norwegian journalist (again, not a target of NOSENKO's section, being neither American, British or Canadian); NOSENKO has not explained how he came to be involved in this operation, but he said his role was that of involving [redacted] with women and blackmarketeers so that another officer, ARKHIPOV, could recruit him. [redacted] has not identified NOSENKO, but reported on an individual whose role corresponds to the one NOSENKO claimed as his own (Pages 121-122). NOSENKO's third operation in 1957 was really not an operation at all. He was assigned to accompany the British [redacted] and the latter's interpreter [redacted] on a tour of Soviet publishing houses (Page 121). NOSENKO said his purpose was only to watch [redacted] a suspected intelligence agent or officer. His presence was confirmed by [redacted] who recognized NOSENKO's photograph.

This is the sum of NOSENKO's reported, sometimes verified, operational role during the three years preceding his promotion in June 1958 to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, hereafter referred to as the American Tourist Section.

The only case of the June 1955-June 1958 period resulting in agent contacts abroad, and the one to which NOSENKO ascribed the greatest importance, was the recruitment of BURGI. For this reason, the BURGI operation is discussed in detail below, with particular attention being given to those aspects of the case which reflect upon NOSENKO's own personal role.

(ii) The BURGI Case

NOSENKO's statements of this operation generally agreed with that BURGI provided to the FBI in 1957. The part NOSENKO played in the case, both in his brief initial presence with the two homosexuals in the Moscow restaurant on the evening of BURGI's compromise (20 June 1956) and in the Kiev events (23-28 June 1956) would appear to be one normally taken by a KGB staff officer. The identities of the other two KGB participants in the Kiev recruitment, KOZLOV and PETRENKO, seem clearly established. There were discrepancies between NOSENKO's and BURGI's versions, but most of these could stem from NOSENKO's faulty memory nine years after the events. (Such discrepancies include NOSENKO's failure to remember his first Moscow meetings with BURGI; the identity, role, or even existence of the person "Anatoliy" whom BURGI says introduced him to NOSENKO and participated in the homosexual compromise; whether NOSENKO was at the Kiev airport to meet BURGI; the location of NOSENKO's bedroom in the Kiev Hotel as compared to BURGI's; NOSENKO's reference to BURGI's "interpreter" when in fact BURGI neither had nor needed one; and NOSENKO's failure to remember the unusual circumstances of BURGI's departure from Kiev.) Other contradictions and omissions in NOSENKO's reporting relate to matters of greater operational consequence:

TOP SECRET

- NOSENKO was unable to say when or how the KGB first learned that BURGI was a homosexual, nor could he remember who first proposed an operation against him.

- NOSENKO gave a confused and evasive account of his dealings with the First Chief Directorate on this case.

- NOSENKO insisted that there was no official file on BURGI, and that none was opened as a result of this operation. The initiative for the operation came, he said, from the Second Chief Directorate, and when NOSENKO traced BURGI in the First Chief Directorate, there was no information on him there.* The KGB's only information on BURGI at the time of the compromise came from BURGI's visa application (which showed him to be a professor of Russian) and a few agent reports from the preceding days in Moscow. BURGI, on the other hand, reported that during the recruitment KOZLOV, the senior Soviet present, showed knowledge of the names of BURGI's sister, mother and father and knew the sister's occupation; details of BURGI's background, work, and military service, BURGI's relations with the Russicum in Rome, which BURGI said he had never mentioned in the USSR; and BURGI's acquaintance in the U.S. with Alexander KERENSKY.

NOSENKO cited "his" recruitment of BURGI in Kiev in 1956 as one of the main reasons for his rapid rise in the KGB. BURGI's story of the recruitment, as reported to the FBI, definitely establishes NOSENKO's role as having been subordinate to that of KOZLOV--it was KOZLOV, not NOSENKO, who made the recruitment.

* DERYABIN interrogated NOSENKO on this case. NOSENKO's answers to such detailed questions as how the traces were done, how the travel to Kiev was arranged, details concerning the personnel involved, the contents of the file, and other mechanics of the case, betrayed an almost total lack of memory.

c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section

NOSENKO said that in June 1958, when the unit that had formerly handled tourists from all countries was reorganized into two sections, he was promoted from the rank of senior case officer to that of Deputy Chief of the newly created American Tourist Section. NOSENKO said that this section was the most important in the Tourist Department, and that he did not know why he, in particular, had been chosen its Deputy Chief but was certain that GRIBANOV had no voice in the decision.

d. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent Personnel

NOSENKO has named with clarity and consistency the other officers of the American Tourist Section during this period. The Soviet agents of his section whom NOSENKO has identified were mostly his own; he said that the agents were constantly shifted from case officer to case officer and hence it was "difficult to say just who handled which agents." NOSENKO said he had approximately eight Soviet agents in 1958 and about 12 or 14 in 1959, most of them employed by Inturist (Pages 109-112). With the exception of the two homosexuals, YEFREMOV and VOLKOV discussed separately below, NOSENKO cannot supply personal data on his own agents or remember specific jobs they did for the KGB.

e. Knowledge of Section's Activities

As of June 1958, according to NOSENKO, the work of the section of which he was deputy chief was "just getting going." Its mission was, first of all, to detect Western Intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the Soviet Union; only secondarily was the section directed toward the recruitment of KGB agents from among these tourists. In his new position NOSENKO was responsible for supervising other officers in the section in efforts along these lines. Because of this and because at GRIBANOV's request he personally reviewed KGB information on the use of tourist cover by Western intelligence services and KGB counteraction through 1958 (Pages 145-146), NOSENKO made a number of statements concerning these subjects during the 1955-1959 period.

CIA started its so-called "legal travel" program in 1955 and by 1958 was deeply committed to such operations. Now there is firm collateral information on what the KGB knew of this operational program. In view of NOSENKO's duties in the American Tourist Section and the section's prime mission, he should have knowledge of agent compromises during 1958 and 1959. Moreover, thanks to collateral holdings, what NOSENKO did and did not know can be compared with information from other sources. These facts are reviewed below.

(i) BLAKE

A valuable source of information for the KGB in its planning for the operational activity of its Tourist Department in the late 1950's and early 1960's was the Englishman, George BLAKE (Pages 146-147). BLAKE has confessed that in the summer of 1959 he passed the KGB a 19-page summary of the results of a three-day meeting during the first week of June 1959, between representatives of CIA and MI-6; these sessions were on the subject of "legal travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. This

summary spelled out in detail the complete CIA operational doctrine pertaining to tourist-type operations and stressed CIA's reliance on tourist agents for the spotting, recontacting, assessment, and communications support of internal assets.

While NOSENKO has displayed some familiarity with CIA modus operandi in the field of tourist operations, he has never mentioned that the KGB was in possession of documentary reporting which described these methods in full detail. NOSENKO does not appear to be aware of who BLAKE was, much less of his importance to the KGB. NOSENKO never volunteered the name of BLAKE in his debriefings, and when specifically asked in 1962 about BLAKE, the KGB agent in British Intelligence, he said that he had read the dossier and that BLAKE had been "an agent of the Second (British) Department (of the Second Chief Directorate) who was not nearly as valuable as the [redacted] or the other Englishman" (VASSALLI). By 1964 he could not recall any such agent of the British Department. When the name BLAKE was mentioned, he asked: "Who's BLAKE?"

BLAKE had, in addition, passed to the KGB a photocopy of a 21-page summary report of a second, follow-up conference between CIA and MI-6 on "legal travel" operations which was held in Washington from 20 to 25 April 1960. NOSENKO, although not in the Tourist Department at the time the latter report was received by the KGB, said that he reviewed all important materials of the American Tourist Section when he became its Chief in January 1962. Asked whether the Tourist Department had received documentary information from any agent source while NOSENKO was away from the department in the years 1960-1961, he replied that none had and that he knew of no agent who could have provided such documentary information.

(ii) GOLITSYN Document

NOSENKO in 1964 reported knowing that GOLITSYN at the time of his defection in December 1961 took with him an official top secret KGB document concerning Western Intelligence operational activity in the field of tourism (Pages 147-149). He did not mention this fact in the June 1962 meetings. Although NOSENKO also stated that this document had been prepared by the Tourist Department, he has not been able to describe the document in detail and specifically did not mention that this particular document was in large part based, as subsequent analysis has shown, upon the above-mentioned reports submitted to the KGB by George BLAKE.

(iii) Tourist Agents

NOSENKO asserted that the KGB detected no agents among American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959, and that no tourists had been caught in the act of mailing letters, servicing dead drops, or contacting agents, except one in 1959 whose name, NOSENKO said, was MacGUIRE (actually McGOWAN in 1958). NOSENKO signed a statement attesting to these facts.

TOP SECRET

The KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN, however, refers to a number of cases of American tourists who were found by the KGB to be engaged in intelligence collection or intelligence support activities. In addition to MCGOWAN, the GOLITSYN document cited the cases of SIMARD, GRAY and FRANCIS, all of them CIA agents detected by the KGB in 1958 and 1959. These years coincide with the time when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the section which was responsible for monitoring and uncovering activities of this sort, but NOSENKO has never mentioned them. Furthermore, the annual reports of the section which NOSENKO would have helped to write, by virtue of his claimed position as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section, presumably included all of these cases.

f. NOSENKO's Tourist Paper

NOSENKO was questioned at length on the review of Western tourist operations which he claimed to have written for GRIBANOV. He said he gathered the material for this study from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talking with various case officers, then took the study to GRIBANOV's office. NOSENKO could not remember whether he discussed his findings with GRIBANOV, could not give any examples of the information which he included in the report (other than statistical information on the increase in foreign tourism), could not recall what the report said about CIA tourist operations (other than there appeared to be increased use of tourists travelling by automobile), and did not know what other American Intelligence services were sending agents into the Soviet Union under tourist cover during these years. On the basis of his research for this report and his own experience, NOSENKO said he knew that KGB operations against tourists had been developing slowly and that, at the time the report was written during the tourist season of 1959, the KGB knew little about the use of tourism by the American services.

BLAKE's confession that he passed documentary information on this subject to the KGB, but more particularly the intensity of KGB operations against tourists at this time as reflected in the GOLITSYN document and other reports indicate, that this statement by NOSENKO must be erroneous.

g. The OSWALD Case

According to NOSENKO's account of his direct involvement in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD (Pages 136-144), his participation seemed to stem solely from his supervisory role as Deputy Chief of the American Section. In this capacity, NOSENKO said, he was the one who made the decision that OSWALD was "not normal" and of no interest to the KGB. On other occasions NOSENKO has reported that he made this decision together with his subordinate KRUPNOV, or that "they decided," or "it was decided." NOSENKO's information on the handling of OSWALD in 1959 is unique, and there is no collateral information against which it can be reliably measured. The results of the polygraph examination in October 1966, however, indicated that NOSENKO lied in having said that he was personally connected with any aspect of the OSWALD case and that he had heard of OSWALD before the assassination of President Kennedy. The polygraph results also indicated that the KGB gave NOSENKO special instructions on the OSWALD case and what he should tell U.S. authorities about it.

h. NOSENKO's Operational Activities (1956-1959)(i) General

NOSENKO appeared in one operation shortly after being promoted to the position of Deputy Chief, the recruitment of the American woman HARRIS in September 1958 on the basis of her romantic involvement with a Soviet male. HARRIS tentatively identified NOSENKO's photograph as that of one of two Soviets who approached her in Moscow and said that, of the two, he was "definitely the man in charge." She denied having had further contacts with the KGB after leaving the Soviet Union. In 1959, NOSENKO said, he also supervised the sexual entrapment of [redacted] but did not become personally involved in the approach, which was made by his superior DUBAS. Some time during this year, NOSENKO said, he recruited the second of his pair of homosexual agents, YEFREMOV. Beginning in the spring of 1959 he used the two in a series of successful recruitment approaches to [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted]. (In the case of [redacted], who as a commercial representative [redacted] in Moscow, was not the responsibility of NOSENKO's section, NOSENKO was asked to make the approach because he was a "specialist" in this type of operation.) In 1959 NOSENKO also used these agents in operations against two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLERFORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, in 1959 he accomplished the recruitment of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL, on the basis of sexual compromise.

(ii) The Homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

There is a preponderance of homosexual recruitment operations in NOSENKO's account of his KGB career. He has referred to several homosexual agents with whom he has worked on specific recruitment-entrapment operations, but said that he himself was never their official case officer. They include "LUCH," "STROYEV," "NIKOLAYEV," "SIBIRYAK" and KOSHKIN. He has remembered only a few of their names and has supplied no personality information about them. He identified only VOLKOV and YEFREMOV as his own agents.

NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former agent (cryptonym "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMOV (cryptonym "GRIGORIY") and to have been their sole case officer from the beginning of their KGB careers in 1957-1958 until they were deactivated in 1963 because they became too well known. He met them frequently, directing them in at least a dozen entrapment operations or other homosexual encounters. NOSENKO took them with him when he transferred to the American Department in 1960 (but used them in no operations during 1960 and 1961) and back again in early 1962 to the Tourist Department (where they were used only once, immediately after his return). He gave a relatively clear account of the recruitment (Pages 107-108), but:

- He has never been able to remember YEFREMOV's patronym.

- He does not know the home address, general area of Moscow residence, family circumstances, job details, or other basic information about either of them.

- He said that during the five or six years he handled them, he never was at their homes, never met them in a safehouse (only on the street), and never met either of them alone without the other's presence.

- He did not know about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's encounters with and development of one Dutch and five other Americans, independently known to CIA. Of the Americans, three were CIA agents and a fourth was the well-known American diplomat and author Charles W. THAYER.

- He told about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's compromise of Robert BARRETT in 1959 (Page 126) but did not know that they had met BARRETT again in 1961, shortly before BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 compromise.

- He did not know details of why or how VOLKOV and YEFREMOV first came into contact with their most recent target, W.E. JOHNSON, nor how they set up the compromise which led to NOSENKO's entry as a "police official" under the name Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV (Pages 289-293).

(iii) Homosexual Entrapment Operations

During 1959 NOSENKO said he made recruitment approaches to five U.S. and British citizens on the basis of homosexual entrapment operations involving the agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV. All five approaches were successful, and the four Westerners who have now been identified have, in turn, identified NOSENKO in one way or another as the recruiting officer. With the exception of the FRIPPEL case and the homosexual compromise of BARRETT and WILLERFORD (which did not result in approaches during NOSENKO's tour in the American Tourist Section), these were the only operations in which NOSENKO took part in 1959 and they represented, in fact, the only recruitments by the section during this year, NOSENKO said. He claimed repeatedly in 1962, 1964, and 1965 that at the end of 1959 he received a commendation from the KGB Chairman for his recruitment of the five homosexuals and FRIPPEL (discussed separately below). In October 1966, he admitted that this claim was untrue.

In discussing the ~~case~~ case (Pages 123-124) NOSENKO had forgotten details which, from his confirmed participation, he certainly once knew. He said that (as with the ~~case~~ case-- see below) another case officer (IVANOV) had the file materials on the target before he did. NOSENKO stated that his agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported to NOSENKO in Moscow on ~~his~~ homosexuality and then "IVANOV and I and possibly GUSKOV, the Section Chief, reported this to DUBAS," Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO could not remember the arrangements for taking the pictures, nor in what Moscow hotel the photography took place. When ~~he~~ went to Leningrad, NOSENKO was sent there to approach him, flying alone (as in the ~~case~~ case). All Leningrad arrangements were made by the local KGB. Asked why he was assigned to the case, NOSENKO replied: "I was told to go." Asked why IVANOV could not handle it, he answered: "He was not considered capable," his English was "not bad but he didn't have enough operational experience." NOSENKO did not remember who wrote the request for permission to make the

TOP SECRET

approach ("Maybe I did, or maybe I dictated it to IVANOV") or whether [redacted] was staying in the hotel where the Leningrad compromise and approach took place. He named the Leningrad case officer, PERELETCV, but said that he, NOSENKO, made the recruitment [redacted] said another man was present.

NOSENKO's account in general matches [redacted] statements on this approach (Pages 125-126). The discrepancies, as well as the omissions in the former's statements and his uncertainty of the facts, may be attributable to faulty memory on the part of NOSENKO. Although NOSENKO was at this time Deputy Section Chief, when asked to explain his own selection as recruiting officer, he said that he did not know why "they" chose him and, when pressed as to who selected him, said "DUBAS, I think." When asked why the case officer VETLITSKIY, who originally had the materials on [redacted] could not do "the job, he answered: "I don't know." NOSENKO claims that he himself arranged the transfer of a KGB "agent or operational contact" (he did not remember which) to Uzhgorod from Odessa for this case, and said he did this only by phone calls, with nothing written. He gave a physical description but had no other knowledge of this agent, neither name nor code name nor job nor background nor KGB status ("I wasn't interested"). The agent, he said, travelled alone; NOSENKO did not arrange to receive him in Uzhgorod because the local KGB took care of everything. NOSENKO met him only once, and then in the company of a case officer of the Uzhgorod KGB, whose name or other data he has also forgotten. NOSENKO said he did not report to Moscow about progress and plans on the case from Uzhgorod or other stops in this operation, nor obtain permission to travel alone with the agent to Lvov and Minsk after the recruitment; the local KGB's in Uzhgorod, Lvov, and Minsk did that, he said. NOSENKO could not describe KGB arrangements and support in Lvov and Minsk, where he said "the only thing I needed was a car from the airport to the city." [redacted] said they travelled by train.) Likewise, NOSENKO was unable to describe the KGB procedures for clearance, tracing, reporting and other management of this operation.

(iv) The Agent FRIPPEL

FRIPPEL (Pages 129-135) is the only American citizen with whom NOSENKO ever had more than fleeting operational contact in his whole KGB career and is the only foreign agent he claims to have run for more than two meetings at any time in his career (with the exception of [redacted], Pages 201-212, and "PROKHOR," Pages 173-181). The American Express Company representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL was not recruited so that he could report on American tourists visiting the Soviet Union, or on official and unofficial Americans living there, but in hopes of learning about approaches being made to members of Soviet delegations visiting the United States. With a wealth of reporting assets in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB did not need him there. When FRIPPEL was reassigned to New York City, however, there were no plans to contact him through the local KGB Legal Residency. FRIPPEL is identified by KGB cryptonym in the CHEREPANOV papers as a suspected American Intelligence agent. That FRIPPEL was considered such by the KGB is confirmed by statements of a self-admitted KGB agent in contact with the American tourist ROBERTS in 1962.

TOP SECRET

701.

NOSENKO said FRIPPEL was his agent and said, repeatedly: "I recruited him myself." In 1962 no other KGB officer was mentioned by NOSENKO, who quoted from a number of his conversations with FRIPPEL. In 1964 NOSENKO said he and CHELNOKOV "had carried out the recruitment together," but NOSENKO was the case officer. According to FRIPPEL's account, CHELNOKOV was the senior officer in the recruitment and in the later meetings.

NOSENKO never met FRIPPEL alone while FRIPPEL was stationed in Moscow. The only times he ever did so were later, he said, when FRIPPEL returned to the USSR, and these consisted of a brief visit to FRIPPEL's hotel room during FRIPPEL's visit to Moscow in the summer of 1962 and a short meeting in Odessa where FRIPPEL was on a cruise in February 1963. (Both of these meetings took place after NOSENKO, in his 1962 contacts with CIA, had exposed FRIPPEL as a KGB agent.) According to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting, NOSENKO phoned someone to ask whether he could accept FRIPPEL's invitation to board the ship; the answer was evidently no. NOSENKO denied this, insisting that there was no one in Odessa superior to him, and as a Deputy Department Chief, he would not have to ask anyone anyway.

NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and their wives dined at FRIPPEL's house in Moscow some time after FRIPPEL's recruitment. NOSENKO acknowledged this to have been a most unusual procedure and could name no parallel in KGB agent handling. Asked why it happened, he said: "Because he invited me," and when asked why CHELNOKOV and his wife went along, NOSENKO said: "Because he was also involved in the recruitment."

NOSENKO said he retained operational control of FRIPPEL, then still Moscow representative of a tourist firm, when NOSENKO shifted in June 1960 from the Tourist Department to the American Department; Later NOSENKO also maintained responsibility for contact during FRIPPEL's visits to the USSR after FRIPPEL's PCS departure from Moscow in January 1961 and after his own return to the Tourist Department. According to FRIPPEL, who saw no sign of change in NOSENKO's responsibilities during his relationship with him, he recalled meeting CHELNOKOV (who had stayed in the Tourist Department) alone, without NOSENKO, probably in 1960.

FRIPPEL said he was queried by NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV only once concerning U.S. Embassy personalities, specifically on BOWDEN and WINTERS. NOSENKO, who claimed case officer responsibility for Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN in 1960-1961 as well as for FRIPPEL said the two did not know each other; in fact, they met socially several times. NOSENKO could recall nothing which FRIPPEL ever reported to or did for the KGB, dismissing the subject on several occasions with: "He never gave anything of value." The only question NOSENKO posed when he came to FRIPPEL in August 1962, FRIPPEL said, was whether the agent knew what the newspaper editors he was escorting were going to ask KHRUSHCHEV in an interview. According to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting NOSENKO posed no questions and merely made polite conversation until FRIPPEL excused himself.

During the early 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO volunteered: "If you had been clever you could have made me work inside the USSR; you could have contacted me through FRIPPEL..." NOSENKO was asked in October 1966 whether he had expected or hoped CIA would attempt to establish contact with him inside the USSR through FRIPPEL. He strongly denied this.

1. Remarks

NOSENKO claims to have participated directly or indirectly in every recruitment operation with American tourists in the years 1955-1959. His presence in KGB operations during this period has sometimes been confirmed, but not always did these cases involve tourists of the three nationalities--American, British, and Canadian--for which NOSENKO said his section was responsible:

<u>Years</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Status in USSR</u>	<u>Confirmed</u>
1955	MALIA	American	Tourist	No
1956	BURGI	American	Tourist	Yes
1957	[REDACTED]	German	Commercial/Tourist	No
	[REDACTED]	British	Tourists (under investigation)	Yes
	[REDACTED]	Norwegian	Quasi-official visitor	No
1958	HARRIS	American	Tourist	Yes
	KRAFT	American	Tourist	No
1959	DREW	American	Tourist	Yes
	[REDACTED]	British	Tourist	No
	[REDACTED]	British	Tourist	No
	[REDACTED]	British	Resident	Yes
	MERTENS	American	Tourist	Yes
	BARRETT	American	Temporary Resident	No
WILLERFORD	American	Temporary Resident	No	
FRIPPEL (to 1963)	American	Resident, later tourist	Yes	

This tabulation of 15 cases shows a higher number of operations involving American (six) and British (three) tourists than any other category, but it nevertheless intermingles citizens of other nationalities and having different status in the USSR. FRIPPEL and [REDACTED] were neither tourists nor (according to them and NOSENKO) used against tourists; [REDACTED] were from continental Europe; BARRETT and WILLERFORD worked in Moscow for several months. The tabulation also shows that, according to NOSENKO, his operational work was considerably more intensive in the time after he became Deputy Chief of the section than before, when as a senior case officer his administrative responsibilities presumably would have been far less demanding.

Although NOSENKO's participation in five cases of the American Tourist Section is confirmed, his acknowledged role in five others of different varieties--with corroboration by other sources in two of them--raises doubts about whether he belonged to that section as a senior officer. The doubts are strengthened

by the nature of his information about the four individual cases reviewed at length above:

- In the BURGI case NOSENKO did not have knowledge of the extensive background information on the recruitment target which the KGB possessed at the time of the approach; or of other significant details in what NOSENKO described as an operation of greatest importance to the American Tourist Section and to himself personally. In addition, NOSENKO has admitted lying about his having received an award for his role in the recruitment of BURGI.

- Regarding the DREW case, NOSENKO said he was chosen for the approach (made on the basis of homosexuality) because the regular case officer lacked operational experience. By April 1959, however, the KGB had arranged "hundreds" of homosexual compromises in the USSR, NOSENKO reported in another context. His earlier personal experience with Western targets had been limited to a secondary role in the BURGI case and a principal role in the HARRIS case, the latter not an approach on homosexual grounds. It is difficult to comprehend how NOSENKO would have qualified for the task whereas the case officer IVANOV would not.

- There are gaps in NOSENKO's information about a number of significant aspects in the [REDACTED] case, including staff planning and management of the operation, operational support arrangements, and on personnel of the outlying KGB units involved. NOSENKO was unable to explain why he was selected to make the approach to [REDACTED].

- CHELNOKOV was the senior case officer for FRIPPEL. NOSENKO never met this agent alone while he resided in Moscow as the American Express Company representative, and NOSENKO reportedly acted on a supervisor's instructions at their later meeting in Odessa. Despite his occupation and his entree into the American community in Moscow, FRIPPEL reportedly was not exploited by the KGB against tourists or U.S. Government employees but was targeted to report on matters to which he had no access; hence there seems to have been no logical reason for the FRIPPEL case to have been transferred from the American Tourist Section to the U.S. Embassy Section and back again. Although available information verifies the continuity of NOSENKO as FRIPPEL's handler, it cannot be considered firm evidence of NOSENKO having been an officer in either of these sections and in fact might be interpreted as evidence that he was not.

Similarly, while familiar with some but not all of the operational activities of the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO failed to support his claim to being their American Tourist Section case officer; he has been unable to provide rudimentary background information of these two individuals, who allegedly were prominent in operations of the section. NOSENKO's statement that he retired the files of VOLKOV and

YEFREMOV because they were too well known is incompatible with his other reporting to the effect that neither took part in an operation between 1959 and early 1962.

In further reference to NOSENKO's claims to having been the case officer in these various operations, he has been unable to recount in any detail KGB staff procedures involved in these operations, such as name-tracing, coordinating with other components, obtaining approvals for action, etc. Finally, of his alleged 54 months of service in the American Tourist Section, NOSENKO's described activity against foreigners accounts for only about three months; if the bulk of his time was spent with recruiting or handling Soviet-citizen agents, he might be expected to remember something about some of them. He can barely remember names (and only a few), has given confused accounts of their recruitment, remembers nothing about any of their specific operations or activities for the KGB, and knew no personality background data on any of them.

Even if it were assumed that NOSENKO was a case officer of the American Tourist Section, his claim to the position of Deputy Chief cannot be substantiated. He himself could not explain his appointment to the job. He did not know about the CIA "legal travel" operations compromised to the KGB in 1958 and 1959 when he was allegedly in a supervisory capacity. NOSENKO knew nothing about the documents on such operations which BLAKE gave the KGB and which can be presumed to have been of the utmost interest to the American Tourist Section, among all KGB Headquarters elements. These documents offered material that could have proven valuable to the preparation of NOSENKO's own paper on Western tourist operations; they were used in the genuine KGB paper written by the Tourist Department and passed to CIA by GOLITSYN. As with his status as a case officer in the American Tourist Section, NOSENKO the Deputy Chief could not describe how data on tourists was received, general and specific plans laid, events discussed, decisions made, and leads channeled.

The foregoing paragraphs suggest the conclusion that NOSENKO was not a senior case officer or the Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. While the methods of the Tourist Department are not independently known in detail, it is conceivable that what NOSENKO did on behalf of the KGB (not necessarily the American Tourist Section) could have been accomplished by a principal agent. These conclusions do not cast doubt about the facts presented by NOSENKO on the KGB investigations in the OSWALD case but merely rule out the possibility of NOSENKO's having been involved with this case in any way prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.

