

**JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM**AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10168-10040
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY_FILE_NUMBER: 62-116391-41X

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: PAPICH, SAM
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 03/13/1970

PAGES: 85

SUBJECT: CIA ACT, ANTI-CASTRO ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret

NEW CLASSIFICATION:

REVIEW DATE: 11/03/1998

UPDATE DATE: 02/12/2001

STATUS: Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(A)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(C)

COMMENTS: EBF, INC ADMIN PAGES

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~
Prior Release was made to
Rockefeller Commission

TO : The Director

FROM : SA Sam Papich

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

DATE: 3/13/79 3/16/81 ✓
CLASS. & EXT. BY: SPA - ~~SP1/DA~~
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 23
DATE OF REVIEW: 3/13/90

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CIA INFO ON pg 21 & 22
only was declassified per
John E. Bacon 8/27/80

Reference is made to my letters dated March 2 and March 5, 1970. In my letter of March 5, 1970, I stated "it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances." It is my understanding that the Director desired that this list be identified. Enclosed herewith is a list of approximately 75 items.

This list should not be considered absolutely complete. Preparation was predicated on my personal recollection and a review of Bureau records. To make this list more complete and specifically accurate would necessitate the review of thousands of files. The enclosed list can be supported by Bureau records. What CIA records reflect on the same items is unknown. This also must be kept in mind in connection with our evaluation of the alleged CIA grievances which I previously listed.

I realize that it is presumptuous on my part, but if the Director feels that our Bureau work can benefit by a personal discussion between the Director and myself, I am available until April 3, 1970. I plan to leave the area immediately thereafter for an extended period.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Papich

SJP: ~~_____~~
(4)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT.

~~_____~~
HPV/8/98

REC- 87

62-80750-478

ST 102

10 APR - 1 1970

Classified by 72
Exempt from GDS Category 2+3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
11-11-75

Classified by 72
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

ENCLOSURE

2/6/98 2668 SLD/gee
JFK

~~SECRET~~

SECRET



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

✓

K BRACKETED Pg. 3

20 March 1970

KP 1/8/98

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

~~FBI INFO~~

~~5668 SLD/GCL~~

~~(JFK) 2/9/98 4/2/98~~

Dear Mr. Hoover:

We have completed our review of domestic positive intelligence collection engendered by your letter of 11 March 1970. We warmly welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the implementation of the 1966 agreement and the collection of positive intelligence which you proposed. I concur also with your comments that there is a need for close coordination of our efforts in the field of positive and counterintelligence collection. To be most effective, I agree that it is essential for this Agency, together with your Bureau, to conduct a continuing analysis of clandestine collection activity. The product is of growing importance to the national security and to the United States Intelligence Community. Therefore we endorse your proposal for a reexamination and bespeak your desires as to how this might be conducted.

With regard to the 1966 set of ground rules, which you sent to the then Director, Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., the competent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an effective and realistic agreement. I welcome your statement that no major problems have been encountered since its adoption.

I feel strongly that there are other related subjects, of similar importance to the national security, which warrant periodic reexamination since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine collection of positive intelligence.

EXP. PROC.

MAR 20 1970

REC 8

MAY 6 1970

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

As a result of our review, engendered by your letter, I believe that the following subjects are deserving of your personal consideration:

(1) Audio coverage. Audio coverage provides timely intelligence of inestimable worth to U.S. officials for policy planning, early warning, and accurate guidance necessary for the improvement of operational and collection activity here and abroad. Audio coverage is unique production because it is readily subject to local cross-checking and evaluation which is far more difficult and costly to achieve abroad. Further, such coverage is on targets which affect directly the national interests.

For several years your Bureau had been receptive to requirements and leads which resulted in valuable coverage. The quality of your production proved that your Bureau alone possesses capabilities and experience which cannot be duplicated by any other U.S. agency.

On 2 October 1969 two related requests for audio coverage were submitted by this Agency pertaining to positive intelligence targets, one of whom had KGB connections. (I refer to the case of ██████████ and ██████████ ██████████.) Your Bureau replied that henceforth the Agency should refer all such cases directly to the Attorney General for approval.

It is suggested that the question of audio coverage be reopened between representatives of your Bureau and this Agency. I would welcome your thoughts and observations on this subject.

I wish to assure you that I believe that this sensitive type of collection should be implemented under rigid and stringent controls. This is absolutely necessary in order to maintain the highest standard of security both in instituting the coverage and for the exploitation of the product. (An excellent example of this is demonstrated in your effective and secure production of [SCOPE.] (S))

(2) Mail Coverage. Another much needed intelligence tool is mail coverage. Its importance has been proven in the past. I have the impression that it has been discontinued, and I would suggest that our representatives should confer and examine together whether this asset might be deployed against communications of the Soviet Bloc, the New Left, and identified foreign agents.

(3) CIA Technical Services. A significant expenditure of this Agency's money and personnel has been committed to research and development for the improvement of technical aids. This Agency has provided your Bureau with an appreciation of our resources and capabilities, and has offered you at cost or gratis our most sophisticated equipment.

[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S)

Although we will continue these services, we would welcome any suggestions from your Bureau for improvement in the technical field including proposals how these assets can be better employed. Your comments will be particularly appreciated in view of our mutual interests in implementing Operation [REDACTED] (S)

(4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting. Since the collection and reporting of positive foreign intelligence is, as you say, only incidental to your main internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, I realize that your personnel are somewhat at a disadvantage in carrying out the evaluating and reporting processes necessary for the conduct of positive intelligence. At our 1966 conference, we offered to institute positive intelligence training courses, including reports writing and

** This section describes sources for technical intelligence collection.*

SECRET

analysis, for FBI personnel. In soliciting your views on the desirability of this type of training, I wish to reiterate our willingness to provide such instruction. It would be designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community in depth, thus making the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL) more meaningful to your personnel.

