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FROM: (Requesting component) C/IA/AM/L		SUBJECT / AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION	
TO: (Station/Base) Santiago, Chile			
FROM: (Division) C/LA			
INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS			
COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12 ITEM 5-ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD CODES AND ON MACHINE LISTS. ITEM 6-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE. ITEM 7 AND 8-USE ONLY YOUR LETTERS OF ORIGIN SYMBOLS FOR FIELD HEADQUARTERS AND USE HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.		ITEM 10-ENTER OLD FILE WITH AMENDING A FILE, USE ALL FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE REFERRED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO EXPLAIN THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS. ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST DETAIL ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR NMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.	
INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE			
1. TYPE OF FILE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SUBJECT <input type="checkbox"/> PROJECT		2. CODE FILE NUMBER COUNTRY CODE CATEGORY NUMBER SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER 015 126 003	
3. THE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES Psych Warfare General			
ACTION REQUIRED			
4. ANALYSIS ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> OPEN FILE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION) <input type="checkbox"/> AMEND FILE TITLE <input type="checkbox"/> REOPEN		5. DISPOSITION <input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN <input type="checkbox"/> DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED (FRO DATE)	
6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)			
7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)		8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST) 015	
FILES ACTION			
<input type="checkbox"/> HOLD IN CS FILES	<input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNRESTRICTED	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER
<input type="checkbox"/> CHANGE PERMANENTLY TO TOFFICER & DISK			
10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)			
11. ENDORSEMENT SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. <i>[Signature]</i> RESPECTIVE DATE		12. COORDINATION SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)	
13. HQ APPROVAL REQUEST APPROVED BY <i>[Signature]</i> DATE		CODE FILE NUMBER	

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONTRAST~~ ~~OF THIS GESTURE OF CONFIDENCE WITH~~
~~DEU'S CONFISCATION OF PRIVATELY OWNED PRESS TWO MONTHS AGO~~

- 2. BUENOS AIRES: CAN NTTHRIFTY-1 BARRANGE PICK UP FOR ANSA WIRE? Y
- 3. [] QUITO: SUGGEST YOU HAVE PJVANDYKE-1 OR PJNETWORK-1 TIME THEIR COMMENTS TO COINCIDE WITH OAS MEETING. Y
- 4. FILE: 200-120-356. E-2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 5 NOVEMBER 1974
 ORIG: E. JAMES MCTIGHE
 UNIT: C/LA/CA
 EXT: 1553

AC/LA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Baron
 DC/LA/CAM
J. Kennedy
 C/LA/NU
 C/LA/SB

[Signature]
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
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T 499138 EIA362 PAGE 01 IN 392115

TOR:171812Z OCT 74 LOND 54017

SECRET 171537Z OCT 74 OCT 74 STAFF
CITE LONDON 54017
TO: DIRECTOR, ROME INFO SANTIAGO,
RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG



- REF A. DIRECTOR 604965
- B. DIRECTO 629942

1. REUTERS STORY DATED IN SANTIAGO IN 17 OCTOBER "TIMES"
IS HEADLINED "RUSSIA RESPONDING TO CHILE CALL TO FREE PRISONERS."

HIGHLIGHTS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARING TO RELEASE A LIMITED NUMBER OF TOP POLITICAL PRISONERS IN RESPONSE TO A CHALLENGE BY THE CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA. INFORMED SOURCES SAID TODAY.

"A RED CROSS EMISSARY WAS DUE TO ARRIVE HERE TONIGHT FROM GENEVA WITH A LIST OF 100 CHILEAN PRISONERS THE RUSSIANS WANT RELEASED IN EXCHANGE FOR THE FREEDOM GIVEN TO ITS OWN DETAINEES, THE SOURCES SAID. THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OR DENIAL OF THE REPORT FROM EITHER GOVERNMENT OR RED CROSS OFFICIALS."

ARTICLE RECOUNTS PINOCHET CHALLENGE TO MOSCOW AND HAVANA AND

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T 499138 E14352 PAGE 02 IN 390115

TOR11722122 OCT 74 54017

POINTS OUT CHILE HAS SINCE FREED MORE THAN 300 DETAINEES WITH "UNTIL NOW, NO APPARENT RESPONSE," ALSO ADDS LUIS CORVALEN LEADS THE KREMLIN LIST.

2. APART FROM NEW DIMENSION ADDED TO REF PROPOSALS BY ABOVE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (AI) COULD BE INDUCED TO TAKE UP ISSUE. AS NOTED REF AI HAS VERY PRESCRIBED APPROACHES AND TECHNIQUES WHICH IT USES TO HANDLE, VIA A CHAIN OF INDIVIDUAL SPONSORS, INDIVIDUAL CASES. WHILE THEY MAY OCCASIONALLY USE PUBLICITY IF ALL ELSE FAILS THEY BASICALLY REGARD IT AS A DISTINCT INHIBITION TO THE SUCCESS OF THEIR BEHIND THE SCENES PERSON TO PERSON TECHNIQUE. AI'S POSITION ON THE CHILEAN CHALLENGE WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE NEGATIVELY INFLUENCED BY ITS HAVING ONLY VERY RECENTLY ACCEPTED A MOSCOW CHAPTER DESPITE THE STRONG OBJECTIONS OF SOME OF ITS KEY LEADERS.

[REDACTED]


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T 499138 EIA302 PAGE 03-03 IN 390115
 TCR:1718122 OCT 74 LOND 54017



0 THE SITUATION INCLUDING THE PARA ONE
 STORY, HE NOTED THAT AI EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAS RECENTLY
 VOTED IN NEW AND TO SOME EXTENT UNTRIED MEMBERSHIP, ALTHOUGH
 NEW COMPOSITON COMMITTEE MAY IN LONG RUN BE LESS INCLINED
 TO AVOID ACTION WHICH PUTS PRESSURE ON SOVIETS, SUCH ISSUES
 PRESENTLY ALL THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL WITHIN AI IN VIEW NEWNESS
 COMMITTEE AND NOT LIKELY RECEIVE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTENTION UNTIL
 COMMITTEE SHAKES DOWN, WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

4. FILE DEFERM E2 IMPDET

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609942

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TO: ROME, LONDON, INFO SANTIAGO. Y

RYBAT MHSPAUN REDLEG Y

REF: DIRECTOR 6049685 Y

1. GIVEN PERISHABILITY REF IDEAS, REQUEST YOUR COMMENT ON
FEASIBILITY OF APPROACHES TO DEFLOWER AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AS
OUTLINED. WELCOME ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS ON MEANS LIMIT FURTHER
ANTI-BKHERALD PROPAGANDA IN RELATION TO CHILE AND ANTI-JUNTA
PROPAGANDA ^{CONNECTED WITH} IN RELATION TO TREATMENT OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. Y

2. FILE DEFER. E-2 IMPDET. A

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OCT 15 1974	
FBI - WASHINGTON	

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15-126-3
15 OCT 1974

DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG: [redacted]
UNIT: LA/CA
EXT: 9011

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C/EUR/CA *[Signature]*

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TO: ROME, LONDON, INFO SANTIAGO. Y

RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG Y

1. INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF CHILEAN JUNTA AND MORE RECENTLY OF BKHERALD HAVE BEEN ORCHESTRATED TO DRAMATIC PROPORTIONS. HQS BELIEVES EFFECTIVE EXPLOITATION OF GENERAL PINOCHET'S OFFER TO EXCHANGE A NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS FOR AN EQUAL NUMBER OF SOVIET AND/OR CUBAN PRISONERS IS OPPORTUNITY TO BLUNT HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. IF THE USSR AND CHILE CAN BE LUMPED TOGETHER IN POPULAR MIND AS EACH HAVING POLITICAL PRISONERS, THE SITUATION CAN BE EXPLOITED TO DIVERT SOME OF ATTENTION FROM JUNTA'S SUPPOSED MISDEEDS TO SOVIET HANDLING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. A REPORT FROM A SENSITIVE SOURCE INDICATES THAT THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE CONCERNED OVER THE PRESSURES THAT COUBLD DEVELOP FROM THE OFFER. Y

2. THE EXCHANGE OFFER HAS ASPECTS THAT WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO NUMEROUS GROUPS IN EUROPE BUT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE REACTION, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF CHILE'S EXTREME UNPOPULARITY AND THE LACK OF BOTH A NEUTRAL SPONSOR AND SUFFICIENT PUBLICITY. EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE OFFER TO RELEASE IMPORTANT CHILEAN

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15-126-3
2 Oct 74

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COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST LEADERS, WHATEVER THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE OTHER HALF OF THE EXCHANGE. LEFTISTS OF NUMEROUS SHADES INCLUDING THE BERTRAND RUSSELL GROUPS SHOULD ALSO FAVOR THE RELEASE OF THESE PRISONERS, YET BE LESS TROUBLED BY THE DISCOMFITURE OF THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. SECOND, THE OFFER IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR GROUPS LIKE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TO BRING DIRECT PRESURE ON THE USSR TO RELEASE SOME PROMINENT INTELLECTUAL PRISONERS. FINALLY, THE OFFER SHOULD ATTRACT SOME HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FROM THOSE WHO FAVOR RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS NON PRINCIPLE. IN FACT, PROPERLY DEVELOPED, THE EXCHANGE IS POTENTIALLY ATTRACTIVE TO ALMOST THE ENTIRE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. 4

3. ^{SUGGEST} ~~REQUEST~~ ROME APPROACH DEFLOWER TO SEE WHETHER HE CAN GET HIS GROUP INTERESTED IN TAKING PRACTICAL STEPS TO GET PRISONERS RELEASED ^{ON EXCHANGE BASIS.} FROM CHILEAN JUNTA, PERHAPS IF HE CAN PICTURE HIMSELF AS SAVING THE PRISONERS (COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST LEADERS IN CHILE AND IMPORTANT INTELLECTUALS IN THE USSR) FROM A FASCIST REGIME ON THE ONE HAND AND FROM A STALINIST COUNTRY ON THE OTHER HE CAN BECOME SUFFICIENTLY INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE EXCHANGE. OBJECTIVE WOULD BE HAVE

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DEFLOWER DEVELOP MAXIMUM EUROPEAN INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITIES THAT THE EXCHANGE OFFERS AND MAXIMUM PUBLICITY OF HIS EFFORTS. Y

4. FOR LONDON: REQUEST STATION



5. FILE DEFER. E-2 IMPDET.H

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EUR/BC

EUR/I

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DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1974

ORIG: [Redacted]

UNIT: WH/CA

EXT: 9011

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CREUR/CA

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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
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TO: SANTIAGO INFO CARACAS. Y
 RYBAT VUNUMBER Y
 REF: CARACAS 25759 [IN 28578A] Y

Psych

C/WH/4
WH/4 SEC/1

1. RECOMMEND YOU CONSIDER ENLISTING SUITABLE VUNUMBER ASSET TO PERSUADE JUNTA TO RELAX ITS RESTRICTIONS ON FREE PRESS. OBJECTIVES OF SUCH MOVE WOULD BE THESE: Y

A. DEMONSTRATE TO WORLD THAT PINOCHET GOVT FIRMLY IN POWER IN CHILE AND THAT IT FUNCTIONS NOW WITH AT LEAST TACIT CONSENT OF MAJORITY OF CHILEANS

B. GIVE SUBSTANTIAL DEMONSTRATION OF JUNTA'S COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND THEREBY DEFUSE ONE OF MORE EXPLOSIVE GRIEVANCES OF WORLD PRESS AGAINST CHILE REGIME. Y

2. TO AVOID APPEARING TO CAPITULATE TO PRESS FROM CUBANS PER REF, SUGGEST CHILEAN MOVE IN RESPONSE TO THIS INFLUENCE SHOULD NOT FOLLOW UPON CRITICISM EMANATING FROM CUBAN DOMINATED JOURNALISTS CONFERENCE IN CARACAS. GESTURE, IF ADDRESSED TO ANYONE, SHOULD BE MADE TO IAPA TO ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE THAT RESPECTS ORGANIZATION AND THEREBY TO REINFORCE ITS ~~HOSTILE~~ HOSTILE

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REGIMES, WHERE FREE PRESS REMAINS PROSCRIBED. 4

3. REQUEST STATION COMMENTS. E-2 IMPDET.4

DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1974
 ORIG: E. JAMES MCTIGHE
 UNIT: C/LA/CS
 EXT: 1553

J. Dennis
 C/LA/CS

J. Dennis
 C/LA/CSB

C/LA

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~~C/WH/A~~
~~DC/WH/A~~

TO: LASB. Y

PSYCH Y

REF: DIRECTOR 605601 Y

BOOK CABLE Y

~~C/WH/A~~
 Bill C. L.
 AI K.
 - file. Dorothy
 for
 PSYCH
 file

1. FOLLOWING IS ANOTHER, APPARENTLY WELL-RESEARCHED ARTICLE BY DAVID F. BELNAP ON EROSION OF DEMOCRACY IN CHILE UNDER ALLENDE WHICH APPEARED IN LOS ANGELES TIMES ON 27 SEPT 74. SUGGEST YOU PASS FOLLOWING EXCERPTS TO LIAISON AND AGENTS OF INFLUENCE FOR BACKGROUND. NOTE FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS ARE MERELY REHASH ALLEGED CIA COVERT FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PRESS AND PARTIES IN OPPOSITION TO ALLENDE REGIME. THEIR REITERATION NOT PARTICULARLY WORTHWHILE IN THIS CONTEXT. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSESSMENT REACTION THIS DATE WHEN USED. Y

ABRIDGED TEXT FOLLOWS: Y

A NO SER POR EL EXAGERADO VOLUMEN DEL VERBAL QUE CARACTERIZO LA ACTUACION DE LOS DOS BANDOS EN EL LARGO Y ENCONADO

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INSTRUMENTO POLITICO IMPORTANTE EN CHILE, TUVIERON UN INDICIO DE BLO QUE LES AGUARDABA, INCLUSO ANTES DE LA TOMA DE POSESION DEL NUEVO PRESIDENTE. LOS PERITOS EN COMUNICACIONES DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA LES INDICARON QUE EFECTUARAN REBAJAS EN SU PERSONAL INFORMATIVO PARA DARLES CABIDA A LOS PERIODISTAS MARXISTAS DESIGNADOS POR EL PARTIDO, SO PENA DE PERDER MAS TARDE SUS LICENCIAS PARA TRANSMITIR. Y

~~CHILE--EL GOBIERNO--~~ ANUNCIA BAJA LA FERULA ALLENDISTA, LAS ENTIDADES ESTATALES-- Y LAS INDUSTRIAS PRIVADAS, A MEDIDA QUE IDAN CAYENDO EN MANOS DEL GOBIERNO-- LE DABAN PUBLICIDAD UNICAMENTE A AQUELLOS MEDIOS INFORMATIVOS QUE PERTENECIAN A LA UNIDAD POPULAR BO QUE APOYABAN AL REGIMEN. ENTRE ESTOS FIGURABAN, EN EL MOMENTO DE DESPLOMARSE EL ALLENDISMO, APROXIMADAMENTE LA MITAD DE LAS RADIODISORAS DEL PAIS (UNA DE LAS CUALES, LA MAYOR, ERA PROPIEDAD DE SALVADOR ALLENDE) Y CINCO DE LOS ONCE PERIODICOS DIARIOS QUE SE PUBLICABAN EN ESTA CAPITAL. Y

LA TELEVISION COMERCIAL CHILENA ESTA TOTALMENTE SOSTENIDA POR EL ESTADO O POR EL SECTOR UNIVERSITARIO, DE MODO QUE NO DEPENDE POR COMPLETO DE LA PUBLICIDAD PARA SUBSISTIR. POR ANADIDURA, DURANTE UNA

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GRAN PARTE DE LA GESTION PRESIDENCIAL DE ALLENDE CASI TODA LA TELEVISION DE CHILE ESTABA CONTROLADA POR LOS MARXISTAS O POR SUS SIMPATIZANTES. ESTA SITUACION CAMBIO SOLO CUANDO LA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE SANTIAGO LE ARRANCO EL DOMINIO DE SU CANAL DE TV A LOS ALLENDISTAS Y SE UNIO A LA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE VALPARAISO EN UN ESFUERZO POR LLEVARLE UNA PROGRAMACION NO-MARXISTA A TODA LA CIUDADANIA, UTILIZANDO ESTACIONES DE RELEVO DE MICROONDA DE ELABORACION CASERA. TRUNFARON EN ESTE EMPENO EN UNA MEDIDA ASOMBROSA MIENTRAS SALVABAN LOS OBSTACULOS DE TODO TIPO, AUN FISICOS, QUE EL REGIMEN LES INTERPONIA PARA IMPEDIRSELO. Y

EL MERCURIO, EL PERIODICO MAS GRANDE DEL PAIS, HABIA PERDIDO EL SESENTA PORCIENTO DE SU VOLUMEN PUBLICITARIO NORMAL A MEDIADOS DE 1971, Y CUALQUIER ESTACION RADIAL CORRIENTE, NO AFILIADA A LA UNIDAD POPULAR, PROMEDIABA UN OCHENTA PORCIENTO DE PERDIDAS SEMEJANTES. Y

ESTA EROSION PUBLICITARIA CONTINUO HACIENDO ESTRAGOS A MEDIDA QUE LAS PEQUENAS EMPRESAS INDEPENDIENTES FUERON SUSPENDIENDO SUS ANUNCIOS AL IRSE AGOTANDO SUS EXISTENCIAS DE MERCANCIAS O AL SOBREPASAR POR MUCHO LA DEMANDA A LOS ABSTECIMIENTOS DISPONIBLES.

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Y A LO LARGO DE TODO ESTE PERIODO ELEVABANSE CONJUNTAMENTE LOS COSTOS DE PUBLICACION Y TRANSMISION, IMPELIDOS POR LA INFLACION DE DOS CIFRAS QUE ARRASABA AL PAIS Y QUE ASCENDIO A TRES A PARTIR DE 1972. Y

LAS AUTORIDADES GUBERNAMENTALES NEGABAN ENTRETANTO TODAS LAS SOLICITUDES DE LICENCIA PARA IMPORTAR PIEZAS DE REPUESTO Y EQUIPOS DE REEMPLAZO PARA LAS PLANTAS QUE SE DETERIORABAN, Y EN EL CASO DE LAS RADIOEMISORAS, DE ELEMENTOS TAN ESENCIALES COMO SON LAS UNIDADES GRABADORAS Y LAS CINTAS MAGNETOFONICAS. Y

EN CUANTO A EL MERCURIO Y A MUCHAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO, LOS SINDICATOS MANEJADOS POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR TRATABAN DE INVENTAR PRETEXTOS PARA QUE EL GOBIERNO PROCEDIERA A ADUENARSE DE SUS EMPRESAS RECTORAS. LA DE EL MERCURIO, QUE PUBLICA TRES ROTATIVOS DIARIOS EN ESTA CAPITAL Y OTROS CINCO EN DISTINTAS PARTES DE LA NACION, FUE OBJETO DE INVESTIGACIONES FISCALES, DE ACUSACIONES DE NEGOCIAR ILEGALMENTE EN DIVISAS Y DE INSULTOS PERSONALMENTE LANZADOS CONTRA ELLA POR ALLENDE. Y

PERO EL ESFUERZO MAS VIGOROSO QUE REALIZARA EL REGIMEN PARA TRATAR DE MANIPULAR A LA PRENSA ESCRITA OPOSICIONISTA FUE LAS

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INCESANTES TENTATIVAS DE APODERARSE DE LA UNICA ENTIDAD PAPELERA INDEPENDIENTE, PROVEEDORA DE PAPEL PERIODICO PARA TODAS LAS PUBLICACIONES NO PERTENECIENTES A LA UNIDAD POPULAR, ASI COMO TAMBIEN PARA LAS QUE SEGUIAN LOS DICTAMENES DE LA COALICION GOBERNANTE. Y

EL GOBIERNO TRATO PRIMERO DE ADQUIRIR LA MAYORIA DE LAS ACCIONES DE LA EMPRESA, COMPRANDELAS A SUS 16,000 ACCIONISTAS. LUEGO INTENTO PERSUADIR AL CONGRESO PARA QUE ESTABLECIERA UN MONOPOLIO ESTATAL SOBRE EL PAPEL PERIODICO, Y FINALMENTE ENSAYO LA ELABORACION DE UN PRETEXTO PARA DECRETAR LA EXPROPIACION DE LA COMPANIA, TACTICA QUE HABIA FUNCIONADO CON OTRAS INDUSTRIAS. Y

UNA VEZ FRACASADAS TODAS ESTAS INICIATIVAS, EMPRENDIOSE LA DEL ASEDIO ECONOMICO. NO SE MITIGARON LOS CONTROLES DE PRECIOS IMPUESTOS A LOS ARTICULOS DE PAPEL PARA MANTENER EL EQUILIBRIO ALTERADO POR EL ALZA DE LOS COSTOS DE PRODUCCION. ELLO HIZO QUE LA FIRMA PAPELERA DECLARA UNA PERDIDA DE 9,100,000 DOLARES DURANTE LOS DOCE MESES QUE FINALIZARON EL 30 DE JUNIO DE 1972, PERDIDAS QUE AUMENTARON A UN RITMO DE 120,000 DOLARES DIARIOS MAS TARDE EN ESE MISMO AÑO. Y SEGUN MANIFESTARON LOS SINDICATOS DE LA PROPIA EMPRESA, LA

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AUTORIZACION PARA SUBIR LOS PRECIOS CONCEDIDA POR EL REGIMEN EN OCTUBRE DE 1972 PROPORCIONO MENOS DE LA MITAD DEL ALIVIO ECONOMICO QUE SE NECESITABA. Y

POR OTRA PARTE, AL COMENZAR EL AÑO 1972, LA SITUACION DE LAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO NO-ALLENDISTAS ERA DESEPERADA. DOS VECES DURANTE ESE AÑO EL CONGRESO APROBO UN IMPUESTO ESPECIAL PARA AYUDAR A COSTEAR TODAS LAS EMISORAS, VETANDO AMBAS INICIATIVAS EL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA. Y

EN SEPTIEMBRE, DESPUES DEL SEGUNDO DE ESTOS VETOS, PARECIA QUE LAS CUATRO ESTACIONES MAS IMPORTANTES DE ESTA CAPITAL NO ADSCRITAS A LA UNIDAD POPULAR SUCUMBIRIAN. NO OBSTANTE ESTO, SOBREVIVIERON Y FORMARON PARTE DE UNA RED VOLUNTARIA DE EMISORAS APODADA "CADENA DEMOCRATICA," LA CUAL LE BRINDO A LA OPOSICION ANTI ALLENDISTA UNA TRIBUNA DE EXPRESION PARA COMPETIR CON EL FRENTE DE ESTACIONES ORGANIZADO SIMILARMENTE POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR A TRAVES DE TODA LA NACION. Y

SALVARONSE IGUALMENTE LA EMPRESA PAPELERA INDEPENDIENTE Y EL MERCURIO. TAMBIEN ESCAPARON CON VIDA EL DIARIO LA PRENSA,

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ADQUIRIDO POR INTERESES DEMOCRATACRISTIANOS DESPUES DE LA ELECCION DE ALLENDE PERO ANTES DE SU TOMA DE POSESION, Y EL ROTATIVO TRIBUNA, FUNDADO POR EL PARTIDO NACIONAL EN LOS COMIENZOS DE LA PRESIDENCIA ALLENDISTA. ES DE PRESUMIRSE QUE AMBOS ORGANOS OBTUVIERAN RESPALDO ECONOMICO DE SUS PARTIDOS RESPECTIVOS O A TRAVES DE ELLOS, YA QUE NINGUNO DE LOS DOS PUBLICABA MUCHOS ANUNCIOS. (TANTO LA PRENSA COMO TRIBUNA FUERON CLAUSURADOS POR LA JUNTA QUE DESALOJO DEL PODER A ALLENDE, COMO PARTE DE SU DECISION DE DECLARAR EN "RECESO" A LA POLITICA.) Y

LA UNIDAD POPULAR EMPLEO TAMBIEN LAS TECNICAS DE HOSTIGAMIENTO ECONOMICO Y DE DIVIDIR PARA CONQUISTAR CONTRA LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS DE OPOSICION, DIEZMANDO CON ESTA ULTIMA TECTICA AL TRADICIONAL PARTIDO RADICAL CHILENO, Y ESFORZANDOSE POR HACER ZOZOBRAR AL PARTIDO NACIONAL, DE TENDENCIA DERECHISTA, DESTRUYENDO EL PODERIO ECONOMICO DE SUS ELEMENTOS PRINCIPALES. Y

COMO EN CHILE LA LEY NO EXIGE QUE SE DE CUENTA DEL APOYO ECONOMICO DESTINADO A LA POLITICBA, RESULTA DIFICIL AVERIGUAR COMO SE DESENVOLVIERON ECONOMICAMENTE BAJO EL ALLENDISMO LOS PARTIBBDOS EN SI.Y

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EN LA ESFERA POLITICA, EL OBJETIVO PRIMORDIAL DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR ERBA EL PARTIDO DOMOCRATBA-CRISTIANO, EL MAS GRANDE DE TODOS LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS DE LA NACION. DE LAS SEIS AGRUPACIONES INTEGRANTES DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR, LOS CUMUNISTAS SOBRE TODO SE PERCATARON DE LO ESENCIAL QUE RESULTABA PARA ESTABILIZAR AL GOBIERNO MINORITARIO DE ESA COALICION GANARSE EL APOYO DE LA DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA, O SI NO DIVIDIRLA. Y

PERO A NO SER POR LA PEQUENA FRAGMENTACION OCURRIDA POCOS DIAS DESPUES DE LAS ELECCIONES PRESIDENCIALES DE 1970, LOS DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANOS MANTUVIERON INTACTA SU UNIDAD, EVOLUCIONANDO GRADUALMENTE DE UNA POSICION DE ADVERSARIOS LBEALES DEL GOBIERNO A OTRA DE BBB OPOSICION IRREDUCTIBLE. Y

TRATAHDO DE RESCATAR A BALLENDI, CUYO PROPIO PARTIDO SOCIALISTA, DE FILIACION MARXISTA, REPRESENTABA EL MAS NUTRIDO DE LOS ELEMENTOS IRRACIONALES QUE CONFORMABAN LA UNIDAD POPULAR, LOS COMUNISTAS LLEGARON INCLUSO A PEDIRLE AYUDA A LA IGLESIA CATOLICA, ROGANDOLE QUE MEDIARA CON LA DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA PARA CONTRIBUIR A APUNTALAR AL REGIMEN CUANDO ESTE SE VENIA ABAJO. Y

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MAS ERA YA DEMASIADO TARDE. HACIA MUCHO TIEMPO QUE SALVADOR ALLENDE HABIA SELLADO SU SUERTE CON LOS DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANOS, AL FALTAR SISTEMATICAMENTE A TODAS LAS PROMESAS QUE LES HICIERA A CAMBIO DE LOS VOTOS QUE NECESITABAN PARA QUE EL CONGRESO DETERMINARA SU ELECCION A LA PRIMERA MAGISTRATURA, Y AL CONFESARLE CINICAMENTE AL INTELLECTUAL SOCIALISTA FRANCES REGIS DEBRAY EN UNA ENTREVISTA QUE HABIA FORMULADO ESAS PROMESAS EXCLUSIVAMENTE PARA ASEGURAR SU NOMBRAMIENTO COMO PRESIDENTE. Y

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1. "WATERGATE" A COMMON PHENOMENON IN USSR. ("NY TIMES,"
 9 OCTOBER). SOVIET HISTORIAN AND POLITICAL DISSIDENT ROY MEDVEDEV
 HAS CHARGED SOVIET PRESS WITH SUPPRESSING NEWS ABOUT WATERGATE
 "BECAUSE REGIME FEARS REVEALING TO SOVIET PUBLIC HOW INDEPENDENT
 JUDICIARY, FREE PRESS AND ELECTED LEGISLATIVE BODIES CAN RESTRAIN
 EXECUTIVE POWER...WATERGATE-TYPE ABUSES ARE COMMON IN USSR, BUT
 SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT IS SECURELY SHIELDED NOT ONLY FROM FALSE CHARGES
 BUT ALSO FROM LEGITIMATE INVESTIGATION OF REAL ABUSES OF POWER...FOR
 EXAMPLE...ABORTIVE ATTEMPT BY PROSECUTOR IN GEORGIAN REPUBLIC TO GET
 PERMISSION TO SEARCH APARTMENT AND INTERROGATE FAMILY OF REPUBLIC'S

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FORMER LEADER MZHAVANADZE, WHO WAS TOPPLED IN SEPTEMBER 1972 AMID CHARGES OF WHOLESALE CORRUPTION AND GRAFT THAT CHARACTERIZED HIS RULE...ALTHOUGH THERE WAS MORE THAN ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THIS TYPE OF INVESTIGATION, HIGHER PARTY OFFICIALS WOULD NOT PERMIT IT."

2. EAST GERMANS REAFFIRM SEPARATION FROM WEST ON 25TH ANNIVERSARY. JOHN GOSHKO WRITES IN "WASHINGTON POST" OF 8 OCTOBER THAT EAST GERMANY'S "NEW SENSE OF ASSERTIVENESS" WAS DEMONSTRATED ON 7 OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF STATE BY LARGEST PARADE EVER STAGED BY EAST GERMAN PEOPLE'S ARMY: "THOUSANDS OF JACK-BOOTED TROBBOPS MADE STREETS OF EAST BERLIN ECHO TO THUD OF TRADITIONAL PRUSSIAN GOOSE STEP...SEEMINGLY ENDLESS WAVE OF SOLDIERS IN RIGIDLY DISCIPLINED RANKS...HOLDING OF PARADE IN EAST BERLIN CONSTITUTED DEFIANCE OF FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL OF BERLIN...IN PROTEST, 12 NATO NATIONS WHICH RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY, REFUSED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO CELEBRATIONS IN EAST BERLIN... EAST GERMAN STANDARD OF LIVING WHICH HIGHEST IN SOVIET BLOC IS STILL THIRTY PERCENT BELOW THAT OF ...WEST GERMANY...DESPITE LIVING STANDARDS EAST GERMANY IS ~~PERIODIC~~ ONE OF MOST CLOSED SOCIETIES IN SOVIET BLOC -- MORE REGIMENTED IN

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MANY WAYS THAN SOVIET UNION ITSELF...EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT OWES ITS PRESENT SUCCESS TO BERLIN WALL AND CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF WALL ALONG ITS 860-MILE BORDER WITH WEST GERMANY."Y

3. EGYPT CANCELS ORDER FOR SOVIET PLANES. CAIRO, 29 SEPTEMBER. WEEKLY NEWSPAPER "AKHBAR AL-YOM REPORTS THAT EGYPT HAS DECIDED TO CANCEL ITS ORDER FOR EIGHT RUSSIAN-BUILT TU-154 JET AIRLINERS, CITING "NUMEROUS AND MAJOR DEFECTS" IN AIRCRAFT'S PERFORMANCE THAT JEOPARDIZE SAFETY OF PASSENGERS. ONE OF PLANES CRASHED IN FLAMES DURING TRAINING FLIGHT 10 JULY, KILLING TWO EGYPTIANS AND FOUR SOVIET CREWMEN. EXACT CAUSE OF ACCIDENT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED AND OTHER PLANES OF THIS TYPE HAVE BEEN GROUNDED. NEWSPAPER SAID EGYPTIAN AVIATION ORGANIZATION WOULD FILE CLAIMS WITH THE SOVIET EXPORT FIRM, "FAVIA", FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF \$7.5 MILLION ALREADY PAID ON THE \$47.5 MILLION DEAL.Y

4. NO CUBAN/SOVIET RESPONSE ON SETTING PRISONERS FREE. NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG CARRIED AFP REPORT FROM SANTIAGO, 24 SEPTEMBER, THAT GENERAL PINOCHET, CHIEF OF CHILBEAN JUNTA, HAD SAID NEITHER CUBA NOR SOVIET UNION HAD RESPONDED TO CHILEAN CHALLENGE OF 011 SEPTEMBER TO

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RELEASE SAME NUMBER OF PRISONERS AS CHILE WAS RELEASING. PINOCHET ALSO SAID FOREIGN MINISTRY AND CHILEAN EMBASSIES ARE RECEIVING HUNDREDS OF LETTERS DAILY FROM RELATIVES OF SOVIET PRISONERS, AND THAT THESE LETTERS WERE BEING FORWARDED TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS. HE ALSO REVEALED HE WOULD RECEIVE DELEGATION FROM BUENOS AIRES OF UKRAINIANS-IN-EXILE WHO WOULD GIVE CHILEAN OFFICIALS INFORMATION ON SOME FIFTY UKRAINIANS WHO ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN USSR.

5. EDITORIAL IN MEXICO CITY INDEPENDENT DAILY, "LA PRENSA," 25 SEPTEMBER, ACCUSED KGB OF SPYING AND INTERVENING IN LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS. COMMENTING ON PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AGAINST CIA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA, EDITORIALIST WROTE THAT THE KGB SHOULD GET OUT OF LATIN AMERICA. "...THAT SINISTER RED POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS COMMITTED SO MANY DASTARDLY CRIMES IN OUR COUNTRY SUCH AS THE ASSASSINATION OF TROTSKY. KGB HAS ESTABLISHED BOOK PUBLISHERS USED BY THE FASCIST LEFTISTS TO INFILTRATE PARTIES, MEETINGS AND LITERARY GATHERINGS. KGB USED THE PRESS AND GROUPS OF ARTISTS, INTELLECTUALS, WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS TO SING THE PRAISES OF A RED DICTATORSHIP. ...THE KGB SHOULD GET OUT WITH ITS THOUSANDS

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APPEALED TO ALL ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES TO SEND DELEGATIONS TO CAMBODIA FOR FIRSTHAND VIEW OF THE 'INFERNO' CREATED BY INDOCHINESE COMMUNISTS. ACCORDING TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS, WHENEVER COMMUNISTS CAPTURED A VILLAGE, MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF MOSLEM FAITH WERE MARCHED TO A CONCENTRATION CAMP AND THEIR HOMES WERE BURNED TO THE GROUND. THE OLD AND WEAK WERE KILLED; THE HEALTHY WERE FORCED TO GIVE UP THEIR RELIGION AND WORK FOR THE COMMUNISTS. TO HELP DEFEND THEIR RELIGION AND THEIR ADOPTED COUNTRY AGAINST COMMUNIST DEPRE-DATIONS, KHMER MOSLEMS ORGANIZED A BRIGADE, NOW PART OF THE CAMBODIAN ARMED FORCES, AND MANY MOSLEMS HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES ON THE BATTLE FIELD. IN THEIR APPEAL, CAMBODIAN MOSLEMS BEGGED FELLOW MOSLEMS ALL OVER WORLD TO UNITE IN EFFORT TO COMPEL NORTH VIETNAMESE AND OTHER INDOCHINESE COMMUNISTS TO CEASE BLOODSHED IN INDOCHINA."

