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**TOP SECRET**

October 17, 1951

*3 Copy of Papers*

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Mr. Everett Johnson      National Security Council  
Mr. Charles Eyer      Department of Defense  
Mr. Alan Dines      Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. Melville Ruggles      Department of State

**FROM:** P - Col. Paul C. Davis *PCD*  
Office of Plans and Policy

**SUBJECT:** Inventory of Gold for Germany.

With reference to my memorandum of October 11, 1951,  
regarding above-mentioned subject, the attached papers complete  
said file.

Also attached is draft Copy No. 6 of the Psychological  
Support for National Policy Vis-a-Vis USSR dated October 1, 1951,  
which was distributed at Panel "B" Group III Meeting on  
October 16, 1951.

Attachments: (7)

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MORI/CDF Pages 1-24, 32-64, &  
66-75

TAB

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28 September 1951

AGRICULTURE

## 1. International significance on the cold war front:

Agriculture, as a basic industry of practically every country, has a two-fold place in cold war activities. In the sphere of economic warfare, it is a primary target for various forms of attack, in the scope of psychological warfare, agriculture provides a livelihood for large and homogeneous sections of each country's population and presents unique opportunities for penetration by [redacted] propaganda. Strengthening the agricultural economies of non-Communist nations is essential in order to face the USSR with positions of strength in the military, economic, and political fields.

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Peasants and farmers have traditionally been poor prospects for Communist recruitment and by the same token present excellent targets for cold war activities. The potential of agriculture as a field for cold war operations is considerable, therefore, from the aspect of both economic and psychological warfare.

## 2. Overt elements or programs; Primary agency responsibility; Action capability:

<u>a. Current</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Action</u>
(1) Land Reform	Inter-Agency UNESCO	Raise the standard of living of peasantry and improve their relationship to the land they cultivate.
(2) Technical Assistance Program (Point IV)	State Department, Department of Agriculture	Economic development of backward areas; improvement of living conditions and stability; increase of trade and the availability of strategic commodities.
(a) Food improvement program; improvement projects for various crops.		

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- (b) Insect control.
  - (c) Animal improvement.
  - (d) Agricultural economic research, farm management, marketing.
  - (e) Rubber program.
  - (f) Disease control.
  - (g) Extension program.
- 
- |  |                           |  |
|--|---------------------------|--|
| (3) Agricultural Training program.                   | Department of Agriculture | Training of foreign technicians in agricultural methods. Demonstrations and instruction in U.S. farming methods.                   |
| (4) Development of Agricultural Institutions Abroad. | Department of Agriculture | Same as (3).   |
| (5) ECA Agriculture Program.                         | ECA                       | Economic rehabilitation and advancement of Western Europe.   |
| (6) USIE Educational Program.                        | State Department          | To raise agricultural production and standards through better practices, demonstrated by films, lectures, pamphlets, posters, etc. |
| (7) Smith Act  | Inter-Agency              | To use the repayment of the Finnish debt to the U.S. after World War I to assist in the education of Finnish students in the U.S.  |
| (8) Bank Loans                                       | Export-Import Bank        | Develop credit and create stability through greater agricultural and other production.   |

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|--|---------------------------------|---|
| (9) Subsidy of various philanthropic and scientific organizations such as Rockefeller, Ford, and Near East Foundations, etc.                                     | State Department, ECA, private. | Improve living conditions in backward areas; train indigenous technicians; place American experts abroad to teach better methods. |
| (10) U. S. Colleges Program Abroad   | Private                         | Find better breeding stock for U. S. corn, improvement of indigenous corn.  |
| (a) Iowa State Corn Improvement Program  |                                 |   |
| (b) Michigan State Costa Rica Project  | Private                         | Improvement of international relations and agricultural methods   |
| (c) Etc. Note: Most of the overseas programs of this type sponsored by American colleges, are at least partially subsidized by ECA or Department of Agriculture. |                                 |   |
| (11) Research by American Commercial Firms, such as Grace and Co., United Fruit Co., International Harvester, Del Monte Packing Co., etc.                        | Private                         | Improve the quality and availability of world food crops. Improvement and adaptation of American machinery to local conditions.   |
| (12) Subsidy of commercial projects such as irrigation, well drilling, drainage, etc.  | ECA, State Department           | To improve living standards and political stability abroad.   |
| (13) Support of and leadership in UN agricultural activities.  | ECA, State Department           | Rural education centers under UNESCO, livestock restoration under FAO, etc.   |

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b. Suggested

- |   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| (1) Extend to the field of agriculture the ECA Work Study Plan to train 2,000 foreign nationals in this country in industry       | Agriculture and ECA   | To indoctrinate foreign nationals with modern US agricultural techniques and methods.  |
| (2) Distribute small packages of seeds with a good will message on the cover to individuals or farm granges in foreign countries. | Agriculture (individual states to send their crop seed specially to selected areas) | To create good will by bringing the American farmer and the other peoples of the world into closer understanding and sympathy. |
| (3) Continue food study programs such as "Wheat for India" whenever applicable  | Agriculture   | To exemplify the humanitarian approach of the US.  |

c. Relative Effectiveness

The Land Reform Program in Japan has been highly successful.

(1), (13). The Technical Assistance Program offers the best opportunity as a cold war weapon for positive US undertakings in the agricultural field. Since World War II the effect of US assistance throughout the world in agricultural affairs has been amply demonstrated. The rehabilitation in Europe and general progress in crop production throughout Asia has been accomplished to a very great extent with the technical, materiel, and financial support of the United States. This very concrete accomplishment is excellent material for cold war purposes.

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3. Suggested Action

The US Government should continue to concentrate and expand its output of effort in the international agricultural field on positive programs which are forces for good, such as the principle of land reform and technical assistance (Point IV), primarily channeled through UN agencies (UNESCO).

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## COMMUNICATIONS (Psychological Media)

1. Statement of International Significance ~~in~~ the Cold War Front -

A comprehensive and diversified system of contacts between peoples and governments to influence the collective attitude, opinion, and minds is essential to the conduct of psychological operations. Influence by idea encompasses and permeates the broader sociological, political, and economic spheres and its impact is indirectly reflected within these action areas.

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2.	<u>Elements or Programs</u>	<u>Agency Responsibility</u>	<u>Action</u>
a.	Current		
	(1) UNESCO Relations Staff	State	Serves as the principal channel between the Department of State and UNESCO, developing policies with respect to US participation in UNESCO
	(2) Office of Public Affairs	State	Develops and conducts programs to keep the American public informed on international affairs and to keep the Department informed as to American public opinion
	(3) Division of Publications	State	Initiates, coordinates and executes internal and external publication policy of the Department of State
	(4) International Information State Educational Exchange Program	State	Directs the formulation of operational activities of international information and educational programs. Plans domestic and overseas activities, encouraging the use of private facilities wherever practicable. Develops and reviews audio and visual materials.

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	<u>Elements or Programs</u>	<u>Agency Responsibility</u>	<u>Action</u>
a.	Current (cont.)		
(5)	Division of International Press and Publications	State	Prepares and transmits overseas current press information and materials for dissemination by US foreign missions. Provides such information and materials to foreign journalists in the US.
(6)	Office of International Information	State	Develops and executes international information programs and assures dissemination of media, materials, and services, making use of private facilities wherever practicable.
(7)	Division of International Broadcasting	State	Produces and broadcasts radio programs in English and foreign languages for use in State Department international information programs. Uses private contract facilities when appropriate and provides necessary broadcasting and relay facilities. Maintains liaison with foreign radio correspondents in the US.
(8)	Division of International Motion Pictures	State	Provides motion pictures in appropriate foreign languages for use abroad through purchase, production, adaptation, and editing. Furnishes necessary equipment for effective operation. Uses private facilities as appropriate.
(9)	Office of Educational Exchange	State	Develops and executes international educational exchange programs. Encourages and assists similar activities of private agencies in the US and abroad. Assists US-sponsored schools, assists foreign government and American and foreign

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<u>Elements Programs</u>	<u>Agency Responsibility</u>	<u>Action</u>
a. Current (cont.)		
(9) Office of Educational Exchange (continued)	State	volunteer organizations in undertaking exchange of persons through Division of Exchange of Persons. Furnishes educational, scientific, and cultural information and materials for distribution through the medium of libraries and cultural centers maintained abroad through other public and private channels. Assists other governmental agencies in the recovery of its artistic and historic arts and monuments looted or confiscated from war areas.
(10) Bureau of UN Affairs	State	Acts as channel between the US Government for the UN affairs and other international organizations.
(11) Division of International Conferences	State	Prepares State Department position on the extent and character of US participation in governmental and non-governmental conferences, congresses, commissions, etc.
(12) Office of UN Economic and Social Affairs	State	Carries out State Department responsibility with respect to Economic and Social Council of UN as well as economic, humanitarian, and related matters in UN General Assembly.
(13) Bureau of German Affairs	State	Discharges responsibilities relating to international information, educational exchange, and domestic public affairs activities concerning Germany.
(14) Air Force Public Relations PW Division	Air Force	Handles public information activities, public relations, and liaison, in accordance with prescribed public relations, plans, and policies.

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<u>Elements Program</u>	<u>Agency Responsibility</u>	<u>Action</u>
a. Current (cont.)		
(15) Public Relations Section of the Navy PW Division	Navy	Handles public information activities, public relations, and liaison, in accordance with prescribed public relations, plans, and policies.
(16) Public Information Section of the Department of the Army	Army	Handles public information activities, public relations, and liaison, in accordance with prescribed public relations, plans, and policies.
(17) SCAP PW Division	Defense	Transmission to Far East areas of US aims and objectives to invoke a sympathetic and appreciative understanding of US relations with Far Eastern Governments and peoples.
(18) ECA Information Program	ECA	Prepares information programs related to ECA activities abroad in ECA countries under policy supervision of Department of State.

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b. Suggested - NONE

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c. Relative Effectiveness

The most effective [ ] propaganda are items 5, 6, 7, and 8. However, these items have too long portrayed the American material advantages in contrast to the "have not" material disadvantages of other peoples. In order to be effective, these USIE programs must become harder-hitting, spend less time on the quantitative advantages of the US, and be based on two or three concrete qualitative objectives which have been predetermined by the PSI. The advantages inherent in a representative type of government which includes a bill of rights, freedom privileges, and individual ownership will have a more impressionistic value than comparison of living standards, and represents an ideal worth a great deal more in the form of resistance potential to totalitarian regimes.

3. Suggested Action

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- (1) That the PSB determine three major objectives which it is the desire of the US Government to accomplish in [ ] propaganda field (to sell the status quo is not a dynamic propaganda weapon).
- (2) That these objectives stress: moral and spiritual values and the inalienable right of the individual to live in a society which respects the Four Freedoms; Western World rearmament is an element of strength to preserve the freedom and security promised in the UN Charter; the accretion of physical and moral strength is the job of all peoples which will lead to a virile UN and the prospect of lasting world peace.

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CULTURE

1. International Significance on the Cold War Front.

Culture is the total achievement of individual and collective development of a sense of appreciation of the finer things, evolved along mental, spiritual, and artistic lines, by a civilization. Culture itself is intangible and cannot be measured by precise units or standards of measurement. However, its outlets and manifestations, such as works of art, pieces of literature, declamations of drama, and compositions of music, are tangible or are susceptible of being reduced to tangible form and can be evaluated. Moreover, culture, like religion, generally permeates the souls of those imbued with it to such an extent that it is one of the last elements of independence purged out of the individual man under a totalitarian regime.

2. Suggested Programs.

a. One example of an achievement which could be effected through the use of music as a cultural medium lies in the possibility of subsidizing an organization like the National Negro Opera Company and sending it on tour abroad. This would have an especially salutary effect if a small number of white artists could be induced to join the company and sing subsidiary or supporting roles. It is believed that an enterprise of this type would be doubly effective in that it would, on one hand, extol abroad American appreciation of music and, on the other hand, would offset much of the vicious race discrimination propaganda which is levelled against us.

b. Another possibility of action lies in having an ostensibly privately endowed institute patronize and issue commissions to exiled artists from the enslaved countries who could create works of art symbolic of the struggle against tyranny in their native lands, which could then be dedicated by appropriate ceremonies.

c. Set forth hereunder is a check list of possible cultural media which can be used as weapons of propaganda:

(1) Music.

(a) Especially created traveling opera companies.

(b) Especially composed and dedicated symphonies commemorating events and persons.

in this country. Photographs of the dedicatory proceedings and of the objects of art could then be spirited across forbidden boundaries by whatever mechanical means exists for the transmittal of such materials.

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(c) Light operas of the Gilbert and Sullivan type designed to ridicule or belittle existing regimes, employing as central characters some of the leading figures of oppressed lands as, for example, Rakosi in Hungary.

(d) Folk tune ballads recounting the deeds of Christian anti-Communist heroes and memorializing episodes in the struggle of the non-Communist world against Fascism in World War II.

(e) Oratorios with fundamentally religious themes which will appeal to the orthodoxy and faith of the enslaved peoples.

(2) Drama.

(a) Allegorical plays contrasting the social and economic order of the free world with that of the enslaved world.

(b) Skits and sketches dramatizing certain selected moments of current history, to be presented by radio.

(3) Literature.

(a) Books and articles analyzing current conditions, designed for translation into appropriate languages and spirited into forbidden territory.

(b) Poetry and prose which can be composed along lines such as those suggested above in (a) and which can be read over the radio to the enslaved peoples.

(4) Sculpture and Painting.

(a) Topical and symbolical works of art which can be dedicated in the free world to commemorate events and peoples in the enslaved world.

(b) Replicas of the above which can be spirited into forbidden territory and distributed among the people.

(5) Choreography.

Ballets which can be written to exemplify certain points of view or certain lessons of philosophy, which can be performed

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in the free world and described to the enslaved world  
by means of radio narration.

3. Suggested Action:

a. The round-the-world trip several years ago of the American Town Hall of the Air was a brilliantly conceived project and an excellent type of cold war weapon. This type of international contact, utilizing traveling instrumentalities and organizations, should be continued and expanded.

b. That the appropriate section of the Department of State review this field for expanded analysis and recommended courses of action.

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## INVENTORY OF COLD WAR WEAPONS

## ECONOMIC WARFARE

1. Economic Warfare has been a weapon of national policy since at least the time of the Roman Empire. During the past 100 years it has come to be especially significant and probably reached its greatest stature during World War II. However, it is the view of some experts in the field that traditional economic warfare is less effective against a relatively integrated and self-sufficient economy as is the Soviet Bloc than it was against Italy, Germany, and Japan during WW II. The potentiality of economic warfare remains and therefore it may become necessary to develop new and unorthodox techniques to use this weapon most effectively.

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2.  Programs:

a. <u>Current</u>	<u>Responsi- bility</u>	<u>Action</u>
(1) Council of Economic Advisors	Executive Office of the President	To develop national economic policies.
(2) Technical Cooperation Administration (Point IV)	State	To aid under-developed countries and to stimulate thereto a flow of private capital.
(3) Mutual Defense Assistance Program	State	To achieve a proper relationship between foreign economic measures and defense plans.
(4) Office of International Finance	Treasury	To develop international finance and monetary programs; to sponsor and participate in the international monetary fund, the International Bank for

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Reconstruction and Development, the Anglo-American Finance Agreement, and the US Exchange Stabilization Fund.

- |   |             |  |
|---|-------------|--|
| (5) Office of Alien Property                  | Justice     | Control or vesting of foreign owned property.  |
| (6) Anti-Trust Division                       | Justice     | To dissolve monopolies on interstate and foreign trade.  |
| (7) Office of International Trade             | Commerce    | To promote the foreign commerce of the US.   |
| (8) Maritime Administration                   | Commerce    | To determine ocean routes and services essential to the foreign commerce of the US.                                    |
| (9) Patents Office                            | Commerce    | To administer federal patent and trademark laws.   |
| (10) Foreign Trade Zones Board                | Commerce    | To establish free ports in the US to promote foreign commerce.   |
| (11) Bureau of Emergency Procurement          | GSA         | To stockpile strategic materials.  |
| (12) Office of Foreign Agriculture Relations. | Agriculture | To survey foreign production and consumption of foreign products.  |
| (13) Commodity Credit Corporation             | Agriculture | To import and export farm commodities.   |
| (14) Civil Aeronautics Board                  | Independent | To regulate economic aspects of US air carrier operations, domestic and international, and to develop airports abroad. |
| (15) Economic Cooperation Administration      | Independent | To foster economic development of Europe and Far East.   |
| (16) Export-Import Bank of Washington         | Independent | To finance imports and exports.  |

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- |  |             |   |
|--|-------------|---|
| (17) Federal Communications Commission | Independent | To facilitate world-wide communications services. |
| (18) US Tariff Commission              | Independent | To report upon tariff and foreign trade matters.  |

b. Suggested

It is suggested that a unit within the United States Government be designated responsible for planning and coordination of all measures to be taken in the economic warfare field. One such unit has already been recommended in NSC-104. To date it has not been activated. Whether or not this recommendation is in itself the answer has not been decided. However, it is obvious that such unified direction is necessary.

c. Relative Effectiveness -

The foregoing agencies and departments will play their respective roles in carrying out the following measures of economic warfare which have been proposed by NSC. Of these, only export controls and finance measures are currently operative.

- (1) Export controls
- (2) Preclusive operations
- (3) Finance measures
- (4) Blacklisting
- (5) Technology
- (6) Shipping controls
- (7) Decreasing reliance on trade with the Soviet Bloc
- (8) Import controls

In addition to the above measures there are positive programs for economic strength as ECA and Point IV which represent elements of

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economic warfare which have the aspect of "economic defense."

It is, of course, obvious that parallel action by the US and the allies in carrying out the above measures is prerequisite to their successful execution. Such parallel action taken by the Allies is too recent to permit an appraisal of the adequacy and effectiveness of measures aimed at export control. It is considered that positive programs as the ECA and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development have been quite adequate.

3. Suggested Actions -

It is suggested that new and unorthodox techniques be developed in the economic warfare field and be activated on a much larger scale than is currently the case as typically outlined in the supplement.

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## 1. International Significance on the Cold War Front.

As all action in support of foreign policy is designed ultimately to influence the "state and content of mind of the peoples so as to weaken the adversary and strengthen support of the nation in pursuit of its objectives," the cold war may well be termed a battle for the minds of men. Education, which is defined as the discipline of mind or character through study or instruction, is a fundamental precept in the prosecution of the cold war.

As the objectives of the U.S. and the free world are: (1) To reduce the influence of the Kremlin Regime, both nationally and internationally; and (2) to bring about a comity of nations, it is incumbent upon the U.S. and other free nations to educate the individuals of the USSR and satellites along the lines of such objectives, and it is also incumbent upon the U.S. to expand this additional concept among the individuals of the free world. While the latter is obviously the more accessible field of exploitation, the fact that education in the USSR and the satellites is tightly controlled should not obviate efforts in that direction.

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2.  programs; primary agency responsibility; action capability.

- |   |       |  |
|---|-------|--|
| a. (1) USIE                                     | State | To promote a better understanding of US in other countries, and to secure mutual understanding between people of US and other countries. |
| (2) Student Exchange<br>(Fulbright Act)         | State | To inculcate respect for US institutions and learning.   |
| (3) UNESCO                                      |       | To remove national barriers and provide interchange of educational ideas and methods.  |
| (4) American Council<br>of Education            | State | Orientation for foreign visitors to promote friendship and understanding.  |
| (5) World Literacy<br>Movement<br>(Dr. Laubach) |       | Elimination of illiteracy.   |

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b. Suggested (apparent gaps)

- |     |   |                     |   |
|-----|---|---------------------|---|
| (1) | International University  | UN                  | To bring all nationalities together in a common center of learning.                                     |
| (2) | Train foreign government workers in US, State, and City Government.               | State (Governors)   | To sell the US brand of democracy and representative government and to improve techniques of operation. |
| (3) | Train foreign technicians in industry.  | Commerce (Industry) | To raise industrial standards outside US.   |
| (4) | Birth control educational measures.   | UN                  | Reduce population pressures.  |
| (5) | Establishment of international teachers organizations and professional societies. | UN                  | To promote exchange of ideas and teaching techniques.   |
| (6) | Teacher exchange (similar to Fulbright student exchange)                          | State               | To inculcate respect for US institutions and learning.  |
| (7) | Research foundation available to all nations.                                     | State               | To promote unity in fields of research.   |

c. Relative Effectiveness

- (1) Elements 2-a (1 and 2) need expansion.
- (2) Element 2-a (3) needs more emphasis on projects concerning fundamental education.

3. Suggested Action:

A panel of qualified educational leaders be convened to analyze further the potentialities of this field and submit their recommendations to the PSB. As UNESCO has undertaken considerable research, it would be profitable to obtain their assistance in further analysis of the field of education.

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ENTERTAINMENT

## 1. International Significance on the Cold War Front:

Propaganda efforts are wasted unless they reach an audience. The one way to acquire an audience is to provide entertainment. Entertainment, as a whole, covers many art forms and, therefore, reaches audiences of wide varieties of tastes. Entertainment (music, drama, literature, sports, such as the Olympic Games, etc.) surmounts all racial and national barriers, so their applicability is universal. Entertainment can deliver a tremendous impact on non-communists or neutrals, as well as on the Communist Bloc.

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2.   elements or programs; primary agency responsibility; action capability:

ResponsibilityActionA. Current:

- |   |                             |  |
|---|-----------------------------|--|
| <p>(1) Approximately 150 reels covering approximately 75 subjects, at least half to be produced abroad in such countries as Iran, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Italy, France, Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, and New Delhi.</p> | <p>State<br/>Department</p> | <p>(1) To expose Communist tactics and develop psychological and military resistance thereto.</p> <p>(2) To show the positive alternatives to Communism.</p> <p>(3) To show that the national objectives of the free world coincide with US objectives.</p> <p>(4) To point out the need for solving international problems through international cooperation.</p> |
| <p>(2) Traveling Theater Groups, such as opera, musicals (Oklahoma), etc.</p>   |                             | <p>To promote U. S. ideas and ideals.</p>  |
| <p>(3) Traveling athletic groups, such as baseball, hockey, tennis, golf, etc.</p>  |                             | <p>(1) To further international fraternalization.</p> <p>(2) To present opportunities for exchange of ideas.</p>   |

B. Suggested:

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B. Suggested: (apparent gaps)

- |  |       |  |
|--|-------|--|
| (1) US Glee Club (to be composed of individuals of various races and national extraction). | State | To promote US ideals and to foster change of national clubs. |
| (2) UN Glee Club (to be composed of individuals of various races and national extraction). | State | To promote "one world" concept.                              |
| (3) UN Anthem (similar to "God Bless America;" tie-in with religion).                      | State | To promote "one world" concept.                              |

C. Relative Effectiveness:

Elements 2-a (2) and (3) need expansion. Elements 2-b (1), (2), and (3) should be highly effective.

Wherever possible, the foreign (non-communist) origin of sports, folk songs, etc., should be emphasized to evidence the fact that the U.S. does not claim credit for everything (as does the Kremlin).

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Government and International Organizations

The significance of governmental activities on the Cold War front hardly needs emphasis, since this field includes such matters as Congressional legislation, treaty ratification, and the formation and conduct of the nation's foreign policy by diplomatic and other procedures.

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## FIELD - GOVERNMENTAL

a. Congressional

<u>Technique</u>	<u>Responsi- bility</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
(1) Resolutions, separate or concurrent (e.g., the MacMahon Resolution on Friendship for the Russian people)	Senate and House	To clarify US purposes and to serve as cold war PW weapon
(2) Investigations (e.g., proposed investigation of Katyn Massacre)	Senate or House	To serve as cold war PW weapon
(3) Treaty Ratification and/or Revision (Proposed ratification of the Japanese Treaty and revision of the Italian Treaty)	Senate	To legalize treaties, the contents of which treaties may be used for PW purposes
(4) Speeches	Senate or House Members	To serve deception or PW purposes
(5) Calculated leaks	Senate or House Members	For deception purposes
(6) Legislation and appropriations (ERP, MDAP, MSP, etc.)	Senate and House	To give direction and support to a variety of US activities

b. Administration

(1) Diplomatic Procedure (notes, recognition or withdrawal of recognition, etc.)	State	To give effect to US aims
(2) Negotiation of treaties and their revision	State	To serve US policy purposes and to serve as PW ammunition

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|--|---|---|
| (3) Alliances and Pacts<br>(NATO, the bilateral<br>Japanese-US Pact, etc.)   | State and<br>Congress   | To give effect to US<br>purposes and to provide<br>PW ammunition  |
| (4) Executive Agreements   | State   | To give effect to US<br>purposes and to provide<br>PW ammunition  |
| (5) Offer of good offices<br>(e.g., the Harriman<br>mission to Iran, the<br>Graham mission to<br>Kashmir, etc.)                    | State or<br>Special<br>Presiden-<br>tial Rep-<br>resentatives | To reduce friction between<br>various parties when such<br>friction would endanger US<br>interests                    |
| (6) Harassing actions,<br>delays, etc.   | State<br>Justice<br>Commerce<br>etc.                          | To apply pressure by means<br>of petty annoyances   |
| (7) Political sanctuary<br><div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 15px; margin: 5px 0;"></div><br>etc.)        | State<br>Justice  | To continue a long-standing<br>US policy and to provide<br>psychological warfare and<br>political warfare ammunition. |
| (8) News releases and speeches<br>(e.g., HICOG's recent state-<br>ment on US policy toward<br>defectors from behind the<br>Curtain | Various<br>Executive<br>Depart-<br>ments and<br>Agencies      | To clarify the US position<br>and provide cold war ammuni-<br>tion  |
| (9) Calculated leaks   | State<br>Defense<br>Other US Depart-<br>ments and<br>Agencies | To serve US ends in a<br>variety of ways  |
| (10) Ceremonial activities<br>(e.g., dedication of<br>gift statues from the<br>Italian people)                                     | President<br>State<br>Other officials<br>and agencies         | To serve US purposes and<br>provide PW ammunition   |
| (11) Visits of Dignitaries   | State and<br>other US<br>Agencies                             | Can be used as symbols of<br>unity and purpose and as a<br>means of puzzling the<br>enemy, etc.                       |

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|---|---|--|
| (12) Making proposals embarrassing to the enemy (e.g., suggesting the revision of the Italian Treaty, etc.)   | State<br>Commerce   | To serve US purposes by embarrassing the enemy.                            |
| (13) Deportation (e.g., US attempts to deport Harry Bridges)  | State<br>Justice  | To serve US purposes by ridding the country of certain undesirables        |
| (14) International Conferences  | State<br>Commerce<br>Treasury   | As a means of achieving US aims  |
| (15) War Scare  | State<br>Defense<br>President   | To deter enemy by emphasizing US readiness to go to war                    |
| (16) Emigration Policies  | Congress<br>President<br>Justice and<br>State                             | To serve US purposes and provide PW ammunition                             |
| (17) Subsidized travel to US <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. trade union leaders</li> <li>b. industrialists and technicians</li> <li>c. Women leaders</li> <li>d. leaders of veterans movements</li> <li>e. religious leaders</li> <li>f. Scientific figures</li> <li>g. Cultural and intellectual figures</li> </ul> | State Dept., Labor, ECA, and a variety of non-governmental organizations. | Acquaint leaders of thought of other lands with true nature of life in US. |

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c. International

- |                    |       |                        |
|--------------------|-------|------------------------|
| (1) United Nations | State | To advance US purposes |
|--------------------|-------|------------------------|
- (2) Subsidiary UN organizations (ECOSOC, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, International Court of Justice, Trusteeship Council)
- (3) International organizations in the economic and reconstruction fields (International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ECA, etc.)
- (4) International organizations in the field of Communications and Transportation (International Telecommunications Union, International Civil Aviation Organization, etc.)
- (5) International organizations in the field of religion (World Council of Churches, etc.)
- (6) International Organizations in the field of labor (ICFTU, etc., ILO, etc.)
- (7) International organizations organized on a geographical base (Arab League, Organization of American States, Council of Europe, etc.)
- (8) International organizations in the field of science.

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- (9) International organizations in the field of youth
- (10) International women's organizations (Inter-American Commission of Women, etc.)
- (11) International trades and professional organizations
- (12) International veterans organizations

d. Non-governmental Movements and Activities

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| (1) Organizations for humanitarian purposes (e.g., Bundles for Britain, Red Cross, CARE, Friendship Train, etc.)                          | To assist the friends of the US and earn good will. |
| (2) Organizations for good will (e.g., the American Legion's Tide of Toys, the letter-writing campaigns stimulated by Drew Pearson, etc.) | To assist the friends of the US and earn good will. |
| (3) Organizations of refugees (e.g., the NCFE, the European Movement, IRO)  | To aid refugees and to serve a cold war function.   |

Suggested

Subsidization of travel to the US of influential foreign figures not primarily associated with government	State	To recognize the importance to a society of the leaders of thought.
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Relative Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the elements and activities listed above is directly reflected in the formation and conduct of the nation's foreign policy and is measurable principally by the successes achieved in the

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foreign policy field. Congressional resolutions and investigations are effective instruments since they are presumed to indicate the popular will as differentiated from the adoption of courses of action which are advanced solely by the administration. International non-government movements and activities (d) are particularly effective cold war weapons since they in large measure have the humanitarian theme. Any activity which relieves suffering and misery as differentiated from the strictly political or ideological approach has a tremendously favorable psychological impact. CARE is an excellent example of an effective cold war weapon.

3. Suggested Action

It is suggested that an expanded survey be made for utilization of non-governmental movements (CARE, Friendship Train, Tide of Toys, etc.) as cold war weapons and the possible support of corresponding indigenous movements in other countries, such as "Union of Friends of USA."

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LABOR

In the Communist arsenal of weapons, there is none so important as the use they make of the trade union and labor movements to further their ends in non-Communist countries. Penetration, infiltration and the seizure of control of trade unions, especially those in the strategic industries, such as coal, communications, transport, maritime, steel and engineering trades, and government service, represent the most fundamental precept of Marxist, Leninist and Stalinist revolutionary strategy. Since Lenin's time, the trade union represents the major medium through which the Communists work.

The technique of establishing Communist control has been reduced to a science. The effort and energy expended on the trade union front, the training of specialists for this work, and the central direction of Communist activities in the trade unions from Moscow represent not just another front on which they operate but a major and decisive front. There are four reasons for this concentration on the trade union movement.

- a. It gives them an economic stranglehold on a country, which they use in two ways: strikes to hurt production; wage demands to encourage inflation.
- b. It gives them direct control over masses and enables them to paralyze a country in times of insurrection and rebellion.
- c. It enables them to foster class hatred and national disunity.
- d. It gives them the means of sabotage and espionage.

The Communists are now the dominant group in the trade union movements of France, Italy and Indonesia. They have powerful groups

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established in the trade union movements of Japan and India. They have a substantial, if less dangerous measure of control, in Finland, and in most of the primitive unions in Central and South America, Africa and the Middle East. Their most serious threat, however, is in the first five countries named, i.e., Italy, France, Indonesia, Japan and India.

To dislodge and destroy Communist control of the trade unions must be a major objective of American policy. To achieve this, the main responsibility falls, in the first instance, on the governments of the respective countries. The social and economic policies which they follow have an important bearing on the strength of Communist influence, for by eliminating unemployment, improving wage and social legislation, equalizing the distribution of wealth, etc., etc., these governments can deprive the Communists of the basis of their mass appeal. But beyond this, only these governments have the power to take steps to strengthen the bona fide trade union elements, and to weaken the Communists where they exercise control.

Another powerful force ranged against Communist control of the trade unions is the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions created by the bona fide trade unions of the world, including the AFI, CIO, the British TUC, etc. This body, with the regional organizations which it is now developing, is the main counter-weight to the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. Associated with the ICFTU are the International Transportworkers Federation, the International Metal Trades Federation, the International Clothing Workers Federation, and a

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and a half dozen other international organizations created by bona fide trade unions in particular industries.

In the United States, the AFL and its associated Free Trade Union Committee have since 1945 supported bona fide trade union elements in various countries in their efforts to rid the trade union movement of Communist control. They maintain representatives in Germany, Europe, Indonesia, India and Japan for this work. But they are hard pressed for funds and have great difficulty expanding their activities. The CIO, since its break with the WFTU, has also been fighting Communism in the international field and has one representative for Europe and one in Italy.

The encouragement of free trade unions throughout the world represents a basic policy of the U.S. government. The Mutual Security Law, just passed, specifically lays this down as legislative policy as well. The State Department maintains labor advisors in Washington and has a corps of about 30 labor attaches in the field. ECA has a Labor Division in Washington and labor advisors in nearly all their missions. The Labor Information Service of the ECA and the one now developing under the NSC have as their objective the trade union field.

A measure of cooperation and participation exists between the free labor unions and the Government in order to further the twin objectives of fighting Communism in the international trade union field and developing strong bona fide trade unions. There is, however, a great deal more that can be done in this field both by the Government and by the unions working separately and in concert. Similarly the influence of this

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Government can be brought to bear on certain other Governments to induce them to follow policies designed to strengthen bona fide labor movements.

Suggested Action: The Psychological Strategy Board should give this area of operations the fullest possible attention, because it represents one of the most important and fruitful fields for the development of a psychological strategy plan.

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SECRETMILITARY1. International Significance on the Cold War Front.

Military potential and capacity is the physical element of power in a development of a position of strength; the buttress of foreign policy. The immediate object of foreign policy is national security; the long-range object of world peace.

Rearmament, an advancement to a sound military posture, and economic stability and progress, are primordial guarantees to peace. The United States and its allies accept this fundamental postulate. The challenge by the Soviet Regime to a power position of dominance mandates the immediate counter response by the free world. The pre-eminence of military strength must, therefore, be reflected within all other fields of endeavor. Western world rearmament is to avert war, not precipitate it, and, secondarily, to wage war successfully if the primary objective is not achieved.

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2. Elements or Programs: Primary Agency Responsibility: Action Capability.

<u>a. Current</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Action</u>
(1) Regional collective security arrangements	State Defense	Coalition of allies in recognition of a common danger.
(2) Military alliances and pacts	State Defense	Firm military and security commitments

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<u>a. Current (contd)</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Action</u>
(3) National Security Aid Programs (MDAP, Truman Doctrine)	State Defense	(1) Provision of military means to allies. (2) US help to any nation demonstrating the will and determination to remain free.
(4) Balanced military forces	Defense	Preparation for any contingency to prevent disaster.
(5) Occupation Forces	Defense	An interim safeguard until formalization of peace treaties.
(6) Military Advisory Missions	Defense	Complements aid to standardize doctrine, training and increase readiness.
(7) Base rights	State Defense	Instill confidence and ensure offensive capability.
(8) Strategic materials stockpiling	GSA NSRB Defense	Provision of critical materials for emergency.
(9) Foreign military training in US military schools	Defense	Standardization of tactics and techniques.
(10) Selective Service Law	Defense	Increase US readiness and strength
(11) Special legislative provisions (Lodge Bill)	Congress Defense	(1) Increase the military potential (2) Utilization of indigenous manpower (3) Generate a patriotic motivation and an ideal for rallying

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a. <u>Current</u> (contd)	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Action</u>
(12) Ranger and guerrilla training centers	Defense	Specialized training for sabotage activities.
(13) Mass destruction weapons (AEC)	AEC Defense	Self-sufficiency as a deterrent to general war.
(14) Guided missiles	Defense	A threat potentiality.
(15) Paramilitary forces	Defense	Augmentation of internal security forces for special missions.
(16) <u>UN Agencies</u>		
a. UN Military Observer Teams (Palestine, Kashmir)	Defense	Adjudication of cease fire arrangements
b. Military Staff Committee	Defense	Composition of UN military forces (Act 43)
(17) Arms Standardization Board	Defense Defense	Cooperation with allies to permit expeditions and uniform weapons allocations.
(18) Military Attache System	Defense	Collection of Information
b. <u>Suggested</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Action Affected</u>
(1) Integrated International Forces (European Army)	Defense NATO	To facilitate German participation in defense of Europe.
(2) Ex-enemy rearmament (Germany, Italy, Japan)	State NATO	To contribute physically to their own defense.
(3) Universal military training	Defense Congress	To provide a durable and long term foundation of military strength.

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c. Relative Effectiveness

(1) Items 2-a (1 through 5) and item (13) are the most effective cold war military weapons at the present time. Items (6 through 10), (12), and (14 through 18) are essentially cold war or war preparation effort and are complementary to the major items. Item (11) is essentially prototype with an authorization of 12,500. To date, enrollment orders have been written for the initial 2500 spaces. Administration, legal, and security implications have delayed an effective implementation of this program for over one year. This bottleneck should be broken. It should be expedited as a showpiece since it has unquestionable potential as a cold war weapon from both the psychological and practical points of view.

(2) Items 2-b (1 and 2) have strong psychological implications and every circumstance conducive to their acceptance should be exploited. Item (3) is vital to the maintenance of strong military posture for the long term and should supplant the present draft and National Guard systems.

3. Suggested Action.

a. That the JSPD informally review the suitability of this listing of military elements and programs as cold war weapons.

b. That the PSB, with the approval of the President, establish liaison with an appropriate committee of the Congress to facilitate Congressional

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action and sponsorship of specific acts or programs to advance the national strategy in cold war. Universal military training and the Lodge Bill (Freedom Corps) are type examples of cold war activity which are contingent upon Congressional support.

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- q. Continuously invite private USSR citizens to non-official international conferences.
- r. Stress USSR territorial acquisitions as evidence of imperialism.

2. Inducement Weapons:



- b. Promulgation of broad political platform for dominated areas in the post-liberation phase (Baltic States, Korea, Indo-China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.).
- c. Formulate and announce U.S. policy toward nationality groups in USSR.



3. Positive Psychological Actions:

- a. Support for moral rearmament.
- b. Emphasis and support for European federalization.
- c. Continued support of UN activities, including the formation of a UN military force.
- d. Advocate free elections for the formation of a Unified Germany.

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POLITICAL ACTION GROUPS

1. International Significance on the Cold War Front

The activities of some of the political action groups listed below are appropriate for application to other democracies. Some of the groups are already operating, or could operate, in a still wider variety of countries, including non-democracies. The political action group, as a medium, therefore, has widespread potentialities.

Political action groups invoke a response proportional to the financial support received and to the efficiency and personal connections of their staffs.

Their targets are primarily of three kinds:

- a. legislative and administrative organs
- b. special groups
- c. the general public

They have an impact upon non-communists and neutrals outside the Soviet bloc, and by radio and otherwise upon the populations of the satellites, and possibly of the USSR.

Political action groups probably possess as high an effectiveness as any other medium of propaganda and influence. In fact, they may be utilized as agents for every form of propaganda and activist work. The use of political action groups is therefore absolutely essential to the advancement of the interests of the United States and its allies in the cold war.

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2.   Elements

- a. Current (Type examples only)

(1) Groups organized primarily to promote an international program

- (a) Atlantic Union Committee, Inc.

The lobbying group of Federal Union, Inc. to secure Congressional action in behalf of a federal

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union (political, military, economic) of the democracies of America, the British Commonwealth, and Western Europe.

(b) Federal Union, Inc.

Promotion among the general public of the idea of a political union of all the western-type democracies.

(c) Committee on the Present Danger

Promotion of legislation favoring US policies abroad, such as the Mutual Aid Pact.

(d) National Council for the Prevention of War

Promotion of such US policies as ECA, the mutual assistance program, the educational exchange, aid to the expellees.

(e) The European Movement

Promotion of the idea of a United Europe, largely among Europeans.

(f) United World Federalists, Inc.

Promotion of measures to strengthen the United Nations, and to further US participation in the UN.

(g) World Federation of United Nations Associations

Promotion of the idea of international action through the medium of the United Nations.

(2) Groups promoting an international program, as a byproduct of other activities which are primary.

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(a) General organizations

A. Americans for Democratic Action

Promotion of anti-communist international policies of the United States, and cooperation with the democracies of the world in the UN.

B. Rotary International

(b) Economic (business and agricultural) organizations

A. American Farm Bureau Federation

B. International Chamber of Commerce

C. International Cooperative Alliance

(c) Labor organizations

A. American Federation of Labor

Among its action and propaganda agencies are the Free Trade Union Committee and Labor's League for Political Education.

B. Congress of Industrial Organizations

Political Action Committee and various committees promoting same ideals as above.

(d) Patriotic organizations

A. Daughters of the American Revolution

B. Society of Mayflower Descendants

C. Sons of the American Revolution

(e) Veterans' organizations

A. The American Legion

B. American Veterans' Committee

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- C. Reserve Officers Association of the United States
- D. Veterans of Foreign Wars of the US
  - "Promotion of matters relating to national security and a sound foreign policy."
- (f) Women's organizations
  - A. American Association of University Women
  - B. General Federation of Women's Clubs
  - C. International Federation of Business and Professional Women
  - D. League of Women Voters of the US
  - E. National Council of Jewish Women
- (g) Youth organizations
  - A. Boy Scouts International Bureau
  - B. Students for Democratic Action
    - Youth group of Americans for Democratic Action. Anti-communist liberal democratic.
  - C. United States National Students Association
    - Federation of the Student Councils of most American universities.
  - D. World Assembly of Youth
    - Largest anti-communist international youth organization
- (h) Other organizations
  - A. Catholic Action



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The activist organization of the international Roman Catholic Church.

B. Interparliamentary Union

Connecting link between all the democratic parliamentary bodies of the world.

C. National Congress of Parents and Teachers

D. World Alliance of YMCA Associations

E. World Jewish Congress

(3) Groups promoting programs for individual foreign countries.

(a) "Hands across the Sea" groups

A. English-Speaking Union

B. Alliance Francaise

(b) Refugee groups

A. National Committee for Free Europe

B. National Committee for Free Asia

C. Federation of Russia Refugee groups under Kerensky

c. Relative Effectiveness

Certain of the listed political action groups aspire to international objectives but channel their major activities primarily to domestic lobbying (2a (1) (a), (b), (c), and (d)). However 2a (1) (e) and (g) have timely potentialities for greater exploitation on the international front. Those organizations with a cosmopolitan admixture, such as veterans organizations, womens clubs, youth groups, should be excellent mediums for utilization in the psychological field. The Tide of Toys program of the American Legion is an example of inspired and self-

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generated action. The Boy and Girl Scouts conclaves provide a point of departure for continuing contacts and exchange of membership in summer camps.

3. Suggested Action

That a series of projects be assigned to veterans', youth, and womens' organizations, which appear to be institutionally inspired, which could permit contact with similar groups in other countries whose goals, aspirations, and activities have a common aspect. The emancipation of women in Japan is considered by many as one of the most progressive post war developments; a factor which, if properly evaluated and guided, may assure continued pro-Western orientation more than any other. The American League of Women Voters should be recruited as an instrumental factor to establish a relationship with the Japanese women. Visits of delegations, distribution of literature, and unit correspondence exchanges can be initiated as community enterprises. The American Federation of Womens Clubs could likewise organize parallel type organizations in Germany in which wives of occupation forces, State, and ECA personnel could assume the leadership.

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PROFESSIONAL GROUPS

1. International Stand/Voicings on the Cold War Front.

Professions have an inherently international character. Many times the professional philosophy is so strong or its personal humanitarian aspects so compelling that a righteous course of action is taken in events irrespective of ideological or sociological conditions and circumstances. There exists within the professions a certain respect for ethical practices and common aims which can often be the vehicle for generating responses in accord with the "freedom" concepts of the Western world; courses of action or concepts which inspire respect, and thus a comparative analysis with oppressive or restrictive measures followed in other areas. This comparison of professional programs, patterns, and terminology is a psychological weapon. The availability or denial of information or data could be a leverage factor to condition the support of a given professional group. The professional groups comprise an important factor in the intelligentsia strata and their pliability and utility as a psychological tool is quite evident.