(5) Seminars on Opposition Services. Given the growing sophistication and increased capabilities of hostile intelligence services, it is suggested that CIA and FBI experts in this field meet as required at our respective Headquarters, the Washington and New York Field Offices, in order to keep abreast of new developments, modus operandi, operational tasks, and diverse missions of opposition services. I know that you will agree with me that no opportunities for improvement should be overlooked which might help to negate the efforts of hostile services who are charged with undermining the security of the United States. These sessions should also provide an opportunity to explore and devise new means to penetrate and neutralize these inimical forces.

(6) Live Bloc Sources. The record of our cooperation and coordination to exploit live penetrations and defectors from Bloc sources proves the success of our mutual effort.

I believe that there is room for substantial improvement in achieving a more uniform and efficient exploitation of the positive intelligence potential of certain of these sensitive sources. I would invite your thoughts on how we may better coordinate requirements for these sources and establish a more thorough evaluation of their positive intelligence production before it is given general dissemination within the Government. Our review would suggest that there are good reasons for consultation to explore the development of higher quality live sources, for example
[code clerks.] (s)

SECRET

SECRET

(7) Live Sources in the Non-Bloc Area. Sources such as code clerks and diplomats are a fertile field for procurement of much-needed intelligence relating to the activities of certain Latin American and Middle Eastern countries which are expanding their subversive and terrorist activities, even to the United States. I do not feel confident that both agencies have adequately exploited the full potential of this field, and would urge that this subject be explored by our respective representatives.

(8) New Left and Racial Matters. There is already a substantial exchange of information in this field. Limitations of manpower raise a serious question as to whether both agencies can keep pace with future unpredictable developments. The increasingly close connection between these forces in the United States and hostile elements abroad has been well established by both of our agencies. I feel it would be in our mutual interest to determine how we can best employ more wisely our limited manpower, knowing that this problem, which embraces bombings, hijacking, assassination, and the demeaning of law enforcement officers, is international in scope.

(9) Relations with Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches. I do not feel that there are any serious conflicts in this area but there may be room for improving the quality of liaison in order to expand positive intelligence collection. Given the changing situations both here and abroad, periodic re-examination of field relations could assist both agencies to make mutually-agreed adjustments.

Mr. Hoover, I wish to assure you that I value highly your personal judgment in affairs bearing on the national security. I know that your experience is derived from a unique lifetime of dedicated service to our country. In this spirit, I welcome sincerely your observations on the foregoing agenda and solicit your thoughts regarding any other item which you deem worthy of the attention of your Bureau and this Agency.

Faithfully yours,



Richard Helms
Director

5

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CASES AND/OR SITUATIONS
INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

IN THIS DOCUMENT, KP 1/3/98

(1) MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most part in 1957. The case had many wide foreign ramifications and historically has been, and undoubtedly will be, one of the most important and involved cases of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We did not disseminate any information of significance in this case until 1954. On various occasions when the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated arguments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to cooperate with the Agency. The position taken by CIA was that it should have been advised regarding the Soviet operational activity in foreign countries, claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity to develop more information of significance, identify Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. We did not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the extreme sensitivity of the case. We actually did not permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to the MOCASE until 1957.

In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had every right to have received the information earlier because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA employees and operations. CIA further argued that it had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the Agency at the same time that the case was publicized. The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case permitted the French, rather than the U. S., to play a dominating role in Europe.

~~FOR MARGALD RELEASE (CIA 88-1826)~~
5668 SLD/GCC
(1)(6)
(JFK) 2/1/98 4/2/98

~~SECRET~~

1001

~~SECRET~~

How much information CIA has developed over the years concerning our operational activity in Mexico City is unknown. However, we should bear in mind that former Special Agent George Munro handled many of our operations in Mexico, including key informants, and subsequently began performing services for CIA after he left the Bureau. We also should not forget that Americans operating in Latin American countries for one agency are heavily exposed to the resources of another U. S. intelligence or investigative agency. This Agent knows from personal experience that operating in these areas constitutes a "very small world" and the exposure to leaks and errors is considerable.

(3) THE ABEL CASE

Although CIA has not raised the point for several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably still exists, that the FBI did not play it square with CIA in the Abel case by not making certain that the Agency was given the proper recognition for its contributions. CIA feels that in the first place, there would not have been any U. S. access or availability to the source in this case, Reino Hayhanen, because CIA took the full responsibility for moving Hayhanen from France to the U. S. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined to become involved in any operation designed to transport Hayhanen to the U. S. It should be noted that Hayhanen was an alcoholic and that his first contacts with CIA in Paris raised questions concerning Hayhanen's mental stability.

After Hayhanen arrived in the U. S., we arranged access to him for a period, the purpose of which was to obtain a complete story of his intelligence activities in the U. S. and we were particularly interested in identifying all of his associates, especially the man who later was identified as Rudolph Abel. After a short handling period in the U. S., we dropped Hayhanen because he became a problem. It was an extremely critical situation because we had not yet identified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility for the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but we

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

countries with far better impressions than in the past. In addition, we have learned more about these countries, their services, and their security chiefs by spending a few minutes with them. Needless to say, this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped our Legal Attaches.

(7) ~~(S)~~ (U) ~~(S)~~ (U) [CIA] - [DUTCH] INTEREST IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

(U) In 1965, the [Dutch Internal Security Service] (U) was in the process of investigating individuals in (U) [Holland] who allegedly had been engaged in Soviet-espionage (U) activity. The [Dutch] wanted to have certain individuals (U) in the U. S. interviewed and approached [CIA] to make (U) inquiry at the Bureau. At that time, our relations (U) with the [Dutch] had been practically nonexistent because (U) the [Dutch] had failed to honestly deal with us in the (U) case of [Joseph Petersen, a Dutch] official who had been (U) clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National (U) Security Agency. When [CIA] approached us, we told (U) [the Agency] that the [Dutch] could submit their request (U) through diplomatic channels. We subsequently told [CIA] (U) we would not handle the interviews for the [Dutch]. We (U) stuck to our position. [CIA] surrendered but felt that (U) we were impairing their efforts to gather information (U) concerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe. (U) (Walter G. Krivitsky, Bufile - 100-11146)