6. U.S. Embassy Section (1960-1961)a. Introduction

From January 1960 until January 1962 NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, under KOVSHUK. This period (described in Pages 152-285) is the most significant in NOSENKO's account of his KGB career for a number of reasons:

- The section is the specific unit working against the U.S. Embassy, by NOSENKO's own statements the KGB's most important counterintelligence target in the USSR. Its operations (characterized on Page 152) directly affect American security. The section has the two-fold purpose of knowing of and controlling all access of Embassy personnel to Soviet citizens and of collecting, assimilating, evaluating, and using information from all possible sources to recruit Americans stationed in Moscow.

- NOSENKO's position as Deputy Chief of this section provided him his access to most of the major counterintelligence information he has reported, including recruitments of foreign embassy officials and micro-phone operations against the U.S. Embassy. Most important, it provided NOSENKO with his authority for stating that there were no successful recruitments of or agents among official Americans in Moscow for this two-year period, or for a time both before and after. (This is the same point made by indirection in the CHEREPANOV papers; yet this view is contradicted by information from GOLITSYN. Although the latter did not serve in the U.S. Embassy Section, he knew members of it and gave leads to KGB operational interest in and possible recruitments of official Americans in the Moscow Embassy during this period. Some of these appear to be related to information items NOSENKO has provided.)

- The apparent importance of NOSENKO's information on this period contrasts sharply with that from other periods. His accounts of recruitments in the tourist field covering the five years prior to this assignment and the two years following have been checked thoroughly and not one of them represents a penetration of any government; none has access to classified information; most were inactive, suspect, or already known to Western counterintelligence organs.

sensitive
source

- NOSENKO's work against the U.S. Embassy is confirmed by ~~XXXX~~ and less directly by other Soviet sourced reporting to CIA and the FBI. It is denied by GOLITSYN. (GOLITSYN has said that NOSENKO was not in the section during these years.)

TOP SECRET

b. Entry into the Section

NOSENKO has given a detailed account of how he came to be transferred into the U.S. Embassy Section, but he has never given a precise date, usually saying "January 1960" or "at the beginning of 1960."

As described on Pages 153-154, the shift was made at GRIBANOV's insistence and against NOSENKO's own personal wishes. GRIBANOV told NOSENKO during a personal interview, at which NOSENKO voiced his objections, that the transfer was part of his (GRIBANOV's) plans and was primarily to put new life into operations against American code clerks, the primary target of the Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV did not tell him why he, instead of another, had been selected for this job, although NOSENKO had the impression it was because of his achievements in the Tourist Department. (see Part VIII.D.5.). NOSENKO's transfer could not have been a result of his close personal relationship with GRIBANOV or because his father was a friend of GRIBANOV's: NOSENKO has admitted that he exaggerated the closeness of his relationship with the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate and most recently (February 1965) said that he had few personal contacts with him outside of work; NOSENKO has also said that his father never met GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO initially said that he relieved nobody on coming into the section. He eventually recalled, however, that BAKHVALOV was his predecessor but left the section before he (NOSENKO) arrived. NOSENKO's confusion on this point, his description of how he assumed custody of certain files from BAKHVALOV although the latter had transferred to another department, and the opportunities NOSENKO had to name BAKHVALOV as his predecessor before he eventually did so are described on Pages 154-156.

c. Functions as Deputy Chief

In NOSENKO's view the transfer to become Deputy Chief of the section from the same position in another section was definitely an important promotion: He now became second-in-charge of the most important operational section of the entire Second Chief Directorate. As KOVSHUK's deputy, NOSENKO had the right and obligation to be aware of all activities in order to exercise his general supervisory functions and so as to be prepared to become the Acting Chief of the section when necessary.

NOSENKO said that consequently nothing was hidden from him for the two years 1960 and 1961. He claimed to have had complete knowledge of the U.S. Embassy Section's activities during the relatively recent years of 1960 and 1961 and to know of all significant operational successes achieved in the years before and after this period. He has also said he has told CIA all he knows of these activities. It was on this basis that he was able to say in 1965: "Tell Mr. McCone that there were no recruitments. I was there."

When NOSENKO reported for duty, he and KOVSHUK agreed on a division of supervisory duties within the section. KOVSHUK was, in addition to his over-all responsibility for

the section's operations, to supervise in particular operational activity against American diplomatic personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy. NOSENKO had been specifically instructed by GRIBANOV and American Department Chief KLYPIN to concentrate his efforts on the supervision of operations against the most important American recruitment target, the code clerks at the Embassy, with the aim of revitalizing these activities and making recruitments. (NOSENKO said there had been none since the early 1950's.) According to the agreed-upon division of labor, NOSENKO also assumed case officer responsibility for John ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security officer (identified by NOSENKO as a CIA officer, but actually a CIA cooptee). Additionally, he was responsible for maintaining the section's file on factors pertaining to the physical security of the Embassy and for receiving and disseminating materials from the microphones concealed in various U.S. Embassy offices. These were functions held, NOSENKO said, by his predecessor BAKHVALOV and were turned over by NOSENKO at the end of 1961 to his successor GRYAZNOV. Apart from these duties, which apparently were routinely assumed by the Deputy Chief, NOSENKO supervised, during the early part of 1960 (as NOSENKO first said in 1965), the work of the officers responsible for operations against the American Armed Forces Attachés in Moscow; in October 1966, NOSENKO reported that he was personally responsible during this period for the operational activity against Naval and Marine officers in the Naval Attaché's office.

d. Knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief

As deputy to KOVSHUK, NOSENKO said, he was aware of all the operations being conducted by the section during this two-year period; by his own statement, nothing was kept from him. There were in these two years a total of over three months when KOVSHUK was ill or on leave, and at these times NOSENKO was acting chief of the section. In the latter capacity, NOSENKO was responsible for supervising the administrative work and operational activity of the entire section and, in particular, assumed KOVSHUK's work in directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Therefore, pertinent to his claims are the facts presented in the following paragraphs.

NOSENKO could not remember any operational decisions that he made as acting chief, or any specific or unusual occurrences during these times. In answer to a question, NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSHUK's which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going out of the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences. He could not remember any of KOVSHUK's agents, except GLAZUNOV (whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own agent and later said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's") and the American correspondent STEVENS (about whom NOSENKO had reported in connection with his responsibilities in 1953-55). NOSENKO also said that in 1960 KOVSHUK recruited PREISFREUND, although earlier he had reported that he (NOSENKO) had done this. (Regardless of who the recruiter might have been, KOVSHUK attended NOSENKO's meetings with PREISFREUND.)

TOP SECRET

NOSENKO knew that his immediate supervisor KOVSHUK had personal contact, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, with some U.S. Embassy officers and was aware that one of these had been WINTERS. He knew no details of KOVSHUK's contacts with WINTERS, nor that his own friend KISLOV, as well as his friend and frequent source of operational information LOPUKHOV, were also in touch with WINTERS. He could not remember who else KOVSHUK knew, or what KOVSHUK was doing with them, or why. NOSENKO knew neither that William MORRELL (declared to the Soviet Government as a CIA officer) belonged to CIA nor that KOVSHUK, who was aware of this fact, was in personal contact with MORRELL.

Unlike KOVSHUK, ARTEMEV, KOSOLAPOV, BORODIN, BIRYUKOV, KRIVOSHEY and many other Second Chief Directorate officers, NOSENKO never had any direct contact, even for cultivation or assessment, with any American officials, either stationed in the Embassy or visiting the USSR. However, his English had been proven good enough to qualify him particularly for tourist recruitments and his operational flair had been tested. (It was this which caused him to be picked for the DREW, ~~and other~~ and other approaches and the only reason why he, an English speaker, would have been specially selected to work on the German ~~who~~ who spoke "some English.")

DERYABIN and other defectors from the KGB have stated that the deputy chief of a section working against a foreign embassy in Moscow would be responsible for approving and retaining monthly schedules for the planned use of safehouses by the section; that he would discuss agent meeting schedules with individual case officers and approve and retain a list of planned agent meetings for each case officer on an individual basis; and that he would approve the acquisition of new agents and new safehouses and their transfer from one operation to another. By contrast, NOSENKO first did not list these functions among his responsibilities and later denied that he had them. NOSENKO did not understand the question when asked whether he had any responsibility for supervising the use of safehouses in Moscow (Page 162) and said that as the agents and the safehouses belonged to the case officers, they could use them when and how they liked without informing anyone; only when they were meeting an active development agent was it necessary to report to NOSENKO and this only after the meeting. NOSENKO said that, while he was Deputy Chief of the section, three or four subordinate officers had safe apartments, but he did not remember the location of any of them. Neither NOSENKO nor his subordinates GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had such apartments, instead using less secure "meeting apartments" (which are used in the absence of the full-time occupant). NOSENKO was able to locate his own "meeting apartment" (which he said he brought with him when he transferred from the Tourist Department and later took back with him to the Tourist Department) by street and could do the same for GRYAZNOV's. He was not sure of the location of the apartment used by KOSOLAPOV.

e. Knowledgeability of U.S. Embassy Physical Security

According to NOSENKO, he maintained the file on physical security at the U.S. Embassy, and it contained detailed floor plans and photographs of the installation. NOSENKO was unable to give the location or the floor of the office of any single individual or component of the Embassy, including those of the Ambassador, or his own targets (ABIDIAN, the military code room, and the State Department communications room). NOSENKO said that all important Embassy offices were located in the "zone of security," which he has variously reported as the "seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth floors," or "seventh and up," or the "top four floors." NOSENKO did not remember how many floors there are in the Embassy, nor was he even sure how many floors were included in the restricted area. (The restricted area in fact consists of the top three floors, the eighth, ninth, and tenth.)

f. Knowledgeability about American Intelligence Personnel

NOSENKO said that not only the deputy chief but every officer in the section could identify the known and suspected American intelligence personnel in the Embassy. Nevertheless, he himself did not know about three CIA officers (MAHONEY, MORELL, and GARBLER) whom the KGB had definitely identified as such before their assignments to Moscow in 1960-1961. For example, MORELL, whose overt CIA affiliation was officially announced by the Embassy to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, was under direct and active cultivation by KOVSHUK and the KGB First Chief Directorate officer K.N. SMIRNOV in 1960-1961; NOSENKO knew nothing about this (although asked leading questions and given hints) and did not identify MORELL as a CIA officer. Four of the seven officers whom he said the KGB suspected to be CIA had never had any such affiliation. He could not give any information at all on the person he said the KGB considered to be the CIA chief in Moscow, KLOSSON, either on his Moscow activity and contacts or on the extent and results of KGB coverage, or on his personal situation and background. He could not explain why KLOSSON was considered to be the CIA chief, but said that "every officer thought he was."

g. Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Operations

As his main task, the prime reason he was moved into the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO alleged, was to supervise the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity he closely guided the work of case officers GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV.* NOSENKO shared an office with his two subordinates, and the three were within sight and hearing of

*According to GOLITSYN, who knew both men well. GRYAZNOV was "a very experienced" case officer with some success; he had spent about the last five years of his 16 years in the KGB in the American Department and was a specialist in code clerk operations. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had about ten years' KGB experience and, like GRYAZNOV, was specializing against code clerks in 1960.

one another and used a single safe, which contained files on the American code clerks and the agents involved with them. NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases with them, taking part in operational planning, and approving or disapproving all operational measures. NOSENKO originally asserted that he had also read and studied all the files kept on the American code clerks; under questioning on individual cases, however, he retracted these statements and said that he may have skimmed some of the files, that he did not study any of them, but that in any event he read all the current incoming materials on the code clerks from microphones, agents, and the like and then routed them to the case officer concerned.

CIA has two types of information against which the reports from NOSENKO can be compared. The first consists of the detailed debriefings of code clerks returning from Moscow, administered routinely by the Department of State and the military services; it also includes the special debriefings and interrogations of the Department of State, the FBI, and CIA as a follow-up to KGB operational activity which has become known from various sources. On this basis, CIA has accumulated a considerable amount of collateral information on the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section involving United States code clerks during the period NOSENKO said he was its Deputy Chief. The second type of information is the reporting on KGB operations by GOLITSYN who, from contacts with U.S. Embassy Section officers in Moscow and Helsinki, was able to provide several leads to what he said were recruited American code clerks. GOLITSYN's information thereby directly contradicts NOSENKO's statement that the KGB had no successes in its code clerk recruitment operations from the early 1950's to the end of 1963, and none of the subjects of GOLITSYN's leads have been positively identified. Some of GOLITSYN's information has been generally substantiated by other sources. In one case, this confirmation has come from NOSENKO himself, whose information on the STORSBERG operation, on the agent PREISFREUND's role in it, and on GOLITSYN's knowledge of KGB use of PREISFREUND presents an explanation of one and possibly two of GOLITSYN's leads.* Another of GOLITSYN's leads, that concerning an operational trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in order to establish contact with a code clerk, is confirmed by documentary evidence that KOSOLAPOV did in fact travel on the Helsinki-Moscow train with an American code clerk at the time and under the cover GOLITSYN reported. NOSENKO denied that such a trip was made by KOSOLAPOV.

NOSENKO has been questioned in detail about each of the code clerks serving in Moscow during 1960 and 1961. His information concerning KGB activities involving five of these Americans (STORSBERG, JENNER, MORONE, ZUJUS, and KEYSERS) and

*As discussed below, there are important differences in the accounts of GOLITSYN and NOSENKO, particularly regarding the outcome of this operation.

his lack of information concerning a sixth (GARLAND) is discussed in detail in Pages 166 through 219. NOSENKO's information on a number of other cases, less important in his opinion, is described in the tabulation of American case leads given on Pages 364-410. Certain of these cases are further examined below to determine whether NOSENKO's knowledge equates with details which the deputy and acting chief of the U.S. Embassy Section could reasonably be expected to know and retain.

(1) The STORSBERG Case

The operation against STORSBERG (Pages 166-185) was, NOSENKO said, the most important case he had as supervisor of code clerk operations. The KGB, while able to break certain State Department ciphers, had had no success with military cryptographic systems, and therefore NOSENKO "dropped everything for a year" to involve himself with the development of James STORSBERG, the military code clerk at the U.S. Embassy. The following facts are pertinent to an evaluation of NOSENKO's story of this case.

NOSENKO originally raised the STORSBERG case indirectly at his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962. He told how GOLITSYN, during a visit to the American Department in 1960, at a time NOSENKO was on leave, had requested permission to use a U.S. Embassy Section agent, a Finn, in his own operations in Helsinki. During his discussions in the American Department, GOLITSYN learned that this Finnish agent was being used in operations against Embassy employees living in America House. NOSENKO said that the KGB realized that GOLITSYN had passed this information on to the Americans following his defection, for the regulations governing visits to America House by third nationals had been tightened. At this meeting NOSENKO did not name the Finnish agent or specify his involvement in any particular operational activity nor did he date the visit by GOLITSYN.

Later in the 1962 meetings NOSENKO gave a detailed summary of the Finnish agent's involvement in the unsuccessful recruitment attempt against an American military code clerk. NOSENKO, without naming the Finn or the American, said that he personally conducted the recruitment confrontation with GRIBANOV present. These early accounts were full of quotes of what NOSENKO said to the American and vice versa, descriptions of the American's reaction to the confrontation, and statements of NOSENKO's admiration for the American despite his refusal to work. Following his defection, NOSENKO recounted the case in even greater detail, in fact, in more detail than he gave for any other case. He identified the Finn as PREISFREUND and the American as STORSBERG and described and referred to the case whenever possible (over 50 times). When asked for details of other code clerk cases, for example, he repeatedly diverted to discussion of the STORSBERG case to illustrate how the KGB operated against code clerks in general.

After defecting NOSENKO denied that he personally confronted STORSBERG. He said that his personal role was limited to directing STORSBERG into the hotel room where the approach was made; after first saying that he had never claimed any other role, he admitted that he may have been "painting"

himself (exaggerating) in his descriptions of 1962. This admission came only after the tape of NOSENKO's 1962 statements had been played to him and he had successively said that (a) it was not his voice, (b) he was drunk in 1962, (c) the CIA case officer in Geneva had made him nervous, and (d) CIA probably spliced various pieces of tape together to make this false one. Still, NOSENKO said, he directed the entire operation from beginning to end, and it was his most important case. Interrogated further concerning his role in the STORSBERG operation in October 1956, NOSENKO said that he had never read the KGB file on STORSBERG, which was held by GRYAZNOV.

GOLITSYN, as NOSENKO reported, did visit the American Department, did request permission to use PREISFREUND operationally in Helsinki, and did report this to CIA in late 1961 following his defection. GOLITSYN also reported that, in denying his request, KOVSHUK told him that PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American Embassy employee, possibly a military man and possibly a code clerk or diplomat; therefore, KOVSHUK said, PREISFREUND could not be used for six months or so in other operations, for otherwise the Americans might become suspicious. NOSENKO has not reported these details, but has said only that GOLITSYN was instructed to drop interest in PREISFREUND because PREISFREUND belonged to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO volunteered at his first meeting with CIA that he was on leave outside of Moscow on the occasion of GOLITSYN's visit to the American Department. Since defecting he has insisted with absolute certainty that this visit took place in the late spring or early summer of 1961 and has described his leave, where he went and with whom. GOLITSYN's passport and CIA travel data show that GOLITSYN was on TDY in Moscow in January 1961.* Told this, NOSENKO said that it is untrue, that he recalled being told of GOLITSYN's visit after his return from leave in July 1961, and that he was certain that he (NOSENKO) was in Moscow in January 1961.

NOSENKO has indirectly confirmed that the operation of which GOLITSYN learned during this visit to the American Department was the operation against STORSBERG. He did so by his assertion that PREISFREUND, his own agent, was used in only one operation, that against STORSBERG. Thus, as to the outcome of this operation, there is a conflict between NOSENKO's information and that earlier provided by GOLITSYN. There is also a conflict between NOSENKO's statements that the recruitment approach took place some time after May 1961 (NOSENKO's dates have varied from June to October 1961, STORSBERG said it was in October 1961) and GOLITSYN's statement that this approach had already been made in January 1961 when he learned of it.

GOLITSYN provided a second lead which NOSENKO appears to confirm and which may be related to the STORSBERG case. GOLITSYN said that during a visit to the American Department

*GOLITSYN has based his assertion that NOSENKO was not in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961 partly on this visit.

in the spring of 1960,* he learned from GRYAZNOV that he (GRYAZNOV) had developed an operation against an American military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent" certain that a recruitment approach to this code clerk would be successful. GOLITSYN said that GRYAZNOV told him that this would be the first recruitment of a military code clerk (as contrasted to a State Department code clerk) in the history of the American Department. There were only two persons meeting this criterion who were in Moscow at the time GOLITSYN placed this visit, STORSBERG and HURLEY; the superior of STORSBERG, HURLEY performed back-up cryptographic duties in STORSBERG's absence. If NOSENKO's report that there was no development of or approach to HURLEY can be accepted, this lead from GOLITSYN would apply to STORSBERG rather than HURLEY. There is a conflict between NOSENKO's information on the STORSBERG case and this second GOLITSYN lead in that GOLITSYN described an operation which was in its final stages in the spring of 1960, whereas NOSENKO (as well as STORSBERG) asserted that the STORSBERG operation was just under way at this time and was long and drawn-out.

(11) The JENNER Case

Apart from the STORSBERG operation, NOSENKO has been able to supply the greatest amount of detail concerning the operation (also unsuccessful) against the State Department pouch clerk Paul JENNER (Pages 186-196). This case developed as a result of an idea originated by NOSENKO himself shortly after he arrived in the U.S. Embassy Section. Because of the inaccessibility of American code clerks to the KGB in Moscow, it was NOSENKO's plan to send a KGB officer to Helsinki in order to strike up an acquaintance with a code clerk entering the Soviet Union aboard the Helsinki-Moscow train. The first (and last) time this was attempted, NOSENKO related, was in March 1960, when the KGB learned that JENNER, listed as a "secretary-archivist" and thus assumed by the KGB to be a code clerk, was scheduled to transit Helsinki en route to his assignment at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Under NOSENKO's supervision KOSOLAPOV therefore travelled to Helsinki and boarded the same train as JENNER. Additionally, GRYAZNOV took a KGB female agent to the town of Vyborg, on the Finno-Soviet border, and placed her on the same train. Both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent met and spoke with JENNER en route to Moscow, and the girl gave him her telephone number, asking him to call her. After JENNER's arrival in Moscow, both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV submitted written reports to NOSENKO describing the contacts on the train. Although the KGB later found out that JENNER was only a pouch clerk, not a cryptographer, he was considered of interest and when JENNER failed to telephone the female agent, the two were brought together in a "chance meeting" at the Moscow airport. JENNER would have no part of the agent's invitations, however, and the operation therefore went no further.

*When NOSENKO was told of the GOLITSYN visit in May or June 1960, he denied that it took place, saying that he necessarily would know if it had.

JENNER reported to the Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy upon his arrival that he had been contacted by two Soviet students from Vyborg, a young man and a woman, on the Helsinki-Moscow train. He also reported having been given a telephone number by the girl and later reported having been recontacted by her at the Moscow airport.

CIA has documentary evidence, in the form of official Finnish train manifests, that JENNER travelled from Helsinki to Moscow by train on 31 March 1960. This document shows that JENNER travelled alone and no Soviets were aboard when the train left Helsinki. CIA also has an official travel manifest showing that KOSOLAPOV, using the name KOLOSOV, travelled from Helsinki to Moscow by rail on 2 April 1960, two days later, and that no Americans travelled on this train with him. NOSENKO identified KOLOSOV's photograph as that of his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. (NOSENKO earlier said that he did not know whether KOSOLAPOV used an alias for this trip, what that alias might have been, or whether KOSOLAPOV had an alias passport; he agreed that he would have had to authorize such a passport.) When he was told of CIA evidence that KOSOLAPOV did not travel on the same train as JENNER and therefore could not have met and talked with him as NOSENKO had reported, NOSENKO refused to believe it; he insisted that he had read the reports of both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV, and that the events were exactly as he described them.

(iii) The GARLAND Case

GOLITSYN told CIA after his defection that while he was stationed in Helsinki, probably in November--not March--1960, KOSOLAPOV travelled to Finland under alias and commercial cover in order to make the acquaintance of an American code clerk on the Helsinki-Moscow train. KOSOLAPOV's arrival had been announced by a cable from KGB Headquarters to the Helsinki Legal Residency. According to GOLITSYN, the Legal Residency learned which train this American was to board and succeeded in placing KOSOLAPOV in the same compartment with him. GOLITSYN saw KOSOLAPOV board the train with this American. Later, when another American Department officer visited Helsinki, GOLITSYN asked him how KOSOLAPOV's operation with the code clerk had gone; from the officer's refusal to answer, GOLITSYN assumed that it had been a success.

CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPOV made a second trip to Helsinki in November 1960, again under the KOLOSOV alias. Finnish railroad manifests show that KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki by train on 16 November 1960 and that one of his travelling companions on this train was GARLAND, who was en route to Moscow to assume his duties as chief of the State Department code room at the American Embassy (Page 198). There were no other Americans on this train.

Told that KOSOLAPOV had made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960 and had travelled to Moscow on the same train as an American code clerk, one of his own targets, NOSENKO said that this could not be. He agreed that, as in the case of KOSOLAPOV's trip to meet JENNER, he would necessarily have been involved in the planning of such a second trip and would have had to approve arrangements and correspondence in connection with it. Even if such a trip took place when NOSENKO was out of Moscow, he said, the details of it would

TOP SECRET

715.

have been known to him upon his return, and he would not have forgotten about the trip. (In fact, CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki on 12 November 1960 and that NOSENKO left Moscow for Amsterdam, en route to Cuba, on 15 November.) NOSENKO has not changed his position that there was no such trip.

(iv) The MORONE Case

Like the STORSBERG operation, the MORONE case was mentioned at NOSENKO's first meeting with CIA; he cited it as an example of a technique which NOSENKO introduced for using third nationals to obtain access to American code clerks who were reluctant to establish contacts with Soviet citizens. According to NOSENKO's most recent version, given in early 1965, the KGB learned that MORONE and a Marine Guard (BEGGS) planned to travel to Warsaw on leave. KOSOLAPOV thereupon drew up an operational plan, edited by NOSENKO and KOVSHUY and approved by GRIBANOV, proposing that a female agent of the Polish UB be introduced to MORONE on the Moscow to Warsaw train for the purpose of obtaining compromising materials. KOSOLAPOV arranged with Polish liaison officials in Moscow to have such an agent sent to Moscow, met her when she arrived, and briefed her on the operation. She was then placed on MORONE's train together with a KGB technician whose task it was to obtain tape recordings of the compromise. Events went according to plan: MORONE met the girl and was intimate with her on the train, but when the technician reported to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw, he said that the tape recordings were of low quality and unsuitable for their intended purpose. In a further attempt to acquire compromising material on MORONE, KOSOLAPOV later brought the UB agent to Moscow, and on this occasion photographs were obtained of their intimacies in a Moscow hotel room. Still, the KGB felt, there was not enough blackmail material to ensure recruitment, and it was further planned to have the America House maid IVANOVA attempt to lure MORONE to a room in Moscow where truly compromising photographs of intimacies with a Soviet citizen could be obtained. Possibly because they noticed MORONE's interest in IVANOVA, NOSENKO said, the Americans ordered MORONE out of Moscow before further steps could be taken.

Although NOSENKO provided a considerable amount of detail on MORONE's trip to Warsaw, there were numerous variations in his different accounts. In 1962 he said that he had handled the entire operation himself, including telephoning Warsaw with the request for the girl; he also said that the UB obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw and that several months later the female agent was brought to Moscow expressly for the purpose of introducing MORONE to a Soviet girlfriend. This, NOSENKO said, was successful and MORONE was soon having intercourse with a KGB agent. While still in place in Geneva on 1 February 1964 NOSENKO gave a different version: "We," he said, arranged for the girl by a dispatch pouched to the KGB advisor in Warsaw; moreover, the Poles, who had obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw, sent the KGB only pictures of the two kissing, keeping the best ones for themselves, and this is why she had to be brought to Moscow. NOSENKO told the FBI later in February 1964 that compromising photographs had been obtained in Warsaw but no recruitment was attempted because KHRUSHCHEV had

TOP SECRET

given instructions that no actions were to be taken which might embarrass then existing good relations with the United States. When in February 1965 it was pointed out that MORONE arrived in Warsaw on 14 December 1960 and that NOSENKO left for Cuba on 15 November 1960, NOSENKO revised his story of receiving the personal report of the technician to say that he had perhaps read the technician's report after returning from Cuba in December 1960.

CIA learned of the MORONE train trip and subsequent involvement with the UB agent in 1961 from a Polish source who had provided much sensitive and reliable information previously. The Polish source submitted a considerable amount of detail including the date of the operation (which NOSENKO did not recall) and the fact that the Polish agent was handled in Moscow by a KGB officer named "Volodya." It was on the basis of this report that MORONE was withdrawn from Moscow in May 1961.