2. The professions of law, medicine, and journalism are the three main professional groups with widespread affiliations which would serve as psychological tools.

a. Legal.

In the whole field of basic human rights and the legal protection of those rights, the Soviet system is obviously highly vulnerable to attack by the legal profession.

Now the Soviet system has systematically destroyed these rights and made a travesty of law and justice in all countries brought under Soviet domination can be forcibly demonstrated with almost endless examples.

- Coerced courts and constitutions
- State theft of property
- Official kidnapping
- Sudden mass deportations
- Slave labor camps
- Mock, prejudiced trials
- Physical abuse of both witness and accused
- "Shotgun" balloting
- Secret police
- Denial of the rule of Law

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The legal profession can set before the average citizen a shocking factual picture of what is happening under the Soviet system and what could happen to him if he allowed himself to fall under such a system. This type of information - the truth VS the big lie - can be disseminated and used both overtly and covertly.

Some of the major influential legal organizations in the Western world are:

- (1) American Bar Association, and other comparable national associations
- (2) International League for Rights of Man  
75 Seventh Ave., N.Y.
- (3) International Association of Democratic Lawyers  
18 Quai Bourbon, Paris
- (4) International Bar Association  
511 Fifth Avenue, N.Y.
- (5) International Arbitration League  
33 Victoria Street, London
- (6) International Court of Justice of the U.N.

#### B. Medical.

In some cases directly and in others indirectly, the profession of the so-called free world can engage in the "cold war" through such measures and actions as:

(1) By demonstrating that Western Europe and the USA have higher standards of health and medicine than in Russia and the satellite orbit. (Life is healthier longer in the free world).

(2) By pointing out that the benefits of the new "wonder" drugs and curatives developed by the West are denied to Soviet-controlled populations by the "Iron Curtain". (The Soviet "Iron Curtain" keeps you sick and or dooms your child).

(3) By urging, on humanitarian grounds, the exchange of physicians and surgeons, and medical ideas, between the West and the Iron Curtain countries.

(4) By stressing

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(4) By stressing that organized medical counter-measures and life saving techniques available to the West can greatly reduce civilian casualties in the event (Total war on civilian population is by no means total).

(5) By condemning the Soviet Slave camp program with its natural temptation, if not actual practices to engage in medical experimentation on inmates in the same pattern.

(6) In the field of military medicine, by pointing out the vastly superior medical protection of the Western soldier, especially in Korea. ((a) Our wounded live to fight again. (b) What chance has a wounded North Korean or Chinese? (c) Are the Soviets using totally modern medical means in Korea because they wish to carry out experimental observation and measures on North Korean and Chinese casualties? Why do so many die? With Russia facing China, is it true Soviet medical advisors have been instructed to be indifferent to the conservation of Russian manpower in Korea? (d) Where is Russian battle medicine for the wounded Chinese, etc.? (e) If Korea is an example, what medical chance has the Satellite Czech, Polish and Hungarian soldier?).

Influential medical and health organizations actively operating today:

(1) World Health Organization, UNESCO

(2) National Medical Associations

(3) World Medical Association  
2 East 103 St., N.Y.

(Includes U.S.A., Great Britain, Australia, Canada and a number of European Associations)

(4) International Committee of Military Medicine

(5) International Office of Public Hygiene

(6) Permanent Committee of International Congresses for Medical Assistance by Air.

c. Journalism.

Typical examples of the range and complexity of your country's involvement in the "cold war" are:

(1) The ...

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(1) The international news services -- with AP and UP as examples of those which operate independently of governmental control -- with Reuters as an example of one which is definitely influenced by governmental policies -- with Tass as an example of one completely under governmental control for propaganda purposes.

(2) The many national news agencies operating in their countries for propaganda purposes, such as the Greek Communist agency, "Maripress", in England.

(3) The United States press presents such extremes as the so-called "isolationist" Hearst interests, the independent "New York Times" and the Communist Party Organization, "the Daily Worker".

(4) The great metropolitan newspapers and press organizations in the free world which are controlled organs of political parties, such as the Communist "L'Humanite" in France, and the Social Democrats, "Die Telegraf", and the Christian Democratic, "Der Tag", in Germany.

(5) The political propaganda newspaper, printed in many languages and having world wide distribution, such as the weekly Cominform paper, published in Bucharest.

(6) The large, dominant Communist party newspapers in Russia and satellite countries, such as "Pravda" in Russia, Rudé Právo in Czechoslovakia and "Szabai Nap" in Hungary.

(7) Press control or suppressive measures recently taken by countries in the "outside" world, such as the "La Prensa" rape in Argentina and the increasing press censorship against Nehru.

(8) The entire multi-lingual emigre and refugee press both in the United States and throughout the world.

(9) The specialized newspaper with a definite propaganda objective, such as the Communist agrarian publication in France, "la Terre".

(10) Press organizations used as political fronts, such as the Communist controlled "International Organization of Journalists".

(11) National journalist unions, such as the "British National Union of Journalists (NUJ)".

3. Suggested 1944

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3. Suggested Action.

A specialist of each of the above fields be consulted to determine in what way the professions might contribute means and techniques which will support US strategic objectives: (President of American Medical Association -- Dr. Fishbein; President of the American Society of International Law -- Mr. Manley Hudson; President of the US Press Associations -- Mr. Hugh Baillie).

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SECRETRELIGION

## 1. International Significance on the Cold War Front:

The potentialities of religion as a cold war weapon against Communism are universally tremendous. Religion is an established basic force which calls forth men's strongest emotions. Because of the immoral and un-Christian nature of Communism and its avowed opposition to and persecution of religions, most of the world's principal religious organizations are already allied with the cause of the free nations. Our over-all objective in seeking the use of religion as a cold war weapon should be simply the furtherance of world spiritual health; for the Communist threat could not exist in a spiritually healthy world.

That the USSR is vulnerable with respect to its position in opposition to religion was demonstrated during World War II, when the Kremlin attempted to re-establish some degree of religious freedom in order to gain the support of the people in the national stress of war. Current information from the Iron Curtain countries testifies to the effectiveness of even the sporadic and unorganized religious opposition to the Communist regimes.

2.  Programs; Primary Agency Responsibility; Action 25X1  
Capability:

a.	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Action</u>
(1) USIE VOA	State	To publicize through all available media, the Communist threat to religions and the freedom of man.
(2) Religious Advisory Panel	State	To provide religious support and policy guidance to the State Department's information activities.
(3) UNESCO	U.N.	To promote freedom of religion among the nations of the world.
(4) Individual Church Groups	State	To encourage churches, their leaders and their members to oppose Communist doctrine and practices.

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b. Suggested: (apparent gaps)

- (1) World Council U.N.  
of Religions

To unite world religions as a force opposed to Communism. State Department's Working Group on Religion is studying a proposal entitled "God vs. The Kremlin," which would accomplish this objective.

- (2) Increased religious State  
programming on VOA

To stimulate religious activity behind the Iron Curtain. It is recommended that regular broadcasts of various bona fide religious services be beamed to church members behind the Iron Curtain.

c. Relative Effectiveness:

While it is presumed that elements 2-a (1-4) are effective, it is estimated that element 2-b (1) should have top priority and vigorous support. As an undenominational effort, concerned with no sect or creed, but positive and evangelical in spirit, it can overtly sponsor an offensive against Communism in which all religious effort in that direction can be brought to bear. A large overt effort of this sort is requisite to form a background against which covert activities can be undertaken with maximum effectiveness. Wars do not start in a spiritually healthful atmosphere.

3. Suggested Action:

A panel of qualified religious leaders be convened to analyze further the potentialities of this field and submit their recommendations to the PSB. Such a panel should be so constituted as to receive the support of all faiths, including interdenominational organizations and sects which are not necessarily included in any interdenominational or interfaith organization.

- 2 -

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SECRETSCIENCE

## 1. International Significance on the Cold War Front:

The exploitation of the sciences constitutes a major element of the prosecution of the cold war, as well as a major element of the preparation for and waging of the hot war by both the U.S. and the Communist Bloc. Scientific research and development provide the means (devices, techniques, practices) by which the cold war may be waged most effectively and efficiently. The extent of the U.S. scientific lead over its enemies is more important than absolute accomplishment or progress; therefore, the slowing down of the enemy's scientific progress will have the effect of increasing the U.S. lead.

Of particular significance in the general field of science is the cohesive force evident among individuals comprising each field of science --in some cases such cohesive force rises above differences in ideologies and forms a basis for fraternization, as well as for an exchange of ideas in the particular field.

25X1

2.  or programs; primary agency responsibility; action capability:

ResponsibilityAction:

a.

- |  |       |   |
|--|-------|---|
| (1) USIE   | State | To promote exchange of ideas.   |
| (2) UNESCO   |       | To remove national barriers and provide interchange of scientific developments.   |
| (3) International U.N. & Control of Atomic Energy (also of BW) | State | To promote exchange of scientific information for peaceful ends and to control the use of atomic energy to extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes. |

b. Suggested: (apparent gaps)

- |  |       |   |
|--|-------|---|
| (1) Support of international scientific organizations. | State | To promote exchange of ideas and to develop international fraternization. |
|--|-------|---|

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c. Relative Effectiveness:

Item 2-b(1) is a fertile area for advancing U.S. influence and to overcome the rigidity of international boundaries.

3. Suggested Action:

a. Coordinate the PW research effort supported by various Government agencies. Eliminate overlapping activities and those which do not promise anything which the principal practicing PW agencies can use, even in part, during the next ten years.

b. Support PW by making available objective pre-testing facilities and techniques and by organizing known laws and techniques into reliable presentation theory and patterns under the immediate close supervision of practicing PW agencies.

- 2 -

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APPENDIX

LIST OF COLD WAR WEAPONS AND TECHNIQUES

Although many types of weapons and techniques may be applied to more than one field of endeavor, for the purpose of facilitating verification and comparison of the list, they are set forth below in four basic classifications: Political, Economic, Military, and Propaganda.

1. Political:

a. Types of weapons

- (1) Political individuals and parties
- (2) Resistance groups
- (3) "Volunteer" forces
- (4) Minority groups
- (5) Labor groups
- (6) Ethnic groups
- (7) Int. & IS Agencies
- (8) Press
- (9) Radio
- (10) Publications

b. Techniques

- (1) Diplomatic intervention and non-intervention
  - (a) Threats and show thereof
- (2) Military intervention and non-intervention
- (3) Displays of force
  - (a) Mobilization of Armed Forces
  - (b) Military demonstrations

(4) Assassinations

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3. Military:

a. Types of Weapons

b. Techniques

- (1) Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces
- (2) Deployment of Allied Armed Forces
- (3) Show of force (parades, fly past, naval visits, manetvert)
- (4) Military campaigns (Korea)
- (5) Use of "volunteer" and guerrilla forces
- (6) U.S. and Allied mobilization
- (7) Potential of new weapons

4. Propaganda:

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4. Propaganda:

a. Types of Weapons

- (1) Newspapers (daily, weekly, and organizational)
- (2) Pamphlets, leaflets, brochures, handbills, booklets
- (3) Periodicals
- (4) Books
- (5) Posters
- (6) Displays (advertising types)
- (7) Radio (commercial, governmental, covert, amateur)
- (8) Movies
- (9) Photographs
- (10) Rallies
- (11) Mail
- (12) Telephones
- (13) Balloons, guided missiles, air drops
- (14) Airplanes

b. Techniques

- (1) Government and military directives, instructions, proclamations, etc. ....

- (2) Rumors



- (5) Identification
- (6) Persuasion
- (7) Intimidation

- (8) Planted documents

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INVENTORY OF COLD WAR WEAPONS

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I. General: ~~The~~ list of cold war weapons set forth below, only by way of example, is not exhaustive. Also certain of the items may not be agreed upon by members of this panel to be "weapons". They are grouped, for ease, in subjects with regard to the national posture. They support and are related to certain of the techniques by which they might be applied.

II. Political

A. U. S. political posture

1. Congress
2. Executive Branch of Gov't.
3. Legal Branch of Gov't.
4. News commentary (press and radio)
5. Diplomacy: includes treaties and CFM
6. United Nations (deserves special treatment)
7. U. S. Labor movements
8. U. S. Industry e.g. Wall Street, N.A.M. etc.
9. U. S. political parties
10. U. S. political action groups: youth movements, veterans organizations, religious groups.

Which influence foreign politics by actions of

1. ECA
2. VOA
3. U.S.I.E.
4. Foreign radio (e.g. RFE)
5. Foreign Press
6. Foreign political parties (includes resistance groups in Iron Curtain countries)
7. U. S. Industry in foreign countries (e.g. Aramco)
8. Foreign judicial circles (outlawing communist parties  
Otis, Vogeller, Mandzenty trials)

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Constituting legal actions against communist parties, funds, assets, injunctions, etc.)

9. Foreign political action groups, religious groups, youth movements, women's leagues, labor groups,

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**B. Weapons**

1. Political individuals and parties
2. Resistance groups
3. "Volunteer" forces
4. Minority groups
5. Labor groups
6. Emigre groups
7. UN & US Agencies

**C. Techniques**

1. Diplomatic intervention and nonintervention
  - a. threats and show thereof
2. Military intervention and nonintervention
  - a. threats and show thereof
3. Alliances - treaties
  - a. political
  - b. economic
  - c. military
4. Assassination
5. Coup d'etat
6. Revolution
7. Bribery
8. Sabotage
9. Intimidation

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10. Infiltration
11. Coercion
12. Exploitation of prejudices
13. Penetration of governmental agencies and military establishments.
14. Creation of paramilitary groups
15. Blackmail
16. Detention
17. Provocation
18. Character assassination
19. Support of minorities
20. Organization of resistance groups

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III. Economic

A. U.S. economic posture as influenced by the action of:

1. ECA
2. World Bank
3. Export-Import Bank
4. Federal Reserve
5. Department of State
6. Department of Treasury
7. Department of Commerce
8. Department of Agriculture
9. National Production Authority
10. Defense Production Authority
11. United Nations

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1. Military blockade
2. Paper blockade
3. Labor groups
4. Resistance groups
5. International cartels
6. Government agencies (ECA, etc....)

C. Techniques

1. Currency and credit manipulation
2. Trade agreements
3. Black lists
4. Pre-clusive buying
5. Export controls
6. Import controls
7. Subsidies
8. Black market operations
9. Freezing funds and credits
10. Lend-lease
11. Strikes
12. Hijacking
13. Sabotage
14. Administrative sabotage
15. Purchase and sale of gold
16. Shipping control

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17. Annoying, delaying, and confusing transportation
18. Evacuation of technicians, etc....
19. Foreign economic assistance

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#### IV. Military

##### A. U.S. military posture as influenced by the action of:

1. Congress
2. Department of State
3. Department of Defense
4. Atomic Energy Commission
5. Defense Production Authority
6. Allied Armed Forces
7. United Nations

##### B. Weapons

##### C. Techniques

1. Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces
2. Deployment of Allied Armed Forces
3. Show of force (parades, fly past, naval visits, maneuvers)
4. Military campaigns (Korea)
5. Use of "volunteer" and guerrilla forces
6. U.S. and Allied mobilization
7. Potential of new weapons

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V. Propaganda

A. Weapons

1. Newspapers (daily, weekly, and organizational)
2. Pamphlets, leaflets, brochures, handbills
3. Periodicals
4. Books
5. Posters
6. Displays (advertising types)
7. Radio (commercial, government, covert, amateur)
8. Movies
9. Photographs
10. Rallies
11. Mail
12. Telephone
13. Balloons, guided missiles, air drops
14. Airplanes

B. Techniques

1. Government and military directives, instructions, proclamations, etc.
2. Rumors
3.
4.  25X1
5. Identification
6. Persuasion
7. Intimidation 25X1
8.

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9. Composite photographs and films
10. Songs, anthems
11. Art--sculpture, architecture
12. Satire
13. Caricatures
14. Prophecies, prognostications
15. Revelations, inside stories
16. Sabotage
17. Symbols
18. Petitions
19. Strikes
20. Picketing
21. Merchandising
22. Public ceremonies

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WORKING PAPER  
DRAFT

28 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Appearance of Mr. Dulles before the PCITA  
Scheduled for Wednesday, 29 April 1953.

REFERENCES : a. Letter of 3 April 1953 to Mr. Dulles  
from Robert Blum.  
b. Memorandum of 16 April 1953 to C/Ops/PP.

1. Recognizing that the questions raised in Blum's letter mentioned above cannot be answered accurately without considerable detail, the following discussion of his questions has still been kept brief since it is only intended to provide some clues that might prove helpful to Mr. Dulles. Please let me know if any supplementary material is desired.

2. Policy with respect to covert operations: What should be their scope and purpose and their relation to foreign policy as a whole? In what situations should we rely on covert operations and in what situations should they be avoided?

a. Covert operations within the NSC 10/2 range only make a real contribution to the U.S. effort when they are in support of either specific foreign policy or military objectives or both. Operations not so conceived or merely directed at minor objectives are at best of temporary influence and are quite apt to amount to little more than harassment.

b. Covert operations should not be used where any other type of operation could effectively achieve the result. In other words, covert operations in a sense are a necessary evil and consequently should be avoided except where necessary.

c. The most fundamental and perhaps most obvious test is assuming an operation in the foreign field is necessary or highly desirable and assuming further that it cannot be performed by private or other effort so that if it is to be done at all, it is inevitably a government job, then it should be accomplished covertly if, and only if, known official U.S. participation would seriously diminish or destroy the effectiveness of the operation.

d. The reasons for the above have been confirmed on many occasions by experience. Exposure of covert operations,


regardless of

regardless of the cause, results in severe penalties not only to the operators but to the U.S.; covert operations, because of the demands of security and cover, are unavoidably more complex and devious and consequently less efficient than overt operations; and due to the limited corps of skilled personnel available to CIA the luxury of many operations cannot be enjoyed but rather a system of highly selective priority must be pursued in choosing operations having the greatest potential and still the best chance for success.



25X1

f. Two possible issues for discussion under this question, if Mr. Dulles wishes to consider them, are first, to what extent IIA or a "new propaganda agency" will be capable of either continuing or taking over the medium-to-light-gray operations heretofore engaged in by State and MSA; and second, to what extent is it appropriate for CIA to attempt to carry out large



These are big problems and ones with which Mr. Dulles is very familiar. If desired we could provide separate material on both, but will not do so here.

3. An appraisal of our present and prospective ability to conduct successful covert activities.


a. The ability of CIA is related almost exclusively to the number of experienced and competent personnel available, though, of course, availability of cover and budget are also extremely important.



25X1

d. Further, the

d. Further, the difficulties inherent in maintaining the security of covert operations, both in respect to exposure by government officials and by the press, are increasing.



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f. The ability of CIA to conduct effective operations within the Soviet bloc are severely limited by the nature of the Soviet police state, the first truly totalitarian state.

g. The future capability of CIA's covert operations into the bloc may expand through the development of new techniques aimed at Soviet weaknesses. Research in this field will be continued and possibly increased.

4. Organization and control of covert operations -- in Washington and in the field: Should CIA have the responsibility or should it be some other agency? What should the relationship be to the State Department and to the Embassies?

a. Covert operations should remain in CIA:

(1) Covert operations and covert intelligence both use the same clandestine techniques and technical support facilities.

(2) The combination of covert operations and covert intelligence within the same organization provides for

more efficient

more efficient use of the very limited pool of skilled personnel both U.S. staff officers and foreign agents.

- (3) Counter-espionage protection to covert operations is now provided by CIA. Covert operations conducted outside of CIA would probably require a large degree of duplication of such counter-espionage protection.

[REDACTED]

25X1

- (5) Wherever two agencies or departments have been given the authority to conduct covert operations, the result has been disastrous.

[REDACTED]

25X1

c. The responsibility for true guerrilla warfare should remain at least for the time being in CIA, because the present task is to develop clandestine organizations which are the prerequisites of successful guerrilla operations.

d. As already stated, covert operations should be in support of foreign policy so CIA will and must continue to look to State for policy guidance and for advice on the political advisability of particular operations. In the field

[REDACTED]

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5. The extent to which U.S.-identified or white propaganda should be replaced by non-attributable or grey: Who should be responsible for grey propaganda?

a. It appears to be the consensus of informed opinion that official or "white" propaganda is being overdone, es-

[REDACTED]

b. The present agreement between CIA and the overt agencies assigning responsibility for grey propaganda is satisfactory. The difficulty has arisen in persuading some of the overt operators to live up to it.

c. The extent

c. The extent to which CIA can increase its efforts or assume projects now controlled by other departments or agencies is extremely limited. Most of the relevant factors have already been mentioned; lack of qualified personnel; limited cover; difficulties of covert operations; questions as to the desirability of including any large operation or one with a substantial overhead in a clandestine organization; and the whole problem of priorities -- i.e., the best and most productive use of limited assets.

6. The nature of psychological warfare: Is it a technique in its own right or an illusion that risks distorting the proper conception of foreign policy as a whole? What significance does this issue have for the reconstitution of the Psychological Strategy Board?

a. In the propaganda sense psychological warfare is a separate technique but it should not be considered an independent category of government action. The military, political and economic are independent weapons in their own right but not so psychological warfare. The last, as propaganda, is a technique for persuading those affected or interested of the value of the other three in friendly hands or their destructive effects in enemy hands. Moreover, aside from the propaganda technique aspect, there is unquestionably a psychological bonus or "extra" to any official government action so that the departments and agencies carrying out military, political or economic actions are also, whether or not they want to be, acting simultaneously as psychological warriors. In this aspect the psychological factor is an element of the main decision but no more.


b. The subsidiary question to the above is, assuming psychological warfare is a known quantity, what portion of it should be clandestine? On this reference is again made to earlier statements, covert operations should be necessary and not possible of achievement otherwise; they should be attempted when only government can accomplish them and still government's known participation would seriously diminish or destroy their effectiveness; in the propaganda field the subject matter and its distribution is essentially an overt matter and usually only effective if achieved through non-official channels (speaking of the free world). Consequently, covert efforts in the free world should be directed at penetration or control of channels where such penetration or control must be achieved without U.S. effort being divulged. In the Soviet bloc the limitations are so great that except for radio, efforts must be clandestine. As to radio the issues as between overt and covert have already been mentioned.

c. The PSB

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c. The PSB should be eliminated for organizational reasons though many of its functions should continue preferably under the NSC. As indicated above, all government activity has a psychological kicker attached to it. Weight should be given to this by joint departmental discussion and decision. Moreover, the technique of propaganda should receive joint consideration. Thus PSB functions should continue, but a separate agency is not only unnecessary but less effective than using the existing mechanism of NSC. (This discussion could be elaborated but will only do so if requested.)



25X1

G. TRACY BARNES  
Chief

Political and Psychological Warfare

cc: C/OPS/DDP

~~SECRET~~  
Mr. Tabor

(1)

4/29/53

MEMORANDUM FOR HEARING BEFORE JACKSON COMMITTEE

- ✓ 1. General attitude of CIA toward covert activities and guerrilla warfare activities
2. Attitude respecting assumption of "grey activities" of State Department
  - a) Real distinction is not black - grey - white but whether US Govt. sponsorship should or should not appear
- ① 3. Essential that there should be only one USA agency responsible for covert operations abroad and difficulty divorcing these operations from CIA, if CIA is to continue covert collection of secret intelligence (espionage)
4. In general CIA being asked to carry on too extensive covert operations pending development of adequate personnel
5. Possibility of bringing in private enterprise - the super foundation idea

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(2)

6. Bob Blum's questions:

- a) Relation of covert operations to foreign policy
- b) Ability to conduct successful covert operations
- c) Responsibility for covert operations - whether CIA  
or elsewhere
- d) Handling of "grey field"
- e) The nature of psychological warfare - is it technique  
in its own right or does it distort conception of foreign  
policy as a whole - reconstitution of Psychological  
Strategy Board (refer to need for coordination - this  
week's example - immigration proposal and MIG 15  
defection proposal)

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OUTLINE FOR BRIEFING OF JACKSON COMMITTEE.

1. Our estimate of Soviet intentions -- continuation of Cold War techniques at least until atomic gap closed. (Theory of "enoughness").
2. Despite slowing in tempo of Soviet successes no reason to estimate Soviet feel further successes impossible. Vis: Critical areas, Southeast Asia, Middle East, Central Africa, Latin America.
3. Soviet had long head start in Cold War (Warsaw and post Yalta techniques, long education in techniques of revolution and subversion).
4. Only began set up our own covert organization in 1948 after Czech Coup February 25, 1948, and Italian election problem April 18, 19, 1948. (10/2 18th June 1948, 10/5 October 23, 1951). Why covert operations placed in CIA. Relation covert operations to covert intelligence.
5. This function not sought and has strained capabilities -- Magnitude paper.
6. Detailed project by project report will be given at later date. Accept view of vital importance this activity.
7. As preliminary will present what the enemy is doing and outline of our activities in the Cold War.

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

C/PP

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. TD/P					<p><b>EYES ONLY</b></p> <p><i>For Mr Sullen</i></p> <p><i>Sullen -</i></p> <p><i>Here is the material which you requested in connection with your approaching appearance before the Jackson Committee.</i></p> <p><i>It has been prepared by the staff under Tracy Barnes supervision (in consultation with me) and wherever I concur with and support most of it - I would suggest sub-paragraph (b) and (c) of para 2 and a few of the other more extreme (perfectionist) points in the para. For</i></p>
2.					
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83D CONGRESS }  
1st Session }

SENATE

{REPORT  
{No. —

OVERSEAS INFORMATION PROGRAMS  
OF THE UNITED STATES

REPORT

OF THE

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON OVERSEAS  
INFORMATION PROGRAMS

PURSUANT TO

THE PROVISIONS OF S. RES. 74, 82D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION,  
AND S. RES. 44, 83D CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION



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WASHINGTON : 1953

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<sup>1</sup> Appointed by President of Senate to serve with the special committee.

II

### FOREWORD

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The Committee on Foreign Relations on June 5, 1953, authorized the transmittal to the Senate of a report from the Special Committee on Overseas Information Programs created pursuant to the terms of Senate Resolution 74 (82d Cong.), as amended by Senate Resolution 44 (83d Cong.).

JUNE 15, 1953.

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83D CONGRESS	{	SENATE	{	REPORT
1st Session				No. _____

## OVERSEAS INFORMATION PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 15, 1953.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. HICKENLOOPER, from the Special Committee on Overseas Information Programs, submitted the following

### REPORT

[Pursuant to S. Res. 74, 82d Cong., and S. Res. 44, 83d Cong., 1st sess.]

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

In his state of the Union message, February 2, 1953, President Eisenhower asserted the necessity "to make more effective all activities related to international information." The President declared that "a unified and dynamic effort in this whole field is essential to the security of the United States and other peoples in the community of free nations," and added, "there is but one sure way to avoid global war and that is to win the cold war."

An international information service is a new tool in the conduct of United States foreign relations. Its full potentialities are scarcely realized. Our international information program must support and promote our foreign policy and our foreign relations or it has no reason for existence.

This country did not engage extensively in overseas information programs until World War II. After the war and until 1948, the activity was lodged within the Department of State and conducted on a limited basis. In addition an educational exchange program was provided for under the Fulbright Act of 1946 (Public Law 584, 79th Cong.) and a second program added by the Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 402, 80th Cong.) in 1948. The former financed the exchange of professors, students, and others out of foreign currency funds accruing from the sale of surplus properties abroad.

The Smith-Mundt Act gave permanent legislative authority to the information program of the Department of State, assigning to it the following objectives:

To promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and other countries.

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It is not possible to pass off the exchanges of persons. In 1948, the year the Smith-Mundt Act was passed, the Economic Cooperation Administration launched a separate information program to publicize the European recovery program.

By Executive order, in 1950, a further step was taken to enlarge the scope of overseas information activity. To the function of promoting "mutual understanding" and a "full and fair picture" of the United States, which were the purposes of the Fulbright and the Smith-Mundt Acts, President Truman directed that there be added the "Campaign of Truth." This mandate constituted an attempt to broaden the original intent of the information program into a more dynamic psychological weapon to meet the growing threat of communism.

These shifts in purposes and emphasis in the program during the past several years have reflected themselves in constant changes in organizational structure both within the Department of State and within the executive branch generally. From a relatively minor function under an Assistant Secretary of State, the administration of the information program has evolved through a series of reorganizations into a quasi-autonomous unit which since January 1952 has been called the International Information Administration.

Congressional assessment of the need and value of the program is suggested in a history of fluctuating appropriations for the overseas information and educational exchange services. In the last year of World War II, appropriations were approximately \$70 million. By 1948 they had decreased to \$20 million. By 1950, after the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act, appropriations for the program administered by the Department of State reached \$47 million. When President Truman's Executive order inaugurated the "Campaign of Truth" in 1950, Congress appropriated \$121 million. A substantial proportion of this sum, however, was earmarked for the construction of radio facilities for the Voice of America. For the past 2 years appropriations have amounted to approximately \$85 million annually for the International Information Administration. In total, upward of half a billion dollars have been appropriated for international informational and educational activities since 1945.

In terms of cost and personnel, the United States information program has now reached a level of operations which is second only to that of the Soviet Union. The Department of State estimates, that Russia spends \$1.4 billion annually for propaganda, both for internal and external purposes, and employs over a million propagandists. The propaganda of the Communists is unconcerned with truth and is militant in promoting world communism. In this, it is similar to Nazi methodology.

The United States cannot and will not tolerate in its own program the utter disregard for truth which has characterized the foreign information programs of totalitarian nations. Nor has this country accepted the premise of the British information system, which while factual and nonpropagandistic in tone, concerns itself primarily with the affairs and interests of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. The short history of the American program has been characterized by a search for means which would advance both the interests of the United States and the community of interests of the non-Communist world.

## 2. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

By 1951, while there was general agreement in this country on the importance of overseas information service, at the same time there was doubt as to the efficiency and effectiveness of the program. The program had not been examined by Congress since passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948, other than for annual hearings by the Appropriations Committees and a brief hearing in 1950 on Senate Resolution 243 to expand the information program. On February 19, 1951, Senators Alexander Wiley and William Benton introduced Senate Resolution 74 (82d Cong.) proposing a complete study of the United States information program. Reporting the resolution favorably, the Foreign Relations Committee noted the receipt of a variety of criticisms of the program.

Senate Resolution 74 was passed by the Senate on June 30, 1952. The resolution directed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or a subcommittee thereof to conduct an investigation and study of the objectives, operations, and effectiveness of the overseas information programs of the United States. The committee was to be composed of members of the Foreign Relations Committee appointed by the chairman and two other Senators appointed by the President of the Senate. Those designated in the 82d Congress were Senators Fulbright, chairman; Gillette, Benton, Wiley, Hickenlooper, and Mundt.

This special committee submitted an interim report on January 30, 1953 (Senate Report No. 30, 83d Cong.). This interim report stated that "the overseas information services and programs of the United States and private agencies are very important and that they must and can be strengthened." It also recommended continuation of the investigation in order that the full study called for by Senate Resolution 74 might be completed.

Senate Resolution 44 (83d Cong.), passed February 20, 1953, continued the special committee until June 30, 1953. The committee appointed under Senate Resolution 44 (83d Cong.) consists of Senators Hickenlooper, chairman, Wiley, Knowland, Fulbright, Gillette, and Green from the Foreign Relations Committee and Senators Mundt and Hill from the Senate at large. As in the previous session, both political parties are equally represented.

## 3. PROCEDURE OF THE INVESTIGATION

(a) *Evaluations of overseas operations*

As an initial step, the special committee requested American Ambassadors to evaluate the information program at their missions abroad and to suggest improvements. Approximately 80 responses were received.

The committee also sought appraisals of the program from American foreign correspondents. Fifty-five evaluations were supplied to the committee.

Similar requests were made of American religious groups and business organizations with extensive operations abroad. From these groups and organizations the committee obtained approximately 10 summary reports covering observations of their overseas associates.

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During November-December 1952, Senator Hickenlooper inspected information operations in the Far East, Senator Fulbright, in Europe, and Senator Gillette, in the Middle East. Senator Wiley had previously observed the program in Europe and the Mediterranean area.

Extensive discussions with personnel of the United States missions abroad and other informed Americans and with local nationals were held at the various posts visited. These discussions provided considerable insight into the weaknesses and strengths of the program.

*(c) Staff studies*

To secure additional information, the committee directed its staff to prepare studies on various aspects of the program. Eight such studies have been published as committee prints during the course of the investigation.

Staff Study No. 1, United States Overseas Information Programs, provided background information, surveyed the current status of overseas informational activities and brought together basic documentation.

Staff Study No. 2, The Information Program of Great Britain, contained comparative data on the size and techniques of the British Overseas Information System.

Staff Study No. 3, The Soviet Propaganda Program, highlighted the activities carried on under the most extensive propaganda operation in the world.

Staff Study No. 4, Organization of United States Overseas Information Functions, discussed alternative solutions to the problem of the organizational location of the information program in the executive branch of the Government.

Staff Study No. 5, Analysis of Reports From United States Mission Chiefs Abroad, summarized the strengths and weaknesses of the information program, as seen by the Ambassadors in the field.

Staff Study No. 6, Analysis of Reports From American Correspondents Overseas, and Staff Study No. 7, Analysis of Communications Received From Business and Religious Organizations, supplied the committee with an additional summary of evaluations of the program and with suggestions for increasing its effectiveness.

Staff Study No. 8, Voice of America Broadcasts on the Death of Stalin, analyzed a sampling of radio scripts to assess the manner in which this subject was handled in official broadcasts to various parts of the world.

In preparing these studies and in carrying out its work generally, the committee had the assistance of the regular staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. By drawing on this pool of specialized personnel, the committee was able to conduct its investigation with a minimum of full-time staff employees and with consequent savings in costs.

*(d) Hearings*

The first phase of hearings was held on November 20 and 21, 1952, prior to the departure of members of the committee on overseas inspections. This phase was primarily exploratory in nature, designed to establish the scope of the investigation and to provide the com-

mittee with background data for use abroad. The witnesses included representatives of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the International Information Administration, the Mutual Security Administration, and the Technical Cooperation Administration.

After the return of the committee members from their surveys abroad, a number of informed and interested persons outside of Government were invited to testify at public hearings on the information program. In issuing these invitations, the committee sought to draw upon the experience of former officials of the Information Administration, the Advisory Commissions on Information and on Educational Exchange provided for under the Smith-Mundt Act, public-spirited organizations and relevant industries such as radio, motion pictures, and publishing.

A total of 35 witnesses were heard during the second phase of the hearings which extended from March 6 to April 1. Among the organizations represented were the following: the Motion Picture Association of America, the American Book Publishers Association; the American Library Association; the American Legion; the Ford Foundation; the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters; International House; the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers; the Institute of International Education; the National Education Association; Board of Foreign Scholarships; the Saturday Evening Post; the World-Wide Broadcasting System; the Advertisers Council of America; the American Federation of Labor; and the American Institute of Public Opinion.

On completion of the second phase, hearings were recessed for several weeks. During the interval, the committee prepared summaries of criticisms and suggestions relating to the program. These were given to the Department of State with the request that informed witnesses be designated to comment on the specific criticisms and suggestions.

Testimony of Dr. Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the information program, and eight other official witnesses was heard in a third phase of the hearings, April 20 to 27.

The committee then convened in New York May 11, 12, 13. This fourth phase dealt with statistics and programs designed largely to show the effectiveness of the Voice of America, but it also covered potential uses of television and other forms of telecommunications in the information program.

Since radio broadcasting had been most severely criticized in reports received by the committee, officials of the Voice of America were given the fullest possible opportunity to explain the operation and to answer criticisms. Some 30 witnesses were heard during the sessions of the committee in New York.

The committee has analyzed the mass of information which has been accumulated. It has reached conclusions and is prepared to make recommendations on the overseas information programs as required under Senate Resolution 74 as amended by Senate Resolution 44. For the most part, these treat with the activities of the International Information Administration of the Department of State, but also concern themselves with the specialized information programs of the Mutual Security Agency and the Technical Cooperation Administration.

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The information program of the Department of Defense deals with special problems growing out of the presence of American troops abroad and the training of foreign military personnel in this country. The committee has taken cognizance of the military program but makes no attempt to offer recommendations with respect to it. An appropriate body of the Senate may wish to examine its operation in detail.

#### 4. PRINCIPAL WEAKNESSES OF THE INFORMATION PROGRAM

##### (a) *Ineffective coordination of psychological policy*

The Psychological Strategy Board was established to coordinate the psychological policies of the United States. Much of its activities are necessarily of a highly classified nature, but data has been available to the committee which suggests that the Board is not effectively discharging its function.

The Executive order (June 20, 1951) creating the Psychological Strategy Board is loosely drawn. It lodges various responsibilities in the Board but limits its authority to "guidance" and "reporting." Lewis K. Gough, commander of the American Legion, testified that he has been advised that—

not a single major recommendation of the Board has been executed by the departments or agencies to which it reports.

This report was not challenged by representatives of the executive branch. Observations of members of the committee abroad and other evidence moreover suggest that the component agencies of the Board, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense, and the Department of State are continuing to go their separate ways in matters of psychological policy. This lack of coordination has no doubt reduced the effectiveness of the overseas information program. Just as this country cannot afford to have conflicting foreign policies, it cannot support conflicting policies within the Government in dealing with other nations or in handling major international issues.

##### (b) *Duplication and competition in informational activities of United States agencies operating abroad*

The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) and the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) operate overseas information programs. The committee has been told that these programs have been merged or coordinated with those of the International Information Administration (IIA). Examination of the written merger agreements, however, suggests that they are more in the nature of cartel arrangements with much duplication, some conflict, excessive personnel, and continuing high operating costs.

Specifically in the Far East there has been no attempt to combine the information programs of MSA and IIA. In several countries, the committee found two separate and distinct information structures. This has resulted in duplication, conflict in programs, and excessive personnel.

It is difficult to evaluate the written understanding between TCA and IIA on avoidance of duplication in informational effort since the former is still a comparative newcomer to the field. The rapid growth of the information budget of TCA, however, suggests that its ambi-



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tious expanding information activities should be kept under observation if a duplication of the situation that has developed between MSA and IIA is to be avoided.

In pointing out this duplication the committee questions the continued need for multiple overseas information programs. It sees in the present situation unnecessary risks of conflict in policy, increased administrative costs and excessive informational activity.

The same observation is generally true of the separate exchange of persons programs administered by MSA, TCA, and other agencies. These programs were separately authorized by law and by law were to be administered separately. There may be some types of exchanges so intimately related to the major projects carried on by MSA, TCA, and others that they can be better handled by these agencies themselves. While these exchanges differ in degree from those administered by the IIA under the Smith-Mundt and Fulbright program, the committee questions the need for their scattered administration. It believes that the absence of efficient coordination in this field is adding to administrative costs and is probably creating costly competition among various agencies operating in this field.

*(c) Lack of budgetary stability and continuity of administrative direction*

In the postwar years, appropriations for the overseas information program have fluctuated sharply, drastic cuts caused in the main by dissatisfaction with its operations alternating with precipitate increases. Simultaneously, there have been rapid changes in the organization of the program and in its administrators. There have been some 5 major reorganizations and 5 Administrators in the last 5 years.

This instability has been costly. It has resulted in much lost administrative motion. It has had an adverse effect on the ability to recruit the type of specialized personnel needed in this program. It has, on occasion, produced too rapid expansion with consequent waste. It has made it difficult for Appropriations Committees to judge past performance or to estimate the probable effectiveness of new organizational proposals.

Many of the witnesses have cited the repeated shifts in the direction of the program as a major factor in reducing its effectiveness. The committee concurs in this view. It would point out, however, that in any new undertaking there is bound to be a certain amount of instability. It takes time and experimentation to determine an effective level and method of operation. In the case of the information program, difficulties have been accentuated by the limited experience of the United States with an activity of this type. Even more serious is the fact that those who have been responsible for the program in the past have tended, perhaps inadvertently, to hold out to Congress and to the American people an exaggerated picture of the accomplishments of overseas information which has produced cycles of excessive expectation and disappointment. These reactions have been reflected in fluctuating appropriations.

The committee believes that the program can be stabilized by presenting realistic goals. It is damaging to the entire program when the Appropriations Committees are led to expect results which are not attained. A realistic information program, properly administered, can be of inestimable value in producing a favorable attitude toward us and our policies. The present Administrator, Robert L. Johnson,

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satified his interpretation of the role of Government information when he testified that—

A Government program of information and educational exchange can be only a small segment of the great flow of American ideas which reach other peoples through the printed word, our products and our skills, our Armed Forces, and our tourists.

The committee believes that the information program must settle into a clearly defined continuing pattern of operation. Enough knowledge of the nature and possibilities of overseas information has now been accumulated to make this possible. To apply this knowledge, however, will require a well-defined scope of activities, reasonable stability in appropriations, technically competent personnel and a continuity of administrative direction. The committee feels that this can be accomplished.

(d) *Ineffective administration of the program by the Department of State*

Numerous witnesses testified to the inadequacy of, or perhaps indifference to, the administration of the program in the past by the Department of State. Those who had previous experience in operating the program were unanimous in agreeing that the program had been hampered among other things by the redtape, budgetary rigidity, and bureaucratic rivalry in the Department. Those who had observed the program in unofficial capacities generally expressed the view that the administrative needs of a hard-hitting, fast-moving information program could hardly be met within the confines of a cautious, tradition-bound, bureaucratic foreign office. Many witnesses favored complete separation of the program from the Department and its elevation to the Cabinet level.

The attitude of the public affairs officers at the posts abroad was somewhat in contrast to those mentioned above. While these officers still complained of certain administrative inadequacies and discrimination on the part of old-line Foreign Service personnel, nevertheless, they agreed that the situation in the field had improved during the past year or two and there was little sentiment among them for complete separation. Their attitude was succinctly expressed by one field officer in this manner: "The administrative link is too close; the policy link is not close enough. This should be reversed."

A most serious indictment against the administration of the program by the Department came from the Advisory Commission on Information. In its Seventh Semiannual Report, February 23, 1953, the Commission stated:

During the past 5 years we have observed the efforts made by top officials of the information program to overcome internal resistances and misunderstandings of the Department of State. They have been hampered by established procedures and traditions developed for the purposes of political diplomacy and not for propaganda and information. Too much time and effort on the part of IIA has been spent in attempting to fit the program into the structure of the Department and to the convincing of officials of its importance.

There has been a singular lack of enthusiasm and imagination in the Department's development of the information program. When the program was first set up under Department of State auspices it got off to a slow and unconvincing start. There was much overt and covert opposition to it in the Department. Instead of initiating and carrying on a fresh, dynamic program, the Department converted it into a low-level and secondary operation. It soon became apparent that the Department was more interested in conforming the information program to its own long-established conventions than in carrying out the congressional intentions of Public Law 402.

Repeated recommendations of our Commissions were disregarded or reluctantly and halfheartedly adopted. Such progress as has been made has followed only after repeated recommendations, protests, and threats of reduced appropriations.

[It is to be noted that the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, however, recommended that educational exchange should remain in the Department of State.]

These criticisms, in the main, seem to be valid. Some may excuse these shortcomings by pointing out that they are characteristic of the early stages of any new undertaking. The fact is, however, that after 7 years the program should have arrived at maturity.

*(e) Inadequate personnel and faulty personnel practices*

The committee recognizes that there are many able men and women employed in the Information Administration. It cannot, however, ignore the observations of a number of witnesses to the effect that unsuitable or unqualified persons fill many posts in the administrative hierarchy both at home and overseas. Dr. Wilson Compton, former Administrator of the program, touched on a principal source of the difficulty when he testified that—

The building up of this program was pushed somewhat faster than the available qualified personnel would justify; also, to some extent and in some activities, there has been accumulated a sort of overhead of persons who may have been fairly well qualified for the function they were asked to discharge when they were originally employed, but who are not very well qualified for the function that they are asked to discharge now.