(8) COLONEL JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

Colonel John Grombach was a retired U. S. Army officer who, during World War II, established a private intelligence network, operating throughout the world but primarily in Europe. His sources included any number of European exiles who came to the U. S. While he was in business, he was financed by the State Department, then the Department of the Army, and in the later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA. Grombach established contact with the Bureau through one of his subordinates, Pat O'Brien, who periodically called

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

on us and furnished information which Grombach felt was of interest to us. This dissemination through Pat O'Brien continued during the period of Grombach's relationship with CIA. We never informed CIA that we were receiving such information which also was of interest to the Agency. It is possible that Grombach had given the same data to CIA but we do not know. CIA and Grombach clashed and the relationship was severed in an atmosphere of severe bitterness. In the last years of its dealings with Grombach, the Agency had successfully penetrated the latter's organization and allegedly had identified many of the sources. CIA hinted to the Liaison Agent that it had become aware of the relationship between Grombach's organization and the Bureau. How much CIA really learned about this relationship is not known but if its penetrations were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence to justify a charge that the Bureau had withheld information from CIA, particularly when we were receiving the data from an organization which was financed by the Agency. (Bufile - 62-77906)

(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

(Herbert Hoover Commission - 1954)

In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under the leadership of General Mark W. Clark. In January, 1955, we were advised by a representative of the task force that Senator Joseph McCarthy had furnished the group a list of CIA employees who were considered subversive. CIA became cognizant of this development and there was talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished the names to the Senator. When the Liaison Agent was informally approached on this, he flatly told the Agency to officially submit its charges. The Agency never did. What information CIA may have had on this matter as it pertained to the Bureau is not known. It is possible that the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee. (Relations with CIA, Bufile - 62-30750)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(10) INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in the U. S. In many instances we did not see fit to notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that you could not separate "internal Security" from "counter-intelligence," namely a lead in France pertaining to a communist in the U. S. warranted advising CIA, if not, at least asking the Agency to handle the lead. In the last several years, it is not believed that there is any basis for complaint since we have regularly been notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel abroad. If the Legal Attache is investigating, CIA is notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts. There have been exceptions where we have taken the position that CIA should not be notified because of the sensitivity of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to CIA cannot be established from our files; however, we should bear in mind that when our Legal Attaches investigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials normally contacted by CIA. How many of these foreign officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll, is unknown.

(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA

We operated informants in Cuba when we had a Legal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported on activities of communists and other subversives in that country. During the period we operated these informants, we did not coordinate our operations with CIA. We did not advise the Agency that we had such sources. However, in 1960, after Castro came on the scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants in a secure manner. Approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. What these informants may have subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had evidence to establish that we had been operational in Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant to Directives. (Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont, February 5, 1960, re: "Partido Socialista Popular," 64-200-210, 2377 and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, February 3, 1960, re:

134-8539-4) (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN [BRAZIL] - 1959. (S) (U)

In 1959 the U. S. Ambassador in Brazil accused our Legal Attache of engaging in uncoordinated covert intelligence activity "of a nature which I believe exceeds his terms of reference." The Ambassador further indicated that CIA was unhappy over the Legal Attache's activities and the Agency allegedly had told the Ambassador that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from a source who was a fabricator or a provocator. This situation arose as a result of the Legal Attache's operation of an informant in [Brazil]. (S) (U) Some of the information that he received from the informant was of a derogatory nature and related to a [Brazilian] who was being touted as a Presidential candidate. (U) CIA asked for the identity of the informant and we told the Agency that the person could not be identified because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed. This case is being cited because CIA may have evidence that we had been operational in [Brazil] had not coordinated pursuant to Directives, and that the matter was further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability of the information. (U) (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, May 1, 1959, re: "William I. Friedman, Legal Attache, Rio de Janeiro," 67-429840) and (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, May 25, 1959, re: "Soviet-Satellite Activities - [Brazil]," 134-[7667-48]) (S) (U)

(13) BORDER COVERAGE

In June, 1957, our Phoenix Office presented a problem concerning the Bureau's handling of informants on the Mexican border. These informants were operating inside Mexico. The problem was predicated on situations which might arise as the result of CIA's endeavors to develop informants who already were being handled by the Bureau. It was pointed out that CIA logically could come in contact with such sources and could make approaches for recruitment. It was recommended and approved that in order to protect our coverage in the border area, a valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would continue to be utilized even if he were contacted by CIA. Our policy was that we would not identify our sources to the Agency.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

How much CIA learned about our border coverage is not known. Again, it is pointed out that former Bureau Agent [George Munro] may have been knowledgeable. (U) As indicated, he later began performing services for CIA. If CIA learned that we were operating informants in Mexico, it could use such information as additional evidence of Bureau failure to cooperate and coordinate with the Agency pursuant to Directives. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, June 14, 1957, re "Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border, Relations with CIA," 100-356015-1238)

(14) CARPORT CASE (U)

In May, 1957, the Bureau's double Agent in the captioned case was advised by [his Soviet contact] that he was to have a meeting in [Switzerland] during the period (U) [June 16-19], 1957. A question arose as to whether CIA (U) should be informed concerning the double Agent's travel to [Switzerland]. It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA.

What is important here is that CIA established contact with our double agent at one point. The Agency may have had further contact without our knowledge. The Agency may have also picked up the contact with the [Soviet] (U) in [Switzerland]. The case is being highlighted since we cannot exclude the possibility that the Agency has evidence to demonstrate that we were operational [in Europe] and we (U) did not coordinate with the Agency. (Memorandum Branigan to Belmont, June 10, 1957, re; ["CARPORT," 105-25453-1825]) (U)

(15) CIA REQUESTS FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired if W. C. Sullivan could give a lecture on the communist movement in the U. S. It was recommended that Sullivan give the lecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts of the Government. The Director made the notation "We cannot make Sullivan available to this outfit." The Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies. (Memorandum Sullivan to Belmont, October 1, 1958, re: "Request for Lecture on Communism by CIA,")

(16) CASE OF [REDACTED]

