Request ID: 0000952321

UNCLASSIFIED

TRANSMITTAL OF MATERIAL

Type: OMAL

Submitted: 20190117

TO	FROM (RETURN ADDRESS)	
MR. JOHN GREENEWALD, JR. 27305 W. LIVE OAK ROAD SUITE # 1203 CASTAIC, CA 91384 PHN#: (800)456-2228	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 9800 SAVAGE ROAD FORT MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000 ATTN: RAMSEY,VICKI LYNN SUITE: 6881	This transmittal may NOT be downgraded upon removal of the enclosure(s). This transmittal may NOT be declassified upon removal of the enclosure(s).

WRAPPED	COMSEC	SUBMITTED
[X] U [ ] S [ ] D	[ ] YES [X] NO	20190117

SHIPPING MODE	PACKAGE CT
USPS - First Class	1 of 1

LN#	UNCLASSIFIED TITLE/DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	QTY	TOT COST	MFG SERIAL#	BARCODE	CLASS. OF ITEM
1	SERIAL: MDR-103900, DATED 17 JANUARY 2019	1	0			UNCLASSIFIED

DESIG	ACCT	TYPE	PAS STATEMENT	APPROVAL
CPODIR	NO	NA	Not Applicable	

SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS (UNCLASSIFIED)

REQUESTED BY	SIGNATURE	ORG	PHONE
RAMSEY,VICKI LYNN (VLRAMSE)	Vicki Ramsey	P133	(301)688-7785

UNCLASSIFIED

DO NOT STAMP RECEIPT PORTION WITH CLASSIFICATION

Request ID: 0000952321

RECEIPT

(Please sign and return immediately. Avoid tracer action)

Type: OMAL

RETURN TO	FROM	Receipt is hereby acknowledged for the material or documents listed under this Request ID
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 9800 SAVAGE ROAD FORT MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000 ATTN: RAMSEY,VICKI LYNN SUITE: 6881	MR. JOHN GREENEWALD, JR. 27305 W. LIVE OAK ROAD SUITE # 1203 CASTAIC, CA 91384 PHN#: (800)456-2228	SID (Typed or Printed) / DATE RECEIVED NAME (Typed or Printed) SIGNATURES

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

Serial: MDR-103900
17 January 2019

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.
27305 W. Live Oak Rd.
Suite #1203
Castaic, Ca. 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This responds to your request of 26 March 2018 to have "Cryptologic Involvement in USS Pueblo Incident" reviewed for declassification. The material has been reviewed under the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requirements of Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 and is enclosed.

Some portions deleted from the document were found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with E.O. 13526. The information denied meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Section 1.4 subparagraph (c) and remains classified TOP SECRET and SECRET as provided in Section 1.2 of E.O. 13526. The withheld information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.3(h)(2) of the Executive Order.

Section 3.5 (c) of E.O. 13526, allows for the protection afforded to information under the provisions of law. Therefore, information that would reveal NSA functions and activities has been protected in accordance with Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605, formerly 50 U.S. Code 402 note).

Please be advised that some information responsive to your request includes other government agency's information and is also included.

Since your request for declassification has been denied you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. Any person denied access to information may file an appeal to the NSA MDR Appeal Authority. The appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days after the date of the denial letter. The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA MDR Appeal Authority (P133), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, STE 6881, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6881. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which you believe the release of the information is required. The NSA MDR Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 60 working days after receipt of the appeal.

If you have any questions regarding this action, please contact me at 301-688-7785.

Sincerely,



JOSEPH DEMATTEI
Chief
Declassification Services

Encl:
a/s

CRYPTOLOGIC INVOLVEMENT IN USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

P#4

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : LTCOL Frank L. Miller, P REP COMINT Compromise Damage Assessment Task Group, PUEBLO Incident

DATE: 29 January 1968

In reply refer to: P04/

FROM : P04
W. D. Oppenheimer/3356-s

SUBJECT: COMINT Compromise Damage Assessment Relative to Documents for which P04 is OPI (TECHINS 6002, 7010, 7011, 7013, 9003)

1. TECHINS 6002, SIGINT MINIMIZE PROCEDURES - Document is classified SECRET-HVCCO, and provides information in general relative to the type(s) of material/information generated within the NSE and forwarded electr[illegible] under normal circumstances but decreased in preced[illegible] or t[illegible] forwarded by courier under MINIMIZE conditions. Its compromise would [illegible]ously affect the cryptologic effort except to give an enemy an [illegible] how to disrupt and slow down the electrical exchange of information [illegible] among the members of the community by disrupting communications [illegible] MINIMIZE might be declar[illegible]

2. TECHINS 7010, INFORMAL TECHNICAL NOTES - Document [illegible] is SECRET-HVCCO and reveals general type information th[illegible] ry [illegible]ist would expect to be exchanged between and among members of [illegible] organization. Its compromise would not seriously affect the [illegible]yptologic effort.

3. TECHINS 7011, CRYPTOLOGIC INFORMATION PUBLICATION - Document is TOP SECRET with a CODEWORD Annex. It would reveal that such information is handled separately from normal SIGINT product and therefore of special interest to NSA. Its compromise would not seriously affect the cryptologic effort.

4. TECHINS 7013, STANDARD TRANSLITERATION TABLES - Document [illegible]assified SECRET-HVCCO and reveals that the NSE uses or has established standard methods for converting foreign languages (particularly cyrillic) to romanized form with morse equivalents. Such could be expected by any modern cryptologic organization and would, in part, be available from open sources. No serious damage would occur by this compromise unless nations changed procedures overall.

5. TECHINS 9003, CATEGORIZATION OF COMINT - Document is classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD and defines various categories of COMINT and degree of sensitivity the U.S. applies to each. It reveals 2nd Party collaboration, existence of special sources, existence of 3rd Party sources by station designators, certain classification criteria, and (in Annexes) specific categorizat classification rules for COMINT material assigned to the various categories. The

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

29 January 1968

letter is a definite revelation of success both from a T/A and C/A and collection standpoint in addition to referencing other documents which are even more specific in their revelation. Compromise of this document is considered extremely grave.

6. Compromise of all of the above documents would compromise US/2nd Party SIGINT collaboration and COMINT codewords by virtue of their distribution lists and classification. Compromise of the SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT to T-9003 would reveal certain special source designators which are not releasable to foreign nationals.

7. Should the documents listed fall into the hands of SINO/SOVIET BLOC organizations, one could expect widespread changes in target communications systems as well as possibly serious diplomatic actions against the U.S.

8. It is recommended that the matter be reported to USIB as well as LSIB.

for LAWRENCE D. TERRY
Chief, Operations Staff
Production

USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

GROUP A

Group A Contact:
CHARLES R. LORD (A06)
X49295
22-890-6789

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

SUBJECT: USS PUEBLO Incident; Impact and Loss on Group A Targets and Operations

I. PREFACE:

A. The following constitutes an assessment of the impact on Group A SIGINT operations and targets resulting from the presumed compromise of those documents known to have been provided as support to the USS PUEBLO and which may have been on-board at the time of its capture. In the absence at this time of authoritative evidence regarding either (1) which Group A-related documents may have been off-loaded at Kami-Seya prior to departure on the last mission, or (2) which specific Group A-related documents on-board may have been destroyed by the crew of the USS PUEBLO, Group A has assumed that all pertinent documents provided as support to USS PUEBLO operations have been compromised. Additional support may well have been provided by other organizations (e.g. messages from USN-39, NOTAL DIRNSA) on which Group A is unable to comment. It may eventually prove feasible, subsequent to possible identification of off-loaded documents, to moderate our present assessment of damage.

B. Each technical support paper, selected TECHINS, or other document relating to Group A operations, has been reviewed and a precis has been prepared with accompanying impact statement. In instances in which essentially the same information is presented in several different forms (e.g. various sorts or reverse listings), the documents have been grouped together and a single assessment provided. A summary statement of overall impact on Group A targets will be provided as the final section of this report.

II. DOCUMENT EVALUATIONS:

[redacted]

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION





[redacted]

F. A61 COMINT Technical Report #8-67

Title: Russian International Callsign Listing

Classification: ~~SECRET CANEN~~

Content: This report is an alphabetical listing of International callsigns used on Soviet communications. These callsigns are drawn from blocks allocated to the Soviet Union through international agreement. [redacted] The format utilized provides the following categories of information:

1) Callsign
2) Callsign usage indicator (i.e. day/night/both)
3) Station function indicator (i.e. control, outstation)
[redacted]
5) Location by place name; or in case of ships, the name or number of the individual ship
6) Type of Ship
7) Ship tonnage
[redacted]
11) Date first observed
12) Date last observed
13) Validity

A detailed listing of abbreviations and their expansions indicative of Types of Russian commercial ships, naval ship types and naval ship classes is included.

[redacted]

G. A64 Working Air #10-66

Title: Soviet Radiotelephone Manual

Classification: ~~SECRET SAVIN~~

Content: This document is a glossary and handbook reference intended for use by Russian linguists engaged in the interception and transcription of Soviet radiotelephone communications. While the overall classification of this document is SECRET Codeword, it includes information ranging from unclassified material in open source Soviet and U. S. publications [redacted] Specific information included in the report follows:

1) COMINT designation of certain Soviet electronic equipment.
2) ELINT covernames as applied to Soviet radar equipment.

[redacted]

4) Equation of certain Soviet covernames to SIGINT covernames.
5) One - 2 flag naval code and associated numerical equivalents.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

I. Russian English Dictionaries

Title: SMIRNITSKIJ; Russian-English Dictionary
SEGAL; Russian-English Dictionary
MULLER; Russian-English Dictionary
MORSKOH SLOVAR' (Naval Dictionary)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Content and Impact: The Russian-English dictionaries and the Morskoj Slovar' are open source documents whose presence aboard the PUEBLO are of absolutely trivial significance in comparison with other documents aboard, and serve only to confirm our interest in Russian language material in general and, in the case of the Morskoj Slovar', Russian naval activities in particular. It is difficult to consider their loss as a compromise of any significance.