Other difficulties in the field of personnel arise from personnel practices for which the Department of State is responsible. Information employees are fact disseminators, not fact gatherers, as are regular Foreign Service officers. The temperament and the skills required for the one are not the same as for the other. The testimony of various witnesses and observations overseas leads the committee to believe that this distinction has not been sufficiently recognized either in recruitment or assignment.

Nor has the Department established what the committee would regard as a satisfactory training program for employees in the information service. Inexperienced people are often sent abroad after the most meager orientation, and followup training at the posts is more a matter of chance than policy. In this connection, the committee cannot overemphasize the desirability of officers abroad being proficient in the language, history and culture of the country of assignment.

The committee finds that comparatively low salary classifications for key policy positions and the inadequacy of prestige attaching to such positions in the Information Administration add to the difficulties of attracting and holding professionally competent employees. The Department of State has assigned to the Information Administration only 3 out of the 27 classified supergrades which it is allotted. The Information Administration, however, comprises 40 percent of the total personnel of the Department.

Unfortunately, there is little doubt that the Information Administration has frequently been used in the past as a "dumping ground" for departmental employees for whom other assignments are not conveniently available or as a stepping-stone for Foreign Service officers whose primary interests lie elsewhere or for interim appointments for officers awaiting other assignment. The committee would like to make clear that it has no objections to temporary interchanges

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of information and the Department for training or special purposes. There is much to be gained from cross-fertilization of the fact disseminators and the fact gatherers. The committee feels, however, that the practice pointed out by Mr. Ben Hibbs, editor of the Saturday Evening Post, is not in the best interests of the program or the Department. Mr. Hibbs testified that ever since he has been a member of the Advisory Commission on Information—

it has been the practice of the State Department to assign young Foreign Service career men to important posts in information work—particularly to posts located abroad. This is regarded as just another tour of duty by many of these fellows—something to be endured on the climb up the ladder. Their goal is not to be topnotch information men but eventually to be ministers and ambassadors. Most of them are competent young men, some of them brilliant, but they are not particularly well equipped for important information posts.

Another personnel practice which should be mentioned as disruptive of the effectiveness of the program is the current system of rotation of assignments followed by the Department. Officers frequently have little time to familiarize themselves with a post before they are assigned elsewhere. The result is that there is little incentive to become really expert in the language and customs of the area to which they have been assigned. Short tours of duty may be justified for the diplomatic and consular service, but the committee does not believe that the same principle should apply to the Information Service.

The committee would like to emphasize the vital importance which it attaches to the solution of the personnel problems which have been cited. It is essential to have well-selected, well-trained persons in this program. Information employees overseas are under the constant scrutiny of other peoples. Indeed, it is of paramount necessity that they meet local inhabitants and be in constant communication with them. In relationships of this kind, a misfit, an incompetent, or a person with alien sympathies can do serious damage to the prestige and interests of the United States and our objectives.

*(f) Maladjustment of responsibility between Washington and the field*

During the past 5 years the information program has gradually shifted from a centralized to a decentralized operation. Formerly most information materials were prepared in this country and planning and operating decisions were made largely in Washington. The field posts were primarily disseminating centers with limited influence over what was disseminated. The pattern of operation differed little from post to post.

This situation has been steadily reversed in recent years. Regional reproduction centers overseas and the individual posts themselves are now turning out substantial quantities of the information material used in the program. The posts are presently the principal focus of the entire program and exercise prime influence in planning the operations for their respective localities on a tailor-made basis.

The committee's own observations generally support the views of the many witnesses who found this change of emphasis beneficial. Situations, customs, and attitudes differ from post to post throughout the world. By placing the emphasis on the field operations, it has been possible to adjust to these differences and thereby gain greater acceptance for the activities of the program. The absence of such adjustment in the past undoubtedly contributed to general ineffectiveness.

(g) *Failure to secure foreign cooperation in propagating common concepts*

Analysis of the operation of the information program reveals that two major concepts have developed. One might be termed the national program which encompasses primarily the dissemination of information about the United States, its peoples, and policies. The other concept involves propagation of international matters in which the United States has an interest, but not a unilateral interest. Included in this latter is the publicizing of anticommunism, democracy, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In the first concept, the information program serves as an American instrument for communicating information about the United States. In this, the committee believes, the program should be a firm, forthright, clearly identified voice of this country based upon a pattern which is understandable to the recipients.

In its other concept, however, the program serves not alone as an American instrument but as a part of the total voice of world freedom. Propagation of information about the aims of the free world on the one hand and the evils of aggressive communism on the other should be the concern of all countries and all peoples. This is not and ought not to be a unique American responsibility. The evidence suggests that the manner in which our information program is administered in some areas has created an impression of this kind.

The committee believes that the character of our program should be such as to enlist the active cooperation of other nations and peoples in propagating common concepts, to the end that it may stimulate their enthusiasm and friendship and not their apathy or suspicion. The greater our unilateral effort, the higher will be the cost to this country and the more the need for American personnel. However, the more cooperation which we receive from other countries, the greater will be the impact of the message.

This weakness in the program varies in specific detail from post to post. In general, however, the variance seems to be directly related to the caliber of the field personnel. The more capable the officers the more conscious they appear to be of the value of foreign cooperation and the more likely they will be to obtain such cooperation.

There is still another aspect of the problem that should not be overlooked. In the absence of coordination among free governments and unofficial agencies, a listener in Iron Curtain countries may hear conflicting ideas from the Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Free Europe, etc. The free world should unquestionably speak with many voices but its fundamental messages should be the same. The committee believes that each voice should be concerned as to what the other is saying.

(h) *Failure to utilize fully widespread public interest in this country to further program*

The generous cooperation which the committee has received in its investigation from nongovernmental sources attests to the widespread public interest in the information program. Many individuals and groups have indicated their desire to help in promoting a better understanding of the United States and in developing mutually beneficial relations with other countries.

The committee is aware of the steps that have been taken by the Information Administration to bring about public participation in the

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used for want of effective leadership and guidance. It agrees with the many witnesses who testified along the lines of the following statement by Waldemar Nielsen, former Director of the information program of the Mutual Security Agency in Europe:

\* \* \* I think we must make much greater use of private and semiprivate American organizations in the field of international propaganda.

I think that there is a tremendous contribution that can be made by American churches, by American trade unions, by American organizations like the American Legion, to the general problem of advancing American interests and informing, creating world understanding of American concepts and American ideas.

(i) *Unsatisfactory evaluation methods*

There is general agreement that one of the prime needs of the program is a realistic system for evaluating effectiveness. Such a system involves techniques for calculating the reach of the program (how many people are being contacted by radio, publications, motion pictures, etc.) and the impact which it is making on the attitudes of the people contacted.

Increasing efforts are being made by the Information Administration to measure effectiveness. Evaluation units are maintained in the various media. The Administrator has a small evaluation staff. Evaluating officers have been assigned to a few field posts. Private research agencies under contract have undertaken evaluation studies for the Information Administration. Even the semiannual reports of the Advisory Commissions constitute a kind of evaluation of the program for the Secretary of State and the Congress.

These efforts notwithstanding, the committee shares the conviction of many of the witnesses that inadequate evaluation remains a principal weakness of the program. Part of the difficulty stems from the scattering of responsibility for the evaluation function and the haphazardness that appears to characterize the present approach. In these circumstances, the probability of bias in evaluation increases and, inevitably, the cost. Another difficulty is the tendency of evaluators to depart from their main task of measuring effectiveness and to give undue emphasis to the development of impressive data to justify the program to the Administrator and to Congress.

Even more serious, perhaps, is the common error noted in all branches of the Information Administration of judging effectiveness by feverishness of activity. Frequently, it seems to the committee, information personnel delude themselves with the conviction that if the graph of output of information material shows a constantly ascending curve then all is well with the program. It is the unusual officer, the committee found, who recognizes that the effectiveness of the information program does not depend on quantity.

The committee also notes that at some posts to which independent evaluation officers had been assigned directly from the office of the Administrator, the results have been neither satisfactory nor happy. A principal difficulty appears to be that the status of these officers in the chain of command and the extent of their authority is ambiguous. In consequence, they are sometimes inhibited from exercising the very independence of judgment and action which was the principal justification for their assignment to the field in the first place.

The problems discussed above are those which primarily concern internal evaluation within the Information Administration. The

Advisory Commissions were established by Public Law 402, to provide among other things independent assessments of the overall effectiveness of the information program to Congress and the Secretary of State. The committee does not believe that the Commissions have effectively discharged this particular function as they might have done with broader authority. In reaching this conclusion, the committee in no way intends to reflect on the able, public-spirited persons who have voluntarily given their time and efforts to the work of the Commissions. The problem lies not in the Commissioners but in procedures which leave them dependent on the Department of State for staff and for information on which to base their reports and which do not provide for a clear-cut method of reporting to Congress.

The committee believes that scientific evaluation techniques to measure public demand and acceptance developed in the United States by business and industry might be more profitably adapted in the planning and execution of this program.

(g) *Lack of a common understanding of the objectives of the information program on the part of the Administration, Congress, and American people*

Many witnesses pointed out the necessity for clarification of the objectives of the information program so that the Administration, Congress, and the American people will know what to expect of it. The confusion over the purposes of the information program exists within the Information Administration itself. Mr. Lloyd Free, public-affairs officer in Italy, testified that—

The most fundamental weakness in the IIA program as heretofore administered is a lack of a basic understanding shared by all \* \* \* of the job to be done.

The committee's observations in various parts of the world corroborate Mr. Free's opinion. Frequently public-affairs officers seemed to distort the legislative purpose of the program beyond most liberal interpretation. At some posts, the objectives stated in Public Law 402 (80th Cong.) were being strained to cover activities of a kind and on a scale which appeared quite remote from the original intent of the Smith-Mundt Act.

This diversity of interpretation and understanding of purpose leads to costly, ineffective, and sometimes questionable activities at many posts. It frequently resolves itself into superabundant activity calculated to satisfy everyone's concept of what overseas information should be but which instead confuses. The committee is convinced that a prime reason for the recurrent outbursts of criticisms and consequent instability of this program has been the administrative failure to develop among participating personnel a clear and uniform understanding of the aims of the program together with effective methods for their achievement and to communicate that understanding to Congress and the American people.

##### 5. THE MEDIA—STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

As presently administered, the information program is carried on primarily by field posts which are serviced by five media. These are the Information Center Service, the International Education Exchange Service, the International Motion Picture Service, the International Press Service, and the International Broadcasting Service (the Voice of America).

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The number of information centers has grown from none in 1948 to 200 in 63 countries in 1952. In addition, there are 34 binational centers, largely in Latin America.

Stimulating favorable attitudes abroad through the use of overseas information libraries is a long-range process. Nevertheless, the potentialities of this medium are considerable. Their appeal is primarily to the groups who are most directly concerned with international relations, i. e., students, Government officials, members of the professions, and various groups and organizations.

Information from all sources, including the committee's own overseas observations, indicates that these centers contribute effectively to the purposes of the information program. Former Directors of the information program testified to their value. Nonofficial observers abroad who communicated their views to the committee generally concurred.

There are, however, certain precautions which are indicated if the utility of the library program is to be preserved and extended. Care must be taken to prevent field posts from distorting the purposes of the libraries. The libraries are essentially American institutions and their atmosphere, collections, and functions must be maintained as such.

The committee does not refer to the binational centers, which are specifically designed to blend the culture of our country with that of another. What should be avoided is the tendency, particularly in underdeveloped countries, for the library administration to undertake functions which are properly those of local authorities and which burden the United States with responsibility for providing general library facilities. This tendency, if not checked, is bound to lead to increased and unwarranted costs, substitution of American initiative for what should properly be local initiative and, in some situations, adverse reactions to what will be termed "American cultural domination."

During its overseas inspections, members were repeatedly told of an unfilled demand for translations into the local languages of certain American books, particularly those of a technical nature. While English is the major secondary language of most of the individuals abroad who would be interested in our overseas library facilities, an increase in the percentage of translations from English in the collections would probably result in a considerable and proper expansion in the use of the information centers. This is a matter for consideration by the Administrator. Local authorities in some countries should be prevailed upon to cooperate in providing translations into their languages as part of a community educational process.

Finally, the committee wishes to call attention to the problem of book selection for the overseas libraries, particularly books of a controversial nature. The wise selection of books for inclusion in the libraries abroad is fundamental to the success of this undertaking. Unless reasonably consistent, commonsense criteria are established and maintained for this program the effectiveness of these libraries for our best interests may be diminished.

An adequate cross section of American literature should be provided for a better understanding of American life and culture but writings of Communists or Communist sympathizers should not be tolerated



in any manner which would indicate their acceptance by the American people.

(b) *Exchange of persons*

In comparative ratings of the various mediums, it is generally conceded that the exchange-of-persons program under the Smith-Mundt Act and the Fulbright scholarship program is among the most effective instruments for the creation of mutual understanding and good will.

Since 1948, a total of 15,722 students, professors, and other persons have been exchanged under the program of the Department of State, 11,866 coming to the United States and 3,856 going abroad. Some 42 percent of the cost of exchangees coming to the United States and 98 percent of the outgoing exchangees have been financed out of foreign-currency funds realized from the sale of surplus war materials rather than from new appropriations of dollars.

The strength of the exchange-of-persons program appears to stem from diverse factors. The program enjoys a high prestige both at home and abroad and is therefore able to attract the voluntary participation of leading citizens. It is nonpolitical and nonpropagandistic in character so that it is acceptable in all parts of the non-Communist world. More than any other part of the program, exchanges are a two-way undertaking which stimulate foreign participation. Exchangees often are or may become prominent in government, business, and the professions and their potential impact on attitudes toward this country is considerable.

The difficulty with the exchange-of-persons program has been largely of an administrative nature, dealing with such questions as selection and orientation of exchangees and financial arrangements.

The committee was particularly concerned with the administrative location of the exchange-of-persons program in the event that the information program should be separated from the Department of State. Many official witnesses concurred in the view of Dr. Robert L. Johnson on the desirability or even the necessity of retaining exchange of persons with the other media. Dr. Johnson stated:

\* \* \* The more I have learned about it \* \* \* the more I feel that really the exchange program is the hard core of our entire information program and that the movies, our press, our publications, and our voice are really supplementary \* \* \*

Informed nonofficial witnesses, concurring in this high evaluation of the utility of the exchange program were of the opinion, nevertheless, that its effectiveness would best be served if it remained an integral part of the Department of State. Some advocated separation of exchanges from the other media even if the Information Administration remained in the Department. Their principal argument was directed to preservation of the nonpropagandistic, nonpolitical character of the exchange program which otherwise might be lost.

While there may be advantages in retaining all the media in one agency, nevertheless the committee believes the exchange-of-persons program should be retained in the Department of State without substantial change in its administration or programs. The relationship between short-range media such as radio and press and long-range educational media such as exchange of persons is not so interlocked that, properly administered, the divorcement of this single unit would be detrimental to our overall purpose.

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*(c) Motion pictures*

The Information Administration exhibits motion pictures in more than 30 languages in 87 countries. It operates several hundred mobile motion-picture units mostly in the Middle East and the Far East.

The evidence supports the value of the continued use of motion pictures in the program. The strength of this medium lies in its combined visual and audio appeal and its mass impact. The committee, however, feels that it would be an error to use size of audience reached as the measure of effectiveness. The appeal of free motion pictures, regardless of content, is very great especially in impoverished parts of the world. Documentary and other types of films are useful in the program when they convey an intelligent and progressively unfolding message related to the objectives of Public Law 402. When films are properly used and tied in with other media their value is potentially great. The showing of films willy-nilly merely to attract mass attention for the moment is abortive and expensive. On occasions it is detrimental.

With respect to the quality of motion pictures employed in the program, the committee is inclined to agree with the opinion of Mr. Eric Johnston, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, who testified:

\* \* \* I am inclined to think that the State Department shorts have improved a great deal in the last few years; they have learned. \* \* \*

Officials of the motion-picture program appear to have become aware of the dangers of stimulating envy and resentment by accentuating the difference between the standard of living in this country and others.

There also seems to be a better understanding of the great importance of selecting films which will not run counter to the traditions and customs of the audience before whom they are exhibited. Films which are not carefully chosen in this respect can do more harm than good. Senator Green, for example, recalled the shock to an audience in India when bathing beauties were shown as one of the best features of the State of New Jersey. Undraped women in public violate the Indian code of propriety.

With respect to the mobile motion-picture units employed in the program, the committee believes that with proper selection of subject matter they are valuable. These units undoubtedly attract mass audiences, particularly in remote areas, and bring a picture of American life to people who might otherwise have only hearsay impressions of this country. With artful selection of subject matter they are effective. On the other hand, there are certain drawbacks in the use of these units. The public-affairs officer in Italy, Mr. Lloyd Free, stated the problem in this fashion:

They are subject to two difficulties: One is cost, because they are very expensive to operate; the other is, that if they are operated as a straight United States proposition, there is considerable danger of them inviting a reaction about United States intervention.

Continuous attention to and careful selection of subject matter must be emphasized in this program.

*(d) Press and publications*

The International Press Service has facilities both in this country and abroad for the production and dissemination of press copy and

publications. Its output consists of pamphlets, magazines, leaflets, cartoon books, reprints, posters, photographs, displays, newsletters, and fast-press materials.

The committee has received diverse comments on the press and publications program from all parts of the world, many of them critical. Criticisms have been directed at both press materials and pamphlets, posters and other publications produced by the International Press Service of the Information Administration. In the case of press materials, the principal comments from abroad have concerned themselves mostly with the slowness, the bulk and the style of the material. There has been advocacy of the complete abolition of the wireless file on the grounds of its relatively minor value and its competition with the regular commercial news services.

With respect to publications as distinct from the press materials of the International Press Service, criticisms are directed at the massiveness of the operation and the contents and style of the literature produced and distributed. The comment of Theodore Repplier, member of the Press Advisory Committee of the Advisory Commission on Information, is typical of one shortcoming that is repeatedly cited. Mr. Repplier testified:

I believe that IPS material designed to reflect American life is too diffuse. It tries to cover too much ground. It tries to convey too many ideas about the United States. We do not have that much time, and we do not have that much money. To use advertising terms, we are trying to sell too many products in too short a time, with too small an appropriation. If we are to make headway, we must, I think, confine our \* \* \* material to transmitting one idea at a time. This is a principle of sound advertising, the application of which I feel is very much needed.

Mr. Boris Shishkin, director of research of the American Federation of Labor, gave voice to another common criticism when he stated:

Too often \* \* \* substance has been sacrificed to form. A swanky brochure, with half-tone illustrations exquisitely laid out and printed on heavy slick paper, is likely to be resented by an impoverished worker and farmer. Some have told the story in language far over the heads of the people they have tried to reach.

With printing plants in various parts of the world, output of publications runs into hundreds of millions of reproductions annually. The committee has had numerous complaints to the effect that much of the centrally produced material is unsuitable for use by particular posts. The flow of this material, however, has reportedly decreased in recent months. There have also been reports of wastage in distribution. If these reports are valid, responsibility at least in part is attributable to the posts in the field since they now exercise considerable choice over the materials that are supplied to them.

It should also be noted with respect to the press service that in many regions not reached by regular commercial news services, the IPS wireless bulletin is a principal source of information for indigenous newspapers and other publications. Statistics kept by the International Press Service indicate that features, photos, and other prepared press materials are sought in considerable quantities by foreign publications. However, the information service should not become a competitor of commercial news and related services in any areas which they serve.

*(e) Voice of America and other forms of telecommunications*

In 1942, the United States Government began to broadcast news commentaries and other programs to the people of the world by short-wave radio. This was done through the Office of Coordinator of Information. Programs were to serve as an instrument primarily of psychological warfare, but, also, as a means of making America's wartime mission clear to friends and enemies abroad.

With the outbreak of World War II the United States took control of all shortwave international broadcasting transmissions in this country. These had all been built by private enterprise, and the operation was continued during the war by the owners under contract with the Department of State.

Between 1942 and 1944 the Government constructed additional transmission facilities.

It had been the intent of the Government at the end of the war to discontinue international broadcasting, but with the development of the cold war and the consequent enactment of Public Law 402 in January 1948, it was deemed necessary and vital to expand our short-wave transmitting facilities. Public Law 402 directed the Secretary of State to—

purchase, rent, construct, improve, maintain, and operate facilities for radio transmissions and reception—

and the Secretary was also directed to—

utilize to the maximum extent practical the services and facilities of private agencies.

Today the Voice of America network consists of—

(a) New York, Washington, and Munich studios for program origination.

(b) Twelve domestic plants (at present) containing 42 transmitters with powers up to 200 kilowatts.

(c) Overseas plants at Munich, Tangier, Salonika, the Courier (at Rhodes), Colombo, Manila, and Honolulu.

(d) The network is further extended by many relays of specific VOA language programs over stations and networks in many areas including Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America.

(e) The network will be greatly strengthened by the high-power plants expected shortly to become operational at Munich, San Fernando (Philippine Islands), and Okinawa.

The domestic transmitters are used primarily to send programs to relay bases, and the relay stations in turn retransmit programs on medium-wave and shortwave to listeners in assigned target areas. The well-known technical difficulties inherent in shortwave broadcasting and the preference of listeners in most parts of the world for medium-wave broadcast make the relay bases the primary source of program transmission to listeners.

This large expansion in broadcast facilities, along with others in the planning and construction stage, has been undertaken at a most substantial cost to the American taxpayer. A large part of the appropriations of the International Information Administration have and will be expended for these purposes.

The ostensible goal of the Voice of America is to transmit programs clearly and consistently to foreign areas selected for it, with determinations of policy content made by the Department of State. In

other words, the intent is to create a broadcast transmission system that will reach all listeners in designated areas at any determined time with consistently reliable signals.

The committee and its staff have devoted considerable time and study to an examination of the Voice of America plant with relation to its objectives and have arrived at certain conclusions. It must be kept in mind that the geographic location of the United States puts it at a distinct disadvantage in reaching the rest of the world with shortwave broadcasts. The great distances which radio beams must travel dissipates a major part of the energy. To overcome these deficiencies American technical science has achieved means to increase the reliability and strength of signals.

At best, with existing facilities, deficiencies exist in the reception of shortwave signals overseas. After studying the developments of the shortwave broadcast facilities, the committee believes that the planning has been haphazard, frequently unscientific, and at all times costly. Its engineering has been inexperienced and mediocre, and often inadequate. Thorough technical studies, including those of the electromagnetic barriers, were not made or considered at certain locations (e. g., "Baker East" in North Carolina and "Baker West" in the State of Washington) before contracts were let and extravagant expenditures made. Signal propagation problems were not thoroughly resolved. Certain station sites were acquired and building contracts let before adequate engineering specifications were on the drawing board. The result has caused confusion within the organization itself and suspicion of the competence of the VOA on the part of the American public. These shortcomings have been among the primary factors which have stigmatized the Voice of America as inefficient, both in this country and abroad.

The electronics profession has brought radio transmission to a fairly exact science. The United States has the leading technologists in the world. The committee believes, nevertheless, that in spite of the enormous grants of money that have been made to it by Congress, the Information Administration has failed in establishing effective radio communication of our message of freedom to the world. It has failed to make adequate use of the available technical skills of our country.

The committee sought diligently for consistent, concrete evidence of the effectiveness of our radio transmissions. The following observation by the chairman, however, typifies the experience of other members of the committee who traveled abroad:

I, personally, have had a very disappointing series of reports in those countries as to the listening audience and the effectiveness of the Voice of America, on standard bands. \* \* \* But as for the Voice of America, which broadcasts on shortwave, I have been told repeatedly that nobody listens to it—that is, comparatively speaking—and that very often the places we want to reach do not have the proper sets to receive the shortwave broadcasts.

In hearings in New York, officials of the International Broadcasting Service took issue with critics of the Voice, particularly those abroad. It was pointed out that programs beamed to foreign countries were intended for indigenous persons and that Americans abroad, including those in the embassies, generally did not make efforts to listen to them. Consequently, Voice officials contended, their reports were not necessarily based on first-hand observations, and, further, might

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be prejudiced by the desire of those at the posts to obtain increased funds for local use at the expense of the broadcasting medium.

Insufficient proof was given to the committee by Voice of America personnel who appeared before it to sustain the claim that our signal was adequately received abroad. In fact, there exists no overall continuing monitoring service in the Voice of America. Only recently a start has been made to determine transmission strength in this country and receiver strength abroad. This should have been done long ago.

With respect to the administrative setup of the VOA, the New York operation of the VOA leaves much to be desired. In the first place, it is housed in seven separate buildings at high rentals. It lacks coordination of activities, and authority is divided between the New York Administrative Office and the International Broadcasting Service. This division places the Administrator of the broadcasting service in the anomalous position of being unable to fix responsibility on his staff for producing results. This was certainly evidenced in the chaotic conduct of the construction program. Duplication in staff, friction amongst personnel, and other inefficiencies were the result. The committee is advised that as of May 18, 1953, the IIA took steps to merge certain functions of the New York administrative office and the International Broadcasting Service.

The accounting operations for the International Broadcasting Service show the need for many changes and improvements. Here again there is division of responsibility between the New York Administrative Office and the International Broadcasting Service.

There exists many personnel problems in the New York operation. In part, this is attributable to too frequent changes in overall policy, multiple internal reorganizations, too frequent executive shifts, and budgetary fluctuations.

The function of the Voice of America is primarily that of a service organization. In theory, it operates the instrumentalities for conveying the message of the United States as determined by the policy advisers in Washington. It does not and should not make policy. If, as has often been true, policy decisions are uncertain, or laggard or confused, the corollary can only be a dilute, delayed, or bewildered Voice over the air waves.

When it phrases policy for broadcasting purposes ineffectively, or inaccurately, however, the Voice must be—as it has been—criticized. The committee has paid much attention to a review of the scripts sent out by the Voice. It cannot rate many of them high in message value or purpose. Many of them might well have been omitted.

The committee also notes that the view expressed by Mr. George Probst, director of the University of Chicago Roundtable, is one that was frequently heard during the course of this investigation. The committee agrees with Mr. Probst, who testified:

\* \* \* the Voice of America is ineffective and unsuccessful in talking to our friends and our potential friends who live in this third world between Russia and the United States. The stance or posture of the Voice of America has been and is a commercial salesmanship framework that puts us into a competitive shouting contest with the Kremlin. Europeans find our American broadcasting technique of flogging the listener with words uncongenial and unsubtle. \* \* \*

An important problem for the Administrator is to see to it that in the message content the purpose of Public Law 402 is adhered to. It must not be the decision of the section head as to what he and his assisting foreign-language advisers believe would be the best palliative to give our particular friends abroad, but what the undiluted forthright message of America is and what it stands for. That is why there must be strong and informed direction at the top. That is what is presently lacking. It would be better to forego broadcasts entirely than to diminish the character and simple impact of our story. Much of the justifiable criticisms of the Voice's message will be forgotten if we quite literally adhere to the objectives of section 2 of Public Law 402; namely:

to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people, and policies \* \* \*

At the New York hearings evidence was inserted in the record to refute the charges of the lack of audience interest in VOA broadcasts. Mr. Robert Francis, Acting Deputy Administrator of the International Broadcasting Service, for example, testified:

\* \* \* We have over a million requests for program schedules, which are only sent out when people write in and ask for them. \* \* \*

Our audience mail is running over 300,000 pieces of mail a year. That is a tremendous amount of audience mail, particularly when you consider that it is quite expensive and difficult usually for someone living abroad to write a letter to the United States; sometimes the postage is 30 cents.

Even though presented with enthusiastic sincerity, the committee was not convinced by the elaborate testimony and presumptive evidence given by VOA personnel to establish numerical and other proof of foreign audience reception. Much of the data was of a speculative nature.

*(f) Television*

It would appear to the committee from its experience and from testimony which has been received that a universal picture language, through television, is bound to become a major factor in working toward greater unity of the non-Communist world. The Information Administration seemingly has not kept pace with important technological developments in this field. While acknowledging that audiovisual media are of prime importance in the information and educational field, the Administration has paid little attention to new telecommunication methods, including television.

The committee has examined the development of television in the United Kingdom and Western Europe. Without doubt television offers great possibilities for the international information program. Studies should be undertaken to determine the practicability of television broadcasts in various areas. The technical problems of such broadcasts are less complicated than would appear at first glance.

*(g) RIAS*

Aware of the general opinion that the American radio station in Berlin, Germany, has achieved notable success in the field of information, the committee took steps to survey its present effectiveness. The station was built in the early days of the Berlin blockade and became at once our principle weapon in countering Communist propaganda.

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It has been steadily increased in power, operating now with a new transmitter. It relays several programs of the Voice of America daily in addition to about 16 hours of original programs. A second RIAS transmitter is located at Hof, Germany.

RIAS is overstaffed but it performs effectively and offers unique opportunity for continuing the fight against communism. Its independence of action should not be substantially interfered with. It could be made more effective by reviving the techniques used on the station during the Berlin blockade, by relaying its programs over American-controlled transmitters in Austria and by coordinating much of the RIAS program with the Voice of America in Munich and possibly with Radio Free Europe.

#### 6. RECOMMENDATIONS—ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

##### (a) *Strengthen coordination of psychological strategy*

The security ramifications of the work of the Psychological Strategy Board are such that the committee is not in a position to make specific recommendations with respect to it. Such evidence as is available, however, clearly points to the need for adjustments in coordination of psychological strategy. A number of possible remedies suggest themselves. One is to strengthen the Psychological Strategy Board by adding to it a representative of the White House and conferring on the Board powers to secure the necessary cooperation on policy from all executive departments and agencies. An alternative might be to abolish the Psychological Strategy Board and transfer responsibilities in this field to the National Security Council. Without prescribing the details of the remedy, the committee believes the President should deal with the problem as a matter of urgency. Conflicting approaches in this field which now characterize the operations abroad of several executive agencies must not be allowed to weaken our world position.

##### (b) *Consolidate nonmilitary overseas information programs; coordinate all exchange of persons programs*

The committee examined pro and con the continuance of the separate information programs of the Mutual Security Agency and the Technical Cooperation Administration. Information is an important part of the success of these agencies, and this is the basic contention for separate information programs. Senator Mundt, however, pointed out the inherent danger of separate information programs when he remarked:

\* \* \* we started out with MSA and the theory originally of the information service was that it was to be rendered through the so-called IIA Administration. Then they said, "Well we need just a little authority. We have got certain things to tell in a different way." So they started out and have now reached the point where they have an exchange program of their own, they have a series of radio programs of their own, and they have a literature distribution program of their own. They virtually operate a second IIA of their own, and now quickly following in their tracks is point 4 which says, "We also have a little different angle."

The argument for separate agencies must also be weighed against the cost, the increased personnel and the dangers of conflicting influences on foreign policy growing out of separate programs. Mr.



Waldemar Nielsen, a former Administrator of the MSA information program in Europe, stated:

\* \* \* I am firmly convinced, on the basis of my operating experience in Europe in connection with the MSA information program, that there should be an integration of all the civilian information agencies of the American Government operating abroad.

The committee notes, finally, that much of the material produced and disseminated by the International Information Administration publicizes the work of MSA and TCA. It would seem, then, that if duplication is to be avoided, either the International Information Administration should minimize publicizing the work of these other agencies or they should leave this responsibility to the IIA.

It is the view of the committee that neither the MSA or the TCA should assume responsibility for the direct production or dissemination of material abroad which publicizes their programs. There is no convincing reason to believe that this responsibility cannot be performed satisfactorily and with greater economy by the International Information Administration.

With respect to the exchange of persons programs now operated by MSA and TCA and other executive agencies, their purposes do differ substantially, in some cases, from those envisioned under the Fulbright Act and the Smith-Mundt Act which are presently administered by the Department of State. Mr. Francis J. Colligan, Deputy Director of the Educational Exchange Service, in response to a question by Senator Fulbright on the problem of coordinating these various programs, testified:

\* \* \* I am not at all sure \* \* \* that one could completely merge them because many of them grow out of pin-pointed needs arising out of the broader projects which MSA and TCA may be conducting, for example, a public health project in Bangkok, Thailand.

On the other hand, the subdivision of responsibility, once begun, is difficult to check and genuine need for separate activity can easily become confused with the individual agency's concept of what it considers necessary.

The committee believes that the exchange of persons programs should be continued as separate projects, pending further study. There is, however, an immediate need for administrative arrangements which will require all exchanges sponsored by the various agencies to channel through and to have the approval of an appropriate division in the Department of State. Such a procedure should help to prevent duplication in certain fields of study and an imbalance of selections as among the different geographic areas of the world. It should also be possible for anyone desiring information about any aspect of the exchange program to obtain such information from a central source in Washington.

(c) *Give the International Information Administration greater autonomy within the Department of State for a trial period of 1 year; or establish it as a separate agency, except that the exchange of persons program should remain in the Department*

This recommendation was arrived at after exploration of all aspects of the administrative problem. It was communicated to the Presi-

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dent on May 8 by the chairman, in the form of a resolution of the committee.<sup>1</sup>

Much of the testimony received by the committee favored complete severance of the entire information program from the Department of State.

There is potential difficulty in coordinating information activities with foreign policy. Such coordination depends on day-to-day contact at all levels, not merely on occasional meetings of the heads of the two bodies. One of the principal complaints in the past has been the inadequacy of this contact. The committee also has taken into account the reports from the field which indicate that the relationship is much improved. The difficulties which the program encountered in working within the Department in the past might, of course, be eliminated by providing the Information Administration with higher status and greater autonomy. Regardless of where the program is lodged, its Administrator must continue to use the facilities of the Department.

Against these considerations, the committee has weighed the arguments for full separation which were summarized by Dr. Robert Johnson, the Administrator, in this fashion:

\* \* \* My personal opinion, in brief, is that the creation of a separate agency will assure these things: (1) A greater flexibility, (2) a singleness of purpose, (3) a sharper, faster approach, and (4) a better chance to attract highly qualified people.

New administration and greater autonomy for the information program within the Department of State might make possible the realization of the advantages of separation without the disadvantages that separation involves. An additional year's trial, so as to avoid further dislocation and the instability entailed in another major organizational upheaval, might be defended. But the committee approves the change, provided that the exchange of persons remains in the Department of State. The committee notes that Reorganization Plan No. 8, submitted by the President on June 1, conforms with this recommendation.

<sup>1</sup> Text of letter and resolution follow:

MAY 8, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Senate Committee on Overseas Information Programs of the United States today adopted the enclosed resolution setting forth its views on the administrative location of the information programs in the executive branch.

As you know, the committee was created during the last session of Congress and operated under the chairmanship of Senator Fulbright. It was continued this session by Senate Resolution 44. The members are Senators Wiley, Mundt, Knowland, Green, Fulbright, Gillette, Hill, and myself.

We respectfully submit these considered views.

Very sincerely yours,

BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, *Chairman.*

RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON OVERSEAS INFORMATION PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES CREATED BY SENATE RESOLUTION 74, 82D CONGRESS

Whereas this committee has conducted a thorough and comprehensive study of the international information and educational exchange programs, it feels justified in submitting to the President the following views:

The committee believes that the complete separation of all international information and educational functions from the Department of State would be inadvisable and would tend to give educational exchange programs a propaganda flavor, nevertheless:

(1) In the event the executive department deems it advisable to separate the overseas information operations from the Department of State and vest them in a new, independent information and propaganda agency at the subcabinet level, the committee strongly recommends that the educational exchange programs remain in the Department of State;

(2) If the executive department does not desire to separate the educational exchange programs from the other information activities, then the committee believes that the programs should be kept together, within the framework of the Department of State, for at least 1 year in order that the new management may have an opportunity for more study before making final determinations of the disposition of these programs. In this event, the committee recommends that the Administrator of the information and educational programs be elevated in his position, within the Department of State, so that he be given greater authority and responsibility in administering the policies and personnel of the programs: It is therefore

*Resolved* That these views be respectfully transmitted by the chairman to the President for his consideration.

The committee notes that Dr. Martin McGuire, a member of the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, stated:

\* \* \* The Commission [on Educational Exchange] has officially expressed its strong conviction that the administration of the educational program should be lodged in and retained by the Department of State. \* \* \*

It has also given careful attention to the views of Senators Mundt and Fulbright, members of the committee, who have a long experience with these programs. Both Senators have stressed the view that the continued success of the exchange program rests on close ties with the Department. They have pointed out the likelihood of the loss of prestige and the nonpropagandistic reputation which now attaches to the program if it is a part of an independent information agency. These are essential attributes if the exchange program is to continue to attract the type of distinguished cooperation both at home and abroad which is necessary to its effective operation.

The committee recognizes certain administrative advantages in retaining all the media in a block. If the net effect of such retention, however, may be the undermining of the exchange program it cannot advocate this course.

No matter where the information program is lodged, the committee is convinced that in the operations of our missions abroad, there can be but one source of authority; namely, the chief of mission. To that end, there must certainly be the closest coordination between the Information Administration and the Department of State and the Secretary of State must lay down the policy directives for the Information Service.

The ultimate success or failure of the information program, irrespective of its departmental lodgment depends on skilled administration and personnel. With these, the program can succeed within or without the Department of State. Without these, it will fail wherever placed.

*(d) Establish independent personnel system suited to the needs of the overseas information program*

The committee concurs with the many witnesses who testified to the desirability of an independent personnel system regardless of where the program is ultimately located. It believes that this independence should be outlined in general as follows:

1. The number of supergrades in the Information Administration should be increased and be filled by outstanding specialists in informational or related activities.

2. The interchange of select personnel between the Department of State and the International Information Administration should be permitted with the mutual approval of the Secretary of State and the Administrator.

3. The Administrator should have broad authority to separate unsuitable employees without, at the same time, subjecting the individual employee to capricious or arbitrary treatment.

4. The principle of not expanding particular operations until suitable employees are available should be observed.

5. More effective and extensive use should be made of well-screened local employees at posts abroad, with a consequent reduction of American nationals.

6. Rotation policies now in operation should be reviewed and revised to permit retention of employees with special aptitudes for particular areas at the same post for longer periods of time.

7. The "hardship post" concept, under which special inducements are given to personnel to serve in certain geographic areas, should be abandoned wherever possible. Every effort should be made to secure and assign to difficult posts personnel who are interested in the area and who will make personal adjustments necessary for living therein for prolonged periods.

8. Members of an employee's family accompanying him overseas should be screened to evaluate their adaptability to official residence abroad.

9. A regular basic training program for employees should be established in this country geared to the specific needs of the information program.

10. Training in the language, culture, and history of the area of assignment, as a regular in-service training, should be continued by all employees.

11. A realistic adjustment in representation allowances should be made for key public affairs employees overseas.

12. The provisions of the Smith-Mundt Act for FBI checks of all personnel should be continued and should be vigorously enforced.

The committee believes that the sooner these measures are carried out the earlier the personnel policies of the Information Administration will begin to reflect the needs of the program.

*(e) Consider establishing regional coordination of the program in all areas of the world*

As previously pointed out, the committee is in general agreement with the present trend toward decentralization of responsibility to the country post. It also warns of the danger of carrying this process too far.

Reconciling the responsibility of Washington with an effective degree of autonomy in the field is the responsibility of the Administrator. There may be a need for regional coordinators in some parts of the world to serve as a midpoint in authority between headquarters and the local posts. These regional coordinators could serve to channel efforts within the framework of regional policies. In this fashion, they could act as a restraint on unwarranted and costly variations and potentially dangerous conflicts in the program between posts. They could also encourage cooperative study and action within the region on common informational problems.

*(f) Explore possibilities of increased cooperation and coordination with friendly foreign governments and groups*

Many of the public affairs officers abroad recognize the need for more realistic cooperation and have worked closely with other foreign information offices and private groups at the local level. It is suggested that the Administrator explore fully the possibilities of coordinating our program with that of other friendly nations and organizations and that he recommend to the Secretary of State ways and means of increasing their participation in propagating common ideas and ideals.

(g) *Encourage greater participation of nongovernmental groups, organizations and individuals in the program*

The committee commends the efforts to enlist nongovernmental interest in the information program. However, most of the witnesses who testified on the point felt that much more is needed in this respect. Dr. Wilson Compton testified:

A great fundamental handicap to this program is the limitation by law of the authority of the International Information Administration to tell its own story to the American people for whom it undertakes to speak.

The committee believes that reasonable publicity about the program in the United States should be available to encourage the participation of the American people. Publicizing in the past was halted by legislative action because of the feeling that it was being used primarily for self-glorification and as a means of promoting higher appropriations.

It is of particular importance that the Information Administration take the initiative in establishing continuing liaison with the motion picture industry, press and publication industries, the overseas transportation industry and other large private organizations with extensive foreign interests, contacts and influence. Through voluntary cooperation with these organizations, it should be possible to make more truly representative the total picture of this country that is commercially distributed abroad.

Finally, the committee wishes to reiterate a recommendation which has been made many times since it first appeared in the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948. To the greatest practicable extent, private commercial channels of communication should be used in carrying out the purposes of the program, provided security is insured.

(h) *Consolidate all evaluation functions of the IIA in an independent evaluation and inspection corps responsible directly to the Administrator, with records of the corps accessible to appropriate congressional committees and the Advisory Commissions*

Consideration was given to the question of the removal of the evaluation function from the Information Administration and assigning it to the Advisory Commissions or to a joint committee of Congress as was suggested by some witnesses. The committee felt, however, that continuous evaluation and inspection is a responsibility of management. Except for periodic outside audits, the Administrator should have the responsibility for realistic evaluation of the needs and the effectiveness of the various aspects of the operation.

The committee recommends that the Administrator consider the practicability of a small evaluation and inspection corps competent to utilize modern scientific evaluation techniques. This corps might well replace the present scattered evaluation groups. To be effective, the corps would have to be independent of the chain of command and responsible only to the Administrator. To insure their independence employees of the corps should not normally be subject to reassignment elsewhere in the Information Administration.

The complete records of the evaluation corps should be available at all times to proper congressional committees and the Advisory Commissions.

## 7. RECOMMENDATIONS—THE MEDIA

*(a) Strengthen overseas libraries and exchange of persons programs*

The committee believes that these media merit strengthening. Additional use of our foreign currency funds should be considered for this purpose. Expansion could be projected over a period of years on the basis of the capacity of both programs to expand without stretching their functions, impairing adequate screening, or altering their fundamental character.

With respect to the libraries, the committee is of the opinion that an increased allocation of funds could be utilized most effectively to enlarge collections, particularly of technical books and to expand the translations program. In some countries, there is also a need to improve working quarters.

On the issue of selection of controversial books, the committee feels that the Administrator must establish the specific criteria to guide his subordinates and be prepared to explain these criteria. He cannot delegate this responsibility to others. The committee is convinced that if clear-cut, commonsense criteria, based on what is useful in terms of the objectives of the information program, are set down and properly explained, they will find general acceptance on the part of all who seek to protect and to advance the interests of the United States.

In recommending an expansion of both educational and other types of exchanges, the committee has taken into consideration the great weight of favorable testimony and other opinions of its effectiveness. Among these is a letter from General Eisenhower to Kenneth Holland, dated October 16, 1952 which was inserted in the record. It reads in part:

I firmly believe that educational exchange programs are an important step toward world peace.

\* \* \* \* \*

It is very heartening that so many thousands of students, teachers, specialists, and trainees from abroad will have an opportunity this year for advanced study in our colleges and industrial plants, and that equally large numbers of American students will study abroad.

\* \* \* \* \*

It is my personal hope that this activity, so important in the future of the world, will continue to expand in the coming years.