On July 9, 1956, an official of the State Department confidentially advised the Bureau that [REDACTED] a CIA employee in Moscow, had been involved in an affair with a Soviet girl. According to our source, [REDACTED] allegedly had furnished information to the Soviet girl. We checked with the State Department and CIA and we confirmed that [REDACTED] had been involved in an affair and that he had been recalled. According to CIA and State Department, there was no indication that [REDACTED] had been involved in any espionage against the U. S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau to identify its source and then changed its mind. Whether CIA has documented this as an instance where the Bureau failed to cooperate by not volunteering the source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case that should be kept in mind. (Bufile - [REDACTED])

(17) THE [REDACTED] OPERATION

In April, 1963, we became involved with CIA in that Agency's efforts to collect sensitive information relating to [REDACTED] French Government intentions to conduct espionage against the U. S. CIA had access to a sensitive source, [REDACTED] who was in a position to make available highly important [REDACTED] French documents. On April 11, 1963, CIA informed us that our Legal Attache in [REDACTED] Paris had locally contacted CIA concerning this matter. CIA Headquarters was highly disturbed because its office in [REDACTED] Paris had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted to be informed regarding the nature and the extent of our dissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We

- 12 -

~~SECRET~~

(U) determined that the Legal Attache had made inquiries in Paris in response to leads which had been sent from Bureau Headquarters. This matter is being highlighted because it was a vitally important operation to CIA and the Agency had received indications that information had been leaked to French authorities. We have no evidence or reason to believe that the Legal Attache Office ever involved itself in any such leak. However, we should not, under any circumstances, discount the fact that CIA has penetrated French services and has had access to sensitive information in Paris. The French have always had an outstanding capability of tapping phones and installing microphones in Paris. Such coverage on U. S. officials, including their residences, should never be excluded. The information we had conveyed to our Legal Attache possibly may have been acquired by the French through clandestine coverage. CIA possibly could charge us with handling their sensitive information in an insecure manner by transmitting it to Paris without conferring with the Agency.

(U) In connection with alleged French espionage activity in the U. S., CIA has never been satisfied with the efforts made by the Bureau. The Agency possibly could take the position that we looked lightly at the allegations and did not pursue a matter which, in their eyes, merited a more aggressive approach. (Bufile - ██████████)

(U) For some time, CIA has held to a position that the French Intelligence Service (SDECE) is penetrated by the Soviets. The Agency has pointed out that if the French are collecting sensitive information in the U. S., the product is ending up in Moscow. In January, 1964, we reviewed the status of our investigation of French intelligence activities in the U. S. The Director commented "I think this whole thing has been imaginary on the part of CIA which has been played as a sucker by ██████████ I would waste no more time on it at least until all CIA restrictions are removed." CIA did impose restrictions by not permitting us to pursue certain leads because it feared that its sensitive source would be jeopardized. (Bufile - ██████████)

from CIA. We did not obtain clearance from CIA for the inclusion of this information in our monograph. Clearance approval was not obtained because of the urgency of the document. CIA was irritated because it considered our action a distinct violation of the third agency rule. The Agency never made any protest.

(21) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN GUATEMALA (S) (U)

(U) In 1966 and 1967, we were operating informants in Guatemala. (S) At the inception of our operational activity, CIA was not informed. In one case, we finally were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA whereby the Bureau would be permitted to run the informant in Guatemala. (S) In the second instance, we established an agreement with CIA in October, 1967, that we could continue handling an informant in Guatemala with the understanding that the Bureau Agent, on the occasion of each visit, would confer with the local CIA office on political information collected from the informant. These two cases had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was under the definite impression that we had been running these informants before we had finally coordinated with them. It is true that the CIA Chief in Guatemala was much incensed but no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and the matter was put to rest. (U) (U)

CIA may have developed concrete evidence that we were operating in Guatemala bearing in mind that in a place such as Guatemala City it would not be difficult for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an FBI Agent in contact with Guatemalans. (S) Our potential vulnerability is that we were operating in Guatemala without coordinating with CIA. (S) (U) (U)

(22)

The information emanating from the captioned sensitive Bureau operation has been disseminated to CIA and other agencies for several years. The sensitive source has traveled abroad numerous times and his trips

~~SECRET~~

(25) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON WITH
DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1960

(U) In January, 1960, our Legal Attache, Bonn, traveled to Holland for the purpose of exploring arrangements for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities. The U. S. Ambassador raised questions, pointing out that over the years, all relations with the Dutch authorities had been handled through CIA. He indicated that before there was any change in procedure, it would be necessary for CIA and FBI to come to some form of an agreement. Allen Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that his Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to exploring the liaison arrangement. We eventually conferred with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all parties concerned. (U)

Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where we failed to coordinate with the Agency in line with National Security Council Directives. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, March 3, 1960, re: "Legal Attache Operations - Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands," 66-18973-123)

In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legal Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark. The purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not inform CIA of our intentions. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, January 14, 1960, re: "Legal Attache Operations, The Netherlands," 66-18973-113)

(26) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - 1962

(U) By letter dated November 7, 1962, CIA raised questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination of counterintelligence information to foreign intelligence services. CIA, at that time, had particular reference to information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the Greek Intelligence Service concerning KGB operations. CIA took the position that pursuant to the coordinating

- 17 -

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to such dissemination. The particular data had emanated from one of our sensitive [redacted] sources [redacted]. We responded to CIA by stating that the information was the product of an internal security operation and did not relate to any operational activity abroad. CIA again surrendered. The Agency could argue that it was responsible for following Soviet matters with the Greek Intelligence Service and that we had an obligation of coordinating with the Agency. (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan, November 9, 1962, re: [redacted])

(27) "THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT, "A BOOK AUTHORED BY
DAVID WISE AND THOMAS ROSS

In August, 1963, we received information indicating that Wise and Ross were in the process of gathering material for a book pertaining to activities of U. S. intelligence activities. Both Ross and Wise contacted the Bureau. It was recommended that liaison orally advise CIA that these two individuals were preparing a book concerning U. S. intelligence agencies. The Director noted "I see no reason doing so."