8. IRAN INCENSED BY NORTH KOREAN BEHAVIOR. TEHRAN, 9-12 SEPTEMBER (TEHRAN JOURNAL AND KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL): TWO OF TEHRAN'S LEADING NEWSPAPERS CARRIED REPORTS ON HOW NORTH KOREAN ROWDYISM HAD MARRED ASIAN GAMES, AND CRITICIZED THEIR ^{ATHLETES'} BEHAVIOR. ONE REPORT CARRIED *BSB* HEADLINE, "WHENEVER THERE'S TROUBLE, THERE'S A NORTH KOREAN." AFTER

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1. RECENT PUBLIC LETTER TO CARDINAL RAUL SILVA REQUESTED HIS ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING RELEASE OF JURI GRIGOVICVICH PRONIN, CURRENTLY DETAINED IN USSR. LETTER FROM DETAINEE'S WIFE, A CHILEAN CITIZEN NAMED MARIA ELIANA E. DE PRONIN, WAS GIVEN PROMINENT LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE SEPT 26. TEXT OF LETTER WAS WRITTEN IN SOMETIMES IRONICAL TONE, APPEALING TO CADRDINAL'S "NOBLE CHRISTIAN HEART TOWARDS CHILEAN POLITICAL DETAINEES." CONTINUING, DETAINEEB'S WIFE SAID SHE BELIEVES AN AUTHORITY SUCH AS THE CARDINAL, "WHO HAS SO MANY TIMES DEFENDED THE DETAINEES OF THE LEFT," COULD INFLUENCE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO RELEASE HER HUSBAND, SAID MARRIED PRONIN IN JANUARY 1968, AND HUSBAND SINCE AUGUST 1968 DETAINED IN UJTA CAMP FOR HAVING TRIED TO

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LEAVE USSR ILLEGALLY. Y

"2. CARDINAL RESPONDED PUBLIC (OCT 1) IN FORM OF LETTER TO CONSERVATIVE "EL MERCURIO," REITERATING HIS INTENTION TO USE ALL HIS STRENGTH TO HELP THOSE WHO SUFFER," REGARDLESS OF OTHER CONSIDERATIONS." IN RESPONSE, CARDINAL ASSURED WIFE AND PUBLIC THAT HE WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE ON DETAINEE'S BEHALF, ALTHOUGH HE HAS NO RELATIONS WITH USSR AND IS NOT OPTIMISTIC. Y

"3. COMMENT. PRESS COVERAGE OF LETTER EXCHANGE, AND PERHAPS REQUEST ITSELF, IS OBVIOUS CONTINUATION OF PRESS HARASSMENT OF CARDINAL FOR HIS CRITICISM OF GOC HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE, AND FOR HIS SILENCE DURING CHILEAN HUE AND CRY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN USSR AND CUBA. IN HIS RESPONSE, CARDINAL SOFTLY REBUKED CRITICS AND GOC BY STATING, "MOREOVER I BELIEVE IT IS CLEAR TO YOU (EL MERCURIO) THAT THE CARDINAL'S REQUESTS TO AUTHORITIES, EVENTHOSE WITH MORE INTIMATE TIES TO HIM, ARE NOT ALWAYS WELL RECEIVED." Y

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TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

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1. IN FEATURED EDITORIAL CAPTIONED "KENNEDY ON THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN" EL MERCURIO OF 16 SEPTEMBER DESCRIBES REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON AS SECOND (LUGARTENIENTE) OF SENATOR KENNEDY. EL MERCURIO OUTLINES OBJECTIVES OF HARRINGTON REVELATIONS AS: A) TO GIVE AMMONITION TO THE POLITICAL INTERESTS OF (SENATOR) KENNEDY; B) TO CONTINUE THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN WHICH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM HEADS AND HAS GREATLY INFILTRATED THE ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL CIRCLES SUPPORTING KENNEDY; C) DIRECT FIRE AT THE CHILEAN DAILY WHOSE PUBLICATIONS AND OPINIONS SEEM TO HAVE THE STRONGEST IMPACT INTERNATIONALLY.

2. EL MERCURIO FURTHER COMMENTS THAT HARRINGTON ATTACK IS AN ATTEMPT TO IMPEDE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CHILE (SIC) AND DIRECTLY CONNECTS WITH WORLD-WIDE SOVIET CAMPAIGN "TO STRANGLE OUR GOVERNMENT EVEN AT THE COST OF (CAUSING) HUNGER FOR

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THE CHILEAN PEOPLE WHILE THE GRANERIES OF THE UNITED STATES ARE EMPTIED FOR RUSSIA."

3. AFTER TOUCHING SEVERAL OTHER BASES, EL MERCURIO CONCLUDES BY DENYING THAT THERE HAS EVER BEEN ANY "UNCONFESSABLE" INCOME IN ITS HISTORY. EL MERCURIO'S BOOKS WERE SUBJECT TO MOST THOROUGH AND HOSTILE SCRUTINY DURING THE MARXIST REGIME WITHOUT ANYONE BEING ABLE TO SPECIFY IRREGULARITIES. THEREFORE, EL MERCURIO REJECTS "WITH LEGITIMATE DISDAIN THE IRRESPONSIBLE CHARGES MADE BY A CLOSE COLLABORATOR OF MR. KENNEDY AND FEELS AUTHORIZED TO CONJECTURE THAT THE ATTACK IS THE FRUIT OF JOURNALISTIC IRRESPONSIBILITY OR OF THE ANIMOSITY OF THE ADVISORS OF A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WHO IS STOPPED SINCE SEVERAL YEARS AGO IN HIS AMBITIONS BY THE MORAL EXAMINATION

~~LA JERONIMO SANTIAGO 30338 SECRET~~

OF HIS ACTIONS TO WHICH HE HAS BEEN SUBJECTED IN HIS COUNTRY".

4. PRESIDENT FORD'S STATEMENTS ON CHILE FROM HIS 16 SEPTEMBER NEWS CONFERENCE WERE CARRIED IN FULL BY "EL MERCURIO" UNDER FRONT PAGE HEADLING "FORD: U.S. HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH FALL OF ALLENDE." THERE WAS NO EDITORIAL COMMENT IN "EL MERCURIO" AND NO NEWS OR EDITORIAL COVERAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT IN "LA TERCERA".

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TOR:171642Z SEP 74

SAGO 30338

MRS. ALLENDE'S ATTACK AGAINST SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS CARRIED IN
"LA TERCERA" BUT NOT IN "EL MERCURIO".

5. IN TAKING THE EXAGGERATED POSITION IT HAS ON THE REVEL-
TIONS, EL MERCURIO HAS LEFT ITSELF VULNERABLE TO BEING EMBARRASSED
AND CONTRADICTED BY STATEMENTS (SUCH AS THE PRESIDENT'S) THAT ARE
MORE ACCURATE PRESENTATIONS OF WHAT WENT ON IN CHILE PRE-COUP.
EL MERCURIO MAY WELL HAVE TAKEN THIS POSITION BECAUSE, BESIDES
THEIR RIGHT-WING VIEWS, THE CURRENT MANAGEMENT IS GENUINELY
IGNORANT OF THE FUNDING THAT TOOK PLACE WHEN FUBRIG-2 WAS RUNNING
THE SHOW. FUBRIG-2 WHO SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO CHILE 18 SEPTEMBER,
HAS TOLD COS THAT NO ONE CURRENTLY AT EL MERCURIO KNOWS OF FUND-
ING. EVEN CURRENT MINISTER OF ECONOMY LENIZ DOES NOT KNOW DETAILS
BUT HAD SUSPICION ABOUT INFUSION OF FUNDS THAT TOOK PLACE IN U.P.
ERA. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO MONITOR INTERNAL EL MERCURIO REACTION
THROUGH FUBRIG-2.

6. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

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MERCURIO" ITSELF, THE HEADLINE AND A SHORT EDITORIAL COMMENT INTRODUCING ABOVE COVERAGE DESCRIBES THESE DEVELOPMENTS AS "NEW AND GROTESQUE EPISODE IN THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN" AND ATTEMPTS TO TIE REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON CLOSELY TO SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (WHO HAS SINCE THE COUP BEEN UNDER STEADY ATTACK HERE FOR HIS CRITICISM OF THE MILITARY INTERVENTION AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN CHILE). "EL MERUCIRO" MAKES CONNECTION WITH RECENT REVELATIONS ¹⁹ BY REP. HARRINGTON BY "EL MERCURIO" ¹⁹ OF AN ARTICLE FROM "MC CALLS" WHICH DEALT WITH CHAPPAQUIDICK IN A MANNER UNFAVORABLE TO SENATOR KENNEDY.

19-250-23
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3. "EL MERCURIO" RESPONSE, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE NET EFFECT OF RAISING MORE QUESTIONS HERE THAN IT ANSWERS. THIS INCREASED PUBLICITY WILL INCREASE PRESSURE ON AND POSSIBLY SCRUTINY OF STATION ASSETS INVOLVED AND MAY AFFECT THOSE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED. ON 13 SEPTEMBER, FUPOCKET-1 WAS QUESTIONED BY NEWSWEEK REPORTER HERE ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF FUNDING. FUPOCKET-1 DENIED ALL KNOWLEDGE OF ANY FUNDING FROM FOREIGN SOURCES. DETAILS FOLL SEPARATE CABLE.

4. REQUEST WOS KEEP STATION UP-TO-DATE ON ANY PLANS OR CONCRETE ACTIONS TO CONTINUE INVESTIGATION OF REVELATIONS.

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SAGO 30293

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CITE SANTIAGO 30293

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REFS: A, DIRECTOR 595482

B, SANTIAGO 30253 (IN 354910)

21p

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1. FOLLOWING STATION AGENTS WERE CONTACTED, PERIOD 8-10 SEPTEMBER, IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCE REVELATIONS. THEIR COMMENTS AND REACTIONS FOLLOW.

2. FUERMINE-1 CONCERNED BUT RELIEVED THAT NO NAMES WERE MENTIONED. COMMENTED THAT TIMING WAS EXCEPTIONALLY BAD SINCE IT COINCIDED EXACTLY WITH EDUARDO FREI'S ARRIVAL IN THE U.S. AND HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS HAD BEEN DELIBERATE. FUERMINE-1 ASKED WHETHER WE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE FURTHER INVESTIGATION OR MEDIA PLAY IN THE U.S. REPLIED THAT WE DID NOT KNOW BUT WOULD KEEP HIM INFORMED. HE IS TRAVELING TO GERMANY ON 22 SEPTEMBER AT INVITATION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION INSTITUTE (WEST GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS). DURING HIS TRIP HE WILL

IN VIEW OF REF DEVELOPMENTS, HE

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DOES NOT PLAN TO [REDACTED] HE
 RETURNING CHILE VIA NEW YORK AND CHICAGO AND PLANS TO MEET
 WITH FREI 15 OCTOBER IN NEW YORK. FUERMINE-1 EXPRESSED THE
 OPINION THAT THE JUNTA WILL NEITHER RAISE THE MATTER WITH
 EMBASSY NOR PURSUE FURTHER SINCE IT IS NOT IN THEIR
 INTEREST TO DO SO.

2. FUBRIG-2 RECEIVED NEWS CALMLY BUT WAS MOST CONCERNED
 ABOUT IMPLICATIONS OF EFFECTS OF THE REVELATIONS AND EXPRESSED
 OPINION THAT SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON SHOULD BE CHANGED
 TO ^{PREV} PREVENT SUCH LEAKS. HE WAS RELIEVED THAT EL MURCURIO WAS NOT
 MENTIONED BY NAME (BUT WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT IT WILL NOT BE
 EASILY IDENTIFIED IN ANY SUBSEQUENT COMMENTARY). FUBRIG-1
 THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE JUNTA MAY WONDER IF USG STILL NOT IN
 SOME WAY SUPPORTING PDC, WHICH OF COURSE JUNTA WOULD FIND
 MOST UNACCEPTABLE.

4. FUERMINE-5 ALSO TOOK THE NEWS CALMLY ABOUT REVELATION
 OF \$9,000 ITEM FOR TRAVEL OF PDC LEADERS. WHILE SHAKING HIS
 HEAD ABOUT THE LEAKING OF SUCH MATTERS, HE BELIEVES THAT THE
 REVELATION, UNLESS IT IS MADE MUCH MORE SPECIFIC BY SUBSEQUENT
 INVESTIGATIONS AND PUBLICITY, WILL NOT CAUSE HIM A PROBLEM.

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CONSIDERS THE FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE DELEGATION AS BEING PDC AND (INCORRECTLY) AS MAKING A TOUR OF LATIN AMERICAN RATHER THAN EUROPEAN CAPITALS WILL LEAD AWAY FROM PROPER IDENTIFICATION, SINCE THE FUNDS THAT PASSED THROUGH HIS HANDS WERE APPROXIMATELY \$4,000 AT THE THEN LOCAL FREE MARKET RATE (AS OPPOSED TO STATION SPENDING RATE), HE FEELS THAT THIS WILL ALSO HELP HIDE PROPER IDENTIFICATION EVEN WITHIN THE PDC OF THIS FUNDING.

5. FUPOCKET-1 WAS INFORMED OF DISCLOSURE OF \$25,000 FOR PURCHASE OF RADIO STATION ON 8 SEPTEMBER, WAS VISIBLY DISTURBED UPON HEARING NEWS AND COMMENTED "YOU PEOPLE NEED TO CHANGE YOUR SYSTEM SO THAT SUCH NEWS DOES NOT GET OUT." STATED THAT NO ONE WITHIN HIS GROUP KNEW THAT HE GAVE MONEY ON THE SIDE TO PURCHASE THIS RADIO STATION AND THAT NO RECORDS WERE MADE OF HIS PART IN THE DEAL. HE REMARKED THAT THE FORMER OWNER OF THE STATION IS A SOCIALIST AND UNLIKELY TO DISCUSS THE TERMS OF THE SALE SINCE ILLEGAL MONEY TRANSACTION INVOLVED. FUPOCKET-1 PROMISED TO KEEP US ADVISED OF ANY BLOW-BACK.

6. ON 10 SEPTEMBER? FUBARGAIN-1 SAID THAT GENERAL PINOCHET

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DID NOT SEEM VERY UPSET BUT COMMENTED IN FUBARGAIN-1'S PRESENCE THAT THE DISCLOSURE "SEEMED TO BE A ^{ME} DUMB THING TO DO." FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH FUBAEGAIN-1, HE SHOWED HIS UNHAPPINESS AT WHAT HE FEELS IS GROWING EVIDENCE OF USG INCOMPREHENSION OF GOC. SAID HE AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE TRAVELED TO STATES AND ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE WAY USG FINCTIONS COULD PARTIALLY UNDERSTAND CURRENT U.S.G. ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS. SAID MOST JUNIOR OFFICERS, HOWEVER, ARE INCREASINGLY UPSET AND CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY FEEL IS U.S. FAILURE TO BE A "GOOD FRIEND" OF CHILE DESPITE THE IMPORTANT SACRIFICES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE HERE IN THE WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUGGLE.

7. ACCORDING TO FUBARGAIN-1, MOST CHILEAN OFFICERS VIEW THE REVELATIONS AND THEIR TIMING AS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT BY A SECTOR OF U.S.G. (ALBEIT THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH) TO DELIBERATELY DAMAGE JUNTA AND FALSELY CAST DOUBT ON THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND ROLE IN BRINGING DOWN ALLENDE. OFFICERS HAVE ADDED THIS LATEST BLOW TO WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE U.S. FOOT-DRAGGING ON SUPPLYING CHILE ARMS URGENTLY NEEDED FOR DEFENSE

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AGAINST PERU AND U.S, FAILURE NOT ONLY TO ASSIST, BUT ACTUALLY TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS, PROBLEMS OF CHILEAN IMAGE ABROAD. SUM IS THAT CHILEAN OFFICER CORPS BECOMING INCREASINGLY BAFFELED AND RESENTFUL ABOUT U.S. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE.

0. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

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PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS
MEDIA IN ALLENDE'S CHILE

*For
Psych 6 file*

HIGHLIGHTS

- Since President Allende's electoral victory in 1970, the Government propaganda apparatus has mounted a coordinated campaign against the opposition communications media focusing on the prestigious El Mercurio newspaper chain and key opposition radios. The long-range goal is to create conditions that will insure Government control over the media so that an emasculated opposition will operate intuitively and through self-censorship within an approved framework.
- The opposition radio stations bear the brunt of an array of legal and illegal devices designed to intimidate them. These devices include the threat of violence, favoritism in the distribution of essential Government advertising revenue, temporary closures, and Government-fomented strikes.
- Chile's national television -- the only country-wide channel -- has become an important propaganda instrument for the Government. But it is being challenged by a Catholic University channel which is attempting to expand its service beyond the Santiago area.
- A major confrontation between the Government and the opposition, lasting more than a year, has taken place at the Papelera, Chile's only important private newsprint producer, with the company supported by the opposition media stymying repeated Government efforts to take over the firm. The paper company claims that Government price policies have brought it close to bankruptcy.
- Despite officially-sanctioned harassment, the opposition media have continued to function, taking advantage of the fluid political situation currently prevailing in Chile, and have become increasingly effective in exploiting the Government's economic failures and the growing dissension within the ruling Marxist coalition.
- Nevertheless, the opposition's economic base that sustains its media is being slowly undermined as the Government expands its control over the Chilean economy. Many opposition media are reportedly already in difficult financial straits. The Chilean Communist Party, seeking to strengthen its voice in the March 1973 Congressional elections, has already purchased five beleaguered radio stations (one a former opposition station) in southern Chile.

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III. THE ALLENDE PROCESS - HOW THE MEDIA ARE TREATED

Allende's treatment of the opposition media and his utilization of the pro-Government media offer revealing insights into the unique claim that Chile will carry out a Socialist revolution within the framework of traditional bourgeois and democratic institutions without social cost.

Any Chilean government possesses wide powers that can be employed to control and intimidate media opponents given sufficient will power and cynicism to do so, despite the fact that media freedoms in Chile are twice-guaranteed, both in the 1925 constitution and in a statute of constitutional guarantees agreed to by Allende's Popular Unity coalition and the Christian Democrats (PDC) as a condition for PDC support for Allende in the congressional run-off held subsequent to the Presidential election in September 1970.

What are some of these powers? Any Chilean executive under provisions of the State Internal Security Law may establish emergency zones by decree headed by military commanders empowering the State to enforce news censorship and to restrict access to newsprint supplies. A law on publicity abuses empowers the government to petition the courts to suspend access to news and information. (Laws on the books that pose potential threats to freedom of radio information are more severe and more frequently utilized. See Section III. B. Radio.) Furthermore, through the judicious parceling out of advertising from State and autonomous State firms any government can discriminate against opposition media by denying or restricting this key source of revenue.

Unlike predecessor governments which utilized existing laws and accepted practices to reward political associates and benefit business partners, the Allende Government has consistently and frequently applied these measures to harass, to intimidate, and to undermine the morale of political and class opponents in the media. These tactics are applied throughout the country.

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A basic organizational technique for the UP coalition has been the establishment of UP committees (CUP -- Comité de Unidad Popular) -- composed of newsmen who are militant members of parties belonging to the Government coalition or independent supporters of UP policies -- in newspapers, radios, magazines, and in journalistic bodies. The CUP's have been most active at the union level: demanding exorbitant wage increases, insisting that UP employees be given the right to express their opinion on editorial pages, disrupting legitimate union meetings, forming rump unions, and leaking internal company data to the leftist press and to the Government.

The goal of certain Unidad Popular militants regarding freedom of the press was most explicitly and revealingly stated by the organizing committee for a conference of leftist journalists which was held in Santiago in April 1971. The committee issued the following statement prior to the conference:

... we believe that we must fight for true freedom of the press, which will only be possible when there is true economic independence. We maintain that Chile will have true freedom of the press only when the means of mass communication are part of the area of social property, that is, (when they) belong to all Chileans. The press, radio, television, and the theater must be tools at the service of liberation and culture of our people and not a private business, an ideological battering ram of the national and foreign minority (the capitalists) as is presently the case. ⁷ (underlining added)

Another statement said "the mission of journalists is to support and defend the People's Government (the UP) together with all the workers." The declaration also underlined the support of UP newsmen for "Viet-Nam, Cuba, and all the people that are building Socialism," and threw a bouquet at Cuba's Prensa Latina agency for its "objective" reporting of the Chilean phenomenon. Allende himself lent legitimacy to the mission of UP journalists in a speech kicking off the conference when he stated that "committed" newsmen must act as the "vanguard" of the revolution by "elevating the political level of the people." Reiterating a theme expressed on many other occasions, Allende asserted that his Government would respect freedom of information while at the same time he lamented his Government's "excessive tolerance" for the opposition media.

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A. Press

In the key Santiago metropolitan area, there are five major opposition daily newspapers and one important neutral daily, La Tercera de la Hora.

TABLE 2. MAJOR OPPOSITION AND NEUTRAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS

<u>Title</u>	<u>Estimated Circulation</u>	<u>Political Orientation</u>
El Mercurio	160,000	Independent, conservative
Las Noticias Ultimas	120,000	Part of the <u>Mercurio</u> chain
La Prensa	25,000	Christian Democratic (PDC)
La Segunda	60,000	Part of the <u>Mercurio</u> chain
La Tribuna	25,000	National Party (PN) interests
La Tercera de la Hora	190,000	Independent

A favorite target of the Government and its propaganda apparatus has been the conservative, independent daily El Mercurio, dean of the Chilean press and chief representative of the largest and most influential newspaper chain in the country. Tarred regularly as "pro-U.S." and as a "gringo newspaper written in Spanish" -- potent accusations in Chile -- El Mercurio has borne the brunt of every conceivable kind of pressure short of outright seizure.

On numerous occasions the paper has been implicated along with other opposition media in alleged seditious plots carried out in concert with foreign (i. e., U. S.) interests to overthrow the Government. Advertisers have been "requested" not to do business with the Mercurio chain,⁸ which has been accused of foreign exchange irregularities by tax authorities, by Government supporters on the paper's own staff, and by Allende himself at public rallies. Allende, too, periodically reacts to critical Mercurio editorials with charges that Chile and the Presidential office have been "insulted," that the Mercurio chain indulges in "libertinism unprecedented in Chilean journalistic history."

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and that the chain is "faithful to its tradition of infamy." The Government propaganda apparatus follows suit.

The PDC organ La Prensa and the National Party tabloid La Tribuna are secondary targets for the UP propaganda apparatus because their circulation is limited. Pressures employed against these dailies are aimed generally at the political parties behind them in contrast to the Mercurio chain where pressures are intended as a warning signal to the "free" media as an institution.

Independent La Tercera receives distinct treatment. The Government exerts minimal pressures on the paper in return for favorable editorial treatment of Allende policies (see Section VI. A. The Opposition Media Reaction). This tactic has paid dividends for Allende and for Tercera's owner, German Pico Cánau. Allende obtains favorable publicity in a mass-circulation paper that maintains comparative objectivity in its news columns, thus lending credence to Allende's claims that he will respect traditional Chilean freedoms while making the transition to Socialism. Freed from the need for the strident partisanship so characteristic of the rest of the press, Tercera steadily builds its circulation with a public seeking some relief from the verbal civil war. As a result Pico, who has been head of the Chilean newspaper association, has defended the Allende Government's press policies in international forums. The understanding with the Government, however, is an uneasy one; Tercera is not sufficiently malleable for the Socialist Party, the principal party in the Government coalition.

B. Radio

Radio continues to be the most important medium of communication in Chile. The latest available figures compiled by the World Radio-TV Handbook give Chile a total of 137 stations, including 29 in the capital city, Santiago (See Table 3). The number of receivers is estimated at 3 million, or one for every third person. In a country 2,600 miles long radio's strategic importance is understood by both Government and opposition. The Government has resorted to a variety of devices designed to intimidate opposition radio stations: requests by Allende advisers that opposition stations hire designated leftist commentators; threats of violence; favoritism in the distribution of needed government advertising revenues; temporary closures; and strikes fomented by CUP committees.

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TABLE 3. IMPORTANT RADIO STATIONS

<u>Station</u>	<u>Political Orientation</u>
Radio Agricultura	National Party (PN)
Radio Balmaceda	Christian Democratic (PDC)
Radio Cooperativa	PDC with PN elements
Radio Corporación	Socialist Party
Radio IEM	University of Chile station controlled by Marxists
Radio Luis Recabarren	Chilean labor federation (CUT) station; Communist-controlled (See Note No. 10)
Radio Magallanes	Communist Party
Radio Minerfa	Independent with PDC and PN elements.
Radio Pacifico	Radical Party (UP)
Radio Portales	Socialist Party
Radio Santiago	Catholic Church interests
Radio UTE	State Technical University station controlled by Communists

Partial blame for leftist infiltration of Chilean stations must rest with "bourgeois" radio owners. Long before Allende became president the Chilean businessmen and politicians who owned radio stations made it a practice to hire leftist commentators because they believed that leftists were superior professionals and helped to increase listenership. When the UP came to power it tapped an existing source of manpower.

In addition, the Government frequently utilized existing regulations to gain its ends. Radio concessions are granted by a Government entity (Servicios Electricos) attached to the Interior Ministry. The same entity can cancel or transfer such concessions. ¹⁰ Regulations promulgated during World War II state that "In case of internal disturbance, catastrophe or war radio stations are subject to the rules, control, and censorship that the Government may adopt." Under this type of emergency regulation, all radio stations were placed under an obligatory Government network -- not an unusual practice for the Allende Government -- when a modified martial law was decreed in 21 of Chile's 25 provinces during the October-

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November 1972 truck drivers strike (See Note No. 18). Another regulation decrees that stations must interrupt their transmissions whenever the Interior Minister judges it to be necessary in the interest of the internal security of the State. Still another regulation authorizes the Central Bank to control the importation of equipment and spare parts for radio, television, and the press.

The Government moved quickly after the 1970 presidential election to obtain control of key stations. The Socialist Party gained control of Radio Portales, Chile's most popular station, and purchased Radio Corporación from El Mercurio (Portales has subsequently slipped in popularity). The Communist Party purchased Magallanes, an important Santiago station. The Communist Party recently also purchased Radio Simón Bolívar (formerly pro-opposition) in Concepción (as well as four other stations in southern Chile in preparation for the Congressional elections in March 1973). The rightist National Party daily La Tribuna quoted the former owner as saying that "the age of privately-owned mass media (in Chile) is over" with only the Government, strong economic consortiums, and the most powerful political parties capable of sustaining media operations. La Tribuna says the Communist Party is now the most powerful (single) broadcaster in southern Chile.

PDC-oriented Radios Balmaceda and Cooperativa, however, have to date successfully resisted Government enticements and pressures (see Section VI. A. The Opposition Media Reaction). Balmaceda -- a radio station which over the years had earned a reputation for objective newscasts -- has been the number one target of the UP in the radio field. It has suffered more temporary closures than any radio facility. The station was shut down, for example, 17 hours in June 1971 for broadcasting an alleged "alarmist" report during the State of Emergency decreed after the assassination of Perez Zujovic, a former interior minister in the Frei Government. At the same time a UP station, Portales, received nothing more than an admonition for transmitting "alarmist" news more acceptable to UP propagandists. During the August-September 1971 period Radio Balmaceda was shut down on three separate occasions under similar pretexts (see Note No. 10).

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In radio as in the press the Government has used CUP committees to formulate exaggerated wage demands, to foment strikes, and to form rump unions. CUP unions at Radio Pacifico, for example, forced the owner to sell out to a cooperative formed by employees when wage demands could not be met. The radio station subsequently was purchased by the Radical Party -- a member of the UP coalition.

The principal Government weapon, however, is its control over public service advertising, which traditionally has provided the bulk of revenues for Chilean radio stations. The Government has dangled the prospect of advertisements in return for favorable news treatment, but the bait has not been picked up by the major opposition radios which recognize that their independence is at stake. The economic squeeze makes the future of Chilean independent radios appear bleak.

C. Television

Since its inception in Chile in 1962, television has made great strides, but the medium still lags behind radio, especially in the provinces where technical conditions for viewing are poor. According to the best estimates available, there are 350,000 sets in Santiago and a total of 500,000 sets in the country. Chile is served by the following television channels: 1) A national network with some 21 outlets throughout the country; 2) the Catholic University channel in Santiago; 3) a separate Catholic University channel in Valparaíso; and 4) the University of Chile channel in Santiago.

The Government clearly recognizes television's importance as a propaganda vehicle, and under the direction of an Allende confidante, newsman Augusto Olivares (Socialist and a suspected member of the ultra-left MIR -- Movement of the Revolutionary Left), it has transformed Chile's only nationwide television channel into an outright political instrument of the Government coalition. Slanted commentaries favoring UP policies, character assassinations intended to smear political and class opponents, and a steady drum-fire of Socialist propaganda in news and cultural programming became standard fare.

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At the same time network authorities made it difficult under a variety of pretexts for opposition spokesmen to air their views in contravention of the State television statute. For example, the authorities frequently obliged all television channels and radios to carry official statements and denied opposition spokesmen equal time, resorting to the legal fiction that the official statements were transmitted voluntarily.

A popular political chat show "A Tres Bandas," in which opposition representatives freely debated UP representatives (the only such show carried nationally), was cancelled in August 1972 after two years of UP agitation against it. The Government defended the step by alleging that the program had poor listenership and by pointing to a ruling granting all political parties equal time to express their views on twice-weekly 20-minute slots. The original chat show format provided several hours of open-ended and frequent face-to-face confrontation, usually embarrassing to the Government.

The University of Chile station has consistently asserted the Marxist line since its inception, but the two remaining university channels have successfully fought Government control to date (See Section VI. C. University Confrontation and Television Freedoms). None of the university channels, however, is national in scope.

D. Magazines and Book Publishing

Early in 1971 the Government purchased the plant and equipment of the PDC-controlled Zig-Zag publishing empire -- one of the most modern in Latin America. The GOC announced the purchase after prolonged negotiations, provoked originally by the excessive demands of a Communist-led union. Under the terms of the accord the Government purchased Zig-Zag's plant and equipment, the company's national line of comics, and several magazines while Zig-Zag retained several mass-circulation magazines (Ercilla and Veja being the most important) under a two-year contract with the Chilean Treasury. The Zig-Zag infrastructure formed the basis for the newly-established Government-owned Quimantu National Publishing Enterprise. The accord with Zig-Zag has been scrupulously observed to date.

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Quimantu quickly began turning out magazines, comic books, and textbooks pushing UP policies. Comic books like Firme were designed for mass consumption and aimed at adults with low cultural levels, while others like Ramona were aimed at the teen-age market. Cabrochico, another comic book, was geared to pre-teens. The format of some Quimantu products closely resembled competing Zig-Zag products. The weekly Ahora, for example, was designed to compete with Ercilla. After eight months Ahora collapsed, rejected in the market place by Chileans who were turned off by heavy-handed political propaganda.

E. Films

The Government's film production company, Chile Films, became the UP's principal propaganda arm in the film field. Rival Chilean private producers went out of business, squeezed by rising production costs and discriminatory tax and exchange rate treatment that denied them needed equipment and spare parts from abroad. Chile Films signed a comprehensive exchange accord in March 1971 with the Cuban Cinematographic Institute (ICAIC) (See Section V. C. Exchange of Persons, Visitors, and Exchange Agreements).

Chile Films also initiated agreements with the experimental film institute (leftist) at the University of Chile, the film institute at the Communist-dominated State Technical University (UTE), the Government information office, the film department of the Communist-dominated CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores -- the major labor organization), the national television network, and the University of Chile television station. The stated purpose of the accords was to "develop the new Chilean film industry."

Its products are intended to glorify the roles of workers, peasants, and students in the march to Chilean-style Socialism, romanticize the proletarian role of the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, and attack the "bourgeoisie" and their "imperialist" allies. Despite an intense publicity buildup, however, few films actually appeared in the 1970-72 period. Most of the films that were produced appeared to be pieced together from newsreel film taken during the Allende presidential campaign or from post-election political rallies.

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The Government's delay in making public the results of June 1972 elections for top posts in the Communist-dominated CUT labor federation also damaged Government credibility. The opposition media scored heavily in a barrage of charges of irregularities and vote fraud with a public that takes justified pride in clean elections.

B. The Papelera Confrontation

The Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles Y Cartones (known as the Papelera), Chile's major private producer of newsprint, became another propaganda battleground cast by the opposition in terms of "freedom versus Marxist totalitarianism."

In October 1971, the Government, carrying out a long-standing pledge, announced that CORFO (the Government Development Corporation) had opened negotiations to buy out the Papelera through the purchase of its stock. The opposition media immediately launched a campaign to warn the public that the free press would be crippled if newsprint distribution were placed at the mercy of Government suppliers. At the same time, the opposition media pleaded with private shareholders to refuse to sell to the Government. In addition, a "freedom fund" was created enabling private persons to buy up Papelera shares to prevent the company from falling into Government hands.

For several months pro- and anti-Government media carried out daily an intensive propaganda battle in advertisements, news stories, and editorials. Both sides resorted to the familiar numbers game: the pro-Allende media claimed that the Government was besieged by willing shareholders eager to sell out; the opposition asserted that shareholders were resisting temptation. Government propagandists argued that newsprint production was essential to the State and must be controlled by the State; the opposition said Papelera must remain in private hands as a patriotic duty.

Thwarted to date in its attempt to buy out Papelera shareholders, the Government has not hesitated to use other measures -- price controls, labor-induced production shortages, and strong-arm tactics -- to prevent the delivery of raw material to the plant. The Government press also circulated rumors that Jorge Alessandri (former President

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of Chile and a leading shareholder and board chairman of the Papelera) had made a deal with Allende to give the Government control over the Papelera to weaken the will of private shareholders and their supporters. That the Papelera still withstands these combined pressures a year later is a tribute to a determined defense of the firm by an opposition Congress, to the loyalty of the bulk of the Papelera employees, and to an aroused and alerted opposition media.

The battle for control of the Papelera will continue and the odds are not good for the company. Repeated requests for price increases sufficient to absorb cost increases -- forced on the firm in part by Government economic policies -- were not met, and the firm declared in September 1972 that it could not meet loan payments due to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Finally, in December 1972 the Government authorized new price increases averaging 45 per cent, which were, however, inapplicable to the price of newsprint. The Papelera gains some breathing space but Government pressures on the company are certain to continue. The price increase itself may be viewed as a form of pressure.

The battle has spilled over into the halls of the Chilean Congress. Partly to protect the Papelera's independent status, the PDC sponsored a "three areas" constitutional amendment designed to give Congress some control over which businesses can be incorporated as social property by the Government. (The Papelera is one of the firms appearing on the Government's original list of 91 firms to be absorbed by the Government as social property.) The amendment -- still a bitter bone of contention between the Government and the opposition -- would, among other points, declare null and void CORFO's attempted purchase of Papelera stock in the absence of Congressional approval.¹³

C. University Confrontation and Television Freedoms

Growing opposition confidence fed by an election victory at the University of Chile in April 1972 and by stiffening opposition attitudes at Santiago's Catholic University had important spill-over effects in television programming at two channels run by Catholic University. Increasing opposition effectiveness even raised the possibility that the Marxist-controlled University of Chile channel for the first time in its existence might be obliged to inject some objectivity into its output.

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
Incumbent University of Chile Rector Edgardo Boeninger, an independent with Christian Democratic sympathies, gained 51.9 per cent of the vote for rector in April against three other contenders representing the UP coalition and leftist splinter groups, including the MIR. An independent-PDC state also gained control of the previously Marxist-controlled Superior Normative Council. The victory was billed by the opposition media as another victory for democracy and pluralism over Marxist totalitarianism.¹⁴ In the process Rector Boeninger became a hero of the opposition media and a symbol of "democratic" defiance of Government efforts to impose its will on an independent university. The opposition's rallying cry became "Defend a democratic and pluralist university." Translated into media terms it became "We want a democratic and pluralistic university TV channel."

Rallying behind that slogan, opposition supporters at the two Catholic Universities (Santiago and Valparaíso) began to ease out leftist influence in the news departments of the two university channels. UP supporters, however, remain at the technician level at the Santiago channel and can be expected to create problems for their opponents. Opposition authorities who now control the channel are proceeding cautiously against them.

A more significant indication of UP long-range attitudes toward television freedoms has been the Government's persistent refusal to permit university television stations to extend their networks throughout Chile. In September 1972, President Allende blocked the opposition's most recent attempt to obtain legislative sanction for such an extension by vetoing selected items in a PDC-introduced bill. The Government claimed that its own bill -- pending before Congress and allowing universities to establish stations only within the territory in which the seat of each university is located -- would create a national network for all recognized universities on an "equal and non-discriminatory" basis. What the Government did not say was that the bill if passed would preserve the State Network's position as the only single channel that can be viewed by a national television audience. Presumably the Government bill also would permit the Communist-dominated State Technical University to operate a television station in Santiago in competition with Santiago's Catholic University channel which, according to available public opinion surveys, is viewed by approximately 69 per cent of the capital's audience.¹⁵

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Ercilla
October 5, 1972

**Demonstrators Protest President Allende's Veto of Bill Permitting
University (Santiago) to Extend Its Television (Channel 13) Throughout Chile.**

In subsequent developments, the Catholic University at Santiago as nevertheless extended its television service to the Concepción metropolitan area, third most important in Chile, via a television repeater in Talcahuano. The Government has ordered that the repeater cease operation as the University lacks a concession under 1959 law to function in that area. The University has refused to comply, claiming that the 1970 National Television Act, which authorizes the universities to operate television channels, is the governing statute and that it needs no additional concession to operate in any part of Chile. Meanwhile the repeater is still functioning (as of February 15, 1973) while the legal (and political) debate continues.

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Allende in Retrospect

By Paul E. Sigmund

World attention has moved away from Santiago since the bloody overthrow of Salvador Allende last September, but the questions that were raised at that time still need answering. Where should the primary responsibility be placed for the tragic events on and after September 11, 1973? Was it, as the Left contends, the result of a fascist counterrevolution aided and abetted by the forces of imperialism? Was it, as the Right asserts, the only available response to Allende's attempt to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat by a mixture of guile and force? Did it mark the "death of a dream" of the establishment of socialism by democratic means, and was it thereby one more demonstration that Marxism must use force to accomplish its goals? Were there internal and external political and economic factors which made it impossible for Allende's experiment to succeed, or was the downfall of the *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity) coalition government the consequence of a series of ideologically-influenced analyses and mistaken policy choices which, if they had been different, might have produced another result? A review of the course of the Allende government with the aid of the considerable new material that has become available in recent months may help to answer these questions.