In a survey of Cabinet officials of member countries of the United Nations conducted by International Public Opinion Research, Inc., for Time magazine, it was reported that among media of information "the largest vote was given to the 'exchange of students and visitors' as the most effective means for increasing the flow of information between nations. Such exchanges were far out in front on every continent. In fact, running throughout most of the questionnaires, there was a constant theme that face-to-face contacts are the best way to gain greater understanding around the world."

With respect to the administrative shortcomings in the exchange of persons program, the committee makes the following specific suggestions:

1. Foreign currency funds applicable to the Fulbright program (Public Law 584, 79th Cong.) should be exempt from the Rabaut amendment (Public Law 547, sec. 1415, 82d Cong.). In its limitations

on the use of local currency funds, the amendment has hampered effective programing.

2. The Commission on Educational Exchange should establish the criteria for selection of educational exchanges provided for under the Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 402, 80th Cong.).

3. Wherever practicable, the binational commissions abroad functioning as part of the Fulbright program shall also make selections of educational exchanges under the Smith-Mundt Act.

4. Consideration should be given to alleviating unusual or emergency financial expenses incurred by exchanges during the period of their participation in the exchange program.

5. Provision should be made for broader orientation of foreign students on all aspects of American life.

6. It is of the utmost importance that exchangees are selected with the greatest prudence, and plans for their training carefully formulated.

*(b) Continue the motion picture program*

The committee is of the opinion that the motion-picture program should be continued. The Administrator must exercise close supervision in order to make certain that the program remains closely tied to the purposes of Public Law 402 (80th Cong.). In this connection, the committee suggests that wherever practicable a nominal rental fee be charged for the use of films, a practice which is extensively employed in the British information program.

With respect to the mobile motion-picture units, the committee recommends their limited use where they are clearly beneficial to the program. It believes that local channels of distribution may frequently be substituted for the units.

The Administrator should consider the advisability of establishing a motion-picture advisory group especially with a view to minimizing further the number of objectionable commercial films which, when exported, tend to give a distorted picture of the United States. Mr. Eric Johnston, in testimony before the committee, expressed the willingness of the private motion-picture industry to cooperate with the Government. This is an offer which the committee believes should not be ignored.

*(c) Reappraise the press and publications service*

While the press and publications program, taken as a whole, is a useful instrument in furthering the purposes of the information program, parts of it should be revised, reduced, or eliminated. A prerequisite to valid judgments on what specifically should be done, however, would be an expert investigation of the entire operation as well as an authoritative evaluation of the content of the materials. The Administrator is urged to conduct a full efficiency and effectiveness audit of the International Press Service including an analysis of the desirability of continuing certain newspapers and periodicals as quickly as possible as a preliminary to making adjustments in the program. The committee believes it desirable in this connection to explore the possibilities of selling some of the publications. This practice is followed at a few American posts abroad and is a regular policy of the information programs of certain countries. This would be one method of proving the attractiveness of such publications.

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(d) Do not use the title "Voice of America" and explore the possibilities of more effective use of telecommunications, including television, in the program

The Voice of America is more effective and more useful than some of the public criticisms in recent times would suggest. The fact remains, however, that there have been serious shortcomings in this operation. The time has come to face these shortcomings and to correct them. It is a task that is essentially administrative in nature and the new leadership should move promptly to tackle it.

The Administrator must reappraise the entire structure of the Voice of America. In matters of administration, such problems as relocation of the Voice either in one building in New York or Washington, fiscal procedures, inadequacies of budgetary and accounting systems and personnel, require immediate attention. Many of these matters have been the subject of costly and detailed management surveys by outside experts. The need now is to put their relevant recommendations into practice.

With respect to broadcasting facilities of the Voice, the committee feels that the Administrator should reorganize the engineering section of the Voice of America from top to bottom, and to this end should secure the best available assistance from the telecommunication industry. The committee has been told that the American electronic industry is anxious to further this effort of our Government, but it has never been invited to do so and, in fact, has been alienated because of the treatment it has received from the persons in the Voice in charge of engineering.

In undertaking a reappraisal of the Voice, the committee believes the Administrator must do battle with entrenched incompetence wherever it is found. He must deal realistically with claims of broadcasting success which are supported by impressive but sometimes misleading statistics. He must weigh the present cost of communication by radio against the cost of other media, making due allowances for emergency situations or future technological improvements in which the importance of telecommunications might be greatly enhanced.

The committee suggests that the Administrator realistically review the relative importance of all foreign broadcasts. It may be that some could be limited—others strengthened. Retention of frequencies must ever be considered. It is unwise solely for economic purposes to abandon friends or potential sympathizers. It may be that certain of the recent curtailings have been more arbitrary than wise.

While the subcommittee is anxious that inefficiency and waste be eliminated from the broadcasting service, it has no desire to see this operation discontinued or crippled. There are many millions of people presently under Communist control. Radio broadcasts are our sole information contact with these people. The job of the Voice of America is to reach them and to tell them the American story—a story based on truth and liberty. To reach these people continually and effectively the Voice must overcome jamming techniques and must keep apace with technological advances which will enable it to penetrate the iron curtain.

The world is under great political stress and many people have been strengthened in hope and conviction by listening to the Voice. This is not an opportune time to abandon these listeners. The Voice of



America can be strong in both signal and message. The program can also be economical and effective at the same time if the Information Administration is adept in the handling of the operation.

Telecommunication is an essential medium in reaching other nations. The developments in television and other techniques have immense potentialities as yet scarcely recognized. The feasibility of linking the Atlantic nations and much of the non-Communist world with this media in vast television networks is established. It could become a reality in a comparatively short time. Other nations are already expanding rapidly in this field and it is essential that the United States, whose technical accomplishments have speeded the development of telecommunications, remain in the vanguard.

The subcommittee suggests, therefore, that a national commission be established, composed of representatives from the Government, the telecommunication industry, education, and other appropriate groups. It should be directed to study the present status and the potentialities of the international use of all forms of telecommunications and it should report its recommendations to the President and to the Congress.

#### 8. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

##### *(a) Avoid drastic cuts in appropriations for the information program*

Recognition of the importance of the information program is general and is characteristic even of those witnesses who were highly critical of certain aspects of the program. The committee is unanimous in endorsing the continuance and the strengthening of this program. It has given careful consideration to the views of many who like Dr. George Gallup, director of the American Institute of Public Opinion, advocated a considerable expansion of the operation. Dr. Gallup testified that—

It is almost \* \* \* ridiculous \* \* \* to attempt to win the people of this world to our point of view with the present amount of money, which is only a little bit . . . one or two companies, incidentally, spent in reaching the people of this country through advertising.

\* \* \* One or two companies in this country spend as much as we do [on the information program] just to sell soapflakes and soap products to the American public. We find that they have found it necessary to spend that much money to sell products that everybody regards highly.

For the present the committee believes, however, that an enlargement in total expenditures for this service is unwarranted. The information program has grown rapidly and further expansion now might prove wasteful. The present need is for a revamping and coordination of activities. Few public affairs officers at the posts abroad indicated a need for additional funds. Reports have been received, moreover, which suggest that some areas of the world have already been oversaturated with propaganda. This again is an administrative problem.

Budgeting for the information program should not be based on past expenditures, but funds should be apportioned among the various media and to the posts in accordance with present needs. The Administrator should also be given as much flexibility as feasible to reallocate funds during a fiscal year, if shifting circumstances make changes desirable.

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It is easy to devise projects which will absorb increased appropriations. This program could operate at many times the present level, if the only test for appropriations were: How many projects can be developed? This criterion should read: How many effective projects can be developed within reasonable financial limits?

If the recommendations contained in this report are put into effect the committee is of the opinion that a far more effective overseas information program can be developed. In the first place, considerable savings should result from consolidation of the MSA and TCA information programs under the International Information Administration. Secondly, a reduction in American personnel abroad implicit in recommendations 6 (d) and 6 (f) should lead to lower operating costs. Finally, a continuing appraisal of all operations by an evaluation corps such as envisioned in recommendation 6 (h) should lead to a tighter, more efficient and more economical organization.

(b) *Adhere to the terms of Public Law 402 (80th Cong.) and maintain a tone in the program worthy of the United States and its citizens*

Public Law 402 (80th Cong.) states that the objectives of the act are to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries. These are clearcut purposes and the committee sees no reason for alteration of them. The difficulty in the past has not been with the purposes but rather with the means which have not fully served these purposes.

It should be borne in mind that the opinion of the world regarding the United States and its objectives is being affected continuously by news developments in the United States. In that news, the official efforts of the International Information Administration play but a relatively small role.

Infinitely larger is the role played by Congress, by the executive branch, the judicial branch, and by the organizations and individuals on the American scene acting on issues which might once have been considered "domestic" but which are now of deep international significance. A single action by an American organization, a speech by a Member of Congress or by an official of the executive branch, or an Executive order, administrative regulation or law, can produce—in and of itself—an impact throughout the world of vast and enduring proportion.

Similarly, the words and deeds of America's citizens abroad, whether they be members of our Armed Forces, tourists, businessmen, clergymen, students or officials of the Government, can accomplish profound and lasting results.

As chief of mission in a country, the United States Ambassador is in a particularly potent position to contribute formally and informally to the objectives of the information program. Wholly aside from the ordinary type of media releases, a well-directed impromptu comment on the part of the Ambassador, a meaningful gesture, can cause a significant impression throughout the length and breadth of the country to which he is accredited.

We must not, therefore, become so preoccupied with organizational forms, procedures and programs that we fail to take due cognizance of the spontaneous activities of Americans—individually and collectively—in their words and deeds—in helping to affect the thinking of the world.

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Finally the committee hopes that it will not only help to make other nations over in our image. Most of them have cultures and traditions much older than ours and we have much to learn from them.

#### 9. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

##### (a) *Accomplishments of the investigation*

This committee has spent almost a year in this investigation of our overseas information program. The objectives, methods, effectiveness, and utility of overseas information have been extensively explored.

This report and the records of the investigation, the committee believes, identify the principal weaknesses of the overseas information program and point the way to a realistic strengthening of the entire operation. Experience will undoubtedly bring to light additional weaknesses and indicate the desirability of further changes and adjustments. The committee feels, however, that the results of the investigation can prove helpful for the effective future development of the program.

##### (b) *Limitations of the investigation*

The committee should like to make clear what it has regarded as the limits of its responsibility in the investigation. This report contains recommendations which may require legislation.

The report also contains recommendations which are administrative in nature. The committee has set them forth because it feels that the Congress and the Administrator should have the views of a senatorial group which has made an intensive study of the program. The committee believes however, that it should not intrude upon the administrative responsibilities. In matters which lie within his province, the Administrator of the program has the responsibility and must have the authority to discharge that responsibility.

The principal role of a senatorial investigation of this kind is in the nature of a post audit of an operation which is carried on by the Government and also for the purpose of proposing corrective legislation if that is indicated.

##### (c) *Remaining tasks*

A substantial portion of the committee's responsibilities under Senate Resolution 74 and Senate Resolution 44 has now been discharged. There remain two major tasks: (1) Examination of the operation and effect of the program in the American Republics; and (2) a test-check of such action as may be taken on the committee's recommendations.

The committee proposes, therefore, the extension of its authority until January 31, 1954, without additional funds. During the ensuing period, any necessary legislation can be prepared for the consideration of Congress. The committee anticipates making a field study in Latin America as provided for in Senate Resolution 44. Such a study will also make possible observations of the effect of its recommendations and a firsthand investigation of the recent cutbacks in Voice of America broadcasts to that area.

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

DIARY  
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick  
JAN 56 - DEC 58

*Volume III*

OGC Has  
Reviewed

PFIAB review completed.

NSC, DOS, DIA and USAF review(s) completed.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

3 January 1956

IG Staff Meeting.

Went over the JOT survey with [ ] and [ ] and then had an hour with Baird during which he talked about his philosophy of the JOT program. I suggested that all senior officials of the Agency be used to assist in the college recruiting program.

25X1

25X1

Talked to Amory about my plans to advise [ ] concerning his job performance. He agreed and showed me drafted version of the notice

OGC

25X1

[ ]

[ ] came in to say that he was greatly concerned over the lack of fiscal control. I told him that I thought we had pointed out all of the weaknesses in the Comptroller survey and did not feel there was anything further to ~~have~~ be ~~doing~~ done at the present time.

[ ] asked if I would call Angleton and [ ] about him. Told him that I would.

[ ] called about NSCID 5 and the fact that the Army reply had implied that this directive should be rewritten because it restricted Army operations and that they asked the same thing on NSCID 13. I told him that we would raise the matter at the IAC meeting and ask which directives the members wanted to have revised.

Amory: called and said OCI complained because [ ] had come down to ask about the results of the French election.


LBK/IG

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**TOP SECRET**

4 January 1956

25X1



25X1 [ ] came in at suggestion of [ ] who had it broached 25X1  
to him by Ed Tate, Assistant to the President. Told [ ] there was no 25X1  
opening on the IG staff but that I would be glad to talk to Angleton and  
25X1 [ ] about him and would call him at [ ] 25X1

25X1 Grogan: called to say Joanne Laiman of Legislative Reference Service  
of the Library of Congress had called to see if she could get a copy of the  
[ ] report for some Congressman. He will tell her this is classified but  
that the Congressman can ask for it directly.

25X1 [ ] called about the January 20th meeting. Told him I would  
check with the DCI and let him know.

Wisner: called to say that he thought [ ] should 25X1  
talk to Cord Meyer and myself--possibly together. +

25X1 [ ] reported that a [ ] 25X1  
who was asked to resign for security reasons, tried to take his case to  
Congress. +

25X1 [ ] asked if we would check our space requirements for the  
new building.

25X1 Amory: asked if [ ] might be available for OCB. Told him I would  
not object over his talking to [ ] and so advised [ ]. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

4 January 1956 (continued)

25X1

Discussed  and the OCB assignment with

25X1<sup>+</sup>

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

5 January 1956

25X1

OGC

Bill Darden of Senate Armed Services: [redacted]

FOIAB5

Talked to Angleton about [redacted]

He said he would see

25X1

25X1

[redacted] at 3:00, Monday in 1603 L Bldg. He said that he would prefer that

[redacted]

Called [redacted] and agreed that he should come down on 12 January at 10:30. Advised Cord Meyer.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] brought down the Joint Committee paper. Said the DCI wanted some changes made. He also asked whether [redacted] could be made available to replace [redacted].

25X1

Talked to [redacted] concerning the fight on [redacted]. He had little information to add to the cable but said he would keep me advised.

25X1

(continued)

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

5 January 1956 Continued

25X1

[ ] called to ask what was the cost of maintaining a government employee over and above salary. Told him I did not know but would find out.

25X1  
25X1

Talked to [ ] about [ ] and the Jackson report. He said he would call [ ] directly.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

6 January 1956

Went over the briefing paper with [ ]

25X1

Advised [ ] to go on a familiarization trip to SE Asia.

Talked to [ ] about cost accounting and asked to try and ascertain the exact cost to government per federal employee.

Asked [ ] to send me the Brownell report which he did.

With the DCI and [ ] went over the joint Intelligence paper and dispatched it via to [ ] Also discussed with them Senator Saltonstall's inquiry concerning our communications and gave [ ] a copy of the Monthly Personnel Statistical Report to show Saltonstall.

25X1

The DCI said Attorney General Brownell had called him about the legal problems in connection with the establishment of a Board of Consultants on Intelligence. He asked me to prepare a folder with all the pertinent papers and to check with Houston and [ ] which I did.

LBK/IG

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
9 January 1956

DCI and Senior Staff meetings both cancelled because of storm.

25X1

Lunch with

25X1




25X1

25X1

With  talked to  of NEA Division who is resigning 25X1  
to run for Congress from the  He has been with the  
Agency since 1950 and served in  and in the NEA Division here. 25X1

25X1

25X1



LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

10 January 1956

IG Staff Meeting.

DCI: asked that we give him information on Senator Smith and Mrs. Boulton as he was having dinner with them tonight.

25X1

[ ] called from [ ], to ask as to when he should report for duty. Told him that it would be at his convenience and that 1 February was satisfactory to us.

25X1

25X1

[ ] called to say that they recently instituted collection proceedings with 304 former Agency employees and that 181 of these were outstanding and that I might hear from some of them.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

11 January 1956

Raised for discussion at the DCI meeting the request of Col. Goodpaster for our views on whether the Clark Report should be given to Messrs. Macy, Perry and Hamilton of the Bureau of the Budget. It was generally agreed that we should offer no objections. [ ] later called to suggest that the Director advised Goodpaster to clear this with Defense also.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

+

Talked to Helms about the assignment of [ ] as War Planning Officer. Told him I would have no objections and thought it might be a good assignment for [ ]

25X1

T  
25X1

[ ] called to ask what I thought the White House would do on our comments on the Clark recommendations. Told him that I thought that the White House would advise us that they have reviewed our comments and accepted them. [ ] called again to ask what we planned to do on the recommendation for increasing the pay for the Deputy Directors. Advised him that these pay increases would be accomplished after the Executive Pay Bill passed raising the Director and Deputy Director.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ]

25X1

of [ ] n. Asked him to prepare for the IAC a new version

25X1

[ ]

+

Guthe: called again concerning [ ] Told him that I thought [ ] would take care of it by the end of the week.

25X1

25X1  
T

**TOP SECRET**

11 January Continued

25X1

Asked [ ] to have the form for retirement sent to [ ].  
Advised him to put a caution note in the file of [ ] who  
seemed a little queer. He advised that there seemed to be a very good  
possibility for a job for [ ] in ORR working for [ ] on  
Project [ ].


25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1



LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

12 January 1956

Houston: came over to advise that [ ] of his staff expressed the opinion that [ ] had left a considerable number of irritated people in the Far East by virtue of his manner which was described as arrogant and overbearing. He also said his social behavior left something to be desired. He suggested that I talked to [ ] who is returning shortly.

25X1

Houston: showed me a memorandum taking <sup>the</sup> ~~that~~ position that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had no jurisdiction to ask CIA for a briefing on guided missiles.

[ ] and Cord Meyer. (See memo for the record.)

25X1

Meeting with Normal Paul. Sent over with him information for Senator Saltonstall.

25X1

25X1

[ ] came in to leave me a book by Churchill.

Meeting with [ ] (See memo for the Record.)

25X1

Lengthly discussion with [ ] on our activities in [ ]

25X1  
25X1

12 January 1956

Continued

25X1

[ ] called twice. The first time to ask if we had any Clark recommendations on a federal pool for intelligence research and I told him that this was not in our section of the report. The second time he asked about Agreed Activities and paper mills. Told him I would send over Karamessines to brief him on this and arrange this with Helms.

25X1

LBK/IG

SECRET



SECRET

13 January 1956

At DCI meeting announcement of Board of Consultants. DCI asked me to prepare cable to field [ ] and telegrams to each consultant, to advise Grogan and to talk to [ ] about the Joint Committee paper. Talked to [ ] about the paper and he advised that it had gone to only NSC members and their principal assistants and he thought there would be no security problem.

25X1  
25X1

Talked to Robert King in Vice President Nixon's office about the Joint Committee Paper and we suggested the matter be deferred until the Vice President returns to office.

Darden of Senate Armed Services: called to change the date of the meeting to Wednesday, 25 January at 1030 AM. Advised the Directors office.

25X1

[ ]

Col. White: agreed with the letter to [ ].

25X1

Checked with [ ] on the distribution on the Board of Consultants cable.

[ ] called to say that [ ] would like to work either for the IG or [ ]. Told him I would pick it up from there.

General Cabell: asked if I would make sure that we could handle

[ ]

Discussed cover problem with [ ] and sent over with him what [ ] had said.

25X1


[ ]

25X1

13 January 1956

(continued)

25X1



25X1

Asked Gates Lloyd to ask  to lunch with the Director.

25X1

Haines of House appropriations: called to say that they would like to have  until 23 January. Told him OK and advised Gates Lloyd.

25X1



Went to Georgetown hospital to see

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

14 January 1956

Sherman Kent: came up to protest against the dissipation of the authority of the Board of Estimates between JAEIC and GMIC terms or reference. Told him I would write a memorandum to the DDCI on this subject.

25X1

reported that the DCI didn't believe the Congressional lunches were worth the effort. He also asked me to acknowledge the President's letter on the Board of Consultants.

25X1



LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

16 January 1956

Advised the DCI's meeting of the briefing of the Senate Armed Services Committee at 10:30 AM, Wednesday, 25 January 1956 Armed Services Conference Room. The DCI announced that I would be responsible for all of the work in regard to the new Board of Consultants.

25X1



25X1 Briefed [ ] on the Board of Consultants for use in his orientation lecture.

Lunch with Cong. Zablocki.

Advised Papich that we would keep him informed if there were any matters in connection with the Board of Consultants affecting the FBI.

25X1 [ ] briefed me on the status of the Regulations Survey.

25X1 [ ] briefed me on the status of the JOT survey, and I gave them the go-ahead on their outline.

Discussion with the Director and [ ] on the telegram<sup>s</sup> sent to the Board of Consultants and agreed that it would be preferable to have one of the girls call and simply state that there had been an error in transmission. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

(continued)

**TOP SECRET**

16 Jnauary 1956 (continued)

The Director asked me to fill in [ ] on the situation in

25X1

[ ]  
[ ] called to state that operation/<sup>al</sup> advice urged him not to go-ahead with the proposition that [ ] advanced.

25X1-

25X1

Asked Colonel Edwards to look into the project that [ ] was working on in the DD/P area. 25X1

Pforzheimer: called to say that he heard from a Congressional source that Colonel Hathaway, who went to Russia with Senator Russell, was telling everybody that it was a national disgrace that CIA had nobody behind the Iron Curtain.

[ ] called to say that he regretted he was unable to find a supplement to the Jackson Report. He also said he was following through on [ ]

The Director advised me that the Board of Consultants would meet Monday, January 23, and asked me to prepare the necessary paper work.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

17 January 1956

Meeting with the Director and [ ] (see memo for the record).

25X1

25X1

Baird: said the Language Incentive Program would be in DD/S's hands this week.

Asked Amory whether he wished to talk about OCR and he declined.

25X1

Discussed with Col. Goodpaster at the White House the Monday meeting of the Board of Consultants. He suggested that the Director give the President some items for discussion; Goodpaster will ask the President about the Secrecy Oath, the Executive Order and will have Hagerty call about a press release concerning the Monday meeting.

DCI: asked me to arrange for a briefing of Clarence Randall. Talked to Helms, [ ] Sheldon and [ ] about it. (See memo for the record).

25X1

25X1

Asked [ ] Security to arrange for building passes for the Board of Consultants and to sweep the Senate Armed Services Committee next Wednesday in advance of our briefing.

25X1

DCI: said to make sure that the [ ] report was taken to the Randall briefing. Advised Sheldon.

25X1

25X1


Talked to Edwards about [ ] case.

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

18 January 1956

25X1



King Carr of Bureau of the Budget: called and asked if he could go swimming with me.

Amory: called to complain about the Supergrade Board and also to mention that Pforzheimer had pointed out this week is the 10th anniversary of CIG.

White: called about Gen. Dunford and pointed out that General Cabell had objected to General Officers being recalled to active duty if their duties were not strictly military. Told him I would discuss with Gen. Cabell. Also mentioned to White my discussion with [redacted]

25X1

Went over with [redacted] the materials for the Board of Consultants meeting.

[redacted] came up to report on progress as [redacted] and to ask if I would support him for the National War College.

25X1

[redacted] called to say he had worked out details with [redacted] and did not plan to use the [redacted] name at all.

25X1

Talked to Col. Goodpaster about the Board of Consultants and whether they should be paid or would be WOC and whether the White House would pay them. He said that they would do some homework and he would call me back. I stated that I assumed they got everything and he agreed. I also said the DCI was thinking of asking the IAG to meet with them and he said he was sure the Pres. Approved For Release 2009/01/26 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003300020001-5

**TOP SECRET**

19 January 1956

25X1

[ ]: came in to talk about the latter's experience at Warm Springs and to thank me for my assistance in getting him there.

Meeting with Lloyd and Saunders together with [ ] to talk about their trip to the Far East. Agreed that there was no purpose in Logistics setting up a special inspection unit and also agreed that the IBM machines should be removed from the Far East.

25X1

Meeting with the Director to discuss the Board of Consultants. Asked to have the DDCI change the date of his lecture at the Naval War College and agreed that all members of the Board should be [ ]

25X1

Went over the Armed Services Briefing with him (DCI). He asked that I talk to Angleton about the letter from [ ] He signed the paper on [ ] and called General Gaither about the Monday meeting with the Board.

25X1

25X1

Asked the DDCI to change the Naval War College lecture which he did; discussed the assignment with [ ] with him and filled him in on the latest developments in [ ] se.

25X1

Advised Mr. Wisner of the Monday meeting of the Board, of the Foreign Service Inspectors Briefing, and of the Wednesday meeting of the Armed Services Committee.

Advised Colonel White of the Monday meeting of the Board and of the Wednesday meeting of the Armed Services Committee.

Telephoned Dr. Killian in Cambridge and read to him the telegram going to the rest of the Board. He agreed to it. He said he was meeting Governor General Adams at 10:30, Monday and raised the question as to whether the Board should meet at the White House or here. I advised that the plane would take him to New York and wait for him.

Andrews of OCR: called to ask the policy on who should have the book of NSCID's. Advised him that this should be carefully held down. He stated that [ ] wished to leave one at the Naval War College. [ ] called on the same subject and after discussion agreed to ~~take~~ take all those pertinent to their seminar and have them returned. at the end of the session.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

19 January 1956 (continued)

25X1

[ ] called concerning [ ] Advised him that I ~~was~~ had  
not made the inquiry.

25X1

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

20 January 1956

Asked White to find space that he could show the Killian group in the event they wished to be housed with us.

DCI: asked that he have the T/O's and budget on a single sheet of paper for the Monday meeting.

Personally called the following to invite to the Monday briefing: Belmont of FBI, Espe of Navy, Schow of Army, Samford of Air who said Lewis would come in his place, Armstrong of State, and Traynor of AEC.

Briefing of Foreign Service Inspectors from 9:30 to 1:00.

25X1



LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

21 January 1956

Telephoned General Hull to advise him of the Monday meeting.

25X1

Together with [ ] conferred with the Director on the note books and rearranged the order of biographical sketches and rewrote the history of intelligence.

Talked to the DDCI [ ]

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

23 January 1956

Raised no items at the DCI's meeting but gave him items to raise at meeting with Killian and Adams and suggested schedule for the Board.

25X1

Lunch with .

Attended meeting of Board of Consultants.

25X1

25X1

25X1

called and said that he had seen Senator Saltonstall at the Alfalfa Club dinner and Saltonstall had been concerned about the form of our  operations. Advised  that N. Paul had briefed Saltonstall on this and that while I thought the Senator didn't understand, I felt the issue had been coped with.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

24 January 1956

25X1  
25X1

Talked to [ ] about the [ ] case. He agreed to try a  
[ ] to see if that wouldn't resolve the issue.

25X1  
T

Advised Helms that we would probably be ready to start on SR Division about the end of February and would have another team ready to start there in March and would then go through the DD/P area.

25X1

[ ]

T

Edwards: asked if I would get Goodpaster to request the appropriate FBI investigations necessary for Q clearances for the Board of Consultants. Told him I would.

Referred Edwards to the Newspaper column on the [ ] up in New York.

25X1

Thanked Edwards for the very good work his security men had done for the Board of Consultants.

Meeting of IG Staff.

25X1

Together with [ ] went over the JOT survey with Baird. He said he thought ~~there was~~ it was a very good survey but suggested that we leave out the recommendation that the Personnel and Training offices be merged.

25X1

[ ]

[ ]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

(Cont.)

**TOP SECRET**

24 January 1956 Continued

The DCI asked that I process through the changes that the President decided in the Executive Order.

Pat Coyne: called and said he was conferring with Dillon Anderson on the Board of Consultants. I briefed him on what had transpired thus far.

Discussed with N. Paul on Career Legislation; the briefing of the Senate Armed Services Committee; and latest developments with the building .

25X1 [ ]: said he would send to me the briefing notes he had prepared for the DCI for presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Met with the Man Power Group to go over draft of the paper for the Director.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

25 January 1956

[REDACTED]

+

25X1

Meeting with [REDACTED] (See memo for the record).

+

Coyne: called to ask whether Macy, Perry and Hamilton were cleared for our material. Told him yes.

25X1

[REDACTED] reported on the Contact Division trip.

25X1

Helms. reported that [REDACTED] name had come up as a possible staff director for the Board of Consultants at dinner with Killian the night before.

White agreed that the JOT survey could go to the Deputies.

25X1

Talked to Tietjen and [REDACTED] of Personnel about [REDACTED] and agreed that until she had an examination by Johns Hopkins that we could make no promise of financial aid.

25X1

+

25X1

[REDACTED] in the Pentagon call and asked whether I could see if he could get a job over here. Told him I would look into it.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

26 January 1956

25X1

Lunch with  at which we discussed his staybehind proposal and he said he thought he would write the Director about it. Told him to go ahead.

Meeting with the Career Council.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

27 January 1956

Went over the Regulations Survey with [REDACTED].

25X1

25X1 Told [REDACTED] that she would have to pay her expenses at Johns Hopkins and dependent on their recommendations we would try to assist if treatment was required. +

25X1 Lunch with [REDACTED] who was briefed on the Board of Consultants and who said he would send me a copy of their language assessment form.

25X1 [REDACTED] dropped in to report on some of his observations in the Far East.

25X1 Gave [REDACTED] back his handbook for security aids.

Asked Sheldon to gather up the material for the DCI's House Armed Services briefing.

Told Grogan that I thought it was all right to release the material on Tokyo Rose.

Sent over the House Armed Services Briefing with the DDCI.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

30 January 1956

25X1  
+

At DCI meeting DCI asked that I look into the [ ] retirement and selection out system; DCI also requested that I check why no recent VIP disseminations had been made and pointed out that the brain washing item would have been very good; DCI asked that I write the people in [ ] about the honorarium which he wants to give to the Welfare Fund; DCI said that Jenner had asked Saltonstall whether the FBI or CIA checked CIA personnel and also whether CIA engaged in political warfare activities. Advised DCI meeting of [ ] letter on [ ] and of the survey of colored personnel request by the President's Employment Policy Committee.

25X1

25X1  
2525X1

DCI: asked me to talk to Houston about his memorandum on the [ ] situation.

DCI: asked that I talk to [ ] about their series of reports on [ ]

25X1

Edwards: asked if I would check Goodpaster again on the security matter of the Board of Consultants.

Asked [ ] to follow through on the VIP disseminations.

[ ] had told him the DCI had approved the FDD recommendations. Told him to take no action until he got instructions in writing.


[ ]: showed me latest correspondence from [ ] Told him I concurred in Security's recommendation that this not be answered.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

30 January 1956 Continued



25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

31 January 1956

Meeting of the IG Staff.

25X1

[ ] came in to pay his respects and talk about certain command problems in the FE Division.

25X1

[ ] came in to report that he had been approved for area familiarization and at his request I called [ ] and set up a meeting between them.

25X1

Coyne: brought over the summary of the recommendations of the Clark Group and the suggested White House action. Most pertinent were Army's comments that the Military Services should be allowed free rein in espionage and counterespionage and that they also should be given more authority for inducement of defectors.

Reynolds: came in to talk about a retirement program and to advise of an exit interview in which there was considerable concern expressed about reprisals for anyone going to the IG.

Meeting with the supergrade board.

25X1

[ ] that we would undertake a survey as quickly as we could.

25X1

25X1

Asked [ ] to process [ ] in at top of GS-17 and to follow through on [ ].

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

OC

1 February 1956

Conferred with the DCI on his discussion with the President on the Joint Committee.

25X1

[ ] reported that [ ] told the Director that he was to brief the NSC on the extent of his testimony to Congressional committees on guided Missiles and atomic energy.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

2 February 1956

25X1  
25X1

Discussed [ ] assignment with him and referred him to [ ] for further details on his conversion from retired military to civilian.

25X1

Discussed with [ ] his career plan and suggested that he bring it to the IG staff meeting for further discussion.


At DCI's request went over with Houston the [ ] situation. He stated that he could cover this matter by an oral briefing by Edwards.

25X1

Coyne: called concerning a meeting with General Cassidy who he said they had referred to me for further briefing.

25X1

25X1



General Hull: came in to read the Clark and Doolittle reports.

Asked Col. Goodpaster to arrange with the White House Security Officer to work with our Security Office in clearing the Board of Consultants.

25X1

Asked Carey to send to our office immediately the teletype of Dr. Killian concerning the charges against him by Fulton Lewis. Asked Edwards to check [ ] who had written to Senator Ives concerning Killian. He reported no information.

25X1

Personal call from [ ].

25X1


[ ] came in to discuss the case of an [ ] office whose sister is active communist and to ask if I would chair the Loyalty Board. Told him that I would.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

2 February 1956 Continued



25X1


LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

3 February 1956

25X1



Briefing on progress of OCR survey by



25X1

General Cassidy: came in and the Director came down to meet him.  
I gave a copy of the note book we had given the Board and told him I would  
be happy to help him in any way.

Delivered the commencement address to the class of Intelligence Procedures  
and Methods.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

4 February 1956

At request of Colonel Goodpaster sent to the White House two copies of Killian's summary statement.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

*R*

6 February 1956

25X1

[ ] came up to discuss my comments on [ ]  
memo on the PRC. He also showed me the TSS presentation which I told  
him indicated good progress.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ] reported that the DCI was planning to rewrite the BEC  
presentation and that he would assist him.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 February 1956

Met with Norman Paul.

25X1

Meeting with

25X1

Introduced  to DCI.

Talked by telephone to the following people:   
Houston on Public Aid Society, DCI on News Highlights, and Aid Society.

25X1

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

8 February 1956

Paul: came in on the Executive Pay Bill matter and said that he had rewritten the letter which the Director had approved in order to conform to Roger Jones' ideas of the Bureau of the Budget. I approved the changes and he took it over to Jones; Jones called back later in the day to say that the changes and the letter were completely unacceptable to the Bureau of the Budget and the Civil Service Commission. I advised the DCI of this and he agreed to talk over the matter with Sherman Adams. Mr. Paul took the necessary support material to the DCI for this conversation.

which

25X1

25X1  
25X1 [ ] of Security: brought back my gun and brought me a memorandum concerning [ ]

Houston: brought in [ ] staff and we had a pleasant discussion of the problems of [ ]

25X1  
25X1

Meeting of the PRC.

25X1  
25X1 [ ] brought in [ ] for a brief discussion of [ ]

Coyne: called to say that he had suggested to Barba of White House Security that he talk to me about the various security clearances required for the Board of Consultants. Talked to Barba and then referred him to General Cassidy.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

(Cont.)

**TOP SECRET**

8 February 1956 Continued

Advised Grogan of the Executive Pay Bill letter and arranged that he should attend my 11:30 meeting with Paul when there were cases of possible public relations interest.


LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

2

**TOP SECRET**

9 February 1956



25X1

1


25X1

[redacted] came in to show me the questionnaire he was submitting to the Career Service Boards on career planning.

25X1



25X1



DCI: advised that Kennedy would be here Tuesday, February 14th.

Meeting of the Career Council.

(Cont.)

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

9 February 1956 Continued

25X1

[ ] dropped in to ask what my views would be to a major effort in OSI to weed out incompetents. I said that I would support it provided it was done on a fair basis and that furthermore I would recommend that they would start recruiting against their potential losses, double slotting if necessary.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

10 February 1956

Meeting of the DCI's staff at which the DCI said Dr. Killian had asked for briefings in April on the following subjects: (1) the organization and scope of the collection agencies with particular reference to CIA and NSA; (2) the estimating procedure and analysis of National Estimates; (3) the relationship between the intelligence organizations; (4) specific problems; (5) an analysis of what had been done on the Clark and Doolittle Reports.

Meeting with Messrs. Paul, [redacted] case. We agreed that Judge Morris' inquiry would have to be met and that any attempt by the Director on the part of the Agency to hold back would only aggravate the situation.

25X1

Messrs. [redacted] briefed me on the progress of the OCR survey.

25X1

The DCI: came down to meet [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] of OTR: came up to leave with me the book Use and Abuses of Psychology by H. G. Eysenik and to suggest that a method be devised for an impartial group preparing assessment reports on individuals considered for promotion or reassignment.

25X1

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~



**TOP SECRET**

13 February 1956

Delivered lecture to SIS.

Meeting of the Senior Staff.

Spent 1 hour and a half going over the April agenda for the President's Board of Consultants with General Cassidy.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

14 February 1956

Meeting of the IG Staff.

Brief discussion with Ambassador Kennedy and the DCI on the Board of Consultants and then gave Mr. Kennedy the Clark and Doolittle reports to read.

Organization meeting of the Loyalty Board on the case of [ ] with [ ] Edwards and Warner present.

25X1

Lengthy discussion with [ ] on problems in the [ ] Told him that I would support him if he recommended that [ ] be [ ]

25X1

25X1

Lunch with Ambassador Kennedy.

Meeting with [ ] (See memo to I. O. Division)

25X1

Grogan: came in to brief me on the latest items in regard to relations with the press.

Meeting with Paul, [ ] case. Agreed to tell [ ] that subject had no direct information on Burgess and Maclean.

25X1

Cassidy: called to advise that he was going to NSA to see [ ] and would take [ ] with him. Arranged for a Comint briefing and told [ ] in response to a telephone call, that they had been cleared.

25X1

Cord Meyer: called to say he was getting strong reactions from several FEC Board members concerning [ ] using their names in his search for a job. [ ]

25X1  
25X1-

**TOP SECRET**

(cont.)

**TOP SECRET**

14 February 1956

25X1

[ ] called to ask if I knew what the Director's response would be to their letter. Told him it would be the same as mine.

25X1

[ ] called to say he was going to New York to talk to

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

15 February 1956

Ambassador Kennedy: came at 0900 for briefing on the Clark and Doolittle reports. He repeated that he saw no value in briefings and that he thought if the Board was going to operate that way that it would be useless. I suggested to him that a preferable mode of procedure might be for each member of the Board to concentrate on a particular problem and spend sufficient time in Washington to become cognizant of the issues involved and then be able to brief the Board at its meetings. He said he thought this would be a good method of operation and telephoned to Dr. Killian who agreed. Dr. Killian also concurred in Mr. Kennedy's

[REDACTED]

25X1  
25X1

Cassidy: called to say that he would like [REDACTED] to attend a meeting on Friday at 1000 concerning an agenda for the April meeting of the Board. I advised Cassidy that Col. Edwards would call on him about the physical security of his offices.

The DCI asked what he should do about the letter he received from Mrs. Dunbar, the mother of Mrs. Maclean wife of the British defector presently in Moscow.

25X1

The DCI said he had received a call from Dr. Killian concerning Mr. Kennedy's suggestion of the members of the Board specializing in particular problems.

Briefed the DCI on [REDACTED] marital problems, and he directed that the family be told the exact facts.

25X1

[REDACTED]

**TOP SECRET**

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

16 February 1956

Lunch with Sherman Kent.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

17 February 1956

Advised the DCI meeting of [ ] operation and of the progress on the Board of Consultants.

25X1

25X1 [ ] came in to ask assistance in locating a friend of his in the Marines.

Meeting with Norman Paul and Col. Edwards to see who should be the focal point on the security commission work, and agreed it should be in Paul's office.

25X1 Discussion with [ ] on the SR survey.

25X1 Discussion with [ ] on the Elint survey.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

20 February 1956

25X1

[ ] brought in the letter to Killian approved by the DCI.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

[ ] called about a change [ ] wanted in the PRC presentation.

Edwards: called to say he would give me some statistics on employees with Communist relatives but requested that the names not be revealed to the Board.

25X1

[ ]

Dr. Farrier: called to say that the [ ] operation was postponed.

25X1  
T

Organizational meeting with Board on [ ]

25X1

25X1

Meeting with Mr. Paul, [ ] and Houston to discuss what the

25X1

[ ]

25X1

General Hull: stopped in to ask two questions: (1) Was there any inhibitions on inspections by the IG; (2) Did the Comptroller now receive sufficient data for proper accounting.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

R

21 February 1956

Meeting of the IG Staff.

25X1

Meeting of the Board on [ ] from 2 until 3:30.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

Meeting with the SR inspection team of [ ]  
and [ ] two  
others from SR.

25X1

25X1

[ ]

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

22 February 1956

The DCI said that he would prefer to have the IG inspect the I. O. Division rather than I&R. I suggested to him that the relationship between the IG and I&R be completely severed except for the required reporting on cases of malfeasance. He seemed amenable to this suggestion.

25X1 Discussed with [ ] his Elint study and advised him of [ ]  
25X1 comments on the [ ]

25X1

25X1 Went over with [ ] the SR survey and agreed that no field trips  
were necessary.

Norman Paul: reported on the meeting with the Director and his conversations on the CIA Bill.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

23 February 1956

General Cassidy: came over and gave him the letter to Dr. Killian who he said would be in town shortly. He said that he wanted to come over next week and read the directives issued to implement the NSCID's and semi-annual report to the NSC meeting by the Director.

Meeting from 2 until 5:45 of the Loyalty Board on

25X1

25X1

Farrier: called to say that  had been operated on successfully.

25X1  
1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

✓

**TOP SECRET**

24 February 1956

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] came up on the question of how much detail the project review programs should have on personnel figures of the divisions. Agreed that they could bring these figures with them when they made their presentations.

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Lunch with Mr. and Mrs. Cummins Catherwood with the DCI, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mr. Paul: reported on the hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

+

**TOP SECRET**

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

27 February 1956

25X1



stopped in for a meeting.

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

28 February 1956

IG Staff Meeting.

Met with

Attended PRC meeting.

LBK/IG

**Page Denied**

**SECRET**

29 February 1956

DCI staff meeting.

Attended official luncheon for General Cassidy.

LBK/IG

**SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

1 March 1956

Met with Norman Paul.

Meeting with Cord Meyer.

25X1

Lunch with

Meeting with Amory.

25X1

Meeting with

25X1

Meeting with

Attended the CIA Career Council meeting.

25X1

By telephone talked to the following: Sheldon,

25X1

LBK/IG

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

2 March 1956

Attended DCI staff meeting.

25X1

Met with

Meeting with DD/S, D/Commo, and

25X1

Briefed by the SR Survey team.

Briefed by the OCR Survey team.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

5 March 1956

Attended CIA Staff Meeting.

Attended Senior Staff Meeting.

Visited  at NIH.

25X1

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

6 March 1956

25X1

Meeting with

Meeting with Warner of General Counsel.

25X1

Meeting with

LBK/IG

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1

of TSS dropped in.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

7 March 1956

Attended an official breakfast for members of Congress.

DCI Staff Meeting.

Met with Col. Edwards.

Meeting of the Gorin Board.

Met with

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

8 March 1956

Gave lecture to the Management Training Course.

Attended official luncheon for Congresswoman Bolton.

Meeting with Dr. Guthe.

LBK/IG

By telephone talked to the following people:  and Blake.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

9 March 1956

DCI Staff Meeting.

25X1

Met with

Met with Mr. Paul.

Met with the SR Division Survey team.

Attended meeting on the new building.

25X1

Met with .

LBK/IG



**TOP SECRET**

10 March 1956

25X1

Received the DCI's approval of agenda for the Board of Consultants; he suggested Thursday, 5 April, for the dinner for the Board and also suggested preparing another notebook for the Board containing the NSCID's and 54/12. Also discussed Africa with the Director and he recommended that I bring it up at the Monday Staff Meeting. Also advised him of the latest developments in

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

12 March 1956

Advised DCI Staff Meeting of the Morrow program on the Egypt-Israeli conflict, and at DCI's request raised the question of [redacted] interest in Africa which he directed Helms and Cabell to cover.