It is not known if CIA was aware of the contact with the Bureau. Wise and Ross subsequently published the book which contained extremely derogatory information concerning CIA. (Memorandum Jones to DeLoach, re: "David Wise of the "New York Herald Tribune" and Thomas Ross of the "Chicago Sun Times")

(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward developing coverage in Africa. CIA was looking for the services of any Negro informant who might be available. The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to

- 18 -

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

In the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau would reestablish technical surveillance coverage on [redacted] who CIA felt was a key figure in the transmission of scientific intelligence data to the [redacted] Intelligence Service. We declined to reinstitute the coverage. CIA considered the matter important because of its relationship to the [Mideast Crisis.] (U)

On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the Attorney General.

CIA has never made any official comment or protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned action by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency has looked to the Bureau as the logical point of contact and as the only organization having the resources and capabilities of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.

(30) MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

The Liaison Agent recalls fragments of other situations or conflicts which occurred over the years and which resulted in the voicing of CIA displeasure or criticism. The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is necessary to acquire the required data. There was one instance early in the 1950's which involved information received from a source of unknown reliability charging Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while in Europe. We disseminated the information to several agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest.

The Agent also has recollection of instances when CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by Bureau revelation of CIA information during the course of interviews conducted by us. Technically, this would be a violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly if an important informant was lost. CIA never made any official issue or protest.

- 24 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN - DEFECTORS - 1954

By letter dated October 13, 1954, a very strong letter of protest was sent to General T. J. Betts of the Interagency Defector Committee at CIA. This letter made reference to political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government. General Betts disseminated a memorandum indicating that members of the Committee had agreed that in view of commitments made by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse effect on the over-all United States Defector Program. We emphasized to General Betts that this matter had never been officially presented before the Defector Committee. He was informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.

8. CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955

On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was referred to a matter which had not yet developed into a serious situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts between the two agencies. Dulles was referred to the contacts of aliens in the United States made by CIA personnel without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. The requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an established agreement. (62-80750; memorandum Roach to Belmont September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")

9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)

In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA approached a National Academy graduate to utilize his services in Guatemala. This approach was made while the graduate was attending National Academy classes. A protest was made to key CIA officials for not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the Academy graduate. (Re: [REDACTED])

10. [REDACTED]

In December, 1955, we received information indicating that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was developing for utilization in a double agent operation. We learned that CIA representatives had established contact with [REDACTED] and had given him some advice and guidance without first checking with the Bureau. We protested to CIA. ([REDACTED])

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

us that he had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI would be furnishing operational guidance to him. We had never become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined that a CIA official had been in error in making the above-described misrepresentation. We protested the CIA official's handling of this matter. (Re: ~~Dr. [redacted]~~) (u)

15. ~~[redacted]~~

(U) On July 20, 1956, we determined that one ~~[redacted]~~ had been in contact with the Czech Military Attache, Washington, D. C. We further ascertained that ~~[redacted]~~ was a CIA employee. We were informed by CIA on July 21, 1956, that the Agency had no information concerning ~~[redacted]~~ reported contacts with the Czechs. We later interviewed ~~[redacted]~~, and it was indicated that ~~[redacted]~~, in fact, had been in contact with a CIA official concerning his meetings with the Czech Military Attache. We protested and CIA submitted a letter of apology. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman July 21, 1956 ~~[redacted]~~)

16. ~~[redacted]~~

(U) In July, 1956, a statement was made by a State Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly had advised that the subject, a Soviet agent, was being permitted to enter the United States so that his activities could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position to promote a defection. The Bureau was not in possession of any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry of the subject for the purpose described above. The State Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative. We were not in a position to identify the CIA employee without conducting investigation within the Agency or without the Agency coming up with the identity. (Re: ~~[redacted]~~) (u)

17. ~~[redacted]~~

By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly protested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had interviewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. It should be noted that there was a well-established agreement whereby it was incumbent upon CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any alien in the United States. (Letter to CIA November 8, 1956, ~~[redacted]~~)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

18. [DARRELL PATRICK HAMMER] ~~(S)~~ (U)

(U) [Hammer] was a former student at Columbia University with whom we had been in contact because of his association with a [Soviet] assigned to the United Nations. (U) In December, 1956, [Hammer] made a trip to [Russia] where he was contacted by an unidentified individual and was given a letter indicating that the writer was [a Colonel in the KGB] and that he was interested in cooperating with the United States. When [Hammer] returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to interview the subject because of the Agency's foreign intelligence interests. We subsequently interviewed [Hammer], at which time he informed us that he had been cautioned by CIA not to furnish pertinent information to the Bureau. CIA denied that any such statement was made. (Re: [Darrell Patrick Hammer]) ~~(S)~~ (U)

19. CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA-1957

The San Francisco Office furnished information indicating that CIA had requested a firm in California to furnish that Agency information regarding all foreign inquiries pertaining to a high-speed camera manufactured by the company. The matter was reviewed because we wanted to be certain that CIA was not invading our jurisdiction. We did not develop evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction. The Director did make a notation, "O.K., but it does seem to me we give CIA a pretty wide authority to explore such a field. H" (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman April 10, 1957, "Flow of Intelligence Information to Soviets and Satellites through So-called Channels")

20. [REDACTED]

On May 23, 1957, CIA advised that one of its representatives in the field had interviewed the captioned [REDACTED] alien who had agreed to cooperate with the Agency after he returned to [REDACTED]. CIA conducted this interview without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to an established agreement. A vigorous protest was made to the Agency. (Re: [REDACTED] - [REDACTED])

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21. ~~(S)~~ CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR ~~(S)~~ COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES - 1957 ~~(S)~~ (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several ~~(S)~~ Colombian officials who were coming to this country under CIA invitation. CIA was told that no tours would be given to the ~~(S)~~ Colombians because in the past a ~~(S)~~ Colombian ambassador had grossly insulted the Bureau after we had arrested the ambassador's chauffeur on White Slave Traffic Act charge. ~~(S)~~ (U)

If we so desired, we could give consideration to accusing CIA of trying to impose upon us individuals whom we considered undesirable in light of the foregoing.