Allende's opponents never tire of pointing out that he was elected with only 36 percent of the vote in a three-way race.¹ What they do not mention is that in the congressional run-off between the two

front-running candidates he was elected president by a lopsided majority vote of 135-35. He received the support of the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in the run-off in return for his agreement to the adoption of a Constitutional Statute of Democratic Guarantees protecting freedoms of expression, education and religion, and guaranteeing the independence of the military from political control. The text of the statute, which was added to the Chilean Constitution shortly after Allende's election, reflected the fears of non-Marxist groups that the new Marxist President would use the considerable power of the Chilean executive to undercut and eventually destroy all opposition to a Marxist takeover.

Political and Economic Strategy

When he took office, Allende promised that he would follow a "second model" of Marxism—the *via Chilena* to socialism, "with meat pies and red wine." To prove that this model was "anticipated by the classics of Marxism," he quoted from Friedrich Engels on the possibility of

... a peaceful evolution from the old society to the new in countries where the representatives of the

¹ Allende's supporters in the Popular Unity coalition consisted of his own Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista—PS*), the Communist Party (*Partido Comunista—PC*), the main body of the Radical Party (*Partido Radical—PR*), the leftist Catholic "Movement of Popular United Action" (*Movimiento de Acción Popular Unido—MAPU*), and two other smaller groups. The largest opposition groups were the centrist Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano—PDC*) and the rightist National Party (*Partido Nacional—PN*).

In retrospect, it is ironic that the Chilean Senate never acted on a constitutional amendment proposed early in 1970 to establish a second-round popular election, which would have provided the President thus elected (probably the right-wing candidate, Jorge Alessandri) with a clear popular mandate.


Mr. Sigmund is Professor of Politics at Princeton University. Among his published works are Models of Political Change in Latin America, 1970, and The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (2nd rev. ed., 1972). He has visited Chile nine times since 1963, most recently in January 1974 to do research on a forthcoming book dealing with Chilean politics.

Allende in Retrospect

*people have all power and in accord with the constitution can do what they desire when they have the majority of the nation behind them.*²

Yet it was precisely the question of majority support that was Allende's central problem in his design to carry out a peaceful transition to "socialism with democracy, pluralism and liberty." The parties in his coalition were in a distinct minority in the Congress, and although there was no doubt about the legitimacy of his election by that body, his victory had only been possible because of the conditional support of the Christian Democrats. The PDC, it should be noted, included both Radomiro Tomic, the party's 1970 presidential candidate, who had gone to Allende's house to congratulate him the day after the popular election, clearly inferring his future support, and conservatives like Senator Juan de Dios Carmona, who had fought within the party to prevent it from voting for Allende in the run-off. In the immediate aftermath of the election the PDC was controlled by the Tomic forces, who claimed to be in favor of "communitarian" socialism, nationalization of copper, acceleration of agrarian reform, and reduction of Chile's *dependencia* on the United States. One way, then, for Allende to achieve his acknowledged goal of majority support for the transition to socialism would have been to try to arrive at an understanding with the Christian Democrats on the points in his program with which they were in agreement. This might have provoked the secession of some of the rightist members of the PDC, but if an accord had been reached with the party's leaders, it would likely have given Allende a majority in the Congress for at least part of his program.

Flushed with victory and unwilling to come to terms with the party which he had termed "the new face of reaction" during the campaign, Allende chose an alternative strategy. The next congressional elections were not scheduled to take place until March 1973, but the Chilean Constitution provided that in the event of a conflict with the Congress over the text of a constitutional amendment, the President could call a national plebiscite. The strategic course adopted by Allende was to attempt to expand popular support for his coalition and then propose a constitutional amendment which, in accordance with the Popular Unity electoral program, would replace the existing bicameral legislature with a unicameral



Salvador Allende speaks of his plans for Chile at the 23rd Congress of the Socialist Party, held in January 1971, three months after his election as President of Chile.

—Photo by Senti Visalli for Photoreporters.

house, to be elected immediately following the approval of the amendment. The Congress would be certain to reject the amendment, but if Allende had the support of a majority in the country, he could win the plebiscite and secure control of the unicameral legislature that would then be established.

Allende's strategy for the expansion of electoral support was an economic one which drew as much from John Maynard Keynes as it did from Karl Marx. The Chilean economy, already operating below capacity, had gone into a profound recession as a result of Allende's election. The response of Pedro Vuskovic, Allende's Minister of Economics, was to "prime the pump" by adopting a deficit budget, increasing public expenditures, and redistributing income by skewing the annual wage readjustment for the preceding year's inflation (35 percent in 1970) in favor of the low-income sector of the population (the lowest income groups received a 40-percent increase). The utilization of unused industrial capacity, combined with strict enforcement of price controls, more stringent collection of taxes, and refusal to devalue the Chilean *escudo* in relation to the dollar, were expected to contain possible inflationary pressures which might result. (The Allende government also had a cushion of nearly \$400 million in foreign reserves left to it by the Frei government as a result of high international prices for copper, Chile's principal export.)

The strategy also contained a Marxist element—

² *El Mercurio* (Santiago), Nov. 6, 1970, p. 23.

accentuation of the class struggle. At the same time that appeals were made to the pocketbooks of the lower-class Chileans, there was also to be an effort to increase their class consciousness (*concientización*) through government publications and the use of the media to remove the elements of "false consciousness" instilled by "bourgeois" propaganda. Expressing the diametric opposite of a claim often voiced by his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, Allende said in a press conference just after his installation, "I am not president of all Chileans." And in his first "State of the Nation" message to the Congress he asserted:


... the People's Government (Gobierno Popular) is inspired in its policy by a premise that is artificially denied by some—the existence of classes and social sectors with antagonistic and opposing interests.⁴

Allende's economic advisers anticipated an additional source of revenue for the government from the "exploitative" profits of the industries that were to be nationalized by the new government. The partially American-owned copper mines were to be taken over by a constitutional amendment—both to lay to rest any legal doubts about the reversal of the Frei-Chileanization agreements of 1967 and 1969, and because a general consensus in Chile favored nationalization.⁵ Other companies were to be nationalized after a controlling interest was gained through the purchase of shares on the open market by the government development agency. The latter course seemed facilitated by the fact that the price of shares had been depressed since the elections, and further economic pressures could be created by allowing wage increases but forbidding any rise in prices. The legal adviser to the government, Eduardo Novoa, also outlined other "legal loopholes" in existing Chilean law which could be used for "temporary" takeovers of companies, including "intervention" because of labor disputes and "requisition" because of a "breakdown in supply of an article of prime necessity."

⁴ Salvador Allende, "The Chilean Way to Socialism," in Paul E. Bismund, Ed., *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, 2nd rev. ed., New York, Praeger, 1972, p. 450.

⁵ Frei's Chileanization program had involved the purchase by the Chilean state of a controlling interest in the large copper mines owned by the Kennecott and Anaconda companies. The agreements had also provided that Chile's payments to the American companies were to be invested in the expansion of copper production and refining in Chile, earning the country additional revenue in the 1970's to pay back the loans contracted to finance the purchases.

The takeover of large sectors of Chile's basic industry and trade, as promised in the Popular Unity program, was thus seen as an essential part of an economic and political strategy aimed at achieving and maintaining power. Combined with a rapid acceleration of agrarian reform (again using existing legislation—the 1967 agrarian reform law—but exploiting provisions such as one authorizing the expropriation of "abandoned or badly-farmed land," with one percent payment in cash and the rest in bonds), the planned takeover meant that even if the effort to create a unicameral left-dominated legislature failed, the Allende government could destroy the economic base of the "capitalist" opposition through a series of "irreversible" *hechos consumados* (hechos consumados) which would give the



A Chilean peasant guards the gate of a farm south of Santiago which was seized from its owners on the pretext that it was "operated unproductively" (*mal explotada*).

—Photo by Miguel Contreras.

Allende in Retrospect

government control of the economy and of the excess profits that the private sector had used for luxury consumption or had sent out of the country as profit remittances to foreign companies. At the same time, the fact that the policy remained within the letter, if not the spirit, of the law meant that intervention by the military was unlikely.

Allende's constitutionalist and legalist strategy was not universally accepted within his coalition. Most of his own Socialist Party—beginning with its newly elected General Secretary, Senator Carlos Altamirano—and several other groups further to the left, such as the MIR (*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and the VOP (*Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo*—Organized Vanguard of the People), were openly doubtful about the wisdom of relying on elections and "bourgeois legality" to achieve power and advised preparation for an armed confrontation with the forces of reaction, which they foresaw as inevitable. Allende's effort to portray the transition to socialism as peaceful in character was not assisted by the publication of his conversations with French revolutionary theorist Régis Debray in early 1971.

In these, Debray declared that "in the last analysis and until further notice, political power comes out of the end of a gun," and Allende repeatedly stated that his differences with apostles of violence like Ché Guevara were only "tactical," because the Chilean situation required that he observe legality "for the time being." Allende himself organized an armed personal bodyguard, the so-called GAP (*Grupo de Amigos Personales*), and—we now know—as early as December 1971 received reports on the illegal importation and distribution of arms to the MIR and to his bodyguards.*

While there were thus intermittent hints of revolutionary alternatives, Allende's basic economic strategy was "socialist consumerism,"* combined with a rapid expansion of state control in industry, trade and agriculture, and his basic political strategy

* See Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende*, New York, Random, 1971, pp. 52, 77, 91, and 97. *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Feb. 18-24, 1974, p. 3, reproduces the report, found in the presidential palace.

* On "socialist consumerism" see Paul E. Sigmund, "Two Years of Popular Unity," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1972, pp. 38-51.



A Santiago rally in November 1970 celebrates the first anniversary of the Allende presidency—in the foreground, a picture of Latin revolutionary Ché Guevara.

—Photo by Claus Meyer for Black Star.

was an expansion of the electoral base of the Allende coalition by an appeal to the material interests and the class consciousness of the lower classes. It was the interaction of the various elements of this political and economic strategy that finally produced the breakdown of Chilean constitutionalism and the intervention of the armed forces that the extreme left of the Allende coalition had been predicting all along.

Initial Success

At the outset, the new economic policy was astoundingly successful, although it had within it the seeds of future disaster. Income redistribution stimulated demand, while price controls and an artificially low exchange rate kept prices down. As a consequence, a mini-boom ensued. By March 1971 the *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril* (Association for the Development of Manufacturing), representing Chilean business and industry, admitted that production had increased by 6.3 percent over the figure of 12 months before, and by May that figure had reached 13.5 percent. The Institute of Economics of the University of Chile later reported that unemployment in the Santiago area dropped from 8.3 percent in December 1970 to 5.2 percent in June 1971 and declined further to an unusually low 3.8 percent by the end of the year. The Consumer Price Index stopped climbing entirely in December 1970 and had only increased by 6 percent by the time of the municipal elections of April 1971—its lowest rise in many years. At the same time, salaries and wages increased by 27 percent in real terms.

This wave of economic prosperity—combined with the absence of the political repression that some rightists had predicted would result from a victory by the Marxists—led many, particularly in low income groups, to vote for the candidates of the Popular Unity coalition in the April municipal elections. Allende's own Socialist Party bettered its electoral showing in the 1969 congressional elections by nearly 100 percent (a jump from 12 percent to 22 percent of the total), and the candidates of all the parties supporting Allende received about 50 percent of the vote, as compared with the 36 percent which the President himself had received only seven months before. Yet, gratifying as the results were, the coalition was still a few votes short of the absolute majority that Allende required to win a plebiscite on a constitutional amendment. He was later criticized for not calling the plebiscite at the time

when the regime's popularity was at its highest point,¹ but in retrospect it does not appear at all certain that he would have won—particularly since by the time that the constitutional prerequisites for such a vote had been fulfilled, the economic and political situation would have been much less favorable.

The period after the municipal elections now appears to have been crucial for the long-term survival of the regime. The Right was still in disarray, the Christian Democrats had elected a compromise leadership which was not committed to either of the party's wings, and the short-run economic and political indicators were favorable. Yet, instead of taking action on the economic front to stem the loss of foreign reserves and to dampen inflationary pressures—and on the political front to prevent the movement of the Christian Democrats into an alliance with the right-wing opposition parties—the regime continued its previous policies, confidently assuming that in the long run "the people" would support it and ignoring the warnings of "bourgeois" economists that the loss of foreign reserves, the expansion of demand, and the sharp decline in investment would produce disastrous consequences in the following year.

Political Polarization

The hardening of the Christian Democratic position began in mid-1971. It was accelerated in June by the assassination of the former Christian Democratic Interior Minister, Edmundo Perez Zujovic, by extremists, at least one of whom had been released from prison by Allende upon his accession to power. A month later in a by-election in Valparaiso, the victorious Christian Democratic candidate received the support of the Right. The tacit alliance with the Right led to the secession from the PDC of eight deputies and a number of other party leaders to form the pro-Allende *Izquierda Cristiana* (Christian Left). This was counterbalanced however, by a split in the other direction within the Allende coalition. Five of the seven Radical senators (including two former presidential candidates) and 7 of the 19 deputies left the Radical Party (PR), and formed the *Partido de la Izquierda Radical* (Party of the Radical Left—PIR) in protest against the Marxist orientation of a

¹ See, e.g., Paul M. Sweezy, "Chile: The Question of Power," *Monthly Review* (New York, London) December 1973, pp. 1-11.

Allende in Retrospect

PR policy resolution which the dissidents described as "completely removed from the characteristic and distinctive ideology of our party" and opposed to "the interest of the middle social strata" whom the party had always represented.* For a time, the PIR continued to support the Allende government, but within a year it had entered the ranks of the opposition.

In July 1971, the Christian Democrats had voted in favor of the constitutional amendment nationalizing the copper mines, but from that point forward, the pattern was one of polarization of Chilean politics and society into two opposing blocks. The Allende forces controlled the executive and pursued an increasingly vigorous ideological purge of those who were not entirely sympathetic to the government. The opposition controlled the legislature, and in October 1971 the Christian Democrats and the rightist parties attempted to assert legislative control over the expansion of the public sector by voting in favor of a constitutional amendment limiting the use of the intervention and requisition procedures and requiring that all transfers of private enterprises to the "social" or mixed sectors be carried out in accordance with specific legislation adopted by the Congress. This legislative act, referred to as an amendment on the "Three Areas of Property," became the focus of a continuing deadlock between the President and Congress that lasted until Allende's overthrow in September 1973.

Allende's refusal to accept the amendment or to call a plebiscite to resolve his differences with the Congress appeared to the congressional opposition to be a decisive indication of his determination to bypass the legislature in carrying out the Popular Unity program, and from the time of the adoption of the amendment onward, the Christian Democrats began to cooperate with the rightist parties in opposing the executive. One method was to impeach ministers for violation or (more often) nonenforcement of the law. The first of many such impeachments took place in January 1972. Another method was to present a united electoral front against the government. Informal cooperation between the rightist parties and the Christian Democrats led to striking victories in two by-elections in January 1972, and a month later these groups formed the Democratic Confederation (*Confederación Democrática—CODE*) to prepare joint lists for the 1973 congressional elections. A third area of cooperation was in


marches and demonstrations against the government, the most famous of which was the March of Empty Pots in December 1971, in which thousands of housewives, mostly of middle-class background, marched, banging pots to protest food shortages.

Those shortages had developed because the predicted economic difficulties resulting from the Vuskovic policy began to emerge in late 1971: The balance-of-payments surplus had been depleted at such an alarming rate (in 1971 there was a deficit of \$315 million, while in 1970 there had been a surplus of \$91 million) that in November 1971 the Allende government called a moratorium on payment of its foreign debts. Chile had already experienced difficulties in securing loans from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank as a result of its failure to compensate the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies for the nationalization of their major mines. The debt moratorium was bound to make it considerably more difficult for Chile to secure foreign credits, particularly for the short term. In December 1971, the Chilean government finally permitted a partial devaluation of the Chilean *escudo* so as to decrease the distortions created by its overvaluation, but this created pressure on prices of goods manufactured with imported components. Shortages of certain food items—especially cooking oil, detergents, sugar, toothpaste, and cigarettes—were ascribed by the government to upper-class hoarding and to increased consumption by low-income groups; however, the dislocations in the countryside associated with the very rapid expansion of the agrarian reform (Allende took over almost as much land in his first year in office as Frei had in six years) clearly had something to do with the problem as well, and the situation could be expected to get worse with the harvest in early 1972. A 100-percent increase in the money supply as a result of the government's deficit spending was also beginning to produce inflationary pressures now that the unused capacity of Chilean industry had been taken up by the 1971 expansion. Most important, a sharp drop in investment (Allende said it had declined by 7.7 percent, but opposition economists claimed it had fallen by 24.2 percent) meant that the spectacular growth rate achieved in 1971 would be sharply reduced in 1972.

Yet the degree of the incipient crisis was not

* On the inaccuracy of the term "invisible blockade" to describe the Allende government's credit problems, see Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1974, pp. 322-40.

* *El Mercurio*, Aug. 8, 1971, p. 37.



Workers occupying a plant outside of Santiago proclaim their intention to hold it to the death. The initials of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) are painted on the wall by the gate.

—Photo by Maggi Costello.

Immediately evident from the figures for 1971. Industrial growth had reached 8.3 percent, agrarian production (based on plantings before Allende's accession to power) had increased by 5.3 percent, and unemployment had dropped to record lows. The Communist Party in a report to a Popular Unity "conclave" in early 1972 warned that "very strong inflationary pressures could make our situation acute," but the government took no action to deal with the problem. The continuing optimism of government policymakers at this time was expressed at a Round Table in Santiago sponsored by the University of Sussex and the Chilean Planning Office in March 1972. In the course of discussion Radoslavo Tomic, the defeated Christian Democratic presidential candidate, asserted that the Allende government had committed a "fatal political error" in failing to establish an "institutional majority" in the Congress through a "far-reaching agreement between socialists inspired by Christianity and those inspired by Marxism—that is, between the Christian Democrats and Popular Unity—in the period following the 1970 presidential election." Allende's representatives con-

fidently replied that "with a gradual heightening of the political consciousness of the proletariat, there seemed to be no obstacles in the internal logic of the Chilean bourgeois state to prevent the workers' winning sufficient strength to gain control of the legislature as well as the executive."¹⁰

On the political front, there were individuals and groups on both sides who attempted to stem the movement toward polarization, which they correctly foresaw would lead to the breakdown of Chilean institutions. Two important efforts to arrive at a compromise on the issue of the constitutional amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" were made in the first part of 1972. In April the Left Radicals, who had entered the Allende government in January, carried on lengthy negotiations with the Christian Democrats to hammer out a satisfactory agreement on this issue, only to have it rejected by the top command of the Popular Unity coalition parties. The Left Radicals responded by leaving the government and joining the opposition, a move Allende described as "a stab in the back."¹¹ A second set of negotiations in June between the head of the Christian Democratic Party and Allende's Minister of Justice broke down when the time limit set by the Christian Democrats expired and the PDC leadership refused to extend it.

The two sets of negotiations seem to have collapsed for related reasons. In April the left wing of the Popular Unity coalition was unwilling to accept a compromise which would slow down or stop the forward movement of the government nationalization program, while in June the right wing of the Christian Democrats could point to an impending by-election in mid-July as a reason for discontinuing discussions. Both cases illustrated a general problem posed by the Chilean multiparty system. Once political conflict became polarized, the extremes held the rest of the opposing coalitions hostage and prevented what could have been a convergence of views in the center.

The negotiations were interspersed with a series of demonstrations and counterdemonstrations by the government and the opposition which always stopped just short of open violence. Several observers, including the American Ambassador to

¹⁰ J. Ann Zammit and Gabriel Palma, Eds., *The Chilean Road to Socialism*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1973, pp. 38, 247. The Communist Party report appears in *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 1972, p. 4.

¹¹ Partido Izquierda Radical, *Trayectoria Política del PIR* (Political Path of the PIR), Santiago, 1972, p. 79.

Allende in Retrospect

Chile, Nathaniel Davis, remarked on the pattern of "brinkmanship" that the Chileans exhibited." Social and political tensions increased—but as long as economic deterioration was not reflected in runaway inflation, the Chilean political system seemed able to contain them.

The Turning Point

The strains in the system only became unmanageable in mid-1972, when the lid blew off the fragile Chilean economy and let loose the pressures that had been building up for at least a year. As the deficit in government spending rose, particularly because of its subsidies to the "social area," its foreign reserves dropped nearly to zero, and the growth of industrial output slowed down. Allende replaced Economics Minister Vuskovic with Carlos Matus and appointed Orlando Millas as Finance Minister. The Matus-Millas team sought to "find stability at another level," ordering a drastic currency devaluation, raising prices in the nationalized sector, and permitting limited agricultural price increases. The result was a sharp jump in the cost-of-living index, which climbed from 27.5 percent at the end of June to 99.8 percent at the end of September. A wage readjustment to compensate for the increase in the cost of living only accelerated the inflation, so that by the end of the year the official consumer price index had reached 163 percent (see Table 1). In September, industrial output began to drop in absolute terms (i.e., not merely in terms of the rate of increase)—a drop that continued every month thereafter until the September 1973 coup.¹¹ Agricultural production (excluding livestock) also commenced to decline, and mineral production registered precipitous drops, although copper production rose by 1.3 percent for 1972 owing to the fact that a number of new mines came into operation. (On other elements of the worsening economic situation, see Table 2.)

Chile's economic problems were paralleled in the

political arena: Several additional ministers were impeached, including the Minister of Interior, who was charged with abetting the illegal importation of arms from Cuba in March. (The Allende government claimed that suspect shipments from Cuba—"bultos Cubanos"—were "works of art," but after the September 1973 coup, the government White House published an inventory of over 2,000 pounds of arms sent from Cuba in 13 crates which customs

Table 1: Monthly Fluctuations in Consumer Prices and Industrial Output under Allende

	Month	Consumer Price Index	Industrial Output*
1970	Oct.	35.6	-8.0
	Nov.	35.3	4.3
	Dec.	34.9	-0.3
1971	Jan.	28.1	-4.5
	Feb.	22.8	-7.3
	March	20.1	6.3
	April	20.2	1.6
	May	21.0	13.5
	June	21.1	10.7
	July	19.1	6.7
	Aug.	17.4	10.7
	Sept.	15.6	25.5
	Oct.	16.5	22.6
	Nov.	18.8	22.1
	Dec.	22.1	19.5
1972	Jan.	24.8	18.5
	Feb.	32.0	11.9
	March	34.0	10.2
	April	38.1	12.6
	May	40.0	11.4
	June	40.1	2.5
	July	45.9	5.0
	Aug.	77.2	3.6
	Sept.	114.3	-7.8
	Oct.	142.9	-7.7
	Nov.	149.9	-8.1
	Dec.	163.4	-11.1
1973	Jan.	180.3	-6.8
	Feb.	174.1	-4.7
	March	183.3	-2.8
	April	195.5	-11.3
	May	233.5	-11.0
	June	283.4	-14.8
	July	323.2	-10.7
	Aug.	303.6	-11.9
	Sept.	286.0	-22.9
	Oct.	528.4	18.0
	Nov.	528.9	5.1

*Percentage of change from the same month of the previous year.

SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (National Institute of Statistics), Santiago; Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (Association for the Development of Manufacturing), Santiago.

¹¹ A secret cable from US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis to the State Department, published in Jack Anderson's column in *The Washington Post* (Washington, DC) on March 28, 1972, commented that "the Chileans have a great ability to rush to the brink, embrace each other, and back off." On the same point see Mauricio Solari and Fernando Cepeda, *Allende's Chile: On the Politics of Brinkmanship*, Bogotá, Universidad de los Andes, 1972.

¹² The Allende government blamed the drop in production on the October 1972 strike, but this ignored the fact that production declines began before October.

Table 2: Some Indices of the Chilean Economy, 1970-72

	1970	1971	1972
Gross domestic product (% change)	3.7	8.3	1.4
Investment (% change)	8.6	-24.2	-8.5
Real wages and salaries (% change)	13.0	30.0	-9.0
Exports (\$ million)	1129	1045	853
Imports (\$ million)	1020	1124	1287

SOURCE: Department of Economics, University of Chile.

had been forbidden to inspect.") The judiciary joined in the conflict, protesting the failure of the Ministry of Justice to carry out court orders, while progovernment demonstrators denounced the *viejos de mierda*—"filthy old men"—in the Supreme Court. As it became apparent that there was no real possibility of resolving their differences, the two sides turned to the armed forces as impartial arbiters, and the national holidays in mid-September 1972 were marked by rival efforts of the Congress and the President to ingratiate themselves with the military.

The political involvement of the military was accelerated by the next step in the Chilean tragedy—the October 1972 strike. Respectively termed the "employers' lockout" and "the national strike" by pro- and anti-Allende forces, it began far from Santiago, in the remote southern province of Aysen, with a strike by small truckers. (Referred to by the government press as the "truck-owners," the membership of the truckers' *gremio*—guild—was almost entirely composed of owners of one or two trucks who feared an announced plan to establish a state trucking agency which would have had priority access to new trucks and spare parts). The strike quickly spread across the nation, as the truckers were joined by bus and taxi drivers, shopkeepers, doctors, nurses, dentists, airline pilots, engineers and part of the peasantry. The Christian Democrats and the rightist parties supported the strikers, and the work stoppage dragged on for over a month resulting in an estimated loss of \$150-200 million in production. Agriculture was particularly hard hit because the strike took place in the midst of the planting season; indeed, there is no doubt that part, though not all, of the 25-percent drop in the 1973 harvest was the consequence of the strike. Industry

was not as adversely affected, since workers attempted to keep factories going despite management's efforts to cease production—and the October strike saw the emergency of "Industrial Belts" (*Cordones*) and "Communal Commands," which seemed to embody the type of spontaneous "popular power" that leftist theorists had spoken of as the basis of a genuine revolutionary class consciousness to replace the materialistic "economism" that had characterized Chilean workers until this time." When the workers seized closed factories, the plants were usually "intervened" by the government, so that an important result of the October strike was a considerable expansion of the government-controlled sector of industry and trade.


The most important outcome of the strike, however, was the direct involvement of the military in the Allende cabinet. A condition of the settlement of the strike was that the military take over key cabinet posts. This resulted most notably in the assignment of the Ministry of the Interior to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Carlos Prats, so as to assure that the congressional elections scheduled for March 1973 would be carried on freely and impartially.

The involvement of the military and the preparations for the March elections brought about a lull in the escalation of political conflict in Chile. Inevi-

¹⁰ The *Cordones* were more or less spontaneously organized committees of workers from seized factories which coordinated production and distribution in a given industrial area. The Communal Commands (*Comandos Comunales*) were organized by the *Cordones* to mobilize the local population in the surrounding area. They included representatives of neighborhood committees (*juntas de vecinos*), mothers' groups (*centros de madres*), price control and distribution committees (*juntas de abastecimiento y precios*), and other groups. On the persistence of worker "economism," see James Petras, "Chile: Nationalization, Socioeconomic Change and Popular Participation," *Studies in Comparative International Development* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), Spring 1973, pp. 24-51, also available in James Petras, Ed., *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution*, New York, Wiley, 1973, Chap. 2.

¹¹ *Secretaría General del Gobierno, Libro Blanco (White Book)*, Santiago, 1973, pp. 103-08.

Allende in Retrospect



Symptomatic of leftist attacks on Chilean institutions, a Santiago wall poster denounces the country's Supreme Court as "Protectors of Fascist Sedition."

—Photo by Juan de Onis for The New York Times.

tably, however, it also produced political divisions within the military itself, which had hitherto been relatively aloof from the process of polarization. It was soon apparent, for instance, that General Prats was willing to give the government the benefit of the doubt in nearly every instance that its decisions or actions were challenged. Conversely, the Navy was noticeably less enthusiastic, and in January Admiral Ismael Huerta resigned from the cabinet over plans for the initiation of what he took to be a food-rationing system. It is now also known that the first plans for a possible coup were made by intermediate-level officers at the end of 1972.¹⁴

Food distribution became a critical issue as the black market continued to expand, with much of Chile's agricultural production going into illegal channels because of the government's refusal to increase the official prices paid for agricultural produce. The result was, in effect, two separate price systems—a subsidized, state-owned distribution system oriented primarily toward the low-income groups and a flourishing black market aimed at middle- and upper-income groups. The expansion


of the covers of government-appointed Supply and Distribution Committees (JAPs) to deal with the black-market problem led the opposition to charge political manipulation of food distribution; nonetheless, the government seemed powerless to combat black-market operations.

The March 1973 Elections

The congressional elections in March did not resolve anything. Chile's right-wing parties had hoped that food shortages and economic difficulties would produce a two-thirds majority against the government, which might in turn permit the impeachment of the President, but the results, while showing an anti-government majority of 56 percent, gave the Allende regime 44 percent—a larger vote than most observers had predicted. The opposition pointed out that the vote of the pro-government forces had declined from the 50 percent they had registered in the 1971 municipal elections, while the government compared its 44 percent with the 35 percent that Allende had received in 1970. In fact, the only proper basis for comparison was the

¹⁴ The New York Times (New York), Sept. 27, 1973.

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Apprehensive middle-class homeowners man a watchtower along a security wall built around their Santiago neighborhood; a Socialist slogan on the outside of the wall counters with "We Will Win."

-Photo by Santi Visalli for Photoreports.

1969 congressional elections. On that basis, the leftist parties had suffered a slight loss in votes but had achieved a slight gain in seats. Certain oppositionists later argued that the Left would have suffered much greater losses had it not been for a government-assisted electoral fraud involving some 200,000-300,000 votes, but the statistics presented in support of the argument are unconvincing."

While the government's interpretation of the elections as proof that it was expanding its popular support was not accurate, the election results indicated that at least it had not lost popularity as rapidly as previous governments faced with similar economic reverses. Despite a wage readjustment in October, real wages had declined 7 percent in 1972, and raging inflation continued to consume the wage increase in early 1973. However, the combination of discriminatory distribution of government-produced goods and appeals to class consciousness seemed to

have stemmed the erosion of support, at least among the masses of the poor.

Unfortunately for the government's longer-range interests, the deliberate accentuation of class consciousness had an opposite effect on the middle class, driving middle-class areas to organize themselves into "Neighborhood Committees" to defend themselves. It also, for the first time, led many to arm themselves for a possible confrontation, which seemed more likely now that the safety valve of an impending election was no longer present. A government proposal to limit full wage readjustments to those making less than three times the minimum wage did nothing to reassure the hostile middle-income groups.

Before the elections, it had been rumored that there might be another attempt in March at an accommodation between the regime and the opposition forces, possibly under the auspices of the military. Any possible accord of this type was quickly prevented by the publication, two days after the elections, of a government decree calling for the initiation in June of a single national unified school system, which would follow a common curriculum including compulsory courses in socialism and work

"The report of the Investigating Committee of the Catholic University of Chile, reproduced in the Libro Blanco, pp. 220-33. The statistics on new voters in 1973 omit the 21-to-24 year-old group who would have been too young to vote in 1970. They comprised almost exactly the number of "fraudulent" voters estimated in the report.

Allende in Retrospect

periods in factories. The ensuing uproar involved the Catholic Church for the first time in formal opposition to the government and mobilized thousands of secondary school students in violent demonstrations in downtown Santiago. Stories of fierce arguments over the school proposals among the top military officers (the military had left the cabinet after the elections) filtered into the national press, and a military delegation held a formal meeting with the Education Ministry to express their opposition. The controversy subsided only when the government announced that the proposal had been postponed, *preventing* further discussion.

Within the government, the debate continued on whether to "consolidate in order to advance" (the Communist position) or to "advance without compromise" (the Socialist stance). One indication of how the debate was resolved was the decision by the government to use a constitutionally-authorized "decree of insistence" allowing the cabinet to override the rulings of the Controller General of Chile, Hector Hurtado, who had disallowed the requisitioning of *some* of the factories taken over during the October 1972 strike. Conflicts also continued with the judiciary over the executive's refusal to obey court orders to return seized properties. On May 26, the Supreme Court sent a public letter to the President denouncing

... the illegal attitude of the administration ... [its] open and continual rebellion against judicial orders ... which signifies a crisis of the rule of law [and] the imminent breakdown of the juridical structure of the country.¹⁴

The stalemate between the executive and the Congress over the constitutional amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" was compounded when the Constitutional Tribunal refused to take jurisdiction over the disputed question of whether, in the absence of a plebiscite, the Congress could override the President's item vetoes by a majority or by a two-thirds vote.¹⁵ A second constitutional conflict along the same lines developed when the opposition majority in Congress voted in favor of an amendment to give farms under 40 hectares (about 100 acres) in size an absolute guarantee against expropriation

and to compel the distribution of land in the "reformed" sector to the peasantry after a transitional period of two years. (The government had once again used a loophole in the 1967 law to postpone indefinitely the distribution of expropriated land by individual title.)

In May the official price index jumped 20 percent, indicating that the inflation was moving into a new hyperinflationary stage. The one effort that the government had made to hold the line—its refusal to grant a full cost-of-living wage increase to the El Teniente copper miners on the grounds that under their contract they had already received partial cost-of-living increases—led to a bruising two-and-a-half month strike, which included a miners' march on Santiago, mass rallies, and simultaneous one-day general strikes for and against the government in mid-June. By that time, Allende was once more ready to resort to military involvement in the cabinet to restore social peace.

Last Stage—Decline and Fall

On June 29, the last act of the Chilean tragedy began with an abortive revolt by the Second Armored Regiment in Santiago. Apparently, several army units had been in contact with *Patria y Libertad*, a right-wing political organization, and had planned to seize President Allende at his residence and to occupy the presidential palace. The revolt was canceled one day before it was to occur, but when one of the officers of the Second Armored Regiment was arrested and held in the Defense Ministry, the Regiment decided to free him and in the process to seize the presidential palace as originally planned. General Prats, the Army Commander, used the other military units in Santiago to put down the revolt in a few hours—most of which were spent in negotiation rather than shooting—but not before President Allende had gone on the air to urge "the people" to take over all industries and enterprises as a response to the uprising of "a small group of rebellious military men." The Central Labor Federation also urged the workers to occupy the factories, and in one day the number of companies taken over by the government rose from 282 to 526. The "Industrial Belts" that had sprung up at the time of the October strike now achieved new importance. The spread of "people's power (*poder popular*)" had been seen by Allende as a deterrent to a possible future coup, but it created many additional problems for the

¹⁴ Libro Blanco, p. 215.

¹⁵ The term "item veto" reflects the fact that the Chilean president, unlike his US counterpart, can veto or even rewrite individual sections of proposed laws.



Workers in hardhats and bearing pitchforks march in Santiago in support of the Allende administration during brief nationwide strikes by pro- and anti-Marxist elements in mid-June 1973.

—Wide World Photos

government. Production declined sharply after the takeovers, the opposition got fresh fuel for its claim that the expansion of state control of industry was being carried out through extralegal channels, and "water popular"—as expressed in the worker occupations—appeared to some extent to pose a possible threat of an alternative to the power of the central government.

After the June 29 revolt, Allende made new efforts to secure military involvement in the government, but his negotiations with the armed forces were unsuccessful.²² Instead, they embarked on a policy of vigorous enforcement of the Arms Control Law, a measure which had been adopted in October 1972 but only sporadically enforced thereafter. This law authorized any military or police commanders to carry out arms searches if there was "a presumption of the clandestine existence of illegal firearms."²³ The right-wing *Patria y Libertad* organization had now announced publicly that it was going under-

ground in an attempt to overthrow the government by force, and military intelligence was also aware of the initiation of arms training by all the government parties, even the centrist Radicals.²⁴ In the course of their crackdown, the military found arms caches in factories in Santiago and Concepción, and the killing of a worker in one such arms raid provoked protests from the leftist parties.

At this point, the Chilean Communist Party and the Catholic Church both concluded independently that the only solution to the impasse in Chile was one more attempt at an agreement between the Allende government parties and the Christian Democrats. The Communists initiated a campaign against civil war almost simultaneously with a statement by the Chilean hierarchy calling for a renewal of dialogue. Probably in response to these pressures on both sides, two lengthy discussions took place on July 31 between UP and PDC representatives. Both Allende and the Christian Democrats agreed on the necessity of enforcement of the Arms Control Law, but disagreement continued on the constitutional reforms. Allende offered to sign the amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" in return for a constitutional amendment specifying that the Congress could only override presidential vetoes of constitutional amendments by a two-thirds vote. He also proposed the establishment of joint committees to work out further agreements. However, the Christian Democrats denounced these proposals as "dilatatory" and broke off the negotiations.