25X1

[redacted] of the General Counsel's office called on the Aid Society and advised him that I would set up meeting on this.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

Obtained General Cabell's approval of agenda for the Board of Consultants briefing and was asked by him to review the [redacted] file and a Management study on the DD/P organization.

25X1

Advised White, Wisner, Helms and Kent of their responsibilities in the Board of Consultants briefing.

Advised White, Wisner, Helms and Kent of their responsibilities in the Board of Consultants briefing.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

LBK/IG

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

13 March 1956 Continued

Agreed with Paul we should write a letter to the chairman of all four committees suggesting an overnight visit to  to see our training activities.

25X1

25X1

Advised Amory that I would send him the Board of Consultants presentation schedule showing what he was to cover.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

13 March 1956

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1

Met with [REDACTED]

25X1

Met with [REDACTED]

25X1

Met with [REDACTED]

25X1

Met with [REDACTED]

25X1

Met with [REDACTED]

Met with Mr. Warner.

Met with Mr. Paul.

25X1

Meeting with [REDACTED]

25X1

By telephone talked to the following people: Paul, Amory, [REDACTED]

25X1

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

14 March 1956

25X1 Meeting with [ ] and Ashcraft.

Meeting of the Gorin Board.

25X1 Meeting with [ ]

Meeting of the Welfare Aid Society.

25X1 Meeting with [ ]

LBK/IG

Attended DCI Staff Meeting.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**SECRET**

15 March 1956

25X1 Meeting with [ ] and Cassidy.

25X1 Met with [ ] today.

Meeting of the Career Service Board.

25X1 Meeting with [ ]

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

16 March 1956

DCI staff meeting.

25X1

dropped in for a few minutes today.

25X1

Met with

Attended a seminar on psychology today.

Met with the OCR survey team.

Met with the SR survey team.

Meeting of the Supergrade Board.

LBK/IG

25X1

stopped in.

25X1



**Page Denied**

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~~TOP SECRET~~

21 March 1956

Meeting with Helms and Norman Paul.

Meeting with Helms on IG schedule; [ ] and IO Survey.

25X1

Meeting with the DCI on agenda for the President's Board; gave him letters to sign, the dinner list and the agenda for each Board member; told him about [ ]

25X1

Met with DDCI and Col. Grogan on News Highlights.

Met with [ ] (on Career Plan)

25X1

LBK/IG

Talked to Edwards on [ ] pass.

25X1

[ ] on Dr. Killian.

25X1

[ ] phoned to say that on returnees in his Division [ ] sees the operational people, [ ] sees some, and the Personnel officer sees all.

25X1

25X1

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

**SECRET**

22 March 1956

25X1

Met with  (on Career Plan)

Met with  (on Career Plan)

Met. with  (on Career Plan)

Met with Norman Paul.

25X1

came in to see me.

25X1

Meeting with  of OSI.

LBK/IG

**SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

23 March 1956

Attended DCI Staff Meeting.

25X1

Met with [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] dropped down to say good-bye.

25X1

Met with [REDACTED].

Briefed by SR survey team.

Talked to Helms about Personnel and [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Talked to DCI about [REDACTED].

LBK/IG

Received immunization shots today.

25X1

[REDACTED] came up to see me about a problem.

**TOP SECRET**

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

26 March 1956

25X1 Met with

Met with Col. Edwards.

25X1 Attended Board Hearing on

LBK/IG

~~SECRET~~

27 March 1956

25X1

[ ] called about [ ]

25X1

[ ] called about Killian. Said I would check and call him.

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1

[ ] agreed to take physical in about two weeks, will come back in June and marry later.

25X1

Talked to [ ] of A&E/OTR on duplication in JOT coverage.

25X1

Met with [ ]

25X1

Talked to Wisner on [ ] Said he was probably irritated, he was hard to fit into any organizational procedure, his relations in FE Division were bad.

25X1

Sent [ ] Elint report.

LBK/IG

**SECRET**

28 March 1956

Attended A/DCI Staff Meeting.

25X1 Met with

25X1

LBK/IG

Edwards said it was ok for  to stay until the end of April.

25X1

25X1 Told  to keep  until the end of April; then on on contractual relationship.



~~SECRET~~

29 March 1956

25X1 Met with [redacted]

25X1 Meeting with [redacted]

25X1 Met with [redacted]

25X1 Meeting with [redacted] on PPC Survey.

Attended the Career Council meeting.

LBK/IG

25X1 Toured [redacted]

**TOP SECRET**

30 March 1956

Talked to Cassidy about briefing Killian.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

2 April 1956

Board of Consultants meeting.

Helms called to say it was okay on [ ] and that Wisner approved. Also asked if there would be more board hearings.

25X1

Talked to [ ] about the letter from Arthur Fleming.

25X1

Talked to DCI on [ ]'s views. DCI also approved of bringing [ ] on the staff.

25X1  
25X1

Talked to [ ] and said his transfer date would be 15 May and he would be kept on UV funds.

25X1

[ ] said [ ] is to go the Georgetown with [ ]

25X1

25X1

White called about a meeting on the new building and about a meeting with Belen.

LBK/IG

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

4 April 1956

25X1

Met with [REDACTED]

25X1

Met with [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] came in to discuss a problem.

25X1

Lunch with General Cabell. Discussed NSCID 9, [REDACTED] and trouble.

25X1

25X1

Meeting with [REDACTED].

LBK/IG

25X1

Talked to Amory and [REDACTED] on Sheldon.

**TOP SECRET**

5 April 1956

25X1

Meeting with

Meeting of the Building Steering Committee.

Board dinner at the Alibi Club. (Board of Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities.)

LBK/IG

Met with Norman Paul.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

6 April 1956

Attended DCI Staff Meeting.

Met with Gates Lloyd.

25X1

Met with

25X1

Met with

Met with Mr. Amory.

25X1

came in to discuss his job problem.

Attended the Manpower Meeting.

25X1

Met with

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

9 April 1956

Attended Senior Staff Meeting. Discussed separations and comments on other agencies.

Met with General Cassidy.

LBK/IG

Talked to White and Bissell re. space.


25X1



Procedure for handling mediocrity:

1. Review files and whether individual has seen them.
2. Immediate supervisor take action - orally.
3. Immediate supervisor take action - written.
4. 90 days notice.
5. Keep personnel office advised.
6. Keep IG advised.

25X1



**TOP SECRET**



~~TOP SECRET~~

April  
10 ~~APR~~ 1956

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1

Meeting with

Meeting with Mr. Paul.

25X1

Meeting with .

25X1

Meeting with DCI and

Cassidy said the following Members of the Board would concentrate on the following subjects: Hull & Lovett - Planning & Personnel; Fairless & Ryerson - Organization; Conolly & Kennedy - Security; Conolly & Killian - Education & Training; Kennedy - Budget.

Talked to White on the DD/S Survey and on the drivers uniforms.

Talked to the DCI on the Board of Consultants.

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

11 April 1956

~~Attended~~ DCI Staff Meeting cancelled.

25X1

Met with [ ] and Norman Paul.

Attended PRC Meeting in which SR was covered.

Talked to White on the CAT meeting scheduled for April 21.

25X1

Talked to [ ] about DD/P circulating a CSI on A&E.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

Talked to [ ] on letter to DCI.

Talked to [ ] on auditorium in building.

Talked to [ ] on his reports to the FBI. He will talk to Houston.

Talked to Paul who had a call from [ ] would go before 25X1  
Morris. Public hearings will be on TV.

25X1

Talked to [ ] on a cable writing refresher session.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

12 April 1956

25X1

Meeting with  and Gen. Cabell.

Talked to White on memo on recruiting and training.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

13 April 1956

25X1 Met with  of Security.

Talked to Dr. Tietjen.

25X1 Met with  on survey.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

13 April 1956

DDCI and [ ] came down to talk about the [ ] case. DDCI said he did not agree with our conclusions and that he was sure that [ ] had at least said the Defense position was to support policy. I said he may "have", but it wasn't proven. He said he considered that [ ] should be admonished. After a rather heated argument he said he considered the paper unsatisfactory. I called later to apologize for a rather intemperate argument. He said perhaps he should apologize and that he considered it perfectly appropriate to argue. I asked to have the paper returned for certain changes.

25X1

+

25X1

WHITE: said we could start survey of DD/S at any time and he would meet with [ ] and myself on Monday after the Deputies meeting. He also said he was annoyed because [ ] had come to see me, according to [ ].

25X1

Lunch with John Tietjen and a lengthy discussion with him on the psychiatric program.

**TOP SECRET**

14 April 1956

Met with Amory all morning.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

16 April 1956

25X1

Meeting with White, [ ] . (Subj. DD/S survey)

Met with Clifton Smith.

25X1

Talked to [ ] about the President's Board.

Sam Papich dropped in.

Talked to White about session re DD/S survey.

25X1

Talked to [ ] about trip abroad.

Talked to Amory on intelligence planning.

Talked to Kent on intelligence planning.

Cassidy called about special meetings for 8 & 9 and summary sections; Gen. Hull and Mr. Lovett will be over on Mon the 23rd; they will look into planning first, talk to the Director on joint staffing, Amory and Kent on NSC 4 and DCIDs; also talked about Kennedy and Italy.

Told Norman Paul to see Clifton Smith of WH police.

25X1

[ ]

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

17 April 1956

Talked to White on new Board meeting and recruiting and training.

25X1 Lunch with [ ]

25X1  
25X1 Talked to [ ] on the [ ] case.

Talked to Ralph Clark on the Clark report.

25X1 Paul said [ ]

25X1 Talked to Edwards re [ ]

25X1 Talked to [ ] on the Clark Committee's Special Recommendation.

Talked to Cassidy about briefing Hull and Lovett.

LBK/IG



**TOP SECRET**

18 April 1956

White called to say that Hamilton of the Bureau of the Budget had asked for figures on budget by categories FY 53 to date.

Talked to Cassidy on which areas Kennedy will cover.

Edwards called to say he was called by Cassidy to talk to Conolly about work of NSA and special clearances. He will send me memo on it.



25X1

Saunders called about the briefing for Kennedy.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

18 April 1956

Questions on WE Area Division Program before PRC - 18 April 1956

1. Why no central control of operational and informational requirements?
2. What is difficulty in obtaining specific customer requirements and briefs?
3.
4.
5. What is comparable size of division this year with last? In agents?

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

19 Apr.1956

Talked to DDCI on the Walters Committee getting into the [ ] matter.

25X1

Talked to Edwards about [ ] redefection.

25X1

Talked to Paul on the [ ] redefection.

25X1

25X1

[ ]

Talked to [ ] on the Legislative bill in Congress; DCI approved honor certificates; discussed membership in the career staff, unsatisfactory performance, fitness reports, etc.; does council want to select Section Board for next fiscal year; and employee disciplinary action.

25X1

Talked to Wisner about [ ] and their reports to Congress.

25X1

Told Cassidy reports of IG will come tomorrow and asked what is involved in this.

LBK/IG

[ ]

25X1

Talked to [ ] of OTR on War College.

25X1

Attended the Career Council meeting.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

20 April 1956

Attended DCI Staff Meeting.

25X1

Lunched with

25X1

Meeting with  on survey.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

23 April 1956

Cassidy asked for an operational outline.

Saunders brought over Outline for Cassidy.

25X1

called on Clark Recommendations.

Talked to Edwards re. the Security briefing.

25X1

Talked to  re. the SIS lecture on the 14th.

LBK/IG

25X1

Lunch with

Meeting with Hull and Lovett of the President's Board.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

24 April 1956

CASSIDY: reported he thought the briefings were well received. He said he thought Lovett and Hull would recommend that National Intelligence objectives be placed in an NSCID rather than a DCID so they would have to receive NSC and Presidential approval. He also said they were still in an exploratory stage as to method of procedure and mentioned that they had sent the President a report which had been acknowledged by the President with apparently an unsympathetic reaction from the President as to any delimitation. Cassidy said he thought the Board or Dr. Killian would want to sit down with the President on this subject.

25X1 [ ] said he would write a report on the briefing he and Kent gave Hull and Lovett. Said they covered use of operational information and its potential use in wartime, as well as national intelligence objectives.

25X1 [ ] called to complain about Grogan's objection to his using the title "Intelligence Unmasked" and his requirement that the speech be written out. I pointed out that we were in basic violation of NSCID 12, and that I didn't intend to get in the middle - he and Grogan should take their fight to the DCI.


25X1 [ ] OTR: came in to get details on the memo requested for the President's Board on conflicts in training. He also said OTR had carefully reviewed and guided General Platt and that he had refused to follow suggestions, so he didn't feel any obligation rested with OTR for further action.

25X1 PAPICH: called on [ ] Said I would have [ ] call him and see P. tomorrow. 25X1

25X1 [ ]: said he would make suggested amendment on [ ] opinion and return it to [ ] and myself for concurrence. 25X1

25X1 [ ] said the DCI wanted me to prepare something on "scholarships" for CIA employees.

Lunch with Baird who told me about his three-month trip. He feels that we are wasting a lot of money and manpower training so-called agents. He found that two out of three persons abroad would prefer to have directed assignments - if they were certain these would be arrived at objectively.



Meeting with Career Council.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

25 April 1956

CASSIDY: said Kennedy would probably go to [ ] with Pat Coyne at the suggestion of Doolittle.

25X1

Meeting of Building Steering Committee in R&S Building to see functional layout of organization in the new building. (0910-1130)

CASSIDY: said probably only 5 members of the President's Board would be here May 12 - and they would not necessarily want us to appear - although he would like an outline of the subjects they have laid out for themselves and to have those experts stand by.

WISNER: at my request, gave the following information on his lunch with Lovett yesterday: he expressed concern over the broad charter of the Board; he felt that the Mansfield bill did not completely end the question of Congressional supervision and that we should get more active scrutiny by Congress; he was interested in the Philby case and possible penetration of CIA; he listened to Wisner's worries about Kennedy, but apparently didn't advise any action.

WISNER: expressed great concern about Kennedy, and I asked him to give [ ] guidance for the briefing which he said he would do.

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

[ ] OCR: came up to ask about possibility of a job with IG staff.

25X1

[ ] came up to discuss project for a publications group on which I concurred with reservations. He assured me they would not be pushing materials into the U.S. press.

25X1

Project Review Committee meeting. \*

[ ] dropped in.

25X1

WHITE: suggested to him that the Budget people not come to tomorrow's meeting on the building. He said it couldn't be avoided, and he was afraid they wouldn't let us go for our money this year.

[ ] now of OSI ELINT staff, formerly of Scientific Branch, FI/RQM; came up to say that he thought the latter badly organized and ineffective.

25X1

\*TSS Program:

[ ]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

26 April 1956

25X1

Met with [redacted].

25X1

Lunched with [redacted].

25X1

Meeting with [redacted] and Kennedy (President's Board).

Attended meeting of the Steering Group.

LBK/IG



**TOP SECRET**

27 April 1956

Attended the DCI Staff Meeting.

Lunch with Col. White.

25X1 Met with

LBK/IG

25X1 Met with  on survey.

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

Monday, 30 April 1956

DCI Staff Meeting

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said for me to look up NSC action 1541 of Apr 26 which was assigned to OCI for action and relates to suggestions of the Killian Board.

Asked [REDACTED] what he had done on the suggestion that Nixon visit Satellites since DCI turned it down. Said he had filed paper, but that he understood Bob King had gone down to State to discuss it on day after Nixon had announced his candidacy.

[REDACTED]: called for guidance on briefing on [REDACTED]. Told him DCI had said Wisner or Helms should be there.

Suggested to [REDACTED] the SR team see Truscott and Helms. This was done.

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

1 May 1956

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1 Meeting of the

Meeting of the SR Survey Team.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

Wednesday, 2 May 1956

Told the DCI I was extremely concerned because [redacted] has been reprimanded - in fact, nearly court-martialled - for being frank in their presentation to Ambassador Kennedy. Said that I had not been present for the entire briefing, but that I did not see how the briefers could be criticized for fully and frankly answering questions and that Mr. Kennedy had described the briefing as "excellent." Further, I said that Mr. Wisner had discussed the briefing with me two days before, and I had specifically asked him if he would advise [redacted] and he said he would. The DCI said he planned to talk to Killian about Lovett doing the DD/P area, that it wouldn't be good if Kennedy were the only one who covered the clandestine services as he was getting old and crochety and had some very fixed views. He said he had told Wisner that he thought a lot of his views about Kennedy were personal dislike, to which Wisner agreed. He said that he thought [redacted] had perhaps been too low an echelon to give the briefing, and that he would talk to [redacted] about it.

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

Advised Wisner that the Board might wish to be briefed on May 12 on Plans, Organization and Operations.

Advised SHELDON that the Board might want to be briefed on May 12 on DDI organization and research operations.

Advised WHITE the Board might want to be briefed on May 12 on DDS organization, Personnel, Budget & Fiscal, Training & Education, and Security.

GROGAN: called about a Collier's inquiry that the DCI had given the President's favorite book to all his associates - said I didn't know anything about it. Also said Wisner had asked [redacted] whether he thought CIA's public relations were all right. Said the DCI had agreed he was giving too many speeches.

25X1

PRC meeting followed by discussion with Bissell, [redacted] on the necessity for closer coordination between [redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1

(cont.)

TOP SECRET

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 3 May 1956

Lecture to Management Course.

25X1

25X1

DCI: brought in [ ] to talk about [ ] who will be  
in [ ] this week and who wants to see DCI and myself.

25X1

25X1

Talked to [ ] about BEC claim.

25X1

25X1

[ ]  
HARRY REYNOLDS: came in to talk about Career Council and [ ]  
[ ] Called Tietjen about [ ] and he said to suspend all personnel  
action for the present.

25X1

25X1

Meeting of CIA Career Council.

BROSS: called [ ]  
that EE was using.

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

Friday, May 4, 1956

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1 NORMAN PAUL: reported on letter to Symington; on meeting with Budget about building; discussed letter to Eastland about McCarthy documents; about [REDACTED] matter.

25X1 CABELL: came in to get my concurrence on our recommendation in Comptroller survey against blanket waivers and the new set of conditions established for them; (filled me in on [REDACTED] case - he saw [REDACTED] and then a large group on East-West trade.

25X1

25X1 [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED] reported on progress of DD/S survey.


Went over outline of survey of handling raw intelligence with [REDACTED]

25X1

TOP SECRET

May 7, 1956

25X1



Advised deputies meeting of briefing President's Board would require on Saturday, May 12th; also that DCI, etc., would receive excerpts of Clark Report on counterintelligence.

DCI said Dr. Killian had told Dr. Scoville that the Board would want to know what Sen. McCarthy had on CIA.

Ad hoc discussion after Senior Staff Meeting with White and [ ] on their need for another building to which both White and I objected strongly.

25X1

Advised White that [ ] was ready to brief him on [ ]

25X1

Briefed deputies meeting - and at DCI request senior staff - on significance of defeat of Mansfield Bill.

Called Cassidy about Saturday briefing. He said Dr. Killian was there and he would call back.

Talked to Wisner about Saturday briefing. On Kennedy briefing for May 11 he said he had sent a paper to DCI, but received no answer.

Talked to [ ] about Saturday briefing and showed him what had been received from Cassidy - he said he would have outlines of three briefings for me by Wednesday.

Asked Sheldon for outlines of briefings which will be given by Scoville, [ ]. Also checked with him on [ ] case and asked that he keep me advised of any USCIB action on NSC 1541 (comint clearances).

25X1

EDWARDS: advised he had sent me briefing outline via DDS. Also said [ ] board had started hearings.

25X1

Advised Wisner of 9:30 meeting, and [ ], White, [ ], Baird, Saunders, Edwards and Sheldon that Saturday briefing was out.

25X1

for briefing

Cassidy called to say Saturday they wanted Wisner at 9:30 to discuss informally and generally and the DCI at 10:30 to go over special project.

SECRET



May 8, 1956

25X1      Advised [ ] that Kennedy would be in Friday, May 11th.

DCI: said he would go over to the Board at 9:30 and that he wanted to cover McCarthy, Symington, and Planning; processing of estimate on Soviet nuclear stockpiles.

I.G. staff meeting.

25X1      Told [ ] to talk to superiors of girl in EE.

CASSIDY: said McCarthy had called Kennedy about the material he had, and Kennedy would ask him to turn it over. Said he wanted Clark and Doolittle and IG reports for Saturday briefing, and would like Edwards to get the rooms vetted on Friday. Said Kennedy would be here with Coyne at 9 a.m. Friday to discuss [ ] Said [ ] and Coyne would be with Board at 9 a.m. on Saturday to discuss Planning and Security, and would like Sheldon then. Asked for itinerary for Killian, Kennedy and Coyne leaving Washington on 27 June for approximately two weeks to

25X1

25X1      [ ] Also asked about a possible semi-annual or annual report from CIA.

25X1

SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

9 May 1956

DCI Staff Meeting.

Met with Norman Paul.

Attended PRC Meeting at which NEA was discussed.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

10 May 1956

25X1 Meeting with

Meeting with Norman Paul.

25X1 Meeting with Paul,  and Grogan.

25X1 Lunch with

25X1  came up to discuss a personal case.

Meeting of the Career Service Board.

Meeting of the Supergrade Board.

Talked by telephone to Bross,

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

11 May 1956

Attended the briefing for Amb. Kennedy of the Board of Consultants.

Attended the special luncheon for the Board and WE Division.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

12 May 1956

Meeting of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

Monday, 14 May 1956

Delivered lecture to Strategic Intelligence School on "The Significance and Nature of Strategic Intelligence".

25X1

25X1

25X1

went over with him (1) Killian, Land and Cassidy

25X1

said Board  
lly, Personnel

had made following assignments: Kennedy, Budget and Fiscal; Fairless and Ryerson, Organization; Doolittle, Security; Killian, Operations, Planning for Research and Technical Services Research; (4) asked me to prepare form for period report.

25X1

LBK

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, 15 May 1956

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1  
25X1

-  
Meeting with [ ] on administrative burdens.  
[ ] will work something into the DD/S survey on this.

25X1

-  
WHITE: appointed [ ] to act as administrative support officer to President's Board. Briefed him on what to do and called Cassidy about the arrangement.

25X1

-  
Went over President's Board matters with DCI. He suggested I call [ ] on the foundation matters.

-  
NORMAN PAUL: asked me to raise question of sanitizing memos on Symington inquiry at deputies meeting, which I did, and got agreement this wasn't necessary.

25X1

-  
Lunch with [ ]

LBK

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, 16 May 1956

25X1 [ ] called to say Helms would not forward his letter on [ ] to 25X1 Personnel.

-

25X1 [ ] meeting, chaired by IG. EE program (see further notes below).

-

25X1 [ ] discussion (see memo for record).  
25X1

-

[ ]

-

25X1 [ ]: called about the [ ] case and asked that we call a board meeting.

-

25X1 DCI meeting: suggested to them that we advertise our career bill; that we might get [ ] that we work out a satire on the executed Communist leaders.

-

25X1 [ ] called to ask what had happened to an I & R recommendation that  
25X1 a Board be set up to act on [ ] security cases. He said something should be  
25X1 done as [ ] just ignores recommendations.

-

25X1 [ ] called about the blind man in J Building about whom the nurse's  
office sent up a petition signed by 250. Very poor working conditions.

-

25X1 [ ] came in to say goodbye and to suggest DD/P organize own working  
group to look into personnel problems.

-

TIEFJEN: said he agreed about keeping medical reports out of personnel folder.

LBK

(cont'd)

SECRET



**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 17 May 1956

25X1

[ ] called about Bureau of Budget surveys. Want to see me to discuss functions of IG.

25X1

[ ] came up to discuss case of [ ] who had appealed to him to get CIA to tell Secretary Quarles about his good work. Quarles now has his case and the Air Force will probably revoke [ ] commission. 25X1

GROGAN: showed me two memos he was showing DCI on [ ]. 25X1

25X1

ASHCRAFT: asked about DCI comments on [ ] Said I was sending memo to [ ] about it. 25X1

25X1

[ ]: lunch.

Meeting of Career Service Cpuncil.

LBK

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, 18 May 1956

25X1

[REDACTED]

-

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] dropped in. Said [REDACTED] had been ill, but was doing a good job. Told him about [REDACTED] he seemed interested and said he would ask [REDACTED] to send forms.

25X1

25X1

-

[REDACTED]

-

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

AMORY: reported to me about an Arthur Kohlberg letter quoting a comment he had made at Harvard about recognizing Red China. He had written to a Professor who was present to ask for more information; and said he would advise the DCI after he had the information. I said I would advise Norman Paul and Edwards.

-

25X1

AMORY: asked him for suggestions on an area to be covered for the President's Board. I said [REDACTED] had been suggested. He called back Saturday to say he thought area should be one critical to U.S. as well as covered by all agencies and suggested [REDACTED] in July and August 1955.

25X1

-

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]: at Norman Paul's request called him to get action speeded up on making [REDACTED] available to [REDACTED] in New York as a possible court witness. [REDACTED] called back to say FBI was neutral. Asked him to tell Cabell. Advised Paul.

25X1

-

[REDACTED]

-

Review of SR survey with [REDACTED]

25X1

-

Review of DD/S survey with [REDACTED]

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, 18 May (cont'd)

DCI meeting: advised them that Career Bill had been handed to Career Council; DCI raised question of including executive pay raises in our bill; advised Norman Paul who thinks it unwise; cleared Bob King briefing--DCI said to ask Nixon if he wanted more on NSC quarterly briefing.

-

Meeting of review board on [ ] agreed to forward opinion to DCI.

-

BOB KING (VP's office): called and asked him to McCarthy's briefing Tuesday and to lunch afterward. Advised Norman Paul.

LBK

**TOP SECRET**

21 May 1956

25X1

[REDACTED]

-

GATES LLOYD: came in to ask advice about [REDACTED] desires to build a building at CIA Langley site. Said I thought DDCI should go as far as calling Chief of Staff of Air Force to stop it.

25X1

-

HART PERRY and LYMAN HAMILTON (Bureau of Budget): hour and a half meeting with them; described to them workings of IG Staff and discussed some general problems in the intelligence community.

25X1

-

[REDACTED] reported on meeting with President's Board liaison officers.

25X1

-

[REDACTED] discussed with me some reactions to Clark and Doolittle reports.

-

No DCI Staff meeting.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 22 May 1956

25X1 [ ] came in about rate of per diem for President's Board. Suggested he talk to Cassidy about it and urge him to talk to Goodpaster.

25X1 [ ] called about when Kennedy [ ] 25X1  
25X1 [ ] Advised him from

25X1 [ ] : called about getting [ ] a job in the Boston area. Said I 25X1  
25X1 would talk to [ ] about it.

25X1 [ ] called about the Chinaman Kellis had written about and said he was going to suggest to DDCI that the IG look into it.

Lunch with BOB KING, McCarthy and Paul.

25X1 KING: asked that I see whether the Agency was assisting the [ ] 25X1  
[ ] that [ ] had been up to see the Vice President about it.

KING: said he might refer a [ ] to me, as he had written the Vice President about coming back to CIA. 25X1

IG Staff meeting.

25X1 [ ] said he would like to suggest that Career Preference Statements not be filled out by supervisors, but by an impartial panel.

25X1 HELMS: asked him to get someone on the selection of a time and country for the intelligence collection exercise; advised him I might take a trip to [ ]

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

SECRET

23 May 1956

CASSIDY: gave me Erskine paper on reorganization of intelligence to read and said he was returning it and asking what they proposed to do. Also said he was prepared to go to [ ] and that Killian had planned to talk to [ ] about going [ ] l.

25X1  
25X1

-

J. C. KING: talked to him about a trip to [ ]. He seemed to think it would be a good idea and said he would work out an itinerary. Helms agreed that [ ] could participate. Advised King that [ ] and [ ] would do survey with me.

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1

-

GROGAN: came in about a talk Scoville wanted to give; also asked for a copy of News Highlights study.

-

Chaired [ ] on WH area program. (See notes below.)

25X1

-

TRUSCOTT: called about a colonel who was coming to see him about a job-- well schooled in French affairs, St. Cyr, etc. Suggested he get him to fill in PBS.

25X1

-

[ ]

25X1

-

[ ]

**SECRET**

24 May 1956

Delivered talk to Career Council on career planning.

Handed Reynolds "Eyes Only" memo on

25X1

Handed DDCI the Board case on

25X1

25X1

called about doing a management seminar on June 5. Said I <sup>25X1</sup>ld.

25X1

LBK/IG



SECRET

25 May 1956

25X1 [ ] called about routing to [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] said Hamilton of Bureau of Budget is going on alert exercise in June and suggested we send an observer.

25X1 [ ] said [ ] had advised him that 6 colored employees  
25X1 of Logistics ([ ] Warehouse) had asked for permission to join  
25X1 NAACP, and had been advised that permission was not required. Told  
[ ] to go talk to Logistics Division chiefs.

[ ] 25X1

Helms: called about countries to do a survey of intelligence collection. Suggested [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] called about cable [ ] on Kennedy and Killian. 25X1  
Said I had no particular ideas on answer.

25X1 Asked [ ] to send up I&R's survey of WH Division.

Set up WH briefing for Monday at 2 PM.

LBK/IG

ET

28 May 1956

DCI: Asked that full text be obtained of Partridge and LeMay testimony before Symington Committee.

25X1



called to confirm FBI tour tomorrow.

25X1



said he would check schedules of Board.

25X1



called to see if it would be all right for  
be on [redacted] when Killian was there.

25X1

Asked Cassidy to advise me when Killian would be in Washington.

WH briefing by Col. King and Branch Chiefs.

LBK/IG

29 May 1956

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1

25X1

Took [ ] to see DDCI.

DDCI: said he thought [ ] board should proceed.

25X1  
25X1

[ ]: came into say hello.

Grogan: said he disagreed with [ ] report on News Highlights.

25X1

[ ] came in to suggest not doing DDI survey now.

Briefing on Branch II of WH Div. by [ ]

25X1

Amory: said he had advised DCI of existence of Erskine paper. Gave ~~him~~ copy him copy and urged him to protect source.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

30 May 1956

**TOP SECRET**

31 May 1956

25X1 Asked Amory to restrict copies of Erskine paper and to remove covering memo from [ ] to the Board and to indicate that there should be no further dissemination without consulting me. He said he was sending original back and copies only to DCI and DDCI with whom he had talked about the paper.

Advised Tietjen of trip and he said he would let me know if there was anything further we should do. Called back to say immunization card should be changed from tourist to official, to send it back to him.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1 [ ] of ORR came up to suggest that what he considered a wasteful research proposal by looking into; viz "Policies, Performance and Prospects of Soviet Agriculture" as proposed by the Agricultural Subcommittee of EIC. He said it was originally suggested by a Mrs. Richter of State and involved 5,000 man-hours. Suggested consulting [ ] who would be 25X1 in charge of project and [ ], the section chief.

25X1 DCI asked that N. Paul be advised of 2:30 Monday meeting with Richard Arends of Francis Walters' staff.

25X1

31 May 1956 Continued

25X1 Took [ ] in to be formally welcomed to the staff. Discussed  
25X1 [ ] trip with him. He said ( [ ] was pressing for return of [ ]  
[ ] I was strongly against. Advised him of discussion with Coyne  
and that I would send details on ( [ ] to Kennedy by Coyne. 25X1

Asked Sheldon to arrange a briefing on [ ] .

25X1

25X1 Consulted [ ] and Wisner as to feasibility of Killian seeing [ ]  
25X1 [ ] and said DCI didn't think it was too good an idea.

25X1

Asked DCI whether he thought [ ] could stay in [ ] while Killian  
was there. He said yes. Advised [ ]

25X1

Arranged new briefing schedule with J. C. King.

Talked to Coyne at length about problem of Kennedy briefing. He said  
that was recognized by Cassidy and Goodpaster, and he would do his best to  
restrain him. He also said that Cassidy had commented on Wisner's  
antipathy to Kennedy and that Wisner was trying to get the Board to go  
light on his area.

Asked Coyne to take a note to Kennedy on the [ ] matter.  
Norman Paul advised that Clarence Cannon had objected to the authorization  
and appropriation being in one bill and had insisted it be referred to  
Foreign Affairs to approve its authorization. The State letter according  
to O'Connor had offered no objection but had not urged it, pointing out  
it was more a matter of grace than right.

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

1 June 1956

25X1

dropped down for a few minutes.

Meeting with Wisner.

Meeting with WH Branch Chiefs.

Talked by telephone to the DCI and

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

4 June 1956

Deputies Meeting.

Senior Staff Meeting.

Lunch with Baird.

25X1

Meeting with [ ] of WH Division.

25X1

[ ] came in to see me.

LBK/IG

Meeting of the WH Survey team.



**TOP SECRET**

5 June 1956

IG Staff Meeting.

OCI language and area briefing.

25X1 Lunch with .

25X1 Meeting with  of Management.

Talked to the following by telephone:

25X1

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 June 1956

25X1

Meeting with [ ]

25X1

Meeting with [ ] to discuss current survey.

25X1

Meeting with [ ]

Meeting with Norman Paul.

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

Meeting of the [ ] in which SE was taken up.

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 June 1956

Briefed by Commo.

Briefed by WH Division.

25X1

Lunch with

Meeting with DCI.

25X1

came in to see me.

25X1

came in to see me.

Meeting of Career Council.

LBK/IG

DCI buzzed and said to write letter to the Ambassadors.

**TOP SECRET**

8 June 1956

DCI Staff Meeting.

Meeting with General Cassidy.

WH Division Survey briefing.

25X1  
25X1 [ ]  
[ ] dropped in to say hello.

25X1  
Met with [ ]

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**SECRET**

11 June 1956

DCI staff meeting.

Meeting of the Career Council.

WH Survey review.

LBK/IC

**SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

12 June 1956

IG Staff meeting.

Meeting with the DCI.

Left on TDY for  Returned on 11 August 1956.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

13 August 1956

2

25X1

Gave half hour briefing to the Deputies Meeting on trip to [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

DCI: stated that he was worried about the problem in TSS and thought it should be reorganized; that he was very worried about the DDI Office and felt something should be done; that he believed [redacted] and that we should get a stronger personnel officer; and that he wanted to reduce the Agency in size to a sufficient degree to get it into the new building.

25X1

Called Wisner and told him I would be available to give him or any of his people any briefings they wanted.

25X1

25X1

Cord MYER: called about the letters from [redacted]. Told him that my reaction was that [redacted] didn't appreciate our kindness and the time had come to cut him off. [redacted] agreed and said that he would so advise the Director if queried.

25X1

+

25X1

Went over with [redacted] various matters that had arisen during my absence.

Norman PAUL: briefed me on Congressional developments during my absence and I advised him that I had discussed his future with the Director and would continue to follow through on this particular matter.

25X1

Called George Carey to advise him that I had brought back an envelope for him from [redacted].

LBK/IG

SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

14 August 1956

2

25X1

IG staff meeting, including general discussion of [redacted] inspection. Asked [redacted] to prepare a summary report on our returnee interviews and asked [redacted] to participate in the preparation of the IG Annual Report.

25X1

25X1

Together with [redacted] gave the National Board of Estimates an informal briefing on our observations in [redacted]

25X1

25X1

The DCI requested a memorandum on the assistance given to us by Capt. Slye in [redacted] so that he could advise the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence.

25X1  
25X1

Lunched with [redacted] in [redacted] and a general discussion of the situation

25X1

[redacted]

+

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**



~~TOP SECRET~~

12

15 August 1956

Attended Deputies Meeting.

25X1      Lunched with J. C. King and filled him in on general observations as  
a result of our trip to [redacted]

25X1      Together with [redacted] advised him that I thought he  
should go to the doctors for a physical examination. (See memo for the record.)

+

SAUNDERS: brought in the annual budget to be signed off on.

EDWARDS: came in to say hello and we discussed general security problems.

25X1      General Truscott asked for anything we had on Unconventional Warfare  
in [redacted]

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET** 16 August 1956

m

Asked BAIRD to prepare a schedule for showing Admiral Conolly the Training establishment on the 19th and 20th of September. Asked [ ] to do the same in regard to Personnel for the 21st of September.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Asked [ ], about Conolly's preferences in briefings. [ ] said that he thought the best would be a combination of formal briefing and discussion.

25X1

Asked Cassidy about Conolly's briefing and he suggested informal discussions. He also said they would have the 22 September meeting there. He asked for just one copy of the ONI summary of NIE's and also asked for the Semiannual Report which he had called [ ] about.

25X1

Advised [ ] that the survey of the [ ] Division would probably be put off until the first of the year.

25X1

Lengthly discussion with [ ] who had just returned from [ ]

25X1

Luncheon and meeting of the Building Advisory Group with the architect.


**TOP SECRET**

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

17 August 1956

25X1



25X1  
25X1

Together with [redacted] briefed [redacted] and his OCI colleagues on our observations in [redacted].

25X1


Spent an hour with White going over the DD/S survey and certain observations on our trip. Told him that I thought the requirements for financial reporting from Class B stations were too great and that there was a tendency in Logistics to require unnecessary reporting.

25X1


Asked Edwards to come in and discuss with me the case of staff status for [redacted]

25X1

25X1



25X1



17 August 1956 Continued

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

25X1

25X1 Lunch with Pat Coyne who filled me in on his trips with Kennedy and Killian and gave me a chance to look at the draft of the report which he and Cassidy had written for Killian to present to the Board in September. The report is critical of the Elint effort; comments on our wide-spread contacts with the [ ] and the apparent unhappiness of the Ambassador on this subject; quotes the comment of one station chief on the large staffs in Washington; discusses the apparent inadequacies and failures of TSS; mentions the critical attitude of most military attaches toward CIA; comments favorably on the Air Force Comint-Elint order of battle unit in [ ] and mentions that [ ] does not believe 25X1 himself to be sufficiently briefed on CIA activities. In addition to all of this, Coyne mentioned to me that Kennedy felt that we were spending far 25X1 too much money in [ ] that he thought there were far too many people in 25X1 intelligence work; and described the incident of the recording machine in the Embassy in [ ]

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

R

25X1 Baird: called me concerning the briefing paper inasmuch as [ ] 25X1  
 25X1 [ ] is leaving next week. I advised him that we were planning a  
 meeting on this subject and would probably recommend that a briefing  
 officer be put on [ ] staff.

25X1 [ ] asked my advice on the case involving three men in Logistics  
 one of whom had a bad record for tardiness and absenteeism. I told [ ] I 25X1  
 thought these men were trying to duck behind us because they were basically  
 inefficient and he shouldn't let them do this and he should talk to their  
 supervisor.

[ ] 25X1

Went over with Col. Edwards the [ ] case. He agreed 25X1  
 that the turndowns may have been unjustified and recommended that I prepare  
 a memorandum to the DDCI stating the facts in the case and recommending  
 that they be given staff status. Edwards commented that the DDCI was getting  
 tougher on clearances where there were any foreign relations. He also stated  
 that he understood the Director blew up when the three Deputies went to him  
 to try to get the building appropriation increased to get all the people  
 in it. He also commented that he was surprised at the apparent trend to  
 cut down on overseas rather than Washington. I asked him to prepare a badge  
 for David Bruce who is now on the President's Board of Consultants.

25X1 Lunch with [ ]

On WH survey talked to J. C. King for about half an hour and asked that 25X1  
 he send some clarifying instructions to [ ] on the [ ] operation. 25X1  
 He said that he would do this. Also asked that he get some word to Ambassador  
 [ ] on whether we would have a slot there in the Embassy. +  
 He reported that he was having great difficulty filling several field slots  
 with girls and wondered whether the time hadn't come for directed assignments.

25X1 Talked to [ ] about half an hour and had him describe the  
 activities of the staff in WH. Following this, spent the rest of the after-  
 noon with [ ] who discussed the work of [ ] 25X1  
 [ ] station was best in his branch and perhaps [ ] was second best. 25X1  
 He said that he reviewed and signed off on all outgoing cables and pouches  
 which were then released by King. He said he did not consider himself to  
 be in the chain of command, but that the chain of command was from the  
 Director to the DD/P to King to the Field Station. He said that he spent  
 the bulk of his time attending the daily staff meetings held by King and  
 working with [ ] on matters of policy, etc.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

21 August 1956

25X1 IG Staff Meeting at which I urged the staff to keep papers cleared out of  
25X1 their files; asked each staff member to report on individual cases which they  
25X1 have been handling; announced that TSS and IO surveys would start on the  
15th of September; Asked [ ] to look into the Loyalty Board procedures and  
to work with [ ] and myself on this; discussed the position of a  
chaplain in the Agency; [ ] reported on his survey of Clandestine Services  
reporting; and gave a brief resume of my discussion with White on the DD/S  
Survey.

25X1 Told [ ] to keep on top of the [ ] case.

Ed. Clark: of the Bureau of the Budget, called and requested an interview  
with somebody who could give him a general survey on economic reporting. After  
checking with Amory, advised him that this would be [ ] and the meeting  
was set up for 2:30 on Friday, 24 August 1956.

25X1 [ ] called concerning [ ] who is still anxious to make  
a change from WE Admin. Told him that I would mention this to [ ] and would  
also review the file myself.

25X1 [ ] called concerning the cable regarding Weill of the House Committee  
on UnAmerican Activities. We agreed that we should let nature take its course  
on this case and we would not approach the Committee here in Washington.

25X1 Baird: called concerning [ ] of his staff who is interested  
in making a change and suggested that she might be good on the IG Staff.

(cont.)

**TOP SECRET**

21 August 1956 continued

25X1 Spent from 2 to 4:30 talking to the [ ] of WH Division. This 25X1  
included [ ] who said that he had been urging them to have all administrative  
25X1 matters pass over his desk and that he considered himself responsible for seeing  
that the personnel in the station received just and adequate treatment. Also  
talked to [ ] all of the [ ] desk. 25X1

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

22 August 1956

At the Deputies meeting pointed out that I had been discussing the possibility of a chaplain. General Cabell said that he had had this matter under consideration and had offered it to Reynolds; ~~and~~ there was a discussion of some high award for General Canine.

General Cassidy: came to lunch and reported to me some of the matters about which the Board was concerned. He stated that apparently each department issued different instructions on Agreed Activities and that they had met at least one senior officer, General Schweitzer of SHAEF, who said that he felt only one US agency should be engaged in clandestine activities. He also said that they had the feeling that there were too many service attaches and little necessity for them particularly in some areas like [redacted]. He commented on the wide-scale activities of USIA and the gray field and suggested that we take the initiative [redacted]

[redacted] mentioned that General Doolittle was quite concerned about insuring a smooth transition to wartime conditions and suggested CPX in bases like [redacted] and other localities where we were closely integrated into a military command. He mentioned [redacted] refusal to participate in one upon an order from G-2 and said that he felt [redacted] was right in refusing.

25X1

25X1  
25X125X1  
25X1

[redacted] called for a briefing on our trip. I asked him about [redacted] activities and he stated that he felt [redacted] was pulling the wool over Cabell's eyes and pointed out that [redacted] had gotten 35 additional slots for his staff including 10 for consulting engineers and 25 for an Elint center. [redacted] also said that he had seen [redacted] in [redacted] who had urged him to tell me to take a good look at [redacted] considered to be very good.

Set up luncheon with [redacted] and at Col. King's suggestion invited [redacted]

25X1

Talked to the following people on the WH summary [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] called concerning a letter from the Subcommittee on Manpower Utilization. Asked him to return it to me to look over before they prepare a reply.

**TOP SECRET**

LBK/IG



**TOP SECRET**

23 August 1956

25X1 Briefed [ ] on our observations of the Communications  
25X1 people in [ ] In general we said we thought the people were excellent ,  
25X1 but they might need somebody in [ ] and that they might need additional  
25X1 people in [ ]

Completed the briefing of the OCI people on [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] came to lunch and advised me of the difficulty which would  
25X1 probably develop with the [ ] over the brutal interrogation of some [ ] 25X1  
25X1 in [ ] by an SR Division individual.