(Memorandum July 15, 1957, Roach to Belmont ~~(S)~~ "Representatives of Colombian Intelligence Service" - Request for Bureau Tour by CIA") ~~(S)~~ (U)

22. ~~(S)~~ REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS - NEW YORK CITY - 1957 ~~(S)~~ (u)

On November 15, 1957, our New York Office was contacted by the local CIA representative who desired to be informed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the premises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located across the street from a building occupied by the ~~(S)~~ Soviet - United Nations Delegation. ~~(S)~~ The CIA representative indicated that his visit to our office was pursuant to instructions received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was concerned about the possibility of the ~~(S)~~ Soviets establishing coverage of conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council. It should be noted that the Council included as members many well-known personalities, including officials of the United States Government. ~~(S)~~ (u)

Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dulles was informed on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used by CIA in that such a sensitive matter had been taken up at the field level rather than through Bureau Headquarters. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont November 19, 1957, re "Council on Foreign Relations") ~~(S)~~ (u)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

23. [REDACTED]

In October, 1957, we received information from [REDACTED] indicating that a [Polish] scientist then visiting in the United States might defect. We followed developments through [REDACTED] and we kept CIA advised. The Agency was fully aware of the situation and particularly knew that we were in contact with [REDACTED]. We subsequently received information indicating that [REDACTED], a CIA employee, established contact with [REDACTED] for the purpose of developing information concerning the work of [Polish] scientists. A protest was made to CIA for not properly coordinating their interests with us, bearing in mind that the action taken by [REDACTED] possibly could have jeopardized a Bureau operation. (Re: [REDACTED] - [REDACTED]) (S) (U)

24. [REDACTED]

By letter dated February 10, 1958, we directed a protest to CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the subject a [Romanian] alien, without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. (Re: [REDACTED] - [REDACTED]) (S) (U)

25. ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYEE

On April 23, 1958, we received information indicating that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being with the FBI when she tried to arrange an interview with [REDACTED], an official of the International Association of Machinists in Washington, D. C. [REDACTED] gave a signed statement in which he claimed that he had received a phone call from a Miss [REDACTED] who said she was with the FBI. Upon checking with CIA, we were informed that Miss [REDACTED] denied that she had made such representation. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont April 25, 1958, "Unknown Subject; [REDACTED]")

26. [REDACTED]

By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested to CIA for interviewing an alien in the Detroit area without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to established agreement. (Re: [REDACTED] - [REDACTED])

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

30. GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN (S) (U)

The Legal Attache, Bonn, advised by letter dated June 10, 1958, that he had been invited to visit General Reinhard Gehlen, the head of the West German Intelligence Service. CIA became aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative informed our Legal Attache that it was not desired that the Legat visit with Gehlen. Our Legat was instructed by the Bureau to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position. (U)

We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as being uncooperative. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 17, 1958, "Relations with CIA")

31. CIA INTEREST IN CHINESE ALIENS (S) (U)

In June, 1958, we raised the question concerning CIA's failure to adhere to an agreement relating to CIA's recruitment of Chinese aliens in the United States for overseas intelligence operations. Under the agreement, CIA was not to approach any Chinese alien without first checking with us. A situation developed in Illinois indicating that CIA allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and even took some action without first checking with us. We expressed our disapproval in a letter to CIA June 12, 1958. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman June 9, 1958, "Recruitment of Chinese Aliens in the United States for Overseas Intelligence Operations") (S) (U)

32. CIA OFFICIAL'S CRITICISM OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"

Our Legal Attache, Tokyo, obtained a copy of a memorandum sent to an official in our Embassy in Tokyo by Chief of the CIA Office in Japan. In his communication belittled the value of "Masters of Deceit" as an anticommunist weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book pertained only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a small, ineffective, faction-ridden organization. He stated that the author of the book was not an intellectual but rather a policeman. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 12 and 24, 1958, "Masters of Deceit.") (S) (U)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

33. ~~CIA DEVELOPMENT OF [INDONESIAN] GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES~~ (S) (U)

(U) In May, 1958, CIA furnished identifying and background data concerning three individuals - [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted], all employees of the Indonesian government and assigned to the United States. [redacted] had been developed as a source of information by CIA in [redacted]. [redacted] came to CIA in Washington, D. C. and volunteered his services. [redacted] had been developed as a source by CIA and had been furnishing some information to the Agency. In a letter dated June 24, 1958, we told CIA that in the case of [redacted], we felt that the Agency should have notified us at an earlier date in order that we could have considered exploitation for internal security purposes at the outset. (Re: [Indonesian Activities - 100-254749]) (S) (U)

34. [MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, AKA DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE] (S) (U)

The subject, a former member of the [Polish] Intelligence Service, defected to the United States and furnished extremely valuable information. The beginnings of this case include information raising questions concerning CIA cooperation. (U)

In June, 1958, we developed information indicating that CIA may have opened a letter in [Switzerland] which had been addressed to the Director by an individual who had identified himself as [Dr. Heinrich Schutze]. The writer further indicated that he might be connected with the [Polish] Intelligence Service. The letter addressed to the Director had been placed in an envelope which, in turn, had ended up in the office of the [United States Ambassador in Switzerland]. We subsequently received a copy of the particular communication from CIA, and the contents were such at that time that no action was required by the Bureau. We asked CIA for particulars leading to the alleged opening of the letter which had been addressed to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the letter. We were confidentially informed by an Agency representative that the [Ambassador] had opened the letter and then referred the matter to CIA. The contents were such that investigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA in Europe. What actually happened at the United States Embassy is something we may never know. [Michal Goleniewski - 65-65192] (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

35. [REDACTED]

By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concern regarding CIA's alleged interview of a Chinese alien whom CIA was considering for overseas recruitment. CIA denied that an approach of the alien had been made. Our investigation contradicted the statements emanating from CIA. (Rev. [REDACTED] Bureau file [REDACTED]) (S) (U)

36. [COMPROMISE OF FBI TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE] (S) (U)