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~





A CONTACT OFFICER
CHAS. R. LORD
x 4929
22-890-6789

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

K. Title: Type J (JULIETT) Callsign System

Classification: ~~SECRET SAVIN~~

Content: Although no specific document has been compromised, the sum total of Juliett callsign information contained in other documents on board leads to the conclusion that the U. S. state of knowledge on the Juliett callsign system has been compromised.

[redacted]

L. A67 Working Aid 1-67, dated 20 March 1967.

Title: HEAD NET Radar Equated to Specific Ships

Classification: ~~SECRET SAVIN~~

Content: Indicates possibility of identifying specific Soviet ships through ELINT analysis of the HEAD NET [redacted] early warning/surface search radar associated with certain missile-configured Frigate, Destroyer and Soviet Missile Range Instrumentation Ships. Itemizes, based on analysis of HEAD NET signals from all Fleet areas (i.e., Baltic, Northern, Black Sea and Pacific Ocean) [redacted] Also included are references to other radars associated with certain of the specific vessels (e.g. BIG NET, FLAT SPIN, SLIM NET, KNIFE REST, SHIP WHEEL /with SMRIS SAKhALIN, SIBIR, SUCHAN/

[redacted]

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

M.

N.

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~





EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

R. A2 COMINT Technical Report #19-67, dated 1 May 1967

Title: Soviet Merchant and Fishing Callsign List

Classification: [redacted] SAVIN

Content: The document is a compilation in alphabetic order of Soviet R and U callsigns used by the Soviet merchant ship and fishing vessel fleets and associated shore stations and identifies the users of the callsigns. It includes the callsign, [redacted] user, type of vessel, tonnage and the validity (e.g. A%) of the equation.

S. [redacted]



V. [redacted]

W. A582 Working Aid #1-67

Title: Cross-Referenced Listing of TEXSIGS as of 1 September 1967

Classification: ~~SECRET CANTN~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Content: Provides a current listing of Technical Extracts of Signals (TEXSIGS), both active and cancelled, to include by NSA [redacted] and the system covernames assigned (e.g. BLACKPOOL).

Impact: Due to imprecision in the identification of documents provided as support to USN-467Y, it is not yet certain that this Working Aid has been compromised. [redacted]

III. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT EVALUATION:

[redacted]

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

B. GOPI (COMNAVFORJAPAN)

Title: General Operational Intelligence (Broadcast)

Classification: Probably up through TOP SECRET TRINE

Content: This report is the general intelligence broadcast which is reportedly received by all NAVSECGRU detachments such as USN-467Y. Although the precise content is unknown, it purportedly includes current intelligence on all targets within the purview of CINCPAC. [redacted]

Impact: Undetermined

C. No other SIGINT intelligence product relating to the Soviet problem has been identified at this time.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

IV. MESSAGES

A. Situation: [redacted] to USN-39; info to USS PUEBLO, USS BANNER and others. Quote USS PUEBLO Tech Support

1) In event PUEBLO is deployed to Sea of Japan, intend to dupe USS BANNER Soviet collection guidance for PUEBLO when operating in modes 2/3.

2) Query station ability to provide technical info/does necessary to support PUEBLO based on BANNER guidance. DIRNSA will provide any itmes you feel necessary and not available your area.

3) For [redacted] Request you assist where possible unquote.

B. USN-39 [redacted] Quote Anticipate no difficulty in providing PUEBLO seme tech support as is provided BANNER unquote.

Based on this exchange, it must be assumed that the PUEBLO had contacted either USN-39 or the BANNER to obtain the "collection guidance" referred to above so she would have prior knowledge of her future Soviet missions. If this were indeed true, several messages would be involved and are discussed in detail below.

C. Contents: [redacted] Still valid 33 page collection guidance message for "CLICKBEETLE" operations in the Sea of Japan.

Part I COMINT

1) [redacted] States priorities on which intercept is desired, not only of specific [redacted] cases, but special signals as well (e.g. [redacted] etc.). Includes recording instructions and lists [redacted] cases in areas 1 thru 9 which includes the general area of Soviet coastline from Vladivostok to Sovetskaya Gavin.

2) VHF Radiotelephone. All inclusive instructions on intercept of service voice communications, including Soviet Navigational Air, Soviet Long Range Aviation, Military tactical air, Soviet tactical air and Soviet Air Defense. [redacted] Soviet Naval and Naval Air assignments, [redacted] type activity and unit type (e.g. helos, Rocket Cutters, etc.). Also included in this section was some Military and Border Forces tactical voice and [redacted] for Soviet Merchant Shipping.

3) Manual Morse cases were specified; however, no frequencies or terminals were stated.

4) [redacted] Frequency, callsign both day and night and known schedules were given for 8 [redacted] cases. A [redacted] guard was specified, but no instructions were given; however, reference was made to Special SCRAMTIL #02-64 which was known to have been on-board.

Part II

Special Signals receiver/recorder instructions were given in brief form on 6 TEXSIGS including [redacted]

PART III

Contained instructions on forwarding all data collected to NSA attention A61.

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Part IV

Was NMSOB general tasking for new or unusual signals and referenced cataloging in accordance with TECHINS 1021. Intercepts should be forwarded to [redacted] signal analysis laboratory.

Part V

Was detailed ELINT tasking for specific geographic areas noted by coordinates and specific radars desired. Areas included the East Coast of North Korea, North Korean Navy, North Korean Air and North Korean Army targets. General target signals were also listed by SEDSCAF designator and name (e.g. [redacted] FIREWHEEL). An additional specific task was included which was referenced by SICR. A special PEEL GROUP task was assigned to satisfy SICR N-E10-13488. The objectives were stated with all background information, requirements and extremely detailed collection instructions.

[redacted]

D

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

E. [redacted] General [redacted] ELINT tech support and collection guidance for USN-467X (USS BANNER) during deployment in the Soviet Far East peripheral area. Although the PUEBLO was not on distribution for this message, probable duplication of the text may have been obtained from USN-39, the BANNER [redacted] would be one of the high priority items for PUEBLO collection.

F. Content: [redacted] on insight to its use, how the system operates and detailed instructions on collection techniques.

G. [redacted]

H. [redacted] Partial updating of K12/168 above. Gives frequencies, our designator of signal and type of signals associated with the [redacted] missile. Additional impact statement not necessary.

I. [redacted] Another updating of K12/168 which added and deleted certain [redacted] changed to Soviet tactical air [redacted] assignments; added the [redacted] additional ELINT SEDSCAF designators were also added. An additional impact statement is not necessary.

J. [redacted]

K. Content: Additional ELINT coverage in the Sea of Japan. Gives background information and collection requirements on FLATSPIN and SLIMNET radars.

L. [redacted]

M. [redacted]



[redacted]

- Exploitation and Reporting: considerable evidence has been provided as to the ways in which SIGINT is used for both immediate tactical support and for summary analysis and reporting. In some instances, primarily in the case of Soviet Far Eastern Naval and Air Defense communications, the [redacted] particular types of SIGINT reporting/support have been delineated and identified. [redacted]

- Technical Identifiers: case and TEXSIG notation systems, arbitrary unit designator (AUD) systems of at least Far Eastern forces, coverword assignments and, in some cases, the interrelationships of these "handles", have been disclosed.

- A Organization: at least certain A elements are clearly identified as possessing interest/responsibilities for certain SIGINT targets and/or operations. [redacted]

B. Impact of Compromise:

[redacted]



EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

IMPACT AND LOSS ON GROUP 3 TARGETS AND OPERATIONS



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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



TITLE: North Korean Naval Manual Morse Message Formats ~~(SECRET// [illegible])~~

CONTENTS: This document formats and has sample messages for Tracking reports, Administrative/Operational Messages, position reports and Weather messages.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



TITLE: B11 Working Aid #31-67, North Korean Air Force Tactical Voice Activity, 1 Aug 67, ~~(COMINT-GAMMA)~~.

CONTENTS: This working aid contains technical details concerning NKAF tactical ground station callsigns, pilot callsign allocation systems, frequency usage, airfield cover numbers, frequently observed placenames, bomb and ground attack ranges as well as cover terms and terminology used in communications.

TITLE: B71 CTR #4-66, North Korean Air Force Communications Relay Activity, 8 March 1966 (~~SECRET-CANEL~~).

CONTENTS: This technical report contains a detailed summary and discussion of North Korean Air Force communications relay activity and related [redacted] communications procedures. Also included are working aids and diagrams depicting the Net structure on each of the communications modes.

[redacted]

TITLE: 2/8/KCA-E/R1-67, Technical Supplement, North Korean Air Force Supersonic Fighter Aircraft, 15 February 1967 [redacted].

CONTENTS: This document provides a complete listing in chronological order of flights by supersonic aircraft of the NKAF from 1 December 1965-1 December 1966.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



TITLE: B11 Working Aid #3-67, NSA Standardized Abbreviations, 9 November 1967, ~~(U)~~.

CONTENTS: This document contains extracts from TECHINS 1Ø91 and is used to standardize certain abbreviations for English terms.

ASSESSMENT: No damage would result from the disclosure of this document.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TITLE: Bll CTR 71-67, North Korean Navy Communications, 6 Nov 67 ~~(SC)~~

CONTENTS: This report presents recovered technical details on the signal operating plan of the North Korean Navy (NKN) as of current date level. Specific information contained in the document includes diagrams of the NKN communications structure, details of the NKN manual morse and [redacted] callsign systems as well as frequency usage.

[redacted]

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TITLE: B71 CTR #15-66, North Korean Navy Communications, 8 Dec 66 ~~(SC)~~

CONTENTS: Like several other reports in this assessment this report presents details on NKN communications procedures. In this case details of NKN use of separators; name, location and function of land based navy stations; sea area designations and NKN weather terms used in communications.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TITLE: 2/O/TEL/RL3-67, Possible New Radio Equipment in North Korea, 10 Apr 67 (~~SI~~)

CONTENTS: This very short report contains minimum evidence of the existence of [redacted] radio equipment in North Korea (possibly local fabrication)

[redacted]

TITLE: B71 CTR #10-66, Aircraft of the North Korean Air Force, 17 Aug 66 ~~(SCI)~~

CONTENTS: This report is NOFORN dissemination.