25X1 [ ] called to ask if Ashcraft could come to the Briefing and  
Debriefing meeting.

25X1 [ ] called to say hello.

25X1 [ ] called about an award for [ ] which was submitted 25X1  
on July 7, 1955 and has not been acted on. He also mentioned that he thought  
25X1 [ ] concerning whom [ ] has details, had been on the side of the  
angels.

25X1 Asked [ ] to set up a TSS discussion of the survey.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

24 August 1956

25X1 Met with Lloyd, [ ] on the briefing and  
25X1 debriefing situation. We agreed on certain minor modifications of the regulation  
25X1 which [ ] will follow through on in preparing a new draft, and agreed it  
should be placed in Training in the Presentation Division that [ ] has. 25X1  
It was also agreed that Lloyd and I would talk to Baird about its location.

25X1 Together with [ ] 25X1  
25X1 and [ ] about the TSS survey and arranged for [ ] to cover the [ ] 25X1  
25X1 unit of TSS on their [ ] trip. Advised them that we would start our survey  
officially on or about the 15th of September.

25X1 Lunch with [ ] who expressed his concern at his slow progress  
and difficulties of expressing himself.

Spent from 2 to 4:30 at [ ]

25X1

25X1 Talked to Helms about the meeting on the Public Services Aid Society and  
he said he would be in [ ] but would give me his proxy. Also mentioned to [ ] 25X1  
25X1 him that I received a letter from [ ]  
and would handle this: he also said that they would make their own arrangements  
to see [ ]

LBK/IG

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

27 August 1956

Briefed General Cabell for 45 minutes on the WH Division field trip.

25X1

Meeting with [ ] Lloyd, Baird, [ ] and Sheldon on the Public Service Aid Society. We agreed that there should be a campaign solicitation and it should take place this time as part of the United Charities Drive. Also agreed we would get out some material which should be in the hands of the key people this week.

25X1

25X1

Sheldon reported [ ] had seen General Cabell for two hours and 10 minutes Saturday afternoon; he had been thoroughly debriefed by Security and planned to take his case to Congress. Advised [ ] of this and told him to be sure to check with [ ] to be sure that everything had been done.

25X1

25X1

†

Discussed briefly with Lloyd and Baird the take over of the briefing and debriefing coordination functions by OTR. Told Baird we would send him a list of possible candidates.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] This was attended by General Cabell, Col. Edwards, [ ] and [ ] and myself. They seemed appreciative and expressed their hope that we would read their report and said they would be in touch with us.

25X1

25X1

Spent from 2 to 4:30 in WH Division talking mainly to [ ] about [ ] but also asked that [ ] supply us with the [ ] material so that we could see what type of guidance is going to the field.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] called to say that he had talked to his people about the Aid Society drive and found that they were wholeheartedly in favor of it.

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

R

28 August 1956

IG staff meeting.

25X1

Told [ ] to tell the Logistics employee that his work is probably unsatisfactory and we could do nothing to help him in this regard.

Lunch with Sheldon who filled me in on the latest details of the NSA problem and the difficulties in USCIB.

25X1

Meeting with WH Division people from 2 to 4:30 and saw the following:



Continued

**Page Denied**

29 August 1956

Deputies meeting at which I advised General Cabell of the meeting of the Public Service Aid Society, the fact that we would conduct the campaign now and would present a memo for his signature launching the campaign. Also mentioned the [ ] case that that we undoubtedly hear from them and that I urged everybody to kindly refer the matter to our staff.

Gates Lloyd: called about the Public Service Aid Society and I told him to take the letter direct to General Cabell without coming through here.

Baird: came in to protest strongly against the briefing and debriefing function being assigned to his office. Said that he had discussed this with General Cabell. Told him that I would mention it to Wisner and Amory and see if one of them would be willing to take it on in their staff.

Meeting with Lloyd, [ ] on the Public Service Aid Society and agreed to go ahead with the campaign now and also agreed in general on the phrasing of the publicity.

Cassidy: called and said that Killian might want to talk about the [ ] situation on Thursday. I advised him that we probably wouldn't have the material ready but would have the material ready for the September meeting. He said that the USIA matter had come up in [ ] with Coyne and Kennedy and that after they had raised it with [ ] had it brought to Killian's attention. He also said that he would go along with the annual and semiannual reports on 30 June and 31 December, but would like to have a budget report on 1 May.

Lunch with [ ]

[ ]: of ONE said that they had an urgent need for the [ ] report and asked if I could get it from [ ]

WH Division survey from 2 to 4:30 with discussions with the following:

Continued

**Page Denied**

30 August 1956

At the request of ONE called [ ] and arranged for them to borrow a copy of the [ ] advised that this was a matter of major importance inasmuch as the [ ] was in strong contradiction with the Estimate as presently drafted.

25X1

Edwards: raised the [ ] case and said that [ ] had been very favorably impressed by his work and his conduct [ ] Told him I still thought on the basis of his family associations that he should continue in a contract status rather than transfer over to a staff status.

Went over the WH survey with [ ] and allocated areas of responsibilities.

Carey: called re [ ] Told him that I was certain that [ ] still was a consultant. Checked the consultants list and called him back to tell him that [ ] was a consultant to the Security Staff.

Lunch with Wisner who said that they would be very interested in Norman Paul should he ever decide to transfer into that area. Advised him of the meeting in [ ] in November or December of the State Departments chiefs of mission. Also told him that the general consensus in the field was that the regional conference had been valuable. Advised him that the WH report would be in two parts--with one group of recommendations to be implemented by the DD/P and the other by the Division. Asked him if He would object to taking over the briefing and debriefing function on [ ] staff. He said he wouldn't but didn't want to be quoted on it.

Saw the following people in WH Division:



**Page Denied**

31 August 1956

12

25X1

Edwards: called about [ ] who is threatening to go to "True" magazine and print a complete story on PBSUCCESS. He said that he would put [ ] on the case and I asked [ ] to handle it for us.

25X1 +

25X1

Went over with [ ] the paper on competitive promotions and made several suggestions to changes which they said they would adopt.

25X1

Asked [ ] to follow through on the [ ] case and we would take no action but wait for their next move.

25X1

25X1

[ ] brought in a letter from Admiral Conolly which has been lost in the Director's office since August 8. Asked him to please advise everybody that all matters on the President's Board should be referred to my office. He also brought in the letter to [ ] and I told him it could be torn up as it would not be sent.

25X1 +

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

[ ]

+

25X1

Lengthly discussion with [ ] about the situation in various [ ] countries.

25X1

LBK/IG

4 September 1956

12.

25X1

25X1

[ ] started flap by calling Norman Paul and Grogan on the USIA request for the Director's statement to the House on Unamerican Activities Committee. Met with [ ] and Grogan and as soon as [ ] understood we had not written the request but that it had been edited from the DCI's speech to the Penn Law School, the flap was over.

25X1

25X1

[ ] came up to ask advice on his career in the Agency. Told him that I thought he should stress administrative work and perhaps should talk to White after his return.

Meeting of the Senior Staff.

25X1

25X1

Lunch with [ ] and briefed him on the background of our relations with the I&R Staff.

25X1

25X1

(continued)

4 September 1956 continued

25X1

25X1

Went over with [ ] the case of [ ] Grogan had TRUE  
magazine send us their correspondence with him and they advised that they do  
not have any intention in dealing with him. [ ] will see if he  
can be prosecuted under the Security laws.

25X1+

25X1

[ ] also raised the point that the General Counsel may reverse  
himself on paying for medical benefits for dependents where this is overseas.

LBK/IG


~~TOP SECRET~~

5 September 1956

12

25X1

[ ] came in to ask about using one of our offices for [ ] Told him we had already been approached by [ ] speaking to [ ] and the answer was absolutely no, and I told him [ ] should either get an office in OSI or the DDI could make one available.

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

WH survey: Completed discussions with [ ] operations and then discussed at length the staff work [ ]

25X1

25X1  
25X1

[ ] called to see if we could set up a meeting with John [ ] Told him that I would check and call him back.

25X1  
25X1

Edwards: called to say that [ ] had told him that [ ] might not remain Chief of the [ ] for very much longer.

25X1

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

6 September 1956

Gates Lloyd: called to say that he had seen David Bruce and Wisner and that Bruce was going to specialize in Training, Personnel and Operations and that he wanted to be briefed but his clearance had not come through. Told Lloyd I would talk to Cassidy and get this matter straightened out. Talked to Cassidy and said he would get in touch with Bruce immediately on the clearance, and if possible, to arrange for him to be briefed on the same days as Conolly. Baird also called on this, greatly excited, having talked with Lloyd and I calmed him down and told him it was all under control.

25X1 Edwards: called to say that [ ] has gone to The Daily Worker to see if they would buy his story and had then gone to the FBI. Edwards will follow the case, and if he puts anything in writing he will have him ~~arrested~~ arrested.

25X1 Talked to Grogan who will arrange to set up a meeting with [ ] and advised [ ] and Ashcraft and asked them to coordinate their operations. 25X1

25X1 Grogan: asked if I was aware that [ ] had been announced as a witness before the HCUC. I said that I had and that we were aware of it but would not be brought into it officially. 25X1

25X1 [ ] briefed me on the Building Meeting.

25X1 [ ] called and asked if we could suspend a subpoena that the  
25X1 HCIA might issue [ ]. Told him I would try.

Pat Coyne: called on economic reporting. Told him that I considered the basic rule to be that State covered everything.

(continued)

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

7 September 1956

25X1



25X1

Lunch with

Baird: called to find out whether Conolly and Bruce were cleared for AQUATONE.

25X1

25X1

called to say that the Office of Personnel would send a memo to the Comptroller to try and get  reimbursed for the leave that she was required to take by the Medical Office. Told him I agreed.

25X1

Grogan: called to say that all of the arrangements had been made with

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

7 September 1956 continued.

25X1

Called [ ] who said he had been in bad health lately.

25X1

Pat Coyne: called to ask whether it was true that [ ] had given [ ] a pistol as a present.

25X1

25X1

Went over with [ ] some of his writing on the PPC survey and told him that I thought it was quite good.

25X1

Cassidy: called to say that David Bruce would let us know on the 17th whether he wanted to go with Conolly for the briefing. I asked him whether he thought it would be wise for me to go along. He said he not only thought it would be wise but very useful. He said he had a long talk with General Doolittle on the war games and that Doolittle was not satisfied and had asked him to follow up. I called [ ] and told him to get in touch with Cassidy so that he could brief him.

George Carey: came in to find out whether Amory was going to back [ ]. 25X1 I told him that I had a talk with Amory and Amory had agreed that [ ] should 25X1 not be retained.

Gates Lloyd: called to find out whether there should be any follow-up with David Bruce. Told him that it had all been taken care of through General Cassidy.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

SECRET

10 September 1956

25X1  
25X1

Called [ ] to check and find out whether [ ] had ever made a present to [ ] of a gun.

25X1  
25X1

[ ]  
all. Also asked why Allen Dulles was making so many speeches and he thought he would try ~~xxx~~ selling him again on getting across to the American public the fact that CIA activities was an analysis and not an espionage service inasmuch as the American people still did not like espionage.

25X1

[ ] and said that they had received a report that he had withheld some cables from the Chief of Station. We agreed that Commo should continue to handle this case and would not bring us in unless necessary.

J.C. King: asked if the letter to [ ] could be changed slightly on the request of the Counselor of Embassy [ ] He also agreed that the grades and titles of his people were too low and appreciated anything we could do about it.

25X1  
25X1

[ ]  
(continued)

SECRET

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**TOP SECRET**

11 September 1956

P

IG Staff Meeting. Discussed the Annual Report and pointed out that I had changed the comments on recommendations so as not to give the impression that we feel all of our recommendations must be carried out but only to imply that we believe they should have open-minded consideration. Also, advised the staff we would eventually cut our T/O to four girls upstairs inasmuch as I thought that number could handle the staff, and the two girls who would handle two men each would have those four who did the least dictation. I also mentioned that [ ] would be in charge of the girls upstairs. Described the Consolidated Charities Drive and especially the history of the Public Service Aid Society. Mentioned that in the future I would limit the staff meetings to one-half hour. Suggested that in the TSS Survey the team try to talk to as many people as possible inasmuch as I found our discussions with the WH people to be fruitful from our point of view and a valuable morale factor from their point.

General Cassidy: advised that Admiral Conolly had received the outline and approved of it. He said that he would also go along on the trip to [ ] and I so advised Baird.

Talked to [ ] about his future and advised him that I had talked with Wisner and asked whether he was interested in any future use of him. We agreed that he would participate in the I.O. Survey. We also agreed to forward the papers to [ ] inasmuch as they didn't seem to have any intelligence value and that [ ] might know or find out that they had been sent to him.

[ ] dropped in to talk about this and I explained to him why we were sending them to [ ]

25X1

[ ] advised that he had heard the Pentagon was going to try to get the Clark Report to the NSC. I asked that he try and check further on it.

(Continued)

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12 September 1956

At the Deputies Meeting advised that the President's Board would be here the 22nd but had made no request for formal briefings with the exception of having someone standing by to talk about [redacted]. Admiral Conolly will be here the 19th, 20th and 21st and possibly David Bruce. General Doolittle was here last week talking about war gaming. I also advised that [redacted] had gone to [redacted]; that I had heard [redacted] would replace [redacted] that the Pentagon was trying to push the Clark Report to the NSC; and that I was planning to use Norman Paul on some surveys.

Lunch with [redacted] who said that while he had been very mad about the PP survey initially, he had now gotten over it, and that he particularly objected to the statement that the PP Staff was party [redacted] and that he felt [redacted] had listened to all of the rebels on the PM side, including [redacted] also advised that [redacted]

[redacted] discussed with him the case of [redacted] who is apparently getting into financial difficulties, and said he thought he should talk to [redacted] about it. I agreed. He also said that he had prepared a paper on [redacted] and another on the Personnel Office and said that he thought [redacted] had Communications in a good enough state so that he could turn it over it [redacted] and the other men he has been grooming. I said I agreed that [redacted] would be excellent to take over Personnel but that General Cabell was dead opposed to it. [redacted] then said he had a serious proposal to make--that I take over the DDI Office for a couple of years. I said that I would rather like a job like that, but under no conditions would I propose myself to the Director for such a job.

(continued)

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**SECRET**


13 September 1956

Grogan: called on News Highlights and said the DD/P would change the mast-head to enable us to send copies outside the Agency. I said I agreed with the memo and it was now in General Cabell's office.

25X1



asked if we had any contribution to the cable to the DCI.

Lunch with Angleton who brought up the  books and left them for our use in the survey.

25X1

25X1

25X1

LBK/IG



14 September 1956

Talked to Sherman Kent about Norman Paul participating in the Board of Estimates' work. He said they would be delighted to have him participate on a part-time basis and they would be able to judge whether they would like him full time. I said if that were the case, we would like to know by the first of the year and we could possibly break in [ ] to take over his job as Legislative Counsel and we could release him to the Board by June. Kent had a qualifying comment to make and that was that he had promised [ ] a place on the Board when his job with [ ] was over. I suggested that we cope with that problem when it arose. Kent also mentioned the problem they were having with Security on [ ] He asked me not to do anything until he advised me further. We also talked about [ ] and he said that [ ] best spot would be in ORR.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Gave the Management lecture.

Lunch with [ ] who did not have very much to offer on the WH subject. He said he saw very little actually of either King or their work but was under the impression that they had acquired considerably more professionalism.

25X1

(continued)

**SECRET**

**Page Denied**

14 September 1956 continued

25X1



**TOP SECRET**

17 September 1956

Cassidy: called to inquire about the [ ] paper and advised that Bruce 25X1 would be going along on the Training review but would probably concern himself more with plans and operations. He said he had talked to Killian who was interested in the origin and development of PP operations and I told him that we would have a paper for them on that subject. He said that there would be no individuals called from the Agency to testify on Saturday. Advised General Cabell that the briefing had been laid on for David Bruce and Admiral Conolly and that N. Paul and I were going down to [ ] with 25X1 them.

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

(Continued)

**Page Denied**

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R

18 September 1956

25X1 [ ] called to say that he would like to do a study on the coordination of Regulations or would like to have us do it, but that if he did it, he would like to have the DDCI back him up. Told him that I would send [ ] to see him.

25X1

25X1

IG staff meeting at which I advised that the Consolidated Charities Drive thus far had 4 contributors totaling \$335 and that the rest of the staff should hurry up and contribute. Discussed the WH, IO, PPC and TSS surveys; advised them that the President's Board would meet Saturday but called no witnesses. Announced that Bruce and Conolly were going to Training, that Doolittle was interested in war gaming and that they had reports on PP development, and staybehind, [ ] and reports handling. Also announced that [ ] might be detailed to [ ] to work with the architects and that I had fruitful lunches with B [ ] and Angleton.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Reynolds: called about [ ] and I gave him the full history of his relations with the Agency. Reynolds said he was going to return [ ] call and tell him that he ~~was~~ either should resign or go before a board.

25X1

+

25X1

25X1

25X1

Called [ ] of the Comptroller's office and told him that we had a complaint about the Payroll Branch about which we wanted to look into. Discussed this matter with [ ] who will go over ~~to~~ the Comptroller's Survey, the Management Report on the office and other pertinent material and then see [ ].

25X1

25X1

[ ] called to say the [ ] paper would be up today. I reminded him that I told [ ] in August that the deadline was 14 September and that this included clearance through Wisner.

25X1

25X1

[ ] came over to talk about what should be done about B and C Career Service cases. Told him that I thought this was a matter that should be discussed by the Career Council as well as such subjects as whether individuals should be given directed assignments.

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

Major General Howard Snyder: called from the White House to say that as a result of a meeting he had with Howard Rusk and J. Edgar Hoover, Governor Adams had asked him to invite me to lunch on Thursday, 27 September. I called Rusk who said this had come about as a result of a talk he had with Hoover and that he wanted to discuss something he had seen in [ ]. I suggested that he ask [ ] and at his request we called Dr. Snyder's office and passed on this suggestion.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

19 September 1956

A/DCI staff meeting.

25X1

of WH Division came in.

OTR luncheon for Adm Conolly and then group took off for

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

20 September 1956

25X1

Spent the day at  (See memo for the record.)

LBK/IG



~~TOP SECRET~~

21 September 1956

At General Cabell's request set up a luncheon for Dr. Killian to discuss Agency problems about which the board might wish to take action. The following were present: Dr. Killian, Admiral Conolly, General Cassidy, Messrs. Helms, Sheldon, Lloyd and [ ] and myself. [ ] answered several questions concerning the report on the dealings with [ ] and the [ ] which the Agency gave [ ]. He also explained that an article concerning himself might appear in the press and that all of his activities in [ ] had been cleared in advance with senior officials of the Department of State. Dr. Killian stated that they were interested in this problem because they felt sure that there would be Congressional inquiries. A general review of the situation in regard to the building was given to them and they asked for a brief memorandum outlining the problem to them. Dr. Killian also raised the question as to

[ ]

[ ]

Admiral Conolly: gave me a file of correspondence from [ ] and asked that I handle the matter.

Sat in on a meeting between Admiral Conolly and General Cabell at which Admiral Conolly raised the question of [ ] who had just resigned from the [ ]. He was told that this matter would be looked into. Conolly also spoke very highly of [ ] and the impression that the Training personnel left with them.

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

24 September 1956

General Cabell: called and asked what steps should be taken regarding the briefing of David Bruce. I told him that we would wait to hear from General Cassidy. He called later to say that Bruce had called Wisner and had asked to see him this noon. I suggested that Wisner urge Bruce to deal with us through Cassidy. Cabell asked me to pass this on to Wisner and Wisner said he would keep me informed as to any conversation.

Went over the TSS survey with [ ] and told him I wanted to participate in periodic meetings with the TSS personnel. 25X1

25X1 Talked to [ ] and urged that he come to see us.

25X1 [ ] came in to say good-by.

25X1 [ ] reported at length on his trip to the [ ] and also on his 25X1  
25X1 discussions with [ ] and White on personal matters.

25X1 [ ] came in and said he would like a job on the staff and I told him I would review the matter carefully and would let him know within a couple of weeks.

25X1 [ ] came in to ask whether I had any strong views on the OO survey. I said that I had three very definite opinions: (1) that OO had taken a very cavalier attitude on the Career Service recommendations; (2) that Contact Division field strength could be readjusted internally; and (3) that Contact Division headquarters could be reduced materially. He asked that I talk to Amory about this and then advise him so that he could tell General Cabell.

25X1 Called General Cassidy on the Board meeting and he advised that the next one would either be November 7, 15, or 28. Told [ ] so he could schedule 25X1  
25X1 an IAC visit to the [ ]

Cassidy: said that the Board had urged Bruce to look into matters of organization--a subject which [ ] had not been able to cover. 25X1  
They also wanted Bruce to take a trip to the [ ] 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

(Continued)

TOP SECRET

24 September 1956 continued

Cassidy: reported that at the next meeting of the Board they would like to have a briefing on the status and views on the most recent Important Estimates. He also advised that they would answer the DCI's letter on COMINT.

25X1

[ ] of the Transportation Branch, Services Division, ORR, came in to say that he had a major problem which was not being given due consideration. He left a file of papers which I said I would review and talk to him about.

25X1

[ ] dropped in to report briefly on developments in [ ] 25X1

25X1

[ ] said that [ ] wanted to sit down with us on the TSS survey.

Discussed the I.O. survey with [ ] and called Cord Myer to set up the first meeting. 25X1

25X1

[ ]

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

(L)

25 September 1956

25X1

IG Staff Meeting. [ ] reported on his trip to the [ ] reported on his lengthy discussions with [ ], the Acting Comptroller, on the situation in the Payroll Branch; and the final notice was given for contributions to the Consolidated Charities Fund.

25X1

25X1

Meeting with [ ] on the TSS Survey.

25X1

Went over the I.O. Division Survey with Cord Myer [ ] and arranged to attend the I.O. Staff Meeting on Friday at 11:15 to discuss this.

25X1

Wisner: called on his meeting with David Bruce and said that Bruce was a little vague as to what they meant by organization and was all set to get briefed by us. He also said that Bruce would like to have somebody accompany him on any trip he made who would be knowledgeable of the problems but who would not be considered to be pro-CIA or any other organization.

Adbassador White: called and we set up a luncheon for him.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] came in to say he believed the Killian group should get the annex of our annual NSC report on [ ] and that he would get Reber to send us two copies.

[ ]

25X1

[ ]

General Cabell: advised that he had been directed to brief Estes Kefauver and asked whether there were any problems in this connection. He was told that there weren't.

**TOP SECRET**

LBK/IG

26 September 1956

Cassidy: called and asked for the Jackson Report, a sample of the National Estimates, and the Daily Bulletin when David Bruce came over for his briefing.

25X1 [redacted]: came up and talked at some length on the difficulties  
25X1 that [redacted] was causing in NEA.

25X1 [redacted] came up for lunch and told me about his trip to the [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]: called about some complaint we would receive from a [redacted] 25X1  
25X1 [redacted] for a claim of \$95. +

25X1 Reynolds: called to say that he had advised [redacted] he would separate him 25X1  
25X1 from the service and that [redacted] had been present. +

25X1 Baird: called to say that [redacted] had held up a Finance Officers Handbook  
which had been prepared and which the Comptroller had approved and that it  
was essential for the Operations Support Course and the Administrative Procedures  
Course.

25X1 Talked to King, [redacted] on the WH Survey.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

27 September 1956

Meeting with David Bruce.

Gave a lecture to the senior Management Course.

Attended luncheon at the White House.

Meeting with

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

28 September 1956

25X1

Meeting with

Meeting with the I.O. Survey team.

Meeting of the TSS Survey team.

Meeting with A/DCI, Reynolds and Carey.

Talked by telephone to the following people: Cassidy will visit the PF Staff on Wednesday; and Reynolds on blood donors.

LBK/IG

2 October 1956

25X1 IG Staff Meeting at which it was requested that T/A's be submitted promptly and raised the question of doing an analysis of overtime in the Agency at some future date. [ ] discussed his thought about doing functional studies after the first unit round of services.

Grogan: called about the Incentive Awards poster.

25X1 Discussion with [ ] on the Reports survey.

Reynolds: called concerning the talk to the consultants.

25X1

25X1

LBK/IG



3 October 1956

25X1

At my suggestion Mr. Amory came down and I asked him to read the papers that [ ] left with me. He said he would and would call [ ] We discussed the OO survey and I made my feelings both on Manpower and on Career Service clear and indicated that this concluded my interest. I mentioned that I was trying to locate [ ] in OBI and he suggested that we also try [ ]'s staff. He indicated that, inasmuch as Bill Jackson was reorganizing the President's Staff and this affected him because of his position on the NSC Planning Board, we do the DDI survey the First of the Year. I said that this was completely agreeable.

I told Amory that [ ] was promotable and that I would put it in if he would back it. Amory agreed.

Called Wisner to make sure that he had [ ] lined up to brief Cassidy if required.

Talked to [ ] regarding placing [ ] He said that [ ] would require a Special Clearance anywhere in his office.

Talked to [ ] about placing [ ] in SE. He said that they had considered him but could not use him in headquarters.

Gates Lloyd: asked if I would object to having my name made public in income tax matters. I said that I would prefer not but did not feel strongly on the issue.

Talked to [ ] about his conversation with [ ] and told him that I called back on [ ]

Lunch with [ ].

[ ] dropped in to say hello.

3 October 1956 Continued

25X1

[ ]: came in to talk about [ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ] dropped in to say hello.

25X1

[ ] asked about placing [ ] and I suggested OTR.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

25X1

Told [ ] I had discussed the OO Survey with Amory, and considered the issue closed.

Jim Angleton: called to say he had lunched with Admiral Hillenkoetter who spoke very highly of me and sent his fond regards.

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

4 October 1956

25X1 Discussion with Karamessines [ ] on the coordination of TSS projects.  
25X1 [ ] took extensive notes on this discussion.

25X1 [ ] called to ask to have his memorandum on the IG Commo survey  
which pertains to ELINT sent to the Acting, DCI, and that it had not been cleared  
there yet.

Testified before the Employment Review Board on [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] advised that [ ] had resigned. 25X1

25X1 Talked to Cord Myer about attending the [ ] meeting, and he said he 25X1  
would talk to [ ] Also talked to Cord Myer [ ] and 25X1  
he generally went along on the idea of giving him a sabbatical leave before  
25X1 his assignment to the [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] 25X1

25X1

25X1 [ ] asked whether there were any items I wanted him to take up on his  
trip to Europe. I suggested that he give them a detailed fill in on the Career  
Service.

Lunch with [ ] 25X1

25X1 Cassidy: called to say that Dr. Killian was in town and would be back  
next week on the 9th, 10th and the 11th. I asked Cassidy to tell Dr. Killian  
25X1 that we were dealing with [ ] 25X1  
25X1 [ ] I also advised Cassidy that he or Members of the Board  
might be approached by [ ] and that we could give them full details.

25X1 Houston: asked my advice on somebody seeing General Donovan about [ ] 25X1  
[ ] I suggested that he see him and possibly I would go along. +

TOP SECRET

(Continued)

4 October 1956 Continued

Asked Baird for suggestions on what I should say to the College Consultant 25X1



25X1  
25X1

Baird: brought [redacted] to see me and we briefly  
discussed the [redacted]

LBK/IG

**SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

R.

5 October 1956

25X1

Illustrated.[ ] called up to ask if I had seen his picture in Sports

25X1

Called [ ] to discuss how [ ] was doing inasmuch as she had been put up for Career Service. He advised that she was doing very well and had recently been promoted to a GS-6.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Talked to [ ] about a spot for [ ] on the International Communism Staff. He took the Personnel file and said that he would raise it with [ ] upon the latter's return.

25X1

Called Vice Admiral Roscoe Hillenkeotter, IG of the Navy, to offer him congratulations and see if there was anything we could do for him on his trip. He said no but said he would like to come over for lunch when he came back in November.

[ ] came [ ] and said he wanted a change. I suggested that he talk to Reynolds about this and said I would be glad to help him.

25X1

25X1

[ ] Chief of WE Division, came up for lunch.

25X1

[ ] called and asked to see me at an early date.

25X1

25X1

[ ] asked whether he should interest himself in one [ ]

25X1

[ ] I said no.

25X1

[ ] said he had some material for General Cassidy. I told him to send it through us.

25X1

Lectured to the [ ] at Curie Hall on how the JOT's were doing and said hello afterwards to several.

25X1

25X1

Went over the I.O. Survey with [ ] and the TSS Survey with [ ]

**TOP SECRET**

(Continued)

~~TOP SECRET~~

5 October 1956 continued

25X1  
25X1  
Called [ ] and suggested that they lay on a formal debriefing of  
[ ]

[ ]


25X1  
25X1  
Told [ ] that he could find out about [ ] 25X1  
[ ]

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

8 October 1956

25X1



25X1

[redacted] came in to ask about my job description.

25X1  
25X1

[redacted] came in for lunch and described his three-month familiarization trip to the [redacted].

General Cassidy: called for a copy of the Jackson Report for David Bruce to read.

25X1

General Cassidy: asked for an itinerary for a one-month trip to the [redacted] for himself and Mr. Bruce.

25X1

(Continued)

8 October 1956 Continued

25X1 General Cassidy: advised that the President's Board would be in Washington on November 28, 29 and 30 and would see the President at 11:00 AM on 30 November. He asked that [ ] be prepared to make his one-hour presentation on the programming and planning aspect of his work during this meeting.

25X1 [ ] came in to show me a copy of the A/DCI's talk to the Contact Division chiefs.

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET



9 October 1956

IG Staff Meeting at which was discussed the question of leaving cases open. It was generally agreed that we would start a new category in the Monthly Report of perennial cases which would be kept open on a permanent basis and we would refer all officers in matters concerning these cases to this staff. It was also announced that [ ] would join the staff in December. I reported on my talk to the [ ] and their statements of the difficulty of getting good college graduates because of competition from private industry. Announced that the President's Board would meet on the 28th, 29th and 30th of November and that David Bruce was planning a trip to the [ ]

25X1  
25X1

25X1

Went over certain matters of the I.O. Survey with [ ] and told him to tell [ ] that we wanted at least one man to attend the [ ] management meeting but would prefer two.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Grogan: came in to advise me that "Task Force", a publication of the American Defenders of the Constitution which is an organization backed by General del Valle, General Bonner Fellers and others, had published a violent attack on CIA by Huxley-Blythe and had sent it to Senator Dirksen, Cong. Margaret Church, Cong. Miller and one other. Grogan's recommendation was that we ignore it, which I agreed.

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

2

10 October 1956

25X1 At a short discussion with [redacted] suggested 25X1  
that he arrange to see [redacted] at an early date and get his help in establishing  
good relations with the Ambassador.

Meeting of the Deputies at which I advised them of the meeting of the  
President's Board on the 28th, 29th and 30th of November at which [redacted] and 25X1  
Estimates are the only subjects for briefings thus far. Also mentioned to them  
the publication "Task Force" which bitterly attacked CIA.

Attended presentation of Medals.

25X1 Lunch with [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] called to talk about the cable from [redacted] Told him I saw no 25X1  
objection to advising him when the Director would return.

25X1 [redacted] advised that a copy of the comments on OCI had gone to DD/P and  
I would probably get a call from Hulick asking me what to do about it.

25X1 [redacted] to say there was no necessity to come up,  
that he would attend the Board meeting.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

11 October 1956

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Discussed a personal matter with [ ] of the Office of Security.

25X1

25X1

25X1

11 October 1956 continued

25X1 [ ] came in to talk about [ ] and said that he believed 25X1  
he might be able to use him on an external basis, partly in liaison with [ ] 25X1  
25X1 and partly to do research work. I said that this sounded feasible. He will  
read some of [ ] books and then will let me know before he calls [ ] in to 25X1  
talk to him.

25X1

[ ] 25X1

[ ]

25X1 [ ] of Finance Division, called me to say they had done a  
memorandum on Foreign Exchange, which they would like me to read before it  
goes to the Director.

[ ] 25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

25X1 Discussion with [ ] of the TSS support to [ ] 25X1  
will follow up on this on his trip [ ] in November. 25X1

[ ] 25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

15 October 1956

Had a brief chat with the Director about his trip abroad.

Edwards: called me about a special problem he wanted to see me about.

Reynolds: called to advise that the United Charities Drive had raised \$88,000 and the Public Aid Society had raised \$4,500.

25X1

[ ] of Finance: called to say that he understood I did not think the reply on Currency was responsive to the Director's question. I suggested that they don't do any further work until the Director got back and they could ask him exactly about it.

Helms: called to ask if I would talk to Carey about exactly what the Director wanted from FBIS for training material.

25X1

[ ] called and I told him he was to brief the President's Board on September 28th. He advised me that the [ ] case was still hanging fire and he would let me know later.

25X1

Tietjen: called back to say that he had checked [ ] ears and that they were all right for air travel.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

16 October 1956

IG Staff meeting.

25X1 [ ] came in to express his concern about comments made by Bill  
25X1 [ ] to Dr. Killian. Suggested to [ ] that he take these comments up  
25X1 directly with [ ] when he sees him.

25X1

25X1 [ ] briefed [ ] and myself on his specific responsibilities  
in TSS, which seemed very vague.

25X1 [ ] came up to ask about a job. He said he would like to join  
the staff about 1 September 1957. Told him that I would give it full consideration  
and let him know.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

16 October 1956

Cassidy: called to say that he was seeing Wisner tomorrow at two to continue his briefing on PP; he asked to talk to [ ] and to see the PPC survey when it was finished; he asked for the Staybehind Report and also suggested that CIA have some form of semi-annual report for the Board; and he asked if I would send over our reply on the Clark Committee recommendations. 25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

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25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1



**TOP SECRET**

19 October 1956

25X1

At the Deputies Meeting mentioned Dr. Killian's comments on activities in [ ] and also the request of Mr. Hill of the Department of State for the paper.

25X1

25X1

Discussed with [ ] the TSS Survey.

25X1

Talked with [ ] about her problems. Told her that I would try to get something accomplished by next week.

Meeting of the Building Steering Committee to approve the arrangements for placing the various components in the new building.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

22 October 1956

DCI Staff Meeting at which I raised the question of the Bureau of the Budget asking more detailed and pointed questions. The DCI said that we should reply to certain ones of them that these were policy matters that should be referred to the NSC.

Meeting with [ ] to discuss his experiences overseas and also whether he wishes to pursue his request for [ ] from the Public Service Aid Society. He said he did wish to have his claim submitted to the Society inasmuch as it had been covered by the station and that if the Society didn't cover it, he would have to pay it back.

Asked Ashcraft whether they had debriefed [ ] on their trips to the [ ]. He said that they had not but that it was on the agenda.

[ ] called about [ ] and said that he had threatened to take the problem outside the Agency. He wanted to alert me of this in case we should get any inquiries from Congressmen.

Grogan: called to say that the DD/P was probably going to eliminate News Highlights entirely and would I want to sit in on the discussions. Told him no, but for him to attend these meetings himself. He also said that some item had come up on the handling of the [ ] which resulted in some publicity in [ ]

Talked to Edwards about the club on the Langley site and said that I thought we should organize a group to get a move and that he should sit on it. He agreed. Also asked him to check on [ ] extensio

Talked to [ ]. He said he was interested in him and he would like to see his PHS when we got it.

**TOP SECRET**

22 October 1956 continued

25X1 [ ]: called me to say that the President's Board would probably  
 25X1 be told by the Pentagon that [ ] had been responsible for 25X1  
 developing a PM school in [ ]. He said that we had, but worked on this  
 with the Pentagon and that [ ] was aware of the progress in the matter.

25X1 Told [ ] that I talked to [ ] about his brother 25X1  
 and that I thought everything was on the tracks. +

Talked to the Director to fill him in on what had been going on during  
 his absence. He asked me to do the following things: to write a letter  
 to Killian telling him that he had just returned and that he had been fully  
 briefed by me and was available to see him at any time; to follow through on  
 Grogan's promotion to GS-16; to follow through on [ ] statement 25X1  
 to Grogan that we had a poor man in [ ] and also that [ ] was 25X1  
 close to [ ] to set up a meeting with White after his return to  
 talk about Commercial Staff, Cover and [ ]; to follow through on the recom- 25X1  
 mendations in the report on his trip. In briefing the Director I mentioned  
 the following things concerning the President's Board: Conolly and Bruce's  
 trip to [ ] Conolly's visit to Personnel; the organizational briefing  
 of Bruce; the luncheon with Killian, Cassidy and Conolly; the November  
 meeting, including the appointment with the President and the briefing of  
 Kent on Estimates and [ ] on planning; that Cassidy is looking into PP;  
 that Doolittle is concerned about the transition into war; that they will  
 give us a decision on the Clark recommendations; that Admiral Conolly  
 turned the [ ] papers over to me; that [ ] had talked 25X1  
 to Conolly about the [ ], that they were interested in 25X1  
 staybehind; critical of the [ ] effort; found most military attaches  
 hostile to CIA and too many attaches in the field; and discovered that each  
 department has issued separate instructions on agreed activities. In  
 discussing the IG staff I asked him to work out with General Crittenberger  
 [ ] I also got his approval of [ ] going to the 25X1  
 [ ], of Norman Paul's going to ONE or NEA, of [ ] under- 25X1  
 studying Paul and then taking over in June if satisfactory, of [ ] being 25X1  
 Acting Deputy IG, of [ ] joining the staff on 1 December 1956, and of  
 [ ] joining the staff on 1 September 1956. I also mentioned to  
 him the fact that [ ] would want to see him about [ ] 25X1  
 that I was trying to get [ ] located in a job; of the White House  
 lunch to hear about [ ] trip to Europe, of [ ] 25X1  
 operation; and of the [ ] cases. 25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

23 October 1956

Told Norman Paul that I discussed the question of the Legislative Counsel job with the Director and that the Director was willing to have him use [ ] 25X1 as his assistant during the next session of Congress to see how it would work out, but after that the Director would be perfectly willing to have Paul go to either ONE or perhaps take over as Chief of the NEA Division.

25X1 Called [ ] to tell him that I didn't like the tone of his  
25X1 letter to [ ] and that if I had known it would have been written in that  
tone I would never have suggested [ ]'s name. 25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1

Grogan: advised me that he was meeting with the Director and the Deputy Director to talk about the Group Hospitalization contract. He said that he believed some of our employees had written to Jerry Kluttz and that he was reasonably sure that Group Hospitalization had talked to Kluttz. He also said that he thought the ~~publicity~~ publicity would blow over very shortly. He advised me that we had discovered that one of the girls working in Group Hospitalization had offered a list of the names of all CIA employees who had been taking Group Hospitalization to a foreign diplomat and that we had turned over the matter to the FBI. I told Grogan that he should advise the Director that I did not think we should weaken on the decision to cancel GHI and that I would like to be consulted before any change in that decision was made.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

24 October 1956

I raised the question of a retirement provision in our bill and told the Director I thought we should fight hard with the Bureau of the Budget and the Civil Service Commission to get acceleration retirement for our people overseas. I stated that I thought we needed this in order to move senior people out and make way for bright junior officers. General Cabell said that he thought we needed it also so that it would be an incentive for people to serve overseas. I told the Director that there would be a meeting of the Career Council on this and that we would fully brief him following that. I also advised the Director that I was going to follow through on the [ ] case and that I thought we should exert every effort to bring this man to heel. 25X1

The Director asked me to look into our records of Iceland fish because of my recollection that we had indicated a possibility that the Soviet Union might gain strength in Iceland if they get a good contract for fish.

Called Reynolds and asked that he schedule a meeting of the Career Council for 1 November to consider the Retirement Bill. 25X1

[ ]

25X1  
Talked to Edwards about [ ] and he agreed that we might be able to work out a TDY assignment [ ] He will look at her file and let me know and I will then ask her to see him. 25X1

Sheldon: called to say that the recollection he had of the agreement for handling the matter in interpreting NSCID 9 was that the Director should issue a memorandum rather than raising it at a USCIB meeting. I said this was all right with me as long as this is clearly understood in the Agency. He said that he would check on it and the memorandum would go to the Director for signature.

25X1  
25X1 [ ] called about [ ] whose brother had been to see him, and I asked [ ] to talk to [ ] about the case. 25X1

[ ]

24 October 1956 continued

25X1



25X1

Asked Sheldon what had ever happened about the idea that [redacted] had sold the Director on the idea of having a periodical review which discussed the critical areas of the world. He said that they had done dry runs for two months and then had come to the conclusion there was no market for it.

25X1

25X1



**SECRET**

(continued)

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25 October 1956

25X1




25X1 At his request saw [redacted] who was disqualified for further employment because he had married a German girl. He wanted to get my advice on whether he should appeal. I said that I thought if he felt that he was a valuable professional and that the Agency would benefit by keeping him, that he should directly appeal to Mr. Dulles explaining his merits and his professional achievements. I suggested that he send this through me so that I could attach his Security and Personnel files.

Tom Polgar: called on this later to ask whether I thought there was a chance. I indicated that I thought it was worth doing.

Lunch with Walter Pforzheimer who indicated that Amory was setting up an outside library committee to see how good our library was. He also indicated that our library was very bad.

25X1


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The Director called to say that he wanted me to find out why we had apparently



25 October 1956 continued

25X1



25X1

Asked [redacted] to see Norman Paul on Tuesday, October 30, for that week's Career Counsel meeting.

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

12.

26 October 1956

Sheldon: called to say that he was very upset and took a dim view of the method of procedure of the President's Board of Consultants because they had gone to NSA and had seen our people who were assigned out there and asked them a lot of questions concerning liaison in our work. I asked him whether they had received the proper answers. He said that they had. I told him I saw nothing inappropriate in the way the President's Board operated and that I was most happy that they would proceed in that way and get to the working level to ask their questions.

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

Cord Myer: reported that [REDACTED] could see me in New York at 1030 am on Thursday the 1st of November. 25X1

No DCI staff meeting.

25X1 Talked to [REDACTED] about the rumor I had heard that he was using political influence to seek a job on the outside. He said that this was completely false although he had advised Helms that there was talk going around town that he might return to NSA. We then discussed his possible claim against the government along the lines of the bill that [REDACTED] had gotten [REDACTED] and I advised him that we would be happy to help him on this. He seemed appreciative and said he would like to come up at an early date and tell me what Staff D was doing. 25X1

25X1 At [REDACTED]'s request delivered the graduation talk to the BIC course.

25X1 Went over with [REDACTED] the I.O. survey progress.

LBK/IG

29 October 1956

25X1 At the DCI staff meeting suggested that somebody see [ ] to get his25X1  
views on what should be done in [ ]. Also pointed out that the assassination  
of Col. Bianca Rico in Cuba might well be the start of an anti-Batista Revolution.  
The Director asked that I make sure WH and OCI get together as this might be useful  
for the Bulletin. Mentioned this to [ ] and called25X1  
25X1 Sheldon to suggest that he ask [ ]. He said that [ ] had already25X1  
gone to see J.C. King.

White: asked me to attend the DD/S staff meeting at 11 am on Wednesday to  
hear his comments on his trip.

25X1 Reynolds: called to ask whether I got any results on the [ ] case. He 25X1  
said [ ] had reported that [ ] had made derogatory comments regarding  
the Agency to a foreign official. Asked [ ] to look for the [ ] papers 25X1  
and he advised that they had gone into the Director with General Cabell's  
concurrence in the recommendations.

25X1

[ ]  
Lunch with Col. Baird to discuss the trip to Princeton.

25X1

25X1 Talked to [ ] about the problem of her transfer. Also talked to  
Edwards about it.

25X1

[ ]  
(continued)

29 October 1956

25X1 Chapin: advised me that the Director had also given copies of his report on his trip to Truscott and [ ] I said I would coordinate any action with theirs.