On July 18, 1958, CIA requested the Bureau for permission to play a recording of a telephone conversation obtained by the Bureau to King Hussein of Jordan. The recording had been developed through our sensitive coverage of the Egyptian Embassy in Washington, D. C. On June 5, 1958, we had obtained the contents of a conversation between Mahmoud Rousan of the Jordanian Embassy and the Egyptian Air Attache. The conversation strongly indicated that Rousan was working closely with the Egyptians. Subsequently, CIA developed information indicating that Rousan was a key figure in a revolutionary plot, the objective of which was to overthrow King Hussein. (S) (U)

Rousan returned to Jordan and was imprisoned by King Hussein based upon information made available through CIA. Rousan denied any implication in any revolutionary activity and he was strongly supported by certain top officials in the Jordanian Government. The King told CIA that he was on the spot and that he needed proof of Rousan's conspiratorial activity. CIA asked if we would permit the recording to be played to the King, stressing that this was the only way King Hussein could be convinced. (S) (U)

On July 18, 1958, a CIA official was advised that the Bureau positively would not grant permission to playing of the recording. We maintained that if we granted such permission, our other coverage of a sensitive nature could be seriously imperiled. (S) (U)

On July 21, 1958, Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau would reconsider its position in view of the critical situation in the Middle East. Pursuant to instructions, CIA was then told that in view of the position in which the Bureau had been placed, we acceded to Dulles' request. CIA was further told that we were seriously considering the termination of all of our technical surveillances because we did not intend to be placed in such a position in the future. (S) (U)

On July 22, 1958, Dulles told the Liaison Agent that he was very much disturbed over the Director's reaction. He stated that he was not interested in holding a pistol to (S) (U)

SECRET - 12 -

~~SECRET~~

anybody's head and he further indicated that he was deliberating whether or not the [recording] should be used. It was recommended that the Liaison Agent follow the matter for the purpose of determining if the [recording] was to be used by CIA. The Director's notation was, "No. The fat is in the fire now and it is useless to waste any more time on it. We will probably hear of any details in Pearson's column. H." (U)

The strong position we took in resisting the dissemination of such sensitive information to a foreign government was fully justified. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, dated July 22, 1958, re "CIA Request for Permission to Play Technical Surveillance Recording to King Hussien, Jordan") (S)(U)

37. CIA ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN MEXICAN GOVERNMENT DEPORTATION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS (S)(U)

In 1958, CIA officially informed us that it was engaged in a program designed to disrupt overall communist activity in Mexico. We became concerned because this program was to involve deportation of undesirables, including American communists residing in Mexico. The implementation of such a program would have resulted in the return of American communists to the United States. CIA denied that it was engaged in any operation specifically designed to oust American communists. In September, 1958, we were informed that the Mexican Government had embarked on a strong anticommunist program and certain Americans were ordered deported. We checked with CIA and the Agency's chief in Mexico City claimed that his Agency was not involved. (S)(U)

The Liaison Agent subsequently was informed on a strictly confidential basis that the American Ambassador had been in contact with certain Mexican officials concerning possible anticommunist activities. The Ambassador had consulted with the local CIA chief and had asked for a list of Americans who could be considered as being deportable. The CIA officer reportedly furnished a list of approximately 40 names. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, September 17, 1958, "Legal Attache's Office, Mexico City, Relationship with Embassy and CIA") (S)(U)

38. ~~██████████~~

We expressed our displeasure to CIA in September, 1958, because of that Agency's unauthorized investigation in the United States of a Romanian citizen who was here in connection with an exchange program. The Romanian indicated to an American friend that he was interested in staying in the United States, but was not ready for actual defection because of a (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to notify the Bureau. A letter dated September 16, 1959, was also sent to [REDACTED] and he was told that the Bureau was disappointed in him because he had failed to make any objection to the article and had not alerted us concerning the impending attack against the Bureau. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, August 27, 1959, "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock, 'True' Magazine, September, 1959"; and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, September 4, 1959, "Allen Dulles")

45. ~~ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - 1959~~ ~~(S)~~ (U)

We received information in September, 1959, that the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviews with American businessmen in the Boston area, which dealt with meetings between the businessmen and visiting [Soviets]. CIA reportedly was interested in developing positive intelligence information, but it so happened that one of the [Soviets] was involved in a double agent operation being handled by the Bureau. The Bureau already had notified CIA of our interest in the [Soviet.] By letter dated September 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the manner in which CIA had handled this. (Re [REDACTED], Bureau file [REDACTED]) ~~(S)~~ (U)

46. APPEARANCE OF COLONEL FRANTISEK TISLER BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HCUA) - 1959

On November 6, 1959, information was received indicating that HCUA was interested in obtaining Colonel Frantisek Tisler, a Czech defector, to testify before the Committee. HCUA advised us that it had contacted the State Department who, in turn, had conferred with CIA. Allen Dulles allegedly informed HCUA that Tisler was agreeable to appearing before the Committee and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security instructions.

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority to make a defector available to a congressional committee without first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was informed that CIA did not have such authority because a National Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency Defector Committee. In this particular case the aforementioned Committee had not called a meeting, but the chairman, a CIA official, had made certain phone calls. A Bureau representative was contacted by phone on November 6, 1959, but at that time we had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted the chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee had no objection to making Tisler available.

~~SECRET~~

On November 13, 1959, CIA representatives were informed that we were opposed to making the defector available to HCUA. On that same date we were told that CIA was informing HCUA it was reversing its position and that upon reconsideration, it did not feel that Tisler could be made available.

By memorandum dated November 14, 1959, the developments in this matter were reviewed and it was recommended that at the next Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the HCUA request. (Bureau file 105-38988)

47. CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR

On April 11, 1960, [redacted] of Reico Company, Caracas, Venezuela, informed the Bureau that he recently held a conversation with [redacted], an official of the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. [redacted] was a CIA employee [redacted] took exception to complimentary statements made by [redacted] concerning the Director and the FBI. [redacted] stated that the Director should have retired five years ago for the good of all concerned. A protest was made to Allen Dulles on April 20, 1960. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, [redacted])

48. [redacted] CIA OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA - 1960

In February, 1960, [redacted] ^{Name} [redacted] ^{Position} [redacted] for the Richardson Foundation, volunteered information concerning statements allegedly made by [redacted], a top CIA official. [redacted] allegedly advocated recognition of Red China.