This report is designed as a reference manual for analysts working the NKAF problem. It contains technical details concerning aircraft performance, aircraft specifications, electronic equipment and armament/cargo specifications for all aircraft types known to be in the NKAF inventory and those expected to be added.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

[redacted]

TITLE: 2/O/KCA-E/RQ4-67, North Korean Air Force AAA/SAM Related Flight Activity, 25 Apr 67 ~~(SS)~~

CONTENTS: This product report contains a brief summary of North Korean Air Force (NKAF) activity believed to be related to practice for AAA and SAM units. Flight route activity, airfield controller actions and location of SAM sites through intercept of FAN SONG, A/B radars are prominant.

[redacted]

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

[redacted]

[redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 2020 - TEXTA Manual



EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TITLE: TECHINS 1Ø55 - SIGINT Activities Directory

CONTENTS: Provides a complete list of all U.S. and 2nd party collection and processing sites with specific locations (map coordinates) and describes in general terms the extent of the mission of each station. This document also lists the administrative designators for the U.S. intercept stations.

TITLE: TECHINS 1Ø43 - NSA Forwarding Directive

CONTENTS: Annex B thru E: Traffic forwarding Annex F thru I: Tech product forwarding. Content - Provides list of all raw traffic and technical product generated by each U.S. collection/processing (overt) station and the flow of materials. Includes materials contributed by Third Party sources.

TITLE: TECHINS 2Ø2Ø - TEXTA Manual

CONTENTS: Provides detailed description of case notation systems, world-wide, and description of elements of the TEXTA format. With regard to the CHICOM Ground and Naval targets, this document [redacted] identifies CHICOM Military Regions and Naval Fleet areas.

[redacted]

TOP

[redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1003 - Radiotelephone Recording Transcriptions Procedures

CONTENTS: Mentions CHICOM radiotelephone.

TITLE: TECHINS 1007 - Morse General Search Cover and Reporting

CONTENTS: Discusses CHICOM [redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1019 - Machine Intercept Analysis Report (MIAR)

CONTENTS: Discusses CHICOM MIAR reporting.

TITLE: TECHINS 1042 - Instructions for Preparing and Packaging for Forwarding of Intercept Traffic and Related Material

CONTENTS: [redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1044 - Instructions for the Selection and Forwarding of Product DDI's, Selection of Messages, Administrative and Operational Delivery Distribution Indicators (DDI's)

CONTENTS: Lists DDI's to be used on the CHICOM problem.

TITLE: TECHINS 2003 - Instructions for Preparation of Daily Technical Summaries (TECSUMS)

CONTENTS: Provides format and data elements for all Tecsums, to include CHICOM Ground, Naval and Naval Air.

TITLE: TECHINS 4001 - Serialisation of SIGINT Product

CONTENTS: Acts as a working aid in allowing the reader to have a rapid assessment of the content of a given report/translation. Otherwise no intelligence value.

TITLE: TECHINS 4010 - SIG Publ Manual (formerly TECHINS 4010)

CONTENTS: Ties together 17 other TECHINS dealing with SIGINT reporting procedures. This one document divulges all the general principles, rules, and procedures governing the nature and form of SIGINT reports and translations.

TITLE: TECHINS 4Ø11 - SIGINT Support to Unified and Specified Commands and other Overseas Consumers

CONTENTS: Reveals JSPC, [redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 7Ø1Ø - Informal Tech Notes (ITN's)

CONTENTS: Mentions "CHICOM Naval Air" as example of title of report.

[redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 7Ø14 - Procedures for Providing Information Support to U.S. SIGINT Field Units

CONTENTS: Lends further reference to JSPC's responsibilities in field support on CHICOM targets.

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

GROUP K

K

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ ~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~ ~~NOFORN~~

TITLE: TECHINT 1056 (Collection Management Procedures((U)

CONTENTS: Establishes standard procedures for the management of SIGINT Collection facilities at United States Stations.

ASSESSMENT: The loss of this document should present only a minimal impact to the community. It is noted that the format of messages is given in this document and under certain conditions this type of information could be used for cribbing. The probability of this is thought to be very low. For see no effect on future operations.

TITLE: TECHINS 1001 (Standard Intercept Symbols and Abbreviations) (U)

CONTENTS: This document contains standard abbreviations and their expansions to be used by SIGINT collectors and processors. It is crossreferenced and covers such general subjects as international communications terms, standard abbreviations for describing frequency measurements, signal quality and symbols used to indicate the technical basis for identification of collected signals. (i.e. identified by callsign and schedule or identified by frequency, procedure and placename.

ASSESSMENT: A. The loss of this document should have very little if any impact on the SIGINT community. In reality it is nothing more than a list of common communication and communications related terms which are used by communications personnel world wide.

B. Section 3 para 7 and para 13 appear to be the only areas of this document that could provide some help to unauthorized users. However even these paragraphers are of no use unless the unauthorized user has access to classified SIGINT correspondence on a continuing basis.

TITLE: TSCHINS 1021 and changes thereto

CONTENTS: This publication provides designators for known communications signals and methods the Non-Morse Operators Signal Analysis Handbook provides descriptions of known communications signals. The Telegraphic Code Manual provides combination quivalents for known telegraphic codes.

ASSESSMENT: Access to any of these documents by potential enemies would reveal the extent of our knowledge of the external parameters and coding of communications signals. Further, the fact that we describe signals and codes of non-target" countries [redacted] Brazilian, [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: TECHINT 1003 (Radiotelephone Recording and Transcription Procedures (U)

CONTENT: Basically this document provides the standard terminology and procedures to be used by intercept units engaged in the intercept of Radiotelephone transmissions.

ASSESSMENT: The impact on the SIGINT community due to the loss of this document to unauthorized persons should be minimal.

Except for the degree of thoroughness this document should offer little more than the knowledge of how the U.S. COMINT community performs the recording and transcription of Radiotelephone transmissions.

The loss of the document should have no effect on future Radiotelephone collection.

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ ~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TITLE: TECHINS NO. 1037, "Equipment and Facilities Standards for Intercept Stations ~~(C)~~

CONTENTS: This document, classified SECRET-HVCCO, is a resource standards document prescribing selected general and specific community wide standards for SIGINT operations buildings, antenna fields, and equipment configurations for each position, to be used wherever applicable in support of the development and review of resource requirements.

The standards listed in Annex A, "SIGINT Operations Building and Antenna Field," are very general.

The standards listed in Annex B, "Equipment Composition of Positions," are very specific. The equipments listed in this section are all equipments of an electronic, electrical and electro-mechanical nature that are an integral part of a SIGINT position and have been standardized by NSA to increase community-wide operational and technical efficiency. In Annex B there is a complete description of our Identification Code System from which the six element, alpha numeric code designator is established, and this is commonly called POEI (Position/Equipment Indicator))in the Agency's and SCA's Programming and Tasking documents.

In Annex B each position sheet includes the following:

Position Code (POEI)
Capability
Equipment
Floor Space Required
Weight
Power Required

Under the Capability Section of the position sheet is given the capability of the equipment in the position in relationship to the requirement which established the position. Specifics included in the capability are:

(a) The frequency range of the receivers.
(b) Capability of Demodulating [redacted] general type transmissions.
(c) In some of our [redacted] position sheets the capability section includes specific signals the position is capable of on-line processing.

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET [redacted]~~

(d) In some Radioprinter position sheets we go into detail on our capability for collecting [redacted]

Included in the Equipment section of this document is practically every known equipment used in the SIGINT community. This equipment is listed by AN or commercial designator plus the title of the equipment.

In conclusion it must be said that some position sheets are very brief and some do go into great detail of the capability for collecting and processing signals.

[redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1005 (Radio Printer) Coll Procedures (C))

TITLE: K12 Impact Statement on the Loss of the USS Pueblo

CONTENTS: The following messages were aboard the USS Pueblo and our assessment of their compromise is listed below:

a. Two USN-467Y messages of 22 Jan (SECRET SAVIN) were tech reports for the period 12-22 Jan 68. These messages contained the specific COMINT and ELINT frequencies monitored during that period. This information shows the capability of the on-board equipment and provides insight into the U.S. targets of interest. The addressee lists also associate the ship with NSA and other SIGINT and command units.

b. CINCPACFLT msg 191920Z Jan proposed to CINCPAC the patrol during which the PUEBLO was captured. The message contained objectives for the patrol and, by the addressee list, associated the ship and patrol with NSA and various command units.

c. DIRNSA 122009Z Jan (K12-36) to the PUEBLO and BANNER advised of technical support packages being forwarded. This message shows direct NSA involvement with the ship.

d. CTF 96 110042Z Jan advised of PUEBLO sailing delay and through the addressee list associated NSA and other commands with the ship.

e. CINCPACFLT 052157Z Jan, same as d. above.

f. USN-467X (USS BANNER) 050710Z Jan, same as d. above.

g. DIRNSA message of 4 Dec (A/518) to various SIGINT addees discussed the tech support arrangements for the PUEBLO and BANNER. The message clearly associates NSA with these ships.

h. CTF 96 050512Z Jan contained PUEBLO sail orders and associates NSA with the patrol through the addee list.

i. USN-467Y (PUEBLO) 030116Z Jan provided its operational schedule for 3rd quarter FY68. The message shows U.S. interest in specific operating areas. The message also associates these activities with cryptologic elements, including NSA.

j. JCS 021615Z Jan approves requested TRS and special surface operations submitted by CINCLANT and CINCPAC. Although the specific operations are not identified, the addressee list contains the names of all the U.S. technical research ships, the AGER's, NSA, other cryptologic elements and command units. The associations are obvious.

k. CINCPAC 292111Z Dec 67 discusses the use of a SECRET Codeword to be assigned for "PACFLT AGER operations as intelligence collection ships including SIGINT material and personnel support". The addee list associates NSA and other cryptologic units with these activities.