In accounts given since his defection, NOSENKO has consistently named KOSOLAPOV as MORONE's case officer. KOSOLAPOV drafted the plan for the operation on the train, discussed it with NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, met with a US official in Moscow to arrange for the agent, met the agent on her arrival, and briefed her on her assignment. NOSENKO has not been asked and has not volunteered who specifically placed the agent on the train. Records show, however, that MORONE left Moscow on 13 November 1960, arriving in Warsaw on the 14th; from 12 to 16 November 1960, KOSOLAPOV is confirmed to have been in Helsinki, apparently in connection with an operation involving the American code clerk GARLAND (see above). It is also noted that travel records show that NOSENKO, the officer supervising this (as well, presumably, as KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki), left Moscow on 15 November 1960 with a delegation going to Cuba.

NOSENKO has been questioned concerning the KGB agents in contact with MORONE and what was learned from them. He reported that an Egyptian agent visited America House, met MORONE there, but did not report anything of interest concerning him. NOSENKO also mentioned IVANOVA, a maid at America House, who knew MORONE and whom the KGB wanted to use to lure MORONE into a compromising situation (see above). NOSENKO said that he, himself, had met with IVANOVA several times to discuss MORONE, but that he could not recall anything specific of interest or use that she reported concerning

TOP SECRET

him. Another agent who may have reported on MORONE, NOSENKO said, was an East German girl sent to America House to pose as an Austrian; NOSENKO was not sure what she might have reported or when this was, other than it occurred when he was working against MORONE and that it was during ABIDIAN's tour in Moscow, for he had come to America House to question the girl.

Various reports indicate that MORONE was involved in illegal currency speculation with the Egyptian agent and that on at least one occasion the Egyptian introduced MORONE to a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate. NOSENKO did not know that MORONE was also involved in illegal currency dealings with ██████████ whom NOSENKO has identified as KOSCHAPOV's agent and who, he said, was involved with and reporting on NOSENKO's target ABIDIAN. NOSENKO did not know that IVANOVA once introduced MORONE to a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate; additionally MORONE was reported by a number of his co-residents at America House to have been intimate with IVANOVA herself (which MORONE denied). Some of these same Americans reported also that MORONE was intimate with UMANETS, another KGB agent identified by NOSENKO; MORONE himself said he knew UMANETS "well." Finally, the incident involving the East German girl posing as an Austrian involved the code clerk ZUJUS, not MORONE, and took place after NOSENKO claims to have been transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section; she was interviewed by ABIDIAN's successor, MONTGOMERY.

(v) The KEYSERS Case

The approach to KEYSERS is the only time during his service in the U.S. Embassy Section that NOSENKO claims to have had direct contact with an American stationed in Moscow. (NOSENKO said on one occasion that this was the only face-to-face encounter he could recall; and, on another, that it was possible that STORSEBERG--the only other possibility--may not have seen him on the night he was approached in the Moscow hotel.) KEYSERS therefore is the only independent American source who could confirm that NOSENKO was involved in operations against American Embassy personnel in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself pointed out, however, that this contact was of very short duration, and that it was possible that KEYSERS would not recognize him. This was the case: KEYSERS failed to identify NOSENKO's photograph and described the officer who approached him as a man considerably older, shorter, and probably of a much heavier build than NOSENKO was. Although NOSENKO was able to provide a description of this incident, he did not know much about the overall KGB case against KEYSERS and a number of discrepancies have been noted.

In 1962 NOSENKO first reported the approach to KEYSERS, without naming him, but saying he was the successor to STORSBERG. Since defecting in 1964, NOSENKO has continued to identify him as STORSBERG's replacement. In fact, KEYSERS was sent to Moscow as an assistant to the Embassy medical officer; he also worked in the office of the Air Attache as a collateral duty and for a short while in 1961 was under training in the military code room as a "back-up" cryptographer for STORSBERG. STORSBERG's replacement in Moscow was ZUJUS.

TOP SECRET,

On 24 and 28 January 1964, before the defection, NOSENKO incorrectly named ZUJUS, who he said was STORSBERG's replacement, as the target of this operation. On 2 February 1964 NOSENKO called a special meeting with his CIA handlers to correct this mistake. He said that, in fact, KEYSERS was STORSBERG's replacement, and the approach had been made to him. (Thus NOSENKO had forgotten the name of the one American Embassy official he ever approached.)

In February 1965 NOSENKO said that the KGB believed that KEYSERS did not report the receipt of the defection letter and that there was no indication that he had from microphones or telephone coverage of the U.S. Embassy. In fact, KEYSERS reported the letter at once in the office of the Military Attache, where a microphone was discovered in 1964. NOSENKO had earlier said that this particular microphone was being monitored around the clock by the KGB. (KEYSERS' homosexuality and drinking problems had also been discussed widely in Embassy offices. NOSENKO was unaware of these discussions.)

NOSENKO did not know correctly where or how the KGB delivered to KEYSERS the letter which preceded the airport approach which NOSENKO claimed to have made.

(vi) Other Code Clerk Cases

Frank DAY: NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Department code clerk and the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. As with all other code clerks, NOSENKO was asked whether he knew of any interesting information about DAY, whether he knew of any of DAY's friends in Moscow, or of his travels inside and outside the Soviet Union, etc. NOSENKO answered "no" to all these questions. He said that the KGB had no derogatory information on DAY, was unaware of any vulnerabilities he might have had, and that no operational measures were taken against him. Records show that DAY was in Moscow from May 1960 to October 1961. In July 1961 he travelled to the Caucasus with his friend, the U.S. Agricultural Attache BROWN, formerly an overt CIA employee. DAY later reported that the two were under surveillance by five persons at all times on this trip, that on one occasion they found four "repairmen" in their hotel room upon returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and that another time during this trip an "attractive and available Soviet female" was placed in their train compartment.

John TAYLOR: NOSENKO said TAYLOR was a State Department code clerk and the target of KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not know of TAYLOR's previous service abroad or of any background information the KGB might have had about him. He described an operation against TAYLOR which centered around his intimacy with a Russian maid (a KGB agent) and his sympathy towards the Soviet Union and its people. No compromising photographs were obtained of TAYLOR and the maid, however, and no approach was made to him, possibly because the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important STORSBERG case by creating a "flap." According to TAYLOR, he was intimate with his maid from about September 1960 until the beginning of 1961. On one occasion they were intimate in a "friend's apartment" in Moscow. NOSENKO did not know that the maid told TAYLOR she was pregnant or that TAYLOR offered

her money for an abortion. TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961, whereas the approach to STORSBERG was reported by NOSENKO and STORSBERG to have occurred four to eight months afterward.

Maurice ZWANG: NOSENKO identified ZWANG as a State Department code clerk who was "actively worked on" during the 1960-1961 period. An Egyptian agent, whose name NOSENKO did not recall, introduced ZWANG to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain compromising photographs, but the agent did not like ZWANG and refused to have intercourse with him. At the time NOSENKO left the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1962, there was no further activity surrounding ZWANG. The KGB had no agents in contact with him, and there was no vulnerability data concerning him. When ZWANG was interviewed by the State Department after returning from his Moscow assignment, a polygraph examination indicated that ZWANG had had intercourse with his Russian maid, elsewhere identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent; ZWANG admitted visiting the maid's apartment several times but denied intimacies. In March or April 1961, an Egyptian introduced ZWANG to another Soviet female; ZWANG also admitted visiting her apartment on several occasions, but again denied having had intercourse with her. ZWANG was reported by various other Americans stationed in Moscow to have been active in currency speculation and blackmarketeering with the Egyptian and ~~agent~~ and agent of KOSOLAPOV according to NOSENKO. NOSENKO was unaware of this.

TOP SECRET

b. Responsibility for and Knowledge of ABIDIAN

NOSENKO said that, as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was directly responsible, as case officer, for all coverage of the Embassy Security Officer John V. ABIDIAN. This was NOSENKO's only individual target responsibility, and no KGB officer shared it with him. NOSENKO said that he opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN before ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow in early 1960, and that he turned this file over officially to his successor, GRYAZNOV, when transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section at the end of 1961. It was NOSENKO who wrote the KGB plan for operations against ABIDIAN in about October 1960. ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was considered by the KGB to be a CIA officer and, as LANGELE's successor, was also considered to be the most important counterintelligence target in the Embassy. ABIDIAN was thus made a special target of surveillance from the day of his arrival in the USSR; this meant he was always under surveillance by several teams of the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate. The intensive coverage of ABIDIAN included mail censorship, telephone taps, and agent reporting; it was instituted, NOSENKO said, "in the hope that he might lead the KGB to another PCMOV." ABIDIAN was detected, NOSENKO continued, in three letter-mailings--all to agents already under KGB control. He was seen to enter a suspected dead drop site on Pushkin Street, the significance of which did not become known to the KGB until later, when it was learned that this site was to be used by PENEVSKIY. In the hostile interrogations of early 1965, NOSENKO agreed that he was the single person in the KGB responsible for knowing everything possible about ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO said he knew nothing about ABIDIAN's personal background, his education, his studies in France, his military service, his date of entry into the State Department, his State Department rank, his previous foreign assignments with the State Department, or his status as a Foreign Service Reserve, Staff, or Officer status (FSR, FSS, FSO). NOSENKO said he tried to learn these things, but the information was unavailable in the Second Chief Directorate or in KGB Central files, and although he requested information from the First Chief Directorate, nothing was received. The only information the KGB had on ABIDIAN, insofar as NOSENKO knew, was that contained in ABIDIAN's visa request and in a report from one of the Legal Residencies in the United States; the report provided a basis for believing him to be a CIA officer.

NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the Department of State Biographic Register for information on ABIDIAN's background, he replied that this document was not available to the U.S. Embassy Section; he subsequently recalled that there was an old copy of the Biographic Register "from about 1956" in KOVSHUK's office, but that it contained no information on ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO reported that one of the reasons ABIDIAN was considered a CIA officer was his behavior while serving as a Department of State Security Officer with KHRUSHCHEV's delegation when the latter visited the United States in

1959. NOSENKO never mentioned that KOSOLAPOV, who he said was his immediate subordinate and shared NOSENKO's office in KGB Headquarters, was a member of this same delegation.

NOSENKO did not know where ABIDIAN's office was located in the U.S. Embassy. He said he did not know and was unable to find out who ABIDIAN's secretary was. He reported that some agent told the KGB that ABIDIAN had a sign on the door of his office which said "Security Officer." There was no such sign.

NOSENKO did not know where ABIDIAN's apartment was located. He did not know its contents and said that the KGB was not interested in this. He did not know whether ABIDIAN changed apartments in Moscow, which he did.

NOSENKO identified GROMAKOVA, an Embassy language teacher, as a KGB agent who was valuable because she was intelligent and was able to provide personality sketches on her students based on classroom discussions. He never associated ABIDIAN with GROMAKOVA. When told that ABIDIAN had taken language lessons from her, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN took "several" lessons from GROMAKOVA at the beginning of his tour but discontinued; she reported nothing of significance and there was no regular reporting from her on ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN, however, reported that he took regular, private Russian lessons from GROMAKOVA throughout his tour in Moscow and that they discussed in class his past personal life, travel, education, fiancée, and his trips abroad to see his fiancée.

NOSENKO knew that ABIDIAN travelled out of the USSR two or three times, but had no idea when these trips took place or what countries ABIDIAN visited. NOSENKO said that, as ABIDIAN's predecessor LANGELE was known to have travelled outside the USSR for operational reasons in connection with the POPOV case, it would have been of interest to learn where ABIDIAN had gone, but the KGB had no way of finding this out. (Note in the previous paragraph that GROMAKOVA knew.) When NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out the possibility of photographing ABIDIAN's passport upon his return to the USSR, NOSENKO replied that the KGB does not photograph the passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO said that ABIDIAN made no trips outside Moscow within the USSR and explained that, as case officer, he would necessarily have been aware of any such trip as he would have had to handle all arrangements for surveillance during it. When NOSENKO was told that ABIDIAN travelled to Soviet Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO said for the first time that he was on leave in that month. NOSENKO admitted in October 1966 that he knew nothing of ABIDIAN's trip.

NOSENKO said that he did not know who were ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow or his friends and professional contacts among foreigners there.

NOSENKO said at the end of the January-February 1965 interrogations concerning ABIDIAN that the reason he knew so little about ABIDIAN was because he was "working badly" as ABIDIAN's case officer. The reason for his poor work, he

said, was that he had to concentrate on supervising the work against code clerks and therefore had very little time left for ABIDIAN (see above concerning code clerks).

In 1962 NOSENKO correctly described all of the three clandestine letter mailings carried out by ABIDIAN in Moscow at CIA request (Pages 226-230). He also provided accurate information on CIA letter-mailings in general, pointing out that none at all were mailed for a year and a half after the arrest of LANGELLE in October 1959. (No letters were mailed from 22 February 1960 until 1 April 1961, when ABIDIAN mailed his first one.) NOSENKO explained that the KGB completely controlled this activity through the use of metka, a thief powder applied to the clothing of foreigners in the USSR; a trace is left on anything coming into contact with treated areas, and this can be detected by special machines through which all mail passes. Despite the fact that all of ABIDIAN's letters were mailed to KGB double agents and would therefore have been detected anyway, it was metka, NOSENKO said, which in each case led to their initial identification. After his defection NOSENKO described how the metka had been applied to ABIDIAN's clothing (and hence to the letters) by the agent FEDOROVICH, who began working as ABIDIAN's maid several months after ABIDIAN arrived in Moscow in March 1960. NOSENKO insisted under interrogation that FEDOROVICH was the only agent who had access to ABIDIAN's apartment, that he, NOSENKO, had personally briefed her on the application of metka, and that he was sure that ABIDIAN's letters were detected by means of metka. From a CIA debriefing of ABIDIAN, however, it appears that FEDOROVICH did not begin working as ABIDIAN's maid until some time in July 1961, whereas ABIDIAN mailed his first letter in Moscow on 1 April 1961 and his second letter on 2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, after FEDOROVICH began to work for him.

1. Reporting on ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin Street Dead Drop

NOSENKO's account of the visit by ABIDIAN to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site on Pushkin Street in Moscow is described in detail on Pages 231-235. In summary, NOSENKO reported that at the end of 1960 or early 1961 KGB surveillance followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street, where ABIDIAN was noted to enter a residential building. Upon examination it was decided that this was a likely dead drop site, and a stationary surveillance post was assigned to watch it. After three months, since nothing suspicious had been noted, this post was removed. The true significance of the location did not become known to the KGB until after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962. NOSENKO said he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and was ABIDIAN's case officer when this event took place. He heard of it while sitting in KOVSHUK's office on the day it happened. He visited the site the following day with V. KOZLOV (Chief of the American Department of the KGB Surveillance Directorate), placed the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file, and discussed the results of the stationary post with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month and periodically thereafter until the post was removed. It was KOZLOV who told NOSENKO that after three months the stationary

surveillance had been discontinued. NOSENKO did not tell CIA about this incident in 1962, he said, because he knew that the watch had been discontinued and that nothing suspicious had been noted; therefore, he thought the incident would not have been of interest to American intelligence.

NOSENKO has stressed that ABIDIAN was under special surveillance by at least two surveillance teams at all times and that, on the day he visited Pushkin Street, ABIDIAN was under continuous watch from the moment he left the embassy. NOSENKO has been able to give a detailed description of ABIDIAN's movement to the dead drop site.

Despite the special surveillance coverage of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO said, he was unaware of any unusual movements by ABIDIAN during the days immediately preceding his visit to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO said that he knew definitely that surveillance had reported nothing unusual during this period and that he was sure ABIDIAN had not eluded the surveillance at any time during it. According to CIA records, three days before ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street in response to indications that the dead drop had been loaded, ABIDIAN left the U.S. Embassy in his private car for Spasen House at about nine o'clock in the evening; at about two o'clock the next morning he and GARBLER (CIA Chief of Station) went in ABIDIAN's car to check the telephone pole for the signal PENKOVSKIY was to leave as part of his signal that the drop had been loaded. Two days before ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street he drove his car to the apartment of Air Force Captain DAVISON; he again checked the telephone pole from a window in the apartment and then walked by it on foot. NOSENKO identified GARBLER as a U.S. naval officer but not as a CIA employee (see above).

Asked why, in his opinion, ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street at the time he did, NOSENKO replied that in about B60 an American tourist or delegation member had gone to this address. It was the "opinion of the Second Chief Directorate" that this American had selected the site as a dead drop location, and that ABIDIAN went there merely to check the suitability of the site for this purpose. In fact, ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street in response to what appeared to be a prearranged telephone signal from PENKOVSKIY signalling that he had loaded the dead drop there. It has been confirmed that PENKOVSKIY did not give this signal and, because of the circumstances and type of signal given, the possibility of coincidence has been ruled out. CIA has therefore concluded that the signal came from the KGB.

The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 letter through which he initially contacted CIA. There is no record that a "tourist or delegation member" visited this address. The only known visits by Americans to the building on Pushkin Street--the only ones having any connection with its use as a dead drop location--occurred on 12 November and 4 December 1960 when the CIA officer MAHONEY checked the address from outside, and on 21 January 1961 when MAHONEY entered the building and checked the specific location of the dead drop. MAHONEY is known to have been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer before arriving in Moscow and was the target of heavy surveillance throughout his tour. (NOSENKO did not know about MAHONEY or his CIA status.)

NOSENKO's date of "late B60 or early 1961" is incorrect, almost exactly by a year. NOSENKO said he turned ABIDIAN's file over to GRYAZNOV about 28 December 1961. ABIDIAN checked the Pushkin Street dead drop on 30 December 1961. NOSENKO has described his participation in an approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON as happening "right after returning to the Tourist Department in 1962." Because NOSENKO's participation in this case was confirmed by JOHNSON, and because the approach to JOHNSON took place on 5 January 1962 (he reported it to the U.S. Embassy at once), it can be said with certainty that NOSENKO's entire story of his own participation in the surveillance of the Pushkin Street dead drop site is false. NOSENKO: (a) could not have visited the dead drop site with KOZLOV (who in any event was not in Moscow at the time); (b) could not have placed the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file, which GRYAZNOV held as of 28 December 1961; (c) could not have received almost daily reports from KOZLOV for about a month and periodic reports thereafter; and (d) could not have neglected to tell CIA of ABIDIAN's visit to the drop in 1962 on grounds that the surveillance of Pushkin Street had been discontinued after three months without anything suspicious being noted. (NOSENKO was in Geneva on 15 March 1962, only two and a half months after ABIDIAN checked the dead drop.)

NOSENKO has refused to admit that he lied about his part in this incident. The page containing the contradictions listed in the preceding paragraph was the only page of a "protocol" which NOSENKO refused to sign during the hostile interrogations of early 1965. In October 1966, when he was again asked whether he went to the Pushkin Street dead drop site with KOZLOV, NOSENKO said that he could not remember whether he had gone there at all.

j. Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache Operations

On 29 January 1965 NOSENKO told his interrogator that for the first five or six months of 1960, immediately after transferring to the U.S. Embassy Section and as part of his responsibilities as its Deputy Chief, he supervised Second Chief Directorate activities against American service attaches in Moscow. By this he meant, NOSENKO said, that when GAVRILENKO (the case officer for Air Force Attaches), KURILENKO (Army Attaches), or BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attaches and Marines) had any questions or reports to submit, they would come to him rather than to KOVSHUK, the Chief of the section. After about six months he was relieved of this duty because his other duties did not allow sufficient time for this function and because it was considered more suitable that ALESHIN, recently assigned to the American Department as Deputy Chief, be given this responsibility.

NOSENKO had previously been questioned in detail on his responsibilities in the U.S. Embassy Section, and had never before mentioned this one. NOSENKO told CIA in June 1964 that when he reported for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1960, DRANOV was the responsible case officer for the Naval Attaches and Marines. Soon after his own arrival, NOSENKO said, DRANOV was transferred from the section and his responsibilities were taken over by BELOGLAZOV, who had earlier been assisting DRANOV against these targets.

NOSENKO said on 20 October 1966 that immediately upon, or at the latest a few weeks after, arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section, he went on leave for a month. Either immediately before or right after this leave KOVSHUK told him that he would be responsible for activities against the Naval Attaches. DRANOV was retiring and gave NOSENKO the files on Naval and Marine personnel. This was NOSENKO's first mention either of the leave period in early 1960 or of having had case officer responsibilities for personnel of the Naval Attache's office in Moscow. (At the same time he said that he had lied about going on leave in November 1960.)

NOSENKO was reminded on 25 October 1966 that he had said in 1965 that in 1960 he was supervisor of operations against all U.S. service attache personnel. NOSENKO replied: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working on [supervising] all of them."

NOSENKO has never volunteered details of specific operational activity he handled as the case officer for U.S. Naval Attaches or supervisor of operations against all attaches in early 1960. He said that Marine Colonel DULACKI's contact with (or attempt to recruit) the Indonesian KGB agent which he has described in detail (see Page 488) took place after he was relieved of these functions.

TOP SECRET

k. TDY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case

In the spring of 1961, NOSENKO said, four months after returning from Cuba, he was told unexpectedly that in about a week's time he would leave for Bulgaria to consult with the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR concerning operations against the American Legation in Sofia (Pages 279-283). NOSENKO flew to Sofia in early April 1961, where he was met by A.S. KOZLOV, an advisor there and a former employee of the Second Chief Directorate whom NOSENKO had known at KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO remained in Bulgaria until about the middle of May. While there he discussed both general matters and particular cases with the Bulgarians, gave several lectures on operations against American installations and personnel as well as against tourists, and finally directed the successful homosexual operation against the American Professor LUNT.

Aside from being told that he would be advising the Bulgarian service on operations against Americans at the Legation in Sofia, NOSENKO apparently received no preparation for this trip. He said in answer to specific questions that nobody told him what he was supposed to discuss with the Bulgarians, that he did not meet with the Bulgarian liaison representatives in Moscow before leaving, and that he knew nothing of the organization, personnel, area of responsibility, or problems of the American Department of the Bulgarian service before arriving in Sofia.

NOSENKO was selected for this mission despite the fact that he was extremely busy with his duties in the U.S. Embassy Section (see above discussion of his responsibilities for code clerks, ABIDIAN, and the military attaches) and despite the fact that KOZLOV was permanently assigned as an advisor in Sofia. NOSENKO described KOZLOV in another context as a "very experienced officer" and has said that KOZLOV was Chief of the American Department until 1953 and then from June 1955 until sometime in 1958 was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, Second Chief Directorate. (KOZLOV, assisted by NOSENKO, had recruited BURG in June 1956.) Asked why KOZLOV could not have advised the Bulgarians, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on higher levels and had been away from active operations in Moscow too long.

NOSENKO gave only a general description of his duties as an advisor on operations against the American Legation. On the other hand, he accidentally became involved in a homosexual entrapment operation against an American tourist who was visiting Bulgaria, and he has described this operation in considerable detail. (NOSENKO's previous speciality was tourist operations, particularly those involving homosexual compromise.)

NOSENKO's story about his role in the LUNT case changed greatly between 1962 and 1964. During the first meeting series he described in detail how he set the operation up and what he said to LUNT when he personally confronted the American with the evidence. Since defecting in 1964, however, NOSENKO has said that he took no personal part in the approach itself, that he remained in his office, and that he merely advised how to set it up. (A comparison of his account and that of LUNT indicates that he was not on the scene at the time.)

TOP SECRET

NOSENKO said that the Bulgarian service became aware of LUNT's homosexual tendencies only after he saw LUNT's name or heard it mentioned; he recognized the name as that of a professor who had been assessed as a homosexual when earlier visiting Moscow, and traces with the KGB Second Chief Directorate confirmed that this was the same man. In statements made to U.S. authorities after the approach, LUNT said he had had homosexual relations at least five different times with a Bulgarian during an earlier trip to Sofia. LUNT gave this Bulgarian travellers' checks, which the latter planned to sell on the blackmarket, was on one occasion stopped on the street with him by a Bulgarian civil policeman, and corresponded with him in the interim between his first visit and the one during which the approach took place. LUNT had written the Bulgarian homosexual that he was returning to Sofia before arriving on the second occasion.

The U.S. Visa and the Cuba TDY

NOSENKO said that in October 1960 he was assigned to accompany a delegation of automotive specialists on a visit to the United States but that when this trip was cancelled, he went on TDY to Cuba (Pages 274-278). After he had completed arrangements for his passport and had submitted his true name to the U.S. Embassy for a visa, the Soviets were informed by U.S. authorities that the delegation could not then be accepted in the United States. At about the same time, a delegation of nickel industry experts was being readied for departure to Cuba. At first, NOSENKO explained, it was not considered necessary for a security officer to accompany this delegation to a friendly country, but at the last moment, two days before the delegation was scheduled to leave Moscow, the Central Committee of the Communist Party demanded that such an officer go along. Because there was no time to do otherwise, NOSENKO was chosen for this job since he already had a valid passport and authorization to travel abroad. Visa arrangements were made for the transit countries and NOSENKO left with the delegation, returning to Moscow in mid- or late December 1960.

NOSENKO's U.S. visa request submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 29 October 1960 was his first use of this name in connection with travel abroad. (He travelled to England in 1957 and 1958 as NIKOLAYEV, NOSENKO said, because he had used this name with British citizens ~~in the Soviet Union~~ in the Soviet Union; as ~~was~~ suspected of being an intelligence officer, NOSENKO was exposed under this identity. He applied for U.S. entry under true name, however, despite the fact that he had also used the NIKOLAYEV name with Americans; one of them was FRIPPEL who, according to the CHEREPANOV papers and one other source, was suspected by the KGB to be an American intelligence agent. NOSENKO further explained that he could not use the name NIKOLAYEV because the automotive delegation cover he planned to use in the United States conflicted with the sports/cultural cover he had used in Great Britain, and the KGB feared that this would be noticed when the American and British services exchanged notes. The proposed automotive cover, however, conflicts in the same way with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover NOSENKO used, again under true name, in Geneva in 1962.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

728.

NOSENKO said that the decision to send him to Cuba was made two days before the delegation left Moscow because a security officer was required and he happened to have a passport and authorization to travel. The delegation left Moscow on 15 November 1960, and therefore this decision was reached on 13 November or thereabouts. NOSENKO, who had been transferred to the U.S. Embassy Section in order to supervise and revitalize operations against code clerks, the Section's most important recruitment target, consequently left Moscow on the day that MORONE also departed by train for Warsaw and at a time that his subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16 November 1960), apparently in connection with an operation against John GARLAND.

NOSENKO has given widely divergent accounts of the purpose of his assignment to Cuba. In 1962 he related in detail how he had been sent to investigate how the Cuban-intelligence service was operating against Americans stationed in Havana, particularly intelligence officers, and described what he did to fulfill this mission. Since 1964, however, NOSENKO has claimed merely to have been the security officer with the delegation.

TOP SECRET

1. Personal Handling of Agents

When NOSENKO transferred from the Tourist Department to the American Department, he took along a number of the agents he had used in tourist operations with him: YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, FRIPPEL, DMITRIYEV, and RYTOVA. During this period he also handled LEVINA, a librarian and language teacher at the U.S. Embassy who was turned over to him by U.S. Embassy Section case officer MASSYA in 1960; and PREISFREUND and ~~XXXXXXXX~~ who were used in code clerk operations. These agents and NOSENKO's handling of them are discussed below.