A few days before the dialogue was initiated, the truckers began another strike, which was to last from July 25 until the coup on September 11. As in October, the truckers were joined by the other *gremios*. Coming at a time when the 12-month inflation rate, fueled by massive government budget deficits and subsidies to the nationalized industries and agriculture, had reached 323 percent—and in a situation where inventories had not yet been built up from the October strike—the truckers' action created much more serious problems for the government than the earlier strike. This new crisis once again raised the question of military participation in the cabinet, and General Prats persuaded his fellow commanders that it was their patriotic duty to re-enter the cabinet in order to settle the strike.

²² The clearest accounts of these negotiations appear in Ercilla (Santiago), July 11-17, 1973, pp. 7-10.

²³ Law No. 17,798, *Oficio Oficial* (Santiago), Oct. 21, 1972. By a sure sign the law had come to Allende's desk in the midst of the October strike, and since it had the strong support of the armed forces, he was compelled to sign it despite the opposition of the Communist Party and the MIR.

²⁴ Allende's personal bodyguard had organized courses in arms training at his vacation house outside of Santiago. The MAPU began arms training in December 1972, and the Radicals did so in July 1973. The armed forces were aware of this at least by the end of July. See documents in *Libro Blanco*, pp. 43-45, 192-93, 196-200.

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Trucks stand idle outside Valparaiso, Chile on September 8, 1973, the 44th day of a paralyzing transportation strike.

—UPI.

On August 9 Allende swore in what he called a "national security cabinet," with General Prats as Defense Minister, Air Force Commander César Ruiz as Minister of Transport (the ministry which would deal with the striking truckers), and the heads of the Navy and of the National Police in other cabinet posts.

Almost coincident with the entrance of the military into the cabinet, the naval establishment became involved in a serious conflict with the left wing of the Allende coalition. On August 7, the naval intelligence arm announced the discovery of a plot to carry out an enlisted men's revolt on August 11 in Valparaiso and Concepción. The announcement accused PS Secretary General Carlos Altamirano, MAPU leader Oscar Garretón, and Miguel Enríquez, head of the MIR, of being the "intellectual authors" of the revolt and demanded the lifting of the congressional immunity of the first two, who sat respectively in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Two days before the September coup, Altamirano admitted that he had encouraged navymen to resist their coup-minded (*golpista*) officers."

This attempt to subvert the hierarchy of a service command from below was combined with maneuvers

** It was an indication of the continuing press freedom in Chile that newsstands in downtown Chile at this time contained a left-wing publication headlined, "Soldiers, Disobey Your Officers," and a magazine of the extreme Right with the headlines, "The Right of Rebellion," "Rebellion and its Goals," and "Resistance to the Tyrant."

by Allende to replace officers unsympathetic to him. When General Ruiz resigned his cabinet post on August 17 in protest against his lack of sufficient power to settle the strike, Allende compelled him to add that his departure from the cabinet "implicitly" carried with it his retirement as Air Force Commander. This was correctly seen as an Allende tactic to remove an officer opposed to him, and it met serious resistance from within the Air Force, provoking a series of actions which ultimately led directly to the September 11 coup.

On August 20, top Air Force officers met to decide whether to resist Allende's action. By evening, Ruiz had persuaded them to accept it on the condition that Allende appoint the second-ranking officer, General Gustavo Leigh, as Air Force Commander and name another Air Force general to the cabinet (so that Allende could not repeat the same maneuver with Leigh). The next night the wives of high-ranking military officers, including those of six generals, gathered in front of General Prats' house to present a letter asking for his resignation. When the demonstration was broken up by police tear gas, it provoked such dissension in the armed forces that on the following day General Prats decided to resign both as Defense Minister and Army Commander. He was joined by two other generals who, with Prats, had led the military forces that had quelled the tank-regiment revolt in June.

The resignation of what appeared to be the last defenders of Allende in the army now meant that all three services were opposed to the President. It coincided with the adoption on the same day of a "sense of the house" (*acuerdo*) resolution by the Chamber of Deputies directed at the President and the military ministers, drawing their attention to "the serious breakdown of the constitutional and legal order." The resolution criticized the Allende government for repeatedly bypassing the legislature through the use of legal loopholes and for refusing to promulgate the constitutional reforms voted by the Congress. It accused Allende of ignoring judicial orders, encouraging illegal seizure of property, persecuting opposition labor groups, and supporting illegal paramilitary organizations. In conclusion, it stated that the listed actions constituted a "serious breakdown of the constitutional and legal order of the Republic" and urged the military ministers to "put an end to the *de facto* situations listed above which violate the Constitution and the law" or be

** Libro Blanco, pp. 239-42.

guilty of "compromising the national and professional character of the armed forces."

In its original form, the resolution had declared the Allende government to be illegitimate, but the *acuerdo* had later been softened in order to secure the support of the Christian Democrats. Yet its effect was still to give a congressional green light to the military, and Allende immediately so interpreted it. He replied to the motion by accusing the Congress of "promoting a *coup d'état* by asking the military forces to make governmental judgments independently of the authority and direction of the President"; he also pointed out that according to the Constitution the only way that the Congress could decide on the legality of the President's conduct of his office was through impeachment by a two-thirds vote.²¹

The congressional vote was echoed by several professional associations. The Medical Association called on their "colleague" Allende to resign—a request that was echoed by the Federation of Professionals (CUPROCH)—and resignation petitions were circulated in Santiago. The Lawyers' Association issued a declaration which—"without attributing a malevolent intention" to the President—asserted an "incompatibility between the institutional framework within which he is supposed to exercise his office and the actions which he feels obliged to carry out in his program." Arguing that Allende "would appear to be incapacitated (*impedido*) in the exercise of his functions as he understands them," the statement suggested that he could be removed from office under Article 43 of the Constitution, which authorizes the Congress to declare presidential incapacity.²²

The Coup

Exactly when the decision to carry out the coup was made is not yet certain, but it evidently was reached in the days following Prats' resignation. The armed forces had contingency plans for the control of vital points throughout the country in case of any emergency, and it only required a signal to

²¹ *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Aug. 20-26, 1973, p. 5. The members of the Christian Democratic Party told the *New York Times* that "neither we nor the armed forces favor anything but a democratic solution to Chile's political crisis" but emphasized that the only way to avoid a breakdown of the Constitution was the appointment of military men in at least six cabinet posts, as well as in undersecretary positions and as heads of the chief governmental agencies. *The New York Times*, Aug. 27, 1973, p. 12.

²² *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Aug. 26-Sept. 1, 1973, p. 7.

put them into operation, hence the actual seizure of control required little preparation.

After the resignations of the third week of August, Allende restructured his cabinet without the top military commanders but still retained representatives of the armed forces in ministerial posts. Over the opposition of other PS leaders, he appointed as Minister of the Interior his Socialist colleague Carlos Briones, who was known to be interested in another attempt at accommodation with the Christian Democrats. The president also canceled a projected trip to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Algiers. The government and the opposition again staged rival demonstrations in connection with the third anniversary of the 1970 presidential elections.

On the weekend before the coup, the Christian Democrats called all provincial party leaders to a meeting at which a proposal was adopted for the simultaneous resignation of the Congress and the President and for new elections to resolve the con-



Gen. Carlos Prats, then Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army and Minister of Defense, leaves the President Palace on August 15, 1973, after a conference on the transport crisis.

Allende in Retrospect



Salvador Allende hurries through the corridors of the Presidential Palace with his personal bodyguard on the morning of September 11, 1973, shortly before taking his own life during the military coup d'état.

—Photo by The New York Times.

flict between the executive and legislative branches. During the same weekend, Allende met with the leaders of his Popular Unity coalition and called for the holding of a plebiscite on his conduct of office. Although this step was reportedly opposed by the Socialists, Briones subsequently asserted that Allende planned to announce the plebiscite in a radio address at noon on the day of the coup.²⁷

Meantime, after a stormy session with Allende on September 7, the military commanders proceeded on Sunday, September 9, to draft the text of the *pronunciamiento* issued on September 11. They did not secure the agreement of the National Police until early on the morning of the coup itself, and only after the fourth-ranking officer in seniority had taken over the position of police commander.²⁸

On September 10, Navy units set sail from Valparaiso for previously scheduled maneuvers, but that evening they returned to port and by early morning of the 11th had seized control of that city. Concepción, the third-ranking city in Chile and a

known center of leftist activism, was taken over without a hitch. Santiago required a few hours longer.

To justify their action, the military commanders broadcast a communiqué to the nation. While admitting that the Allende government had initially come to power by legal means, they announced that it had "fallen into flagrant illegitimacy" by violating fundamental rights, by "artificially fomenting the class struggle," by refusing to implement the decisions of the Congress, the judiciary and the Controller-General, by causing a critical decline in agricultural, commercial and industrial activity in the country, and by bringing about a state of inflation and anarchy which "threaten the internal and external security of the country." The coup leaders concluded:

*These reasons are sufficient in the light of classical doctrine . . . to justify our intervention to depose a government which is illegitimate, immoral, and unrepresentative of the overwhelming sentiment of the nation.*²⁹

At 9:30 a.m., when it was apparent that no one but the GAP, his personal bodyguard, was ready to defend him, Allende broadcast his last message to

²⁷ Information from the author's personal interviews with Fabricio Aylwin, Jan. 11, 1974, and Carlos Briones, Jan. 14, 1974.

²⁸ Accounts of pre-coup military activities appear in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Sept. 17, 1973; *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Sept. 25, 1973; *Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 19, 1973; and Robert Moss, "Chile's Coup and After," *Encounter* (London), March 1974, pp. 72-80.

²⁹ *Libro Blanco*, pp. 248-49.

the Chilean people over the single pre-Allende radio station that had not yet been shut down by the military. He began:

This is surely the last time that I will be able to speak to you. . . . My words are not spoken in bitterness but disappointment. In the face of these events I can only say to the workers, "I am not going to resign." At this historic juncture I will pay with my life for the loyalty of the people.

Blaming "foreign capital, imperialism, and reaction" for persuading the armed forces to break with their tradition, he said:

History will judge them. . . . My voice will no longer come to you, but it does not matter. You will continue to hear it; it will always be among you. At the least, you will remember me as an honorable man who was loyal to the revolution.¹⁰

At 11:00 a.m., the coup leaders permitted those who wished to do so to leave the building, and—except for his personal secretary—all the women, including Allende's pregnant daughter, left. The military also offered the President and his family safe conduct out of the country if he would surrender. Allende rejected the offer. The Air Force then sent in Hawker Hunter bombers, which repeatedly hit the palace with rockets and set fire to large portions of it. Finally, shortly after 1:30 p.m., Allende decided to discontinue the resistance, and the members who had been with him left the building in single file, led by the secretary carrying a white flag. Allende stayed behind and, sitting on a sofa in a reception room on the second floor, put two bullets into his head. The automatic rifle that he used was a gift from Fidel Castro.¹¹

Conclusions

Since the coup, comments in the world press representing widely divergent political postures have cited the Chilean case as proof that the hope of achieving Marxist socialism through democratic means is a vain one. Yet most people have failed to note two fundamental errors of the Allende policy, neither of which was essentially related to the attempt to establish democratic socialism:

(1) As noted at the outset, the very quotation from Engels that Allende cited at the beginning of his

administration to justify his course states as a prerequisite "the support of the majority of the people." Allende acted as if he had that support; but even at the highest point of his popularity in the April 1971 elections, he never achieved it. Moreover, his policy of deliberate class polarization, aimed at expanding his electoral base, was more successful in pitting professional and middle-class groups against him than in widening his support among workers, peasants and low-income groups.

2) Marxist economists and policymakers have always placed primary emphasis on investment and the expansion of the productive capacity of the economy. By contrast, the Allende policymakers emphasized increases in consumption and combined this with a headlong rush to take over industry and agriculture—a course far removed from the "two steps forward, one step back" of Lenin. The consequences of these policies after their deceptive initial success were massive government deficits, runaway inflation, and a near-breakdown of the economy. (The argument that Allende's economic problems were the result of a shortage of foreign credit does not really hold water, since they were caused by policies initiated before the foreign squeeze and since, in any event, Allende's regime managed to secure enough foreign credits from Latin American, European, Soviet and Chinese sources to increase the Chilean foreign debt from \$2.6 billion to \$3.4 billion in less than three years. Much of the new indebtedness was to Western Europe and other Latin American countries. Surprisingly, Chile's debt to the USSR, China and Eastern Europe increased only from \$9 million to \$40 million between 1970 and 1973.)¹²

¹⁰ Translated from the transcript of the tape recording of the speech published in Ricardo Boizard, *El Último Día de Allende* (The Last Day of Allende), Santiago, Editorial de Pacífico, 1973, pp. 53-55.

¹¹ On Allende's suicide, see the medical report in *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 1973, pp. 1 and 7. The eyewitness testimony of one of the President's personal physicians, who entered the room immediately thereafter, is published in *Ercilla*, Jan. 28, 1974 pp. 10-13. Allende's widow has asserted that witnesses told her they had seen bullet wounds in his chest and stomach. A supposed account by a personal bodyguard circulated in Mexico and elsewhere describing his murder contains numerous factual errors and describes events which could not have taken place because of the physical design of the building. On this and many other myths of Left and Right concerning the overthrow of Allende, see Paul E. Sigmund, "Allende through the Myths," *Worldview* (New York) April 1974 pp. 16-21.

¹² Secretaría, Comité Interamericano de la Alianza para el Progreso (CIAP), *El Esfuerzo Interno y las Necesidades de Financiamiento Externo para el Desarrollo de Chile* (Domestic Efforts and the Needs for External Financing for the Development of Chile), Washington, DC, 1974, p. v-9.

Allende in Retrospect

Specific aspects of the Chilean system also made the Allende experiment a particularly difficult one. He was able to come to power in the first place because of Chile's deeply-rooted commitment to the democratic system and because the Marxist parties were able to mobilize a part of the proletariat and the peasantry, and he had at his disposal many instruments for state control of the economy which had been developed by previous administrations since the 1930's. However, he was required to operate within an institutional system which included frequent and staggered elections, proportional representation, and a multiparty system which made majority rule very difficult and often gave veto powers to the extremes of Right and Left. The economy had been characterized for nearly a century by a chronic tendency to inflation, and successive governments had consistently ignored agriculture in the interest of securing urban electoral support. The most important systemic constraint of all, of course, was the existence of a professionalized and institutionally-loyal military which was unresponsive to the ideological blandishments of the Left.²³

The immediate causes of the military intervention are apparent from the preceding account. In the last part of 1972, the military were drawn into Chilean politics by both sides and became as polarized as the rest of Chilean society—with the overwhelming majority joining the opposition to Allende. The conflict over education in March-April 1973 heightened that polarization just at the time the military were attempting to extricate themselves from political involvement. Then the expansion of arms searches in mid-1973 revealed the extent to which Chile was becoming an armed camp on the verge of civil war. Finally, the efforts to subvert the existing military hierarchy by a combination of leftist activity among enlisted men and presidential maneuvering with promotions and retirements provided the classis scenario for a *coup d'état*.

²³ The Socialists always believed that they could convert the military to their outlook. This is strikingly revealed in Socialist Party documents published in the *Libro Blanco*, pp. 124-30.

One can also relate Allende's difficulties to the inherent contradictions in the Marxist theory to which he appealed. At the same time that he proclaimed his faith in a democratic, pluralist and libertarian transition to socialism, many of his Marxist supporters spoke and acted on the basis of a belief in the inevitability of armed confrontation. With his knowledge, they armed themselves and—what was worse—talked incessantly about revolution. The repeated statements of Régis Debray and others that the observance of the rules of "bourgeois" legality was only a tactic until the balance of forces had improved was hardly likely to persuade doubters of the sincerity of Allende's commitment to democracy. When the importation and distribution of arms was combined with efforts to reorganize education along ideological lines, to subvert military discipline, and to rearrange the hierarchy of command, it is not altogether surprising that the military finally took action.

A positive evaluation of the Allende years would certainly credit him with a sincere effort to raise the living standards of low-income groups and to involve them actively in the determination of their own future. It would likewise stress the continued existence of freedom of expression for all points of view in Chile right up to the coup. A more negative assessment would ask whether the low-income groups in Chile genuinely benefited from an economic policy which after the first half of 1972 produced hyperinflation, a continuous drop in agricultural and industrial production, and a reduction in the real value of wages and salaries. Even more critically, one could inquire who has suffered the most in economic and in human terms as a result of the breakdown of the Chilean system—the Marxist politicians, many of whom were able to escape or go into exile, or the workers, peasants and slum-dwellers they claimed to represent, who are now paying the price of the Allende regime's mistakes in the form of the hardships imposed by sharply reduced consumption and the strictures of draconian military rule.

Western Hemisphere

SOVIET ANALYST, London
15 August 1974

Kremiin's Hand in Allende's Chile

by JAMES THEBERGE

Why did Salvador Allende's revolutionary government end in a bloodbath despite Soviet support and the plaudits of the world's left-wing extremists, who saw in Chile a new path for Socialism's march to power?

James Theberge, who is Director of the Latin American Department of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, shows how Moscow, the "big brother", though eager to exploit this opening in Latin America to the full, disagreed with Allende's headlong methods, and while warning him of the growing economic chaos denied him enough financial aid.

In 1935, Moscow dispatched Eudocio Ravines, a brilliant Peruvian Communist organizer, to Chile to implement the "united front" and "anti-fascist popular front" strategy that had replaced the ultra-left strategy of the Comintern. Since that time the Chilean Communist party generally has followed a strategy of broad alliance and limited aims, although the Cuban revolution led to a radicalisation of party strategy.

The Chilean Communist party, one of the most loyal pro-Soviet parties in Latin America, gave unqualified support to the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. While its fortunes have shifted through the years as a result of domestic and international developments, it unstintingly supported the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy and repeated Moscow's themes of anti-imperialism and class warfare.

The party, at least prior to the military intervention of September, 1973, was the best organized and strongest in Latin America. Between 1956 and 1969 it formed an uneasy alliance for electoral purposes with the Socialist Party, its more militant Marxist rival on the Left. But in 1969 the Communists decided that a much more broadly based alliance of left-wing forces was necessary for the transformation of the country into a socialist state and they played a key role in the founding of the Popular Unity Front (a coalition of six leftist parties) at the end of that year. After the 1970 electoral victory of the Popular Unity Front under Salvador Allende the Communists became the single most influential force within the coalition. It was a far better organized and disciplined participant than its closest rival, the more ideologically unstable and militant Socialist Party.

The ultimate aim of the party did not waver throughout the Allende period. The Communists hoped to be able to take advantage of the weakness of the democratic institutions to install a "dictatorship of the proletariat" under their direction. Their Secretary-General, Eduardo Labarca, made this clear in his *Corralin 27 Horas* (Santiago, Editorial Galaxia, 1972), in which he declared: "For us the path from capital-

ism to Socialism necessarily requires that the proletariat be converted into the leading class, into the determining social force".

The Communist strategy, shared by Salvador Allende and the "moderate" wing of the Socialist Party, was to "overthrow" the bourgeois state and constitution, using the legal device of the plebiscite. In an interview with Régis Debray in 1971 Allende said: "As for the bourgeois state at the present moment, we are seeking to overcome it. To overthrow it!" (Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution, Conversations with Allende*, New York, Random House, 1971 p.82).

Mass mobilisation, infiltration of Chilean institutions and tactical alliances with the opposition were to be employed to generate sufficient popular support. Congress was to be replaced by a "popular assembly" and the existing legal system by "popular tribunals." President Allende's pledge to uphold the "Statute of Guarantees" (designed to commit his government to preserve Chile's democratic freedoms and institutions in exchange for Congressional support) was simply a "tactical necessity" to gain power, as he explained later.

The Chilean Communists and their allies in Moscow were uneasy about the ideological implications of the *via Chilena* as advocated by Salvador Allende (Debray, p.119). The Communist party refused to endorse the *via Chilena* as a uniquely Chilean path to socialism, which implied that it might not necessarily assume the leading role after complete power was gained by the Popular Unity coalition. The Chilean party supported Moscow's doctrine of the *via pacifica*, which accepted free elections and popular pluralism as a short-term tactical device under Chilean conditions but aimed in the long run at installing a Soviet-style Communist dictatorship. The *via pacifica* was not as "pacifist" as the slogan implied: it embraced all forms of class conflict and violence short of armed insurrection and civil war in the process of establishing the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Misleading Image

The *via Chilena* proclaimed by Allende soon after his election was widely misunderstood in the West. The image that was officially propagated was that of a uniquely Chilean path to a new type of Marxist-humanist socialism, where basic liberties, economic pluralism and free elections were respected by all. Western liberals were led to believe that the Allende government was constructing a new Western-European type of democratic socialism in Chile. This image clashed with the reality of Salvador Allende's revolutionary ambition to use Chile's pluralist democracy to destroy it. He seemed to have abandoned the *via Chilena* formula during the last year of his government. Not only did he rarely

employ it in his speeches but the importance of preserving "democracy, pluralism and liberty" was conspicuously absent.

The government's policy was very much to Moscow's liking: seizure of US investments, the espousal of the doctrine of "ideological pluralism" (relations with all states regardless of ideology and internal political character), closer relations with the socialist camp, and the fostering of an "anti-imperialist (anti-US) front in Latin America.

Under the Allende regime, foreign policy was reoriented, and the previously close ties with the United States were replaced by strong political, economic and scientific ties with the "socialist countries," above all with Cuba and the USSR. The first trip of the Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, outside of Latin America was to the USSR and Eastern Europe, in May-June, 1971. President Allende visited Moscow in December, 1972. Strong ideological and personal ties linked the Chilean Communist party leaders with the Soviet party leadership and Salvador Allende with Fidel Castro.

President Allende's description of the USSR as Chile's "big brother" (*hermano mayor*) was no mere figure of speech but reflected the expectation of his government that the USSR would become the most important socialist ally of the revolution and the main economic bulwark of the regime. Moscow did, in fact, become the most important source of socialist camp economic aid and credits to the Popular Unity government, totalling \$620.0 million (\$156.5 million in short-term bank credit and \$463.5 million in project aid and supplier credits) in the 1971-73 period*. The USSR authorised \$260.5 million in credits (\$98.5 million in short-term credit and \$162.0 million in economic aid) to the Allende regime, most of which was never utilised. This was far from the massive help Allende needed. But Moscow was under no illusion that its economic cooperation would decisively influence the immediate prospects for radical social and economic transformation, although it no doubt helped reduce Chile's dependence on the United States.

Soviet influence expanded rapidly as a result of the Chilean Communist party's loyalty to the USSR and the expansion of Soviet-Chilean economic, technical, scientific, cultural, and fisheries cooperation made possible by the victory of the Communist-Socialist regime. But Moscow became increasingly alarmed at the deterioration of the economic situation, the violent clashes of the ultra-left and the ultra-right, and the growing organisation of opposition forces, particularly after the Popular Unity government failed in the March, 1973, elections to obtain the majority electoral support required to transform

*See *Deuda Externa de Chile*, Tomo V, Departamento de Créditos Externos, CORFO, Santiago, 1973, for full details.

the political and economic structure by peaceful, constitutional means.

Nevertheless, Moscow was not willing to provide the massive short-term commodity assistance (such as foodstuffs) or untied convertible currency credits which the regime needed to finance the import of food, spare parts, and machinery to alleviate local shortages. Moscow's \$99.5 million in short-term bank credits was no doubt helpful but paled into insignificance before the need to finance Chile's import requirements, which, for food alone, were running at the rate of about \$700 million a year when the Allende regime collapsed. The Soviet leadership told Chilean Communist and Popular Unity officials that the main effort to improve the economic situation would have to be made by the Allende government. Moscow repeatedly stressed that the Popular Unity government must reverse the calamitous decline in production and productivity to have a chance of winning over a majority of the Chileans to the cause of socialism.

Refusing to give Allende the hard currency credits he needed to improve his worsening chances for survival, Moscow contented itself with organising solidarity meetings at home and abroad in the hope that these demonstrations would "reach the ears of the Chilean people" (Moscow Radio 13 August 1973). Allende's loyal ally and "big brother" was willing to sell Soviet machinery and equipment to him—that is, expand Soviet exports financed by long-term credits—but denied him the short-term hard currency credits he desperately needed.

A combination of circumstances — Moscow's costly entanglement in Cuba, economic difficulties at home, shortages of grain and foreign exchange — led the USSR to eschew massive short-term aid to Chile and to counsel a policy of self-help to the Allende regime — a theme repeated frequently by the Chilean Communist party leadership when referring to Soviet assistance. In the final analysis Moscow watched idly while the *via pacifica* was destroyed by the disastrous economic policies, the circumvention of the laws, and the tacit encouragement of the ultra-left by President Allende and the Popular Unity government.

Moscow pursued a dual strategy in Chile. At the level of state-to-state relations it acted cautiously, adopted a non-interventionist posture, and encouraged anti-Americanism and independence from the United States. Since it realised that the internal balance of forces did not favour the armed struggle, the Popular Unity leadership was urged to maintain internal unity, reject the "provocative and adventurous" overtures of the ultra-left, avoid actions that might provoke a civil war or military intervention, adopt a more rational economic policy, and consolidate the initial gains of the revolution.

At the same time, Moscow did nothing to restrain direct Cuban involvement in the Chilean revolution. Protected by a friendly, Marxist-dominated government and its Marxist President, Cuba transported large quantities of Soviet and Czechoslovak-supplied weapons to the radical left in Chile on the Cuban airline and merchant ships.

It also established a guerrilla training base and coordinating centre in Chile. The large intelligence team in the Cuban Embassy in Santiago maintained liaison with the liberation movement in Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Cuba's Soviet-controlled intelligence service, Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), also had close ties with the Chilean ultra-leftist and other revolutionary exile groups, providing them with training, arms and funds for the armed struggle in Chile and other Latin American countries.

Revolutionaries Trained

Soviet army personnel were directly involved in the training of worker-revolutionaries for urban guerrilla warfare. This occurred during 1972-73 at El Belloto, near Valparaiso, where the USSR had installed a factory for the manufacture of prefabricated housing. The firm (KPD) employed sixteen Russians, four of whom were engineers and technicians; the remaining twelve were Soviet army officers. After working hours, these twelve officers instructed a hard-core of specially-selected worker-revolutionaries in the use of arms, street fighting and urban guerrilla tactics. The Russian-built factory was kept under constant surveillance by Chile's naval intelligence. On the morning of 11 September 1973, naval intelligence arrested the Russians and three days later expelled them from the country*.

This clandestine involvement in training guerrillas in Chile was an exception to Moscow's official line of giving full support to the legal and peaceful path to socialism. But the Soviet leadership operates on the principle that since every eventuality cannot be foreseen it is better to take advance measures which might "contradict" the official line than to be sorry later. In Chile there clearly were some advantages in having some armed revolutionaries under direct Soviet control: Moscow would be able to retain some measure of influence over the ultra-left, particularly important in the event that this faction was able to seize power. As it turned out, Russia's "united front" tactics failed, and the armed struggle was aborted by the Chilean military.

Soviet Industrial Espionage

The Soviet Union made every effort to extract the maximum advantage from its technical assistance programme. It assigned 46 technicians to the nationalised copper industry to help raise productivity, all of whom were engaged in industrial espionage. They were far more interested in gaining first-hand knowledge of the advanced US mining equipment and methods of operation than in assisting Chilean development. Andrey Zauschquevich, executive vice-president of the copper corporation, told me in December 1973 that the specialists during their two-year stay contributed nothing to the improvement of mining operations and were mainly occupied in gathering specifications of American equipment, obtaining information on mining techniques and organization, and collecting data on costs and productivity.

Moscow was also especially interested in fisheries and fishery-related (oceanographic, hydrographic and marine biological research) assistance to Chile. Fisheries aid gave the Russian's access to Chilean ports for its fishing, oceanographic and other vessels.

the Chileans with a Soviet maritime presence. The growing presence in Chilean waters, around the Cape and in sub-Antarctic waters provided a cover for gathering intelligence and oceanographic data of use to the Soviet navy.

The Soviet Union offered to supply \$300 million in military equipment to Allende in 1971, but the military refused the offer and decided to continue to obtain arms from the United States and other Western suppliers. The anti-Communist military were disturbed by the deepening economic and political violence under the Popular Unity government, and were anxious not to weaken their military ties with the United States and Western Europe by turning to the Soviet Union for arms. Moscow had hoped to establish an important precedent for supplying arms to non-Communist countries in Latin America and further weaken Washington's already strained relations with the Latin American military. Despite the coolness of official US-Chilean relations, the United States continued to maintain friendly relations with the Chilean military.

The Kremlin was very much aware of the weakness of the Allende regime. Not only was it a minority government (in 1970, 36% and, in 1973, 43% of the electorate supported the Popular Unity coalition) but the armed forces and powerful national police were strongly anti-Communist. Since the "democratic forces" lacked full political and economic power, Moscow favoured a gradual take-over by the Communists and avoidance of civil war or military confrontation at all costs. Both the ultra-left and ultra-right opponents of Allende were attacked regularly in the Soviet press. But the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), an ultra-left group that pursued the armed path and hoped to defeat the opposition forces in a violent confrontation, was singled out for particularly scathing criticism. It was charged with "revolutionary adventurism", contributing to political instability and harming the prospects of survival of the Popular Unity government.

From mid-1972 onwards, Moscow realised that the opposition to the Allende government was growing and widespread. It was only the shrewd and dilatory personality of Allende—skilled in maintaining a balance between the disruptive forces within his own government—that held together the disintegrating fabric of society. There was Soviet criticism of the irrational economic management, declining agricultural and industrial production, accelerating inflation, and the worsening balance of payments.

Soviet observers advised a slower take-over of the economy, nationalising the large firms first but leaving the smaller and medium-sized firms alone for the time being. In the last months before the military coup they saw the handwriting on the wall and urged a consolidation of the economic gains already achieved, collaboration with the opposition political parties (especially the Christian Democrats), and avoidance of armed conflict.

**Excerpt* (Santiago), 10-16 October 1973, and author's interviews with the Chilean military high command, Dec. 1973.

Collapse of Socialist 'Model'

The Soviet policy vis-a-vis Chile emphasized cooperation in the political field, the forging of an anti-US front with Chile, Peru and Cuba, and expansion of trade and aid relations while refraining from polemics and interfering in Chile's internal affairs (mainly through its influence over the Chilean Communist Party). The Chilean Communists were given moral and material support for widening the base of support of the regime, but it made no difference to the final outcome. The weakness of the Allende regime, its fateful internal contradictions, official connivance in the arming and violence of the ultra-left, the Weimar-type inflation and food shortages, the growing political polarisation and violence, and the fateful alienation of the armed forces were the decisive conditions that triggered the coup d'etat that led to Allende's downfall and replacement by a military junta on 11 September, 1973.

Moscow was deeply disturbed but not especially surprised. TASS admitted on 20 September 1973 that the "Chilean experience was bitter and dramatic," and Fidel Castro declared that he was "very upset by events in Chile" (the new military junta had immediately broken off relations with Havana). Moscow severed diplomatic relations with Santiago and withdrew its ambassador and embassy staff because of alleged persecution of Soviet officials by the junta. After less than a week in power, Chile's new military government began to feel the full blast of Soviet displeasure and frustration, expressed in a well-orchestrated and sustained propaganda campaign aimed at isolating and discrediting the regime.

The Soviet media accused the junta of "persecuting left-wingers with unparalleled cruelty" (Moscow Radio, 13 September 1973). There were reports in Pravda on 26 September that "the streets of Santiago were flowing with blood" and the radio spoke of "tens of thousands of Chilean democrats" killed. Salvador Allende was alternatively reported to have been "murdered in cold

blood" or to have died a hero's death, resisting the rebels to the very end. Allende's residence was alleged to have been "wiped off the face of the earth." The junta was shooting at women and children in an attempt to intimidate the people. On 20 October TASS indignantly blamed the CIA, Chilean "reaction" and "American monopolies" for organising the military coup. And according to a Moscow broadcast even Leonid Brezhnev, not known for his devotion to Western democracy, expressed horror at the "monstrous, completely open violation of a country's constitution, the unceremonious flouting of the democratic traditions of an entire nation."

The overthrow of the Allende government was a bitter but not entirely unexpected setback for Moscow's united front tactics in Latin America, and had adverse repercussions for Marxist parties elsewhere in the West. Communists and Socialists in France and Italy who had earlier pointed to Chile as a model of the peaceful transition to socialism moved to disengage themselves from the Allende disaster. Instead of leading to socialism, united front tactics in Chile ushered in a period of unparalleled political violence, enormous suffering for Chile's workers and middle class, and the worst economic crisis in its history.

Soviet designs for Chile to serve as the vanguard of the anti-US front in Latin America ended in a complete fiasco and left a deep impression on the non-Communist political parties and the armed forces in the region. It reminded them of the grave risks of entering into an alliance with totalitarian parties. Despite protestations to the contrary, Marxist governments are driven inexorably to violate pledges to uphold the constitution, to destroy the private sector of the economy, and ultimately to install a totalitarian dictatorship.

Authoritative statements of the Chilean Communist Party's position under the Allende regime can be found in Labarca's *Corvalan 27 Hays* and Luis Corvalan's *Camino de Victoria*. (Santiago, 1971).

WASHINGTON POST
28 August 1974

Argentine Manager Murdered

BUENOS AIRES—Gunmen killed the labor relations manager of a French-owned auto plant in Cordoba yesterday, and President Maria Estela Peron spoke out against the recent "cowardly and mercenary assassinations" in Argentina.

The extreme leftist Peronist Armed Forces claimed responsibility for the death of IKA Renault official Ricardo Goya, 55, saying it

was "the Peronist workers' answer to the enemies of our class."

A two-month slowdown at the Renault plant climaxed Monday with ouster of leftist leaders of the auto union. Workers battled police last night on the streets of Cordoba.

Mrs. Peron, in her first speech from the palace balcony that her late husband, President Juan D. Peron often used as a rostrum, declared:

"Many people think that because I am a woman I cannot rule... but with this fragile appearance I have committed myself. Her denunciation of the political killings came in a talk earlier with provincial governors.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 August 1974

SPARSE AUDIENCE HEARS MRS. PERON

Only a Few Thousand Attend
Her First Public Rally

By JONATHAN KANDELL
Special to The New York Times

BUENOS AIRES, Aug. 27—Juan Domingo Peron, had drawn scores of thousands of supporters on numerous occasions. The event was marred by the Government's mounting problems with left-wing industrial workers in Cordoba, 430 miles northwest of the capital. Early this morning, unidentified terrorists gunned down the labor relations manager of IKA-Renault, a leading car manufacturer in Cordoba, as he drove to the main plant that only a few thousand regular unionists gathered today to hear Peron's strike. President Isabel Martinez de Peron, in her first public rally executive, Ricardo Goya, 55, since she took office, speak in years old, followed a clash last night between a left wing auto where her late husband, Gen. workers and policemen (lat

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left two trade unionists seriously wounded.

The rally was ostensibly called to publicize the Government's decision last week to nationalize the distribution and sale of petroleum products. Until now, Shell and Esso subsidiaries had shared the local sale of oil products with the State Petroleum Company.

Assertion of Leadership

But Mrs. Perón devoted most of her speech to defend her claim to leadership of the Peronist movement, which has been in growing disarray since General Perón's death on July 1.

"Do not doubt for a moment that Isabel Perón, his widow and disciple, will faithfully follow his doctrine, no matter what the cost," said Mrs. Perón. During the two months she has been in power, she has sought to transform her image from that of a bereaved widow to a forceful chief executive able to guide a nation divided into numerous rightist, leftist and moderate factions.

She has held well-publicized Cabinet meetings and reunions with opposition politicians, Congressmen and military leaders.

Many of her speeches are heavily laced with references to her husband and his second wife, Eva Duarte de Perón, who gathered an enormous personal following before her death in a major public rally to strengthen her image in the face of rising terrorist activity, labor unrest and economic problems.

At times her voice cracked with emotion and she shook her fist, recalling the street in front of the big Government house was filled. The cameras of the television stations— which have recently been brought under state control—focused on trade unionists and avoided photographing the empty stretches.

"I know that many think that because I am a woman, I cannot take over the helm," said Mrs. Perón, still dressed in black since her husband's death. "But I have two arms, and in one hand I have Perón and in the other Eva Perón."