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

1. DIRNSA 292017Z Dec 67 (K12-1266) contains NSA secondary collection requirements for the PUEBLO operations in the KOROOM area. These requirements show specific knowledge of and interest in the following SIGINT targets:

(1) [redacted]

(2) [redacted]

(3) North Korea Air Force activity on specific frequencies

(4) North Korea Army activity in specific frequency ranges

(5) North Korea Navy activity in specific frequency ranges

(6) Cruise missile emitters at a specific location

(7) Other ELINT emitters at a specific location(s)

n. CINCPACFLT 172154Z Dec 67 was the same proposal as contained in b. above.

n. CNO 151410Z Dec 67 advised the fleet commanders of expanded ACHR operations and requested the assignment of new codewords for use in their operating areas. The addee list associates NSA with these operations.

o. DIRNAVSECGRU 021912Z Jan advised DIRNAVSECGRUPAC that the PUEBLO should take DIRNSA K12-1266 (see 1. above) for action. This associates NSA directly with this patrol.

p. DIRNAVSECGRUPAC 032144Z Jan tasked the PUEBLO with the NSA requirements contained in K12-1266.

q. CINCPACFLT 290226Z Sep 67 assigned the cryptologic designator USN-467Y for use by the NAVSECGRUDET aboard the PUEBLO. The message also outlines command reporting responsibilities for the OIC of the detachment. NSA is associated through the message addee list.

r. CINCPACFLT 290111Z Sep 67 outlines command and control relationships applicable to the NAVSECGRUDET. Among these is the statement "E. Technical direction over SIGINT functions is vested in DIRNSA.....".

s. DIRNSA 251330Z Aug 67 (R72-003) proposes TDY for two NSA civilians to visit the PALM BEACH and PUEBLO in connection with equipment installation matters.

t. NAVSHIPSYSCOM HQ 161456Z Mar 67 associates NSA, LTV Electrosystems at Bremerton, Washington and Sylvania Electronic Systems with the PALM BEACH and PUEBLO.

2. Several other messages noted in the K1 files were not specifically commented on. These messages associated NSA with the PUEBLO through the message addee list. Although the message text was not particularly compromising.

ASSESSMENT: As viewed by the messages discussed above, and without regard for the impact statements being prepared elsewhere, the following compromises are evident if the messages were not destroyed prior to the capture of the PUEBLO:

a. DIRNSA is associated directly with the activities of the USS PUEBLO.

b. DIRNSA provided specific collection requirements for the PUEBLO.

c. The NSA requirements identify specific U.S. SIGINT interests.

d. The addressee lists permit an insight into U.S. cryptologic command and technical relationships.

e. A listing of surface SIGINT technical research ships is given. Contact Mr. Richard Harvey, K12, on extension 3891/5385s for further information.

SECRET SAVIN

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TEXTA (Technical extracts of Traffic Analysis) [redacted] KCN, KCA; KCM.

A. Gist of information - Contains identifying characteristics of raw traffic extracted through processes of T/A, together with conclusions reached by the analyst as to the type of working being used, the type of signal being used to transmit, type of traffic being passed, and the location of the transmitting stations. The case notation tetragraph when related to the Texta Manual can be revealed, e.g. KCM = North Korean Military.

[redacted]

C. Office of preparation - K13

Earl H. Angus, 5816S/[redacted]

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

SECRET SAVIN

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

C. Office of preparation - K13

Earl H. Angus, 5816s/or

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT: TECHINS 1643 (Forwarding Directive)

A. Gist of document - This document contains forwarding instructions for collected raw materials, (Magnetic tapes, pageprint, perforator tapes, etc.). Instructions are broken down to Morse, Radiotelephone and Radioprinter [redacted]. Also includes selection guides for certain types of intercept - how to identify high interest traffic and what raw traffic is to be forwarded electrically.

[redacted]

C. Office of preparation - K13

Earl H. Angus, 5816s/or [redacted]

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

TECHINS 1Ø55

(SIGINT Activities Directory)

A. GIST OF DOCUMENT

This document contains information regarding each intercept site [redacted] i.e.

a. Organizational Title
b. Location (includes geographical coordinates)
c. Category ceilings
d. If located in exposed area whether considered "Risky" or "Dangerous"
e. Mission (Intercept, Direction Finding, Elint, Telemetry collection, etc.)
f. Mail, Courier and Freight Addresses
g. Designator codes (End Product, Machine Source, etc.)
h. Unclassified Mission Statements (which are to be given to foreign nationals in the event asked)

B. ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF LOSS

Loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise since it reveals the magnitude of our SIGINT activities and their geographical coordinates. Also listed is a complete Second Party directory of their SIGINT elements and locations. The scope of our SIGINT operations are highlighted in as much as the document contains general mission statements.

C. OFFICE OF PREPARATION/NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

1. K13
2. L. E. MCE
3. [redacted]

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TECHINS 1Ø19

(Machine Intercept Analysis Report) -MIAR

A. GIST OF DOCUMENT

This document provides instructions for the reporting of all Non-Morse [redacted] entities in a machine retrievable format. It gives detailed instructions for the preparation of the report and identifies what types of intercept are to be reported under this system, and indicates our ability to distinguish [redacted] traffic.

B. ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF LOSS

Loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise from the standpoint of the machine reporting procedures being employed by our SIGINT Activities.

[redacted]

C. OFFICE OF PREPARATION/NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

1. K13
2. EARL H. ANGUS
3. HOME PHONE: [redacted]

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: IFL
Nomagram Scale
Sonagraph Scale
Signal Diary Cards (Blank)
NMSDB Operators Cards (Blank)

ASSESSMENT: Possession of the above by the North Koreans or any other potential enemy would have no serious impact since no information of SIGINT value could be obtained from these items. The signal diary and NMSDB operators logs, if filled in, would provide a summary of all intercepts, including known signal parameters, obtained during the January deployment of the USS Pueblo.

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~NOFORN~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TITLE: MMSDB Working Aid for AGER Operations
TECHIMS 1007
TECHIMS 1012
TECHIMS 1016
TECHIMS 1030, Annex BRAVO
TECHDOC 106
TECHDOC 107

ASSESSMENT: Possession of the above documents could provide the holders with a knowledge of U.S. search and signals analysis methods and could contribute to an increased capability on the part of those having access to these documents.

[redacted]

TOP SECRET TRINE

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TITLE: FIF (Frequency Index File)
T-1021 (Classification System for Radio Signals)
NNOSAH (Non-Morse Operators Signals Analysis Handbook)

ASSESSMENT: Possession of the above will provide information to the North Koreans [redacted] on the extent of U.S. knowledge of their communications systems. It may also provide information on communication systems of other nations [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TITLE: PUEBLO Equipment Assessment

CONTENT: The following equipment/positions would provide enough information to reveal the purpose for which the equipment/position were configured.

[redacted]

The remaining equipment/antennas/positions configurations would not reveal any specific capability. Contact Action Officer G. Horneck, ext 3007 for more information.

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: TECHDOC 137 ~~(SECRET HVCCO)~~

CONTENT: Sets forth principles and techniques applicable to the non-Morse Search and Development (NMSD) program. Includes mission and objectives of NMSD and provides guidance to operations and processing requirements under Technical Instructions contained in TECHINS 1012 and TECHINS 1030.

TITLE: TECHINS 1012 w/changes ~~(SECRET GAMMA)~~

#1 dtd 3 Nov 65, cy 275
#2 dtd 30 Nov 65, cy 274
#4 dtd 11 Jul 66, cy 172
#5 dtd 21 Dec 66, cy 96
#6 dtd 9 Feb 67, cy 135
#7 dtd 28 Jul 67

CONTENT: Directs the non-Morse Search and Development (NMSD) operations below 30 mhz. Includes operating procedures/techniques, tuning and recording instructions, and reporting requirements for different systems which may be encountered in search and contains search plans for fixed HF NMSD positions.

TITLE: TECHINS 1030, Annex Bravo ~~(SECRET GAMMA)~~

CONTENT: Directs operating procedures and techniques for the conduct of non-Morse Search and Development (NMSD) operations aboard designated Technical Research Ships (TRS). Provides instructions for conducting environmental studies of the RF spectrum from 30 mhz to 12,750 mhz from peripheral areas of specified countries of SIGINT interest.

Contains list of countries designated as Interest Countries/areas to the SIGINT effort and provides instructions on intercept, recording and reporting on communications systems emanating from these areas.

TITLE: NMSDB Working Aid for AGER Operations

CONTENTS: Information contained in AGER working aid generally the same as in Annex Bravo to TECHINS 1030 but has been revised to be more applicable to the AGER type operations in view of the more limited search/equipment capability aboard these type vessels.

TITLE: TECHINS 1015, dtd 7 January 66, cy 344 with Change #1, dtd 30 Mar 66. ~~(SECRET GAMMA)~~

CONTENT: Provides instructions on reporting of unidentified signals/systems when encountered by collection positions other than search and development facilities. In genera, purpose is to ensure that any new or unidentified systems get into the proper channels for development and signals analysis on a timely basis.

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: TECHDOC 186

CONTENT: TECHDOC that provides guidance to TECHINS 1887 - Morse Search and Development operations. States objectives, techniques, classification, format, reporting. Makes no specific mention to any country, but [redacted]

TITLE: TECHINS 1887

CONTENT: TECHINS 1887 directs the Morse, Search and Development operation. The document lists manner of search, procedures to be followed; a list of countries (by TEXTA digraph only) on which only minimum cover is required; also makes specific reference to knowledge of [redacted] explains manner and methods of reporting intercept.