(i) YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

NOSENKO continued to meet with these two homosexual agents during his two years as Deputy Chief of the section. He did not use them in any way, however, according to his account. The only contact of the two known to CIA was a meeting in 1961 with BARRETT. In 1959, while in Moscow and a CIA agent, BARRETT was compromised by YEFREMOV and VOLKOV; in 1961, shortly after an apparently chance meeting with them, BARRETT was recruited by the KGB on the basis of the materials obtained in 1959. NOSENKO described the compromise of BARRETT in 1959 and knew that he had been recruited in 1961. He did not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in 1961.

(ii) FRIPPEL

NOSENKO said he continued to handle FRIPPEL during the 1960-1961 period, despite the fact that he never provided anything of value, because he and CHELNOKOV (the Chief of the Tourist Department who was always present at these meetings) "kept hoping he would give something." FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union in January 1961, but NOSENKO continued to be registered as his case officer.

(iii) DMITRIYEV

DMITRIYEV, a specialist on Japan and Thailand who spoke Japanese and English, had been NOSENKO's agent during the 1955-1960 period. DMITRIYEV was then employed by the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow, and NOSENKO did not indicate how he was used in tourist operations. NOSENKO did not describe any operational use of him in 1960 or 1961.

(iv) RYTOVA

RYTOVA was NOSENKO's agent in the Tourist Department after 1956 or 1957, at which time she was employed at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow. An English speaker, she reported any interesting information concerning visitors to the exhibition. NOSENKO has not referred to any KGB operations in Moscow in which she participated during his service there.

(v) LEVINA

LEVINA worked as a language teacher and librarian at the American Embassy and NOSENKO handled her because she had a number of code clerks in her language classes. He

TOP SECRET

met with LEVINA a number of times, but she never reported anything interesting and was never used directly in operations involving the Americans. She was fired from the Embassy at the end of 1960 or early 1961.

(vi) Johan PREISFREUND

As described in Pages 173-181 and discussed above, PREISFREUND was, NOSENKO said, recruited by KOVSHUK in 1960 and was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against James STORSBERG. Both NOSENKO and PREISFREUND said that this was the only operation in which he took part. NOSENKO suggested to CIA that PREISFREUND would be able to attest to his description of this case, and CIA interviewed PREISFREUND in Helsinki and Stockholm during the summer of 1965. PREISFREUND's account generally agreed with NOSENKO's and he was able to supply a considerable amount of personality and background information concerning his former case officer. From PREISFREUND's manner during these interviews, the nature of his responses and statements, and his actions after the interviews were completed, there was no reasonable doubt that he remained under KGB control while meeting the CIA representatives.

(vii) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (KGB cryptonym "SARDAR") was recruited by NOSENKO in 1961. A Syrian [REDACTED] in Moscow, [REDACTED] was first targetted against America House in General, but was then used only in the development operation against ZUJUS, the successor to James STORSBERG as military code clerk in Moscow. [REDACTED] met and developed ZUJUS, but nothing had come of the operation at the time NOSENKO transferred from the American Department. No other use was made of this agent and there was no approach to ZUJUS. NOSENKO first suggested that CIA attempt a "false flag" recruitment of [REDACTED] using his (NOSENKO's) name for this purpose; he provided CIA with [REDACTED] in Damascus so that contact could be established. Later NOSENKO said that [REDACTED] like PREISFREUND, could verify NOSENKO's position as his handler in the ZUJUS operation (Pages 209-212). CIA interviewed ZUJUS, who vaguely recalled having met [REDACTED], did not recall his name and denied that his relationship with [REDACTED] was as close as NOSENKO reported.

TOP SECRET

m. Transfer to the Tourist Department

Some time in the fall of 1961, NOSENKO said, he heard of GRIBANOV's decision to promote him to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire American Department. NOSENKO, however, knew that his chief and friend KOVSHUK wanted the job and that FEDOSEYEV (Chief of the Department) also favored KOVSHUK for this position. Realizing that his own appointment would therefore place him in a difficult position and wishing to avoid this, NOSENKO spoke to the Chief of the Tourist Department, CHELNOKOV, about returning there. At CHELNOKOV's suggestion, NOSENKO went to GRIBANOV with the request to be returned to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American Tourist Section, with the understanding that he would be made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department upon the retirement of the incumbent, BALDIN, in July 1962. To this GRIBANOV agreed. NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV did not discuss with him his reasons for wanting to appoint him Deputy Chief of the American Department or for appointing him Chief of the American Tourist Section, nor did he discuss with NOSENKO his personal requirements for these positions. On one occasion, in early 1965, NOSENKO said that it was because GRIBANOV "thought I was a tough guy, a good case officer. In 1959 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of questions which were reported to him." According to his most recent version, NOSENKO was officially transferred from the American Department at the end of December 1961 and reported for duty in the Tourist Department on about 3 January 1962.

KOVSHUK, who was also a candidate for the job as Deputy Chief of the American Department, had earlier held this position, according to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN. He had been personally involved in many of the more significant American Department operations during the previous decade. These included the recruitments of RHODES and SMITH (the latter one of NOSENKO's most important leads, according to NOSENKO); the handling of SHAPIRO; the attempts to recruit STORSBERG, HARMSTONE, and MANNHEIM; the development of the CIA officer WINTERS; and the interrogation of LANGELLE in connection with the POPOV arrest.

By contrast, GRIBANOV's original candidate for the job, NOSENKO, was present when KOZLOV recruited BURGI, and himself recruited HARRIS, and five homosexual tourists who visited the Soviet Union in 1959. Furthermore, NOSENKO's performance as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, as he admitted under interrogation, was "not good."

NOSENKO has given many contradictory dates for his transfer to the Tourist Department. In 1962 NOSENKO said at various times that this took place in January 1962 and in February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling some time between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 he arrived at the date of 2 or 3 January 1962, after it was pointed out that he appeared in the approach to W.E. JOHNSON on 5 January. (On this basis, he said that the official order was issued about 25 December 1961 and that he turned over his files to his successor GRYAZNOV several days later.) NOSENKO contradicted this latter estimate, however, by saying that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section for the entire period of the three-month surveillance of

TOP SECRET

the Pushkin Street dead drop, i.e., until late March 1962, and by his insistence that he had returned to the Tourist Department by the time GOLITSYN defected; he placed this on 15 January 1962 and refused to believe the correct date of 15 December 1961.

d. Remarks

For no single responsibility has NOSENKO substantiated his alleged service as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in the years 1960-1961. His statements about the appointment to and transfer from this position have been inconsistent; his comparatively narrow experience and his acknowledged falsehoods about a personal relationship with the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV, dispel the likelihood that these personnel assignments were made in the way he claims. Repeatedly he has been contradictory about his activities during this two-year period, shifting his story to suit the occasion and ignoring how each succeeding version made all of his claims increasingly incredible. The limited extent of NOSENKO's information betrays a lack of familiarity with details on the duties, targets, and most of the operations which he has ascribed to himself; in a certain few instances, however, such as his description of ABIDIAN's route to the Pushkin Street dead drop, he has recounted events just as they are known from other sources to have occurred. Nevertheless, where collateral information has covered the few subjects on which he provided details, it has almost invariably contradicted him and showed him to be ignorant of significant facts. The reporting by NOSENKO thus was so superficial, so incomplete, and so demonstrably erroneous as to suggest without reservation that he never served as an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section, much less as its Deputy Chief. All available evidence, excluding that from certain Soviets who were CIA and FBI sources (see Parts VIII.H. and VII.I. below), combines to formulate this conclusion.

7. Tourist Department (1962-1964)

a. Introduction

NOSENKO agreed during the interrogations at the beginning of 1965 that he must have reported for duty as Chief of the American Tourist Section on about 3 January 1962.* In this job he was responsible for planning and supervising KGB activities against all tourists of American, British, and Canadian nationalities arriving in the USSR, and his duties also encompassed preparations for the coming tourist season (Pages 285-287).

In July 1962, in conformity with GRIBANOV's intentions, NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department; it had a table of organization of close to 100 staff officers, was responsible for handling operations against all tourists to the Soviet Union, and maintained the facilities used in these operations. A year later NOSENKO received the title of First Deputy Chief of the Department, a "paper" promotion as there was no other deputy. During this period in the Tourist Department, in addition to his supervisory duties (concerning which he has not been questioned in detail), NOSENKO took personal part in approaches to several tourists, organized and directed the arrest of an American tourist on homosexual charges, and met with a number of agents. It was his senior supervisory position that involved him in two of the most widely publicized cases of this period, the arrest of BARGHOORN and the case of OSWALD.

b. Absences from Moscow

During his two years in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO was available to perform his assigned duties only part of the time. After arriving in the American Tourist Section and after the approach to JOHNSON on 5 January 1962, NOSENKO spent several weeks "getting the feel" of things by talking to case officers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the previous two years, and discussing plans for the up-coming tourist season. In mid-February he began preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO has said that this involved discussions with the Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for arranging for security coverage of Soviet delegations going abroad, as well as with the case officers responsible for the investigation of suspected American agent SHAKHOV. NOSENKO said that he did this on a part-time basis in addition to his regular duties, but has noted in another context that these preparations required sufficient time to make it impossible for him to take a personal part in the recruitment of BIENSTOCK in February 1962. On 15 March 1962, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, remaining there with the delegation until 15 June, when he left Geneva by train to return to Moscow to reassume his duties as Chief of Section. (He said that he had no deputy chief in this position, and it is unclear who performed these functions in his absence.) Thus, according to NOSENKO's account, of the six months he was Chief

* This date was settled upon after he acknowledged that his approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON must have occurred on 5 January, as CIA records show.

of the American Tourist Section, he was in Moscow only three months and for much of this time was involved in breaking in on his new job or in preparing for his temporary assignment abroad. NOSENKO said he had "no accomplishments" in this period.

In the fall of 1962, NOSENKO went on leave for a month in Sochi with his wife and mother. NOSENKO has estimated that six months of 1963 were spent on various temporary assignments in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow, plus a one-month's vacation in 1963. From 15 June 1962 to his arrival in Geneva on 19 January 1964, a period of 18 months, NOSENKO was absent from KGB Headquarters for eight months. Thus in the period 1962-63, holding supervisory positions, NOSENKO was absent or "reading in" for about 13 months, or about 50 percent of the time.

c. Personal Participation in Operations

NOSENKO had direct operational contact with three Americans during 1962 and 1963. Two of these (the approach to JOHNSON and the interrogation of MARCHOOKIN) were unusual in that they were provocations without any attempt to recruit the target; NOSENKO could name no other examples of such operations. In both cases, the victim of the provocation has verified NOSENKO's presence. The third case, the recruitment approach to BRAUNS, was unsuccessful. Additionally, NOSENKO supervised the homosexual compromise of KOTEN, who was closely tied in with [REDACTED] sensitive source and related.

(1) The W.E. JOHNSON Provocation

JOHNSON (Pages 289-293), NOSENKO said, was in Moscow as a tourist in early January 1962 and was considered for recruitment, but a decision was made that he was not worth the effort as he had no access to classified materials and lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in Washington and New York City. (JOHNSON's home was in Texas.) Several days after this decision was made, postal intercepts showed that JOHNSON was writing abusive letters concerning the Soviet Union. They were "so bitter" and critical that the KGB decided that something had to be done to stop him. At about the same time the KGB received an indication that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis and force him to promise not to write any more letters or criticize the USSR in articles when he returned to the United States. The compromise was effected by use of NOSENKO's homosexual agents, and NOSENKO was able to describe the confrontation scene, his second meeting with JOHNSON, and JOHNSON's frightened telephone call to the U.S. Embassy reporting that NOSENKO had recontacted him.

NOSENKO told CIA in June 1962 that he had taken part in this operation "in January." When he contacted CIA in Geneva in 1964 he had a scrap of paper on which was noted JOHNSON's name and the date "5 January 1962." This was the actual date of the approach, but NOSENKO insisted that the date bore no relationship to the name, and that the approach to JOHNSON took

place in the summer of 1962, a fact he recalled distinctly because he wore no overcoat. It was only when confronted with official U.S. records that NOSENKO agreed in early 1965 that the approach was in January and recalled that it was made immediately after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department.*

NOSENKO said that when JOHNSON first arrived in Moscow there was consideration of recruiting him, but that there was a decision against this as he was of little intelligence value. Then JOHNSON mailed insulting letters which were picked up through postal intercept. About the same time there were indications of homosexuality. Then the operation was mounted against him. This implies a very tight time schedule. JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961; NOSENKO said he reported for duty as Section Chief on 3 January 1962; JOHNSON reported his first contact with NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV the evening of 4 January; and the approach by NOSENKO was on 5 January.

Although NOSENKO implied in 1962 that his homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were the ones who originally determined JOHNSON's homosexuality, he said in 1964 only that there were "signs." NOSENKO did not know what these indications were or where they came from. JOHNSON reported that he first met the agent VOLKOV on the evening of 4 January when the latter sat down at his restaurant table; on this same occasion VOLKOV invited JOHNSON to his hotel room the next day. The fact that VOLKOV joined JOHNSON uninvited and set him up for the approach without leaving the table suggests that there had, in fact, been signs of his homosexuality beforehand and that operational plans had been laid by this time.

NOSENKO has described the caution taken in other homosexual entrapment cases and has named several which were called off because of a risk of scandal. It is, therefore, unusual that the KGB would take this risk merely to force JOHNSON, an American and a Baptist minister, to stop writing insulting letters and articles.

NOSENKO did not know why he became involved in this operation the day after he reported for duty in the senior position of Section Chief. He said only that BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, told him to do it. During his talks with JOHNSON, NOSENKO introduced himself to JOHNSON as "Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV," (rendered by JOHNSON as NIKOLOV) the "Chief of Police."

(ii) The BARGHOORN Provocation-Arrest

The arrest of Professor BARGHOORN (Pages 304-309) took place at the end of October 1963, at the time NOSENKO said he was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO has

* How NOSENKO's self-stated and confirmed participation in a Tourist Department operation on 5 January 1962 carries implications for his account of ABIDIAN's visit to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop is discussed above.

described in detail the selection of BARGHOORN as a hostage for IVANOV (the KGB officer arrested shortly before in New York City as a result of ~~the planning of the provocation, or the KGB activities surrounding BARGHOORN~~ the planning of the provocation, or the KGB activities surrounding BARGHOORN which were not related to the provocation, BARGHOORN's arrest in Moscow, and the early stages of his interrogation. Except for some variation in dates, NOSENKO's accounts of BARGHOORN's movements and of the sequence of events in the provocation-arrest matched that of BARGHOORN. This case is in two ways similar to the approach to W.E. JOHNSON: It was an operation in which there was no thought of recruitment, and BARGHOORN was able to identify NOSENKO as a participant.

BARGHOORN reported that the day after his arrest he was questioned by the same officer who had interrogated him the evening before about the "compromising materials" which had been planted on him. With this officer on this one occasion was his "chief," whom BARGHOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. NOSENKO has said that he was told by the Chief of the Tourist Department that GRIBANOV wanted him (NOSENKO) present in the interrogation room at the time when BARGHOORN admitted that he had the compromising information in his possession at the time of arrest. NOSENKO did not know why his particular presence was needed or desired, but he complied despite the fact that he did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN as he knew BARGHOORN would be released. NOSENKO said that he stayed in the interrogation room only until the interrogating officer secured this admission and then he left. BARGHOORN has reported that NOSENKO attended one of the interrogation sessions, that this session covered only biographic and background matters, and that the compromising documents and his possession of them had been discussed the previous evening, right after his arrest.

In describing the planning of this provocation, NOSENKO told CIA that the suggestion to provide BARGHOORN came from GRIBANOV, who took the idea of arresting BARGHOORN to KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYI, but did not divulge to him that it would be based on provocation. This was on the day before the arrest. SEMICHASTNYI agreed with the idea of the arrest and secured permission to carry it out from BREZHNEV, as KHRUSHCHEV was out of Moscow at the time. Reliable sources show, however, that KHRUSHCHEV was in Moscow on 30 October, the day when SEMICHASTNYI allegedly called BREZHNEV, and was also there on 31 October, the day of the arrest. BREZHNEV was not seen by Westerners in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.

(iii) The Approach to BRAUNS

NOSENKO said he personally approached the American tourist BRAUNS (Pages 293-295) shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962. BRAUNS had lived in Leningrad until World War II, had left with the fleeing Germans, and had eventually settled in the United States, where he was a technician working at an "interesting company making computers, adding machines, or other instruments." NOSENKO had originally instructed his

subordinate KRUPNOV to handle the case, but KRUPNOV was not able to get anywhere with BRAUNS and in the middle of the approach called NOSENKO for help. NOSENKO went to the Moscow Hotel where KRUPNOV and BRAUNS were talking, and he eventually secured BRAUNS' agreement to cooperate, against threat of imprisonment for treason on the basis of his wartime flight from the Soviet Union. BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Leningrad, and because NOSENKO felt the recruitment was "shaky," KRUPNOV was sent after him to consolidate the agreement. BRAUNS refused to see KRUPNOV however, so again NOSENKO went to help him. It was clear to NOSENKO, however, that BRAUNS was so frightened that he would never work for the KGB; NOSENKO thereupon decided to terminate the case, and BRAUNS was sent on his way.

NOSENKO could not recall his position at the time he approached BRAUNS, he did not know why BRAUNS had visited the Soviet Union, and he was unable to name any Soviet citizens with whom BRAUNS came into contact while in the USSR. BRAUNS, in fact, had spent almost a week in Moscow before the approach was made. During this time he spent his days with an Inturist tour and his evenings with an old girlfriend he had known before the war. She had been writing to BRAUNS in the United States for about a year, telling him of her unhappy marriage and impending divorce. BRAUNS had written her of his intention to visit the USSR, and she travelled specially from her home in Leningrad to Moscow to spend this time with him.

According to the account given by BRAUNS, the man (NOSENKO, according to NOSENKO) who joined him and his original interrogator in Moscow was the person who first approached him in Leningrad. This suggests, if correct, that it was NOSENKO who was sent there to consolidate the recruitment, not KRUPNOV. BRAUNS was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph but explained that he was so frightened that he probably could not recognize anyone involved. Other aspects of his story therefore may be confused.

(iv) The Arrest of KOTEN

NOSENKO said he supervised the homosexual provocation and arrest of American tour guide KOTEN in 1963 and the developments in the case were reported to him (Pages 298-303); he was not in face-to-face contact with KOTEN. NOSENKO explained that KOTEN, a member of the CPUSA, had frequently visited the USSR since the war, had numerous suspicious contacts there, and was considered possibly to be a "plant" (presumably of the FBI) in the Communist Party. Prior to his arrival in 1963, [REDACTED] Legal Residency reported that KOTEN was in contact with an important [REDACTED] agent in [REDACTED] that he was carrying the address of relatives of this agent with him on his trip, and that he intended to visit them. On this basis, it was considered that he might have the mission of investigating the [REDACTED] agent inside the USSR. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As it was suspected from earlier trips that KOTEN was a homosexual, the KGB planned to compromise him, arrest him, break him, and provide time for the [REDACTED] agent to make his escape from the United States. KOTEN was arrested, but the [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

agent refused to leave the United States, and when the CPUSA protested the arrest of one of its members, KOTEN was released.

KOTEN was a long-time Communist, and there are no apparent reasons why the KGB should doubt his loyalty. His homosexuality was well-known to his acquaintances within the CPUSA, and at the time of his trip to the Soviet Union he was acting as a tour guide for the New York firm "Afton Tours," which is owned by SVENCHANSKIY. (NOSENKO said that SVENCHANSKIY, also a Communist, was his own agent at the time of KOTEN's arrest.)

NOSENKO was able to give a considerable amount of identifying data on the "important agent" [REDACTED]. This agent had been identified [REDACTED] a year before KOTEN's trip. [REDACTED]

The fact that KOTEN had been arrested on charges of homosexuality was leaked by Inturist to press services two days after the reported date of the arrest, resulting in wide publicity in Western newspapers. (The U.S. Embassy was not notified officially until two days later.) There was no apparent reason for this extremely unusual step by the KGB, which can be assumed to manipulate Inturist for operational support purposes.

After the CPUSA had protested the action, KOTEN was released from prison. He was told that the incident was a mistake which had been corrected, that he was free to go anywhere he wanted in the Soviet Union, and that he could return anytime. [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] agent, has since repatriated to the Soviet Union.

d. Agents Handled by NOSENKO

When NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department, he took with him the two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, PREISFREUND, [REDACTED] and RYTOVA (Pages 287-289). The homosexuals he used the day after his return, in the operation against W.E. JOHNSON. This was their first operational use since the fall of 1959; they were never used again before being terminated at the end of 1962 or early 1963, NOSENKO said, because they were "too well known." PREISFREUND was considered compromised to American Intelligence following the defection of GOLITSYN, so he also was never used again, although NOSENKO met him socially when PREISFREUND returned to Moscow on business trips as recently as 1963. During the first part of 1962, on instructions from KOVSHUK and the Chief of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with [REDACTED], who was still involved in the development of ZUJUS, the American code clerk. NOSENKO last saw [REDACTED] before going to Geneva in March 1962; WEISS left the Soviet Union to return to Syria while NOSENKO was away. RYTOVA, NOSENKO said, had been his agent since 1956 or 1957. Some time in 1962 she moved from her position as an instructor of Greek at the Institute.

TOP SECRET

of International Relations to a position in the school of the CPSU Central Committee and ceased agent work. Although she was inactive, NOSENKO continued to be registered as her case officer until 1964, when he defected.

(i) FRIPPEL

Having left his assignment in Moscow in early 1961, FRIPPEL (Pages 129-133 and Part VIII.D.5.) returned several times to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO, who remained his case officer although FRIPPEL now lived and worked in New York City, met him each time. FRIPPEL said there were three such occasions, in February 1962 when he met once with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV in Odessa, and two later times in Moscow and Odessa, when NOSENKO came alone. NOSENKO denied that he met FRIPPEL in Odessa in February 1962 with CHELNOKOV, but said that he met twice with him alone after returning to Moscow from Geneva. The first of these meetings was in the summer of 1962 when FRIPPEL was accompanying a group of American newspaper editors touring the Soviet Union. FRIPPEL said NOSENKO called briefly at his hotel room to enquire what questions the editors planned to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a planned interview. When FRIPPEL said he did not know, NOSENKO departed and FRIPPEL later reported that he did not see NOSENKO again on this trip. (NOSENKO said he called again after the interview to learn the "reactions" of the editors.) The second meeting was in Odessa, when FRIPPEL, visited the Soviet Union as a guide on a tour ship. According to FRIPPEL, it was on this occasion that NOSENKO apparently made a phone call to ask permission to go aboard FRIPPEL's ship, and it might have been at this meeting or the earlier one that NOSENKO told him something of his personal background. (FRIPPEL knew a considerable amount of information about NOSENKO's father and family.) NOSENKO denied the possibility that he would have to request permission to board the vessel and said that if he had told FRIPPEL anything about himself, it was when he was drunk. Both FRIPPEL and NOSENKO agreed that FRIPPEL provided no information of value during any of these meetings.

(ii) SVENCHANSKIY

NOSENKO has cited SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "ANOD," as an example of the Second Chief Directorate's use of foreign travel agents to signal the KGB when an interesting tourist is about to visit the Soviet Union (Pages 295-298). SVENCHANSKIY was recruited for this purpose, NOSENKO said, in 1961 and used to send open-code signals to the Tourist Department by marking visa applications whenever he spotted anything significant. Some of SVENCHANSKIY's signals had been considered, NOSENKO said, "of definite operational interest." In September 1963, NOSENKO took the case over from the previous handling officer, NOSKOV, and his name was listed in SVENCHANSKIY's file as the responsible officer.

NOSENKO first said that he had read SVENCHANSKIY's file and then changed this to say that he had only skimmed it. He met twice with his new agent, once in September 1963 and once later in the year. On both occasions, NOSKOV was present.

TOP SECRET

NOSENKO said that at the time SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 that, because SVENCHANSKIY was known to have had contacts with AMTORG in New York, there was some suspicion that he might be an FBI agent. NOSENKO was unable to be more precise as to the basis for these suspicions and, when asked how NOSKOV had resolved them, was able to say only that NOSKOV "felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an American agent.

NOSENKO knew little about SVENCHANSKIY's background from the one-volume file kept on him in the Tourist Department: He did know that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 on the promise of commercial favors, that he had at one time been detected in blackmarket transactions in the USSR, and that in addition to his travel agency, SVENCHANSKIY ran a Russian-language bookstore in Chicago. FBI and CIA records show that SVENCHANSKIY has been employed by a series of registered Soviet Government organizations in the United States since the early 1930's, that he was released from his position as a United Nations radio officer broadcasting to the Soviet Union in 1952 when he failed to answer questions of the Senate Internal Security Committee concerning alleged subversive activity, and that both his travel agency and his book store are affiliated with registered Soviet agencies, Inturist and Mezhkniga. Allegations on file of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espionage activities date back to the Second World War. In August 1950, Harry GOLD linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage network in the United States during the war. The FBI has reported

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was identified as having at one time been the confidential secretary of GOLOS, the "director of Soviet espionage in the United States." (NOSENKO knew that someone called Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY in New York, but said that she is not a KGB agent and was not the one who marked the visa applications.)

e. The OSWALD Investigation

As First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said, he was directly involved in the investigation of OSWALD's activities in Minsk which was ordered after the assassination of President KENNEDY (Pages 136-144 and Part VIII.D.5.). It is from his role at this time and his reading of the Minsk KGB file on OSWALD that NOSENKO derived his authority to state that the KGB "washed its hands of OSWALD" after his attempted suicide in the USSR, that there was no attempt to recruit either OSWALD or his wife, and that KGB interest in OSWALD while he lived in Minsk was restricted to passive observation.

f. The CHEREPANOV Investigation

Part VIII.B.6.c. contains a discussion of the CHEREPANOV case, in which NOSENKO claims to have been involved in November 1962 while Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

TOP SECRET

g. Remarks

Leaving aside NOSENKO's unsubstantiated claims to supervisory jobs in the Tourist Department in 1962-1963, when he indicated he was absent from KGB Headquarters nearly half of the time, his personal role in operations and investigations of the period appears artificial in some instances and implausible in others. NOSENKO's knowledge of the origins of the JOHNSON case is incomplete, the timing conflicts with other activities attributed to himself, the expressed purpose of the compromise is unique, and the outcome seems to have little consequence beyond enabling JOHNSON to confirm that NOSENKO appeared in it. Although BRAUNS may have been in a position to corroborate NOSENKO's appearance in that operation, he has not done so and his statements contradict NOSENKO on the part the latter played. So too do the statements of BARGHOORN, who recognized NOSENKO as a person who was seen briefly during the interrogation sessions; certain facts from other sources contradict NOSENKO on one important detail (KHRUSHCHEV's presence in Moscow) of the BARGHOORN arrest, explained as a retaliation-hostage action for events in [REDACTED]. NOSENKO's information on the Soviet arrest of the American Communist KOTEN seems simply to have confirmed earlier information [REDACTED]. NOSENKO's information on the background of the SVENCHANSKIY operation is fragmentary, lacking even the most important facts known from several, mainly overt, sources; his attendance at meetings with SVENCHANSKIY was confined to the two times when the original handler was also present. The position of NOSENKO in the FRIPPEL and OSWALD cases is discussed in Part VIII.D.5. In summary, NOSENKO's operational work was not commensurate with that of a Section Chief and Deputy Department Chief, nor with that of a case officer, regardless of rank. Where the participation of NOSENKO in Tourist Department activities has been or might be confirmed by other sources, it is therefore unproven that he was in a supervisory position in the KGB or that he was even a case officer.