This matter was called to the attention of Allen Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent that he had conducted an inquiry, had reviewed a tape recording of [redacted] talk, and was satisfied that [redacted] had not made the statement attributed to him.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to dispute the position taken by Dulles. If the evidence clearly established that [redacted] had made such a statement, we could use the information to support a position that we would have been warranted in being most circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, [redacted])

49. ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S. PREMISES ABROAD BY CIA

A State Department representative informed the Bureau that a microphone had been found in the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City; that it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allegedly

~~SECRET~~

had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had to know what was going on in U.S. establishments. The implication was left that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies through technical installations. Inquiries developed information indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy in 1952 at the request of a State Department official. The Office of Security in State Department was contacted in an effort to pin this down in a more specific manner. We were told by State that their records did not contain any information concerning the microphone.

Subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal Attaches instructing them to be on the alert for technical installations which may affect Bureau operations. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, May 2, 1960, "Installation of Microphones on U.S. Premises Abroad by CIA")

50. [REDACTED]

We received information indicating that the subject, a former Cuban intelligence agent, the subject of a Bureau investigation, had planned to defect in New York City. We permitted a CIA representative to contact the subject in order to orient him so that maximum propaganda effect would be derived through newspaper publicity. We were told that the CIA representative in New York City had been instructed by his headquarters to tell the subject that he would not be prosecuted by the U.S. Government. We complained to CIA stressing that the Agency had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, September 30, 1960, [REDACTED] (u))

51. [REDACTED]

Miss [REDACTED], a CIA employee, obtained a position as a secretary in the Office of the [REDACTED] Delegation to the United Nations. Prior to receiving this job, CIA checked with the Bureau. The Liaison Agent subsequently learned that [REDACTED] had informed the [REDACTED] that she was leaving her job. The [REDACTED] inquired if she could recommend somebody else. She gave them the name of another CIA employee, Miss [REDACTED].

The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was out of line by not first checking with the Bureau before recommending [REDACTED] to the [REDACTED], that the Bureau was interested in developing intelligence information which might be useful to the U.S. Government; and that, in this instance, CIA was obstructing operations by not appropriately coordinating with the Bureau. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, October 31, 1960, [REDACTED] (u))

~~SECRET~~

52. CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN A U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT

On March 30, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted Allen Dulles concerning CIA's failure to obtain Bureau clearance for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document. No known damage had been done, but the Agent stressed the sensitivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence of such errors. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, March 30, 1961, [redacted])

53. "SPY IN THE U.S." BOOK AUTHORED BY PAWEL MONAT

In July, 1961, our Chicago Office received galley proofs of the book "Spy in the U.S.," written by Pawel Monat. A review of these proofs disclosed several references which portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable light. Since CIA was responsible for Monat and for any writing which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA. It turned out that CIA had not been following the preparation of the book. We were told that steps would be taken to protect Bureau interest. The publishers had indicated to CIA that they would cooperate on changes. Although some changes were made, the book still came out with some information which was not entirely favorable to the Bureau. (Pawel Monat, Bureau file 105-40510)

54. CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ATTACHE [redacted] MEXICO CITY [redacted] 1961 (S)(u)

On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache, [redacted] Mexico City [redacted] (S)(u) received information indicating that the [redacted] Czech Embassy [redacted] in that city was planning to protest harassment of its personnel by U.S. Intelligence. The Legal Attache was told by the [redacted] local CIA office [redacted] (S)(u) that the Agency was not involved. On October 12, 1961, the same CIA officer changed his position and admitted that CIA had been involved to a certain extent. The Liaison Agent objected to these tactics. It was important to him to know the facts so he could be guided accordingly. (Memorandum L'Allier to Sullivan, October 18, 1961, [redacted] Czechoslovakian Diplomatic Activities [redacted] - Mexico [redacted] (S)(u))

55. CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES - 1961

When he defected in December, 1961, [redacted] furnished information concerning alleged penetration of American intelligence. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer, [redacted] was a logical suspect. We conferred with CIA and on February 9, 1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the investigation. (u)

~~SECRET~~

Instructions were sent to the field and we then learned in New York City that CIA allegedly planned to make a recruitment approach. The matter was taken up with CIA headquarters and a protest was made because of the wide discrepancy in the reports we received on CIA intentions. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 18, 1966, [redacted]) (u)

67. PASSING OF BUREAU DOCUMENTS TO SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD BY CIA EMPLOYEE - 1966

In September, 1966, we developed information indicating that copies of FBI documents had been passed to Senator Byrd by CIA. The matter was discussed with the Director of CIA and the Agency subsequently conducted an investigation and established that one of its employees, [redacted], had submitted a name check request to the Bureau concerning one [redacted] who was the subject of the material in question. At that time [redacted] had a responsibility of handling name check requests for CIA and, in this connection, was in contact with our Name Check Section. He admitted that he instituted a name check on an "off the cuff basis" for another CIA employee named [redacted].

It is my recollection that one or both CIA employees were subsequently fired or asked to resign. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, September 21, 1966, "Leak of FBI Documents Concerning [redacted] to Senator Robert C. Byrd")

68. ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF BUREAU DOUBLE AGENT (S)(u)

In March, 1967, we protested to CIA in connection with a matter relating to our mutual interest in a chemist connected with [redacted] Corporation in New Jersey. We were utilizing the chemist as a double agent in an operation directed against the Soviets. CIA had established a relationship with the same person for the purpose of acquiring positive intelligence relating to the field of [redacted]. Our Newark Office received information indicating that a CIA officer without authorization, compromised our relationship with the chemist by discussing the matter with the president of the firm. (Memorandum Sullivan to DeLoach, March 15, 1967, [redacted]) (S)(u)

69. [redacted]

In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where the Agency allegedly had failed to report to us concerning a communication which a Cuban exile, residing in the United States, had received from the Cuban Intelligence Service. The particular communication had instructed the exile to initiate preparations

~~SECRET~~