TITLE: IFL - International Frequency List drawn up by the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) (U)

TITLE: Signal Diary Cards

CONTENT: Approximately 500 signal diary cards were on board the PUEBLO, these are classified "CONFIDENTIAL - UNTIL FILLED IN". These cards are for local use, to maintain a record of recovered signals and all data pertaining to these signals, such as: Frequency, bearing, user, modulation and system (IAW TECHINS 1821), the recovery date, log number, data number, signal strength, and any remarks pertinent to the system. These cards are 5"x8".

TITLE: NSSD Operators Log, Form N8275, classified "CONFIDENTIAL - UNTIL FILLED IN".

CONTENT: Approximately 500 of these log forms were on board the PUEBLO, these logs were for use of the non-Morse Search and Development position to provide all available information regarding any recovered signal, such as: Entry no., time (Z) up and down, the RF in mhz, polarity, bearing, signal strength, signal characteristics, (IAW TECHINS 1821), the operator/analyst remarks, recording media, date, log no. (size 8"x13".

TITLE: Frequency Index File

CONTENT: This document contains a compilation of non-Morse communications activity observed in the VHF-EHF spectrum. The technical data contained was obtained from NSSDB field activities, Special Sources, and other SCA/NSA controlled collection efforts, and is intended to provide a ready reference to spectrum occupancy data of COMINT (Communications intelligence) activity in the VHF-EHF range. This document is published by M24 at NSA, and is classified SECRET BAVIN. This document contains pages 1 thru 111, Annexes A, B, and C, (Pages 1 and 2) and Pages 1 thru 844).

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

The data contained in the FIF are as follows: First Hrd Date (year/quarter), continuity dates, intercept site, see Annex A. (This Annex lists all sites that have intercepted capabilities and that have contributed recovered non-Morse activity in the FIF). Intercept area designator (L/L/N that equates to the coordinates at Time of Intercept), carrier frequency, carrier modulation (IAW TECHINS 1921), and other items referring to the signal parameters, transmitting country trigraph, TEXTA notation, transmitting and receiving city tetragraphs, remarks.

TITLE: Memos for Holders of GM/ESV/SP Telemetry Beaconry Intercept Operators Handbook, dated 31 Mar 1966, 19 Dec 1966, and 11 Apr 1967

CONTENT: These three memos transmitted a complete revision of the subject handbook. The document carries an overall classification of SECRET, GRP-1. It was designed as an operators aid to assit in the intercept and recording of [redacted] telemetry and tracking beacon signals. The handbook provides a detailed technical description of known [redacted] telemetry/beacon signal parameters (RF, PRF, BW, etc.). It also contains sections on general recording techniques, receiving system sensitivity checks, time accuracy measurements, and use of the earth satellite plotter, and signal analysis techniques.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TITLE: Memos for Holders of GM/ESV/SP Telemetry Beaconry Intercept Operators Handbook, dated 31 Mar 66, 19 Dec 66, 11 Apr 67.

CONTENT: These three memos transmitted a complete revision of the subject handbook. The document carries an overall classification of SECRET Group 1. It was designed as an operators aid to assist in the intercept and recording of [redacted] telemetry and tracking beacon signals. The handbook provides a detailed technical description of known [redacted] telemetry/beacon signal parameters (RF, PRF, BW, etc.). It also contains sections on general recording techniques, receiving system sensitivity checks, time accuracy measurements, use of the earth satellite plotter, and signal analysis techniques.

ASSESSMENT: With the exception noted below, the handbook does not reveal intelligence successes, but the scope and long history of the collection efforts, are apparent. Para C, Page IX-7 states that analysis of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] ~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

OGA

TITLE: DIA EOB Volume 3, dated 1 October 1967

CONTENT:

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ ~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: PACOM Electronic Equipment Reference Manual (PER-2), dtd 1 Jun 67

CONTENT: Provides a comprehensive narrative description of Communist Bloc non-communications electronic equipment.

ASSESSMENT: This document indicates the extent of PACOM technical knowledge regarding Communist Bloc Radar inventory. The document includes [redacted] nicknames, parametric information, description of equipment, function, capabilities, and correlation of these equipments with associated carrier platforms. Where available, photographs, charts and graphs are presented. Although specific parametric data is not provided, this document also lists by country and platform, the Airborne and Shipborne Electronic Orders of Battle for Communist Bloc and Non-Communist Bloc (including U.S.) countries within the PACOM area of interest. Includes Russia, Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia, [redacted] and U.S. This document also contains a very comprehensive distribution list. This document is classified SECRET.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: PER-3, Collection Requirements, dated 1 Mar 67 (with changes)

CONTENT: The purpose of the PACOM ELINT Report-3 (PER-3) is to provide commanders, their staffs and ELINT collection units with collection objectives to be used in planning ELINT missions. It contains a listing of ELINT emitters and systems of interest to PACOM. Included in each objective is the emitter of interest, the SIOR to which it applies, the collection priority, primary collectors, secondary collectors, search areas, search frequencies, recording instructions, and a brief statement regarding what, where, and how often to collect against the specific objectives. These objectives contain the administrative designators of various collectors, specific geographic areas of interest and specifics concerning our intelligence gaps in regard to certain emitters and/or systems.

ASSESSMENT: [redacted] Its acquisition by the Communists would reveal:

(1) The scope of our operations. Collectors are listed.

(2) The identifying SEDSCAF designators and nicknames of the emitters listed.

(3) Actual or suspected sites.

(4) Interested commands and agencies (distribution list)

(5) Search areas and frequencies

(6) Collection and recording procedures

(7) Various other elements of information

The discussion portion of each objective is sometimes quite extensive. This document is classified SECRET.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TITLE: PEC working copies of ELINT Parameter List

CONTENT: Assuming that the lists referred to are copies of NSA's EPL, they provide detailed parametric descriptions of all known Communist Bloc Military and commercial radars, as well as deployed U.S. and friendly military radars.

ASSESSMENT: Considering that these lists provide the most current results of NSA's ELINT analytic efforts, the loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise.

These lists are classified SECRET NOFORN.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

TITLE: PEC SEDSCAF Guides

CONTENT: Provide the codes their meaning and the basic format for ELINT intercept reports. Used by operators as an aid to preparation of reports required by TECHINS 1302.

ASSESSMENT: Considerable - these guides provide the ability to read EDP formatted and coded ELINT intercept reports. The classification of these guides is SECRET.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

TITLE: NSA ELINT Reference Manual

CONTENT: The ELINT Reference Manual (ERM) is a comprehensive compilation of information on Communist Bloc non-communications emitters. The articles include the [redacted] nicknames, parametric data, description of equipment, function, operating characteristics and capabilities, correlation with aircraft, ships, and other emitters and photos of the equipment and platform, where available. The ERM also includes sections entitled "Working Aids" and "Procedures and Techniques" designed to assist ELINT operators and analysts.

ASSESSMENT: Loss of the ERM constitutes a serious compromise since it is a consolidation of the most significant information known by the U.S. about non-Communist Bloc airborne, landbased and shipborne radars, IFF, Navigational aids, electronic countermeasures, and meteorological devices. The information in the ERM includes collateral intelligence material, such as photos and antenna descriptions, as well as signal intercept data. Also, loss of the ERM in effect compromises much of the [redacted] of Nicknames for Soviet Bloc and Chinese Electronic Equipment," promulgated by [redacted]

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: NSA ELINT Parameter Limits List, 1 Oct 67/1 Jan 68

CONTENT: Assuming that the lists referred to are copies of NSA's EPL, they provide detailed parametric descriptions of all known Communist Bloc military and commercial radars, as well as deployed U.S. and friendly military radars.

ASSESSMENT: Considering that these lists provide the most current results of NSA's ELINT analytic efforts, the loss of this document constitutes a serious compromise. [redacted] These lists are classified SECRET NOFORN.

TITLE: Standard ELINT Data Systems Codes and Formats Manual (SEDSCAF), dated 1 Jul 67

CONTENT: Provides a detailed description of all National ELINT reporting formats (technical and operational) codes, and data processing methods.

ASSESSMENT: The information contained within this document reveals the scope of ELINT activities world-wide since one set of codes identifies all activities (Third Party activities are listed under a "Special Assignment" designator.) The document further reveals all codes and formats used within the National ELINT Collection, Reporting and Data Processing System. It also reveals our current state-of-the-art in ELINT collection capability by the types of information, statements of accuracy, etc., which is routinely required.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: PEC SEDSCAF Guides (para 2.B.2 of ref PEC message)

CONTENTS: Provide the codes their meaning and the basic format for ELINT intercept reports. Used by operators as an aid to preparation of reports required by TECHINS 1302.

ASSESSMENT: Considerable - these guides provide the ability to read EDP formatted and coded ELINT intercept reports.

KL/E. R. Bridges/3375 [redacted] ..... PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TITLE: PEC Working Copies of ELINT Parameter List (para 2.B.1.A-D of ref PEC message)

CONTENTS: Assuming that the lists referred to are copies of NSA's NPL, they provide detailed parametric descriptions of all known Communist Bloc Military and commercial radars, as well as deployed U. S. and friendly military radars.

ASSESSMENT: Considering that these lists provide the most current results of NSA's ELINT analytic efforts, the impact of this loss is considerable.

TITLE: TECHINS 1302, ELINT Collection and Data Reporting Procedures for SCA Facilities, dated 1 September 1966.

CONTENTS: Establishes definitions and general procedures relating to ELINT (less CM/ESV/SP) collection, processing and reporting. The TECHINS defines generic types of signals, the various types of reports required, reporting requirements for general types of signals, tuning and recording procedures and photography procedures. In addition, a distribution list for the TECHINS is included.

ASSESSMENT: Since T-1302 does not identify specific or sophisticated collection, recording procedures or the degree of success we have in the exploitation of ELINT through application of these procedures, the specific loss and impact on future operations is considered minimal. Analysis of the distribution list contained in T-1302 and correlation of this list with other documents reported to be aboard the Pueblo (i.e., T-1055 and T-1043) does, however, indicate the world-wide scope of ELINT operations.