25X1 Dr. James Andrews of OCD ~~is~~ called to say that [ ] had recently 25X1 run into [ ] a former employee who had resigned, and that [ ] hadn't 25X1 been able to find a job and apparently suspected that CIA might be blackballing him. I said that I would look into the matter with the Office of Personnel but that I was reasonably sure that this was not the case.

LBK/IG

12

30 October 1956

25X1

25X1

[redacted] came to lunch and we discussed the accomplishments of the [redacted]

Talked to Houston about the CIA club at Langley and he said that he would put somebody to work on it to find out what the legal problems involved were.

25X1

Went over with [redacted] his PER.

Called Truscott to tell him that I would follow up on the implementation of the DCI's report and would send him a copy.

Ashcraft: called concerning the New York trip and I asked him to advise Lea that I would be there Thursday night for dinner.

25X1

+

25X1

[redacted] called about the visit of [redacted] and said that they would send up the next material well in advance. 25X1

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

2


31 October 1956

At DCI meeting advised that we would be handling the [ ] case. The Director commented that he had no worries about any possible black-mail the man might use. He also asked that I see [ ] while in [ ] inasmuch as [ ] asked to see him.

25X1

25X1

25X1



Discussed the following points with the DCI: (1) See [ ] in [ ] (2) Discussion with [ ] concerning the [ ] (3) The college consultants program and the fact that I was going to [ ] (4) He expressed his general approval of the idea of a club for CIA personnel at Langley; (5) I reviewed the [ ] case for him and he agreed in general with the line we were following; (6) He signed the letter to the White House on [ ] and also the personnel action bringing [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

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**TOP SECRET**

5 November 1956

DCI Staff Meeting.

Had meetings with the following people:

25X1

25X1

Talked by telephone to the following people: [redacted] Col. Edwards on WH Security; Col. Grogan on the [redacted] case; Reynolds on the [redacted] case; [redacted] on the [redacted] case; and Sherman Kent about [redacted].

25X1

25X1

25X1

LBK/IG

25X1



6 November 1956

25X1 IG staff meeting at which [ ] reported briefly on his trip to 25X1  
[ ] on the TSS survey and [ ] raised the question of our intelligence  
failures and what caused them. There was general discussion of this and  
he will prepare a paper to the Director suggesting that we undertake an  
independent review on this subject.

Edwards: reported that [ ] had been 25X1  
completed and she came in to say good-bye and express her appreciation.

25X1 Edwards: reported that he had received a memorandum from the WH  
Division suggesting that Security do periodical inspections of [ ] 25X1  
[ ] stations. I said this was fine and that it did not in any way  
conflict with what we were to propose.

25X1 [ ] called to ask if I would give the lecture on Strategic  
Intelligence to the SIS.

25X1 [ ] called to advise me that they had been reviewing the colored  
employee roster. He said they now had one in [ ] and 25X1  
two in NEA Division headquarters. 25X1

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

L

7 November 1956

DCI staff meeting primarily occupied by flap over the Middle East. The DCI asked that Norman Paul and I brief the Friday staff meeting of what if any effect the changes in Congress will have on our relations.

Baird: came in to discuss strategy at the Career Service Council and I suggested that the first thing we should decide whether it was agreed that the Council should be the final acting body on Regulations.

Col. White: called on the same subject and suggested that we start off the meeting with an executive session.

I called General Cassidy to advise him of the forth-coming press release from the Senate Internal Security Committee in which Adm. Cooke states that he twice approached the Naval member of the Board but never was invited to appear before the Board. Cassidy also advised that he was seeing [ ] on Friday and that we could proceed on that day with our separation.

Carey: called to ask whether there was any immediate plan to take [ ] out of FDD. I said no that I hadn't heard yet from [ ]. 25X1  
Called [ ] and asked him what his plans were and he said he was ready to talk to [ ]. I said I would talk to [ ] and tell him to call [ ] to ask for an appointment. 25X1

Called [ ] to ask him about the status of [ ]. He said that he would check into it and call me back. [ ] came in and told a long sad tale about not being gainfully employed in NEA and I said the best thing to do would be to ~~move him~~ move him to OCD for him to do liaison with the Navy. He seemed happy with this idea. 25X1

[ ] called to say that they had a file from [ ] on the [ ] case and wondered whether they should take action to accept his resignation. I said that I thought they should take no action until we got the answer from the present team in [ ]. 25X1

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

8 November 1956

25X1 [ ] : came in to talk about her assignment in headquarters  
and said there was a possibility of taking [ ] job on 25X1  
25X1 [ ] staff.

25X1 [ ] called to report that [ ] was personally handling 25X1  
25X1 the [ ] case but that they would report about it to me on Monday. He  
also indicated to me that there was the possibility of assigning [ ] 25X1  
to Security.

25X1 [ ] called to say that the [ ] operations which 25X1  
25X1 [ ] had reported from [ ] were several years old. 25X1

25X1 General Cassidy: called to ask if we could arrange for a special  
plane to take Dr. Killian to Charleston, W. Va., if he stayed after 1200  
talking to the Director. [ ] arranged for a plane but Dr. Killian  
changed his mind and left on the commercial air line.

25X1 [ ] called and said that he was planning to send [ ] 25X1  
25X1 [ ] to Europe to work on [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] brought in a DD/P comment on the DD/S survey and I  
25X1 advised him that I would talk to Col. White about it some time next  
week after both [ ] were back.

25X1 [ ] called to ask if he could make copies of the PPC  
survey to circulate within his own staff. I told him to feel free.

25X1 Lunch with White to discuss what action should be taken on the Personnel  
Office. He feels that in addition to a new Director of Personnel that  
every division chief should be changed. I told him that I agreed. We also  
25X1 discussed [ ] whom White told he could not have the Personnel Office  
25X1 job. I suggested to White that if the [ ] job does not go through that 25X1  
[ ]

25X1 [ ] came in to advise that he was very happy in the  
OCI job but that the doctors had now advised him that he could go overseas  
and he was rather interested in the [ ] I suggested that after 25X1  
one tour of duty overseas, he should make up his mind in what area he would  
wish to pursue his career and stick to it.

**TOP SECRET**

12

8 November 1956 continued

Meeting of the Career Council.

Dinner at the Alibi club for

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

9 November 1956

Col. Edwards came in to talk.

Talked to the following people by telephone: Col. Baird on language training; Col. Edwards on the [ ] case; [ ] of WH Division; Reynolds on the [ ] case; [ ]

25X1  
25X1

LBK/IG-kp

**TOP SECRET**

12 November 1956

Saw the following people: Col. Edwards;  and Gen. Cabell. 25X1

LBK/IG-kp

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

13 November 1956

Gave a lecture to the Strategic Intelligence School

Set up meeting on the building club.

Talked to Cassidy about when DCI appears at the Board Meeting.

IG Staff Meeting.

Checked on  exit interview.

LBK/IG

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

14 November 1956

25X1      Talked to Helms about the [ ] case and about the building club.

25X1      Talked to Angleton on the [ ] case.

25X1      Talked to [ ] case.

25X1      Told [ ] I will lead off on the [ ] case.

25X1

25X1      Saw [ ] today on the financial transactions for the last two years  
25X1      by [ ]

25X1      [ ] called to say that Security Office has no interest in  
25X1      [ ]; that Personnel is now determining how many positions they have  
in OCR, who is in them, etc., to see if [ ] can be considered there;  
that they will not approach either OCR or [ ] about this possibility  
until checking back here.

25X1+  
25X1

General Cassidy came over to discuss items for future board meeting.

Deputy's meeting and Senior Staff meeting.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**



TOP SECRET

15 November 1956

25X1      Talked to [ ] in the presence of [ ]. (See memo for the record.) 25X1

Delivered a lecture to the Basic Management Course.

25X1      Went over with [ ] the WH survey.

2½ hour meeting of the Career Council to deliberate on incentive awards for language courses and to interview the candidates for Harvard and the Armed Forces Staff College.

Sheldon: called about briefing the President's Board. Told him that it was for 28 November and should be a roundup of the world situation.

25X1      [ ] called and said he would like to come and talk to me about the work that [ ] was going to do. 25X1

[ ] 25X1

Randolph Higgs of State: called and checked on what he should tell Cassidy, Bruce and Lovett. Told him that they were fully cleared and to tell them anything about CIA.

Cassidy: called to say that Dr. Killian would be here on the afternoon of the 27th and that [ ] today. 25X1

LBK/IG

16 November 1956

At the DCI's meeting advised him of the request of Messrs. Lovett and Bruce to see him to discuss PP operations; also advised that I would reply to the Killian letter of the apparent mix up in dates; and recommended that there be no action taken to reply to any of [ ] allegations.

Koren: came to see me and asked that they receive a copy of the Current Intelligence Digest addressed to Frank Nash, 106 A, Executive Office Building. He reported that they were concerned with anything affecting U.S. overseas bases and called concerning the studies on [ ] that State and Defense have set up task forces under Douglas MacArthur and Gordon Gray and each is sending a letter to all overseas missions dealing with the political and psychological impact of U.S. bases, the problem of U.S. Jurisdiction and mutuality of interest. Koren will send me copies of the President's letter as well as these two.

[ ] of the DDI staff came down to ask about two items on the DCI's trip. I said that it was the Director's idea that the DDI raise the matter of [ ] economy at the NSC Planning Board and that the matter of the University [ ]

Cassidy: called to say Gen. Hull would like to have the material on the Near Eastern crisis kept intact as he wants to look at it again next week. Cassidy also asked that we check on the two witnesses before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee inasmuch as [ ] had told him that our man in [ ] had approved their bringing one here.

[ ] of I&R came up and reported to [ ] and myself on his observations concerning operations [ ].

Meeting with appropriate individuals on the CIA club. (See memo for the record.)

16 November 1956 continued

25X1

[ ] has a case concerning a hardship post which he is going to send up to us to look at as an example. When we receive it, could the man who is working on the problem please call [ ] so that he could explain it to that person. 25X1


TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

✓

17 November 1956

25X1




25X1

25X1


Briefed the DCI on the [redacted] case and he approved the action taken and being planned. He stated, however, that we should analyze the case thoroughly and take the necessary steps to insure that it didn't happen again.

25X1



The DCI advised me of his discussion with Messrs Bruce and Lovett of the President's Board. He said that they were interested in PP operations on a world-wide basis. They wanted to know how national policy is defined. They wanted to be assured that CIA personnel who guide PP operations know the US policy governing them. He asked that we take out of the NSC papers all of the ones pertaining to

25X1



LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

**Page Denied**

6

225X1

25X1

25X1

(Continued)

~~TOP SECRET~~

19 November 1956 continued

The Director called to ask whether he was coming to the Killian Board for 27 November. Told him that I had told Dr. Killian he wouldn't be available then. In view of this, he thought he would stay and have dinner with President Griswald of Yale. I said that this would be very useful for the College Recruitment Program.

25X1

[redacted] called to say that he would take [redacted] Told him I would ask [redacted] to work out the details concerning a desk and a slot.

25X1

Advised Shaffer of Training that the DCI was going to Yale and suggested they prepare a paper of what he should discuss with President Griswald.

Asked George Carey whether FDD could carry [redacted] and he advised that they were overslotted at the moment. Then discussed with him the [redacted] office and said that I had read the [redacted] report in full and thought that we should now present it for discussions first with him, [redacted] and Ashcraft, and then with [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

(Continued)

19 November 1956 continued

25X1 [ ] reported that [ ] had called him today and said that he had been asked to submit a sworn statement to Civil Service. Told [ ] that we were going to list perennial cases and would advise his office and Security of these cases so that any action on them could be checked out with us. 25X1

LBK/IG



12

20 November 1956

IG Staff Meeting. Reviewed the problems likely to be raised at the meeting of the President's Board and advised the staff of the meeting for a CIA clubhouse and the meeting to strengthen our security laws.

Cassidy: called to say he was going to see Dr. Killian tonight and I suggested that I send over a tentative list of subjects the DCI might raise when he meets with the Board next week.

25X1 [ ] brought in the cables and the book prepared by the DD/P on the  
25X1 DCI's trip. Told him I would put this together with the other material and send it to [ ] to review and make sure that all recommendations were being acted upon.

Grogan: came over to tell me about the DCI's talk with 22 members of the press at dinner last night. He felt that it had gone very well and it served to correct the misimpression that we had been caught completely by surprise by developments in the Middle East and in Hungary. He said David Lawrence commented to him that he thought the DCI should make fewer speeches and shorter ones.

DCI: buzzed and asked about Norman Paul's promotion. Told him it was in the mill.

DCI: buzzed and asked if I would have Gen. Cassidy ask Dr. Killian whether they really wanted a world roundup.

Called Edwards and asked him if he would please ask everybody receiving the memorandum on the building to retain the copy themselves. Also asked him to send me the last three monthly reports of the Security Office to show the President's Board.

25X1 Called [ ] and asked him to send me two copies of the Clandestine Services Policy Book--one for myself and one for the President's Board.

25X1 Asked [ ] if ONE to send me a copy of the last IAC Annual Report.

Sheldon: advised me that the DCI might want to discuss once again the question of NSCID 9 when he meets with the President's Board. I also asked Sheldon if there was a USCIB Annual Report. He said that there wasn't but that

~~TOP SECRET~~

20 November 1956 continued

General Canine had given a roundup after his five years as Director today in Secretary Robertson's Office. I asked him if he would please suggest to Canine that he either pass this directly to the Board or give the conclusions to pass to the Board.

25X1 Asked [ ] to make sure that the memoranda on the Agency club were handled by individuals named and did the same with [ ] 25X1

Koren: called and I said that I would send for the material he has for me. He also advised that he would accompany Mr. Nash when he comes to see the DCI Friday afternoon.

25X1

LBK/IG

**Page Denied**

~~TOP SECRET~~

✓

26 November 1956

25X1

DCI Staff Meeting at which I suggested to the Director that he see [ ] when he was in New Haven. The Director asked that I have Grogan get together a book on the clippings of alleged intelligence failures.

DDCI: called on the Monthly Report and said that he thought the section on the Payroll Branch was very good and wanted to make sure that it had been sent to the DD/S.

The DDCI: called on case 404 in the Monthly Report and asked why it had not been a case of a directed assignment. Told him we would look into it and let him know.

25X1

DDCI: called to say that the OCB did not go into the [ ] at the meeting. So advised [ ]. 25X1

Went over with Amory his proposed presentation to the President's Board.

25X1

Told [ ] he did not have to make his talk to the President's Board.

25X1

[ ] called to ask for a 12-hour extension on the material he was preparing for the President's Board.

25X1

Lunch with [ ].

25X1

in [ ] : came up to discuss generally how things were going

25X1

Together with [ ] went over with White and Lloyd the DD/S survey. See memo for the record.

25X1

Went over with Carey, Ashcraft and [ ] the situation in the [ ] Office and asked that they get [ ] to come down to talk to us about it. 25X1

27 November 1956

25X1

25X1

Went over with [ ] their findings on the [ ]

25X1

Went over with [ ]

Cord Myer: called on the policy controls over [ ] and I 25X1  
advised him that we were preparing a memorandum and that [ ] would coordinate 25X1  
it with him.

25X1

25X1

[ ] dropped in to say hello.

25X1

Talked to [ ] about the [ ] case.

25X1

Houston: came over to talk about [ ] and to find out whether 25X1  
I agreed we should do our best to help him get a job. Told him that I thought  
we should even up to the point of getting him a Security clearance if it is  
a government contract.

25X1

25X1

Cassidy: called about the report Mrs. Luce made and I tried to have  
it located through Helms and [ ] We finally got it from the  
[ ] where it had just arrived.

25X1

Advised [ ] that OCR did not feel they could take ( [ ] r 25X1  
at this time but that they would keep it under consideration for a couple of  
weeks.

LBK/IG

SECRET

2

28 November 1956

Went over with the Director the material for the President's Board and spent from 2:30 until 5:45 with the DCI at the President's Board. See Memorandum for the Record.

25X1

[ ] called on cables involving hardship posts. Asked him to send them up so that we could use them.

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

29 November 1956

Cassidy: called and said that he would like to show the Board the Comint intelligence for the day. I told him to go ahead that I would authorize it on behalf of the Director. I so advised Sheldon.

Cassidy: called to ask whether the Agency had ever had a management review by an outside group. I told him no.

Arranged with Cassidy for the Director to see the Board to talk about intelligence relations to policy.

Bob King: of Nixon's office called to talk about [redacted]. Gave him the details of the case and he seemed satisfied. 25X1 +



25X1

LBK/IG

4 December 1956

At DCI meeting took strong stand against re-employing people who leave Agency to go into politics. Advised DCI that [ ] left the dinner because of his 4 a.m. schedule. Also suggested a follow-up on

25X1

25X1

[ ]

Advised Cassidy that DCI had talked to Goodpaster about the recommendations.

25X1

Filled in DCI about [ ]

25X1

[ ]

Cassidy: called to say he would like to go through the library and reference area next week.

25X1

Told [ ] I had no spot on the staff for him. Suggested Economic Warfare in DD/P, which he said he wasn't interested in, Management Staff or DD/S or Training. Said I thought he had burned his bridges by resigning his position in ORR.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ] came up to say he wasn't earning his pay as FI briefing officer [ ]. He said he felt a great injustice had been done him by the I&R report. I said I would review his case and talk to him again.

(Continued)



4 December 1956 continued

Gave Gen. Truscott the DD/P comments on the DCI recommendations, and also the recommendations of the President's Board.

Review of IO survey.

Review of TSS survey.

LBK/IG

5 December 1956

25X1 [ ] called to ask what I intended by the memorandum on the club building. Asked him how he got it and he said that [ ] had given it to him. He then went into a long dissertation about why this was not a good idea. 25X1

Baird: came in to talk about his difficulties with the DD/S who had apparently indicated that he did not feel that Baird <sup>was</sup> effective as the Director of Training. Apparently the DD/S could not explain how Baird could be Director of Training when he admitted that he has no other authority over any other part of the Agency.

Grogan: called to say that the New York News was preparing an article on CIA's coverage of the Middle Eastern crisis in which they commented that the CIA inspector had been dissatisfied with the coverage and wanted a review made overseas. I told Grogan I did not know what they could be talking about. He also asked about an ORR researcher who wished to have his name listed as employed by ICA. I said that I thought that our policy should be to confine this to senior officials who would become known publicly.

Cassidy: called to advise that the meeting of the President's Board would be on December 20th and that they would see the President at 3 P.M. that day. I advised the DCI and DDCI's office.

Meeting of the Supergrade Board.

LBK/IG

✓

4 December 1956

Cassidy: came over and brought Harold R. Lawrence. He asked that we get a badge for Lawrence. He also asked if we would give them a short memorandum indicating what effect the Middle Eastern crisis had had on our personnel dispositions.

General Hull: came in and asked several questions on ~~the~~ Middle Eastern intelligence. These included a question as to why the Watch Committee on 24 October had decided not to concern itself with Middle Eastern affairs. He also asked to see the reports sent in by our special observers on [ ] 25X1 and also the cables from the ambassadors in London and Paris. I got all this material for him and he suggested that the Director bring the [ ] 25X1 material with him to the next meeting of the Board.

[ ] 25X1

The DDCI brought down a letter on [ ] from Cong. Teague and asked that we conduct an investigation into this matter. 25X1

Asked Edwards to initiate a badge for Harold Lawrence.

The DDCI: came down to say that he was going to designate the DD/S as the focal point for dealing with the Frank Nash group.

LBK/IG

✓

6 December 1956

25X1

At [ ] request he came up to talk to me about the I&R Staff. I described to him briefly the history of the staff pointing out that it was now completely an internal DD/P unit which reported to the DD/P on all matters except where there had been malfeasance or criminal fraud in which case it was decided, after consultation with this staff, who would handle it.

The DCI buzzed to asked about the Killian Board and I pointed out that they would not be here until the 20th and that I did not expect any meetings before that although I had known that Dr. Killian was in town today.

[ ]

25X1

25X1

The DCI called about the cable from [ ] on the briefing of Cong. Thomas. I told him that we had not known about the briefing in advance and that I would take care of the guidance to be sent to [ ] Discussed this with [ ] and Norman Paul and asked that a cable be sent telling [ ] to brief Thomas and be sure to explain why we needed so many people and also to stay away from details of operations.

25X1

DDCI: called to say that Cong. Teague was checking with his source to get more details on [ ] So advised Norman Paul.

Cassidy: called to say that in the other dispatch by Mrs. Luce she had only ~~been~~ very nice things to say about CIA including a recommendation that CIA activities be increased.

25X1

[ ] called to say that [ ] had come down to ask some questions on research and development and he wondered who he was.

25X1

Went over the [ ] case with [ ] and suggested a couple of changes in his memorandum.

25X1

[ ]: called to talk about 20 minutes on the inability of the Language Committee to reach any decisions. He suggested that I meet with this Committee plus Baird on Monday and see what could be worked out. Told him to ask the others to come at 2:00.

TOP SECRET

12

6 December 1956 continued

25X1 Went over with [ ] the case of [ ] and told him that I would 25X1  
25X1 talk to the Director about it. He also advised me that we would probably be  
25X1 hearing from [ ] inasmuch as she and her lawyer have been having  
discussions with [ ] and a representative from the General Counsel's Office. +

25X1 [ ] called about a Master Sergeant who apparently had left the  
Agency in a great fit of temper and threatened to go to his Congressman.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

7 December 1956

DCI Staff Meeting.

25X1

Met with

25X1

Met with

25X1

Met with

Meeting with Norman Paul.

TSS Survey review.

IO Survey review.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

11 December 1956

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1

Lunched with

Met with Harrison Reynolds.

25X1

Met with

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

12 December 1956

DCI Staff Meeting.

Met with Col. White and Norman Paul.

Meeting of the proposed new club for Langley building.

Met with 1

Talked by telephone to the following: Helms; Reynolds on the Public Service Aid Society; DCI on PSAS and on my Princeton trip;  on Training.

25X1

LBK/IG



**TOP SECRET**

14 December 1956

DCI Staff Meeting.

25X1

Introduced  to DDCI and DCI.

I.O. Division Survey review.

TSS Survey review.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

17 December 1956

Attended official luncheon for Cong. Thomas.

25X1

[ ] Had appointments with the following two people: [ ] 25X1

Attended meeting on Career Opportunities.

25X1  
25X1

Talked to the following people by telephone: Bob King of Nixon's office;  
[ ] Helms on TSS: DDGI; [ ]; Grogan and Paul; [ ] Reynold; [ ] 25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

18 December 1956

IG Staff Meeting.

Had appointments with the following people: [ ] on NEA Survey; 25X1  
[ ]; Edwards-[ ]

Attended official luncheon for [ ]

25X1

LBK/IG

Discussed inspection of duplication and overlapping in field of  
Communist endeavor.

24 December 1956

General Cabell at my suggestion called Cong. Teague, who he had previously called on the 21st, to remind him of the [redacted] matter. Teague said he had tried to reach his source, who was out of town, but would try again.

25X1

LBK/IG

26 December 1956

25X1

Met with [ ] on TSS Survey, etc.

25X1

Met with [ ]

Meeting with NEA Divison Chiefs on NEA Survey.

25X1

25X1

Talked by telephone to the following people:  
Gorgan on [ ]; and Sheldon.

LBK/IG

27 December 1956

25X1

[redacted] dropped in to say hello. Had come home on leave and was down for the day.

25X1

[redacted] came in to ask that PPC get a 30 day extension on reply to the survey. Said it was OK with me and so advised [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

[redacted] brought in letter to DCI from [redacted]. Told him to send the acknowledgment and send to [redacted] in IO. 25X1

NEA survey with [redacted] 25X1  
Went over staff functions.

25X1

Talked to [redacted] and he said they couldn't use him in NEA; that the DD/I couldn't use him.

25X1  
25X1

[redacted] Cabell sent word by [redacted] that he wanted me to handle the material.

25X1

[redacted] checked in on the NEA travel.

Amory called to ask if he could give further dissemination to the South American roundup. Told him yes.

25X1

Norman Paul advised of Gen. Kuter's statement to Cong. Leroy Johnson (R. Calif.) that CIA help was invaluable; of [redacted] being the one who possibly told Cong. Dodd that there was a deal on [redacted]; of DDCI checking with Teague on [redacted]

25X1

25X1

LBK/IG

28 December 1956

25X1      Advised DDCI of surfacing plans for [ ] 25X1  
and said we would ask [ ] to check it out with him; had lengthy  
discussion on subject of notice re. medical benefits for dependents  
and he agreed to a modified form of notice now--said to advise DD/S  
and ask him to check it out with him; asked him whether he had any  
suggestions for improvement in IG work or whether he thought it needed  
inspection. He had no suggestions and said he didn't think an inspection  
necessary. Advised him I thought we would get pressure from the White  
House and Congress to cut down on manpower--he said he thought the  
DCI should take the offensive.

[ ] 25X1

25X1      [ ] called to ask what reply should be given [ ] in 25X1  
OSI. Said I thought it should be oral to affect IG had look/into it.  
ed

25X1      Went to [ ] to spend an hour with [ ] on R&D. 25X1  
He was highly critical of Materiels Board and said it was dominated by  
Secretariat.

25X1      Gave [ ] fitness reports.

LBK/IG

31 December 1956

R

25X1

Went over allocation of responsibilities for NEA survey with [redacted]  
[redacted]. Their travel will cover from approximately 20 January to  
the first of March. I will call both [redacted] and Angleton to talk to  
them about the survey.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Introduced [redacted] and told the latter to take him from  
there.

Cassidy called to say he would like to come over on Wednesday and read  
the IAC and Watch Committee minutes for the last three months.

25X1

[redacted] asked if I wanted to attend the CBS dinner on 3 January.  
Told him I would let him know.

25X1

[redacted] called to say [redacted] had until 14 January to make a decision  
as to where to go, and that he would like very much to get on the IG staff.

25X1

25X1

Grogan said he was trying to get transcript of CBS roundup. Told  
story of [redacted] trying to get a letter to [redacted] for a [redacted]  
ex-marine, who was going to [redacted]

25X1

LBK/IG



**TOP SECRET**

2 January 1957

At DCI's meeting reported on IG visits to different components today. Also suggested that all supervisors get around to see their people--DCI told Deputies to see that this was done. Reported (1) that Gen. Kuter had told Leroy Johnston (R. Calif.) that CIA's assistance was invaluable; (2) that we had sent out a cable on the [ ] visit and that the two basic questions were on how much the Ambassador coordinated and our relations with other intelligence components; (3) that Cassidy was coming over today to read the IAC and Watch Committee minutes and the next meeting of the President's Board was 27 February; (4) that DCI would receive letters to Russell and Vinson re. meetings and we would want to aggressively see new members (DDCI said he had written Sen. Joseph Clark).

25X1

Suggested DCI see [ ] and we ask him about [ ] He asked if I would call him.

25X1

DCI said he had talked to Jack Kennedy and would also call Hubert Humphrey as he had heard he had made many valuable contacts at [ ]

25X1

DCI asked that I prepare a suggested list of people who would brief the Deputys meeting periodically.

IG staff meeting at which men were sent to following:

Comptroller  
Payroll Branch and  
any coordination or monitoring of research project

FI  
Cover Branch  
RI

Personnel  
Military Personnel Division  
Personnel Reocrds  
Career Service Progress

DCI Office  
Regulations Control Staff  
Cable Secretariat

OCR - Skating Rink (RISTA)  
Possibly ORR Map Library

FDD - [ ]

FBID - [ ]

Logistics

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

2 January 1957 continued

25X1 DDCI advised that Cong. Teague said he had gotten the information  
from the informant on [ ] and would send it down, but that the  
25X1 informant would prefer not to become involved. Also said Teague had  
heard [ ] planned to retire in two months. White called to ask  
about this case; said he didn't know anything about [ ]  
leaving and they were planning to send him overseas in summer of 1957. 25X1 +

Called both White and Lloyd to ask about what had been done on  
the memo. on Payroll Branch. Lloyd said he had the memo, and it  
had "been lost in the Christmas rush."

Cassidy came over and said the war planning comment dealt with  
the over-all community--JCS preparedness; that Doolittle would be down  
shortly to look at costs; that the President had been quite strong  
on his comments on economy in the current intelligence field.

J. C. King called to say "muchos gracias" for the WH Division  
survey and that there might be some items he would like to talk about;  
he also invited me to dinner Wednesday, 9 January, for [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] called to say they wanted to hire [ ] Also said he  
would like to meet one of the survey team abroad, if possible. 25X1

25X1 DCI called about a letter from [ ] on his medical claim;  
talked to [ ] about it who said [ ] doctors didn't agree. 25X1  
25X1 +


LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

3 January 1957

Attended dinner given at Alibi Club by DCI for CBS foreign correspondents. 25X1.



Went over recommendations of President's Board with DCI, and gave him recommendations on how to improve the Agency.

25X1 Told DCI I did not think the following were making any contribution to the Agency and I thought they were bad for the morale of the working level: [redacted] He said he was contemplating replacing [redacted]

DCI said to set up a lunch for [redacted]

25X1

DCI called Goodpaster about recommendations of President's Board and suggested that they meet with [redacted]

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

5 January 1957

Amory came down to read the recommendations of the President's Board. Told him I wanted to see him and Scoville about the situation in OSI. He said he and Scoville had been talking about the situation, and both agreed it was a bad situation. He said he wasn't sure [ ] coming to IG staff was a good idea. I said that should [ ] go back to OSI, it should only be as "line" deputy.

25X1

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

2

7 January 1957

25X1 Cassidy called to say he would come over tomorrow and also would call  
[ ] to arrange for his and Bruce's trip on 6 March to the [ ] 25X1  
25X1 called Andrews in OCR to tell him Cassidy would be coming over tomorrow  
to see his office and [ ] would bring him down.

Andrews of OCR asked for a copy of our study on SS cables.

25X1 Told [ ] about conversation with Amory.

25X1 Asked [ ] to get cards on committees we chaired from [ ] 25X1  
office. 25X1

[ ]

25X1 [ ] d [ ] 25X1  
[ ] 25X1

Went over Congressional problems with Norman Paul.

Reviewed program for NSA survey.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

8 January 1957

IG staff meeting.

Cassidy went over with me the Board's recommendations. All of this is reflected in the memorandum prepared for the DCI. He also said that Killian was very annoyed about Wisner calling Gordon Gray about the [ ] paper and had said that the Board would not tolerate interference in its affairs. He, Cassidy, had called Wisner about this. He said he also knew of Wisner's activities in trying to influence Bruce and Lovett.

25X1

[ ] dropped in and asked for our schedule for the balance of this year. He also said he was revising their procedures. I suggested that (1) they leave personalities out of their surveys; (2) that where they do a report on an individual they provide some method for adjudication.

Sheldon called to ask whether President's Board questions on current intelligence were on substance or procedure. I told him procedure, and then confirmed this with Harold Lawrence.

25X1

Asked Adm. Hillenkoetter over to lunch with DCI on Jan 29th.

Koren called to thank me for getting [ ] lined up.

25X1

Told [ ] and would drop over and see his people. He said that he would like to see him.

[ ] said new building would not have any electronic features that could act as beacon for hostile planes, that only feature on new building was mast for horizontal microwave transmissions and all of rest would be landlines.

Advised Normal Paul of talks with [ ]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

9 January 1957

Norman Paul said he was to see Senator Hayden and set up a meeting.

25X1

Arranged for  to see Cabell on Africa.

25X1

Talked to .

LBK/IG

**SECRET**

10 January 1957

25X1

[ ] a returnee, dropped in for an interview.

Meeting with Amory and Scoville.

Meeting with Col. White and Norman Paul.

Attended official luncheon for [ ]

25X1

Meeting with the DCI this afternoon.

Attended Career Council meeting.

25X1

25X1

Talked by telephone to the following people: DCI, Gen. Cassidy, [ ]  
[ ] and Mr. Paul.

LBK/IG



~~SECRET~~

14 January 1957

DCI staff meeting.

Senior Staff Meeting.

Bob King of Nixon's office came over for lunch.

25X1 [ ] dropped in to see me.

25X1 Meeting with [ ]

Meeting with General Truscott.

LBK/IG

Reynolds called to ask that I send him a paper on [ ] Also, I asked to insure that wording of letter on BEC claims be more diplomatically phrased.

25X1  
T

25X1 Scoville called about Harold Lawrence and his clearance for AQUATONE. Asked to have [ ] office record his clearance.

25X1 I [ ] reported that Harold Lawrence wanted to see NSC 10 10, and all papers relating to it.

~~TOP SECRET~~

15 January 1957

IG Staff meeting at which the subject of support per diem to insure against loss was discussed and the realignment of FE and NEA was also discussed.

Meeting with Mr. Angleton.

25X1

[ ] a returnee, came in for an interview.

25X1

[ ] dropped in with a paper.

25X1

[ ] came in to Lunch.

25X1

[ ] came down to discuss survey.

25X1

Talked by telephone to the following: Sheldon, Baird, Coyne, White, Cassidy and [ ]

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

31 January 1957

25X1

+

Meeting with the DCI at which we discussed [ ] Mike Burke and the 25X1  
proposed TV series; the Killian briefings; who briefs the 26 Feb. Board  
meeting; Congressional rules-[ ] 25X1

Talked to the following people by telephone: [ ] 25X1  
and Mr. Amory.

25X1

[ ] came in to discuss a problem.

+

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

1 February 1957

25X1  
25X1

Talked to [ ] about [ ]; Robert McCollum, Head of the Defector and Refugee Program at State; and asked if [ ] has changed jobs.

25X1

Lunched with Robert McCollum

25X1

Meeting with DCI, [ ] and Helms.

25X1

[ ] called to say the PPC reply would be here on Tuesday.

25X1

[ ] : called.

25X1

Called [ ]

Report of recommendations made by the Killian Board:

1, 4, 9 and 10 - to DCI done.

6, 3, 2 - joint

8a & 5 - information

2, 3, 4, & 8b - May 1, to President

5, 7, 82 & 10 - To President as soon as possible.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

4 February 1957

DCI meeting.

25X1

Asked [ ] about scheduling the CBS TV discussions for a Deputy's Meeting and he said he would check with the Director.

25X1

+

25X1

25X1  
25X1

I called [ ] and asked him to send me the I&R report on [ ] which he said was rather<sup>a</sup> poor and rambling job but which was beyond change when he received it. I also asked him if he would talk to [ ] and he said he would be glad to.

25X1

I asked Norman Paul to supervise the distribution of the book "Hungarian Tragedy" to members of Congress.

Talked to Cassidy about Doolittle's review of Finance and told him that we had arranged for a one hour briefing first by the Comptroller and then by the Auditor. He said this seemed to be fine and that he wouldn't know any more about Doolittle's desires until he returned. Advised Col. White of this.

Cassidy: advised that the Board would desire a status report on the implementation of their recommendations at the time of its 26 February meeting.

**TOP SECRET**

(continued)

**TOP SECRET**

R

4 February 1957 .continued

Cassidy: advised that General Hull would be going to Europe in April and would spend a couple of days in [redacted] and then a few [redacted] 25X1 25X1

Jack Blake: called to say he would like to delay submitting the memorandum on hardship posts until after he had a chance to discuss it with Tracy Barnes next week.

Ashcraft: called to advise me of a large group of [redacted] personnel who were in town this week. 25X1

25X1

25X1

Frank Hand: came over to fill me in on the Defense Department's reaction to the President's Board recommendations. He said that Godel had the Defense Department statutory member's copy of the recommendations. He also said that Godel was trying to persuade Rubin Robertson to name him, Godel, to deal with the DCI on ~~the~~ the 5412 item. He further advised that Godel was aware of the hostility of both Allen Dulles and Frank Wisner and had pretty effectively mobilized the Defense Department behind him including Admiral Radford. He advised that Godel's claim was to the effect the CIA did not live up to its obligations. He further stated that Godel believed that he had John Cassidy pretty much on his side. My only comments to Hand were to the effect that I had only one dealing with Godel and that was by telephone but that I understood that he was a quite brilliant fellow.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET***R.*

6 February 1957

Lengthy discussion at Deputy's Meeting of the question of a TV series on O.S.S. with CIA giving limited cooperation. At the conclusion of the discussion the Director asked me to draw up a method of procedure concerning this. Helms called to express his concern over the views of Col Grogan on this subject. Mike Burke called from New York and I advised him that we should have a final decision by early next week.

[REDACTED]

The DCI buzzed to ask when [REDACTED] was resigning. I said he was close to 70 and had been talking about retirement for some time. [REDACTED] came down later to say that he was not interested in a full time job in [REDACTED] but would like something part time to do. I told him that I would keep it in mind and see what we could develop and that two thoughts occurred to me at the moment--one as consultant to the OO Office; and the other as member of the Executive Committee of the [REDACTED]. He repeated that he didn't want anything that would tie him down and that he wanted to earn some extra income.

Lunch with [REDACTED]

Meeting of the PRC.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

7 February 1957

R

25X1

[ ] came in to leave a report on the Middle East situation which I forwarded to Amory for any further dissemination.

25X1  
25X1

Edwards, [ ] came to discuss technical countermeasures with [ ] and myself as part of the TSS survey. We also discussed the general philosophy as to whether Security should put an officer in each field station to engage in all types of countermeasures.

Met with the Director, General Cabell and General Truscott and went over the action papers which I prepared on the President's Board of Consultants recommendations. They agreed to the bulk of these and the Director signed those with which he agreed, ~~with~~.

Talked to McCollum about a lunch with Tracy Barnes and agreed to set it up on Thursday, 21 February 1957.

Meeting of the Career Council.

Went over with Norman Paul the various legislative proposals.

25X1

At the Director's request called Helms to check on whether there had been any cables sent on [ ] trip. He said there had and he did not think an additional one was necessary.

At the Director's request called Pat Coyne and talked to him about the recommendations of the President's Board. He suggested that we informally advise the IAC ~~and~~ that we are working on our internal actions.

LBK/IG



**TOP SECRET**

8 February 1957

25X1 P.  
Talked to [ ] at Cassidy's office to let us know when she couldn't get a replacement and we would try to arrange for one.

Also asked her to set up a time for [ ] and myself to see Dr. Killian. 25X1

Advised General Truscott of the status of the recommendations.

25X1 [ ] called to say that he had not yet gotten a job and I told him that I would look into the matter immediately. I called [ ] who said that Stewart would be out of town until next Wednesday but that he would call [ ] and promise him that we would have a job for him by Wednesday. 25X1

25X1 At Mat Baird's request talked to Jack Blake about a job running the Management Course. Blake was receptive about it but did not want to jeopardize his position with White: I asked Baird to check this out in advance with [ ] and Blake.

25X1 Lunch with [ ]

25X1 [ ] and her husband dropped in.

25X1 Together with [ ] talked to Killian about TSS and scientific matters.

25X1 [ ] called to ask if I wanted to put any instructions on the ~~making~~ dealing with [ ]. I told him "no" as long as this was a follow-up to [ ] meeting with the Director. 25X1

Pat Coyne called concerning the Director's paper to Cutler on deception and raised the question as to whether another committee is really needed.

**TOP SECRET**

11 February 1957

Talked to Helms about Doolittle and [redacted]  
and television program.

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

Helms called about the [redacted] case.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] came in about a job.

25X1

[redacted] of OSI dropped in.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**Page Denied**

~~TOP SECRET~~

12 February 1957

R

IG Staff Meeting.

Meeting with the Director on career legislation at which he informally approved presenting our bill to the Bureau of the Budget and Chairman Vinson.

i [redacted] d

25X1

Sheldon called to see whether the information on the briefing the President's Board wishes on 26 February could be more specific. I advised him that the information which I had given Mr. Amory was a precise quote of the memorandum we had received from the President's Board.

25X1 Sheldon said that [redacted] who was with OOI, would like  
25X1 very much to talk to me about joining the IG Staff. I said I would be  
very happy to see [redacted]

25X1 Together with [redacted] on the over-all  
25X1 problem of scientific research in the agency. He briefed us on the  
new scientific research institute set up under the Land Committee which  
[redacted] will run. [redacted] views seemed to be in close agreement  
with those of Dr. Killian.

Norman Paul called to suggest Laird Bell as a possibility for the President's Board and indicated that he had just been named to a new commission by the President and thus was obviously acceptable to the White House.

Asked White to ask Garrison to ask [redacted] to list for us all contractors with whom he had personal relations including the acceptance of any gifts or any favors.

25X1 +

25X1 Mike Burke called from New York and advised him that we still had no final decision but I hoped to get one within the next few days.

Continued

12 February 1957 continued

Harold Lawrence came in to say that he had heard at S.A.C. that we were turning [ ] over to S.A.C. I said that I didn't know but would check on it and would advise him. [ ] advised me that this was incorrect but that S.A.C. might be engaging in similar type work with similar type aircraft in July. I told Lawrence about this and suggested for further details he talk directly to [ ] which he said he would do.

25X1

25X1

LBK

13 February 1957

At the DCI Staff Meeting suggested that at an early date we brief the new Civil Service Commission. The Director agreed.

The Director asked me to call Bob King in Nixon's office and set up a time for briefing the Vice President preparatory to his trip to Africa.

25X1 General Cabell asked that [ ] and myself come in and brief him on  
25X1 the [ ] case inasmuch as he was having dinner with Congressman Teague.  
25X1 We advised him that we had discovered no wrongdoing by [ ]  
[ ] and said that if Justice didn't commit itself,  
this generally reflected their attitude. As far as the contract was con-  
cerned, after checking with White and Houston we advised him that it was  
thrown out because one of the bidders protesting to G.A.O that our requirements  
were not sufficiently specific. We also stated that we did not think  
25X1 [ ] had been particularly responsive to our request, but perhaps this  
25X1 was because of confusion in transmission. We advised him that we planned  
to go back to [ ] on this and would also get Security to check his  
banking accounts.

Suggested to Norman Paul that at an early date we get Congressmen Porter Hardy and Meader down to brief them and thus possibly head off any investigation by the subcommittee on International Operations.

25X1 White asked me if I would be willing to have lunch with himself, Gates Lloyd, Gordon Stewart, and [ ] and tell them my views on how personnel should be handled in the Agency.

White said that he planned to advised his staff meeting that they should be more careful in keeping the IG informed of problems in the Agency.

25X1

[ ]

25X1 [ ] called to say that Helms had vetoed any base at [ ] and  
25X1 thus [ ] didn't have to go there. I told him that I wanted [ ] to go  
there anyway in case the subject came up again.

25X1

25X1

continued

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**

R

February  
14 ~~January~~ 1957

Called Bob King and got the details on the Vice President's trip to Africa. (See memo for the record.) He will call back later as to the specific time.

Pforzheimer brought up a letter which he had written in replying to a letter from a friend in Hollywood wanting to make a movie about CIA. I approved of the letter.

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

Baird called to say that he had talked to White about Jack Blake and he also said that Blake suggested [REDACTED] to which I called Blake an unmentionable name. I called Baird later to suggest [REDACTED]s and [REDACTED] as possibilities.

25X1

25X1

25X1

+

Cassidy called to say that we would have from 930 until 1100 on the 26th and that if that didn't take care of our time we could have some more in the afternoon. He said that Admiral Cooke was coming at 1100 so that the Board could hear him and forestall any criticism that they had been unwilling to listen to him.

Saw the Director on the subject of General Cutler's letter and his conversations with Mr. Robertson. He agreed that we should draft an immediate reply to Cutler and gave me a general view of his philosophy. He also gave me permission to show the Robertson letter and the Cutler letter to General Truscott which I did. He also asked General Cabell to provide me with a copy of the [REDACTED] letter for the meeting of the President's Board on the 26th. He said that he wanted to take to the Cutler meeting on the 26th a history of the evolution of 5412, a copy of 5412 itself, and one typical project.