TOP SECRET

E. Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography

1. KGB Awards and Ranks

a. Awards

At various times since contacting CIA in 1962, NOSENKO described a series of awards and decorations which he received over the years for his performance of duties in the Second Chief Directorate (Pages 319-321). He claimed to have received the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, and the Order of the Red Banner; he said he received a special commendation from KGB Chairman SEROV for his role in the BURG1 recruitment and the same award in 1959 for his recruitment of all of the American or British tourists recruited that year by the KGB (three British and three American homosexuals). NOSENKO told of a number of other commendations which he received--almost one a year--for his "general good work." In October 1966 NOSENKO said that he never received any awards for his KGB operational performance, only a medal for satisfactory completion of 10 years of KGB service and a Red Army anniversary medal.

b. Ranks

NOSENKO's descriptions of his various rank promotions follow a similar but more complicated pattern (Pages 322-326). He has given two separate sets of circumstances for his first promotion, from junior lieutenant to lieutenant. According to the first of these, the one NOSENKO adhered to during 1964 and 1965, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while serving in the Far East with the naval GRU at the beginning of 1951. NOSENKO explained that the required time in grade is sometimes cut in half for officers serving at this undesirable post, and that this is why he was promoted after only six months of active duty. In 1966 NOSENKO said for the first time that he did not enter on active duty until March 1951 and that his promotion to lieutenant was in mid-1952, while stationed in Sovetsk, on the Baltic. In all his accounts, NOSENKO has said that he entered the KGB with the rank of lieutenant as this had been his rank in the naval GRU.*

During his first meetings with CIA in Geneva during 1962 NOSENKO claimed then to be a KGB major and said that he had already completed the necessary time in grade for a lieutenant colonelcy. NOSENKO gave an apparently accurate description of the structure of his salary as a major (so much for rank, so much for longevity, etc.) and pointed out that he was filling a position (Chief of Section) normally held by a lieutenant colonel. On contacting CIA again in 1964, NOSENKO claimed the rank of lieutenant colonel. He supported this claim with the TDY authorization issued for the CHEREPANOV search,** which

* See Part VIII.D.2. for a discussion of the likelihood that NOSENKO served in the naval GRU.

** See Part VIII.B.7.c. for an analysis of the CHEREPANOV case.

gave NOSENKO's rank as lieutenant colonel and was signed by GRIBANOV himself and testified to it by his signature on the "official biographical statement" prepared in Frankfurt.

The first major change in NOSENKO's story of his promotions came during the interrogations of January 1965 when he volunteered out of context and for no clear reason that he had never held the rank of major but rather, because of a series of administrative slip-ups and GRIBANOV's advice and help, had jumped directly from the rank of captain, which he received in 1956, to the rank of lieutenant colonel in late 1963. NOSENKO was later to claim that he had never said in 1962 that he was a major.*

In an unsolicited statement given to CIA in April 1966, NOSENKO wrote that he was only a captain and that the TDY authorization for the CHEREPANOV search had been filled out in error.

c. Remarks

NOSENKO's admissions regarding his awards and promotions directly affect his self-portraiture as a successful and rapidly rising KGB officer. They also have a bearing on one of the alleged reasons for this rise [REDACTED]; it was GRIBANOV's favoritism. NOSENKO almost invariably linked GRIBANOV's name to each of the awards he earlier claimed to have received. In most cases it was GRIBANOV who decided that NOSENKO should get a particular award; in the rest, it was GRIBANOV who physically presented the award to NOSENKO. The same is true of NOSENKO's account of his rank promotions: GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said, had promised him that he would be promoted directly from senior lieutenant to major in 1959; when the Personnel Department made a mistake and only promoted NOSENKO to captain, GRIBANOV advised him to accept this rank and promised that when he had completed sufficient time in grade for promotion to major, GRIBANOV would see to it that he was promoted directly to lieutenant colonel. This is what happened, NOSENKO said in 1965, and after he received his rank of lieutenant colonel, GRIBANOV called him in and congratulated him. On the basis of NOSENKO's admissions, there is additional reason to question his relationship with GRIBANOV.**

NOSENKO carried with him to Geneva, against KGB regulation and for no reason he could explain, an official KGB document listing him as a lieutenant colonel and signed by GRIBANOV himself as well as by two provincial authorities. This suggests strongly that the lie concerning NOSENKO's rank was not NOSENKO's alone. (If, in fact, as pointed out above, the CHEREPANOV papers were fabricated by the KGB, then there was no genuine search for CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO's document is also fabricated and not a mistake as NOSENKO claims.)

* This change of story coincided closely in time with a change in the information reported by [REDACTED]. Shortly after NOSENKO's defection [REDACTED] had said that remarks by his KGB associates made it appear that NOSENKO was a lieutenant colonel. [REDACTED] that NOSENKO was only a captain.

** NOSENKO's retractions and changes of story concerning his personal and operational relationship with GRIBANOV are discussed elsewhere (Pages 327-336).

TOP SECRET

2. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs

a. Introduction

NOSENKO drifted into the Komsomol, he said, in 1943 or 1944 without giving the step any thought whatsoever. All of his friends at the Baku school were joining, so NOSENKO did too. He remained an indifferent member of this Communist youth organization throughout his school and university years, in the GRU, and during his first year as a KGB officer. On arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1953, NOSENKO told CIA, he was appointed Secretary of the small Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate, a group of about 17 members.

b. Discussion

NOSENKO was questioned by DERYABIN on his duties as Komsomol Secretary (Pages 623) and, although able to give a superficial account of these functions, was found to be unaware of certain basic information which DERYABIN felt a person in this position should have. Thus, for example, NOSENKO provided a description of the system of levying dues on Komsomol members which was substantially incorrect and was unaware that a Komsomol Congress (the first in many years and therefore a major event) had been held during his claimed tenure as Secretary.

NOSENKO said that he held the position of Komsomol Organization Secretary until the late spring or early summer of 1954, when he got into trouble for having used official KGB alias documentation to conceal the fact that he received treatment for venereal disease contracted from a prostitute. Immediately after this incident, said NOSENKO, he was removed from his position and a "strict reprimand" was placed in his Komsomol file. Several months thereafter, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol because he was too old. For over a year, until January 1956 when NOSENKO was admitted as a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he was the only officer in the KGB who was neither a Komsomol nor a Party member. NOSENKO's account of his expulsion from the Komsomol on reaching his 27th birthday is contradicted by the official Statutes of the Komsomol in effect at that time. These regulations stipulate a maximum age of 25 years and NOSENKO should therefore have been forced out at the end of October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. This was explained to NOSENKO, who insisted that he remained a member until he became 27 years old and that no special exceptions were made in his case.

c. Remarks

The fact that NOSENKO is incorrect regarding the age limitation makes it doubtful that his account of the venereal disease incident and his removal from the Komsomol Secretaryship is true. The date which he gives to this incident is after that on which he should have been expelled from the Komsomol. (Additionally, NOSENKO's descriptions of the venereal disease incident, his use of false documents, and his subsequent punishment by the KGB and the Komsomol have been inconsistent; see Pages 80-81).

The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.).

TOP SECRET

3. Schooling

a. Introduction

There is relatively little reliable collateral information concerning NOSENKO's schooling up until 1950. Other than what he himself has reported, available information consists of overt press releases pertaining to the Minister NOSENKO's career (and giving his location at various times) and comments by one KGB officer and one defector. NOSENKO's own account, together with references to these other sources, is summarized below.

With the exception of minor variations in dates, attributable to memory, NOSENKO's story of his early years until the beginning of World War II, when he had just completed the sixth grade in Moscow, has been generally consistent in its various tellings. Moreover, his accounts of having studied in Leningrad and Moscow agree with information concerning the positions and movements of the elder NOSENKO during these years. In contrast, the period immediately following, during which NOSENKO allegedly received his early training in naval matters is characterized with frequent changes of story, contradictions, and admitted falsehood.

b. Discussion

In 1964 and 1965 NOSENKO recalled that he enrolled in the Moscow special naval school in the summer of 1941, immediately after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, and was evacuated with the entire school from Moscow to Kuybyshev in September to begin studies in the seventh grade. (An article in the Soviet Army newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) on 14 January 1967 confirmed that seven special naval schools were established in the Soviet Union in April 1940. One of these was in Moscow. However, to be eligible for admission, one had to have completed the seventh grade. The article did not indicate that the Moscow school was evacuated.) In April 1966, NOSENKO remembered that he did not go to Kuybyshev at this time but rather had been evacuated to Chelyabinsk with his mother and entered the seventh grade of a regular school.

In keeping with his respective accounts, NOSENKO said in 1964 and 1965 that he returned from Kuybyshev in the summer of 1942 and secured admission to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School, along with which he was evacuated by train to Baku in the fall of that year. In April 1966, after inserting the year spent at Chelyabinsk with his mother, NOSENKO moved all events up a year and wrote in his autobiography that he entered the Kuybyshev school in the fall of 1942 rather than the fall of 1941. NOSENKO also wrote at this time that he transferred to the Leningrad preparatory school and travelled to Baku in the fall of 1943, not 1942.*

* Describing the reasons for his transfer to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School, NOSENKO explained that the Moscow special naval school was evacuated further to Achinsk in Siberia and that this was farther from home than he wished to go. The Red Star article mentioned above said that the special naval schools were all closed in 1943, however. The special school apparently therefore was not transferred further to Achinsk, but was shut down.

Again to accommodate the added year in Chelyabinsk, NOSENKO said in 1966 that he spent half a year (actually, according to the rest of the story, about three months) in Baku before running away from school back to Moscow in January 1944. In earlier accounts he said he was at the preparatory school there from October 1942 until January 1944. Earlier he had also given expansive and changing accounts of his escape from school to join the Soviet front against the Germans at Tuapse; now he admitted that this was a lie. By cutting the time he was in Baku from 15 months to about three, NOSENKO also admitted implicitly that his accounts of the basic training he received in the preparatory school, of the summer he spent working at the school rather than returning to Moscow on vacation, and of his "certainty" that he celebrated his 15th birthday in Baku were also false.

NOSENKO has been relatively consistent in recounting the events of 1944. In 1964, 1965 and again in 1966 he told of studying as an "external" student in Moscow to complete his ninth year of schooling and of rejoining his classmates from Baku when the naval preparatory school returned to Leningrad in the autumn of 1944. On several occasions during 1964 and 1965, NOSENKO described how he and his classmates spent October and November 1944 working in the woods near Leningrad before beginning their tenth grade studies late in the year; he omitted this account from his April 1966 autobiography.

NOSENKO's account of the next years is similarly marked with a number of inconsistencies and falsehoods. (In the latter category he has claimed and later admitted as untrue that he attended the Frunze Naval Academy from 1943 to 1944, that he was on active military duty until being demobilized in 1945, and that he was shot in the hand by a jealous young naval officer in 1945.) According to the account given under interrogation in April 1964, NOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party in the end of April 1945, was hospitalized, resigned from the preparatory school, and received a certificate of satisfactory completion of the tenth grade, although he had been in school only since November 1944. In 1965 and 1966 NOSENKO said, respectively, that he was shot by a naval officer in February or March 1945 and that he shot himself in "early" 1945; since the 1964 interrogations he has claimed only that he received a statement of the courses he had attended at the preparatory school and that he completed the tenth grade at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in Leningrad.

The earliest collateral information specifically concerning NOSENKO's educational background appears to relate to the general period described above. ~~_____~~
~~_____~~
 the Soviet Navy defector ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval preparatory school with NOSFNKO during the period 1944 to 1946. ARTAMONOV, after NOSENKO's defection was publicized, said he had known a son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946. He was then shown a picture of NOSENKO and confirmed this was the man. However, according to NOSENKO's statements, NOSENKO would have been about two

classes behind ARTAMONOV, and would have been at the school for only about two months. It is conceivable that the presence of the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding would be widely known in the school and later remembered, but so would that son's self-inflicted wound and disappearance, which ARTAMONOV has not mentioned. It is unlikely, moreover, that ARTAMONOV could (20 years later) reliably recognize a photo of a person who had been there such a short time and not in ARTAMONOV's class. (NOSENKO claims not to have known ARTAMONOV nor to recognize the name.)

In all accounts, including his 1962 statements, NOSENKO has said that he entered the Institute of International Relations in Moscow in 1945. His descriptions of courses, events and friends are as vague and unsubstantial as his accounts of his earlier schooling. He has given various dates for his graduation and has explained that he did so to cover up the fact that he failed his final examination in the subject of "Marxism-Leninism," of which he was ashamed. NOSENKO most recently claimed that he received his diploma in the end of the summer of 1950. ~~_____~~

c. Remarks

NOSENKO's own admissions, as well as the small amount of collateral information available, make it clear that much of his account of his education has been false. The reasons for this are not at all clear and perhaps, in fact, there is no logical explanation. The CIA psychologist who tested and questioned NOSENKO about his youth suggested that, under conditions of interrogation, he may lie for no other reason other than his need to save face. This view is an accurate description of NOSENKO's behavior when questioned in detail on this and other aspects of his pre-KGB life; it is not so with regard to questioning on his intelligence career. Nor does the psychologist's view appear to explain why NOSENKO forgot or was unwilling to tell CIA about an entire year of his life, particularly such a significant one, after consistently and apparently accurately (judging from the Soviet press accounts of the Minister's activities) describing the years preceding it. It is not apparent why NOSENKO originally volunteered the story of his travel to Baku in the fall of 1942, when this was untrue, or why he said that the Moscow Special Naval School was evacuated to Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that the school was closed, if he was there.*

* The possibility that NOSENKO is not the person he claims to be (and with a completely false life history, or one lived by someone else) has been examined carefully, but no clear conclusion can be drawn on the basis of available evidence.

F. Appraisals of NOSENKO, his Motivation, and Other Operational Circumstances

1. Introduction

Appraisals of NOSENKO the man and of his motivations must be founded, as with any source, on factors which are often immeasurable, but fewer reservations need be attached to an appraisal of the other circumstances affecting the course of events in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. These operational circumstances can be analyzed and evaluated in much the same manner as were NOSENKO's production, sourcing, and biography for they are tangible pieces of evidence. In the next portions of this paper are presented these appraisals, which draw chiefly upon Pages 603-641 (for NOSENKO the man), Pages 20-29 (for his motivations), and Pages 11-19 and 30-43 (for the operational circumstances).

2. NOSENKO

The CIA specialists who assessed NOSENKO found him to be of above-average intelligence, one of them saying that "his effective intelligence is more cleverness than intellectuality, more shrewdness than efficiency." He is capable of good memory and, as illustrated by his repeating certain facts in the same sequence, capable of what appears to be good memorization of details. On the other hand, there were numerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountings of various events, he himself claimed an odd or poor memory, and he was the exceptional defector by having been totally debriefed within a relatively short period.

Parts VIII.D. and VIII.E. discuss NOSENKO's truthfulness with reference to his Soviet Intelligence and personal backgrounds. Here may be added other observations by the CIA specialists: NOSENKO can exercise deception cleverly, he improvised and was evasive under interrogation, and he has a "remarkable" disregard for the truth where it serves his purposes. The results of the polygraph examination were that NOSENKO "attempted deliberate deception."

The gaps and errors in NOSENKO's testimony therefore do not seem attributable to low intelligence or to consistently poor memory, but to a conscious attempt to mislead American Intelligence. Independently, then, this conclusion raises the questions of whether NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB and if so, why he was chosen. Regarding the latter point, it is noted that a CIA psychiatrist observed: "This man is capable of playing a role and playing it effectively," and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NOSENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors] as a possible penetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired." It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations, that NOSENKO displayed an inability to explain the gaps and errors in his reporting.

3. Motivation

Part of one's motivation for such a drastic act as treason or defection may not be wholly conscious, and there may be underlying causes which any source might not want or be able to admit even to himself. Thus, what NOSENKO said about motivation need not be taken at face value, and for this reason the whole question of his motivation must remain a minor weight in the overall assessment of bona fides.

NOSENKO has tried to present a meaningful explanation and has changed or adjusted his story to this end. He initially insisted that he had no ideological motives but simply wanted to "make a deal" in order to get out of trouble; yet this claim is open to question: The amount of operational money which NOSENKO needed to replace was hardly enough to have driven him to treason, especially since there were friends in Geneva like GUK and KISLOV who might have helped him make up his loss. Furthermore, only two days after CIA had rescued him with the funds, NOSENKO spent the CIA money in another drunken debauchery (with the same companion) and came back needing more. The discrepancy between the degree of the need and the seriousness of the act was so evident that the CIA case officer commented to NOSENKO at the outset that there must be some deeper explanation for his act. Thereupon NOSENKO added new reasons: His distaste for certain aspects of the regime, his resentment of KHRUSHCHEV, and his liking for Americans.

By his defection in 1964 NOSENKO changed the course of his life, although he had said in 1962, forcefully and unequivocally, that he would never do so unless in acute danger. In 1964 he could give no coherent explanation for the change of heart and in October 1966 he denied, for the first time, that he had said in 1962 that he would not defect. His only motivation was that, having risen to the level of Deputy Department Chief, he would not get to travel abroad any more. (This contradicts NOSENKO's 1962 statements: anticipating imminent promotion to Deputy Department Chief, he said that he would leave the USSR at least once a year in the future.) For no visible reason NOSENKO seems to have abandoned a purportedly successful and promising career, an undisturbed family life and children of whom he was fond, cast shame on his father's memory and his remaining relatives, and departed forever from his own country.

His own unease concerning his motivation evidently continued until, in 1965, he wrote one cohesive explanation. No part of this statement was ever borne out by his conduct, attitudes, remarks or reactions. He appeared, whenever his reactions seemed spontaneous, to dislike the United States, to have no interest in it politically, culturally, or scenically, and to preserve a preference for the USSR. A CIA graphologist commented on NOSENKO's "strong emotional ties to his traditional background," while a CIA psychologist reported: "Emotionally he has not defected in spite of his attempt to intellectually rationalize that he has." The psychologist also said that it is "almost impossible to determine his true loyalties and true beliefs."

TOP SECRET

4. Operational Circumstancesa. Presence in Geneva (1962)

When he came to Geneva in mid-March 1962, NOSENKO was a newly appointed Section Chief in the KGB Second Chief Directorate, having held this position for two months. He himself acknowledged to CIA that it appeared strange for the KGB to send a new Section Chief on an extended trip abroad unconnected with his own work. His reasons for being in Geneva have varied and to some degree contradict one another: The Disarmament Conference was not expected to last more than "a few weeks," but NOSENKO did not begin his work against SHAKHOV (one of the main reasons for his being there) until six weeks after arrival; GRIBANOV played a role in his TDY, but NOSENKO later denied this; there were in 1962 "new rules" requiring a staff officer to accompany a Soviet delegation, but in 1965 NOSENKO said he did not remember such regulations. He was permitted to go to Geneva in 1962 and 1964, as well as to Cuba in 1960 and England in 1957 and 1958, under no supervision or restraint despite his claim to a record so bad that he was not cleared by the KGB for permanent posting to Ethiopia in 1960.

b. Presence in Geneva (1964)

NOSENKO said on one occasion that GRIBANOV was one of those who allowed him to come to Geneva in January 1964, as a personal favor;* he later not only denied this but said in 1965 that GRIBANOV knew nothing about the TDY. He reported the 1964 TDY might, because of his new position, be his last trip to the West, hence the "favor" of his superiors to permit him this last trip; in 1962 NOSENKO said he had the assurance that as Deputy Department Chief (which he knew he was about to become) he would in the future come to the West at least once a year. Also, NOSENKO could not explain why a First Deputy Department Chief, if allowed out of the USSR as a "treat," would go abroad for a conference which could be expected to last many weeks, probably months. This question is compounded by the fact that NOSENKO would be needed in Moscow: He said that a KGB conference to plan the handling of the tourist season was to be held at about this time, and he stuck to this story even after admitting that the telegram recalling him for this Moscow conference was an invention (see below).

c. Access to KGB Residency and Availability to CIA

NOSENKO in 1962 routinely visited the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva every weekday morning, although he claimed that he had no reason and that it is normally forbidden (as other sources have confirmed).** When asked how and why he

sensitive source

cited GRIBANOV's personal authorization of NOSENKO's trip in the face of derogatory information as one cause of GRIBANOV's dismissal.

**NOSENKO said he did not visit the KGB Legal Residency in London more than once during his visits there in a similar capacity in 1957 and 1958, nor during his trip to Cuba in 1960.

TOP SECRET

did so in Geneva, NOSENKO has given different answers at different times. His stories of simply "dropping in and hanging around" for lack of anything better to do are unacceptable in terms of known or likely Soviet practice. His explanation that it was due to TSYMBAL's auspices or or intervention were contradicted by: First, his own confused accounts of his relationship with TSYMBAL; and second, his own statements at other times that it was GUK who was primarily responsible for NOSENKO's visits to the Residency.

NOSENKO had a full day free for meetings on 11 June 1962, although thereafter he limited meeting times to shorter and shorter periods until his departure. This seemed natural at the time since he would presumably have his own responsibilities and would need to be seen by his Soviet colleagues in his proper surroundings. However, in 1964 he seemed not to have any official responsibilities or any calls on his time: He was willing to spend all his time in meetings with CIA. Although this could be explained by the fact that he planned to defect anyway, it nevertheless would have involved unnecessary risks to a genuine source about to become a defector. He showed no concern at the time, but later (in 1966), he said that he had been in fact afraid; it was for this reason that he invented the Moscow recall telegram, in order to hasten his defection and put an end to his fears of getting caught. It is, of course, impossible to make conclusive judgments on Soviet practice, but one would expect, if NOSENKO were not engaged in security duties, that he would be required to participate for cover reasons in more of the Soviet delegation's official activity. He said that any absence could be explained as "security duties," since everyone on the Soviet Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer. This unconcern for the suspicions of other Soviets conforms neither with observed Soviet practice nor with reports from other sources that Soviet intelligence and security officers under cover go to some pains to hide their true affiliation.

NOSENKO explained the contrast between his freedom and availability in 1964 and his limited free time in 1962 by the fact that in 1964 he had no personal friends in Geneva; in 1962 both GUK and KISLOV expected to see him in his free time. (This story does not explain his ability in 1964 to get away during conference working hours; neither GUK nor KISLOV affected this in 1962.)

d. Timing of 1962 Contact

NOSENKO had been in Geneva for three months in 1962 when the incident which brought him to CIA occurred; it was only two weeks before his departure. He came to David MARK only 10 days before leaving. This had the effect of limiting CIA's time with him. NOSENKO's contact came only about 10 days after CIA had completed, in the same city, a series of meetings with BELITSKIY, a Soviet interpreter who had been recruited and handled as an agent by CIA during earlier visits to the West. NOSENKO, as one of the two primary items he wanted to "sell" revealed that BELITSKIY had been under KGB control from the outset (Page 517).

TOP SECRET

e. Willingness to Meet CIA

Although in 1962 NOSENKO claimed that he wanted to sell only two specific items for the money he had lost, and then disappear, there were indications from the outset that he expected and planned to come back for further meetings with CIA. At this first meeting he called attention to certain information in his possession about POPOV, hinting that he would tell it later; even as he protested his unwillingness to continue meeting with CIA, he was giving ample details about himself which would inevitably have compromised him to CIA and forced his future collaboration. Before he finally agreed to return for more meetings, he said: "Maybe I'll meet you again Monday" (two days after the first meeting). NOSENKO refused, despite repeated inducements, to meet on the intervening Sunday. In fact, when he did return on Monday, he said that he had spent Sunday with friends, drinking and "discussing recent USSR foreign policy moves and speeches by KHRUSHCHEV."

f. The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's confession that he fabricated the story of his having been urgently recalled to Moscow by a telegram ~~_____~~ leaves only two possible interpretations:

- There was a telegram, but NOSENKO's mind has slipped and he is no longer able to distinguish between fact and fancy. This, however, is not borne out by his general conduct nor his performance under interrogation in 1966.

- There was, in fact, no telegram. (This is borne out by Special Intelligence.) Thus, the invention was ~~_____~~ not NOSENKO's but the KGB's; the KGB briefed NOSENKO to report to CIA that a telegram was sent; and NOSENKO made an error in later admitting that it was not.

g. Remarks

The operational circumstances so far reviewed point out the facts that:

- NOSENKO was inconsistent if not contradictory in stating his reasons for being in Geneva in 1962 and 1964;

- He had unusual access to the KGB Legal Residency and an availability for meeting CIA that seemed to impinge upon his security;

- He was willing to return to meetings with CIA although having at first said that there were but two items of information for sale;

- He was "in place" as a CIA source for the last six of his 100 or so days in Geneva in 1962, thus restricting the amount of time he could provide continuing reporting on the local Legal Residency; and

- After 12 days in the same status in 1964, he forced the defection by the KGB recall telegram, which appears to have been a fabrication.

TOP SECRET

Taken together, these facts suggest the possibilities that the KGB sent NOSENKO to Geneva on both occasions for the purpose of contacting CIA, that the KGB wanted the opportunity to gauge CIA's reactions to the walk-in in 1962 and to the defection plans in 1964, and that the KGB guided NOSENKO after contact was established in both years.

A further examination of the operational circumstances in Geneva lends credence to these possibilities. During the 1962 meetings, NOSENKO would frequently answer CIA questions by saying: "I will have to think about that tonight," or "I will have some time tonight to jot down and prepare a good answer for you," or "I don't want to give you an answer to that right off--I am afraid to mislead you." He would return to a later meeting with the information, after having visited the Legal Residency. In 1964 there were other examples of what may have been backstage guidance by the KGB:

-He called for an urgent special meeting to correct something he had said in an earlier meeting. Initially NOSENKO had named ZUJUS instead of KEYSERS as the U.S. Embassy code clerk whom he had personally approached in 1961. This seemed remarkably urgent and important to him at the time, and in retrospect this case gains special importance: It was the only time he claimed to have had direct contact with a U.S. Embassy staff employee during his alleged tour in the American Department in 1960-1961. If he could not remember this one name, it might call his entire story into question. It is hard to find another explanation; had he simply made a careless mistake, with his customary indifference to names and dates, NOSENKO would be unlikely to mull over what he had said at the meeting nor to bother about correcting a minor misstatement. Much less would he feel compelled to call an emergency meeting to do so.

-He came to meetings with "chance" items picked up at the Legal Residency, each of which would require quick action and the commitment of assets on the part of CIA in Geneva. Also, NOSENKO originally said in January 1964 that he wanted to defect right away, but various steps taken or planned by his CIA handlers kept him in place for a time. Each step, however, was quickly negated--usually at the next meeting--by some information NOSENKO had picked up by chance.

-He asked, out of context and without any explanation, whether GOLITSYN had told CIA that the President of Finland was a Soviet agent, and later could not coherently explain where he had heard this, why he had not told CIA about it in 1962, and why he had asked.