TITLE: TECHDOC 102, Groundbased ELINT Collection Operations, dated 25 July 1966.

CONTENT: Outlines the philosophy and methods of conducting groundbased ELINT collection operations. Identifies types of ELINT search and application against generic types of ELINT signals.

ASSESSMENT: Negligible.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

O : DADPM

DATE: 31 January 1968

KOM : ADP

UBJECT: Classified Material Aboard USS PUEBLO (USN-467Y) ~~(C)~~

1. Reference is made to your request for identification of the technical support materials which were aboard the PUEBLO, and a brief assessment of the impact on the SIGINT capability due to the possible compromise of these materials. (Task #13, dated 27 January 1968)

2. The attached information was prepared by the various offices of primary interest within the Production Organization (A, B, K, and PØ4). The assessments were made on an inventory of SIGINT materials known or suspected to have been on board at the time of the incident. These assessments represent an all-inclusive evaluation based on available information, and should provide an overall indication of impact on the SIGINT effort. It is believed that the impact reflected in these attachments is not likely to be seriously altered by later information concerning other SIGINT materials aboard the ship.

3. Special materials have been forwarded under separate cover.

4. This memorandum may be downgraded to SECRET HVCCO upon removal of inclosures.

OLIVER R. KIRBY
Assistant Director, NSA
for
Production

Incl:
a/s

cc: PØ4 ←
P2
A
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D[redacted]12
D33

~~ATTENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Potential Losses to the SIGINT Effort

On the basis of available information, the overall loss and the long term effects on the U. S. SIGINT effort, was reported to the SSO Defense Intelligence Agency on 24 January 1968. The overall loss was assessed to be very severe. This was based on preliminary information that some 33 Naval Security Group personnel, and four ships officers, all cleared and indoctrinated for Category III COMINT, were aboard the USS Pueblo. It was further noted that several of the NSG personnel aboard were knowledgeable in various compartmented problems.

It was noted in general that the Naval Security Group personnel aboard the ship were fully qualified signals intelligence technicians and that their past assignments covered a wide range of geographic areas and targets. Collectively, these men could be expected to be completely knowledgeable of the state of the art in the fields of SIGINT collection, processing, reporting techniques, and successes on a world-wide basis. In addition, the entire U. S. SIGINT collection processing and reporting procedures would be compromised through the depth of the technical support material carried. These documents expose our SIGINT objectives and techniques in attacking these objectives. The results (at least in part) of our years of effort, provide a broad insight into the entire operating structure of the U. S. and some allied SIGINT establishments, and the intelligence interests of the U. S.

The preliminary assessment filed electrically on 24 January 1968, has been substantiated. A more definitive list of COMINT knowledgeable personnel has since been produced. It has been determined that of the 83 persons known to be aboard the USS Pueblo, the following constitute the COMINT knowledgeable aboard:

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Operations Officer
Communications Officer
Officer-in-Charge, NSG Detachment
27 Navy enlisted
2 U. S. Marine Corps enlisted

(The remaining 49 personnel are not known to have had any access to SIGINT information.) (See Tab M for a consolidated listing by name.)

In summary, with the total data presented by the capture of the USS Pueblo, the North Koreans, alone or in concert with other communist nations, could reveal the extent of the U. S. worldwide SIGINT and various other intelligence operations.

(The message reporting the preliminary assessment of the USS Pueblo loss is attached hereto as Tab L. Tab M is a consolidated listing of those COMINT knowledgeable personnel known to be aboard the USS Pueblo. Tab N is composed of individual statements of known duties, access, and previous assignments of these 34 personnel.)

Iraq Reporting Preliminary
Assessment of US Public Law

M

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF COMINT INDOCTRINATED PERSONNEL

Name	Special Access	Previous Assets
CDR Lloyd M. Bucher	Binnacle	
LT Edward R. Murphy, Jr.		
LTJG Frederick C. Shumacher		
Ensign Timothy L. Harris		
LT Stephen R. Harris	Binnacle, Tanker/Host	ADMSG; DLIWC
CT3 Paul D. Brunnahan		USN-13
CT3 John A. Shilling		USN-40
CT3 Anthony A. Lamantia		USN-11
CTSN Steven J. Robin		USN-39
CT2 Wayne D. Anderson		USN-39
CT2 Charles R. Sterling	Tanker/Host	USN-11, USN-39, USN-26, Cape Chiniak, Alaska, USN-16, USN-836, USN-22
CT2 Elton A. Wood		USN-835
CT1 Francis J. Ginther	Tanker/Host	USN-26, USN-12
CT3 Rodney H. Duke	Echo	USN-13
CT1 James A. Shepard	Echo	USN-17, NAVSECGRUACT Istanbul, Turkey, NAVSECGRUACT Key West, Fla.
CT3 Sidney J. Karnes		USN-39
CT3 Earl M. Kisler		USN-14
CT2 Donald R. McClarren		USN-14
CT1 Don Earl Bailey	Tanker/Host	USN-27, USN-14, USN-416, USN-851
CTC James F. Kell		USN-13, USN-11
CT1 David Lee Ritter	Binnacle	USN-855
CT3 John White Grant		
CT2 Peter M. Langenberg		USN-39
CT2 Michael W. Alexander		USN-428
CT3 Ralph (n) McClintock		
CT3 Bradley Reed Crowe		USN-22
CT3 Charles W. Ayling		USN-26
CTC Ralph Dalton Bowden	Tanker/Host	USN-11, NAVSECSTA, Wash., D.C., ADMSG Ft. Meade, NAVSECGRUACT Istanbul, Turkey, USN-12, USN-22
CT1 James D. Layton	Tanker/Host	NAVSECGRUACT Cape Chiniak, Alaska, USN-19, USN-22
CT3 Angelo S. Strano	Echo	USN-17
CT1 Donald R. Peppard		USN-11, USN-40, NSA, Wash., USN-15, NAVSECGRUDET COMSUBFLOT TWO, New London, Conn.
SOT Robert J. Hammond		
SOT Robert J. Chicos	Binnacle	
CT1 Michael T. Barrett		USN-13, USN-40, USN-39, USN-22

N

Commander Lloyd Mark BUCHER, USN

Present Duty:	Commanding Officer, USS Pueblo
Clearances:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT BINNACLE
Access:	Commander Bucher's specific access to SIGINT is not known. It is expected to be minimal due to his previous assignments, none of which were in the SIGINT community.
HAG:	Unknown, to be established by the Department of the Navy.
Previous Duty and Assignment:	No previous SIGINT assignments.

LT Edward Rens MURPHY, Jr., USN
LTJG Frederick C. SHUMACHER, USNR
ENS. Timothy Leon HARRIS, USNR

These officers are assigned various duties as ship's company aboard USS Pueblo. They were indoctrinated for access to Category III COMINT. Their access to classified matter in the NSG Detachment is expected to be minimal.

None of the named officers is known to have had any previous assignments involving access to SIGINT.

CTC Ralph Dalton BOUDEN, USN, 369 90 36

Present Duty: CT 'M' Branch
General Maintenance Supervisor

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
TANKER/HOST

Access: Bouden's specific access to classified information is not known at this time.

During a previous assignment to the National Security Agency, Bouden was assigned to a group of engineering technicians who were responsible for the maintenance of the 1:1 positions (D70 and D79). These positions were used in processing [redacted] signals, wherein the D79 was used to format the channel interlaced signals into separate channels and the D70 was used to make a print out of the channels. It can be assumed that the use to which this material was/is put by an analyst was known to Bouden.

Bouden's tour of duty with NSA ended in June 1959. His access can be expected to have increased correspondingly since his departure.

HAG: A HAG expiration date of 19 December 1971 has been established for CTC Bouden

Previous Duty and Asgmts:
NSGD Finegayen, Guam, Mariannas Islands
Naval Security Station, Washington, D. C.
ADNSC, Fort Meade Maryland (NSA)
NSGA, Istanbul, Turkey
NSGD Sidi Yahia, Morocco
NSGD Cheltenham, Maryland

In his previous duty assignments, Bouden has been assigned duties in the maintenance of Electro-Mechanical Cryptographic Equipment (TSEC/KL47); DF HCO/AMCO Computers (AN/GYK-3, CP 813, FSQ 59) and related equipment.

CTC James Francis KELL, USN, 470 06 36

Present Duty:	CT 'T' Branch ELINT Supervisor (Kell is on temporary additional duty (TAD) from Kami Seya, Japan)
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances
Access:	Kell has extensive NAVSECGRU experience. He is aware of the 400 program and the mission of the 400 detachments. He is familiar with SMRIS operations and CBA transits. He is very familiar with CANUTE (S) collectors on board 900 missions, the platforms utilized, and the geographical areas of interest. Kell is not however, familiar with mission results. He was the training CPO at USN-39 for personnel deploying on 900 missions with CANUTE (S) capability. In the wideband operations area, Kell is probably aware of DF capabilities, but not familiar with results currently being obtained. In the sensitive analytical fields, Kell has an intimate knowledge of all aspects of [redacted] Phase I, and a slight knowledge of analytical procedures in Phase II. He has a detailed knowledge of CANUTE (S) collection procedures and some knowledge of analysis and results obtained. Kell also has a detailed knowledge of all aspects of radioprinter at USN-39 and other sites, including analytic procedures, [redacted] systems, QuA, SMRIS, Flexmux, and others. He is aware of the Juliett callsign system, but is not knowledgeable of methods of recovery or progress.
HAQ:	One year from date of last exposure
Previous Duty and Asgmts:	NSGD Clam Lagoon, Adak, Alaska NSGD Finegayen, Guam, Mariannas Islands NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan In these previous assignments, Kell was assigned duty as Non-Morse Systems Operator and Supervisor, and General Search Operator

CTI Don Earl BAILEY, USN, 494 99 84

Present Duty:	CT 'O' Branch Teletype and Teletype-associated Cryptographic Equipment Operator (Bailey is on Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) from NSGA Kami Seya, Japan)
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT TANKER/HOST, granted at NSGD Wahiawa
Access:	As a communicator, Bailey is intimately familiar with the CRITICOMM system, crypto equipment nomenclatures, and all other phases of NAVSECGRU communications. His only association with sensitive operations is that of handling the communication traffic. While he probably knows generally of the 400-900 programs, wideband operations, restrictions on certain radioprinter analysis and processing and reporting efforts, it is considered he has no specific knowledge of current progress being made in these areas.
HAG:	A HAG expiration date of 6 August 1968 was established based on the TANKER/HOST clearance. Subsequent to this expiration, a HAG of one year from date of last exposure will be assigned.
Previous Duty and Asgmts:	NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan NSGD, Wahiawa, Oahu, Hawaii NSGD, San Miguel, Philippines NSGA, Marietta, Washington USNS Valdez During these previous assignments, Bailey was assigned duties as a communications operator, Wideband HFDF Systems, and as a General HFDF communications operator.