At times her voice cracked with emotion and she shook her fist, recalling the street in front of the big Government house was filled. The cameras of the television stations— which have recently been brought under state control—focused on trade unionists and avoided photographing the empty stretches.

These have been rumors in the last three weeks that conservative Peronist leaders were urging Mrs. Perón to hold a major public rally to strengthen her image in the face of rising terrorist activity, labor unrest and economic problems.

BALTIMORE SUN
28 August 1974

Forecast is cloudy for Bolivia's Banzer

By RICHARD OSBORN

Rio de Janeiro Bureau of The Sun

Rio de Janeiro—Opposition is growing against the continuation in office of President Hugo Banzer of Bolivia. But observers are divided over whether General Banzer will end his tenure legally, through elections promised for next year, or by the usual mechanism for transferring power in Bolivia—the coup d'état.

Last week, General Banzer celebrated the beginning of his fourth year in the presidency by dancing in the streets during a massive celebration of the coup d'état that deposed Gen. Juan José Torres August 21, 1971.

Even as he was celebrating, making speeches about the durability of the Nationalist Popular Front—the civilian-military coalition through which he has governed—the powerful Bolivian Miners' Union declared itself virtually at war with the regime. And the Front apparently was disintegrating.

This week one party in the coalition, the Nationalist Ecolo-

gical Falange demanded immediate elections. The Falange's declaration repudiated immediately by another member party of the Front, a smaller group named after the late president, René Barrientos.

Even as the civilian elements that have supported President Banzer's grudgingly rightwing and intensely anti-Communist regime were falling out, there were reports of dissension within the military.

Although President Banzer received the perfunctory support of the commanders of the armed services during last week's fête, it is evident to resources here, and from reports from Bolivia, that the military is divided over the president and his policies.

It is believed that the younger officers are being alienated increasingly by the president. Specifically, they oppose his refusal to grant amnesty to

these officers who plotted and executed the unsuccessful coup against his government June 5.

A pamphlet was circulated recently to all military units in La Paz, allegedly produced by a group of young officers who have taken inspiration from their counterparts in Portugal who last April led a successful coup against the authoritarian regime there.

The pamphlet read, in part: "Banzer's repression against his own institution [the Army] has persuaded those democratic officers to fight beside campesinos, miners, workers and students. . . ."

After the attempted coup of June 5, many of the officers involved were either jailed or sent into exile to Paraguay and Argentina. According to reports from Argentina, many of these officers have been returning to Bolivia clandestinely.

were urging Mrs. Perón to hold a major public rally to strengthen her image in the face of rising terrorist activity, labor unrest and economic problems.

Despite the poor turnout at today's rally, television announcers remarked that the crowds were "multitudinous." But a commentator in the spoke of "hundreds of thousands" of people on hand. But a walk through the plaza confirmed that only the street in front of the big Government house was filled. The cameras of the television stations— which have recently been brought under state control—focused on trade

unionists and avoided photographing the empty stretches. One of the organizers of the rally asserted that it was successful considering that only two unions—the light and power union and the state petroleum workers—were supposed to attend. But he acknowledged that "Perón would never have addressed so small a crowd."

The chief focus of political unrest in the country has been Córdoba, the second largest city. Last February, a rightwing police coup, apparently backed by General Perón, removed the elected leftwing Peronist governor from power. During the upheaval, rightwing trade unionists also wrested control of the local labor federation from leftists.

Since then, Córdoba has been the scene of repeated incidents of political violence. A few days ago, the Labor Ministry decided to remove legal recognition from the leftist-controlled union at Ika-Ronau—a concern with mixed Argentine and French capital—after labor leaders called a strike in support of higher wages.

The clashes with the police last night resulted when officers moved to dislodge labor leaders from the union headquarters.

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Argentine Left Clings to Hold On University

By Joseph Novitski

Special to The Washington Post

BUENOS AIRES—The tranquility and hallways of the University of Buenos Aires

by a Cultural Revolution Wall newspapers full of

meetings" hang from the high ceilings to the floors. Corners and columns are plastered with posters that urge the defense of the revolution or quote Gen. Juan D. Perón, the Argentine populist leader who died in office as president on July 1.

Outside, people walk past without seeming to notice. But inside, behind the posters, the young people who believed Perón's return to power in Argentina last year meant a giant step toward socialism are trying to add on to their last stronghold the university.

Slowly, but inexorably, the government let behind

university administration and student body. Peronist professors say that President María Estela Perón, the leader's widow and successor, is following a line laid down by Perón: To ease the Marxist left out of the Peronist movement, this means winning back control of the University of Buenos Aires—whose student body of almost 200,000 makes it be far the largest in the country—from the Peronist leftwing.

The university has been a sectarian political battleground for more than a year. Entrance politics, the curriculum, research administration and class structure

The university, an urban campus with old and semi-modern buildings scattered throughout the city, is organized along European lines. Eleven separate faculties, like separate colleges, educate lawyers, doctors, agronomists and liberal professionals. Each gives two years of basic college education. Seven years ago, after a violent university purge by Argentina's military government, many parts of the separate curricula were shaped to American models.

When the Peronists returned to power last May, young leftist leaders loyal to Peron were given the university as their share of the new government. It changed almost overnight.

Entrance examinations were abolished and all high school graduates were offered admission. One year later, 85,000 new students had entered and the enrollment had doubled.

"There are so many people now, it seems that even the rats in the basement take exams," said a fourth-year philosophy student.

Professors with connections to the military government or fore in companies were dismissed. Fourteen were fired from the faculty of economics alone. The university broke off assistance and exchange agreements with the Ford Foundation, the University of California and Rutgers, and opened new programs with universities in Peru, Algeria and Mexico.

Courses of study were changed. Traditional philosophy courses were replaced, in part, by studies of South American politicians and Peron's doctrine. In an introductory architecture

course, a slide show alternates views of a new Sheraton hotel here with pictures of the capital's shantytowns and is followed by a discussion of American imperialism in Argentina.

"Last year we had Samuelson, this year we had Lenin," said a second-year student of economics. "It's really interesting. We learned how Samuelson's book (An Introduction to Economics by Paul A. Samuelson, an introductory text widely used in the United States and some foreign countries) used all those graphs and curves to prove that imperialism was necessary. Oh, not directly, but subtly, you know."

"We took out Samuelson but we did not replace him with Lenin or Marx," Oscar Sbarra Mitre, the 33-year-old dean of the economics faculty, said during an interview. He explained that there is now no single textbook for the two-year introductory course, but rather a reading list with a majority of Latin American authors. Marx—as well as John Maynard Keynes—shows up as an individual theorist, but not at the last word.

The shift from studies designed to produce executives for giant companies to a more populist and national outlook, Sbarra Mitre said, is better exemplified by the course called "History of the Union Movement and Labor Relations," which replaced a course on personnel management.

It was not educational policy, however, but pure politics that turned the university into a left-wing redoubt defying the Peronist government. A basic university law, laying down the rules

for Buenos Aires and the eight other campuses of the national university system, passed congress by a large majority late last year with the support from non-Peronist parties. The law embodied the basic changes that had begun at Buenos Aires.

Meanwhile, a majority faction in the Peronist youth movement backed by two urban guerrilla groups that had fought the military government under Peron's banner, had made the university here their power base. They proclaimed a government program that smacked heartily of Marxism-Leninism and, in effect, challenged Peron for leadership of his movement.

"Look, these people are anything but Peronists," Gen. Peron said last February, when he first began trying to separate his movement's youth wing from the leaders born of the guerrilla movement who call themselves Montoneros.

"Before thinking about getting organized, we've got to think how it can be a true organization and not a sack full of cats who will start showing their claws pretty soon," Peron told leaders of the youth wing. He asked them to reorganize themselves and expel the Marxists. "That's why this purification is necessary," he said.

The purification Peron wanted has been thwarted, in part by government reluctance to drive the whole youth wing into open revolt, and in part by students from the University of Buenos Aires. Twice, since April, they have marched into the streets to protest the appointment of new deans and have forced the government to back down.

A week ago they took over 10 of the 11 faculties in a move to hold onto the temporary university rector, Raul Laguzzi, 32, a professor of pharmacy who is loyal to the Montoneros. And, inside the faculties, it often seems as if one is inside Peron's "sack of cats."

At the medical faculty recently, students who still proclaim loyalty to Peron started playing the Peronist marching song on a loud-speaker system. A faction that stands further to the left put on the Internationale, the Communist hymn, and turned up the volume on their own sound system. The Peronists turned up their volume, and so it went, to ear-shattering levels.

"It isn't bad once you get above the second floor," a professor of neurobiology said.

Slowly the university crisis seems to be heading for some kind of resolution. A week ago, President Maria Estela Peron named a new minister of education. He is expected to name a new rector. Student street demonstrations have been quickly and sharply put down by police. The same demonstrations were tolerated by her late husband.

There have been some hints that the government will try to defuse the crisis by unraveling Peronist politics and the quarrel with the Montoneros from university policies.

"We're waiting to see who the new rector will be," said a young professor. "That should clear up something. In the meantime, if you're thinking of building a house in Argentina, get an old architect."

C. Carl

Western Hemisphere

ENCOUNTER, London
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Allende & the Myth Makers

David Holden

Political Realism & Revolutionary Romance

UNFELING AS IT MAY SEEM to say so when the bloodshed of the Chilean *coup d'état* is still so keenly remembered and the generals who made it are riding unpleasantly high, the fact remains that Salvador Allende died a lucky man. In life he was a failure. Both his policies and his country were shattered long before the end. But in death he achieved success beyond his dreams. Instantly canonised as the Western world's newest left-wing martyr, he became overnight the most potent political cult-figure since his old friend, Che Guevara.

To some extent, of course, the congregation had already been prepared for this posthumous elevation. In the three years of Allende's administration the "Chilean experiment" and the "Chilean road to socialism" had become favourite topics of discussion among left-wing groups in Europe, where Chile's supposed resemblance to Italy or France had encouraged the belief that Europe might, for once, follow in Latin America's footsteps instead of the other way about. Many aspiring revolutionaries from Europe and the United States had actually joined their Latin American counterparts in Chile in much the same spirit as their dropped-out contemporaries had hitch-hiked to Nepal hoping for a glimpse of Paradise in action. By the time of the September *coup* the military junta claimed there were as many as 15,000 foreigners of all kinds in Chile, actively supporting—sometimes with violence—the "socialist revolution."

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These specially interested groups or individuals obviously provided a ready network for international propaganda in the aftermath of Allende's death. But the shocked and, at times, almost hysterical reaction to the *coup* went far beyond such committed parties to embrace many of the West's ordinary liberals and social democrats. For them, as much as for the self-styled revolutionaries, it seemed, a bright light of world-wide hope had been extinguished in Santiago; and from Washington to Rome, via Paris, Bonn and London, anguished cries of "Foul!" rent the air.

Revolt Against the Ballot Box" for which the Chilean armed forces could offer no excuse (*The Guardian*, 12/9/73); as a "Disaster in Chile" that would "set back the cause of socialism and democracy everywhere" (*New Statesman*, 14/9/73); and as "The Death of a Hope" comparable, even, to the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia that ended Alexander Dubcek's régime in 1968 (*The Observer*, 16/9/73).

Within 24 hours of the first, bare news of the *coup* the General-Secretary of the British Labour Party, Mr Ron Hayward, was writing officially to one of Allende's former colleagues to say that it was difficult to express the sense of horror and anger felt by the British Labour movement "as the aspirations of the working people of Chile—shared by so many others around the world—are destroyed at the hands of a few arrogant and ignorant officers acting at the behest of those who believe their right to rule is unchallengeable" (*The Times*, 13/9/73). Mr Len Murray, General-Secretary of the Trades Union Council, expressed his shock and abhorrence with equal speed and vigour. And Mrs Judith Hart, speaking as a member of the Labour Party's National Executive, unleashed a torrent of assertions so passionate as to suggest that her mind had come close to being overthrown with Allende's government. They ranged from the declaration that "the democratic will of the people of Chile" had been defeated by capitalist "collusion" (*The Guardian*, 17/9/73) to "for Socialists of this generation Chile is our Spain" and "This is the most vicious fascism we have seen in generations" (*The Guardian*, 19/9/73).

When the Labour Party Conference met at Blackpool three weeks later these instant reactions had hardened into established orthodoxy. The former Chilean Ambassador in London was given a standing ovation when he became the first non-delegate to address a Party Conference since two Spanish Republicans were allowed to do so in the 1930s. Resolutions were then carried utterly condemning the military *coup* and the precipitate action of the British Government in recognising the military junta; demanding the recall of the British Ambassador from Santiago and the withholding from the military régime of all aid, loans, and credits; and calling on the Labour Movement to campaign for the restoration of democracy in Chile and to offer financial and other assistance to the Popular Unity (Allende's) movement (*The Times*, 5/10/73). My italics.

the reasons for this fierce reaction would repay study. Probably they included a happy chance of timing. Several of the most fashionable matters of Western political protest had passed into history or been shadowed by disillusionment in the year or two before Allende's downfall: from Viet Nam and Greece to Black Power and the Student Movement. Allende's dramatic end supplied a new cause just when it was wanted. Familiar double standards were certainly involved. Nobody at the Labour Party Conference, for example, thought it necessary to ask why such a royal welcome should be offered to the representative of a government which had included one of the very few Communist parties outside Eastern Europe to approve the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. A Pavlovian response to the very idea of "revolution" was also clearly in evidence—and made all the more eager, it seemed, by the fact that this particular revolution had been taking place at such a safe distance in such sublimely foreign parts. There was, perhaps, a characteristic love of worldly failure, too—for it was difficult to read some of the more extravagant expressions of grief at Allende's death without sensing a touch of gratification at the idea that Good had once more succumbed to Evil and so delivered another martyr unto Heaven before he could be corrupted by the practical demands of life on Earth. But most of all, perhaps, the response seemed to stem from ignorance and wishful thinking—always the two most powerful sources of political romanticism—which left the facts of life in Allende's Chile either unknown or ignored and the field wide open, therefore, to the creation of instant myth. Hence the composite picture, now accepted throughout a wide spectrum of Western liberal and left-wing opinion, of Allende as a genuine social democrat of impeccable constitutional propriety who met his end at the hands of a fascist conspiracy on behalf of a minority "ruling class" aided and abetted by the United States of America.

To replace this romantic vision with something approaching reality may already be impossible, for myths undoubtedly possess a life of their own immune to rational challenge. To attempt to do so also may entail some risk of abuse, for it seems to be a common assumption nowadays that anyone who seeks a rational explanation of a military *coup d'état* (unless it happens to represent a left-wing interest) is necessarily a fascist beast.

I SHOULD MAKE IT PLAIN, therefore, that I am concerned here with Allende's Chile and not with what has taken its place. I hold no brief for military juntas, nor for the summary executions, mass imprisonments, censorship or whatever that the Chilean junta may have inspired or tolerated during its early months of power. Indeed, because I happen to know and like Chile as a country and count a number of Chileans among my friends I feel some personal sadness at the country's present plight. But I feel no surprise nor, I am afraid, much moral shock. Military men will be military men, the world over; and in any case Chile was left in such a mess by Allende that some vindictiveness, alas, was only to be expected when he fell.

Nor am I concerned with Chilean might-have-beens. I accept that the country needed genuine social reform and I believe that it could

have been achieved without violence by a democratic government that was ready to work pragmatically within the constitution and with a proper respect for what the economic and political fabric of Chile would stand.

But that is not the point *any more*. What I am concerned about is how the country came to its present pass. And without wishing to speak ill of the dead, it seems to me necessary to say outright for the sake of the living that the Chilean *coup* was largely Allende's own fault and that the myths with which it has been surrounded on the Left are not merely a falsification of Chilean history but a potential danger to the future of liberal and social democratic politics in the Western world as well. Indeed, what is most disturbing to me about the fashionable Western reactions to events in Chile is their revelation of the degree to which revolutionary romanticism has combined with left-wing cynicism in recent years to corrupt our own politics. It is certainly "no accident" that, for example, the British Labour Party which uncritically adopts Allende's cause is also the party which has permitted its self-avowed Marxists and utopian socialists to gain factional positions of unprecedented power.

I will leave others to pursue that theme, however. All I want to do is to try to set some of the Chilean record straight—or at any rate, straighter—by looking in some detail at three of the main myths that now surround the end of Allende and his famous experiment.

1. The American Intervention Myth

THIS FOUND its most virulent expression in the equation of Allende's downfall with that of Dubcek. Yet in the absence of any American armed assault to compare with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—let alone the fact that whereas Dubcek's Parliament supported him against the Russians, a majority of Allende's Congress invited him to resign—there were only stereotype suppositions to sustain it.

In general, the American intervention myth seemed to derive from that characteristic Latin American and left-wing scapegoat complex which insists that the *Yanquis* are responsible for everything (except, of course, anything good). Garnished with historical fact (Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, etc.) this is frequently transmuted in Latin American affairs into a plausible anti-American smear; and the state of Washington politics in 1973 was, of course, guaranteed to give such a smear extra credence this time. The *New Statesman* offered a fine example. "The likelihood is that the trail will lead back to the Pentagon", it assured its readers, "if a proper investigation can ever be mounted. But in default of this it does seem possible to say that Nixonism and its allies were already too heavily implicated in the

¹ Addicts of the ITT conspiracy theory might like to work out, incidentally, why ITT in Chile was never taken over by Allende, even after the notorious memorandum became public property. Was it, perhaps, because its operations there were mostly losing money and Allende did not want to share its financial embarrassments? Or was it that he knew the company had given him an effective political stick to beat his opponents with and he did not want to throw it away by kicking the company out? Either way, ITT's apparent immunity from reprisal did not suggest that he took its challenge very seriously.

subversion of Allende for them to be exonerated now" (14,9,73). The charge is almost ectoplasmically vague yet simultaneously all-embracing. But what does it actually rest on?

First, presumably, the celebrated memorandum of ITT which suggested ways of preventing Allende from assuming the Presidency in 1970 and of toppling his regime if he did so. There is, of course, no doubt of this memorandum's authenticity, nor of its appalling folly; and with such organisations admittedly pushing their conspiratorial notions at the heart of American politics it is not surprising that suspicions of *Yanqui* skulduggery were aroused. But there is a major snag for anyone who sees the memorandum as evidence of actual dirty work: simply, that all inquiries so far indicate that its recommendations were never adopted. They were studied by the CIA, where one department produced a contingency plan based upon them. But neither the memorandum nor the plan seems to have received assent at any higher level; and given the kind of public exposure to which the workings of the White House, the CIA and most other things in Washington have been treated during the Watergate crisis (including the allegations of Nixon's personal involvement with ITT), I am hard-pressed to believe that if such assent had been given it could have been kept quiet until now.¹

Secondly, in support of the American intervention theory, it is pointed out that the U.S. maintained its contacts with the Chilean armed forces and continued to supply them with arms when other American aid to Chile was suspended. Therefore, so the implication goes, the Pentagon was deliberately keeping open the option of inspiring a military coup against an unwelcome government. But this is obviously a two-edged argument. For one thing, an army that is still getting its toys to play with is usually rather more than less likely to endure the follies of its ruling politicians gladly. And for another, what would have been said if the Americans had actually suspended arms shipments to forces whose commanders were serving in Allende's cabinet? The outcry about "*Yanqui* imperialism" and "Pentagon politics" may easily be imagined.

Thirdly, the strangulation of foreign aid and credit is laid at Washington's door as a major weapon in a cold war against Allende from the start. At first glance this has more substance to it. The U.S. certainly suspended further commercial credits of its own to Chile after Allende had nationalised the American-owned copper mines on terms amounting to confiscation. As the major power in the World Bank and the IMF the U.S. also argued there against further aid for Chile; and to the extent that it was successful it must have added to Allende's financial difficulties. But it was not able to prevent other Western countries (e.g. Holland and Sweden) from continuing to offer credit; it never persuaded Britain to close down its small aid programme; it did not exclude the re-scheduling of most of Chile's foreign debt repayments in 1972, and it had not prevented the discussion (incomplete at the time of the coup) of a similar re-scheduling for 1973. In short, the U.S. influence may have limited Western aid and credit but it was far from being able to condemn Allende's Chile to economic purdah. In any case, Chile was not one of the under-developed world's hard cases, totally dependent on external aid and credits for its survival. The wealth of its copper mines alone ensured that in normal times it was

not more than marginally "aid-worthy", and with sensible economic management it ought to have been able to withstand a good deal of external pressure. Unfortunately, nobody with even a nodding acquaintance with economics could have classified the management of the Allende government as anything but disastrous. To a great extent it placed itself beyond the pale for any but the most trusting—or dedicated—of creditors. But even if that had not been so, and if the blame for Chile's economic difficulties could have been laid fairly and squarely at Washington's door, Allende would surely have had small cause for complaint. It was, after all, his administration which announced its immediate determination to "expropriate imperialist capital... realise a policy of self-financing... and review, denounce and repudiate, as the case may be, treaties or agreements limiting our sovereignty, specifically the reciprocal assistance treaties, the mutual aid pacts, and others, between Chile and the United States" (*The People's Unity—Basic Program of Government, 1970*).

It was also his administration which promised to "repudiate the agreements between us and the International Monetary Fund" (*The People's Government—First 40 Steps, 1970*). These bold intentions were never fully realised, it is true; but they were expressed as official policy before the United States or any other "imperialist" power had actually done anything to embarrass Allende's government. In other words, it was Allende who decided to pick the quarrel. It seems naive, to say the least, to complain that his chosen opponents took defensive measures. What else were they expected to do?

THOSE WHO DO COMPLAIN of American action, nevertheless, might be better employed in asking why Allende got so little support from most of the governments which professed to be his friends. Except for Cuba, which offered enthusiastic (but not always practical) advice to Allende, as well as supplying arms and training for his militant Left, the world's established Marxist governments were consistently cool to the "Chilean experiment." The farthest the Soviet Union would go to show its approval was to open a 12-year credit in roubles for Chilean imports of Russian industrial goods and to agree to take a limited amount of Chilean copper for a year or two in repayment. But the hard currency loans that Chile really needed to plug the gaps that quickly opened between Allende's economic promises and performance were never forthcoming from any Marxist source. Nor was that surprising. In the nature of things, Marxist countries rarely have hard currency to spare and they were unlikely to devote what little they might have to bailing out a régime which seemed intent upon over-reaching itself in every direction.

Conceivably, Allende would have done better for himself and his country if he had simply abandoned the "free" world market altogether and taken Chile at once into the controlled trade bloc of the Communist world in the hope of getting total Soviet support. But that would have meant imposing a completely centralised economy and strict political control inside Chile—in short, abandoning the romantic pretence of "constitutional revolution" for the more customary revolution by decree. To his credit, perhaps, Allende was unwilling (or unable) to do that;

but even if he had, it might not have worked. To support Castro's Cuba is believed to have cost Moscow the equivalent of about \$1 million a day for many years. To support a similar régime in Chile would probably have cost even more. There was never the slightest sign that Mr Brezhnev, or anyone else in the Kremlin, was ready to accept such a burden.

To sum up, then, it seems to me that the idea of an American conspiracy to overthrow Allende is both unproven and unnecessary to explain his downfall. I am not saying, of course, that Washington was not relieved to see him go; although I think some American officials would have preferred to see him stumble on for sometime longer in the hope that growing disillusionment would infect even his stoutest supporters and accordingly diminish the chances of his being made a martyr when nemesis finally overtook him. But in general the American attitude seems to have been a predictably cautious one:

*Thou shalt not kill, but needst not strive
Officiously to keep alive....*

A realistic Chilean government embarked on its "road to socialism" would surely have bargained for that much, and (on a truly Marxist analysis such as Allende professed) it should have expected much more—that America would move in for the kill as soon as possible. Yet while adopting a deliberately provocative stance, Allende took no steps to protect himself against possible American reprisals, declined to compromise for the sake of other Western help, and failed to provide grounds even for his supposed Marxist friends to help him.

It was magnificent, perhaps, but it was not politics. At the very least, Allende must be convicted here of a lack of realism that would probably have been fatal to any statesman anywhere.

2. The Ruling Class Conspiracy Myth

THE PICTURE of Allende being overthrown by what has been variously described as a "revolt of the privileged," a series of "bosses' strikes" or a "conspiracy of the traditional ruling class" contains so many misconceptions that it is hard to know where to begin to sort them out. One idea, however, seems basic to them all: that Allende and his Popular Unity coalition were somehow the uniquely legitimate representatives of "the People's Will." That such an odd belief should have gained any currency whatever outside purely propagandist circles is a mark of the confusion that surrounds the Chilean experience in the minds of many non-Chileans. To judge from published comments, such as those referring to the "defeat of the democratic will", some of Allende's sympathisers abroad seem even to believe that he not merely enjoyed a massive popular majority of the vote but was also the first President of his country to do so.

Yet the facts are beyond dispute. Chile was and had been for many years a functioning democracy with a constitution which vested executive power in the President and legislative power in Congress. Both in theory and in practice, no doubt, there were serious weaknesses—as revealed, for instance, in the inability of previous

governments to press through social reforms as swiftly as many Chileans would have wished. But by common consent the system was the best and most stable in Latin America and it had enabled Allende himself to contest the Presidency unsuccessfully three times before he finally won it at his fourth attempt in 1970. There was no doubt of the legitimacy of that victory. But, unfortunately for those who saw it as a unique expression of "the people's will", it was gained only through a narrow plurality in which Allende obtained just over 36% of the poll. His nearest rival, only a couple of percentage points behind, was the candidate of the conservative National Party, whose members in Congress opposed Allende from the start. Another 23% went to the third candidate, a radical reformist from the Christian Democrat party, many of whose members in Congress at first gave Allende the benefit of the doubt, hoping he would modify his avowed Marxism in practice to a kind of reformism compatible with their own ideas and the existing constitution.

In the mid-term Congressional elections of March 1973, the Popular Unity coalition raised its share of the vote to 44% (although this time the "legitimacy" was suspect owing to opposition allegations of substantial electoral fraud). But the opposition parties retained a large majority in Congress where, by that time, most of the Christian Democrats had joined the Nationalists in outright antagonism to the President. On these facts it seems plain that, so far from representing "the People's Will", Allende never actually represented more than a substantial minority interest. Only if "the People" are identified as being those who voted for Allende, while the rest—the majority—are relegated to the status of "non-people" can any other interpretation be sustained. But that, of course, is just what is implied by the myth of the "ruling class conspiracy."

IF THERE WAS a "ruling class" in Chile it was that of the politicians and the surrounding establishment drawn mostly from the narrow upper end of Chile's prosperous middle class. Allende himself and many of his ministers and leading supporters were as much part of that group as were their political opponents. But, ironically, it was a group that often suffered less than others from Allende's socialism because its members on both sides generally possessed enough cash or property to exploit the black market at home or slip into agreeable exile if things got too rough—in any case, to survive (like Allende himself until his death) in very reasonable comfort. But the people who did most to overthrow Allende were rarely of this group at all. With the possible exception of some naval officers, the armed forces were very much apart from the establishment of any political colour; and even after Allende brought the service commanders into his government they remained aloof from, and remarkably little known by, those relatively small circles in Santiago which were accustomed to set the country's political tone.

Indeed, as events since the *coup d'état* have shown, Chile's military men—like their counterparts elsewhere—were probably as contemptuous of the politicians (and as ignorant of politics) as the politicians were of them. They had stayed outside politics for nearly 40 years, and if Allende

himself had not dragged them into the whirlpool they might have been content to remain that way. But their position was made intolerable by the President's own decisions. On the one hand they were encouraged to turn a blind eye to the steady growth of illegal, para-military forces under the command of the President's friends or others who were more extreme in their revolutionary commitment. On the other hand they were required to serve in his cabinet to maintain "law and order" and reassure the country of the President's constitutional propriety. On top of that they were threatened by attempts from within the President's own circle to subvert their authority within their own forces, as in the naval conspiracy uncovered in July 1973, and the public call for a naval insurrection by Allende's friend and fellow-leader of the Socialist Party, Senator Carlos Altamirano, made only three days before the coup.

A surer way can hardly be imagined of provoking mutiny among responsible officers, and it is only surprising, in retrospect, that it did not happen sooner—as in most Latin American countries it surely would have done. To ascribe the mutiny thereafter to the machinations of "the ruling class" is to understand nothing, either of military men in general or of Chile's military in particular.

SIMILARLY, THE SO-CALLED "bosses' strikes" which preceded the military coup were, in fact, nothing of the kind. The lorry-men who paralysed half, or more, of Chile's transport by their month-long strike in September-October 1972, and their even longer strike in July-September 1973, were mostly owner-drivers who would have fitted fairly readily into the Teamsters' Union in the United States. They displayed the fierce economic and social protectionism typical of what in Europe or North America would be called the lower middle class, and they saw themselves threatened by galloping inflation and by what they believed to be the Government's intention to destroy their way of life through state control or ownership of their services. Along with the small shopkeepers who supported them—not forgetting the queue-weary housewives whose famous "Saucepan March" in Santiago was the most dramatic early sign of revolt—they might be classed as the *Poujadistes* of Chile. But by no stretch of the imagination could they be described as representatives of a "boss" or "ruling" class, or even as being especially "privileged" in a social or economic sense. Moreover, they owed little, if any, allegiance to the traditional political groupings of Chilean politics, although they obviously welcomed any support they could get from them. On the contrary, they tended to cut across the traditional spectrum and look to new leaders, whether of right or left. Thus, their principal spokesman, Senor Leon Vilarin, was actually a member of Allende's Socialist Party while others of the leadership came from the Nationalist Party ranks.

*Although even that was not unthinkable towards the end, such was the chaos the economy had fallen into. The last time I left Chile, a week or so before the coup, I drove over the Andes to Argentina and at the Chilean customs post at the summit of the pass I found officials taking a large American car to pieces and laying upon the snow-covered ground around it one ton of copper ingots that had been hidden in various nooks and crannies of the chassis. It would have been worth around U.S. \$200 in cash in Argentina—a fortune, by then, in Chilean terms, of about four million escudos on the black market.

or from no party at all.

The members of the various professional associations, like doctors, dentists, lawyers and airline pilots, which joined the second transport strike, were likewise not "bosses" although they were certainly, in Chilean terms, rather more "privileged." Their protest was probably more ideological than that of the lorry-men and the shopkeepers—it was usually their wives, for example, who objected most forcibly to the Government's politically-inspired changes in the school curriculum—but it was also provoked by sheer exasperation and fear at the growing threat to their professional status posed by the Government's combination of administrative inefficiency and dubious social priorities. For example, Chile's economic collapse and inflation not only threatened many doctors financially but seriously frustrated their work. Some early reports from Santiago after the coup made the point that hospitals were appealing urgently for bandages and drugs to treat the wounded, as if that indicated that the number of casualties must be overwhelmingly high. But bandages, drugs, and other medical supplies had been only sporadically obtainable in Chile for many months beforehand. The daily round of the pharmacies in search of the simplest medicines had become a regular feature of Santiago life; and foreign embassies had been driven to stock-pile their own supplies, imported through the diplomatic bag, for the treatment of the most normal ailments among their staffs. It was partly in the hope of ending that situation that many otherwise conscientious doctors finally joined the movement to get Allende out.

NOR SHOULD IT BE FORGOTTEN that some of the most damaging strikes of all were those of Chile's most influential blue-collar workers—the copper-miners. The last lorry-men's strike was immediately preceded by a two months' strike for higher wages by miners at El Teniente, the country's biggest mine. Because copper accounts for three-quarters of Chile's foreign earnings, that strike probably cost the country far more in real terms than the transport strike, whose costs to a great extent could be absorbed internally. Indeed, as one West European diplomat remarked to me in Santiago, the money lost in those two months at El Teniente would have more than repaid Chile's entire debt to his government—a debt which Allende at that moment was trying to reschedule for the second consecutive year.

It is true that the copper-miners were the élite of Chile's blue-collar class and, no doubt, wanted to keep it that way. To that extent, perhaps, they may be deemed "privileged"—like, say, coal miners or motor car workers in Britain; although I doubt if that is what members of the British Labour Party, or the *New Statesman*, can have had in mind in embracing the "privileged" thesis. But a more important reason for the miners' restiveness, I believe, is that although they were the most vital of all Chile's manual workers they suffered far more than most of their erstwhile comrades from the country's shattering economic decline under Allende. Unlike farm and factory workers, they could not supplement their official wages by selling the fruits of their labour on the black market. The farm worker who could take home a sack

potatoes, a few chickens, or even a side of beef, could make a good living on the black market even if his official wages remained stationary while inflation roared ahead. The factory worker who was entitled to buy a proportion of his factory's output at official fixed prices could (and did) tell that at six or ten times what he had paid as soon as he left the factory gate. But miners could hardly find ready buyers for a stolen truck-load of copper ore.⁸

Thus the copper-miners were thrust, in effect, into the same position as the lorry-men, the shopkeepers, and virtually all of Chile's salaried professional men and women: they were left more or less defenceless against the most vicious inflation the country had ever experienced.

SOME APOLOGISTS for Allende have maintained that the degree of inflation was exaggerated or, at any rate, little worse than was customary in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America. The truth is that it was far beyond anything normally endured in that continent. As little as nine months after Allende came to power, when I first visited Chile, the escudo had already fallen from 20 to 40 against the U.S. dollar on the free, or black, market. Eighteen months later, on my second visit, the Government's own figures put the rate of inflation at 130% in a year, the money issue was going up by 10% a month and the escudo had fallen to about 350 to the black U.S. dollar. By August 1973, the official inflation rate was 323% and rising fast, and the escudo was worth only 2,000 to the dollar—an effective devaluation in less than three years of 10,000%!

Nor is it enough to attribute these catastrophic rates to such adventitious or malicious factors as—and again I refer to published arguments—falling world copper prices, the normal difficulties of maintaining industrial and farm output in a time of radical political change, or deliberate American intervention.

On the last of these three I have already said enough, I hope, to show that it was far from decisive and that it was, anyway, largely self-invited. As to falling copper prices, the fact is that after a fall in the first year of Allende's Government, prices recovered until by the time of his overthrow they were 80% above the level at the time of his election. Had they not risen so steeply he would almost certainly have fallen sooner and probably would not have secured his relative, short-lived success in the mid-term elections of March 1973. The difficulties of maintaining output in a time of change, however, were real—unfortunately, far more so than Allende ever seemed to realise.

To take just two examples: copper and milk. Expropriation of the copper mines from their American owners would, no doubt, have led in itself to the withdrawal of American technicians as well as of American management with some consequent risk of losing production temporarily, at least. But this might have been overcome by the promotion of trained Chilean managers and technicians, of whom there was no shortage.

Alas, for Chile's national income, Allende not merely nationalised but deliberately politicised the mines as well. Jobs for the party boys were handed out in thousands while trained Chileans emigrated so that, after three years of Popular Unity Government, mining manpower and costs had risen by more than a third while mining

output was down by about the same amount.

I take milk as the second example because it was specifically mentioned in Popular Unity election manifestos, which guaranteed "every Chilean child half a quart of milk daily." Here again, the government's programme of land reform, intended to break the power of Chile's remaining landlords and open the way to co-operative or state farming, might have been expected to result in some shortfall in dairy production for a year or two while the teething problems were worked out. In fact, however, milk production dropped as if someone had simply punched a hole in the bottom of every churn in the land. At one large co-operative dairy in Temuco, one of the main milk-producing areas of Chile, the average daily winter intake of milk was about 50,000 gallons in 1970. By 1973 it was down to 7,000. Nor was this surprising. Apart from the fact that legal land reform had been accompanied by widespread and unchecked illegal land seizures so that too many farms were in the hands of people utterly without experience, the prices established for milk—as for most other farm products—were simply economic nonsense. Presumably in the hope of getting half a quart of milk for every child on the cheap, the government decreed that a gallon of milk would fetch less than half the price of one egg. Inevitably, nobody was interested in producing milk and cows were slaughtered wholesale for beef—legally or illegally—or driven over the mountains to Argentina while Allende was forced to scour the world for dried milk exports that, thanks to his policy in the copper mines, he no longer had foreign currency to pay for.

SUCH POLLS were repeated everywhere as the romantic gestures of self-styled revolution were preferred to facing the facts of life. While overall production in both agriculture and industry fell disastrously, Allende simultaneously attempted to redistribute the national wealth by giving Chile's poorer classes more money to spend. They were his constituency and they were properly grateful, for many of them certainly had never had much before. But you can't redistribute what you have already thrown away; and as output vanished, so domestic queues grew longer, foreign debts piled up, and the budget deficit expanded like a hydrogen balloon. A year before the final collapse I asked one of Allende's chief economic advisers what they were going to do to control a situation that was already looking critical. He replied, with commendable candour, that he really didn't know. "I know," he said, "what we ought to do—we should impose an austerity régime tomorrow, freeze wages, and ration essential supplies. But how can we? We would destroy our own political base...."