In addition, the Soviet reactions to the defection were unprecedented and contrasted sharply with, for example, the Soviets' avoidance of publicity concerning GOLITSYN's defection in 1961. The post-defection actions by the Soviet Government created publicity which had the superficial effect of underlining NOSENKO's authenticity, establishing him as a public figure, confirming that he had a family, and verifying that his defection was of alarming consequence. These

TOP SECRET

reactions seem purposeful in light of the approach in Paris in 1966 of a Soviet photographer to Paris Match; the photographer passed photographs of NOSENKO's wife and children as part of a proposed story to dramatize the abandoned family of a "top Soviet intelligence officer" whose defection had caused the "biggest blow ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence." There is no independent press in the USSR, no Soviet journalist allowed to publish as he pleases, and the Soviet Government in the past has shown no predisposition to dramatize defections from its most secret agency. The photographer can only be presumed to have been acting on KGB instructions.

G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO

1. Introduction

The preceding portions of Part VIII. present an analysis of the NOSENKO case without giving detailed consideration to information about him from Soviets reporting to CIA and the FBI. Because their evidence generally runs counter to the results of the foregoing analysis, it is reviewed here separately so that the concentrated examination of NOSENKO would not be diverted by asides as to the authenticity and reliability of these Soviets. As indicated below, the CIA and FBI sources who have directly supported NOSENKO's intelligence background are [redacted] sensitive sources [redacted] and the defectors [redacted] and GOLITSYN. None except GOLITSYN claimed to know NOSENKO personally or to have worked with him, and NOSENKO contradicted GOLITSYN by saying they had never met. Some of them, as well as CHEREPANOV, supported NOSENKO indirectly through overlapping information on specific KGB operations, but this aspect of their reporting is reviewed in Part IX.

2. Corroboration of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career

The statements of [redacted] the sources confirm that NOSENKO was a KGB officer with access to sensitive information: sensitive source

[redacted] said NOSENKO was a KGB lieutenant colonel (later changed to captain), a friend and protege of the head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV, who approved NOSENKO's (1964) TDY to Geneva. [redacted]

[redacted] NOSENKO was a KGB "chief," with access to details on KGB operations against the U.S. Embassy, and was most recently Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. He also stated that NOSENKO, with his information on U.S. Embassy microphones and KGB operations involving correspondents and tourists, was "more valuable [to American intelligence] than PENKOVSKIY." NOSENKO "could do tremendous harm to the KGB," [redacted] and moreover, the KGB "will not be able to operate normally for two years" (i.e., until 1966). He described the repercussions in the KGB caused by NOSENKO's defection: new KGB regulations to increase security, the dismissal of many KGB officers including GRIBANOV and the recall of many others [redacted]

[redacted] Asked [redacted] whether NOSENKO could be a "trick," i.e., a KGB provocateur, [redacted] expressed the conviction that NOSENKO was not. [redacted]

[redacted] sensitive source [redacted] stated that NOSENKO had attended the GRU's Military-Diplomatic Academy (NOSENKO has indicated he declined the opportunity to enroll in this strategic intelligence school in the early 1950's.) Afterwards, [redacted] NOSENKO served in the GRU and then entered [redacted]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] source

- According to [REDACTED] NOSENKO was in "Intelligence." His defection brought about the recall of a KGB secretary from Geneva, the rumored transfer of some 60 Soviet officials from assignments abroad, and the dismissal of KGB personnel including NOSENKO's friend GUK, who had recommended the TDY to Geneva. In addition, [REDACTED] reported, immediately after the defection a representative of the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee went to Geneva to speak to the Soviet Government employees there. [REDACTED] said that NOSENKO had been tried in absentia in Moscow for treason and sentenced to death (see Pages 46 and 342).

- GOLITSYN failed to comment when shown NOSENKO's name in 1962, and there is no record of his ever having mentioned NOSENKO prior to the Western press announcement of the defection in 1964, even though he had named people known to him in the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. (Shortly after defecting GOLITSYN said that he had visited this Department in 1960 and at the turn of the year 1960-1961.) After NOSENKO defected, GOLITSYN was given a summary of NOSENKO's biography. Thereupon GOLITSYN reported that NOSENKO was a KGB officer whom he first met in 1953 and last saw in 1959. From 1953 to 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN stated, NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, responsible for coverage of U.S. military personnel and later either for others in the Moscow Embassy or for correspondents. As of 1959, GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO was a senior officer in the Tourist Department; as of 1960, he was definitely not in the American Department. GOLITSYN added that GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV were friends in the KGB whom he shared with NOSENKO (see Pages 343-344).

[REDACTED] Source

[REDACTED] Soviet source, [REDACTED], indicated she had been told by her KGB friend SVIRIN that NOSENKO was a "civilian"; he had nevertheless provided information on microphones in the U.S. Embassy and had caused "considerable damage." [REDACTED] also have corroborated certain non-Intelligence aspects of NOSENKO's background.

3. Remarks

[REDACTED] Source,

[REDACTED] aside, the Soviet sources have certified that NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer, and all asserted or implied that he had access to information valuable to American Intelligence--the microphones in the U.S. Embassy being one item in common. [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

~~_____~~. Most of them have described the serious repercussions of NOSENKO's defection. The possibilities with regard to the accuracy of these sources' reporting are:

First, they are correct. If so, the foregoing analysis is in error, they are valid sources, and NOSENKO is what he claims to be: a genuine defector whose previous positions in the KGB enabled him to divulge all important details on operations against Westerners, mainly Americans.

Second, they are misinformed. If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, they may be valid sources, and NOSENKO has always been under KGB control. For this to be true, it would have been necessary for the KGB to dispatch NOSENKO with only a highly restricted number of KGB personnel (including GRIBANOV) aware of the actual circumstances of the operation. The KGB, at the same time, would have propagated within and outside of the Soviet Intelligence Services the fiction that NOSENKO was an actual but disloyal KGB officer and would have supported this fabrication in various ways ~~_____~~

the rumor spreading

~~_____~~ about the severity of the loss of NOSENKO, etc.).

Third, they have been purposefully misleading American Intelligence for their own or KGB purposes. If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, and some or all of them have participated in a KGB conspiracy to support the bona fides of NOSENKO, a KGB-controlled source.

These possibilities are discussed further in Part IX.

H. Alternative Explanations**1. Introduction**

Parts VIII.B. through VIII.F. have discussed the inaccuracies, self-admitted contradictions, inconsistencies, and incompleteness of NOSENKO's reporting about himself and the KGB. Collectively, these important flaws in the story of and by NOSENKO make it necessary to choose an explanation for his actions and the nature of his information. There are three alternatives:

First, NOSENKO was a KGB officer but (a) has a faulty or selective memory, has embellished or boasted, or his reporting has been influenced by a combination thereof; or (b) he is insane.

Second, NOSENKO lied about himself in order to save face.

Third, NOSENKO has misrepresented himself, either on his own or at the instigation of the KGB.

Each of these mutually exclusive alternatives is discussed below.

2. First Alternative

According to one postulate, NOSENKO was an officer in the KGB but has a faulty memory, has a selective memory, and/or has embellished or boasted:

a. Faulty Memory

NOSENKO himself has repeatedly appealed for understanding that "different people have different memories" and that his own is "funny," and this is supported by his forgetfulness and errors concerning events he is known independently to have lived through, such as the BURGI and [REDACTED] cases. But it cannot be said that he is, in general, "very bad with names," because he has almost total recall of names and positions of hundreds of KGB officers in the American and Tourist Departments. He has a good memory for faces and rarely failed to recognize photographs of people he claimed to know. He remembered consistently details about certain operations (the compromise and investigation of PENKOVSKIY, the surveillance of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, the JENNER case, the arrest of BARGHOORN, and the search for CHEREPANOV, to cite a few examples). NOSENKO was precisely accurate in his recollection of most of his dealings with CIA personnel from June 1962 onward.

b. Selective Memory

Although having a selective memory is probably true of nearly everyone, a CIA psychologist has described NOSENKO as a psychopath who would register each passing event only in relation to its effect on himself at that moment. This would inevitably make him indifferent to the characteristics of other people, for example, and to the sequence in which events transpired; the aspects important to him might not appear so to a more objective observer. Such a person would

suppress unpleasant memories and would have no real appreciation of or respect for an "objective truth." His reporting, like his perception and his memory, might therefore seem distorted. He might recount events according to his mood of the moment. Thus, for example, if real attachments to family or friends is impossible for a psychopath, there would be an explanation as to why NOSENKO cannot easily remember his childrens' birthdays, why in 1962 (or 1965) he appears to have lied--or been indifferent to the truth--about his older daughter's schooling, and why he cannot recall when he first married. In theory this hypothesis can explain any aberration, since it involves the unknowable. In its most extreme form, by describing NOSENKO as one unable to discriminate between fact and fancy, it would encompass and explain away the facts that his story is obviously untrue and contradictory in major ways; that his account of his personal and professional life and his rendition of the information he knows are so vague and unsubstantial; that he cannot (and/or does not care to) remember or recount how he did the things he did. Most important, it would dismiss any conclusions based on NOSENKO's testimony since nothing NOSENKO said could be taken seriously. This hypothesis, however, is unsupportable because of several factors.

First, NOSENKO claims--and other sources confirm--that he quickly rose to high supervisory responsibility in a counterintelligence organization which is known to require attention to detail. He would have risen in the KGB while overcoming the black marks in his file: scandal, indiscipline, negative background factors, and bad Party record. NOSENKO admits that his performance was not good; he was inattentive and inactive and almost none of his operational activity was carried out unaccompanied. That his rise resulted from his father's influence or GRIBANOV's is untenable, for his father died in 1956 and GRIBANOV's patronage (itself open to the strongest doubt) would not and could not be dispensed upon such a mental case. Mental aberration to the degree which would explain his poor performance under CIA interrogation would necessarily have hindered his performance of KGB duties, denied him special privileges, and and hence cost him the career which NOSENKO has claimed for himself.

A second factor negating this hypothesis of a psychopathic personality is that such a person could be induced to recall certain details with the help of discussion, questioning, and reminders, whereas NOSENKO's vague and hazy reports seem to represent the absolute limits of his memory or knowledge. Years of questioning have not succeeded in dredging up any new details or incidents. Even when reminded, he could not recall, for example, one of KOSOLAPOV's TDYs to Helsinki, the details of the seizure of electronic equipment from the U.S. Army Attaches at Stalingrad, the correct date of GOLITSYN's defection, or the presence of KHRUSHCHEV in Moscow at the time of the decision to arrest BARGHOORN.

Another factor is the impossibility of applying this hypothesis to the totality of NOSENKO's reporting. If the hypothesis holds that some things are important to him and others are not, and that he therefore remembers the former and forgets the latter, it is refuted by the inability to

find a category of information about himself which he consistently remembered nor any that he consistently forgot. If what is important is his own direct experiences, for example, it is odd that he recalled the operations of others better than his own; he remembered the names of hundreds of KGB officers, but could not recall names of his own agents and people involved in his own career; he could recount details of the PENKOVSKIY investigation, in which he did not participate, but not of the discovery of American spies among tourists, such as McGOWAN, for which he was responsible; he remembered details of the 1955 MALIA case in which he did not meet the target personally but forgot details of the 1961 KEYSERS case in which he did. If it is the importance to him of recruitment operations against U.S. Embassy employees which permitted him to recall some details of the STORSBERG and MULE operations, it is not important enough to help him recall some of the other details which were equally pertinent to him personally; and it is not selective memory which made him forget almost every detail about CIA personnel in Moscow and KGB action against them. If it is said that his parental family is important to him (hence his memory of his father's funeral and the names of his uncles and aunts), it is odd that he cannot recall details about his childhood. If drinking with important people is meaningful to him, it would explain why he remembers one GRIBANOV evening with sharp clarity, but it does not explain why he cannot remember the other two times, not even in what season of the year or in what restaurant they took place.

Finally, with reference to the "selective memory" hypothesis, it is precisely in matters NOSENKO said he remembers best and which he told most confidently that the majority of inexplicable contradictions arise. Nothing could shake him from his claim to have been directly responsible for ABIDIAN or on his story of the Pushkin Street dead drop, among numerous examples.

c. Embellishment

The third possibility is that he has simply embellished and boasted, while underlying his story is a core of truth somewhere near what he has reported. NOSENKO has, after all, admitted many "white lies" and boasts ("painting" himself, as he called it). Also, in the interrogations there were repeated signs that he was fabricating and improvising, often in ways which led him into more contradictions and further admissions of white lies. Perhaps then, according to this hypothesis, he simply invented, on his own, various aspects of his career. Perhaps he dated his entry into the KGB earlier to make himself seem more experienced, and invented his service in the American Department to make himself more interesting to American Intelligence. Perhaps he was only a principal agent, not a staff officer, but learned enough from his operations and from his handlers to think he could pose as one. This hypothesis would certainly explain many of the dubious aspects: the story of his career, his lack of information on KGB staff procedures, his ignorance of major KGB events and sources, the degree of his relationship with GRIBANOV, etc. This theory, however, founders on a number of points:

762.

-The validity of the information he has provided. To get such information he would have to be a KGB staff officer, must have worked in both the American and Tourist Departments as he says he did, and must have been a fairly senior officer with broad responsibilities (in view of the number of Tourist Department operations revealed by name in his 1964 notes). To name a few other examples from among hundreds possible:

(a) NOSENKO not only knew the identity of a KGB double agent against CIA, BELITSKIY, but gave checkable details from inside the case, including the names by which the CIA case officers identified themselves to the double agent;

(b) NOSENKO was able to report, with almost complete accuracy, that CIA ceased clandestine letter-mailings inside the Soviet Union for over a year after the arrest of Russell LANGELE in late 1959;

(c) He identified several Americans recruited or approached by the KGB in operations in which he said he did not directly participate, including "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), Sergeant Robert JOHNSON, and Henry SHAPIRO;

(d) NOSENKO knew inside information on Americans at the Embassy in Moscow, including operational activities of John ABIDIAN, (WINTERS) mailing of a letter to POPOV, the homosexuality of two diplomatic officers, etc; LLD

(e) He knew certain details of the story of Aleksandr CHEREPANOV which would not have been available outside the KGB staff.

Thus there would not be any great need nor much room for embellishment.

-The confirmations of others. He appeared before BAGHOORN and other KGB targets as a "chief," and sensitive sources ~~confirmed~~ sub-sources confirmed NOSENKO's unusual importance: that he was a Deputy Department Chief in the KGB, that his defection was a severe blow to Soviet Intelligence, that he was more important than PENKOVSKIY, and so on. A Soviet journalist told Paris Match that NOSENKO's defection was the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence. ~~Two sources~~ reported the recall to Moscow of many KGB staffers as a result of the defection, and these officers did indeed return to the Soviet Union.

Thus any embellishment must concern only minor details such as his rank, which he has already admitted.

d. Combination of Above

Another possibility might be that NOSENKO's poor performance was due to a combination of bad memory, psychopathologically selective memory, and embellishment. While this theory is intrinsically more logical and might correct and round off some obvious weaknesses in any one of the

individual theories, it cannot explain the counterarguments discussed under component parts above.

e. Insanity

It might be postulated that NOSENKO went insane and that this was the cause not only of his seemingly unmotivated contact with CIA in 1962 but of shortcomings in his story. However, NOSENKO thereafter handled senior KGB functions well enough to be promoted and to be permitted abroad in 1964; he has been examined periodically by a CIA psychologist and a CIA psychiatrist; he has been in contact over considerable periods of time and under varying degrees of stress with experienced CIA and FBI personnel; he has maintained his equilibrium under difficult circumstances. None of the foregoing results in an indication of insanity and there are countless other arguments which would invalidate this hypothesis.

3. Second Alternative

It has also been postulated that NOSENKO is a psychopath, is what he says he is, but that for psychological reasons and while under interrogation, he did not want to tell what he knew. By this line of reasoning, NOSENKO has lied for no other reason than to save face; by dwelling on the inconsistencies in NOSENKO's statements, the interrogator merely caused more inconsistencies or else received the false answers that NOSENKO did not know or did not remember the facts. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO recalled and repeated what he had previously said in the less inhibiting atmosphere of the relaxed debriefings prior to 4 April 1964. This alternative explanation thus does not account for the factual contradictions in NOSENKO's reporting before the interrogations, such as the errors in dates, in sourcing on the "ANDREY" case, in details about the Pushkin Street dead drop, etc. It also fails to account for NOSENKO's retractions about his rank as lieutenant colonel, in the face of the KGB TDY travel authorization which shows him to be a lieutenant colonel, and about the telegram recalling him to KGB Headquarters in January 1964. ~~_____~~
~~_____~~ The suggestion that NOSENKO lied to save face consequently can be dismissed.

4. Third Alternative

The only other postulate is that NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, in which case his misrepresentation was done either on his own or as part of a KGB operation.

If he is misrepresenting himself on his own, there are (even in theory) only two possibilities: He is merely exaggerating (discussed above, under the "First Alternative") or he is a fabricator. He cannot be a fabricator, however, since the Soviets have certified him in many ways; including his diplomatic status at the Geneva Conference, Soviet official protests and Soviet Embassy confrontation in Washington, Soviet officials' remarks in various areas of the world, and reports from ~~_____~~ other sources on his KGB status and importance. ~~_____~~ sensitive source and

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There remains the possibility that NOSENKO has misrepresented himself and is a witting part of a KGB operation. This hypothesis could accommodate the argument that the KGB would not dispatch a KGB staff officer as a double agent against a hostile service because, whether or not the argument is valid, NOSENKO (as indicated in Part VIII.D. above) has not proven his claim to having served as an officer of the KGB. If he has been and is now under KGB control, it would appear that he was being built up for years to look like an officer and was shown to Westerners in certain recruitment operations.* This could explain NOSENKO's revelations to FRIPPEL and others about his family and background; the otherwise pointless W.E. JOHNSON case, and NOSENKO's appearance in the BARGHOORN interrogation. It could explain NOSENKO's uneven memory and performance under detailed questioning: Much of what he should have known by personal experience could have been merely memorized as part of his KGB briefing. Nothing in NOSENKO's production (see Part VIII.B. above) would preclude his being a KGB-dispatched agent. That he was a KGB-dispatched agent was the conclusion independently arrived at by the CIA specialist who administered a polygraph examination to NOSENKO in April 1964.

4. Remarks

The first alternative above has been rejected while the possibility that NOSENKO on his own misrepresented himself is unacceptable. The remaining possibility is that NOSENKO has been manipulated by the KGB in an operation directed against American Intelligence.

* His American Department service in 1960-1961 was not supported by any such "show" appearances--he did not insist on the truth of his claim to participation in the KEYSERS case, which, moreover KEYSERS could not confirm; PREISFPEUND is an unreliable witness; and [REDACTED] is not accessible to interview.

I. Summary of Conclusions

CIA has considered every major aspect of the NOSENKO case for the purpose of reaching a definitive conclusion about the bona fides of this man who says he is a KGB officer-defector collaborating with American Intelligence.

As this point-by-point analysis has demonstrated, there is no reason to accept any of NOSENKO's claims to a career as an officer in Soviet Intelligence, to authority concerning the range and degree of KGB operational successes in the USSR (particularly with U.S. officials and private citizens), to accurate knowledge regarding major security cases in that country, or to cooperation with American Intelligence.

It would be sufficient proof of his mala fides to verify that NOSENKO lied about a single segment of his career in the KGB. He cannot have been truthful in saying that he was the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and a Deputy Chief in the Tourist Department of the same directorate from 1962 until his defection. Numerous indications make it doubtful that NOSENKO, as he contended, belonged to the naval GRU in 1951-1952, to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and to the American Tourist Section in 1955-1959. He was unable to support his alleged staff officer status in the KGB, providing incomplete and inaccurate information on his sub-sources and on such topics as Headquarters staff procedures while making illogical statements on *modus operandi*. Neither a supervisor nor, probably, a case officer, it remains dubious but possible that he was a KGB principal agent whose speciality in the past was compromising Western homosexuals. Whatever the capacity in which NOSENKO served, it was not in the KGB ranks, holding the KGB titles, or with the KGB honors he has ascribed to himself, and this fact is enough to prove the falsity of his claims to being a genuine defector.

There is no question, however, that NOSENKO has had the benefit of inside information from the KGB. He has said so, other sources have said so, the Soviet Government's reactions to the defection implied as much, and his reports contain details which could have come only from the KGB. He was introduced into several operations, the first as early as 1953, in a position appearing "senior" to known KGB staff officers. He has provided data on organization, personnel, and methods complementing and supplementing that from others affiliated with the KGB. Purposefully misleading about himself, NOSENKO has also been deceitful in discussing the compromises of CHEREPANOV, PENKOVSKIY, and perhaps POPOV, although here his reporting often correlates with that from several ~~other sources~~. Analysis shows that -- NOSENKO and others to the contrary -- CHEREPANOV was a KGB provocateur, PENKOVSKIY was detected at the latest in early 1961 not 1952, and POPOV was probably uncovered earlier than January 1959 because of a KGB agent rather than surveillance. NOSENKO thus has not merely misrepresented himself but has practiced deception under KGB guidance. Appraisals of NOSENKO's performance under interrogation, his alleged motivation, and the operational circumstances support this view.

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Furthermore, it is the only acceptable explanation, among the alternatives, for what has transpired since contact with CIA began in 1962.

CIA's conclusion about the bona fides of NOSENKO is unequivocal: he is a dispatched agent controlled by the KGB.

Part IX contains a discussion of the implications of the foregoing conclusion for the Soviet sources who, ~~_____~~ have corroborated the bona fides of NOSENKO.

TOP SECRET

IN DEFENSE FOR CASE 19,003

A. Introduction

sensitive sources

The conclusion that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed contradicts information reported to CIA and the FBI by (1) the defector GOLITSYN (op. (2))

[REDACTED]

that NOSENKO held senior positions in the KGB Second Chief Directorate.*** If the conclusion of this study of NOSENKO's bona fides is accurate, none of the [REDACTED] sources can be correct, and they must therefore be either misinformed about NOSENKO or purposefully misleading.

sources

In assessing whether and how [REDACTED] sensitive could have been innocently misinformed about NOSENKO after he defected, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the KGB might have created and supported a legend for a counterfeit KGB officer-defector like NOSENKO. The KGB might have accomplished this by the following means:

- NOSENKO's legend would have required the KGB to brief him in depth on numerous cases and various targets which he would be free to discuss with CIA. The KGB would also have to familiarize him with KGB staff organizational structure and procedures,*** and KGB officers prominent in his story (e.g., GUK, KOVSHUK, TSYMBAL, GRIEBOV) so that he could not only recognize their photographs but also lend reality to his remarks about them. NOSENKO would also have to visit KGB installations and other areas which appeared in his legend.

[REDACTED]

Source

***That these preparations were imperfect, or at least that NOSENKO imperfectly mastered his briefing, was shown in his performance under interrogation.

- Another phase of the preparations would have been NOSENKO's actual and demonstrable participation in operations, seemingly as a KGB officer. Presumably this would be done so that Westerners (e.g., BARGHOORN, TRIPPEL, and W.E. JOHNSON) could certify that they had seen NOSENKO in some such role.

- The KGB presumably would have restricted the number of its officers aware of some or all of the operational plan; it would nonetheless be faced with the problem of how public knowledge of NOSENKO's defection might affect others in the service. KGB officers abroad uninformed of the operational plan might be indiscreet with foreigners, in meeting Western double agents, or before microphones in their homes and offices, making such remarks as "I never heard of this man NOSENKO" or speculating close to the mark. Thus the KGB might have tried to support the bona fides of NOSENKO by the spreading of false rumors about his authenticity (this on the part of the limited few aware of the facts of the case), by recalling KGB officers from the posts in the West (ostensibly because they were known to NOSENKO), by announcing the wholesale dismissal of those responsible including GRIBANOV (although in fact they may have routinely retired or may have been removed from the mainstream of KGB Headquarters activities), and by making general announcements within the KGB about the "loss" incurred by the defection. Furthermore, since it is common Soviet practice to make a bad example of defectors, such announcements might be expected to denigrate NOSENKO as a "bad character" (with venereal disease, an odd Party record, self-inflicted wound, etc., in his background). The KGB might also have taken pains to support NOSENKO further by having Western Intelligence sources, notably double agents recognized by the KGB to be such, told of the seriousness of the defection.

It is within this possible framework that one might judge whether the reports of [redacted] concerning NOSENKO were unwitting repetitions of widely disseminated misinformation, or whether their reports constituted purposeful passage of KGB disinformation.

Their direct and indirect support of NOSENKO's bona fides, as well as the statements by GOLITSYN, are presented and evaluated in the next sections below, together with presentations and appraisals of their information on topics of reporting in common with NOSENKO's. Certain reports by [redacted]

Source

* It is noteworthy that such participation was limited to Tourist Department operations. NOSENKO did not claim physical participation in any contacts with American Embassy officials during the periods 1953-55 or 1960-61, except for MULE and STORSBERG (where his claimed role was uncheckable since it involved only holding a door) and KEYZERS (which KEYZERS did not confirm and on which NOSENKO did not insist, admitting that he doubted KEYZERS would remember or recognize him).

IN A
page
sources

[redacted] are also considered because they overlap NOSENKO's to some extent, although by saying he was a civilian, [redacted] contradicted his claim to KG3 staff officer status. A number of general correlations between the NOSENKO case and the [redacted] operations are then reviewed. The final section of part IX is a summary of conclusions about the relationship between the NOSENKO case and the reporting about him by GOLITSYN, [redacted] sensitive sources

sensiti

B. Background

1. Background

On 20 June 1962, after CIA's initial meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, the CIA was shown a list of names of Soviet delegates to the 1962 session of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. NOSENKO's name was on the list but GOLITSYN gave no indication that he recognized the name.

On 20 June 1962, after CIA's initial meetings with NOSENKO and because of the large overlap of NOSENKO's information and contacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CIA case officers who had met NOSENKO in Geneva met with GOLITSYN to obtain his comments on some of the NOSENKO material. GOLITSYN was told that CIA had received in Switzerland an anonymous letter which reported certain information from within the KGB. The CIA officer stated to GOLITSYN that the letter had obviously overlapped his own report, including names of NOSENKO's friends, GOR, GOR, and GOR, and that the purpose of the letter was suspected, perhaps in relation to NOSENKO's own information. He said that items from NOSENKO were discussed with the First and Second Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, and the First Chief Directorate was shown his report as one of the Second Chief Directorate personnel whom the Second Chief Directorate had named. He said that NOSENKO, and GOR, had indicated to him and possibly reported to him; CIA records, however, show that GOR had reported only to one Aleksander [redacted] NOSENKO, who had been in the office in Japan when NOSENKO left for the USSR in 1961. GOLITSYN made no further comment on these items, except to say that one identified as KGB had left that organization in 1961 for the USA. GOLITSYN said that in general, asking the full details necessary for an assessment, he could say that there were serious areas of disinformation in what he had seen; he wanted to see the full information on the case. It was not given to him.

On 10 February 1964 NOSENKO's defection from the Soviet Disarmament delegation in Geneva, Switzerland was publicized, including his KGB affiliation. When GOLITSYN heard this news he immediately recalled the June 1962 "letter" from Switzerland and linked NOSENKO to it; he thereupon stated that he recalled NOSENKO as a member of the Second Chief Directorate working against American citizens.