CT1 Michael Thomas BARRETT, USN, 489 55 24

Present Duty: CT 'I' Branch
Russian Translator/Analyst/Reporter

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Barrett's specific access to classified information is not known. It is expected that, due to his clearance and duties, he could well be knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: One year from date of last access

Previous Duty and Asgmts:
NSGD Clam Lagoon, Adak, Alaska
NSGA Bremerhaven, Germany
NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan
NSGD Cheltenham, Maryland
NSA, Washington, D. C.

During these previous assignments, Barrett was assigned duties as a Morse Intercept Operator, Traffic Analyst, and R/T Transcriber.

While at the National Security Agency, Barrett completed the RS-450 course, designed to teach

[redacted]

CT1 Francis John GINTHER, USN, 588 74 46

Present Duty:	CT 'T' Branch Watch Supervisor, General Operations
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT TANKER/HOST, at NSGA Skaggs Island
Access:	Ginther can be expected to have gained access to operations areas, the COMINT product, therein, and the technical support material available at his duty stations. He is known to be knowledgeable of TANKER/HOST, and can be expected to have gained extensive knowledge of non-morse intercept operations due to previous assignments.
HAG:	Ginther's present HAG expires 24 April 1970, based on TANKER/HOST access. This HAG will revert to one year after that date.
Previous Duty and Assgts:	NSGA Skaggs Island, California NSGD Sidi Yahia, Morocco NSA, Washington, D. C.

In these previous assignments, Ginther has been assigned duties as a Technical Search Operator in Research and Development; as a Wideband HFDF Operator; and a General Search Operator; Non-Morse Systems.

When assigned to NSA, Ginther completed the SA-100 course. This is the basic 10 week course taught by the Agency to train Non-Morse Search Operators, as well as operators in the fields of ELINT, Telemetry, and other types of non-literal signals. The course includes training in the methods of, and analytical procedures to be used, in attacking various forms of signal modulation.

CTI James Dewar LAYTON, USN, 533 22 39

Present Duty:	CT 'R' Branch Manual Morse Intercept Operator
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT TANKER/HOST at Cape Chiniak, Alaska
Access:	Layton's specific access to classified information is not known. Due to his previous assignments, it is expected that Layton would be intimately familiar with DF activities in the NAVSECGRU. In view of his present duty and clearance, it is possible he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.
HAC:	A HAC expiration date of December 1968 was established based on the TANKER/HOST clearance. After expiration of this date, a HAC of one year from date of last access will be established.
Previous Duty and Asgmts:	NSGA Cape Chiniak Alaska NSGD San Juan, Puerto Rico NSGD Cheltenham, Maryland During his previous assignments, Layton has been assigned duties variously as HFDF Operator (AM/GRD series), HFDF Operator - Wideband Systems, DF Net Control, and DF Contact Screener.

CT1 Donald Richard PEPPARD, USN, 476 91 85

Present Duty: CT 'A' Branch
General Administrative/Personnel Duties

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
It is possible that Peppard possess an extremely limited knowledge of [redacted], due to having processed crypto accountability records for that compartmented operation.

Access: Peppard's specific access to classified information is not known. Due to the nature of his duty title, it may be expected to be substantially less than that of the other crew members.

During a previous tour of duty at NSA, Peppard was assigned to S33. His duties involved the receipt, control, storage, inventory, distribution and destruction of all COMSEC materials processed by S3. Due to this assignment, he became knowledgeable of S3's distribution and accounting system, and the crypto accounts serviced and maintained within the central office of record. Peppard was also directly engaged in programming of an IBM 1401 machine accounting system. The latter is not the system in current use.

During a subsequent assignment at COMSUBFLOT Two, New London, Conn., Peppard probably became aware of the 9$$ program in general and some of its specific detachments.

MAC: One year from date of last access.

Previous Duty & Asgmts:
NSGD Finegayen, Guam, Mariannas Islands
NSGA, Bremerhaven, Germany
NSA, Washington, D. C.
NSGA, Edzell, Scotland
NSGD COMSUBFLOT Two, New London, Connecticut

CT1 David Lee RITTER, USN, 588 10 65

Present Duty:	CT 'T' Branch Non-Morse Systems Operator (Ritter is on Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) from Kami Seya, Japan)
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT Binnacle
Access:	Ritter is aware of the 400, 500 and 900 programs. He has been on TAD on Ivy Green Detachments, and is familiar with the 400 program. He has also been indoctrinated for Binnacle. Although not deployed with a 500 mission, Ritter is briefed on the program and has been exposed to the schedule for the first half of 1968. Ritter is not familiar with wideband operations. In the sensitive analytical fields, Ritter is intimately knowledgeable of Scramscan Phase I, having worked in this project for six months. He has been indoctrinated in CANUTE (G), and is very familiar with collection procedures, but his knowledge is limited in processing. In the field of non-morse search and development, Ritter has a detailed knowledge including all Soviet systems and technical signals. He has a comprehensive and detailed knowledge of radioprinter operations. Although familiar with Soviet callsign systems, Ritter does not have a working knowledge of the [redacted] callsign system.
HAG:	One year from date of last exposure
Previous Duty and Assgnts:	NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan USS Liberty In his previous assignments, Ritter was assigned duty as an ELINT Technical Search Operator

CT1 James Antwyne SHEPARD, USN, 533 21 36

Present Duty:	CT 'T' Branch ELINT Technical Search Operator
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT SPO [redacted] E, granted at NSGA Todendorf, Germany (debriefed 19 Feb 1965)
Access:	Shepard's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his clearance and duty assignment, it is possible Shepard could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.
NAG:	One year from date of last access
Previous Duty & Asgmts:	NSGA Todendorf, Germany NSGA Key West, Florida During these previous assignments, Shepard was assigned duties as an ELINT Analyst, and ELINT Watch Supervisor.

CT2 Michael William ALEXANDER, USN, 391 34 83

Present Duty:	CT 'R' Branch (Alexander's specific duty is not known. He is on Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) from DIRNAVSECGRUPAC)
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances
Access:	Alexander's access to classified information is not known. In view of his clearance, it is possible he could be knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.
HAC:	One year from date of last access
Previous Duty and Asgmts:	DIRNAVSECGRUPAC NSGA, Midway Island During these previous assignments, Alexander was assigned duties as an HFDF Operator (GRD/TRD Series), and as an Operator, DF Net Control.

CT2 Wayne Drexel ANDERSON, USN, 795 71 30

Present Duty:	CT 'T' Branch Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances
Access:	Anderson's access to classified information is not known. Due to his clearance and duty assignment, it is possible that he could be knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.
HAG:	One year from date of last access
Previous Duty and Asgmts:	NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan During this previous assignment, Anderson was also assigned duty as a Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst.

CT2 Peter Morton LANGENBERG, USN, 777 84 82

Present Duty: CT 'I' Branch
R/T Transcriber [redacted]

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearance

Access: Langenberg's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his duties and clearance, it is possible he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAC: One year from date of last access

Previous Duty and Asgmts: NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan

During this previous assignment, Langenberg was also assigned duty as an R/T Transcriber [redacted]

CT2 Donald Raymond MC CLARREN, USN, 917 18 66

Present Duty:	CT 'O' Branch Teletype and Teletype-associated Crypto-graphic Equipment Operator
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances
Access:	As a communicator, McClarren is intimately familiar with the CRITICOMM system, crypto equipment nomenclatures, and all other phases of NAVSECGRU communications. His association with other sensitive phases of NAVSECGRU operations is not known; however, it is possible McClarren could have become knowledgeable of any message processed during his tour of duty.
HAG:	One year from date of last access
Previous Duty and Asgmts:	NSGD, Wahiawa, Oahu, Hawaii During this previous assignment, McClarren was assigned duty as a CRITICOMM Technical Control Operator and as a General HFDF Communications Operator.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

CT2 Charles Ray STERLING, USN, 319 79 48

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
Signal Analyst, Non-Morse Systems, Non-Morse Operator

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
TANKER/HOST

Access: Sterling can be expected to have gained extensive knowledge of COMINT operations due to his many previous assignments. He is known to be knowledgable of TANKER/HOST, and can be expected to have gained extensive knowledge of non-morse intercept and processing.

HAG: A HAG of one year is being assigned, from date of last access.

Previous Duty & Asgmts:
NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan
NSGD Finegayen, Guam, Mariannas Island
NSGA Skaggs Island, California
[redacted]
NSGA San Vito dei Normanni Air Station, Italy
NSGD Cheltenham, Maryland
NSGA Cape Chiniak, Alaska
NSA Washington, D. C.

Sterling's previous duty assignments included duties in Non-Morse collection, Technical Research Operator in Research and Development, Wide Band HFDF Operator, and HFDF Operator (AN/GRD series).

While assigned to the National Security Agency, Sterling completed the SA-100 course. This is the basic 10 week course taught by the Agency to train Non-Morse Search Operators, as well as operators in the fields of ELINT, Telemetry, and other types of non-literal signals. This course includes training in the methods of analytical procedures to be used in attacking various forms of signal modulation.