Precisely. In the end, rather than do that they plunged on down the primrose path of promises and illusions and practically destroyed the country. The "ruling class conspiracy" was the gloss that they and their supporters put upon the reality of their own miscalculations.

3. The Myth of the Constitutional Revolutionary

HERE WE COME to the crux of Allende's policies and character about which, finally,

all the other arguments revolve. Was he a genuine constitutionalist? Was he a true revolutionary? Was he—could he ever have been—both?

Allende himself, of course, admitted no doubts. Repeatedly, he insisted that he was a revolutionary and a Marxist, and that he intended to establish at least the preconditions for what he told Régis Debray would be "total, scientific Marxist socialism." Equally repeatedly, he proclaimed his faith that he could achieve this end by constitutional means, through the ballot box and all it implied. That was, after all, to be the distinctive "Chilean road to socialism" of which so many people outside Chile cherished such high hopes.

But no hindsight is required to see that both theory and practice were riddled with contradictions. Revolutions are born of, or generate, sectional conflict—a fact of political life that Allende acknowledged every time he spoke of "overthrowing" what he called the "bourgeois" state. But a democratic constitution rests upon consensus—a basic acceptance of the fact that the State represents more than a merely sectional interest. The second permits reform, but the first denies it; and there is no way of reconciling the two.

All Allende's practical difficulties followed from this simple distinction. Taken seriously, his constitutionalism meant that his programme could only succeed if a majority would actually vote for it. But, elected as he was with only just over a third of the popular vote and with a large majority of Congress against him, Allende had neither a democratic nor an administratively effective mandate for his revolution. Indeed, in a parliamentary rather than a presidential democracy, he would probably never have been able to begin.

If he was to succeed within his six-year term of office even in opening the door to revolution, let alone establishing it as accomplished fact, he had to transform his minority into a majority. But how to do it? For, if words meant anything, Allende's had to mean that he intended to replace the existing, reformable constitution of Chile with another that would be, of its Marxist nature, irreversible. In other words, a system that was admittedly democratic was to be used to build another that would be effectively dictatorial. This was asking the majority to hang itself from its own gallows; and, not surprisingly, it declined.

ALLENDE'S ATTEMPTS to overcome this basic illogicality in his position were precisely what ensured his ultimate downfall. Refusing to abandon either his revolutionary rhetoric or his professed constitutionalism he was forced to rely more and more upon political illusionism. His sleight-of-hand was often remarkable, as he sought to outwit the opposition majority in Congress by exploiting the letter of the constitution, using every legal loophole to force upon them measures they did not want. But in the process, inevitably, he destroyed the constitution's spirit, so that his opponents became as ruthless as he

* Indeed, as I discovered for myself on a visit to southern Chile nine months after Allende's elections, local police forces there were under specific instructions not to attempt to restore the farms to their legal owners. See also Robert Moss's report in *ENCOUNTERS*, "Allende's Chile", August 1973, and Alistair Horne's "Commandante Pepe", July 1973.

was. At the start he won considerable opposition support in Congress for needed changes like the nationalisation of the copper mines, land reform, and the state's takeover of banks and major industries—evidence that the democratic consensus could and would work within the existing constitution. But, at the end, not a single member of the opposition majority would cast a vote in his support. They voted unanimously to condemn his "habitual illegalities" and were even joined by the Supreme Court in accusing him of disregarding the rule of law. He had cut away the middle ground of Chilean politics, wrecked the democratic consensus, and berotten the reality of counter-revolution through his own addiction to revolutionary slogans.

Equally inevitable was the economic breakdown, which came from Allende's attempts to enlarge his popular base outside the political institutions. Here his plan was two-fold: to buy political support among "the People" through massive wage increases and other benefits and at the same time to squoze the middle class into submission, or even flight from the country, through wholesale nationalisation of their interests and the appointment of his own men to all significant civil-service jobs. The two simply cancelled each other out; for while the first part of the plan raised vast new expectations and demands, the second diminished the country's capacity to meet them. The whirling spiral of inflation followed as a necessary result of Allende's political confusions.

THREE BASIC CONTRADICTIONS were compounded by the fragmented nature of Allende's support. His Popular Unity coalition was far from united. Its majority element was Allende's own Socialist Party—a body that bore little resemblance beyond its name to most of the democratic socialist parties of Europe which so enthusiastically espoused its cause. It was, in fact, a revolutionary Marxist party that began as a splinter of the more bureaucratic and Stalinist Chilean Communist party in the 1930s, and in recent years had acquired a fiery "New Left" wing as well. Several of its leaders, like Senator Altamirano, and many of its rank and file, constantly urged Allende to "speed up the revolution" without much regard for constitutional niceties. The smallest element of the coalition was the Christian radicals of various persuasions, some of whom hoped to offer a bridge to the centre of Chilean politics by cooperating with the left wing of the Christian Democrats, but none of whom ever attained positions of real influence. The coalition's sheet anchor was the Communist Party which, as business and administration slipped into chaos, became increasingly important as a source of discipline and strategic thinking.

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN hard enough to drive this *troika* anyway without either overstepping the constitutional limits of government or antagonising one or other of its elements and thereby jeopardising the only "democratic" base the revolution had. But Allende had also to contend with the still more militant left outside the coalition, led by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which insisted on revolution now, and by violence if necessary—as, in MIR's view, it was.

Here Allende's professed constitutionalism was

revealed at, at least, equivocal. He officially rejected MIR's violence, yet he never permitted the Army to root out their para-military groups. When they stigmatised his land-reform programme as "inadequate" and seized hundreds of farms at gun-point he rebuked them in occasional speeches but did nothing to reverse their actions.⁹

When they hijacked lorry-loads of valuable manufactures, to raise funds by selling them on the black market, he rarely tried to redress the crime. The Left said this was because the MIR truly represented "the People" against whom Allende dared not act. But the truth, I fear, was more equal: For one thing, the MIR had close friends in the Socialist Party and in Allende's own entourage whom the President did not want to offend. For another, as long as their activities did not actually split the Popular Unity coalition, it was often convenient to see them pushing along the revolution by unconstitutional means while Allende denounced them in his role as a constitutionalist.

It was not as if Allende was unable to deal with the MIR when he had to. For example, when a *Milista* force blockaded the Philips television factory in Santiago in 1973 after an unsuccessful attempt to hijack a lorry-load of TV sets, they were allowed by the Government to remain unmolested for ten days, although a police post was just across the road. Yet when diplomatic representations were made by the Dutch *chargé d'affaires* with the hint that his country's financial aid might have to be reconsidered if this harassment of a Dutch enterprise continued, the *Milistas* were hustled away without a shot in 24 hours.

A SIMILAR EQUIVOCATION was evident in Allende's adoption of a personal armed bodyguard—the first in memory to accompany a Chilean President. It is true that the extreme Right in Chile was quick to threaten violence as a response to Allende's proclaimed revolution, and Allende himself always maintained that he needed protection. But right-wing para-military groups were never as big or as highly organised as those on the Left; and, in any case, the proper reaction of a constitutionally-minded President would surely have been to call upon his state security forces to protect him.

Instead, Allende formed a personal unit, known as "the Group of Friends of the President." Trained, armed, and partly manned by Cubans, it was led by known revolutionaries, sympathetic to the MIR, including Allende's son-in-law. The existence of such a group at the very centre of the State was not merely a provocation to the established security forces and an affront to Chilean tradition, it was also an implied rejection of the principle of constitutional rule.

DOUBTS ABOUT the real depth of Allende's constitutionalism were raised also by his personal history and his language, both of which suggested

a romantic attachment to violence. He was, after all, a founder and first president of the Latin American Solidarity Organisation, created in Havana in the 1950s and dedicated to the encouragement of armed insurrection throughout the continent. He promised to "paint Santiago with blood" in 1970 if Congress declined to ratify his election as President, and he repeatedly tried to intimidate the opposition, inside and outside Congress, with the threat of civil war. These were not the actions or the sentiments of a man dedicated to constitutional change, except as a matter of expediency.

On the other hand, it was hard to see Allende as a genuine revolutionary. He never looked anything but the complete bourgeois gentleman. A *bon vivant*, florid but well-groomed, a snappy dresser, with a twinkling eye for the ladies and a good deal of personal charm, his strongest political card was his skill in tactical manoeuvre. But as a strategist, a thinker, a man with a real message, he was unconvincing. Towards the end, as he appeared with increasing frequency on the presidential balcony in Santiago to address chanting crowds of his supporters with revolutionary platitudes, he seemed to me to lose all contact with reality, to have become an actor in love with his revolutionary part rather than a serious leader who knew where he was going.

IN RETROSPECT, I am inclined to think this was always the truth of the matter with Allende. Basically, he was a political romantic, dealing in sensations rather than sense. He enjoyed his hour upon the stage but he never properly assessed the forces he was dealing with, either for or against him. He raised expectations on his own side without commanding the means to satisfy them, and he encouraged opposition on the other side by his use of a revolutionary rhetoric whose threats he also could not fulfil.

At best he was muddle-headed; and time may show that he was deliberately deceitful. Certainly he managed to deceive a lot of people, including himself. But in the end reality taught its own, hard lessons. That you can't be a democrat and a revolutionary—at least, not in a society that is already admittedly democratic. That you can't be anti-American and expect the Americans to help you. That you can't pose as the people's leader and kick most people in the teeth. That you can't conscript soldiers into politics and expect them to remain apolitical. That you can't have inflation roaring out of sight and maintain a base for social welfare. That, in short, the real world is not Cloud-cuckoo-land. Down here, you just can't have your cake and eat it.

It is sad that such elementary lessons should have to be taught yet again at such tragic cost in Chile. But it is alarming that so many people elsewhere should evidently fail to grasp that they are the lessons.

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1. ARTICLE BY PROF. JAMES THEBERGE, PUBLISHED IN SOVIET ANALYST, VOL. 3, NO. 17, 15 AUG, ENTITLED: "KREMLIN'S HAND IN ALLENDE'S CHILE" IS IDEAL FOR PURPOSES OUTLINED IN REF. WE ATTEMPTING TO PLACE, WILL ADVISE. SUGGEST HQ INCLUDE ARTICLE IN PRESS COMMENTS.

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Allendes misstag

— Den svenska debatten är ensidig. Man har på ett lytande sätt dokumenterat juntans grymheter men man drar ingen lärdom av utvecklingen i Allendes Chile. Det är viktigt att kunna kritisera det som var fel i utvecklingen, annars kan man inte lära sig någonting. Om man tystar ner varje form av debatt om det som var före kuppen, använder man sig av ett censur-tänkande som är på samma linje som juntans, säger *Andres Küng, journalist och författare som besökt Chile före, under och efter Allendes tid. Han har nu också givit ut en debattbok, **Att så socialism och skörda fascism.***

— Salvador Allende och "folkregeringen" Unidad Popular (folklig enhet) emottogs med stort intresse även utomlands. Man skulle förtrogen få svar på flera grundläggande frågor. Kan socialismen genomföras på fredlig väg i Latinamerika? Är marxismen i praktiken förenlig med politisk demokrati? Kan en social revolution genomföras med bevarad politisk demokrati?

— Folkfrontens program hade fyra naturtillgångar, framst kopparn, 2) okad takt i jordreformsarbetet, 3) förstatligande av de största bank- och industriföretagen och 4) snabb ekonomisk tillväxt och omfördelning av inkomster och förmögenheter samt kamp mot inflationen.



Andres Küng, journalist och författare, säger att Chile-debatten är ensidig. "Det är viktigt att även kunna kritisera det som var fel på Allendes tid annars kan man inte lära sig någonting".

Koppar viktig

— Kopparns svarar för upp till fyra femtedelar av landets export och mellan en femtedel och en tredjedel av statsintäkterna. Under åren före första världskriget gick gruvorna över i nordamerikansk ägo. I slutet av 1960-talet nationaliserades de till hälften av den kristdemokratiska Frei-regimen. Staten övertog 51 procent av aktierna. Men Freis "chilenisering" av kopparn visade sig slutligen ändå mest lönsam för de amerikanska företagen. Kopparn förstatligades genom ett tillägg till grundlagen 1971. Frågan om ersättning till de forna amerikanska ägarerna hänsköts till högste statsrevisorn — men Allende och hans regering ansåg att de inte hade råd att betala kontant ersättning i dollar.

— Jordbruket svarar för mindre än en fjärdedel av sysselsättningen, vilket är mindre än i de flesta latinamerikanska och andra u-lander. Flera jordreforms lagar antogs före Allende en av dem 1967 då man bestämde att alla jordegendomar över 80 "basnektar" kunde tvångsinlösas (en basnektar = en hektar förskicklig konstituerad jord).

— Taktiken i jordreformsarbetet ökade under Allendes presidenttid. Under hans första år tvångsinlösades nästan lika mycket jord som under hela den föregående sexåriga presidentperioden. Alla stora jordegendomar uppgavs ha förstatligats 1973.

— En följd av jordreformen var att lantarbetarna organiserades tackligt. En annan var jordokkupationerna. De ökade två gånger redan under Allendes första år jämfört med under Freis tid. Jordägarna började gå till motangrepp.

— Produktionen sjönk — de exproprierade gårdarna hade inte tillräckligt med maskiner, redskap, kreatur och utsäde. Den sjunkande tillgången på livsmedel och den stigande efterfrågan ledde till försörjningsproblem och prisstegringar.

— I början genomförde Allende en rad åtgärder för att skapa en jämnare fördelning av förmögenhe-

svarta börsaffärer och hamstring. Penningvärdet sjönk med 10,3 procent.

— Under min vistelse i Santiago i början av 1973 var enbart cigarrretskoen i centrum ett par kvarter långa, berättar Andres Küng.

Förlorade stödet

— De ekonomiska problemen medförde politiska problem. Allende förlorade medelklassens stöd och arbetarklassens stöd minskade. I kongressvalen behövde han majoritet — det var en nödvändig förutsättning för att han skulle kunna fortsätta att genomföra sitt program och stifta sina lagar. Han fick bara 44 procent. Maktkampen kongress — parlament — president fortsatte. Ingen ville ge vika för den andre. Allende drev till åtgärder som inte var förenliga med demokratiska principer och gällande lagar.

— Denna utveckling tyder på att varje försök att mot Bertaltets vilja tvinga fram en extrem politik medför risker för polarisering av samhället som bara skulle gynna odemokratiska riktningar. En aggressiv klasspolitik, vare sig den är reaktionär eller revolutionär, kan framkalla en utveckling mot en socialistisk eller fascistisk diktatur, konstaterar Andres Küng.

— Men inga missförhållanden och misstag under Allendes tid kan användas som ursäkt för kuppen och det blodbad som sedan följde. Man kan ha olika uppfattningar om Allendes politik, men varje sann demokrat måste kunna avsky för den navarande militärjuntan.

Flitig författare

Andres Küng är född i Gävle

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1. IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDRES, CALL ATTENTION TO NEWLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/AUTHOR ANDRES KUNG (PUBLISHED "NY") ENTITLED "TO SOV SOCIALISM AND REP FASCISM", WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING FROM YOUNG SWED. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS". KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP"

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1. DEFER SANTIAGO RE PARA 5 BUT WE FEEL THERE LITTLE TO BE GAINED IN PSYCH TERMS FOR EUROPEAN AUDIENCE TO ATTEMPT CLARIFY WHETHER ALLENDE KILLED WHILE FIGHTING OR ATTEMPTING SURRENDER. JUNTA'S PRESTIGE SO LOW IN EUROPEAN EYES THAT SUCH HAIR SPLITTING WOULD NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE OR COULD ACTUALLY REBOUND AGAINST JUNTA SHOULD IT EMERGE HE DIED WHILE WANTING SURRENDER.

2. SHOULD IT DEVELOP THAT FANATICS AROUND ALLENDE REFUSED ALLOW HIM SURRENDER, THEN THIS MIGHT BE ANOTHER STORY BUT THIS NOT CLEAR FROM REF AND ALSO NOT KNOWN IF GARCES COULD MAKE SUCH VERSION STICK BECAUSE OF HIS EARLY DEPARTURE FROM NATIONAL PALACE.

3. FILE: 56-6-42/3; 201-987906. E2. IMPDET

DISPATCH

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PROCESSING ACTION

TO Chief of Station, [redacted]

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FROM Acting Chief of Station, Santiago

MICROFILM

SUBJECT FUJMEN Psych

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: [redacted] 22455

If available, we would appreciate receiving four copies of Andres Kung's book mentioned in reference. E2 IMPDET.

Leslie H. Berberian
Leslie H. BERBERIAN

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3 May 1974

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NETHERLANDS

CHILEAN REFUGEES IN NETHERLANDS POINTED OUT AS FUGITIVES

[Editorial by N. van Nieuwenhuysen; Reformatorsch Dagblad, Dutch, 19 April 1974, p 5]

The Chilean refugees in the Netherlands seem to be having adjustment problems. These rather prolonged symptoms seem to be caused among other things by the fact that they still find it hard to accept that the socialist dream of their Marxist president is definitely over and that their country is now being ruled by a small group of reactionaries who are trying to keep the people under control through terrorism, repression, and torture. Such problems will take you quite a ways in the Netherlands and those idealists were quick to take advantage of it.

Welfare

What is the situation? Most of the approximately 250 refugees with a high school or university education do not work. About half of them have been housed at the "Huis ter Schie" in Overschie, where they enjoy the sunshine on the terrace or play volleyball in the yard. Board and lodging are free and at the end of the week they pick up another 25 guilders pocket money. In addition they receive free language instruction, commuter tickets for the bus, and compensation for each trip they have to take.

Do you get the idea that they are better off than many old people in the Netherlands? You are probably right, because the Chilean exiles do not have to live on welfare; they are being paid from the frozen funds which had been allocated for development aid to their fatherland, Chile. So you can see how well our tax money is being spent.

14-00000

Considering that this small group of pampered exiles is preaching revolution even here and with a full stomach, it may be useful to point out a few facts. These are facts which are well known in the Ministry in The Hague but for some reason never made it to the Netherlands press.

Facts

The great majority of the refugees are not even Chilean nationals. They are natives of Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay. They came to Chile as a result of illegal and revolutionary activities in which they had been involved in these South and Middle American countries, the ultimate consequences of which they did not wish to suffer.

They felt at home in Allende's Chile because Allende showed sympathy for their situation. His first action as president, after his inauguration in November 1970, was to declare amnesty for all those who "were members of terrorist underground organizations," those who during the last months of his predecessor's regime had been charged with bank robbery, the armed robbery of self-service stores, the theft of weapons from military arsenals, kidnapping, and attempted murder.

The fact that some of those revolutionaries received Chilean diplomatic status was due to Allende's policy of granting residence permits to this type of revolutionaries. These refugees with a high school or higher level education seemed to have no adjustment problems in Chile. As a result they soon found their way to important key positions in the government.

The fugitives didn't suffer any sleepless nights in Chile either, because they felt protected by a militant Marxist army, armed to the teeth. Some 10,000 revolutionaries, from all points of the compass, were at their disposal.

Definition

In the Berner Tageblatt, a Swiss newspaper which is known for not exaggerating, Dr. Mario Puelma, from the University of Freiburg, wrote the following: "The concept of political refugee is only of limited value when applied to Chile. Whatever one's attitude toward the military junta

may be, one thing is certain: the Chilean refugees were not pursued only because of their ideology, their status, or their origin. This is the traditional, humanitarian definition for a refugee. For the most part they are people who, in their own country, could be legally charged with crimes which are punishable under any judicial system.

These refugees carried out activities in Chile which were against the constitution. As a matter of fact, they are specialists in violence. This is why they sought asylum in the foreign embassies in Santiago and why there are so many foreigners among them."

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te zijn beland, betere verhou... gesprek tussen... sen beëcht het... AP slechts dat... in partij-leer". Brezjnev's ont... dere communis... de kwalificat... ik en vriend... Roemenie ver... an mening over... millitaire land... egermanoeuvres... a het Russische... isleren.

Het Ameri... n buitenlandse... lag exportver... urd krachtens... dochteronder... grote Ameri... brieven auto's... Cuba. Deze... waarschijnlijk... saking van het... de organisatie... en tegen Cuba... mbargo

V.S.-economie loopt terug

WASHINGTON — De Amerikaanse regering heeft donderdag bekend gemaakt dat de nationale economie veel krachtiger is teruggelopen, in het eerste kwartaal van dit jaar, dan was verwacht. Prijzen stegen bovendien met meer dan tien procent.

Het bruto nationale produkt verminderde in het eerste kwartaal met een jaar-percentagte van 5,8 Dit is de eerste keer sinds 1970 dat het bruto nationale produkt is verminderd en het is de scherpste daling in 16 jaar. De vermindering van het bruto nationale produkt met 5,8 procent moet vergeleken worden met een schatting van tussen de 3 en 4 procent, zoals die door de regering was gedaan. In het laatste kwartaal van het vorig jaar nam het bruto nationale produkt toe met 1,6 procent.

MINISTERS KRIJGEN HUISARREST

Ethiopische leger uit scherpe verwijten

ETHIOPISCHE Leger
ADDIS ABABA — Premier Endalkachew Makonnen van Ethiopië heeft donderdag bekendgemaakt dat de leden van de regering die eind februari door de straffrachten gedwongen werd af te treden, huisarrest hebben egen.

Volgens de Ethiopische radio heeft Makonnen de gezegd op een bijeenkomst in Addis Ababa van rond 2.000 officieren en manschappen. De premier zou naar de bijeenkomst ontboden zijn door de strijdkrachten die hem hadden laten weten dat het leger gedwongen was om in te grijpen als er niet onmiddellijk tegen de ministers werd opgetreden.

Het leger verwijst de ministers dat zij het land in een economische chaos hebben gestort, zich op onwettige wijze verrijkt hebben en na hun aftreden hebben samengezworen om verdedigheid te raken.

PLANNEN

Makonnen gaf de bijeenkomst een uitvoerige uiteenzetting van de hervormingsplannen van zijn regering. Hij vroeg de aanwezigen voor hun voorbereiding gezakt en deed een beroep op hen om voorbeeld te geven van de tucht die nodig is voor het land in de komende dagen die nog zullen komen. De premier zou het huisarrest van de voormalige ministers bekend hebben gemaakt toen

hem de vraag werd gesteld waarom een arme Ethiopier die een brood heeft gestolen, onmiddellijk de gevangens ingaat, terwijl de ex-ministers die ernstige misdaden zouden hebben begaan, niet voor de rechtbank worden gedaagd en maar ongehinderd op straat rondlopen.

Makonnen zei dat er een commissie is benoemd die een onderzoek moet instellen naar het gedrag van de voormalige ministers.

POLITIE

In de stad Asmara heeft de politie bekendgemaakt dat zij geen routine-werk meer zal verrichten, omdat haar eis tot ontslag van het landelijke hoofd van de politie, luitenant-generaal Yitama Shideshi, niet is ingewilligd. Voorts hebben de 1.200 spoorwegmannen die woensdag in staking zijn gegaan, de vrachtauto's tegengehouden die goederen van Asmara naar de havenstad Massawa zouden brengen.

Arbeidsrust in Canada

OTTAWA — De postertijen, het commerciële luchtverkeer en het scheepvaartverkeer op de St-Lawrence rivier in Canada zijn verlamd door een staking die het land dagelijks enkele miljoenen dollars kost. De arbeidsrust duurt nu al meer dan een week en zal volgens de Canadese parlementaire oppositie de inflatie, die momenteel jaarlijks 10 procent bedraagt, bevorderen.

Door wisse stakingen is de helft van alle postkantoren in het land van alle postkantoren in het land

Opgemerkt Chili

De Chileense vluchtelingen in Nederland schijnen „aanpassingsproblemen“ te hebben. Dit nogal langdurige versblijfsel blijkt ondermeer veroorzaakt te worden doordat zij het nog steeds niet kunnen verkroppen dat de socialistische droom van de Marxistische president definitief voorbij is en dat hun land nu beheerst wordt door een kleine groep reactionairen die met terreur, onderdrukking en folteringen probeert het volk onder de duim te houden. Met zo'n lange volzin kom je een heel eind in Nederland en dit hadden deze idealisten al gauw in de gaten.

VERZORGING

Want wat is het geval? Werken doen de meeste van de ongeveer 250 vluchtelingen van middelbare en universitair niveau niet. Ongeveer de helft van hen is ondergebracht in het „Huis ter Schie“ in Overschie, waar zij op het terras genieten van de zon of volleybal spelen in de tuin. Kost en inwoning zijn gratis en aan het einde van de week vangen zij ook nog eens vijftienvintig gulden zakgeld. Daarbij krijgen zij nog gratis taalcursussen, een rijbewijs voor de bus en een vergoeding voor elke reis die zij moeten maken.

Door

N. van Nieuwenhuysen

U vindt dat zij het beter hebben als menig Nederlands bejaarde? Waarschijnlijk hebt u gelijk, want de Chileense ballingen behoeven niet van de bijstand te leven; zij worden namelijk gefinancierd door de geblokkeerde gelden voor ontwikkelingshulp aan hun vaderland Chili. Zo ziet u maar hoe goed ons belastinggeld wordt besteed.

Daar dit in de watten geleide groepje ballingen zelfs hier nog niet volle maat de revolutie predikt is het misschien nuttig enige feiten te noemen. Feiten die op het ministerie in Den Haag welbekend zijn, maar om de een of andere reden nooit de pers in Nederland halen.

FEITEN

De vluchtelingen hebben voor het overgrote deel niet eens de Chileense nationaliteit. Zij zijn afkom-

Liberaal Kennedy aan



BELGRADO — In Amerikaanse senator Edward Kennedy heeft donderdagochtend op een persconferentie in de Zuidslavische hoofdstad Belgrado de vlootsectoren van de NAVO veroordeeld die onlangs in het noorden van de Adriatische Zee zijn geboden.

Deze oefeningen hebben het geschil tussen Italia en Zuidslavie over de zogenaamde "zone B" ten zuiden van Trieste verheerlijkt. Kennedy verzette het geen afdoende reden dat de oefening niet kon worden afgelast omdat er al verscheidene maanden tevoren in voorbereiding waren genomen. De Amerikaanse senator is donderdag na een bezoek van drie dagen, tijdens hetwelk hij besprekingen voerde met onder meer president Tito, naar de Sovjet-Unie doorgereisd. Hij zal eerst onder de "vlucht" te zijn van zijn gesprekken met het Zuidslavische staatsbeleid.

20 werknemers achterste omdat zij T-shirts droegen, waarop het publiek werd verzocht de Canadese postbrieven te boycotten. De werknemers wilden looncijfers stellen, maar de overheid weigert te onderhandelen totdat iedereen weer aan het werk is.

138 loodsen op de St.-Lawrence rivier, die voor alle scheepvaartverkeer zorgen tussen Montreal en Quebec zijn al een week in staking omdat zij een onmiddellijke loonsverhoging eisen van 20.000 tot 38.000 dollar per jaar. De regering heeft hen 35.000 dollar geboden over een periode van drie jaar en zoekt momenteel naar mogelijkheden om de loosissen te dwingen het werk te hervatten.

Ook het luchthaven personeel eist loonsverhoging van rond de 8000 dollar. De acht grootste luchthavens van het land hebben de afgelopen week op halve kracht gewerkt. Verder dreigt een staking van de verkeersbedieners.

steh in deze Zuid- en Midden-Amerikaanse landen worden bezig gehouden met onwettige en revolutionaire gedragingen. Daarom zij de uiteindelijke consequenties niet wensten te dragen.

In het Chili van Allende vueden zij zich thuis omdat Allende begrip toonde voor hun gedrae. Zijn eerste daad als president, toen hij in november 1970 geïnstalleerd was, bestond namelijk uit het afschaffen van amnestie voor al diegenen die misdaden waren van een terroristische ondergrondse organisatie, voor hen die in de laatste maanden onder zijn voorganger waren aangeklaagd voor het beroven van banken, gewelddadige overvallen op geldbedieningswinkels, diefstal van wapens uit militaire depots, ontvoeringen en moordaanlagen.

Dat sommigen van deze revolutionairen Chileens democratische status kregen is ook verduidelijk als men weet dat de regering van Allende een beleid voerde dat er op gericht was om juist verdedigingsvergunningen te geven aan dit type revolutionairen. Deze verdedigingen van middelbaar en hoger niveau bleken namelijk in Chili geen aanpassingsmogelijkheden te hebben. Zij vonden dan ook weliswaar hun weg naar belangrijke strategische posities in de regering.

Slapeloze nachten hadden de "vervolgden" in Chili ook niet, omdat zij zich beschermd vueden door een tot de tanden gewapend militair-Marxistisch soldaatencorps. Zo'n 10.000 revolutionairen nu alle windstrekken stonden hen toe beschikking.

DEFINITIEF

In het "Berliner Tagblatt" een Zwitserse krant die zich niet aan overdrijving schuldig maakt, schrijft dr. Mario Paelma van de Freiburger Universiteit: "Het concept van de politieke vluchteling kan met betrekking tot Chili slechts in zeer beperkte mate gelden. Hoe men ook mag staan tegenover de militaire junta, een ding is zeker: de Chileense vluchtelingen vueden niet alleen vervolgd voor hun ideologie, status of afkomst. Dit laatste is de traditionele humanitaire afwijking van een vervolgte. Voor het grootste deel zijn het mensen die in hun eigen land wettelijk aangeklaagd kunnen worden voor misdaden die onder elk rechtsbestel strafbaar zijn.

Deze vluchtelingen vueden in Chili daden uit die in strijd waren met de grondwet. In beide zijn het specialisten in geweld. Om deze redenen zochten zij asiel op de buitenlandse ambassades in Santiago en daarom bevinden zich zoveel buitenlanders onder hen."

lijik halfrond
ver Cuba
ington

Irak krijgt parlement

BAGDAD — Irak krijgt voor het eerst sedert de revolutie van 1958 een volksvertegenwoordiging. Het presidium van het "progressieve nationale front" heeft hier toe besloten, zo is donderdag bekendgemaakt. Wanneer de volksvertegenwoordiging er komt en of die tot stand zal komen voor algemene verkiezingen, is nog niet besloten. In Bagdad staat een groot gebouw voor een nationale vergadering maar het is nog nooit gebruikt. De socialistische Baas-partij en de communisten werken samen in het progressieve nationale front.

oen donder-
en ministers
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nalaten te voorkomen dat de invloed uit Latijns-Amerika nog meer aan beperkingen onderhevig wordt gemaakt.

GOUDPRODUKTIE ACHTERUIT

Grote onrust onder mijnwerkers in Z.-Afrika

JOHANNESBURG — In de afgelopen weken is moord en doodslag in de Zuidafrikaanse goudmijnen onder de zwarte mijnwerkers tot een zorgbarende omvang uitgegroeid. De jongste balans van bloedige stamtwisten tussen gastarbeiders uit Lesotho en de Ntsoa's in de goudmijn Carletonville, bij Johannesburg, luidt: tien doden en drie en zestig gewonden.

De meeste slachtoffers waren gruwelijk verminkt. Slaapplaatsen werden vernield, met benzine overgoten en in brand gestoken. Vloeiende mijnwerkers zijn volgens ooggetuigen doodgeschoten.

Tienduizend Basotho's hebben sinds februari hun werkterrein in Zuid-Afrika in de steek gelaten en zijn naar hun veilige bergachtige vaderland Lesotho teruggekeerd. Vele andere zijn van plan ook naar Lesotho terug te gaan. Na de Basotho's vrezzen thans de mijnwerkers uit Malawi aan de beurt te zijn.

INSPRAAK

Woordvoerders van de zwarte mijnwerkers verklaren, dat de mijnwerkers niets in te brengen hebben tegenover de blanke leiding van de mijnen en niets aan de arbeidsom-

zegt te weten waarom de mijnwerkers elkaar doodslaan. Hun vertegenwoordigers weten het niet en ik betwijfel, of de arbeiders zelf het wel weten", aldus de bedrijfsleider.

Veien menen, dat ingewetelde

stammen- vijandschap de oorzaak is van de onlusten. Daarbij komt dat bij de huidige woningnood een nietige aantekening voldoende is om de haat tegen de gastarbeiders tot een explosie te brengen. De mijnmaatschappijen hebben zich tot dusver verzet tegen de eis, de zwarte mijnwerkers te groeperen naar de streken waar zij vandaan komen. Zij menen, dat dan nog grotere onlusten zouden ontstaan. Het zou zelfs tot "slachtpartijen" kunnen komen. Intussen gaat de goudproduktie achteruit. In Lesotho zit de regering met het probleem van de broedeloos geworden teruggekeerde

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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TERRORIST "REFUGEES" IN EUROPE, AND COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN CRITICALLY ANALYZING EVENTS LEADING TO CHILE COUP AND REASSESSING THEIR OWN PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY DEALING WITH NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES AND ASSUMING POWER BY NON-VIOLENT MEANS. MIGHT ALSO MAKE POINT THAT WITH VIETNAM NO LONGER AN ISSUE, CHILE REPRESENTS ONE FOCUS FOR ENGENERING UNITY BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST LEFT IN WESTERN EUROPE.

5. FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON EXTREME LEFTIST VIEWS/ACTIVITY, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR ZDF REPORTER MIGHT CONTACT "SOCIALIST BUREAU," SPONSOR OF SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL. (SEE BONN 31174 AND BBONN 31869). FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON JUNTA VIEWS, SUGGEST CONTACT DEUTSCH-CHILENISCHER BUND (SEE BERLIN 11306, OCT 73). *(276994)*

6. FILE: 200-126-107/11. E2 IMPDET.H

In AC/ISS/CAG/PSB Barbara Baldwin
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- B. DIRECTOR 554557

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 WH/6/Sec'y FEL FUSHER

1. MILTON C. REPOUSH AND RALPH K. TOLGIEN MET WITH EMILIO GALETZKI ON 25 MAY AND PASSED REF B INFO. TOLGIEN HAD FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH GALETZKI ON 29 MAY TO DISCUSS HIS ENCOUNTER WITH ARTHUR CUNNING.

2. GALETZKI MET CUNNING AT HOME OF ROBERT B. HARTFORD, U.S. CITIZEN EMPLOYED IN POPULATION DIVISION OF ECAFE. HARTFORD IS PRO-ALLENDE AND ORGANIZED SMALL SOCIAL GATHERING OF INTERESTED PERSONS TO MEET CUNNING AND DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE. CUNNING IS DESCRIBED AS ABOUT FORTY YEARS OLD, BLACK HAIR, FULL BEARD AND AVERAGE BUILD. HE IS A DEMOGRAPHER EMPLOYED BY UNITED NATIONS AT CENTRO LATINO AMERICANO DE DESARROLLO (CELADE) IN SANTIAGO. HE ARRIVED CHILE IN OCTOBER 1970 WITH HIS WIFE. CUNNING DEPARTED BANGKOK 27 MAY FOR DELHI, KATHMANDU AND NEW YORK AND PLANNED RETURN SANTIAGO APPROX 22 JUNE.

3. CUNNING TALKED VERY LITTLE ABOUT ALLENDE REGIME AND

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CONCENTRATED ON DISPARAGING PRESENT REGIME. CLAIMED THERE THOUSANDS OF REPRISAL KILLINGS BY ARMY, RUN AWAY INFLATION, SHORTAGE OF GOODS AND GENERAL REPRESSION BY REGIME. CUNNING VERY SUBJECTIVE IN STATEMENTS AND HAD FEW FACTS TO BACK UP STATEMENTS. WHEN GALETZKI ASKED CUNNING HOW HE KNEW THERE "THOUSANDS OF KILLINGS". CUNNING CLAIMED "THERE IS CIA REPORT WHICH STATES OVER TWENTY THOUSAND HAD BEEN KILLED." GALETZKI FOUND PORTIONS OF REF 6 INFO USEFUL IN REFUTING CUNNING STATEMENTS. HOWEVER GALETZKI'S TEMPER GOT THE BEST OF HIM HALF WAS THROUGH MEETING AND FRIEND SUGGESTED THAT HE REFRAIN FROM ARGUING WITH CUNNING LEST THE SITUATION BECOME VIOLENT.

4. GALETZKI TELEXED REPORT ON CUNNING TO HIS EMBASSY IN TOKYO. HE TOLD TOLGIEN WOULD PASS HIM ANY FEED BACK INFO ON CUNNING HE MIGHT RECEIVE.

5. REQUEST PDA AND ZOI ON GALETZKI TO DEVELOP AND RECRUIT AS MOLIMBER ASSET TARGETTED PRIMARILY ON AEFISH. TOLGIEN WILL UTILIZE COVER AS [REDACTED] DURING DEVELOPMENT.