On 11 February 1964 GOLITSYN raised the possibility of his participation in interrogations of NOSENKO, and at this time he was given some background on the case and an indication of CIA's reservations about NOSENKO's bona fides. Over the next several months GOLITSYN was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, and at his request was supplied with all the available biographic data of NOSENKO to assist him in analyzing the operation. On 29 June 1964, GOLITSYN was interviewed in detail on the subject of NOSENKO. He confirmed NOSENKO's identity as the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding and said that he was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Tourist Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate. He was shown a photograph of NOSENKO (not buried in a photo spread, but singly) and he identified it as a photograph of the man he knew. At this time he gave the information about NOSENKO which is summarized below.

The NOSENKO case has not been discussed with GOLITSYN since the 29 June 1964 interview; thus he has not been questioned further on the circumstances which led to the encounters with NOSENKO described by him, nor have the results of subsequent detailed reinterrogations of NOSENKO - discussed at length in the foregoing sections of this paper - been made available to him for review, analysis, or comment.

2. Resume and Discussion of Information*

American Department - 1953

NOSENKO has said that he entered the KGB in March 1953** and was first assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department of what is now the Second Chief Directorate, KGB. He stated that his duties from his entry until sometime in 1954, perhaps about June, were to work on files of American correspondents on permanent assignment to Moscow and to meet with the Soviet citizens who were agents or informants reporting on the correspondents to the KGB.

GOLITSYN stated that he met NOSENKO in the American Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate*** a couple of times in 1953 when he, GOLITSYN, was there on other matters. GOLITSYN had earlier identified his own job between December 1952 and April 1953 as Chief of the American Sector, Counterintelligence (Ninth) Department, Foreign Directorate, under the Chief Intelligence Directorate (formed in December 1952 and reorganized in April 1953). From April 1953 until his departure

* The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595, with comments thereon appearing on Pages 647-659, while in this section are a discussion and an evaluation of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate (see Pages 343-344).

** Among the various dates given by NOSENKO for this entry, March 1953 has been given more often than others and is more consistent with the rest of NOSENKO's story.

*** This is now designated the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

for Vienna in October 1953 GOLITSYN was Deputy Chief of the Emigre Sector, Counterintelligence Department, Foreign Intelligence Department, Foreign Intelligence Directorate. GOLITSYN has not indicated the nature of his responsibilities in either of these positions which would have necessitated his visiting the American Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate, although certain activities of common interest with the latter would appear logical. NOSENKO's description of his alleged duties with correspondents, however, did not encompass his having official contacts with representatives of any component of the Counterintelligence Department of the Foreign Directorate. According to NOSENKO's description of the location of his claimed office in the American Department, and his description of the duties of the co-workers he said shared it with him, chance contacts there with such a representative would have been precluded. Even by NOSENKO's account, then, an encounter between GOLITSYN and himself could not have been in the course of interdepartmental liaison between their respective units, nor could it have occurred in NOSENKO's office. GOLITSYN's lack of reporting on KGB operations against American correspondents (other than his conversation with KOVSHUK in 1956 or 1957 about Henry SHAPIRO) is further evidence that his business in the American Department was unrelated to NOSENKO's claimed activities at that time, and GOLITSYN's own statement on the 1953 encounters implied that his meetings with NOSENKO were accidental. Fleeting as their contacts would therefore have been, it could have led GOLITSYN to make the unfounded assumption that NOSENKO was a member of the staff within the American Department.

American Department/Tourist Department - 1955-1960

NOSENKO stated that he transferred from the American Department to the Tourist Department in June 1955, and remained in the Tourist Department until 1960, becoming a deputy chief of section there in 1958.

GOLITSYN, however, insisted that NOSENKO remained in the American Department until at least 1957, or possibly as late as 1958. GOLITSYN added that the KGB would not be aware that he knew

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c.

NOSENKO's true position in the American Department in 1957 or 1958. GOLITSYN did not indicate how he acquired his knowledge on this nor why the KGB subsequently would have been unable to determine that he had. If his access to this information was indeed that remote (as GOLITSYN's assignment in 1957 and 1958 would indicate - see below), it is readily apparent that it could likewise be somewhat garbled. GOLITSYN was unable to explain the fact that NOSENKO's physical presence in exclusively Tourist Department cases had been positively established through photo identifications made by several of the individuals involved, who met NOSENKO as early as 1956.

From 1955 to 1959 (the same years when NOSENKO claimed to have been in the Tourist Department) GOLITSYN was enrolled in the KGB Higher School. He was detached from the school, in the period January-March 1959, in order to gather material for his thesis. At that time GOLITSYN spent just under two months in the Tourist Department,* but GOLITSYN's work did not involve him in any day-to-day operational activities of this department. He has reported having "occasionally" met NOSENKO in 1959; although he did not specify that it was at precisely this time, it seems probable that it would have been. GOLITSYN said that he asked NOSENKO in 1959 where he was working and NOSENKO told him the Tourist Department. Again it appears from this that his encounters must have been brief, superficial, and not work-related, hence insufficient for GOLITSYN to arrive independently at a well-founded conclusion as to NOSENKO's actual status and function with the Tourist Department.

*In describing his own and others' responsibilities in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO has made no reference to this unit having a formal or regular relationship with the KGB school or to students from the school having been detached to the department.

TOP SECRET

Information Not Available to GOLITSYN

The detailed interrogations of NOSENKO concerning his claims to KGB positions between 1953 and 1964, did not take place until many months after GOLITSYN made his statements, and they were based upon all collateral information known relating to each phase. None of the results of these interrogations was made available to GOLITSYN, so he was not aware of the countless points on which NOSENKO contradicted known facts and revealed his ignorance of activities which were carried out by the KGB during his alleged tenure in these departments.

3. Comments on GOLITSYN

Several factors influence the evaluation of GOLITSYN's statements on NOSENKO:

- First, as stated in Part VIII.I., it is concluded that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed. GOLITSYN's testimony verified this conclusion insofar as NOSENKO's claims about service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960-1961 are concerned. Moreover, in 1962 GOLITSYN concluded that the KGB "letter-writer" (actually NOSENKO) was under KGB control in submitting information to American Intelligence. At issue, therefore, is the evidence from GOLITSYN to the effect that NOSENKO was an officer in the American Department (until 1957 or 1958, whereas NOSENKO said he was reassigned from the department in 1955) and in the Tourist Department subsequently.

- Second, GOLITSYN made no comment about or identification of NOSENKO prior to the public announcement of the latter's defection, despite many previous opportunities to do so (e.g., in discussions of GUK, CHURNOV, and KASHCHEYEV) and despite GOLITSYN's proven excellence of memory for names and tasks of KGB personnel. GOLITSYN gave little detail on the circumstances of his encounters with NOSENKO, and he has not been questioned further about them. Nevertheless, as indicated in the foregoing remarks on the circumstances in which the two men could have met, it seems apparent that any contact would have been brief, infrequent, casual, extra-official, and

the following discussion considers GOLITSYN's information about NOSENKO in conjunction with NOSENKO's denial about having been in contact with GOLITSYN.* Possible explanations for GOLITSYN's having referred to their encounters but having misidentified NOSENKO's positions in the KGB are: First, GOLITSYN could have erred; second, GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons; and third, GOLITSYN could have lied at the direction of the KGB because he (like NOSENKO) is under KGB control. To examine each of these points separately:

- GOLITSYN could have erred. Apart from the denial by NOSENKO, who is an unreliable source, there is no evidence to refute GOLITSYN's statement that he and NOSENKO met in the American Department in 1953 and in the Tourist Department in 1958 or 1959. (The conclusions in Part VIII.I. about NOSENKO's bona fides do not rule out the possibility that he was physically present on occasion on the premises of the two departments in these years, although not in the capacities that he has claimed.) The nature of their encounters, however, could have been such that GOLITSYN erred in assuming - because NOSENKO was seen on or near the premises of the two departments, and because NOSENKO told GOLITSYN in 1958 or 1959 that he was in the Tourist Department - that NOSENKO was therefore an officer of these specific elements of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. Thus, if GOLITSYN met NOSENKO as he said, he mistakenly identified NOSENKO as being a member of the staffs of the American and Tourist Departments at these times.

- GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons. He may have believed that to say he met NOSENKO or to say he knew

* There is insufficient information available to reach a conclusion about, or even speculate on, why NOSENKO was so certain GOLITSYN's defection occurred in January 1962, as contrasted with the fact that it took place on 15 December 1961.

NOSENKO's position in the KGB would add authenticity to his earlier evaluation of the NOSENKO information of 1962, to his contradictions of NOSENKO's statements concerning service in the U.S. Embassy Section and the operations of that section, and to his contention that the KGB would try to counteract his (GOLITSYN's) information by spreading purportedly authoritative but purposefully misleading reports on the same subject matter. In summary, GOLITSYN's intention in lying about NOSENKO could simply have been to add greater credibility to his expressed opinion that NOSENKO was a KGB provocateur.

- GOLITSYN could have lied at the direction of the KGB, an explanation that is examined here for the sake of completeness and not because CIA has any reason to believe GOLITSYN is under KGB control. This explanation would mean that GOLITSYN, although offering partial confirmation for NOSENKO's claims, directly attacked the bona fides of another KGB-dispatched agent of allegedly comparable rank and knowledgeability. Acting under KGB instructions, GOLITSYN would have sought to undermine NOSENKO's acceptability, regardless of the fact that NOSENKO said he was providing reliable and comprehensive information about KGB operations against American officials and tourists in the USSR. At the same time, NOSENKO was not giving an account of their relationship that was consistent with GOLITSYN's, by implication NOSENKO was distorting or diluting the earlier reports of GOLITSYN on KGB operations in the Soviet Union, and NOSENKO was seeking to gain acceptance by CIA equal to that experienced by GOLITSYN. According to this hypothesis, two sources under KGB control - each striving for acceptance - deliberately gave conflicting stories of their relationship, and each tried to undermine the bona fides of the other, GOLITSYN explicitly and NOSENKO by implication. This explanation is so illogical, as well as so detrimental to the KGB, that it must be rejected from serious consideration.

The choice thus seems to lie between the first two explanations for GOLITSYN's misidentification of NOSENKO, one an understandable error of assumption drawn from their few chance encounters, the other a misguided attempt that had no sinister goals. In either case, GOLITSYN's testimony does not contribute to a determination of the status of NOSENKO within the KGB as of the years prior to 1960.

There are two explanations for NOSENKO's denial about having met GOLITSYN. One explanation is that they were never in personal contact, the KGB was aware of this fact, and - unprepared for GOLITSYN's statements to the contrary - the KGB briefed NOSENKO accordingly. If in this particular instance NOSENKO told the truth and (as discussed above) GOLITSYN did not, no additional or different conclusion can be drawn about the bona fides of NOSENKO and his claims of service in the KGB. The second explanation is that, as GOLITSYN said, these encounters did take place in 1953 and again in 1958 or 1959, but because of their casual and fleeting nature, NOSENKO (unlike GOLITSYN) has not remembered them.

2. Resume of Information*

According to GOLITSYN, he personally met NOSENKO two or three times in 1953, while visiting the U.S. Embassy section of the American Department, a component of the internal security directorate, and again in 1958 and 1959. On the other hand, NOSENKO was unable to identify GOLITSYN's photograph and he denied ever having seen him. GOLITSYN said that GUK, CHUKAIKOV, and KASHCHIEYEV were friends of NOSENKO as well as of GOLITSYN. (NOSENKO claimed to be on friendly terms with each of the three KGB officers; he acknowledged, however, that his acquaintance with GUK had been merely casual until NOSENKO's three-month TDY to Geneva in 1958 which made them the best of friends.) From 1953 to 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO was a case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section, then transferred to the Tourist Department, where he was a senior case officer in 1959. GOLITSYN stated unequivocally that NOSENKO was not a Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section or otherwise serving in that section or in the American Department as of the time he (GOLITSYN) consulted with various officers there in April-June 1960 and January 1961.** GOLITSYN spoke there with officers whom NOSENKO claims as close colleagues including KOVCHUK and SKYAZNIKOV, and would doubtless have known if NOSENKO were supervising or otherwise involved in code clerk operations. In summary, GOLITSYN corroborated some of NOSENKO's alleged assignment in the KGB Second Chief Directorate but not all of them while NOSENKO contradicted GOLITSYN by saying that the two men had never met.


3. Comments on GOLITSYN:


From December 1952 until April 1953 GOLITSYN was Chief of the American Desk, Counterintelligence Department, Foreign Directorate, KGB (then MGB) and for most of the period from January to March 1959 he was on TDY training assignments to the Second Chief Directorate. In the first job at least, GOLITSYN presumably would have had regular dealings with the U.S. Embassy Section, and perhaps also in the second he would have been in contact with the Tourist Department, in which NOSENKO claimed to have been then serving. Despite this and despite his proven excellence of memory for the names and tasks of KGB personnel, GOLITSYN never mentioned NOSENKO in debriefings during the years 1962 and 1963, nor commented on his name on the two occasions when it was shown to him, although he had numerous opportunities to mention him in connection with the names of GURANOV, KASHCHIEYEV, and GUK.

* The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595, with comments thereon appearing on Pages 647-659 while in the section which follows below are a discussion and an evaluation of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate, as described on Pages 343-344.

**As stated in Part VIII.1., however, it is not credible that NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953, 54 or in 1960-1962.

TOP SECRET





TOP SECRET

There would appear to be no reason why NOSENKO, if he had ever met GOLITSYN, should not have said so to American Intelligence representatives.* To have done so would have given NOSENKO concrete support for his claims of KGB staff service, which he knew to be in question. On the contrary, however, NOSENKO consistently denied any contact and manufactured a demonstrably false story to explain his own absence during GOLITSYN's admitted visit to the section in which NOSENKO claims to have served in January 1961. (See Page 183, second footnote.)

On the other hand, GOLITSYN's claim must be measured against the background and circumstances of his statements. In the absence of any comments about or identification of NOSENKO by GOLITSYN prior to the public announcement of his defection from the KGB, and in view of the amount of information made available to him from NOSENKO materials prior to his making any statements about his alleged acquaintance with him, GOLITSYN's "identification" of NOSENKO as a KGB staff officer known to him personally cannot be considered as spontaneous or uncontaminated information.

The weight of independent evidence against NOSENKO's alleged service in those positions which GOLITSYN corroborated, combined with the conflict between GOLITSYN's and NOSENKO's testimony about their personal acquaintanceship, makes it impossible to accept GOLITSYN's verification of NOSENKO's claimed KGB status during any stage of the latter's career.

*It is not likely that he would forget it. Direct relationship with or knowledge of a defector would be interesting and important to remaining KGB officers; even if temporarily forgotten, post-defection reminiscences would almost certainly bring back memories of such recent and direct contacts as GOLITSYN relates.

2. NOSENKO's Background and Career

Date of Information
10 February 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI on
12 February 1964)

Source
[Redacted]

Information Reported by [Redacted]

NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approxi-
mately 16 years, since about 1947, and was an
employee of the Second Chief Directorate in
Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to
the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also
Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There
is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in
the Ukraine.

10 February 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI on
12 February 1964)

[Redacted]

The photograph which appeared in U.S. news-
papers is not that of NOSENKO. ** [Redacted]
worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB
Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person
who likes to be fashionably dressed at all
times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly
individual and generally well-liked by his fel-
low workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second
Chief Directorate.

10 February 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI on
12 February 1964)

"It appeared quite certain [Redacted]
[Redacted] that NOSENKO had the rank of
lieutenant colonel in the KGB."

19 February 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI on
20 February 1964)


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

** [Redacted] identified by [Redacted] as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at

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
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(Reported to the FBI
on 20 February 1964)

(Reported to the FBI
on 22 February 1964)

(Reported to CIA by
the FBI on 8 February
1965)



[REDACTED] was asked [REDACTED] whether he felt NOSENKO actually defected or whether he felt the defection might be a "trick" by the KGB. [REDACTED] replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the U.S. Embassy.

Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow [REDACTED] on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these. Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the KGB, [REDACTED] attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.

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
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~~10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)~~



~~19 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 25 February)~~




Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva* and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

~~NOSENKO~~ NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate.

~~NOSENKO~~ NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Tourist Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books.**

~~NOSENKO~~ expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO



TOP SECRET

is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad.

that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."

NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.*


(Reported to the
FBI on 9 March 1964)

~~21 March 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI on
23 March 1964)~~

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* NOSENKO volunteered for the first time during the January-March 1965 interrogations that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room." He had not mentioned this dining room earlier.

(Reported to the FBI on 27 March 1964)



"There seems to be unanimous opinion among the KGB chiefs that NOSENKO... could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm." NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting forth the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some KGB "chiefs" that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.*



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20 May 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 21 May 1964)



The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. [redacted] feels quite sure that NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. It was his opinion that NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.

Reported to O.A. by the FBI on 11 June 1964



* See above; NOSENKO did not mention these directories.



(Reported to the FBI
on 22 June 1964)

781.



FBI 010101

(Reported to CIA
by the FBI on 8
February 1965)



The general consensus among KGB employees is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to the U.S. Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. [REDACTED] these comments cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but [REDACTED] no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable." NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.


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782.

4. Repercussions of NOSENKO's Defection

19 February 1964 (Re-
ported to the PFI on
20 February 1964)



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~~20 February 1964 (Ro-
... ..
... ..)~~

~~20 February 1964 (Ro-
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~~20 February 1964 (Ro-
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... ..)~~

[REDACTED]

... KUROCHKIN, a KGB SGT officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be well known to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted" with him.***

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
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784.



(Reported to FBI on
28 February 1964)



(Reported to FBI on
11 March 1964)



(Reported to the FBI
on 11 March 1964)




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20 March 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI
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

Reported to
on 19 June 1964



22 March 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI
on 23 March 1964)



24 April 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI
on 14 April 1964)



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(reported to the FBI
on 5 May 1964)




~~Reported to the FBI
on 10 May 1964~~



Two commissions have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERJABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad; and (b) to attempt to eliminate "weak" KGB employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

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~~Reported to the FBI on
10 May 1964~~



~~(Int. Rep. 29 July 1964)~~

An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at

the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB.* It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect.

Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working.

S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.

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* See Pages 327-336 in which NOSENKO's description of his relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed.

*** NOSENKO identified GOLUBEV by name and photograph as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer, who had served in New York City under United Nations cover in 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO said that he first met GOLUBEV in 1959 and knew nothing of his earlier career. Because GOLUBEV had at one point been assigned to Geneva with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO went to him in 1962 for a briefing on Foreign Ministry personnel in the delegation before his own assignment to Geneva. NOSENKO said he last saw GOLUBEV in KGB Headquarters in 1963. At that time GOLUBEV was assigned to the New York Direction of the Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO said that GOLUBEV had been in this Department as long as he had known him.

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 29 January 1965)



It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.*

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 8 February 1965)



GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection.** In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

* NOSENKO said that his father and GRIBANOV were not acquainted.

** GRIBANOV was reportedly in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat in Moscow as recently as late autumn of 1964. At that time he turned his contact over to another KGB officer.

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Early June 1965 (Re-
ported to CIA by the
FBI on 29 June 1965)

(Revised by CIA by
TOP SECRET on 30 Septem-
ber 1965)

Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career.* GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an important military plant and is now a "nothing."

After the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TAPABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN and GRIBANOV were friends socially and that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there. [REDACTED] described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accused of wilfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.***

* NOSENKO said that it was BANNIKOV who authorized his 1964 trip to Geneva, during which he defected, and that to the best of his knowledge, GRIBANOV did not know that he (NOSENKO) was making this trip. Nevertheless, NOSENKO said that he thought that GRIBANOV might be fired from the KGB as a result of his defection because "he was responsible for pushing me ahead." NOSENKO said that BANNIKOV would not be punished because he had done nothing other than support him as a candidate for the 1964 Geneva assignment (see Pages 333-334).

** NOSENKO reported that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, at which time he became Deputy Chief or "Service No. 2," the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.



*** NOSENKO said he saw GRIBANOV three times socially during his KGB career; on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO reported that he provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN at parties in 1962 and 1963, but not in 1961. He could not recall any details of the 1962 party (e.g., who the girls were, where they went, what they did, etc.). He was, however, able to describe the 1963 party, which took place in October or November, in considerable detail.

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
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


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
According to CIA records, the sequence of events leading up to NOSENKO's confrontation with the Soviets was as follows:

- On the morning of 11 February 1964 the Soviet Embassy delivered a note to the U.S. State Department requesting an appointment in review with NOSENKO, but no reply was given.

- In the early evening of 11 February NOSENKO arrived in the United States.

- On 12 February NOSENKO's agreement to meet the Soviets was obtained, and initial arrangements as to the timing and place of the confrontation were discussed with him and within the U.S. Government.

- Final arrangements were worked upon during the morning of 14 February, the Soviets were then notified, and the confrontation took place late in the afternoon of the same day.



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



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b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY(i) Introduction

[REDACTED] and NOSENKO agree on only one aspect of the PENKOVSKIY compromise (see Part VIII.B.6.b.): They both attribute the initial compromise to KGB surveillance. Although [REDACTED] report agrees with NOSENKO that the KGB learned of American participation in the operation only after PENKOVSKIY was arrested, [REDACTED] subsequent reports contradict this by tying the compromise directly to surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel visiting the Pushkin Street dead drop site. [REDACTED] story of the events stemming from the compromise of the dead drop site is at odds both with the facts of the case and with all other reporting by

(ii) Discussion

[REDACTED] report of [REDACTED] 1962--the month after the KGB terminated the operation--indicated that the KGB had been aware of PENKOVSKIY's involvement with Americans, and specifically with the CIA officer JACOB, for about two and one half months prior to the arrests. This statement is inaccurate concerning JACOB, who was a last-minute substitute for the servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962 and who never before had personally participated in the operation. [REDACTED] statements otherwise agree with NOSENKO's subsequent report and the "official report" regarding KGB ignorance of the role of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY case.

[REDACTED] report on the case, however, is contradictory to his first report and to the other sources: He said in [REDACTED] 1963 that surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected a visit to the Pushkin Street site by an American, and that the resulting 24-hour surveillance of the site caught PENKOVSKIY visiting the same location, whereupon he was arrested and confessed. CIA, however, has no evidence besides the statements by [REDACTED] that PENKOVSKIY ever went to the Pushkin Street site after it was visited by CIA personnel.

In [REDACTED] 1963 [REDACTED] reported at greater length about the role of Pushkin Street in PENKOVSKIY's compromise. At this time he explained that the American had visited Pushkin Street not once but twice; surveillance had observed him on both occasions when he went inside the entrance, but followed him inside only on the second visit. The surveillant who entered the building reported that the American appeared to be tying his shoe; although this was not unusual in itself, [REDACTED] continued, the fact that it was the second visit to the same address for no visible purpose caused suspicion, and as a result the KGB installed a closed circuit TV camera to provide 24-hour coverage of the site. PENKOVSKIY was observed checking it (see preceding paragraph); an American was observed loading a dead drop behind a lobby heating unit (radiator); the KGB tagged the dead drop material with a radioactive substance; PENKOVSKIY was observed unloading the dead drop and proceeding to his office where he secreted the

material in a concealment area in his desk; the KGB also continued in surveillance of the dead drop site, observed PENKOVSKIY load the dead drop, and named an American (JACOB) who came to unload it. PENKOVSKIY was then confronted with photographic evidence of the loadings and unloadings and could offer no defense. This report is the only indication from a Soviet source that the KGB had surveilled the two visits to the Pushkin Street site made by U.S. Embassy officers; while ~~NOSENKO~~ report stated that one American visited the site twice, in fact two different Americans visited the site once each, HARMONY on 21 January 1961 and ABIDIAN on 30 December 1961.



(iii) ~~NOSENKO~~

(iv) Remarks

The Pushkin Street dead drop was never used for communication to PENKOVSKIY, and in fact was loaded only once, when the KGB did so and activated it on 2 November 1962, thereby apprehending JACOB. Moreover, the first visit to Pushkin Street, in January 1961, predated any personal contact between PENKOVSKIY and Western Intelligence, either American or British. Thus, ~~NOSENKO~~ report on Americans visiting there is only partially accurate, and the use of these "surveilled" visits as an explanation for how the KGB detected PENKOVSKIY is unsupported. In reporting incorrectly on this matter, ~~NOSENKO~~ could have erred merely because his sub-sources (one unnamed, the other apparently ~~NOSENKO~~ despite the conflict in reporting about his position) repeated erroneous information in his presence.

~~NOSENKO~~ nevertheless is the only source to reveal that the KGB was aware of the Pushkin Street dead drop as early as 21 January 1961, when HARMONY went to the site. ~~NOSENKO~~ therefore has detracted from the bona fides of NOSENKO by showing KGB awareness of a CIA officer having gone to the dead drop site 11 months before ABIDIAN's visit there, and even before PENKOVSKIY finally succeeded in establishing personal contact with Western Intelligence services. It was the ABIDIAN visit, NOSENKO said, which first aroused KGB interest in the site at Pushkin Street.


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
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
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

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
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D.

1. Introduction.

While in general terms corroborating NOSENKO's claims to service in both the GRU and the KGB, [redacted] has supplied some details which are incompatible with the statements by NOSENKO on his intelligence career. Although not as prolific a reporter on NOSENKO as [redacted] has had several topics in common with NOSENKO: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, CHEREPANOV, SHUBIN, SLESINGER, and the contacts between the GRU officer BOLSHAKOV and Attorney General Robert KENNEDY in 1962. When compared with NOSENKO's information, the reports by [redacted] on the case of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV are interlocking:

[redacted] and NOSENKO agree that POPOV was compromised after his return to Moscow from East Berlin in November 1958 and in consequence of KGB surveillance.

- CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO likewise agree about POPOV's compromise.

[redacted] concurred with NOSENKO by indicating that CHEREPANOV was a genuine source of American Intelligence, and this statement by [redacted]

[redacted] learned some of his details on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, and [redacted] and NOSENKO have indicated that this compromise resulted from KGB surveillance of PENKOVSKIY's British contacts in Moscow.

Presented below are [redacted]'s remarks about NOSENKO, followed by a review of the topics common to these two sources.

2. Statements on NOSENKO

When discussing NOSENKO for the first time, [redacted] said on [redacted] that they were not personally acquainted, but that "various persons" in Moscow (whom he did not identify) had spoken to him about NOSENKO. The statements by [redacted] and NOSENKO on the latter's background are compared in the following tabulation:

[redacted]	<u>NOSENKO</u>
As a young man, NOSENKO attended the GRU's Military-Diplomatic Academy (MDA) and then was in the GRU Information Department-- in all, perhaps a year of service in the GRU.*	NOSENKO said his entire service in the GRU, in the years 1950-1953, consisted of duty in the Naval GRU, first in the Far East and then in the Baltic.**

* Until the late 1950's, the course at the MDA, the strategic intelligence school of the GRU, lasted for four years; more recently, the course has been of three years' duration.

** During the 1950-1953 period and before, the Naval GRU was separate from the rest of the GRU.

NOSENKO

A "very undisciplined person" while in the GRU and "not very good," NOSENKO was to have been discharged from the GRU.

NOSENKO's statements about himself during the 1950-1953 period appear to agree with the evaluation, but he has said nothing about facing discharge by the Naval GRU.