CT2 Elton Allen WOOD, USN, 391 34 67

Present Duty:	CT 'T' Branch Operator, Non-Morse Systems
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances
Access:	Wood's access to classified information is not known. Due to his clearance, it is possible Wood could be knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.
HAG:	One year from date of last access
Previous Duty and Asgmts:	NSGA Guantanamo Bay, Cuba During his assignment at Guantanamo Bay, Wood was also assigned duty as an Operator, Non-Morse Systems. His access during this assignment is not known.

CT3 Charles William AYLING, USN 772 97 62

Present Duty:	CT 'M' Branch Maintenance, General Electronic Equipment Maintenance, TSEC/KW-37 Rcvr, TSEC/KW-7, and TSEC/KW-14
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances
Access:	Ayling's access to classified information is not known.
HAQ:	One year from date of last access
Previous Duty and Asgmts:	NSGA, Skaggs Island, California During this previous assignment, Ayling was assigned duty in the maintenance of TSEC/KG-14 and TSEC/KW-36 Rcvr/XMTR.

CT3 Paul David BRUSNAHAN, USN, 917 59 00

Present Duty:	CT 'T' Branch Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances
Access:	Brusnahan's specific access to classified information is not known. It is possible that he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo
HAG:	One year from date of last exposure
Previous Duty and Assgnts:	NSGD, Clam Lagoon, Adak, Alaska Brusnahan's previous duty assignment was also as a Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst

CT3 Bradley Reed CROWE, USN, 916 63 37

Present Duty:	CT 'R' Branch Morse Intercept Operator
Clearances:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
Access:	Crowe's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his clearance and duty assignment, it is possible he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.
HAG:	One year from date of last exposure.
Previous duty and assignments:	NSGD Cheltenham, Maryland During this previous assignment, Crowe was also assigned duty as a Morse Intercept Operator.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CT3 Rodney Hartsman DUKE, USN, 918 56 75

Present Duty: CT 'T' Branch
ELINT Technical Search Operator

Clearances: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
SPO ([redacted],E) granted at NSGD Adak, Alaska
(Debriefed 18 March 1967)

Access: Duke's specific access to classified information is not known, In view of his duty assignment and clearance, it is possible he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

HAG: One year from date of last exposure.

Previous Duty and Assignments: NSGD, Clam Lagoon, Adak, Alaska

During this previous assignment, Duke was assigned duty as a Non-Morse Systems Operator and Technical Search Operator.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

CT3 John White GRANT, USN, 994 38 99

Present Duty: CT 'I' Branch [redacted]

Clearances: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT

Access: Grant's specific access to classified information is not known. It is possible that he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.

Grant was noted to be on temporary duty at the National Security Agency in March 1967. At this time, Grant was given three specialized operational training, in the [redacted]

HAG: One year from date of last exposure.

Previous Duty and Assignments: No previous SIGINT assignments.

CT3 Sidney Jerry KARNES, USN, 697 58 88

Present Duty: CT 'O' Branch
Teletype and Teletype-associated Cryptographic Equipment Operator

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Karnes' specific access to classified information is not known. As a communicator, it is expected that he would be intimately familiar with the CRITICOMM system, crypto equipment nomenclatures, and other phases of NAVSECGRU communications. The opportunity also exists for a communicator to become knowledgeable of virtually any message transmitted or received during his tour(s) of duty.

HAG: One year from date of last access.

Previous Duty and assignments: NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan

During this previous assignment, Karnes was also assigned duty as a Teletype and Teletype-associated Cryptographic Equipment Operator.

CT3 Earl Murray KISLER, USN, 914 48 32

Present Duty:	CT 'O' Branch Teletype and Teletype-associated Cryptographic Equipment Operator
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances.
Access:	Kisler's specific access to classified information is not known. As a communicator, it is expected that Kisler will be intimately familiar with the CRITICOMM system, crypto equipment nomenclatures, and all other phases of NAVSECGRU communications. His association with other sensitive phases of NAVSECGRU operations is not known, however, it is possible that Kisler could have become knowledgeable of any message processed during his tour of duty.
HAG:	On year from date of last exposure.
Previous Duty and Assignments:	NSGD, Wahaiwa, Oahu, Hawaii During this previous assignment, Kisler was assigned duty as a General Communications Operator.

CT3 Anthony Andrew LAMANTIA, USN, 793 40 66

Present Duty:	CT 'T' Branch Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances
Access:	Lamantia's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his duty, previous assignments, and clearance, it is possible he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.
HAO:	One year from date of last exposure
Previous Duty and Asgmts:	NSGD, Finegayen, Guam, Marianmas Islands During this previous assignment, Lamantia was also assigned duty as a Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst.

CT3 Ralph (nmn) MC CLINTOCK, USNR, 693 00 93

Present Duty:	CT 'R' Branch Specific duty title unknown (McClintock is on temporary additional duty (TAD) from Kami Seya, Japan)
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances
Access:	McClintock's knowledge is generally very limited. He has a general knowledge of the 600 program, but is unfamiliar with mission or location of detachments, or the results and areas of interest. He has a negligible, if any, knowledge of wideband operations. In the sensitive analytical fields, McClintock has a negligible, if any, knowledge of Scramscan, Juliett callsign system, crypto recoveries, or other sensitive processing and reporting efforts.
HAG:	One year from date of last exposure
Previous Duty and Assgts:	NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan McClintock's previous duty title was Manual Morse Operator

CT3 John Allen SHILLING, USN, 776 40 13

Present Duty:	CT 'T' Branch Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances
Access:	Shilling's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his clearance and duty assignment, it is possible he could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.
HAC:	One year from date of last access
Previous Duty and Assgts:	NSGA Bremerhaven, Germany During this previous assignment, Shilling was also assigned duty as a Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst.

CT3 Angelo Salvatore STRANO, USN, 915 41 5[redacted]

Present Duty:	CT 'M' Branch Maintenance Magnetic Tape Records (all types) Maintenance ELINT Equipment
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT SPO [redacted] E, at NSGA Todendorf, Germany (Debriefed 13 March 1967)
Access:	Unknown
NAG:	One year from date of last access.
Previous Duty & Asgmts:	NSGA Todendorf, Germany During this previous assignment, Strano was assigned duty in maintenance of SISS ZULU equipment.

CTSN Steven Jay ROBIN, USN, 772 04 86

Present Duty:	CT 'T' Branch Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT No known compartmented clearances
Access:	Robin's specific access to classified information is not known. In view of his clearance and duty assignment, it is possible Robin could have become knowledgeable of any of the technical support material aboard the USS Pueblo.
HAO:	One year from date of last access
Previous Duty and Assgmts:	NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan During this previous assignment, Robin was also assigned duty as a Non-Morse Operator and Signal Analyst.

Sgt Robert Joseph CHICCA, USMC, 204 76 22

Present Duty:	Linguist - Korean (Chicca is on temporary additional duty (TAD from Kami Seya, Japan)
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT Binnacle
Access:	Chicca has a general knowledge of 400 detachments, but is not intimately familiar with the mission or results of missions on specific deployments. Although briefed for Binnacle, Chicca is probably unaware of the results of missions. His knowledge is characterized as general in that he knows of patrol areas of interest in the Pacific area, and the purpose of the patrols. His knowledge of Scramscan is negligible, if any. He worked in the Juliett callsign recovery section at USN-39 for approximately two weeks, gaining knowledge of methods of attack on this system, the progress of recovery and a general familiarization of other aspects of the system. While Chicca has a general knowledge of the 900 program, he is not informed concerning other sensitive operations.
HAO:	One year from date of last exposure
Previous Duty and Asgmts:	NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan Chicca's previous duty title was Manual Morse Intercept Operator

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Sgt Robert James HAMMOND, USMC, 20[illegible]6801

Present Duty: Linguist - Korean
(On Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) from Kami Seya, Japan)

Clearance: Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT
No known compartmented clearances

Access: Sgt Hammond is generally knowledgeable of the overall Morse collection program. His detailed knowledge of sensitive areas is slight. He is knowledgeable of the 400 program, including missions and some results. Hammond has negligible, if any, knowledge of the 900 program. He probably has no information on details or results of wideband operations. In the sensitive analytical fields, he probably has no knowledge of Scramscan operations. He is aware that progress is being made on recovery of the Juliett call sign system, but has no knowledge of the progress or details of the recovery of the [redacted]

HAG: One year from date of last exposure

Previous Duty and Asgmt: NSGA Kami Seya, Honshu, Japan

Hammond's previous duty assignment was as a Manual Morse Intercept Operator

LT Stephen Robert HARRIS, USNR, 638681/1615

Present Duty:	Officer-in-Charge, NSG Detachment, USS Pueblo
Clearance:	Indoctrinated for Cat III COMINT TANKER/HOST BINNACLE
Access:	Prior to reassignment to the USS Pueblo, LT Harris was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Director, Naval Security Group (ADNSG), with duty in GF3 at NSA, Fort Meade. In this assignment, Harris worked primarily on the Soviet Navy [redacted] Order of Battle, with additional interest [redacted]. Harris is known to have been assigned as an OIC of a 912 detachment. He frequently visited spaces in A Group in connection with these duties. He is known to be experienced as an Analyst/ Translator - Processing and Reporting.
HAG:	A HAG of four years from date of last access has been established for LT Harris.
Previous Duty and Asgmts:	LT Harris completed the Russian Language Course at the Defense Language Institute, West Coast.

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

23 January 1968

SUBJECT: CRYPTOLOGIC DAMAGE ASSESSMENT - USS PUEBLO CAPTURE

1. On the assumption that the entire technical support package carried on the USS Pueblo for KIRKCON targets may have been compromised, the following is considered a reasonable damage assessment:

a. The materials carried by the USS Pueblo consisted of the following:

[redacted]

[redacted]

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