6. FILE: 22-795277, 201-GALETZKI, E2, IMPDET.

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TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PSYCH

REF: DIRECTOR 553537

Refer to K

File. FUSMEN

1. FUERNING-3 HAS CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONTACT WITH LOCAL OFFICES OF MAJOR WIRE SERVICES. WE TASKING HIM WITH COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF REPS HERE AS WELL AS SPOTTING AND ASSESSMENT INFO ON WHO MIGHT BE DISPOSED TO COLLABORATE WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT.
2. STATION ALSO EXPLORING REF WITH FUFRUNK-1 AND FUDOME-16.
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- WH/6/RR _____
- WH/6/Sec'y _____

1. CAQUARRY ADVISED ZDF MAGAZIN PLANNING ANOTHER FEATURE ON CHILE FOCUSING ON CHILEAN POLITICAL REFUGEES IN WEST GERMANY. CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE EXPOSE REVOLUTIONARY/CRIMINAL BACKGROUND OF SOME OF REFUGEES AND IDENTIFY ANY LIVING IN GERMANY UNDER FALSE IDENTITY. ALSO INTERESTED FOCUSING ON WORLD-WIDE LEFTIST EFFORT DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME. AS PART FEATURE CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ZDF INTERVIEW A PERSON KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOVE. IDEALLY SUBJECT SHOULD BE PERSON OF SOME STATURE. INTERVIEW CAN BE MADE LATIN AMERICA, NORTH AMERICA, OR IN EUROPE. SECURITY NOT A PROBLEM AS CAQUARRY WILL SIMPLY ASSIGN NETWORK REPORTER TO MAKE INTERVIEW ON NONWHITTING BASIS USING QUESTIONS CAQUARRY WILL PROVIDE.

F.I.
FUOMEN

2. ALSO APPRECIATE ANY BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO CAQUARRY, GERMAN LANGUAGE MATERIAL MOST USEFUL SINCE CAQUARRY HAS NO ENGLISH OR SPANISH CAPABILITY.

CABLE REC DISSEM BY		PLN	TOTAL COPIES		NUM BY	REPRODUCTION BY OTHER IMA ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED	
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		S E C R E T					
ADVANCE COPY ACTION UNIT	ISSUED	SLOTTED	BY	AL	STAFF		
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ACTION #	O						
T 137600		EJAD65		PAGE 02-02		IN 262014	
				TOH:241716Z MAY 74		BNNB J1991	

3. RE PARA 2 REF, STILL ON "PER DU" BASIS MATTHOEFER RECENTLY CONTACTED CAQUARRY TO ASK HIM MAKE PUBLIC RETRACTION OF PARA 2 STATEMENT. CAQUARRY REFUSED AND SUGGESTED MATTHOEFER INSTITUTE LIBEL SUIT, MATTHOEFER QUICKLY BACKED DOWN. INCIDENTALLY, IN APPARENT BONE TO LEFT-WING SPD, HOS WILL NOTE THAT MATTHOEFER HAS BEEN APPOINTED MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER NEW GOVERNMENT.

4. FILE: 201-0230705; X-REF 201-0903816. E2-IMPDET.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER _____ TOTAL COPIES 33-1 RUN BY _____

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____ **SECRET**

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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T 120861 EI4160

PAGE 21-01

IN 251122

TOR:141022Z MAY 74

15691

SECRET 142938Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE [] 15691

TO: DIRECTOR INFO []

FUCMEN PSYCH

REF: A. DIRECTOR 549305

B. [] 22455 (N 239973)

1. NO STATION TRACES []

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

File FUCMEN

- G/WH/6
- DC/WH/6
- WH/6/SA *low*
- WH/6/FI
- WH/6/RR
- WH/6/Sec'y

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____

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	N			C/OP2, PS/EG 4, DSG/OC, C/OPS.	2
	P				3
O					

T 103782 EIA146 PAGE 01 IN 250476

TOR:1318512 MAY 74

SAGO 29117

SECRET 131621Z MAY 74 STAFF
 CITE SANTIAGO 29117 (JABAUT ACTING)
 TO: PARIS INFO DIRECTOR,
 TOFOCUS UNSOBER
 REFI A. DIRECTOR 549348

C/WH/6 _____
 DC/WH/6 _____
 WH/6/SA _____
 WH/6/PI _____
 WH/6/RS _____
 WH/6/Sec'y _____

B. PARIS 48390 (IN 250170)

1. AGREE WITH REF B RECOMMENDATION TO AWAIT OUTCOME OF FRENCH ELECTION BEFORE DECIDING IF AND HOW TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1. IN MAKING THAT DECISION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED:

A. WHILE STATION HAS CAPABILITY VIA FUTRUNK-1 (IDEN FOR PARIS), RECENTLY RECRUITED SALARIED AGENT, TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1 IN OBTAINING INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT OUR INTERVENTION, NO MATTER HOW SUBTLE, WOULD VERY PROBABLY IDENTIFY UNSOBER-1 TO FUTRUNK-1 AS AGENCY COLLABORATOR.

B. THE CHILEAN GOVT IS VERY SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN PRESS CRITICISM AND WOULD LOOK UNHAPPILY ON ANY T.V. PROGRAM WHICH REFLECTS BADLY ON GOVT, REGARDLESS OF HOW SLIGHT THE CRITICISM MIGHT BE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO OBTAIN

Handwritten: FUOMEN

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T 103782		EIA146		PAGE 02-02	
				IN 250476	
				TOR11310912 MAY 74	
				SAGU 29117	

FUTRUNK-1'S ASSISTANCE FOR ANY PROGRAM WHICH COULD PROVE
EMBARRASSING TO HIM.

2. FILE# 201-872997. E2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
 AGS 0 0 0 0 0 0
 COI 0 0 0 0 0 0
 MCP 0 0 0 0 0 0
 TOG 0 0 0 0 0 0
 PPE 0 0 0 0 0 0
 WHO 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
102248Z DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
549348

CONF: *Surf*

INFO: FILE *1744, WH 8, SS-5, Rteq4, C/P-2*

DISSEM BY: *49*
 TO: INR
 TO: INR
 RETURN TO: PER
 TO: INR #

TO: SANTIAGO INFO PARIS.Y

TOFOCUS UNSOBER Y

REF: OFAA-2356, 9 APRIL 74 (NOT NEEDED SANTIAGO)Y

1. TOFOCUS ACTIVITY SEEKS TO DEVELOP ASSETS TO INFLUENCE NEWS AND OTHER PROGRAMMING WITH POLITICAL CONTENT IN TV SERVICES. IN THIS HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY TOUGH NUT TO CRACK, BUT STATION HAS MADE RECENT PROGRESS WITH UNSOBER/1. THIS FORMER STAFF RECENTLY COMPLETED A 30-MINUTE REPORTAGE ON CURRENT EVENTS IN WEST GERMANY. IT WAS WELL RECEIVED AND RESULTED IN HIS BEING TAPPED TO DO SECOND 30-MINUTE PROGRAM. AS UNSOBER/1 APPEARS TO BE ON WAY TO POSITION OF SUBSTANCE WITHIN TELEVISION, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST HIS RISE AND INSURE THAT STATION'S MOST PROMISING TOFOCUS ASSET ACHIEVES MOST INFLUENTIAL STATUS POSSIBLE. TO THIS END IT WOULD BE OF VALUE IF UNSOBER/2 COULD DO PROGRAM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE.Y

WV/IDA _____
 WV/ETI _____
 WV/WRB _____
 WV/PODy _____

File FUCHEN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

02-1-10					
02-1-10					

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 AGE COI ACP TOS TPE BRQ
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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
 MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
 STAFF

DATA-TIME GROUP

TYPE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

549348

INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER
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2. THE REPORTAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE DESIGNED FOR 30-MINUTE AIRING, AND WOULD HOPEFULLY CONTAIN FILMED INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND VISIT TO DAWSON ISLAND. WHILE WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE FIRST INTERVIEW GRANTED TO [] JOURNALIST BY THE HEAD OF RULING JUNTA (THUS BIG BOOST FOR UNSOBER/1), WE UNDERSTAND PINOCHET HAS GRANTED OTHER INTERVIEWS AND ALLOWED FILMING ON DAWSON ISLAND. PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CAREFULLY DISCUSSED WITH UNSOBER/1, AND HE HAS SAID REPORTAGE WOULD BE FAVORABLE BUT NOT TOTALLY UNCRITICAL--BEST TREATMENT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT COULD HOPE FOR IN [] .Y

3. TO OBTAIN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND OTHER JUNTA LEADERS AND/OR PERMISSION FOR FILM CONDITIONS ON DAWSON ISLAND AND ELSEWHERE IN CHILE, UNSOBER/1 HAS ASKED FOR BKHerald ASSISTANCE. UNSOBER/1 IS CONFIDENT THAT SUPERIORS WOULD APPROVE PROGRAM IF UNSOBER/1 COULD ASSURE THEM THAT HE WOULD BE GRANTED INTERVIEWS, ETC.Y

4. PLEASE ADVISE WHAT ASSISTANCE SANTIAGO STATION CAN PROVIDE TO UNSOBER/1.Y

5. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 8 MAY 1974
 ORG: DAN WAGNER:LD
 UNIT: E/F/INT
 EXT: 9111

CIE/CA *[Signature]*

C/WH *[Signature]*

DC/WH/6 *[Signature]*

CIE/F *[Signature]*

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS

THIRITED E 2 IMPDET
 CL BY: 055747

OUTGOING MESSAGE

32-1

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CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

STAFF

CONF: EUR8

DATE TIME GROUP

102239Z

DIRECTOR

INFO: FILE 11/11N SBB: (WMS) SSS

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

547305

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: KS
 0 NO INDEX
 0 RETURN TO PER
 0 W FILE #

TO: [] INFO [] SANTIAGO. Y

FUOMEN PSYCH Y

REF: [] 22455 | IN 239973 | Y

1. A FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICER (AECLUSTER) REPORTED THAT THE NAME OF ONE ANDRES ALEKSANDROVICH K Y U N G, BORN 1945, NATURALIZED SWEDISH CITIZEN, APPEARED ON SOVIET VISA BLACKLIST AND HE TO BE DENIED VISA TO USSR. NO REASON GIVEN FOR THIS DENIAL BY MFA. (DOI: MID-1971). NO OTHER TRACE HQS FILES. Y

2. [] PLS FURNISH TRACES SUBJECT REF. Y

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.H

DC/WH/ []
 WH/ []
 WH/ []
 WH/ []
 WH/ []

WH/B (CHILE)- 2. K. []

SB/X/EU- []

File FUOMEN

DATE: 10 MAY 74 *view*
 ORIG: MARIA C. WALSH/JD
 UNIT: E/SC/S
 EXT: 1588

[Signature]
 C7EUR
 RELEASING OFFICER

[Signature]
 AC/E/SC
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 008234

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____ **SECRET**

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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T 123294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170

TOR: 131542Z MAY 74

PARI-48390

SECRET 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF
CITE PARIS 48390
TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.
TOFUCUS UNSOBER
REF: DIRECTOR 549349

- CIV/1/6 _____
- DC/1/1/6 Use
- WH/6/3/1 _____
- WH/6/1/1 _____
- WH/6/1/2 _____
- WH/6/1/3/1 _____

*FUG
FUCHEM*

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).
2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HQS TOFUCUS OFFICER.
3. FILE: 221-872997. E-2 IMPDET

FORM 3120b
23 AUG 68

TABLE REC DISSEM BY 9 PER _____ TOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY _____

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____ **SECRET**

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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ACTION #				

T 133294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170
TOR:1315422 MAY 74 PAR: 48390

SECRET 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR,

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HQS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

FORM 3020
21 MAR 73

TABLE REC DISSEM BY 9 PER _____ TOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY _____

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____ **SECRET**

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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ACTION #	<u>MOPS</u>	<u>SSS</u>	3
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T 133294 E1A670 PAGE 01 IN 250170
 TOR1131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

SECRET 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF
 CITE PARIS 48390
 TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.
 TOFUCUS UNSOBER
 REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).
2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HOS TOFUCUS OFFICER.
3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

241838

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 35 PER TOTAL COPIES 30-2 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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ACTION UNIT	FILE	VH IP/AN, 555, PS/E6.4	1
EUR8	INFO	OPS/INT, WH8	2
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ACTION #			4

T 100017 E1AC20 PAGE 01 IN 241838-A

TOR:110024Z MAY 74 9NNB 31516

SECRET 031429Z MAY 74 STAFF
 CITE BONN BASE 31516
 TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, PARIS.
 CATHATCH CAQUARRY TOFOCUS FUOYNX
 REF: BONN BASE 31234 (IN 230053)

#132 DUPE & CORRECTED
 FOR WASH SIC NOTE.
 C/WH/16
 DC/WH/16
 WH/6/31
 WH/6/12
 WH/6/RR
 WH/6/Soc'y

FILE
OMEN
FUC

1. 1 MAY ZDF MAGAZIN WITH CAQUARRY AS MODERATOR CARRIED
 15 MINUTE FEATURE ON CHILE, A THEME LONG DISCUSSED WITH CAQUARRY.
 MAIN PART FEATURE WAS INTERVIEW WITH SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN,
 FRIEDRICH B E E R M A N N (SUBJECT REF) WHO RECENTLY RETURNED
 FROM VISIT CHILE AND SPOKE WITH GENERAL PINOCHET. BEERMANN
 STRESSED THAT ALLENDE GOVERNMENT HAD RULED ILLEGALLY, CONDITIONS
 NOT AS BAD AS THEY SEEM AND THAT OVERALL CHILEAN POPULATION
 FAVORED ALLENDE'S OVERTHROW. SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT INTERVIEW
 WITH SPD POLITICIAN AND SPD, AS INFLUENCED BY ITS LEFT WING,
 HAS BEEN STRONGLY ANTI-JUNTA.

2. HANS M A T T H O E F E R, LEFT WING SPD PARLIAMEN-
 TARIAN AND STATE SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION, HAS BEEN
 LEADING GERMAN OPPOSITION TO JUNTA AND ALSO TRYING BLOCK
 ECONOMIC AID. DRAWING ON FUAWL/5 BACKGROUND INFO (SEE EGN-5363,
 NOV 73) WE HAVE DISCUSSED MATTHOEFER IN DETAIL WITH CAQUARRY

FORM 3070
11 AUG 68

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY _____ PER _____ TOTAL COPIES _____ RUN BY _____

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____ **SECRET** _____

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IN 241838

T 122017 E1A020

PAGE 02-02

~~IN 247048~~

TOP:112024Z MAY 74

BNNB 31516

QUESTIONING HIS MOTIVATION IN STRONG SUPPORT ALLENDE AND EVEN STRONGER CONDEMNATION OF JUNTA, BY COINCIDENCE CAQUARRY ON PER "DU" BASIS WITH MATTHOEFER (NOT FOR SAME POLITICAL IDEALS) AND WELL AWARE MATTHOEFER BACKGROUND INVOLVMENT LEFT WING ACTIVITIES. END OF CHILE FEATURE CARRIED STATEMENT BY CAQUARRY THAT IT STRANGE MATTHOEFER CONDONED ALLENDE GOVT USE OF FORCE AS NECESSARY WHILE HE IS PRESENTLY VOCIFEROUS IN CONDEMNING JUNTA ACTIVITIES. STATEMENT SERVED EMPHASIZE SPD NON-OBJECTIVITY IN DEALING WITH CHILE.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON [] SUGGEST OPEN 201 SINCE HE ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL [] AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE INVOLVED IN ANY FUTURE POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN RIGHT AND LEFT WINGS []

4. FILE: 221-2230705 X-REF 221- [] E2 IMPDET
WASH S/C NOTE: PARIS ADDED INFO ACDEE PER HQS REQUEST.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY _____ PER _____ TOTAL COPIES _____ RUN BY _____

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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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I RF FILE VR

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T 077141

EIA230

PAGE 02-02

IN 239973

TOR:021103Z MAY 74

22455

AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".

2. KUNG (DPOB: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72) EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO. HAS PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC STATES.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



CABLE SEC DISSEM BY *116* PER *[redacted]* TOTAL COPIES *25-1* RUN BY
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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ACTION * *11/17*

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052272 EIA036 PAGE 01 IN 231132
TOR:231149Z APR 74 HAMB 24795

SECRET 232953Z APR 74 STAFF
CITE HAMBURG 24795 (SWARZCHILD ACTING)
TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE, SANTIAGO.
FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL
REF: DIRECTOR 540262

1. WELCOME RECEIVING SPECIAL BRIEF FOR PURPOSES INDICATED IN REF.
2. RELUCTANT TO LEAVE MEDIA FIELD ON CHILE TO SOVIETS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. SUGGEST THEREFORE HQS KEEP OPEN MIND ON SELECTIVE PLACEMENTS SHORT OF GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME.
3. SINCE WOMEN LIKELY TO CONTINUE PLAYING PIVOTAL ROLE IN FURTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, BELIEVE THEIR VIEWS AND REACTIONS OUGHT BE GIVEN MORE PLAY. AS AN EXAMPLE, COULD POSSIBLY ENGINEER ARTICLE IN GERMAN MAGAZINE "DER STERN" (CIRCULATION 1,500,000), WHICH THUS FAR IN VANGUARD OF ANTI-JUNTA PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, THROUGH *[redacted]*
4. FILE: 15-124-46/3. E2 IMPDET.

[Handwritten signature]

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DATE	11/16/74

RECORD COPY
SECRET

15-124-52
23 Apr 74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY

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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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AGENCY MESSAGE

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RF. FILE. VR. IPAN EUR8, WH8,
OSG/IC, S38, PS/EG4, C/OPS

1		
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Y 724892

PAGE 01

IN 104043

FOR IP410112 DEC 73

HAMB 23010

SECRET 040921Z DEC 73 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 23918

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.

MHCUNCH CASPECIAL FUDMEN TOWITY

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1. BASE INTERESTED IN "DOS ANOS DE PENETRACION SOVIETICA EN CHILE" (PORTADA 39) AS VEHICLE TO ENLIGHTEN GERMAN AUDIENCE RE EXTENT OF SOVIET/CUBAN INFILTRATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FABRIC OF CHILE.

2. STUDY COULD BE FLESHED OUT TO ENCOMPASS POLITICO/MILITARY ASPECTS THIS PENETRATION, ESPECIALLY PERCEPTIONS GAINED BY TWO NAVAL PURCHASING MISSIONS, THE LAST VISITING USSR JUST PRIOR TO ALLENDE'S DOWNFALL WHEN CHILEAN NAVY REPS GIVEN RUNAROUND AND TREATED WITH BARE CIVILITY. IT MAY ALSO BE USEFUL TO MENTION THAT SOVIETS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE OFFERED TO SUPPLY ALLENDE (NOT CHILEAN ARMED FORCES) WITH ARMAMENTS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF DEFENDING HIS REGIME. ALLENDE'S MOSCOW VISIT AND UNAVAILING PLEA FOR SOVIET SALVAGING OPERATION IS CRUCIAL ASPECT OF AMBIGUOUS SOVIET ROLE WHICH EUROPEAN LEFT HAS CONVENIENTLY SWEEPED UNDER THE RUG.

3. REQUEST HQS COMMENTS RE FEASIBILITY OF TURNING OUT FINISHED PRODUCT TO MEET EUROPEAN REQUIREMENTS WHICH AT PRESENT PREEMPTED

SECRET
RECORD COPY

04 DEC 73

15-124-52

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3-74

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		S E C R E T	

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED	BY	AI	Z	AGENCY MESSAGE	
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ACTION #	O					

T 724892

PAGE 02-02

IN 104043

TO RI 041011Z DEC 73

HAMB 23918

BY LEFTIST-GENERATED COPY ON CHILEAN DEVELOPMENTS. IF AFFIRMATIVE,
 SHALL TAKE SOUNDINGS ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
 VEHICLE.

4. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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
MITTED AND REGRETTED AN OFFICIAL FIGURE OF 581 DEATHS IN CONNECTION WITH CHILEAN COUP, BUT ADDED THAT CHILEANS RESPECTED HUMAN LIFE, WHILE 'IN CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF HAD, AS HIS DAILY PASTIME, THE WATCHING OF EXECUTIONS BEFORE THE FIRING SQUAD WALL, TO WHICH HE EVEN INVITED SOME OF THE DIPLOMATS...'

4. "AT THAT POINT ROA ROSE FROM HIS SEAT AND DASHED DOWN THE AISLE TOWARD THE ROSTRUM, SHOUTING 'FAG', 'SONG OF A WHORE' AND OTHER INSULTS AT BAZAN, IN SPANISH. OTHER CUBANS FOLLOWED HIM. NICARAGUAN DELEGATION, SEATED IN FRONT NEAR ROSTRUM, ROSE TO BLOCK THE CUBANS. OTHER LATIN FLOCKED TO FRONT OF THE HALL. A DIPLOMAT WHO WAS THERE SAID A CUBAN SHOWED HE WAS CARRYING A PISTOL IN A CONFRONTATION WITH PARAGUAYAN AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO BARREIRO...."

5. "U.N. GUARDS SWARMED TO THE ROSTRUM AND THE CUBANS DISPERSED. ROA RESUMED HIS SEAT LATER. FIVE LATIN AMERICANS CAME TO THE ROSTRUM LATER TO CALL THE CUBANS 'GANGSTERS' AND CHALLENGED THE RIGHT OF A DICTATORSHIP TO CRITICIZE THEIR GOVERNMENTS. U.S. AMBASSADOR JOHN A. SCALI SAID ROA 'HAS ONCE AGAIN SUNK TO HIS USUAL LEVEL OF GUTTER VULGARITY...THE OUTMODOD VITUPERATION OF AN EARLIER ERA.'"

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PAGE 3 OF 3

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6. FILE: 15-124-52; 15-124-53. C2. IMPDET.H

*REF ATTACHED.

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1973 *W. Kent*
 ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
 UNIT: ADC/WH/L
 EXT: 6556/9155

C/WH/SA

15-124-52

James E. Blumley
 C/WH/SA
 CLASSIFICATION

W. Kent
 EA/JK/J
 CONTROLLING OFFICER

[Signature]
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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 CL BY: 057556

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TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, [] TOKYO,
THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, [] LONDON, [] INFO
SANTIAGO.

HP

RYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE

1. SINCE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S APPEARANCE BEFORE UNGA HAS RECEIVED LIMITED PRESS PLAY, BELIEVE FOLLOWING MAY BE USEFUL TO ADDRESSEES FOR BRIEFING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MEDIA AND OTHER CONTACTS WHO MAY BE INTERESTED IN CHILEAN SITUATION. MATERIAL IS LARGELY OVERT, THEREFORE NO OBJECTION TO ITS USE BY [] SO LONG AS STORY NOT PASSED OR USED VERBATIM.

2. ON 9 OCTOBER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER VICE-ADMIRAL ISMAEL HUERTA APPEARED FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR PRESENTATION BEFORE UNGA TO EXPLAIN "FACTS WHICH OBLIGED ARMED FORCES AND POLICE TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND TO ESTABLISH A REGIME OF NATIONAL RESTORATION," AND TO CHARGE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME VICTIM OF A "MOST FALSE, MOST MALEVOLENT, MOST VICIOUS AND VERY WELL-ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN."

3. HUERTA'S SPEECH STRESSED THAT ALLENDE'S MINORITY REGIME HAD

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BEEN STEERING COUNTRY IN DIRECTION OF A TOTALITARIAN TAKEOVER
 INSTIGATED AND SUPPORTED LARGELY BY CUBA; THAT CUBA INTERVENED IN
 CHILEAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS WHILE SECRETLY INFILTRATING ARMS,
 INSTRUCTORS AND PERSONNEL FOR PARAMILITARY GROUPS; INTENDED TO BECOME
 A "PARALLEL" ARMY TO OPPOSE ARMED FORCES; THAT CHILEAN MILITARY ACTED
 ONLY AFTER FAILURE OF ALL OTHER EFFORTS BY PARLIAMENT, JUDICIARY,
 PROFESSIONALS AND WORKERS TO BLOCK DRIFT TOWARD CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS.
 HE STRESSED THAT HIS GOVT IS NOT POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS AND ITS GOAL
 IS TO SET CHILE BACK ON ITS HISTORIC PATH; AFTER GOAL ACHIEVED, "WE
 WILL NOT HESITATE TO RETURN TO OUR BARRACKS AND TO OUR SHIPS."

4. HUERTA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALLENDE REGIME, THE FIRST ELECTED
 MARXIST GOVT IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE, HAD AROUSED ENTHUSIASM IN
 MANY, BUT "IT IS ONE THING, GENTLEMEN, TO EVALUATE A FOREIGN
 EXPERIENCE FROM AFAR, SEATED IN COMFORTABLE ARMCHAIRS OR IN DISCUSSION
 AROUND A WELL-SERVED TABLE. IT IS QUITE ANOTHER TO LIVE IT." HE DE-
 TAILED A HISTORY OF EVENTS OF LAST THREE YEARS, POINTING OUT THAT
 DESPITE AGREEMENTS BY ALLENDE REGIME, LATTER MOVED TO UNDERMINE
 EXISTING JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL MACHINERY OF COUNTRY, ATTEMPTING DO

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HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY, HE DECLARED. THEN, SURPRISINGLY, HE WENT ON TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO HUERTA'S CHARGES BY ADMITTING THAT CUBAN GUNS HAD IN FACT BEEN SENT INTO CHILE BUT THAT THEY HAD BEEN SENT AT ALLENDE'S REQUEST. NOR DID ROA DENY THE AUTHENTICITY OF CASTRO'S LETTER TO ALLENDE WHICH HUERTA HAD PRODUCED; ROA SAID THAT THE LETTER WAS NO SECRET.

7. FILE: 15-124-52; 15-124-53. E2; IMPDET.

DATE: 11 OCTOBER 1973 *W. Kent*
 ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT: SMO
 UNIT: ADC/UHQ/6
 EXT: 6556/9155

C/EUR
 C/UHQ

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TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 26489 | IN 031350 |

B. SANTIAGO 26512 | IN 031722 |

1. PROPOSE USE REFS FOR FUOMEN. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND

CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

*REFS ATTACHED.

WH/6 CT-4

10876 CT-4

DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1973
 ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SM3
 UNIT: ADC/UH/6
 EXT: 6356/9155

A.D. Friedman
 C/1HD

REC-CTY

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TYPE THE WORD ALIGN TO REGISTER HERE. ALL LETTERS

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[] KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY,

ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, [] CARACAS

INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

BOOK CABLE

0 FUOMEN summary of comp. events

1. FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND AND FOR PASSING LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS YOU SEE FIT:
2. FOUR-MAN MILITARY JUNTA THAT REVOLTED AGAINST MARXIST REGIME OF SALVADOR ALLENDE ON 11 SEPTEMBER HAS GAINED FULL CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, WITH EXCEPTION OF POCKETS OF RESISTANCE IN CAPITAL. ON 12 SEPT THERE WAS FIGHTING IN DOWNTOWN SANTIAGO BETWEEN THE ROOPS AND SNIPERS HOLED UP IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND IN INDUSTRIAL AREAS WHERE ALLENDE SUPPORTERS WERE BARRICADED IN FACTORIES. SPORADIC FIRING AND EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD THROUGHOUT DAY ^{AND NIGHT} BUT STRICT CURFEW KEPT OBSERVERS FROM WITNESSING ACTION. CURFEW EXTENDED TO NOON 13 SEPT.
3. AUTHORITIES ESTIMATED DEATH TOLL TO BE OVER 250 MILITARY

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AND CIVILIANS. THEY EXPECTED TO ELIMINATE LAST POCKETS RESISTANCE BY 14 SEPTEMBER.

3. JUNTA-CONTROLLED RADIO STATIONS AND ONE TV STATION OPERATING. PUBLIC UTILITIES ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY. NEWSPAPERS PLANNED RESUME LIMITED EDITIONS 13 SEPT BUT ARE SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP.

4. JUNTA ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT ALLENDE COMMITTED SUICIDE IN LA MONEDA AND TROOPS ENTERING THE BUILDING FOUND HIS BODY IN A DINING ROOM.

5. JUNTA TV PROGRAM SHOWED LARGE QUANTITIES OF SOVIET MADE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS COLLECTED AT LA MONEDA AND AT ALLENDE RESIDENCE ON TOMAS MORO STREET AFTER FIGHTING.

6. JUNTA PRESIDED OVER BY GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET (ARMY), AN INTELLIGENT, PROFESSIONAL OFFICER WITH NO KNOWN POLITICAL TIES; ADMIRAL JOSE MERINO (NAVY), WHO IS INCLINED TOWARDS NATIONAL PARTY (CONSERVATIVE); GEN. GUSTAVO LEIGH (AIR FORCE), A STRONG LEADER WHO FORMER SUPPORTER RADICAL PARTY AND KNOWN TO DISLIKE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS; AND GENERAL CESAR MENDOZA, (CARABINERO CHIEF) WHO HAS

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CLOSE TIES TO MILITARY AND APPARENTLY HELPED PLAN COUP.

7. JUNTA NAMED FOLLOWING CABINET 12 SEPT:

MINISTER OF INTERIOR - MAJ GEN OSCAR BONVILLA (ARMY), WHO SERVED AS PRESIDENT FREI'S SENIOR MILITARY AIDE FOR TWO YEARS.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS - REAR ADMIRAL ISMAEL HUERTA (NAVY), HIGHLY RESPECTED IN NAVY AND ONE OF INTELLECTUAL LEADERS OF COUP.

MINISTER OF ECONOMY - MAJ GEN ROLANDO GONZALEZ (ARMY), REPORTED TO BE A U.P. SUPPORTER ABOUT 1971.

MINISTER OF EDUCATION - JOSE NAVARRO TOBAR, A CIVILIAN BIOLOGY AND BOTANY PROFESSOR OF UNKNOWN POLITICS.

MINISTER OF JUSTICE - GONZALO PRIETO GANDARA, CIVILIAN LAWYER.

MINISTER OF DEFENSE - VICE ADM. PATRICIO CARVAJAL, FORMERLY CHIEF OF NATIONAL DEFENSE STAFF, REPORTED INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1971.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION - BRIG

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GEN SERGIO FIGUEROA (AIR FORCE), REPORTED IN EARLY 1972 TO BE AMONG ANTI-U.P. AIR FORCE COLONELS.

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE - COL SERGIO CRESPO (RET. AIR FORCE), AGRICULTURAL AND CIVIL ENGINEER.

MINISTER OF LABOR - GEN MARIO MACKAY (CARABINEROS), ANTI-U.P. OFFICER NAMED IN JULY AS COMMANDER IN CONCEPCION.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH - COL ALBERTO SPOERER (AIR FORCE), FORMER CIVILIAN SURGEON DESCRIBED AS HARD WORKER.

MINISTER OF MINING - GEN ARTURO YOVANE (CARABINEROS), WHO WAS SCHEDULED TO BE RETIRED BY ALLENDE IN AUGUST, CLOSE TO MILITARY.

MINISTER OF HOUSING - BRIG GEN ARTURO VIVERO, HARD-WORKING STAFF OFFICER WHOSE PERFORMANCE UNDER PRESSURE SOMEWHAT WEAK.

SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT - COL PEDRO EWING (ARMY), DESCRIBED AS INTELLIGENT, PATRIOTIC, CONSERVATIVE.

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PER # _____

UNDERSECRETARY OF INTERIOR - LTM COL ENRIQUE MONTERO
 (AIR FORCE) FORMER LEGAL OFFICER IN AIR FORCE.

MINISTER OF LANDS AND COLONIZATION - GEN DIEGO PARRA
 RETIRED CARABINERO OFFICER, ON WHOM LITTLE IS KNOWN.

MINISTER OF FINANCE - REAR ADM LORENZO ORTUZAR,
 LITTLE KNOWN OFFICER.

8. JUNTA HAS BROKEN RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND WILL PROBABLY
 BREAK WITH OTHER SOVIET BLOC STATES. IT WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR
 TO STRENGTHEN TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY TIES WITH U.S. AND SEEK AID AND
 DEBT RELIEF FOR INTERIM.

9. JUNTA WILL PROBABLY DECLARE COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST AND SMALL
 LEFTIST PARTIES SUCH AS MIR ILLEGAL AND DISSOLVE CUT LABOR CONFEDERA-
 TION. THEY DO NOT PLAN WORK WITH POLITICAL PARTIES BUT MAY CONSULT
 WITH THEM. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS EXPECTED TO EXPRESS
 SUPPORT FOR THE JUNTA AS IS THE OTHER MAJOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL
 GROUP, NATIONAL PARTY. STRIKING TRUCKERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUILDS
 HAVE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH COUP AND CALLED OFF STRIKE.

10. FILE: 15-124-52. E 2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1973
 ORIG: WILLIAM CLYONE DSO
 UNIT: C/WH/B/RR
 EXT: 7710/1069

15-124-52

[Signature]
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 C/WH/B

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PAGE 01

IN 225831

TOR1171326Z APR 74

HAMB 24759

SECRET 171253Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 24759

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, SANTIAGO,

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

1. CHIL'S IMAGE AS REFLECTED IN WEST GERMAN MEDIA COMMENTARIES HAS REACHED ALL-TIME LOW AND EVEN CONSERVATIVELY INCLINED OUTLETS BY AND LARGE, NO LONGER BOTHER TO TELL "THE OTHER SIDE." EASTERN RADIO STATIONS MAINTAIN RELENTLESS DRUMFIRE OF ANTI-CHILEAN PROPAGANDA AND THERE NO APPARENT DEARTH OF INFO TO SUSTAIN RATHER EFFECTIVE DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN.

2. IN SPITE OF DISMAL AUSPICES TO TURN TIDE, (UNLESS JUNTA DECIDES TO SHOW SOME DECENT REGARD FOR OPINIONS OF MANKIND), WE CAN STILL PROMOTE FAIRER UNDERSTANDING OF IMPERATIVES OF CHILEAN SITUATION TO WHICH JUNTA APPARENTLY FEELS IMPELLED TO RESPOND. TOWARD THAT END, REQUIRE SOME TYPE OF OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OF PREDICTABLE TRENDS.

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IN 880779

TOR: 042140Z APR 73

SAGO 24516

SECRET 042118Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 24516

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 24477

(in 878105)

B. DIRECTOR 391223

AN	Ka
AB	y
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1. IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS REF A INFO IF IT WERE SURFACED OR IF IT CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE U.P. GOVERNMENT, STATION RECOMMENDS AGAINST FUOMEN EXPLOITATION AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

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T 827548

PAGE 01

IN 136804

TOR: 141717Z JAN 74

SAGO - 27899

SECRET 141556Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 27899

TO: DIRECTOR, PARIS, BONN, TOKYO, LONDON,

RYBAT FUUMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 499469 -15-124-52

1. WISH TO OFFER FOLLOWING SUGGESTED CHANGES IN REF WHICH BASED ON LATEST INFO AVAILABLE LOCALLY. PARA 3: "...CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO FOR IMPORTS/EXPORTS BY SLIGHTLY OVER 100 PERCENT IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND, ENCOURAGE EXPORTS AND EASE PRESSURES..." "...OTHER PRICE RISES BROUGHT INFLATION FOR THE YEAR TO 508 PERCENT..." (FOR DIRECTOR: WHILE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES BY BOTH EMBASSY AND IMF IN NOVEMBER PLACED INFLATION FOR THE YEAR AT PROBABLY BETWEEN 750 AND 800 PERCENT, THE END-OF-THE-YEAR FIGURE OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE WAS 508.1 SEE SANTIAGO EMBASSY TELEGRAM 0173 OF 11 JANUARY.)

2. PARA 4 LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ "THE MASSIVE 3.5 BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT..." PARA 7: "MONTHLY COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OVER THE AVERAGE DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1973 AND PRODUCTION

OPEN	TRAVEL PROGRAM
	ABSTRACT
	INDEX
	REGISTRATION
	SEARCH
	REPRODUCTION
	FILE
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PAGE 02-02

IN 136804

TOR:1417178 JAN 74

SAGO 27899

WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD OF AT LEAST 850,000 TONS IN 1974,,,"

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DIRECTOR

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TO: PARIS, , BONN, TOKYO, LONDON INFO SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CHILE AT BEGINNING OF 1974 MAY BE USEFUL FOR ORAL BRIEFINGS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS WHO INTERESTED IN CHILE. STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION.