NOSENKO's father, "a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding," was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB.

His transfer from the Naval GRU to the KGB in 1953, NOSENKO said, was at the initiative of KGB General KOBULOV, a friend of his father; the elder NOSENKO was Minister of Shipbuilding.

NOSENKO was "an important boss" in the KGB (directorate or department unknown).

According to NOSENKO, his most recent KGB title prior to defecting was Deputy Chief, Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate.

[redacted] stated that NOSENKO gave "very, very good information" to the United States, having had "great access" to KGB information which included "all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc." The U.S. Embassy, [redacted] continued, had found microphones on the basis of information that NOSENKO had provided.

3. Parallels with NOSENKO's Reporting

a. The CHEREPANOV Case

(i) Summary

One of the two ways in which [redacted] has corroborated NOSENKO on the authenticity of CHEREPANOV as a genuine source of American Intelligence was to cite information he had learned from [redacted]

[redacted] CHEREPANOV had formerly served in the KGB; CHEREPANOV gave some papers to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, which returned them to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); the MFA turned the papers over to the KGB, which traced them by analysis to CHEREPANOV; meanwhile, CHEREPANOV had tried to flee the USSR, but he was captured near the Turkish border and executed. In every major respect, therefore, [redacted] agrees with NOSENKO's version of the case. When asked whether the CHEREPANOV incident might have been "a trick" by the KGB to embarrass the U.S. Embassy, [redacted] replied that it was definitely not.

The second way in which [redacted] has certified that CHEREPANOV was a genuine source is indirect. Like NOSENKO and one of the CHEREPANOV documents, [redacted] had indicated that KGB surveillance of a U.S. Embassy officer brought about the compromise of POPOV.

(ii) Remarks

As stated in Part VIII.B.6., the CHEREPANOV incident was a KGB provocation against the U.S. Embassy, but it is conceivable that statements suggesting the contrary could have been made [redacted]

[REDACTED] agreement with both CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO on the cause of POPOV's compromise, however, appears to be based on [REDACTED] direct involvement, and does not appear to be attributable to sub-sources having provided him with erroneous information; this is discussed further below.

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

[REDACTED] dates on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY are at variance with NOSENKO's and they disagree on whether the KGB knew American Intelligence to be involved in this operation before JACOB of CIA was apprehended at the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962. Both sources stated, however, that surveillance led to the detection of PENKOVSKIY, although again they differ on the person with whom PENKOVSKIY was first seen by the KGB; [REDACTED] said this individual was the British businessman WYRNE, while NOSENKO said it was the Englishwoman Mrs. CHISHOLM.

According to [REDACTED] PENKOVSKIY had been working openly with WYRNE, explaining that he was trying to develop WYRNE, and the KGB learned of their meetings through surveillance.* CIA records show that WYRNE met PENKOVSKIY in Moscow during April-May 1961, May-June 1961, August 1961, and June-July 1962. [REDACTED] report that PENKOVSKIY came under suspicion in May 1962 therefore is not consistent with his statement about KGB surveillance of the WYRNE-PENKOVSKIY meetings, nor does this report coincide with the evidence from WYRNE himself that the KGB was sufficiently suspicious of their meetings to record a conversation they had had [REDACTED] 1961 (one year earlier than in the [REDACTED] version). NOSENKO dated the PENKOVSKIY compromise at a month or two after he was first seen, but at the time not identified, in contact with Mrs. CHISHOLM in November or December 1961.

Whereas NOSENKO said the KGB was unaware of the participation of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY operation until JACOB was detained, [REDACTED] reported that while PENKOVSKIY was at a reception in Moscow, he was observed making contact with an American in a lavatory. [REDACTED] did not date this event, but CIA records show that it was on 27 August 1962. [REDACTED] added that the KGB "invented" the incident at Pushkin Street on 2 November 1962, the month after PENKOVSKIY's arrest, in order to catch the American unloading the dead drop.**

PENKOVSKIY was not personally known to him, [REDACTED] stated.

[REDACTED] 1961; no other sub-sources were named.

* The same statement was made by NOSENKO and in the official KGB document on PENKOVSKIY's compromise.

**This is obviously true, although the date of PENKOVSKIY's arrest may have been more than a month before.

c. The Compromise of POPOV(i) Introduction

Of all the sources available to American Intelligence, [redacted] is the best placed to report on the compromise of POPOV: [redacted]

[redacted] information agrees with that provided by NOSENKO and CHEREPANOV, as well as that in the 18 September 1959 message from POPOV to CIA (believed to have been dictated by the KGB). These four sources have indicated that the compromise resulted from KGB surveillance of a U.S. Embassy official following the recall of POPOV in November 1958. [redacted] however, has not precisely dated the incident (dated by inference by the others at 21 January 1959), has associated it with an American Intelligence dead drop for POPOV (whereas the others have said it was CIA's mailing of a letter to POPOV), and has not named the CIA officer involved ((George WINTERS).] The evidence from [redacted] like that from NOSENKO, CHEREPANOV, and the POPOV message, conflicts with that from COLITSYN whose statements on the compromise of POPOV are supported by analysis of events in 1957 and 1958 on which POPOV reported (see Pages 663-665).

(ii) Details

[redacted] reported [redacted] on the POPOV compromise. POPOV's correspondence with his Austrian girlfriend [redacted] appears to have been the prelude to the POPOV compromise; POPOV, said [redacted] had made a "very serious mistake" by using an accommodation address supplied by American Intelligence to receive mail from a girlfriend in Austria.** "In some fashion" this came to the attention of the Austrian police, [redacted] and it was determined that she had been sending mail to a Soviet officer in Berlin. The Austrian police notified the Soviets, and eventually POPOV was confronted by the chief of his GRU component in Berlin.*** GRU Headquarters was notified, POPOV was recalled

* In his first reference to POPOV's compromise [redacted] that POPOV made the mistake of providing information traceable to himself. No sub-source for this remark was given [redacted] and since then [redacted] has not resolved the discrepancy between this version and the other one treated at length here.

** CIA did not supply POPOV with an accommodation address, but he did secretly correspond with KOCHANEK.

*** [redacted] went to the Austrian police on 25 August 1958 with information that included the identification of POPOV as a Soviet Intelligence officer. POPOV's superior confronted him on 4 November 1958 about KOCHANEK and received from him an admission to having had some correspondence with her concerning his search for operational leads; the superior told POPOV that the Soviets believed "she was working for someone" and that "possibly she is the cause" of the Berlin unit's operational difficulties. POPOV was recalled to Moscow on 17 November 1958 ostensibly for a week's TDY to discuss the case of an American whom he was developing under CIA aegis. He did not return to Berlin.

to Moscow to explain the situation, and when he was unable to do so, the facts were turned over to the KGB for full-scale investigation. [REDACTED] it not been for POPOV's correspondence with an Austrian woman, "they would never have caught him," and that POPOV was "arrested because of a connection with a girl;" also, [REDACTED] at the end of 1958 POPOV was recalled to Moscow "for something" - [REDACTED]. While the foregoing KGB investigation was in progress, the KGB routinely placed under surveillance a U.S. Embassy official in Moscow. This person was observed renting a boat in Gorkiy Park, going to the vicinity of a new bridge near the Moscow Stadium, and there taking photographs of the bridge and surrounding area. Its suspicions aroused, the KGB covered this area and observed POPOV unloading a dead drop. He was arrested, doubled, and "operated" against American Intelligence for a year and one-half.* Eventually, the KGB put in motion a plan to attempt to compromise the American official who was meeting POPOV. The KGB photographed a meeting in a Moscow restaurant, then arrested the official and showed him pictures of his meeting with POPOV and of POPOV unloading the dead drop at the bridge. After the American refused to work for the KGB, he was released and declared persona non grata.**

[REDACTED] CIA questioned [REDACTED] on POPOV's compromise. He said at this time that he had heard POPOV was apprehended through a dead drop. POPOV "apparently was under suspicion there in Berlin, and when they (presumably the GRU) recalled him to Moscow, they wondered who his future contacts would be, and they were told the following: 'KGB workers place American Embassy employees under surveillance.' They observed an American at the staircase... and they found a dead drop under the staircase. So they established coverage of the dead drop and observed POPOV come and unload the drop. They made a report, and after this POPOV was under surveillance... Then he was called in and told thus-and-so. They showed him photographs. They told him he was going to work for them to expose his contacts. He agreed to it..."***

* Since POPOV returned to Moscow in November 1958 and LANGELLE was arrested the following October, he could not have been doubled against CIA for more than eleven months.

** Starting on 4 January 1959, POPOV had a series of six brush contacts in Moscow with the CIA officer Russell LANGELLE of the U.S. Embassy, culminating in the detention and interview of LANGELLE by the KGB on 16 October 1959.

***As previously stated, no Moscow dead drops were used by CIA in the POPOV operation, but LANGELLE did survey the possibilities for dead drops to be used in other operations. One of these was located in Lenin Hills, an area of Moscow not far from the new bridge near Moscow Stadium, and it was situated beneath a staircase; [REDACTED] LANGELLE visited the area of the dead drop site on 24 and 28 May 1958, but the dead drop was loaded by a CIA legal travel agent (on 7 June 1958) rather than by LANGELLE. The CHEREPANOV document, discussed on Pages 563-564, stated, in the course of reviewing LANGELLE's operational activities in Moscow, that this dead drop was for use with an agent named REPNIKOV; in fact, it was not intended for the REPNIKOV case.

(iii) Sub-sourcing by [REDACTED]

In [REDACTED] that he had learned these details about the compromise of POPOV from a conversation [REDACTED] who conducted some of the investigation of POPOV because at the time he was a [REDACTED]. The same sub-source was cited by [REDACTED] information he supplied CIA in [REDACTED]

(iv) Remarks

[REDACTED] reported, inaccurately, that American Intelligence gave POPOV an accommodation address in Berlin, that a dead drop was used in the Moscow phase of the operation, and that the KGB doubled POPOV for a year and one-half before terminating the case. Each of these incorrect items came to [REDACTED] since [REDACTED] participated in the investigation of POPOV, presumably he would have recognized them to be untrue. One explanation for the inaccuracies might be that [REDACTED] precisely what he had been told, but [REDACTED] deliberately misinformed him. There is, however, no evident reason why [REDACTED] would have done this. Another explanation might be that [REDACTED] misunderstood his sub-source, or in relaying the information to [REDACTED] garbled the details. This would mean that [REDACTED] was less than fully attentive to details on a personal acquaintance who had gained notoriety, details which he was told at a time when he was in a position comparable to POPOV's: in contact with [REDACTED] Intelligence.

[REDACTED] None of these explanations seems entirely satisfactory, and the answer may lie elsewhere.

[REDACTED] has been inconsistent about the degree of suspicion surrounding POPOV when he was recalled to Moscow in November 1958 in connection with his correspondence with [REDACTED]. On one hand, in 1962 [REDACTED] indicated that the KGB surveillance of the U.S. Embassy officer was coincidental with the separate investigation of POPOV's relationship with this Austrian woman. On the other hand, in [REDACTED] implied that as a result of the suspicion of POPOV in Berlin, there was interest in POPOV's future contacts in Moscow, an interest which would be covered by the KGB's surveillance of U.S. Embassy employees.

*However, in another version [REDACTED] said that as soon as the illegals reported their compromise in January 1958, POPOV immediately fell under suspicion. The conflict between [REDACTED] statements has not been resolved.

d. SHUBIN, SLESINGER, and BOLSHAKOV

In three instances, 1964 NOSENKO confirmed reports made by [REDACTED] the identification of SHUBIN as a GRU agent, the Soviets' suspicions that SLESINGER was in contact with the FBI, and the status of BOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer.*

SHUBIN was previously known to have been associated with two GRU Illegals in the United States during the 1940's, but independent of NOSENKO and [REDACTED] there is no verification of his having more recently been an agent of the GRU.

[REDACTED] FBI.

BOLSHAKOV, the only claimed mutual acquaintance of [REDACTED] and NOSENKO, has not been named as a GRU officer by any other source, nor has he been observed in meetings with GRU agents. Both [REDACTED] and NOSENKO spoke of BOLSHAKOV's having met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY in 1962. NOSENKO added that, in initiating the contact, the Attorney General knew BOLSHAKOV to be a "military intelligence officer," but this report has not been corroborated.**

4. Comments on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] confirmation that NOSENKO is a genuine KGB officer-defector is comprised of hearsay evidence, and hence the conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB would not necessarily bring [REDACTED] bona fides into question; much would depend upon [REDACTED] sub-sources, as yet unidentified.


[REDACTED] and NOSENKO are mutually supporting on the compromise of POPOV, a man [REDACTED] and both have authenticated [REDACTED] the validity of a CHEREPANOV document which concerned the POPOV compromise and which was prepared by the KGB for transmittal to American Intelligence. In addition, [REDACTED] and NOSENKO support one another about the PENKOV-SKIY compromise, about the contact between BOLSHAKOV [REDACTED] and Robert KENNEDY, and about SHUBIN and [REDACTED]. Their information on BOLSHAKOV and SHUBIN is unique; on SLESINGER it is corroborated by actions taken by the KGB, as reported by SLESINGER; on POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV it is confirmed by KGB controlled sources.

With the exception of his details on POPOV, [REDACTED]'s reporting on NOSENKO and on common topics can be explained, individually, by misinformation [REDACTED] received and innocently passed along. These items taken together, however, in the light [REDACTED] statements on the compromise of POPOV (which conflict with GOLITSYN's reporting and analytical evidence) are indications that [REDACTED] is controlled by the KGB.

**If Robert KENNEDY indeed knew BOLSHAKOV to be a GRU officer, the question remains as to how NOSENKO was aware of the fact, since [REDACTED] was the only source to have made this identification before the time when KENNEDY and BOLSHAKOV met.

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F. [REDACTED]

1. Introduction

[REDACTED] counterintelligence production has been extremely limited. For the most part she has provided only superficial reports, generally only in response to questioning and frequently citing her own lack of access to information of value. Her professed personal involvement in, and dramatic accounts of, certain situations on which NOSENKO's reporting is demonstrably false is therefore noteworthy in the context of her total performance. [REDACTED]'s reporting on NOSENKO, despite vagueness and contradictions, has the net effect of supporting his bona fides and affirming the importance of the information he has reported. Her accounts of the CHEREPANOV case emphasized the depth of his treason and the retribution of the KGB--themes which dominate the NOSENKO account [REDACTED]. Her reports on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, while differing markedly from NOSENKO's in basis, scope, and detail, confirmed almost to the month NOSENKO's dating of the compromise. Her confessed participation as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, despite her repeated claims to know nothing of importance concerning its operations, has placed her in NOSENKO's milieu, and the KGB officers who figured in her reporting are (with two exceptions) personalities who have previously been identified as KGB officers only by NOSENKO.

2. NOSENKO's Background and Career

[REDACTED] has claimed no first-hand or authoritative knowledge of NOSENKO, reporting at various times that she had heard gossip, had heard about him from her KGB friend SVIRIN (who she believed only "knew about" NOSENKO, i.e. did not know him personally), or had heard about him from "someone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not SVIRIN." She has reported fragments on NOSENKO's background: his father's position, his mother's ethnic background, and NOSENKO's non-KGB status. She initially said that NOSENKO's father was a general, later said she was not sure of that, and still later amended her description to "general or minister," adding that he was Ukrainian - thus approaching an accurate statement only after several conversations about him. Her consistent statement that NOSENKO's mother was Jewish and involved in black market activities has not been elsewhere reported, and her statement that NOSENKO was a civilian, rather than a KGB officer, contradicts his own account and that of other sources who have confirmed his KGB status. [REDACTED] sourcing of her limited information on NOSENKO to her KGB friend SVIRIN nevertheless demonstrates at least potential access to some information about NOSENKO. (SVIRIN was identified by NOSENKO as an officer of the Third Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, since 1963, and before that of the Third Department of the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, where he participated in and received an award for his part in the investigation of PENKOVSKIY.)

3. NOSENKO's Knowledge - Damage to the KGB

[REDACTED] has mentioned NOSENKO's disclosures to the Americans concerning the microphones in the U.S. Embassy - her only reference to information he might have provided - on each occasion when she has discussed NOSENKO. She once attributed to SVIRIN the remark in October 1966 that NOSENKO had done considerable harm to the Soviet Union by revealing this information, thus (and specifically only in this context) underscoring the importance of NOSENKO's information. (NOSENKO himself has characterized this information as the most important he has provided.) The context in which she has discussed NOSENKO has been the general one of defectors from the Soviet Union; she has repeatedly emphasized that the Soviets attempt to convince all Soviet citizens that "anybody who defects will find his grave by the hand of KGB people"

[REDACTED] with reference to NOSENKO, she once quoted SVIRIN as having said that NOSENKO, too, would one day be exterminated, thus clearly implying that NOSENKO was a genuine defector.

4. Parallels with NOSENKO's Reportinga. The CHEREPANOV Case

[REDACTED]'s account of CHEREPANOV's disaffection, treason, arrest, and execution confirms in general outline and in emphasis that of NOSENKO. [REDACTED] claims direct knowledge of the case through her own and her husband's personal friendship with CHEREPANOV and his wife. [REDACTED] described her husband, in fact, as the only friend of CHEREPANOV who remained faithful enough after CHEREPANOV's downfall to call on CHEREPANOV's widow, whose address [REDACTED] knew. This direct knowledge is comparable to that of NOSENKO and [REDACTED]


She introduced her account of the CHEREPANOV case, as in her discussions of NOSENKO, by references to the determination and effectiveness of the KGB in apprehending and executing those who were "running away"; she offered CHEREPANOV as an example of a Soviet traitor who had been caught and executed. Her account of the details, however, differs sharply from that of NOSENKO (and others). Her identification of CHEREPANOV as a classmate of her husband at the GRU's Military Diplomatic Academy (MDA) from 1956 to 1959 is unique among the sources who have reported on CHEREPANOV. For the period during which [REDACTED] said CHEREPANOV attended the MDA, NOSENKO has made no specific statements concerning CHEREPANOV's career; he has said only that at some unspecified date after CHEREPANOV's return from Belgrade (elsewhere reported as mid-1956) and before early 1960 CHEREPANOV had been assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate. [REDACTED] also stated, however, that after his graduation from the MDA in 1959, CHEREPANOV "finally" obtained a job in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, suggesting that he had no intervening assignment. Where NOSENKO has failed to establish a clear motive for CHEREPANOV's having collected KGB documents during his assignment to the U.S. Embassy Section for later transmittal to the Americans, [REDACTED] has described his increasing bitterness from the date of his entering the MDA in 1956. She was not sure that he had been a KGB officer; she neither mentioned nor did her account allow for his assignment to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960-1961 (as stated by

by NOSENKO); and [redacted] described the documents which he turned over to the Americans as having come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. She stated, therefore, rather than demonstrated, the point that "these were such important documents, important enough that...he was shot."

During [redacted] second account of the CHEREPANOV affair, [redacted] sourced [redacted] information differently and added first-hand details which she had previously disclaimed having. [redacted] said that "In two days this man was arrested...In two months he was shot." This is also at variance with NOSENKO's account of a KGB investigation of up to 20 or 25 days, followed by the KGB officer's visit to CHEREPANOV on 8 December 1963, CHEREPANOV's flight, and a seven-day search for him before his arrest.

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

Closely conforming in this respect to NOSENKO's account of PENKOVSKIY's compromise, [redacted] placed the date of initial suspicion of PENKOVSKIY at about October or November 1961. [redacted] statements of the basis for this suspicion, however, differ completely from the reasons advanced by NOSENKO (and other sources).



c. Reports on KGB Personnel

[redacted] has named relatively few KGB officers who have figured in [redacted] career as a KGB agent or about whom [redacted] could report any substance. Of [redacted] KGB handlers:



- [redacted] KGB handler while [redacted] was employed [redacted] in Moscow was [redacted]



[redacted] his most important identification among KGB personnel. [redacted] KOSTYRYA was in the U.S. under Inturist cover; [redacted] relationship with him was not related to [redacted] earlier Inturist work, however, but [redacted] connection with a foreign correspondent, which was KOSTYRYA's responsibility after his return to Moscow.

Of the four other KGB officers on whom [REDACTED] has reported in any depth, three were previously identified by NOSENKO and only by NOSENKO:

- V.G. SVIRIN, her KGB friend, is an ubiquitous figure in much of her reporting on other subjects and in her account of her personal life, as well as her primary candidate for a Western recruitment approach. SVIRIN had previously been identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, previously involved in the PENKOVSKIY investigation (both of which assignments [REDACTED] has confirmed).

- In connection with SVIRIN, [REDACTED] recounted an incident in which a KGB officer whom she described in derogatory terms, Valentin MUZEYNIK, had narrowly escaped dismissal as a result of a drunken brawl with a militiaman. MUZEYNIK had not only survived, however, but continued to bear a higher KGB rank than his former friend, colleague, and subordinate, SVIRIN. NOSENKO said MUZEYNIK was an officer of the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

- Vadim BIRYUKOV was identified by [REDACTED] as the KGB officer under Novosti cover assigned to report on the interview in August 1966 of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NOSENKO had previously given information concerning BIRYUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, targeted against foreign correspondents.

5. Remarks

There is confusion in [REDACTED]'s sub-sourcing for her information on NOSENKO and inconsistency in her statements that, on one hand, he was a civilian but on the other, he was aware of microphones in the U.S. Embassy. These facts indicate that if she was briefed by the KGB to report to American Intelligence on NOSENKO, [REDACTED] was inadequately prepared. Otherwise, however, [REDACTED] has personally supported the bona fides of NOSENKO by offering direct confirmation of the bona fides of CHEREPANOV, by corroborating NOSENKO's details on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, and by verifying his identification of KGB Second Chief Directorate personalities.

- The circumstances of her claimed relationship with the KGB contradict KGB practice as known from other sources.

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
[redacted] may have been a KGB-organized prelude to the defection of [redacted] is also suggested by the fact that the one operational contact her husband is known to have had there was a Western double agent, and [redacted] was able to provide identifying data on this agent.)

- Nearly all of [redacted]'s identifications of Soviet Intelligence personalities were previously known.

- She has given conflicting accounts of her motivation for defecting, of her relationship with her husband, and of her associations with KGB personnel.

- Against the background of the claimed difficulties in which she and her husband found themselves, it seems unlikely that [redacted] would have been permitted to leave the USSR.

[redacted] as well as in her conduct in the West and in her husband's situation and behavior since the defection.



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
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
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... information was collected from the ... of CIA with ... activities ... GOLTSEV in 1947 ... operation of this kind ... reported ... with the ... detailed information ... surveillance techniques ... organization and operations ... unique ... information was ... following his defection at the end of 1947 ... organized organization ... identified a sizeable amount of internal ... provided leads to specific ... activities

Since ... Western Intelligence Service ... and agent sources with connections ... with KGB ... the most important of these ...



* A Polish State Officer named ... SOLEMINWSKI was also a KGB agent with ...



Other techniques of which various sources have confirmed one another include the following:

[redacted] reported [redacted] that the surveillance equipment used by the KGB Surveillance Directorate includes special paint invisible to the naked eye but visible through use of a special device. It is used in conjunction with helicopters, closed circuit television at bridges, tunnels, etc. A similar technique was described by GOLENIEWSKI.

- NOSENKO [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV papers have described a special chemical compound sensitive to dogs but not to humans (NAILINE B) which is used in surveillance.

[redacted] reported [redacted] that microphones and transmitters are installed in Soviet automobiles in the Soviet Union by personnel of the KGB Surveillance Directorate. GOLENIEWSKI further provided many details on this technique.

[redacted] the KGB had developed a transmitter using paper-thin batteries so shaped that they can fit in the shoulder pads of a man's suit. They also can be concealed in the sole covers of shoes. Thus concealed, they are used in Moscow by the KGB to listen to conversations between foreign diplomats, particularly at the Hotel Metropol and the Hotel National. Such miniaturized devices have also been described by GOLENIEWSKI, GOLITSYN, NOSENKO [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV papers. Inter alia [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV papers gave the KGB cryptonym as "N-REKIPA".

- NOSENKO and [redacted] have reported the KGB technique of switching telephone calls intended for the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to a KGB installation where they are intercepted by a Soviet posing as an American.

Where the bulk of NOSENKO's reporting on KGB operations was concerned with those of the Second Chief Directorate, this has been true with only two of the other sources named here. [redacted] and [redacted] however, have also given details on specific KGB internal counterintelligence activities in addition to their statements on the compromise of CIA assets within the USSR (a topic of reporting by [redacted] and CHEREPANOV as well). The information from [redacted] and [redacted] is summarized below.

[redacted] has been able to provide details of KGB Second Chief Directorate activity. He reported the KGB's discovery of an American employed at the Sokolniki Exhibition in Moscow in

* The existence and feasibility of such a substance has not been verified.

clandestine contact with an unidentified Soviet female. (This contact is not identified with any CIA operation at the Exhibition in 1959.) He spoke of the KGB's knowledge of an American Intelligence deadrop under a bench in the area of the Agricultural Exhibition. He said that the KGB controlled all U.S. agent contacts in Moscow, including one with an old man in his 60's (NOS-EMKO reported on an individual who may be identical with this agent).

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] claimed to have fulfilled functions which NOS-EMKO and others have described as standard procedure in operations against foreigners and Soviets inside the Soviet Union. [REDACTED] said she was a Second Chief Directorate agent targeted against the Nepalese Embassy in Moscow and later against the Canadian correspondent who employed her.

c. REMARKS

As previously indicated, it was only after the defections of the genuine sources GOLITSYN and G. LASHCHIN in 1961 that American Intelligence began to receive voluminous and mutually corroborative information from others on the activities of the KGB Second Chief and Surveillance Directorates. The timing of this information therefore appears to be significant in addition to the overlap of specific details. The fact that so many of these sources, even including [REDACTED] provided KGB Second Chief Directorate information may reflect a centralized KGB decision to emphasize or sacrifice it.

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H. Evaluation

The conclusion that NOSENKO is on a KGB mission could carry damaging implications for the American intelligence sources who have supported his bona fides. Unless their statements on NOSENKO can be convincingly explained as innocent repetition of misinformation spread by the KGB within the Soviet services, these sources might be concluded to have been deliberately misleading either as promoters of their own personal interests or as parties to a KGB conspiracy.

Regarding GOLITSYN, the opinion of CIA is that he purposefully gave false support for NOSENKO in an attempt to make his opinions more authoritative. This is not a satisfactory explanation for the remarks on NOSENKO by [REDACTED] however, there seem to be no personal interests which their support of NOSENKO's bona fides might have served. The choice thus seems to lie between these three officers being genuine sources of American intelligence but unwitting channels of KGB misinformation and, on the other hand, one or more of them being in league with the KGB.

The possibility that [REDACTED] are under KGB control was tested further in the context of the NOSENKO operation by reviewing parallels in their reporting and his, and general correlations that appear from one case to another. At the same time, the NOSENKO-[REDACTED] connections were shown for comparative purposes. Here nothing was found that would eliminate [REDACTED] from consideration as possibly being KGB provocation agents.

This examination against the conclusion that NOSENKO is under KGB control, has brought the bona fides of [REDACTED] into serious question. If NOSENKO is a dispatched agent of the KGB, these other sources seem also to be.