



20 July 2020

John Greenwald, Jr.  
27305 W. Live Oak Road  
Suite #1203  
Castaic, CA 91384

Reference: EOM-2020-00341

Dear Mr. Greenwald:

This is a final response to your correspondence of 23 April 2020 requesting an Executive Order 13526 mandatory declassification review of the following document:

**Afghanistan Situation Report Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406440001-8**

We have completed a thorough search of our records and determined that the document may be released in sanitized form. We have deleted material that must remain classified on the basis of Section 3.3(b)(1) of the Order. Additional information must be withheld because withholding is authorized and warranted under applicable law as provided by Section 6.2(d) of the Order. Enclosed is a copy showing our deletions and citing our exemptions.

As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel in my care, within 90 days for the date of this letter. Should you choose to do this, please include the basis of your appeal.

To contact **CIA** directly or to appeal the CIA's response to the **Agency Release Panel**:


Central Intelligence Agency  
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To contact the Office of **Government Information Services (OGIS)** for mediation or with questions:

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ogis@nara.gov

Please note, contacting CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or OGIS does not affect your right to pursue an administrative appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mark Lilly". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Mark Lilly  
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

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Directorate of Intelligence

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*file source*

79-81 INC/CB

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 13526 6.2(d)

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# Afghanistan Situation Report

6.2(d)

4 June 1985

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SOVA M 85-10106JX

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
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**Intelligence Sources  
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Information**

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<b>Dissemination Control Abbreviations</b>	<b>NOFORN (NF)</b>	Not releasable to foreign nationals
	<b>NOCONTRACT (NC)</b>	Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
	<b>PROPIN (PR)</b>	Caution—proprietary information involved
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	<b>FGI</b>	Foreign government information
	<b>WN</b>	WNINTEL—Intelligence sources or methods involved



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**AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT**

**CONTENTS**

**KONAR OFFENSIVE CONTINUES** [redacted] 1 6.2(d)

[redacted] Soviet and Afghan forces are securing the eastern side of the Konar Valley and pushing up toward Barikowt. [redacted]  
[redacted] 3.3(b)(1)  
6.2(d)  
6.2(d)

**AFGHAN FOREIGN RECONNAISSANCE UNIT** [redacted] 1 6.2(d)

A reconnaissance unit in the Afghan Army may be carrying out covert activities in Pakistan.  
[redacted] 6.2(d)


**DEFECTION OF INSURGENT LEADER SPURS FACTIONAL CONFLICT** [redacted] 3 6.2(d)

The defection of an important tribal leader exacerbates problems between Khalqi and Parcham troops in Qandahar. [redacted] 6.2(d)

**ISLAMIC CONFERENCE CONDEMNS OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN** [redacted] 4 6.2(d)

The final resolutions of the Islamic Conference of December 1984 reaffirmed condemnation of the occupation of Afghanistan. [redacted] 6.2(d)

**IN BRIEF** 4 3.3(b)(1)  
6.2(d)



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6.2(d)

**KONAR OFFENSIVE CONTINUES**



6.2(d)

[redacted] the Soviets and Afghans probably completed the second phase of their offensive in the Konar Valley on Monday aimed at securing the eastern part of the valley [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] This phase of the campaign--probably aimed at relieving the Afghan garrison at Barikowt--


3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] The Soviets are continuing to use incendiary munitions and cluster bombs in massed airstrikes against insurgent positions.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

6.2(d)



**Comment:** Episodes of fierce fighting will continue, but the insurgents will be unable to prevent Soviet and Afghan forces--because of their superior strength and firepower--from seizing the northern part of the valley and relieving the Afghan garrison at Barikowt, which is on the Pakistani border.

3.3(b)(1)

6.2(d)



**AFGHAN FOREIGN RECONNAISSANCE UNIT**



6.2(d)

[redacted] the Afghan Army has a 206th Battalion reconnaissance unit subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)



3.3(b)(1)

6.2(d)

**Comment:** The reconnaissance department in the Ministry of Defense directs several other reconnaissance units--often referred to as "insurgent battalions"--assigned to each of the Afghan army corps. These units are tasked with identifying and infiltrating local insurgent groups to obtain intelligence. The 206th Battalion apparently is similar in organization, but




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
6.2(d)



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6.2(d)

its mission more closely resembles that of some units in KHAD. It apparently has been operating for more than a year.



3.3(b)(1)


6.2(d)

**DEFECTION OF INSURGENT LEADER SPURS FACTIONAL CONFLICT**



6.2(d)

Ismatullah Muslim Achakzai, a tribal insurgent leader in Qandahar Province, defected to the Babrak regime along with more than 100 of his men in April, according to US Embassy sources in Kabul.




3.3(b)(1)

Ismatullah's defection has exacerbated conflict between the Khalqi and Parcham factions in the area. Khalqis believe their power is being undermined by the Parcham-dominated regime which has charged Ismatullah with leading a tribal militia unit in the region. Khalqi officers recently refused to provide air support to a regime force--including tribesmen who defected with Ismatullah--surrounded by resistance fighters.

6.2(d)

**Comment:** The Afghan Government is increasing attempts to woo tribal leaders from the resistance, and Ismatullah's defection is an important success. His defection and participation in the regime's Loya Jirga have led to resistance calls for his assassination. Khalqi-Parcham problems, pandemic in the Afghan military, probably are intensified by resistance pressure on these units.



6.2(d)

**ISLAMIC CONFERENCE CONDEMNS OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN**



6.2(d)

The recently released final resolutions of the December 1984 Islamic Conference foreign ministers' meeting reaffirmed the Conference's condemnation of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The resolution also demands immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. For the first time the Conference denounced violations of Pakistani airspace and the bombing of its territory.



6.2(d)



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6.2(d)

**Comment:** The impact of the condemnation of the Soviets was weakened by the delayed release--caused by the slow workings of the Conference bureaucracy. The more widely publicized final communique issued at the close of the meetings failed to mention the Soviets. The Islamic Conference is reluctant to go too far to offend the Soviets for fear of lessening their support for Arab-Israeli issues that are deemed more important to the Muslim world than the occupation of Afghanistan.



6.2(d)

**IN BRIEF**

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3.3(b)(1)

desertions in the Afghan 1st Corps between March 1984 and March 1985 totaled about 9,000 men--more than the assigned strength, and almost as much as the authorized strength of an Afghan infantry division. The 1st Corps also suffered almost 3,000 casualties during the period.

6.2(d)

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3.3(b)(1)

6.2(d)

-- A paramedic training facility in Peshawar operated by the Union of Afghan Mujahedin Doctors is preparing to graduate its first class

3.3(b)(1)

The students have completed a one-year course of study. A six-month course is also in progress.

6.2(d)

-- an increasing number of Arab nationals--particularly Iraqis, Syrians, and Algerians--among Afghan guerrillas. many Iranians are fighting with Afghan groups. These Arab fighters are mostly in Sayyaf's groups.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

6.2(d)




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6.2(d)



3.3(b)(1)  
6.2(d)

**UPCOMING EVENTS**

**18 June**

The US and USSR are scheduled to begin talks on Afghanistan in Washington, DC.



6.2(d)

**20 June**

The fourth round of proximity talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan is scheduled to resume in Geneva.



6.2(d)




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6.2(c)



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6.2(d)





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6.2(d)



3.3(b)(1)  
6.2(d)



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6.2(c)



3.3(b)(1)  
6.2(d)



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6.2(d)



3.3(b)(1)

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