SEARCHED	
SERIALIZED	
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FILED	
JAN 11 1974	
FBI - NEW YORK	

2. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS AVOIDED MAJOR INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND HAS MOVED AGGRESSIVELY TO REORGANIZE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES MORE EFFICIENTLY, TO CREATE AN APOLITICAL CIVIL SERVICE, AND TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. ITS ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH AUSTERE, ARE SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE STRICT SECURITY MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE JUNTA HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING ANY LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE OR TERRORISM AND ARE LIKELY TO BE CONTINUED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

3. THE JUNTA MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP OF 11 SEPTEMBER TO REMOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE

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11 Jan 74
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CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON THE COUNTRY'S MEAGER FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88% IN OCTOBER, AND OTHER PRICE RISES PUSHED INFLATION TO SOME 770% FOR THE YEAR.

4. THE JUNTA HAS NOW AGREED TO FOLLOW THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM PROPOSED BY AN IMF TEAM WHICH VISITED CHILE IN LATE 1973. THIS PROGRAM CALLS FOR TIGHTER FEDERAL SPENDING AND FOR LIMITING INFLATION TO 100% IN 1974. THIS IMF PROGRAM IS FEASIBLE BUT MAY BE SOMEWHAT OVER-OPTIMISTIC, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE WORLD-WIDE ENERGY CRISIS WILL SOON FORCE CHILE TO RAISE FUEL PRICES, THUS EXACERBATING THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING INFLATION. ADHERENCE TO THE IMF PROPOSAL HAS, HOWEVER, IMPROVED CHILE'S CREDIT RATING, AS HAS THE SIGNING OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES ON CHILE'S 1971-1972 DEBT. CHILE IS THUS IN A RELATIVELY GOOD POSITION FOR THE OPENING OF THE PARIS CLUB TALKS IN FEBRUARY. THE MASSIVE \$4 BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT, HOWEVER, WILL CAUSE CHILE BALANCE OF BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS FOR SOME TIME.

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FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW SUBSTANTIALLY DURING 1974.

9. INTERNALLY, THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF EXCHANGE RATE HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, THE BURDEN OF AUSTERITY ON CHILEAN CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE HEALTHY INCREASES IN WAGES AND RENEWED CONFIDENCE BY BUSINESSMEN, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST NECESSITIES, AND WORKING CLASS LABOR IS TAKING A WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA OR ITS PROGRAMS. SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) ARE GRUMBLING, BUT THIS DISSATISFACTION IS LARGELY DUE TO GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO SET UP NEW NON-POLITICAL-PARTY MECHANISMS FOR REACHING THE PUBLIC.

10. GOVERNMENT "RECESSING" OF CONGRESS AND ALL POLITICAL PARTIES HAS CREATED A POLITICAL VACUUM IN CHILE. THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH HOLDS THE POLITICAL PARTIES LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR CHILE'S CURRENT PLIGHT, IS TRYING TO FILL THIS VOID BY AN INTENSE USE OF

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CIVILIAN ADVISERS TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES. THIS PHENOMENON IS MOST APPARENT IN THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND IN SUCH TECHNICAL FIELDS AS PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOUSING. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GROUP OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS HEADED BY RAUL SAEZ, FOR EXAMPLE IS WELL KNOWN. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS AN ADVISORY BOARD DOMINATED BY THE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING'S BOARD IS LARGELY CONTROLLED BY THE ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION FIRMS. SIMILARLY, ALMOST EVERY MINISTRY AND MANY AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES HAVE PERMANENT CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF GROUPS WHOSE WELFARE IS AFFECTED BY THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES.

11. IN ADDITION TO THESE CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS, THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF "STUDY COMMISSIONS" THROUGH WHICH CIVILIANS CAN EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE. BEST KNOWN OF THESE IS THE GROUP ^{OF} INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS WHICH IS DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION, BUT THERE ARE OTHER GROUPS WORKING ON A NEW MINING CODE, STUDYING THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, COLLECTING INFORMATION ON ^{AT} UNEMPLOYMENT, WRITING A STATUTE FOR WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, AND

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DELIVING INTO A DOZEN OTHER TOPICS.

12. ALTHOUGH SOME CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HOLD INFLUENTIAL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, MOST CIVILIAN ADVISERS ARE EITHER CONSERVATIVE OR APOLITICAL. LACK OF MORE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION BY CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS MAY CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THE FUTURE, ESPECIALLY SINCE ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING WORKERS, CAMPESINOS AND POBLADORES (WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED EITHER THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) OR THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT) ARE SO FAR INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED ON ADVISORY COUNCILS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED UNITS ADDRESSED TO YOUTH, WOMEN, GUILDS AND NEIGHBORHOOD CIVIC GROUPS IN THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT, AND HOPES THAT THESE WILL SERVE AS VEHICLES FOR GOVERNMENT-TO-PEOPLE COMMUNICATION.

13. THE JUNTA LEADERS VIEW WITH DISTRUST ALL PDC EFFORTS TO WIN NEW POLITICAL ADHERENTS FROM THE WORKING CLASSES WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED ALLENDE'S UP COALITION AND REPORTEDLY BELIEVE THAT THE PDC IS NOT RESPECTING THE POLITICAL RECESS. THE JUNTA IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PDC'S LEFT WING

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IN FIRM CONTROL IN CHILE AND HAS MADE IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS IN REORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT AND IN ENLISTING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ITS PROGRAMS. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT ARE THE BEST WHICH COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED FROM A COUNTRY WHOSE ENTIRE ECONOMY WAS A SHAMBLES IN SEPTEMBER 1973.

17. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 10 JANUARY 1974
 ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:LSS
 UNIT: C/WH/6/SA
 EXT: 6609/1069

WH/EICO - BILL KENT (IN DRAFT)

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EXCHANGE RATES HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. WHILE EXCHANGE RATES CHANGED AND PRICES ROSE, THE GROWTH IN THE MONEY SUPPLY HAS BEEN SHARPLY CURTAILED, CAUSING A RELATIVE SCARCITY OF LOCAL CURRENCY AND A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH FOR BUSINESSMEN.

D. THE BURDEN ON CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE A HEALTHY INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS ARE FINDING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST NECESSITIES. AUSTERITY HAS BEEN EXACERBATED IN MANY CASES BY DISMISSALS OF RELATIVELY UNPRODUCTIVE AND POLITICALLY SUSPECT EMPLOYEES HIRED UNDER THE ALLENDE REGIME. AN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED AND AN EXTENSIVE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

E. THE JUNTA IS ATTEMPTING TO ENLIST PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND BUSINESS IS SHOWING RENEWED CONFIDENCE. CONSUMERS AND LABOR, HOWEVER, ARE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA OR ITS PROGRAMS HAS MATERIALIZED, EVEN THOUGH SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE GRUMBLING AND PREDICTING

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FAILURE FOR THE JUNTA.

F. CHILE STILL FACES LARGE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICITS IN BOTH 1973 AND 1974 EVEN IF DEBT-REPAYMENTS ARE RESCHEDULED IN BOTH YEARS. WITH A MASSIVE \$4 BILLION FOREIGN DEBT HANGING OVER SANTIAGO'S HEAD, IT WILL AT LEAST BE SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE CHILE'S BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS POSITION IMPROVES SIGNIFICANTLY.

G. HOWEVER, COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50% ABOVE LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AS A RESULT OF A 9% LENGTHENING OF THE WORK WEEK AND IMPROVED MINE MANAGEMENT. PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD 750,000 TONS NEXT YEAR DESPITE CONTINUING SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND SERVICEABLE VEHICLES.

H. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS CONTINUE TO BE THE LARGEST DRAIN ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE RECOVERY OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IS A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE OF THE JUNTA. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EXPECTED TO FULLY RECOVER UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SINCE MOST CROPS ALREADY ARE PLANTED AND ARE WELL INTO THEIR GROWING SEASONS. THUS, CHILE WILL CONTINUE TO IMPORT GRAIN IN LARGE QUANTITIES DURING 1974.

I. ALTHOUGH THE PROBLEMS OF ADEQUATE SHORT RUN SUPPLIES

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OF RAW MATERIALS AND SPARE PARTS MUST BE SOLVED TO BOOST PRODUCTION QUICKLY, LONG RUN GROWTH WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON CHILE'S ABILITY TO ATTRACT ADEQUATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT. ATTRACTION OF SUBSTANTIAL NEW INVESTMENT WILL DEPEND ON THE JUNTA'S ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN EQUITY AS WELL AS THEIR ABILITY TO INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN CHILE'S PROSPECTS FOR STABLE RECOVERY AND GROWTH. A CRITICAL FIRST STEP IS TIMELY SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION CLAIMS EMANATING FROM THE ALLENDE NATIONALIZATIONS. THE JUNTA HAS STATED THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR OR, AS IN THE CASE OF THE LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE THE PREVIOUS OWNERS. SOME 90 FIRMS ARE ALREADY IN THE PROCESS OF REVERSION.

J. THUS FAR THE JUNTA HAS SUCCEEDED IN LINING UP SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE ESSENTIAL CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, AND PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW DRAMATICALLY DURING THE NEXT 12 MONTHS.

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K. THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC AS THE JUNTA TAKES STEPS TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. THE PROGRAMS, THOUGH AUSTERE, ARE ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE MAJOR POLICY CONFLICTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE OVER THE DEGREE AND TIMING OF SPECIFIC MEASURES RATHER THAN PROBLEMS OF BASIC POLICY ORIENTATION.

L. THE EMERGING DOMINANCE OF RAUL SAEZ AS SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISOR IS PROBABLY FOR THE BEST SINCE THE JUNTA'S AUSTERITY PROGRAM MUST BE TEMPERED IF POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND STABILITY IS TO BE ACHIEVED. MEANWHILE, CHILE IS PREPARING TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION ISSUES AND COMPLETE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON 1971/72 DEBT SERVICE IN ACCORD WITH THE 1972 PARIS CLUB AGREEMENTS. TIMELY RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES WILL GO FAR IN IMPROVING INVESTOR AND CREDITOR CONFIDENCE IN CHILE.

2. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUGGESTED TO ELICIT HERMES' VIEWS ON CHILE'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AS REQUESTED PARA 3 REF.

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A. HOW MUCH AND WHAT KINDS OF PRIVATE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT FROM GERMAN AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN SOURCES IS EXPECTED TO ENTER CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHS?

B. DO BANK OFFICIALS EXPECT SUBSTANTIAL PRIVATE AND/OR OFFICIAL GERMAN CREDITS TO BE EXTENDED TO CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHS? WHAT TYPES OF CREDITS WOULD THESE BE, I.E. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS RELIEF, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, TIED AND UNTIED TRADE CREDITS?

C. DO BANK OFFICIALS SEE THE WIDESPREAD ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION IN EUROPE TO THE NEW CHILEAN GOVERNMENT AS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING FUTURE INVESTMENT AND AID DECISIONS FOR CHILE?

3. HERMES' REACTION TO ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WILL BE OF INTEREST.

4. FILE: 15-126-52. E2, IMPDET.d

*REF ATTACHED.

DATE: 4 DECEMBER 1973
 ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:SMB
 UNIT: C/WH/6/SA
 EXT: 6609/1069

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZ, QUITO, BOGOTA, [REDACTED] BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS AIRES, GUATEMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR, MANAGUA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR-458246

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN LIMA.

2. SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SUPPORT BY LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES FOR RESISTANCE IN CHILE.

3. BACKGROUND: IT WAS INDICATED IN AN EARLIER BRIEFING (REF) THAT SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU (PCP/SOVIET) INTENDED TO SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN ANY RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN CHILE.

4. THE FIRST WORD OF CHILEAN COUP WAS RECEIVED BY PCP/SOVIET FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN LIMA. CENTRAL COMMITTEE CALLED AN EMERGENCY MEETING WHEN IT APPEARED THAT EVENTS IN CHILE WERE GOING AGAINST

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ALLENDE REGIME. WHILE WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW, CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECIDED TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES SUCH AS SENDING SIX ORGANIZERS INTO CHILE. THESE ORGANIZERS WERE MEMBERS OF PERUVIAN COMMUNIST YOUTH, WHO USED PASSPORTS OBTAINED EARLIER FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN CASE OF SUCH AN EMERGENCY. PASSPORTS WERE LEGITIMATE, BUT DATA IN THEM, INCLUDING NAMES, WERE FALSE. THE PERUVIANS WERE TO CROSS INTO CHILE AT THE TACNA/ARICA BORDER POINT AND WERE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NUMBER OF BOLIVIANS AND BRAZILIANS.

5. ON 15 SEPTEMBER, TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEN WHO WERE LATIN AMERICANS BUT NOT PERUVIANS BROUGHT TO PCP/SOVIET HEADQUARTERS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (CPSU). INSTRUCTIONS WERE DELIVERED TO MEMBERS OF PCP/SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND IMMEDIATELY DISCUSSED BY PARTY LEADERS INCLUDING JORGE DEL PRADO CHAVEZ (PCP/SOVIET SEC GEN), FELIX ARIAS SCHREIDER (PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION MEMBER), GUILLERMO HERRERA MONTESINOS (ALSO MEMBER OF PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION), AND ONE OF THE TWO COURIERS DELIVERING THE INSTRUCTIONS WHO USED THE ALIAS "FIGUEROA." FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, THESE PARTY LEADERS

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GUERRILLA GROUPS THERE AND TO AID CHILEAN COMMUNISTS. SOME DELEGATES TO MEETING ARRIVED EARLY IN ORDER ATTEND REGIONAL MEETING OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) WHICH BEGAN 19 SEPT. JUAN CAMPOS CAMPOS, CHILEAN, SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS OF WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (WFTU), WHO IS IN LIMA FOR ILO MEETING, HELD PRESS CONFERENCE ON 18 SEPTEMBER DURING WHICH HE CALLED ON ALL WORLD TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS TO MOUNT PUBLIC OPINION CRUSADE AGAINST CHILEAN JUNTA.

A. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.A

DATE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1973 *W. Kent*
 BY: WILLIAM N. KENT:LSS
 UNIT: ABC/WH/B
 EXT: 6586/9255

James E. Hammer
 C/WH/B

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TO: PRIORITY LIMA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 25754 |IN 035309|
B. LIMA 26010 |IN 038180|

1. REF A WAS USED FOR FUOMEN. AS FOLLOW-UP WOULD LIKE USE REF
B. ^{LIMA 26010,} SUBJECT YOUR CONCURRENCE AND CAVEATS. WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN
EXILE IN LIMA AND DELETE REFERENCES TO SOURCES IN REPORT []
[] OF [] SERVICE WHO IS
[] AND ALTER TEXT ACCORDINGLY. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2; IMPDET.H

*REFS ATTACHED.

Stamp: *W/116 CT-4*

DATE: 25 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT: SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/B
EXT: 6556/9155

15-124-52
25 Sep 73

James E. Glanville
C/WHB
RECORD OFFICE
COORDINATING OFFICE

[Signature]
C/WHB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: BONN 26475 (IN 037542)

1. IN GENERAL TERMS BUSINESSES LEGALLY NATIONALIZED SUCH AS COPPER COMPANIES, BANKS AND ITT HAVE BECOME GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND WILL NOT BE RETURNED, WHILE BUSINESSES WHICH WERE INTERVENED, INCLUDING MOST DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING FIRMS, MAY BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS. THE SAME GENERAL CRITERIA APPLY TO PROPERTY: LARGE FARMS LEGALLY EXPROPRIATED WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, WHILE FARMS ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED PROBABLY WILL BE RETURNED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE NO LIST EXISTS WHICH SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES WHICH BUSINESSES OR PROPERTIES FALL INTO WHICH CATEGORY. WE HAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS THIS SUBJECT.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. ER, IMPDET.H

DATE: 24 SEPTEMBER 1973
 ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:LSS
 UNIT: WH/L/SA
 EXT: 6607/1069

RECORD COPY

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 C/WH/ER
 TELETYPE OFFICER

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15-124-52 24 SEP 73

SECRET

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PAGE 32-02

IN 037592

TOR:241450Z SEP 73

BONN 26475

3. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER SUB ONLY

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SECRET

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP

CTE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

221721Z

DIRECTOR

450535

CONF: C/W/118 INFO: FILE C/DIRN, C/EURG, DIR/DO, C/SSS, C/PS/EG3.

DISSEM BY: PER 38

TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CHARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT FUOMEN CAGER

REFS: A. BONN 26432 [IN 035549] [*]

B. DIRECTOR 456615 [**]

1. "SOCIAL AREA" IS TERM FOR STATE-CONTROLLED SECTOR OF ECONOMY. STATE CONTROL OVER WIDE VARIETY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES WAS SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED DURING ALLENDE REGIME. THROUGH PURCHASES, EXPROPRIATIONS, REQUISITIONS, AND INTERVENTIONS OF PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES, THE GOC BY MID-1973 HAD CONTROL OVER END PRODUCTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES ACCOUNTING FOR ALMOST HALF OF CHILE'S GDP, COMPARED TO AN ESTIMATED 20% AT END OF THE FREI ADMINISTRATION IN 1970.

2. SINCE TAKING OFFICE, ALLENDE GOVT HAD TAKEN OVER AT LEAST 400 FIRMS. THE EXECUTIVE HAD SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS BILLS THAT WOULD AUTHORIZE INCREASES IN SCOPE AND RANGE OF GOVT-CONTROLLED SECTOR, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON WHAT SECTOR'S LIMITS SHOULD BE. ALLENDE GOVT, THEREFORE, HAD CONTINUED

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15-124-52

22 Sep 73

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

OFF

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: FILE

458535

INDEX DISSEM BY:
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 IF FILES #

TO REQUISITION AND INTERVENE PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES AS IT
 CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED.

3. FILE: 15-1284-52. E 2, IMPDET.H

*INTEND USE (REF B) FUOMEN. PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA"
 PROPERTIES.

**FUOMEN ON ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA.

DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1973
 ORIG: WILLIAM KENT; DSO
 UNIT: ADC/WH/B
 EXT: 6556/9255

ADC/WH/B *William M. Kent*

Rudolf A. Rudi
 ASCEUR/SA

COORDINATING OFFICER

A. A. Wickham
 C/WH/D
 AUTHORIZING OFFICER

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
 221719Z DIRECTOR 458522
 CONF: *fu 118* INFO: FILE *C/PLAN, C/EUR 4, C/EUR 6, D/CTO, C/SS 3, C/OPS/JNT 2*
 0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
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 0 RETURN TO FER 78
 0 INDEX #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, BRASILIA, LIMA, PARIS, LONDON, BONN,
 TOKYO, ROME.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS,
 STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE:

2. SUBJECT: ²REMARKS BY CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN MEXICO AFTER THE 11 SEPTEMBER COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE.

3. SHORTLY AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE, A CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICER WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE CUBAN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) IN MEXICO SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOVT WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE GOOD ORGANIZATION OF CHILEAN MILITARY'S SUCCESSFUL OVERTHROW OF THE ALLENDE REGIME ON 11 SEPTEMBER.

4. HE SAID THE CUBAN GOVT AND CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO WERE NOT SURPRISED, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ALLENDE GOVT WAS MADE BECAUSE THEY HAD LONG PERCEIVED THAT ALLENDE, WHILE A GOOD MARXIST, LACKED SUFFICIENT AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD HIS ENEMIES.

5. HE SAID ~~THE~~ ^{THIS} CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO HAD PLANS PREPARED

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22 Sep 73
15-174-52

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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IN CASE OF ALLENDE OVERTHROW. LONG BEFORE 11 SEPTEMBER CUBAN EMBASSY BEGAN DISTRIBUTING LATEST MODEL AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, AND EVEN ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO CHILEAN WORKER CADRES WITH WHOM CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS HAD BEEN WORKING FOR LONG TIME. MUNITIONS ALSO HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO CUBAN CADRES IN CHILE WHO HAD BEEN ACTIVE AMONG WORKERS. IT IS THEY WHO NOW MUST BEAR MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREPARING THE INEVITABLE COUNTER-COUP AGAINST MILITARY JUNTA. THIS IS EXPECTED TO TAKE TIME AND TRAINING, BUT MEANS ARE AVAILABLE AND CUBAN WEAPONRY IS FAR SUPERIOR TO THAT OF CHILEAN ARMED FORCES.

6. FILE: 15-124-52B. E 2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
 ORIG: WILLOLLIAM KENT:DSO
 UNIT: ADC/WH/6
 EXT: 5515/98192

W. Williams
 C/WH/D

C/WH/COG. *O. Smith*
 C/EUR/SA *J. Mansfield*
 EA/JKO/J *W. Williams*
 C/WH/SA *W. Williams*

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5. FILE: 15-124-52. E 2, IMPDET.d

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
 ORIG: WILLIAM KENT: DSO
 UNIT: ADC/WH/6
 EXT: 5515/9192

DC/WH/3

J.D. Kelevey
 for C/WH/D

W.M. Kent
 for C/WH/6

CLASSIFICATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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class/INT.R. 9/16

AGENCY MESSAGE

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PAGE 01-01

IN 036120

TOR:211917Z SEP 73

PACY 25771

S E C R E T 211911Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 25771

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF A. DIRECTOR 457922

B. PANAMA CITY 2575 *(035309)*

1. CONCUR REF A.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

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w/1/6 CT:7

RECORD COPY
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15-124-52
21 Sep 73

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
210612Z

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DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
457888

CONF: *4/2/73* INFO: FILE *(initials) 0/553 0/4/73*
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DISSEM BY: *2*
 PER: *11*

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 25260 | IN 035305|

1. PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN. WILL OMIT NAME OF _____
 _____ AND REFER TO HIM ONLY AS OFFICER IN CUBAN EMBASSY WHO
 MEMBER OF DGI. WILL SOURCE TO _____
 _____, SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE
 AND ANY CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
 ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
 UNIT: ADC/WH/6
 EXT: 6556/9155

C/UHD
 RELEASING OFFICER

RECORDED COPY
 C/UHD/6
 COORDINATING OFFICERS

15-124-52
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AC/UHD/61
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PAGE 01-01

IN 235549

TOR1211012Z SEP 73

BONN 26432

SECRET 210956Z SEP 73 STAFF

PRIORITY

CITE BONN 26432

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS,
LONDON.

RYBAT ⁰CAGER FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 456615

1. INTEND USE FUOMEN INFO REF, TO INCREASE USEFULNESS.
PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA" PROPERTIES REFERRED TO PARA 3B
REF.

2. FILE 15-124-52. E2-IMPDET

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SEP 21 1973	
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21 Sep 73

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DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
455635

CONF: *clw/hs* INFO: FILE *100* *note above*
1953

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TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, BONN, PARIS, LONDON.
RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS.
STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE:

2. SUBJECT: ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA

3. ON 15 SEPTEMBER GENERAL SERGIO NUNO, MINISTER VICE PRESIDENT OF CHILEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (CORFO), OUTLINED MILITARY JUNTA'S ECONOMIC PLANS AS FOLLOWS:

A. ALL OF FIRMS AND COMPANIES WHICH HAVE BEEN EITHER TAKEN OVER OR INTERVENED BUT WHICH ARE NOT LEGALLY OWNED BY GOVERNMENT, WILL BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL OWNERS;

B. THOSE PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH HAVE BECOME LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO PREVIOUS OWNERS. NUNO SAID HE BELIEVES THAT A GIVEN PERCENTAGE OF OWNERSHIP OF THESE PROPERTIES, PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 40 OR 50%, SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE WORKERS, AND REMAINING PERCENTAGE SHOULD BE SOLD AS SHARES TO THE PUBLIC.

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21/6 CT-4 18 SEP 73
15-124-52

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CL BY: 057556

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 2 OF 2

CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE PENDING INDICATOR

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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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INFO: FILE

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- IMPDET #

TO THE PUBLIC.

4. ACCORDING TO NUNO, PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF THESE INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BEGIN WORKING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY ARE TO REQUEST ANY HELP THEY NEED FROM ARMED FORCES, AND IN EVENT OF ANY PROBLEMS, THEY ARE TO CONTACT GENERAL NUNO, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO HELP THEM.

5. GENERAL NUNO SAID THAT CORFO HAS IN EFFECT ASSUMED THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. GENERAL NUNO AND CORFO WILL WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOPA), WHICH HAS APPOINTED EUGENIO HEIREMANS AS ISOFOPA COORDINATOR WITH CORFO.

6. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1973 *W. Kent*
 ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SNB
 UNIT: ADC/UH/6
 EXT: 6556/9155

J. McKayman
 C/TEUR

SA/UH/EICD
C/UH/EAL
C/UH/D

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T 538842 PAGE 01-01 IN 032783

~~MESSAGE~~ TOR1181935Z SEP 73 SAGO 26529

S E C R E T 161856Z SEP 73 STAFF
 CITE SANTIAGO 26529
 TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,
 RYBAT FUOMEN
 REF: DIRECTOR 456203

1. CONCUR USE OF SANTIAGO 26489 (HCS 9836) FOR FUOMEN. NO SPECIALCAVEATS. *(IN 031351)*
2. PREFER NOT USE SANTIAGO 26512 (HCS 9839) BECAUSE OF SOURCE SENSITIVITY. INFO WAS GIVEN DIRECTLY AND PRIVATELY TO FUSERMINE-3 BY FUABLE-2. *(IN 031722)*
3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

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CT-4

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18 SEP 73
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IN 001722

TOR1172145Z SEP 73

SAGO 26512

SECRET 171950Z SEP 73 INTEL

TDFIR-334.075/1-73
HCS-9839

CITE SANTIAGO 26512

TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE: FUERMINE-3 FROM IDEN. NO INDEX. FILE:

15-9-4, CL BY 009560.

FILED: 171950Z

over



Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
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IN 031722
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

NSC/S

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 58 (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR -314/07571-73

DIST 17 SEPTEMBER 1973

COUNTRY: CHILE


DOI : 15 SEPTEMBER 1973

SUBJECT: PLANS OF EDUARDO FREI, FORMER PRESIDENT OF CHILE

AND LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO LEAVE CHILE

ACQ : CHILE, SANTIAGO (16 SEPTEMBER 1973) FIELD NO. HCS-9830

SOURCE:



1. ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1973 FORMER PRESIDENT EDUARDO F R E I, A LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC), TOLD OTHER PDC LEADERS THAT HE CONSIDERED IT WISEST FOR HIM TO LEAVE CHILE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND FOR HIM TO REMAIN ABROAD UNTIL THE DIRECTIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BECOME CLEARER AND THE SECURITY

S E C R E T

IN 03.722

TOFIR -314 07571-11

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

SITUATION BECOMES MORE STABILIZED.

2. (SOURCE COMMENT: MOST OF THE PDC LEADERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY SINCE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE TARGETS FOR ASSASSINATION BY LEFTIST EXTREMISTS AND THAT THEY MAY BECOME THE POLITICAL TARGETS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE CONCERNED PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFERING OF IMPORTANT POSTS TO RIGHTISTS SUCH AS ORLANDO S A E N Z, THE PRESIDENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOFA), WHO HAS BEEN NAMED AS ECONOMIC ADVISOR TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS; AND LEON V I L A R I N, HEAD OF THE TRUCK OWNERS FEDERATION, WHO WAS OFFERED THE POST OF MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS, WHICH HE REFUSED. WHILE SAENZ HAS A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH PDC MEMBERS, HE IS REGARDED BY THE PDC LEADERS AS BASICALLY OPPOSED TO THE PDC AND INTERESTED IN ITS ELIMINATION AS A VIABLE POLITICAL ENTITY.)

3. FREI SAID THAT WHILE HE IS CONSIDERING LEAVING THE COUNTRY OF HIS OWN WILL, HE WOULD PREFER TO BE REQUESTED TO LEAVE BY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO PROTECT HIS POLITICAL FUTURE. HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. AND HE WOULD PREFER THAT HIS DEPARTURE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE

S E C R E T

IN 031722

TDFIR -314/07571-73

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

IN FEAR FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY,

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFACT AT SANTIAGO,
REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER, EXEMPT FROM
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION
CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION

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T 535956 PAGE 01-01 IN 031535
 TOR:171843Z SEP 73 SAGO 26500

SECRET 171814Z SEP 73 STAFF
 CITE SANTIAGO 26500
 TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR.
 FUORACLE FUOMEN
 REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 25196 (IN 031341)
 B. SANTIAGO 26464 (IN 030951)
 1. CONCUR PARA ONE REF A REQUEST.
 2. FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET.

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<i>138</i>	O				<i>(handwritten mark)</i>			

T 535509 PAGE 01-01 IN 031341
 TOR:1715582 SEP 73 MEXI 25196

SECRET 1715412 SEP 73 STAFF
 CITE MEXICO CITY 25196
 TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR,
 FUORACLE
 REF. SANTIAGO 26464 *(030451)*

(Handwritten signature)
 W/ST
 WHW/Sky

1. BELIEVE GIST OF REF WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF PASSED TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA AS IF IT WERE A FUOMEN ITEM. REQUEST SANTIAGO CONCURRENCE.
2. FOR DIRECTOR: OFFICIAL MEXICAN GOVT POLICY IS COMPLETE SYMPATHY FOR ALLENDE. PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA MET MRS. ALLENDE AT AIRPORT 16 SEPT AND HAD ALREADY DECREED THREE DAYS OF OFFICIAL MOURNING FOR DEATH OF PRESIDENT ALLENDE 17-19 SEPT. UNLESS WE CAN GET INFORMATION ON TRUE FACTS IN CHILE TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA DIRECTLY, THE LITTLE MEDIA PLAY WHICH MEXICO CITY PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF MUSTERING WILL BE LOST IN AVALANCHE OF SPONTANEOUS, PLANTED AND GOVT APPROVED PRO-ALLENDE MATERIAL APPEARING LOCALLY. THE CONSENSUS OF MANY MEXICANS IS THAT THE U.S. AND CIA IN PARTICULAR MASTERMINDED THE COUP.
3. FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET.

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ACTION #	3	6
<u>038</u>		

T 532968 PAGE 01-01 IN 0304:2
 TOR: 1515472 SEP 73 MEXI 25191

SECRET 1515362 SEP 73 STAFF
 CITE MEXICO CITY 25191
 TO: DIRECTOR.
 KDOBELISK FUOMEN
 REF: DIRECTOR 454587

Handwritten notes and stamps:
 CANCELLED
 [Circular stamp]
 WH/6/Secy

1. GIST OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REF WAS PASSED TO KDOBELISK-1 THROUGH KDSLACIER-3 ON 13 SEPT 73. ON 14 SEPT KDSLACIER-3 TOLD GRANDGENT THAT KDOBELISK-1 WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THIS REPORT. KDOBELISK-1 IS RECEIVING NO INFORMATION FROM HIS EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO AT THIS TIME AND HAS TO DEPEND ON NEWS RELEASES FROM CHILE AND ARGENTINA WHICH HE CONSIDERS TO BE OF DUBIOUS ACCURACY.

2. FILE: 52-6-91/3. EQ. IMPDET.

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Y A SALVAR A CHILE DEL ANIQUILAMIENTO POLITICO, SOCIAL, Y ECONOMICO.

SE ABREN AHORA PERSPECTIVAS DE RECUPERACION MEDIANTE UN INTENSO Y DISCIPLINADO ESFUERZO QUE RESTABLEZCA EL HABITO DEL TRABAJO, NORMALICE LAS FAENAS, DETENGA LA DESTRUCCION DEL PATRIMONIO NACIONAL Y REINICIE EL PROCESO DE CAPITALIZACION INDISPENSABLE AL FUTURO BIENESTAR.

CON INNEGABLE SACRIFICIO Y ABNEGATION, LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS HAS CUMPLIDO SU PAPEL DE SALVAGUARDIA ULTIMA DE LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD. PERO LA DURA TAREA QUE IMPONE RESTANAR LAS HERIDAS Y REANUDAR LA MARCHA DE LA NACION EXIGE EL APOYO RESUELTO DE AQUELLA MAYORIZ CUIDADANA QUE, EN TODOS LOS TONOS, HA PEDIDO UNA HONDA RECTIFICACION.

EL QUEBRANTAMIENTO CONSTITUCIONAL PROVOCADO POR EL MARXISMO NO PUDO SOLDARSE CON LAS SOLAS INICIATIVAS DE LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS. LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS NO DESEABAN NI HAD DESEADO NUNCA TOMAR SOBRE SI LA RESPONSABILIDAD DE CONDUCIR LOS DESTINOS DE LA NACION, PERO EL DRAMATICO FRACASO DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR Y LAS LIMITACIONES DEL CUADRO POLITICO OPOSITOR PARA CONSEGUIR EL INDISPENSABLE CAMBIO DE RUMBO FORZARON LA SITUACION HASTA EL PUNTO EN QUE SE ENCUENTRA.

S E C R E T

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CHILE TIENE UN GOBIERNO MILITAR, FORMADO POR LOS SEÑORES
 COMANDANTES EN JEFE DE LAS TRES RAMAS DE LA DEFENSE NACIONAL
 Y EL SEÑOR GENERAL DIRECTOR DE CARABINEROS. LA JUNTA MILITAR
 HA ASUMIDO EL MANDO SUPREMO, RESPETANDO EXPRESAMENTE LAS ATRI-
 BUCIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL, CONTANDO CON LA ASESORIA DE LA
 CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA Y DISPONIENDO EL RECESO DEL
 PARLAMENTO. DE ESTE MODO LA JUNTA CREE ENCONTRAR EL CAMINO
 ADECUADO PARA INSTAURAR LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD QUE SE REQUIERE.

LAS RESERVAS QUE ESTA POSICION DE LA JUNTA PUEDAN INSPIRAR
 A CIERTOS SECTORES POLITICOS NO PUEDEN SER TAN ABSOLUTAS QUE
 LLEGUEN HASTA NEGAR EL CONCURSO DE TODOS LOS CHILENOS AL ESFUERZO
 DE RECONSTRUCCION DE SU PATRIA. POR EL CONTRARIO, A TRAVES
 DE LA JUNTA, ES CHILE MISMO EL QUE JUEGA LA CARTA DEFINITIVA
 PARA TRIUNFAR DEL ODIO, DE LA DESUNION, DEL DESALIENTO Y DE LA
 DECADENCIA. LA LABOR IMPONE LA ACCION DE TODAS LAS CAPACIDADES
 Y LA COLABORACION DE TODA LA CUIDADANIA, ESPECIALMENTE DE
 AQUELLOS CHILENOS QUE POR SU INDIFERENTISMO, SU INDECISION,
 SU EGOISMO O SU PEREZA HAN GENERADO LAS CONDICIONES QUE PER-
 MITIERON EL DESARROLLO DE LA IDEOLOGIA MARXISTA Y SU LLEGADA
 AL PODER EN 1970 GRACIAS A LA DIVISION DE LAS FUERZAS DEMOCRATICAS.

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EL PAIS HA VIVIDO VIRTUALMENTE AL MARGEN DE LA CONSTITUCION Y ABSORBIENDO GRANDES DOSIS DE IDEOLOGIA EXTRANJERA ACOMPANDA TAMBIEN DE GUERRILLEROS EXTRANJEROS. A NADIE PUEDE SURPRENDER QUE EL REMEDIO A TAN DESESPERADA SITUACION SEA DE CARACTER EXTRAORDINARIO Y SE LE ADMINISTRE PROPORCIONADAMENTE A LA VIOLENCIA QUE OPONGA EL MAL ANTE DE SER DOMINADO.

EN MEDIO DE LAS DIFICULTADES, LO UNICO QUE RECLAMA EL PATRIOTISMO ES TRABAJO, ESPIRITU DE SOLIDARIDAD Y COLABORACION PARA EL ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL ORDEN INSTITUCIONAL.

B. EXPRESO PRESIDENTE DE CORTE SUPREMA -- COMPLACENCIA DEL PODER JUDICIAL.

EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA, ENRIQUE URRUTIA MANZANO, ENTREGO LA SIGUIENTE DECLARACION:

"EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA, EN CONOCIMIENTO DEL PROPOSITO DEL NUEVO GOBIERNO DE RESPETAR Y HACER CUMPLIR LAS DECISIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL SIN EXAMEN PREVIO DE SU LEGALIDAD, COMO LO ORDENA EL ARTICULO 11 DEL CODIGO ORGANICO DE TRIBUNALES, MANIFIESTA PUBLICAMENTE POR ELLO SU MAS INTIMA COMPLACENCIA EN NOMBRE DE LA ADMINISTRACION DE JUSTICIA DE CHILE, Y ESPERA QUE EL PODER JUDICIAL COMPLA CON SU DEBER, COMO LO HA HECHO LASTA