25X1

TOP SECRET



I called Helms on the red phone and we had a lengthy discussion of the Cutler letter and he said he would designate [ ] to come up and review with me the proposed response. [ ] called and confirmed this.

25X1  
25X1

25X1 Advised both [ ] and the Director orally, as well as in writing, on the Nixon briefing.

25X1 Gordon Stewart called twice on [ ]. In the first instance he suggested that perhaps [ ] should have another chance in the DD/P area possibly in RQM or Cover. To this I strongly disagreed on three counts: 25X1 (1) that [ ] had two chances in NEA and failed; (2) that Personnel 25X1 exhaustively canvassed the DD/P to try and get him a job; and (3) that [ ] was not qualified for DD/P work, had made a mistake going to DD/P, and would always be unsuccessfully competing with men much younger than himself.

25X1

25X1 [ ] called about who should formally talk with USIA on recommendation 6. I told him that his staff should.

25X1 [ ] came up to talk about a job on this staff. I told him I would review the case and talk to him after he got back from military duty.

+

+

25X1 [ ] dropped in to say hello.

25X1 Meeting with Truscott, [ ] to discuss the action on recommendation 3.

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

15 February 1957

Cassidy called to advise of his trip to SAC with [ ] and to indicate that [ ] had been concerned about SAC's apparent lack of information on their targets. I sent the DCI a note about this.

25X1

Talked to [ ] and advised him that I had gone over the case with Gordon Stewart and did not believe he should stay in the DD/P area.

Amory called me in a state of high consternation about what he termed the arbitrary and high-handed methods in assigning [ ] to OCR and said he wanted to take it up at the Deputies' Meeting. Said I would be delighted to have it taken up at the Deputies' Meeting inasmuch as it is an Agency problem and other officials as well as OCR would have to contend with this. When I told him the conditions that [ ] was going to OCR, he seemed satisfied.

25X1

Met with [ ] at which we gave him our views on [ ]

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

18 February 1957

Gave lecture to the Strategic Intelligence School.

DCI buzzed concerning [redacted]. He said that Security objected. I said that I thought Security was wrong and he overruled their objection.

25X1

[redacted] advised me that at the Deputies' Meeting the DCI said he was preparing a memo on his conversation with Killian, that there had been a discussion whether he should talk to the IAC about the Board recommendations and he had asked White to prepare a briefing on the new building.

25X1

Meeting with Paul, I [redacted] testimony before the Internal Security Subcommittee. We agreed not to make any overtures to Judge Morse.

25X1

Talked to Grogan about the proposal made by General Allen for McCann Ericson on a TV series on OSS.

Discussed the [redacted] case with Edwards and he said that he thought we ought to go on the record with the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities.

25X1

Went over the 5412 recommendation with [redacted] and gave him my draft to utilize in his reply.

25X1

Cassidy advised that they expected Doolittle on the 19th.

Truscott asked for the IAC subcommittee list.

Discussed his training courses with [redacted] and indicated to him that I thought he should do the DDI survey between courses in May.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

20 February 1957

Advised the Deputies Meeting of the dispatch from [ ] commenting on General Doolittle's visit and his apparent feeling that the military command was in our field; reported that Cassidy had visited OCI on 19 February while studying the subject of current intelligence; reported that Harold Lawrence was meeting with Dr. Scoville and others in OSI on the subject of scientific attaches; advised that Robert McCollum was very concerned about the Bureau of the Budget item in NSC 86/1 which would limit our support of [ ] to [ ] and stated that I had talked to Whitney Sheperdson at his request on the [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ]  
the Agency and he stated that he wished once again to read my suggestions from January and that then he wanted to have a dry run of the briefing which will be given the Congressional committees. (Advised White of this and he will set up the meeting.) Discussed the Tuesday Meeting of the President's Board and of the 5412 Group. He went over the list of consultants and indicated those unknown to him. He indicated that he would probably be taking a trip to the Caribbean in March and would be happy to have me go along with him. [ ]

25X1

Pat Coyne called to check on how we plan to revise the NSCIDs. Told him that we would prepare our revisions and then submit them to the IAC.

Called [ ] and told him to take the initiative with USIA in setting up the Larsen-Dulles meeting.

Amory called on NSC 86/1. Said that it would be discussed at the NSC tomorrow and I so advised McCollum.

**TOP SECRET**

20 February 1957 continued

25X1

ned

+

Cassidy advised that Doolittle would be in at 4:00 on Thursday and he would then let us know whether Doolittle wanted a briefing on Friday. He also stated that he didn't know how he would be able to work White into the Board's schedule and suggested that we wait until Tuesday to see if the Board really wished it.

25X1

[ ] advised he had dinner the night before with General Cassidy.

25X1

Told George Carey that the Director did not feel too strongly about [ ]. Also invited him to lunch with McCollum.

25X1

25X1

[ ] called to say that he had suggested to [ ] that he talk to me. [ ] called and I said that I had already covered all of the items.

25X1

Truscott said he would prepare a brief memorandum on the subject of an Executive Director to give to the DCI on Monday.

DCI asked me to review the Security file on the [ ] case and then prepare a letter to Cong. Walters.

25X1

25X1

Called [ ] and asked for a report of the [ ]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

2

20 February 1957 continued

25X1

Asked [ ] concerning OCR's relations with SAC. He said that the Photo Interpretation Division had regular liaison with them and that there was a SAC officer and enlisted man stationed in the Industrial Register to work on target folders.

25X1

Went over the I.O. survey with [ ]

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

21 February 1957

25X1 Went over with [ ] subjects for Career Council consideration.

25X1 Cassidy dropped in to pay what he termed a social call. He later advised that Doolittle would want a briefing Friday and I set one up with [ ]

25X1 Lunch for [ ] and general discussion of refugees.

25X1 Talked to [ ] (See memo for the record.)

Talked to [ ] (See memo for the record.)

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

25 February 1957

At the DCI's meeting the Director asked me to review the CIA policy concerning writing for publication by CIA employees.

The DCI asked that there be included in the notebook for the President's Board meeting his thoughts about a forum of individuals who had recently visited the Soviet Union. He also asked that the [ ] elections be included in the 5412 book. 25X1

Meeting of the Building Steering Committee to discuss ways and means of saving money on the building in order to accommodate more people.

White called concerning the budget book which he had promised to General Cassidy and I asked him to send it directly to Cassidy.

25X1 [ ] called on several items on the book for the President's Board.

Baird asked if I would be willing to go to [ ] to talk to the Basic Operations Course. 25X1

25X1 [ ] called with some information on the [ ]  
25X1 (See Memo for the Record.) 25X1

25X1 Grogan called on the [ ] case and stated that he thought it was most important that we do something about this.

[ ] 25X1

Called George Carey about the DCI's plans for a Russian forum; mentioned to him that I thought a project to help [ ] finance visitors from behind the Iron Curtain would be very profitable; asked him to have FDD send over whoever it was who knew [ ] best. 25X1 25X1

25X1

[ ]



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

26 February 1957

25X1 [ ] came to lunch.

25X1 [ ] called about [ ] and I advised him about what I  
25X1 knew about [ ] He said that they wanted to check with people in  
25X1 the Agency because [ ] was now working in [ ] and had apparently  
made some comments about Mr. Wisner.

25X1

Baird and I decided to cancel the trip to [ ]

25X1

25X1

Andrews of OCR called and reminded me that I had promised him a  
copy of our study on the SS cables. I said that I would send it to him  
right away.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

27 February 1957

Called attention of DCI meeting to the cable from [ ] concerning [ ] who was attacking CIA. Also asked the DCI what he planned to do about [ ] and he authorized me to call a meeting and work out a plan of operation; also agreed that Norman Paul should deal with Roderic O'Connor of State on the Congressional investigations of the Middle East policy.

25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1

Went over with Norman Paul items of Congressional importance, particularly the Middle Eastern inspection and forthcoming Congressional interest in our size.

25X1

Meeting with Houston, [ ] on the subject of concessions or a club at the CIA building site. It was agreed that we should not drop the club idea and should send a sample letter to about [ ] Agency employees to find out if there really would be interest in having such a club. In the meantime inasmuch as we cannot get any concessions in the building, the General Counsel will explore with GSA and GSI possibilities of erecting some sort of a building to house concessions.

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

R

27 February 1957 continued

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Talked to Edwards on the [REDACTED] case and he said that he had talked to [REDACTED] who said that the Bureau was reasonably convinced that [REDACTED] had not been a Soviet agent.

25X1

Mike Burke called from New York and I told him that we were still working on it and would try to let him know at the earliest.

John Francis Blake of EE Admin called to pass on an employee suggestion to the effect that during Lent the Agency should set aside a room where mass could be said. I told him that this posed many difficulties including making space available to all denominations. I pointed out that where this was done in the [REDACTED] in one building and no churches within a couple of miles; that this Agency was in 42 buildings most of which were within a few blocks of a church.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

The DCI reported on the hearings before the President's Board. He said that he had explained to them why he was opposed to the position of Executive Director in the Agency and did not feel that he had shaken them in their conviction that there should be one. He told them about his thoughts about making Truscott a Deputy Director for External Coordination and that they had not commented on this. He said that he had felt he had convinced them on the problem of staffing 5412 projects and had explained to them his concern about the size of the Agency. I advised the Director of the [REDACTED] meeting and what we planned to do and he approved.

25X1

LBK/IG

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

28 February 1957

25X1 General Truscott came down to talk about the next step on 5412 and I  
25X1 told him that the Director had agreed to work out a proposed staffing paper  
and then discuss this with General Cutler. Truscott said that he would  
talk to [ ] about this and have them draw up the paper. He did  
and [ ] came down to ask me a couple of questions on how the paper  
should be prepared.

25X1 Norman Paul reported that he had talked to Clyde Duval in USIA and that  
25X1 Agency was taking the position that they would prefer not to have any  
Congressional Committee call [ ] to testify. He reported later that  
he talked to Carl Marcy of Senate Foreign Relations Staff and that they  
had no plans for summoning [ ].

General Cassidy came over to brief me on the Board's meetings and plans.  
(See memo for the record.)

Told Helms that Cassidy wanted to talk to Desmond Fitzgerald about PP  
and Helms said that he would advise Fitzgerald to call Cassidy.

25X1 [ ] came up to file an appeal for not being paid for his furniture  
to Washington ~~and he~~ which he states had been promised him by [ ] 25X1

Meeting on our manpower presentation to Congress in the Director's  
Conference Room. (See Memo for the Record.)

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**SECRET**

✓

1 March 1957

25X1 At the DCI meeting advised of Cassidy's report on the meeting of the  
25X1 President's Board and also that [ ] had all of the contact files on  
[ ]

25X1 [ ] of ORR came up to say that he would be interested in a  
job on this staff and would like to change his present assignment. Told  
him I would look into his file and give him a call.

25X1 Discussed the [ ] case with Norman Paul and he will explore  
further whether any Congressional committee is likely to call [ ].

25X1

25X1 Advised George Carey of the Director's interest in possibly having  
better coverage of [ ]

re

25X1

25X1 Suggested at the Deputies' meeting that we send a dispatch to our people  
[ ] whose dependents had been evacuated and tell them that we  
were active on this. The Director told [ ] to follow through on it  
after discussions with State.

25X1

Advised the Director that he might get a call from [ ]

25X1

LBK/IG

SECRET

R

4 March 1957

25X1  
25X1

Discussed the [ ] who is going to  
[ ] tomorrow to see him.

Met with the Bureau of the Budget on their comments to the President's Board. (See memorandum for the Record.)

25X1

Helms stayed to talk about the conversion to staff status of [ ] [ ]  
[ ]. He said that he thought [ ] should be told there might  
be a problem in integrating him into State. I said that I agreed and suggested  
that he be told that before he was converted and allowed to make his choice.

25X1  
25X1

25X1

Asked Grogan to look up for the clipping book [ ] flattering  
comments regarding [ ]. Also, Grogan reported that [ ] had been  
asked by General Maxwell Taylor to testify on behalf of General Zwicker  
and if this was necessary. Told him I saw no objection to this.

25X1  
25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

5 March 1957

R

25X1

Lunch with [ ] who wanted to talk about his future career. Strongly recommended that he go to the [ ].

25X1

25X1

[ ] called to get my agreement on postponement of the [ ] until we had the DD/P breadth and scope paper. Agreed to this.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Helms called me about the statement on the ticker that Robert Morris of the Internal Security Subcommittee had ordered two Foreign Service officers brought back to the United States because of faulty intelligence in the [ ].

Talked to Scoville, Carey, Guthe and Kent of the briefing for [ ] and filled in the DCI, ~~on the~~ who approved of it.

25X1

25X1

Edwards called me regarding the case of [ ] and said that [ ] had asked for the information. [ ] denied this.

25X1  
25X1

25X9

[ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ] called and reported on the meeting with [ ] and we set up a meeting for [ ] to see the Director on 12 March.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] advised that USIA had sent a letter to the FBI transmitting all information on [ ] for examination and the appropriate action. This letter stated that DCI and Mr. Larsen had conferred on this and also that they had an informant who stated he was almost certain that [ ] had been a member of the Communist Party up until 1939.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

(cont.)



**TOP SECRET**

5 March 1957

Pat Coyne called to inquire as to what the status of our action was on Recommendation No. 3 and whether we would agree to war gaming. I told him that we would.


25X1 Houston called on the [ ] case. The Board had  
25X1 recommended that [ ] be terminated but that we help get him a job with  
25X1 [ ] He said that there was a serious possibility of Soviet espionage  
25X1 which had not been completely reconciled. I advised Helms I had been  
unable to see [ ] and he said he would let me know if there was any need  
to.

Cassidy called to state that the query regarding recommendation 3 was because the JCS were trying to limit this strictly to intelligence and that he was certain that we regarded it as broader. He also stated that he had his conversation with Desmond Fitzgerald on Monday and was all set to start on the PP survey.

LBK/IG

6 March 1957

25X1



Eloise Paige called to say that she was terribly sorry that [redacted] was coming back in April and wasn't there anything we could do about it. 25X1


25X1  
25X1

[redacted] called to say that [redacted] would come to see me about the [redacted] 25X1

25X1

[redacted] reported on his conversations with [redacted] and advised him that we had agreed to drop the case. 25X1

Andrews of OCR called to say that they had a GS-4 colored girl who had been doing a mediocre job in the library and who wanted a job elsewhere. They had tried to locate her elsewhere and had been unsuccessful and she demanded another job and refused to go back to work there. I told him that she should go back to work in the library where she could be terminated for abandonment of position. 25X1



25X1

[redacted] called to ask if I would support Helms in raising the question of the window walls in the new building on the second and seventh floors. Told him I would.

Reynolds called on PSAS and I suggested he call a meeting.

Mike Burke called to check on the CBS project.

**TOP SECRET**

6 March 1957

25X1

[ ] called to say that [ ] was doing all right and that he would like to promote him. I said that I thought this should be done only after it was certain that his staff was permanent and that he wanted to keep [ ]. I agreed to raise this with Amory when he got back.

25X1

25X1

[ ]

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

7 March 1957

Went over the I.O. Survey with Cord Meyer whose only major disagreement was with the recommendation to transfer [ ] to SR Division. We agreed that rather than transferring it to SR we would suggest that Chief, I.O., and Chief, SR, get together and see whether its transfer would be more beneficial than harmful.

25X1

General Truscott came down to go over the President's Board recommendations and asked if I would go ahead and call meetings and accelerate action on recommendations 1, 4, and 9.

[ ] came up and I told him we were still considering his candidacy and that I would let him know as early as possible.

25X1

Called Helms on the President's Board coordination recommendations and he nominated Karamessines for 5 and [ ] for 9.

25X1

White called concerning a [ ] who worked for him in FBID and who had gotten a Ph. D. and who is now very concerned because he couldn't get a transfer to a research job. [ ] called later and I said I would look over his file and see him next week.

25X1

25X1

[ ] called to say the Director wanted a short paper from me on scholarships to discuss with the Ford Foundation.

25X1

[ ] dropped in to say good-by.

25X1

Edwards called to say that [ ] and he would ask her to come to see me and that I would arrange for her job on the DD/I side.

25X1

Grogan called on the [ ] case.

25X1

Stewart called to say that he had sat down that day with [ ] and a representative of OCR and had made sure that both understood the conditions under which [ ] was being transferred.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

12

11 March 1957

No DCI meeting.

Lunch with Mike Burke. I agreed to draw up certain parables which we would like to get across at the beginning of these programs and he will draw up a method of procedure and also a list of their people who will be working on it, both of which he will send me.

25X1 Cassidy called for all IG surveys on the DD/P area and agreed to start the survey Tuesday, 12 March at 1030, in a meeting with Wisner, Helms and [redacted]

25X1 Norman Paul said the letter from Senator Robertson had stated CIA was building a building for [redacted] people and that we squandered money abroad. He said that Senator Hayden did not seem very much concerned about it.

Asked Norman Paul to take action on the EE cable which requested information about Executive and Congressional relations in the United States. Also told him that the DCI had decided that we should expand our Congressional relations and set up a series of luncheons. He said that he was working hard on the air estimate problem and he would call Judge Morris to set up an appointment for him to come to see me.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

R

8 March 1957

At DCI Staff Meeting suggested [ ] go to the Military Industrial-Planning Conference in Chicago. DCI also suggested revision of letter to Congressman Engle on the Antarctic.

25X1

25X1 [ ] came for lunch.

25X1 [ ] brought up their suggested security arrangements for the  
25X1 [ ] and I agreed to them.

Review of the TSS Survey with [ ]

25X1

25X1 Dropped in on the [ ] luncheon to request that they designate  
individuals to work on the revision of NSCIDs and also on any area  
where CIA could coordinate, integrate or eliminate duplication. Told  
them I would call them next week to start setting up meetings.

25X1 Suggested to Helms that in view of Cassidy's decision to begin on  
25X1 the DD/P Survey that it would be preferable to start the survey with  
himself, Wisner, [ ] and Cassidy. Also suggested both to him  
and to [ ] about making sure that all material transmitted to  
Cassidy came through my office.

Checked with Harold Lawrence to determine whether Cassidy had received the written material he had requested.

25X1 Asked [ ] to send me a chronology of their relations with [ ]  
25X1 [ ]

25X1  
+

[ ]

25X1  
+

Edwards called to say that [ ] would probably call to see me because he had been told by Security that he had too close relations with some foreign embassies. Edwards said that he was also involved in the Sobel case.

25X1

2

8 March 1957 continued

25X1

[ ] said as a result of cables from [ ] the Director said he wanted me to look into the reasons why these people were hired and placed where they were.

25X1

Advised Mike Burke that we could go ahead on the TV project.

Coyne called on the recommendations on No. 5 and said a new memorandum would be coming over from General Cutler.


LBK/IG

100-6-10000

TOP SECRET

12 March 1957

Meeting of IG staff.



25X1

Shown the DCI the second letter from General Cutler on recommendation 5 and advised him I would send it to the PP Staff for action.

25X1



25X1

LBK/IG



~~SECRET~~

13 March 1957

25X1 Cassidy called to advise that they would start this week their trips to Boston to brief Dr. Killian on the latest developments. I said that I would send over Thursday afternoon our memoranda reporting on any late developments that Dr. Killian would be interested in. I also advised him that [ ] had brought up to me the questions which he had been unable to answer and that I would send those answers over as quickly as possible.

25X1

25X1

At the Deputies' meeting reported on General Hull's planned trip to Europe in April and said that I would prepare a dispatch next Monday when I received the definite itinerary from Cassidy. Also reported to the Deputies' meeting that the men had returned from the survey of the Middle East and were available if anyone wished to consult with them.

25X1

25X1 Lunch with [ ] so that he could tell me about his trip to the Middle East.

Convened a meeting on the revision of the NSCIDs and laid down the general rules of procedure on how these revisions should be drafted. (See memorandum to the DCI on progress report on President's Board recommendations.)

~~SECRET~~

Continued

**TOP SECRET**

13 March 1957 continued

Meeting of the PRC to consider the DD/P character and level paper and TSS's request for an additional [ ] for research and development. 25X1  
I advised the PRC I would not concur in the TSS request until our survey had been completed.

25X1 [ ] came in after the PRC to advise that he had recommended  
25X1 that AQUATONE and [ ] be combined and put under [ ] being  
removed from the PP Staff and reporting directly to DD/P. He said that  
he had urged the DDCI to go on record to the President as stating we  
had this valuable equipment which wasn't being used and that we either  
ought to use it or get rid of it. He also said he was seriously  
concerned about the manpower situation and thought that the Director  
ought to tell Congress he was cutting the size of the Agency. We  
also discussed the DD/P staff structure and he agreed that it was  
very poor and nonproductive.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**SECRET**

14 March 1957

25X1

Went over with [ ] the business of handling Regulations and explained to him that our philosophy was to keep regulations to a minimum and to try and make them as clear and simple as possible.

25X1

25X1

Met with Robert McCollum and Dick Brown of [ ]; [ ] and [ ] of this Agency to discuss mutual problems. McCollum raised the question the he had not been consulted on putting certain people under [ ] [ ] said he would take this up [ ]

2525X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1

Edwards called to find out who should be on the NSCID 11 task force and I suggested [ ] of FI.

25X1

25X1

Talked to [ ] about Recommendation 5 and told him there was no further action needed by the PP Staff. Then met with him and the DCI on the recommendation and agreed that the DCI's oral suggestions to Cutler would suffice. The DCI gave me the Cutler memorandum and I sent it back to him later in the day stating that I recommended that we live with it.

Advised DCI that Ambassador [ ] and that he might want to mention th [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

Talked to Helms over the secure phone about what we should do concerning [ ] He suggested that I talk to [ ] and the latter said he would come up in about a week with [ ] to review the situation.

**SECRET**

14 March 1957 continued

25X1 [ ] brought in the papers on the [ ] case.

25X1

25X1 [ ] loaned me the PP notes for March 12th to send to Dr. Killian and the DCI agreed to sending Killian a review of the status of our action on the Board recommendations and Norman Paul's notes on Congress.

Went over with Norman Paul the list of Congressmen that we should attempt to cultivate.

Jack Blake called concerning [ ] and we discussed her future assignment.

25X1

LBK/IG

~~SECRET~~

15 March 1957

Discussion at the Deputies' meeting of the Chinese estimate and suggested to the Director that when we have this problem lined up that we brief Dr. Killian on it. Reported to the Deputies' meeting ~~of~~ the meeting with McCollum and Brown of [ ]

Meeting with the DCI to go over action on the Board recommendations.

[ ] of FDD called and asked what I had done about transferring her. I told her I had done nothing and that the way it had been left was that she would see [ ] She asked if I would mind calling [ ], which I did, and ask him to call her in and talk to her.

[ ] of OCI called about the case of [ ] who had implied that his friend [ ] on the IG Staff would help him out. I talked to [ ] about it who said that he had not seen [ ] for a long time and that he knew [ ] was making a lot of money because he was driving a new cadillac and that he would be very careful in any dealings with [ ] I relayed this information back to [ ]

Checked with General Cassidy to see whether the material prepared for Dr. Killian was what they wanted. He said that it was. He also said that the briefings in the DD/P area were going very well.

Went over with Norman Paul the letter to Congressman Walter on [ ] and we agreed on several changes.

Grogan called to alert me to a flap concerning an [ ] safehouse in the area of [ ]

LBK/IG

18 March 1957

At the Deputies' meeting the Director raised the matter of safe-houses and asked that I make a thorough inspection of the entire situation. There was also discussion of the [ ] incident and White said that I would also inspect that.

25X1

Discussed the TV project for [ ] at the Deputies' meeting and I agreed to take up the matter with Mike Burke.

25X1

I reported to the Deputies' meeting that Dr. Killian would be in town on Thursday and Friday and wished to review the Soviet air estimate.

Advised Norman Paul that the DCI had heard from Senator Symington on Sunday re. the change on the Soviet air estimate.

Attended a meeting of the Supergrade Board and discussed particularly [ ]. I also raised the question posed by my desire to promote [ ] and how it affected his future assignment.

25X1  
25X1

Went over with [ ] the first draft on NSCID 1.

25X1

Baird called and said that he hoped that before the TSS survey was finished the inspectors would talk to [ ], the TSS man at [ ]

25X1K1

25X1

Went over with Baird the safehouse flap and he advised the first he had heard of it was from the [ ]

25X1

[ ] called and said that they were working on my memorandum concerning [ ] and would have an answer over next week.

25X1  
25X1

Talked to Rusher of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and told him I was ready to talk to Judge Morris at any time concerning [ ]

25X1

At the DCI's request called Sheridan Caplin of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and told him the DCI would like to be excused from appearing before that committee. He said that he would advise Mrs. Kelly of this.

18 March 1957

25X1 Advised [ ] that [ ] would be named deputy on this staff and we discussed what assistance he wanted from me in getting his future assignment.

Tietjen said that he would call [ ] and talk to her.

25X1

25X1 [ ] called concerning the testimony of [ ] before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on [ ] and asked that we get a copy of that. I called Duffy of that committee and he said that he would look into it as well as make the [ ] testimony available to us.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1 Talked to [ ] of SR concerning [ ] who is reputed to know Senator Kuchel. [ ] recommended against [ ] coming to the luncheon and said that [ ] was now before an Employment Review Board.

25X1

25X1

25X1 Discussed [ ] suggested changes in the I.O. survey with [ ]

25X1

George Carey called concerning [ ] letter to the Director and I advised him that we would take care of it.

25X1

Wisner called concerning [ ] testimony and I read <sup>him</sup> [ ] memorandum on it.

25X1

25X1 [ ] called concerning the Killian Board memorandum on current intelligence and I said that I would send him a copy and also urged him that OCI get to work on their comments on coordination.

25X1

25X1 [ ] called on the [ ] TV project and said that he would send us all of the material.

25X1 [ ] called to ask if it was all right for [ ] to go on leave during the survey and I told him by all means.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

19 March 1957


IG staff meeting. Discussed the several surveys that have to be done and agreed that we would do these after the completion of the present surveys and before we would start WE and FE. [ ] will attempt to complete the hardship study by the end of the month.

25X1

Discussed [ ] future assignment with him and agreed to talk with Helms and Kent.

Went over with General Truscott the proposed revision of NSCID/1 and he said he would let me have his comments by late today or tomorrow.

25X1



General Cassidy came over to discuss Board problems. (See memo for the record.) In addition he mentioned that at the NSC discussion of the Board's recommendation that on the 5412 matter Foster Dulles had questioned whether he would have to go through all of that procedure. Foster went on to say that he and Allen were working on a plan [ ] and didn't believe that others should be cut in. The President then said "don't you think you ought to tell me" which ended that particular discussion. Cassidy also said that the only comments that General Goodpaster had made concerning his briefings of the President were to the effect that the President liked to have his briefings on an area basis and that he was particularly interested in Czechoslovakia.

25X1



Told [ ] that I would send him the latest memorandum from General Cutler and I believed that this completed action on this recommendation.

Talked to Ed. Duffy of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and he advised me that [ ] would be testifying tomorrow and that if I called him Thursday he could probably make arrangements for somebody from our office to read his testimony.

**TOP SECRET (Cont.)**



19 March 1957 continued

25X1 [ ] called concerning [ ] and said that he was having a very difficult time getting his promotion through and he felt it was most important that this be done. I told him I would talk to Gordon Stewart about it. 25X1


LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**SECRET**

25X1

19 March 1957



Asked Gordon Stewart if he would speed up the action on [redacted] transfer inasmuch as we had already abandoned the slot. Also asked Stewart to see what he could do about getting [redacted] a promotion which his Division had recommended. Advised [redacted] that I had talked to Stewart on [redacted] transfer.

25X1

25X1

25X1

George Carey called to ask whether NSCID 1 had been circulated. I told him that it had not and that it would not be circulated until it had been approved on this level. I then checked with [redacted], who assured me that it had been circulated.

25X1

Told Edwards that the President's Board had been concerned over telephone security in current intelligence, and suggested that he might wish to do some spot monitoring. He advised me that he would look into it and discuss it with [redacted] the OCI security officer.

LBK/IG

**SECRET**

20 March 1957

25X1

[ ] talked to me about being allowed to survey [ ] material. I told him I would check with the Director and let him know.

25X1

25X1

At the Deputies' meeting I advised that [ ] was going to testify on Foreign Aid; that we had prepared a dispatch on General Hull's itinerary; that we would pass the exchange of letters with Senator Symington on to Dr. Killian; that there was a slight flap involving [ ] in FBID; that we would arrange to have Mr. Paul provide items from the Congressional Record to Col. Grogan for the clipping book; and the DCI asked me to talk to Bryce Hawlow at the White House concerning Congressional briefings.

25X1

25X1

Edwards called and said that [ ] and would I arrange for her transfer.

25X1

25X1

Baird called to ask my advice on what should be done about [ ] He is out of his depth in the Operational Course and dropping steadily behind. I suggested that [ ] talk to him and that perhaps it would be best if [ ] audited the balance of the course.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Talked to both Wisner and White on safehouses and Wisner said that they would send us any material that they produced on them.

25X1

Asked [ ] to prepare a proposal on [ ] if it was important that we discuss action before the survey was completed.

25X1

Went over with Truscott the new draft of NSCID 1.

LBK/IG

21 March 1957

Went over with Norman Paul the developments that had taken place during his absence and briefed him on the luncheons for Kuchel and Hardy.

25X1

Went over with [ ] the second draft of NSCID 1.

25X1

Saw [ ] FBID and said I would recommend to Personnel that he be given \* priority for an assignment to a research position when one developed.

25X1

25X1

Karamessines [ ] came up to talk to me about [ ] and said they would like to have him as [ ]'s deputy. I said [ ] had already talked to me about this and thought it would be a good assignment and that I was prepared to release him about 1 October. We agreed that there would be no reason to keep this quiet. I also handed them a copy of the President's Board recommendations on current intelligence.

25X1

25X1

[ ] came up to leave with me a memorandum reflecting his views on ORR and to say good-by inasmuch as he was resigning.

25X1

Meeting with [ ] Harry Reynolds and [ ] on PSAS. We agreed to call a meeting of the Board for late April at which time we would report on our internal campaign, have ready a brochure for our next campaign, a list of wealthy alumni whom we would try to get money from, a list of corporations which could be approached, and possibly a discussion of the Director's ideas on a scholarship fund.

25X1

25X1

Meeting of the Career Council.

Cassidy advised that he would come over tomorrow at 1030 to talk to Kent about the air estimate.

continued

**SECRET**

21 March 1957 continued

Talked to Bryce Harlow at the White House and explained to him the Director's position on talking to Foreign Affairs. Told him that Norman Paul would come over to talk to him about it.

25X1

Told [ ] that I would talk to Helms about a possible assignment for him in the DD/P area and did so.

25X1

Asked [ ] to come to the luncheon for Porter Hardy.

25X1

[ ] asked if I would convene a meeting to try and solve the question of who was going to do briefings for the Agency.

The Director advised that Cutler was going to present his paper to the President and also that he was planning to call Mrs. Kelly directly on his appearance before her subcommittee.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

22 March 1957

At the Deputies' meeting advised that I was planning to ask Ed. Morgan (ABC) over to lunch to talk about Africa and the DCI indicated he would like to attend; gave a brief biographical sketch on senator Kuchel; reported on the PSAS meeting; advised that Judge Robert Morris of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee was coming to see me this afternoon on [redacted]; reported that Bryce Harlow had told Norman Paul that he had never seen Congress in such a budget cutting mood and that even some of the tradition/pork barrels, such as the Veterans Administration, were getting cut; advised that Albert Thomas, Texas Congressman, had stated in the hearing on GAO "that CIA had more waste per square inch than any other agency in government."

Meeting of the Building Steering Committee to go over the report indicating those portions of the Agency that would have to be left out of the new building.

Lunch for Senator Kuchel.

Met for 2 hours with the NSCID 1 task force.

Talked to Judge Robert Morris about [redacted]. (See memo for the record.) 25X1

Discussed the TSS survey with [redacted] and set a tentative date of the first week in April. 25X1

25X1 [redacted] of OCI called to say that the draft of NSCID 9 would be up next Tuesday.

25X1 Talked to [redacted] and he advised that they had received very little use from his services.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

25X1



**TOP SECRET**

Grogan was advised that I was planning on asking Ed. Morgan over for lunch.

**TOP SECRET**

26 March 1957

Meeting of the IG Staff.

25X1

Discussed [ ] with Norman Paul and we agreed that he was a likely looking candidate for the Legislative Counsel job. We also agreed that we would start interviewing the people whose files we had looked over.

Meeting with the NSCID task force and after a discussion with Truscott and Cabell, they agreed to come in and advise the task force of their philosophies. Following this the task force agreed to adjourn until next Monday at which time it would meet with the Chairman of all of the NSCID task forces and see what conclusions they could come to.

Luncheon for Congressman Porter Hardy. (See memo for the record.)

Delivered Operational Support lecture.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

27 March 1957

25X1

Called [ ] and told him to take up the matter with Cord Meyer.

[ ]

25X1

Called Cassidy to find out whether Killian would want material from us this week and he said no and advised that Killian would be in town on Friday.

Checked with Sheldon about further actions on recommendations 7 and 8a and he advised that he thought both had been covered.

Told Norman Paul to go ahead with the luncheon for Senator Bush on Friday and I thought that both the Director and General Cabell should attend.

25X1

Checked with [ ] on when the TSS survey would be finished and he advised about mid April. Also asked him if he would take over the responsibility of preparing the Agency's Annual Report to the President's Board.

25X1

[ ] would be assigned to OCI and I so advised Edwards.

Asked Norman Paul to see that Grogan was supplied with any excerpts from the Congressional Record that the Director might want to see.

25X1

Talked to [ ] and he advised that he had a two-hour talk with him and was hopeful that it could be worked out without going any further.

25X1

Asked [ ] would like to come up to lunch with Ed. Morgan.




2

27 March 1957 continued

**TOP SECRET**

25X1



25X1

25X1

[ ] checked with me on the PPC survey and I told him I had read their comments and that we were satisfied with them and that I had nothing further to say.

Raised no questions at the Deputies' meeting.


25X1

Checked with [ ] on the Larson briefing and provided them with the necessary papers for the DCI. Also sat in on the Larson meeting at the DCI's request.

Asked Edwards if he would give a copy of the [ ] letter to the FBI.

25X1

25X1



LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

28 March 1957

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Lunch with [REDACTED] with whom I went over the possible schedule for the WE survey. He said the he would particularly like to have me cover [REDACTED]. I said that I would do this but would also like to cover [REDACTED]. He said he had no suggestions as to timing inasmuch as almost any time would fit in.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] dropped in. I advised him that I would be perfectly happy to approach the [REDACTED] but would use this only as a last resort. He said that he would check in [REDACTED] when he got back and would advise.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] of OSI called about a briefing of Dr. Killian on the production of AQUATONE. I said that I did not know anything about it and assumed that it was in Killian's SAC capability. He asked if I would advise Cabell, which I did, and also discuss it with [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] called to say the memorandum on [REDACTED] would be over early next week.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

29 March 1957

25X1

25X1

Lunch with [ ] to talk about his African trip.  
In attendance were [ ] Grogan, [ ]

25X1

25X1

At the Deputies' meeting reported on the cable from [ ] giving very enthusiastic reaction to the Public Service Aid Society campaign; suggested that the Deputies at their staff meetings urge that all people using 25th Street walk on the sidewalk; asked if anybody was interested in Whitty Willhours' mention in the Congressional Record and Wisner said he would like to see it; asked the Director the status of Edna Kelly and he mentioned that he was waiting to hear from General Persons on a meeting with the leaders; asked what he wanted brought up at the Bush luncheon and ~~he~~ he said he believed the only item might be Downey and Fecteau; mentioned that General Sibert had sent his regards; and inquired as to whether anybody knew who was replacing [ ]

25X1

Meeting with the NEA survey team to go over their progress.

Went over certain items of the TSS survey with [ ]

25X1

Meeting with the DCI, Grogan and [ ] on [ ] It was agreed at this meeting that we would follow the case closely but exercise extreme caution.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

1 April 1957

25X1

[Redacted]

Attended the Deputies' Meeting and Senior Staff Meeting.

[Redacted]

25X1

Baird came in to say that [Redacted] had hurt his back and probably would have to be operated on.

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] brought in [Redacted] to be signed.

25X1

25X1

Lunch with [Redacted] who suggested that we look into "Guerrilla Communism in Malaya" by Pye as a possible text book for our instruction.

25X1

[Redacted] and said he thought he ought to send up the file and that I ought to talk to [Redacted]

25X1

Talked to Cabell and Truscott about the meeting with the DCI on NSCID 9.

25X1

[Redacted] called and said the memorandum on [Redacted] would be over this afternoon.

25X1

White designated Edwards as his representative on the 10th Anniversary Club.

25X1

[Redacted] called to say that the [Redacted] is most anxious that [Redacted] and I come down on the [Redacted] and also that [Redacted] has sent his regrets.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

TRK/TC

**TOP SECRET** 2 April 1957

IG staff meeting.

25X1 Told [ ] to tell the [ ] that I said they should get down to Washington but quick.

25X1 [ ]

25X1 [ ] called to ask for the [ ] files.

25X1

Got the OCI current budget from Saunders.

25X1 [ ] called to say that he was back from [ ] and brought many regards.

25X1

Cassidy called to say that he would like to follow up his DD/P survey with talks with Baird, Stewart, Saunders and [ ].

25X1

DCI asked for copies of the current intelligence paper of the President's Board to give to the IAC and had me check with Cassidy who said this was OK.

25X1 Lunch with Richard Helms and we discussed the possibility of assigning [ ] the development of the I&R staff, and [ ]'s move to the DD/P.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

3 April 1957

At the Deputies' Meeting advised that we would be having Congressman Dawson to lunch next week.

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

White dropped in to ask if I had any suggestions as to a replacement for [ ] who J.C. King wanted to send to [ ] in February 1959. I said I didn't but would let him know.

25X1

25X1

Had [ ] in and told him that I went over his file and that it was excellent and indicated high regard for him on the part of Commo and that I thought his transfer was entirely in order. He said he would think it over and let me know if there was anything further that I should do. Advised [ ] of the above conversation.

25X1

25X1

Met with the DCI, DDCI, Sheldon and Truscott on NSCID 9 and agreed to minor modifications of the present directive.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Advised Helms [ ] of Personnel would do a salary study. He expressed misgivings but asked that [ ] come to see him to get some material he has. Helms also designated [ ] as the DD/P representative on the 10th anniversary group.

25X1

[ ] called to say that she was the one who had written the note when I addressed the Operations Support Course. WK Agreed to look at her file and would call her then.

25X1

Bissell called to ask if I could postpone for him his meeting with Cassidy and also to say that he had excluded [ ] from a meeting on several sensitive projects. I told him I would talk to Cassidy about this and see how he felt.

LBK/IG

SECRET

R

**TOP SECRET**

4 April 1957

Talked to Bob King of Nixon's office and said I was sending up a letter to the Vice President about which Mr. Dulles had talked to Nixon. Gave this to Norman Paul to deliver.

Asked Cassidy if it was all right if he put off his discussion with Bissell until the week of April 15th. He agreed. Asked him if General Hull wanted a briefing. He said he didn't. Asked him if anybody was going up to brief Dr. Killian this week. He said no.

Houston asked when I was going to [ ] and I told him probably the first week in May and he asked if it would be all right for somebody from the Attorney General's office to go down with me to talk about anti-communist laws. I agreed.

25X1

[ ] asked if it would be all right to have Norman Paul check with Senator McClelland's office on [ ] Told him to go ahead.

25X1  
25X1

Gave Basic Management Course lecture.

25X1

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

5 April 1957

he  
Grogan came in to discuss certain objections/had to the speech  
General Cabell planned to make in New York, particularly on the subject  
of our being informed about the Middle East crisis.

25X1

[ ] brought up the draft of an agreement with [ ] and a  
reply to the President's Board recommendation No. 6.

25X1

25X6

25X1  
ILLEGIB

[ ] reported that McConnell in Senator McClelland's office had advised  
that [ ] had called him and made certain allegations. Told [ ] to go up  
to see McConnell together with Norman Paul.

25X1

25X1

Asked [ ] to come to see me about [ ] proposal.

25X1

Norman Paul asked me about the proposed reply to Senator Hennings'  
letter and advised that he could not find the documentation for our reply  
to the Moss Committee. Urged him to check with Pforzheimer on this.

DCI asked me if I would fill in Cord Meyer on our meeting with Arthur  
Larson. Gave Meyer a copy of the memo for the record.

Advised George Carey that Harold Lawrence wanted to talk to [ ]  
about the technical aspects of communications.

25X1

Norman Paul reminded me that I should see [ ] as a potential  
candidate for the Legislative Counsel job.

25X1

25X1

At [ ] request checked with White as to whether he had any objections to  
our seeing Mr. Ivori of the Bureau of the Budget on U.S. aid to [ ] He  
said he didn't.

25X1



**TOP SECRET**

5 April 1957 continued

25X1 Asked [ ] to send up his [ ] trip report.

25X1 Advised [ ] that we should be very careful in how we handle material  
25X1 out of Security files and pointed out that he put some of it in our records  
25X1 on the [ ] case.

25X1 Cassidy said that he had heard from Baird that we were thinking of  
25X1 hiring [ ] had given the Board the impression  
of being a screwball.

25X1 [ ] called to say that [ ] a commo specialist, 25X1  
age 42, had died of uremic poisoning.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

6 April 1957

25X1



Asked Col. Edwards to check on whether  had ever worked for the War Production Board or had been terminated by them. 25X1

General Cabell called and asked if I could back up the statement in my January memorandum to the Director on how to improve the Agency with specific cases of people not being gainfully employed. Told him I would provide him with it early next week.

LBK/IG

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

2

8 April 1957

No Deputies' Meeting.

Harold Lawrence called to say that he was going up to see Dr. Killian on Friday and would we provide the necessary material.

Advised Norman Paul of the dinner on 17 April and he agreed with the letter to Congressman Thomas.

25X1

Asked [ ] to check and see if there would be any interest in providing assistance for a child of interest to [ ] personal assistant. (See memo for the record.)


25X1

Lunch with J. C. King.

Edwards reported that he had no information re. [ ] but would get the FBI to check.

25X1

25X1



25X1

[ ] advised that there were some new questionnaires from the Fair Employment Practices Committee and he wanted me to go over them before he replied.

ILLEGIB

Checked with [ ] on the NSCIDs and told him that I thought the necessary step would be to check with Truscott and Cabell and I would keep him advised.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

9 April 1957

25X1



25X1


Lunch with



25X1

Went over with [redacted] his replies to the memoranda from Archibald Carey from the Fair Employees Practices Committee.

25X1




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**TOP SECRET**


10 April 1957

25X1



25X1      Advised the following that there would be a courier going to see Dr. Killian this week-end and requested contributions: Cabell, Helms, Amory, White, and Norman Paul. Paul will prepare a brief write up on the difficulties with Congressman Kelly and Helms suggested that we point out that we had predicted 36 hours ahead of time the overthrow of the [redacted] Cabell said that he had not seen a write up of NSCID 5 or 12. I checked with Karamessines who said that 5 was in the mill.

25X1      I called [redacted] on PSAS and he said that the replies to [redacted] 25X1  
25X1      [redacted] was in the mill and that they would route them through me. He also said that they were now shooting for a May meeting of the PSAS board.



25X1

25X1      Called [redacted] on coordination and he said that he felt all aspects of coordination were well covered in the drafts of the NSCIDs and that he did not feel that there was any necessity to attempt further coordination on his level as long as there was an aggressive pursuit of coordination on this level.

**TOP SECRET**

10 April 1957 Continued

25X1  
25X1 [ ] of the CI Staff called to say that the Auditor's report was just about complete on [ ] and that he would send me a copy.

25X1  
25X1 Talked to [ ] of OSI on coordination and he said that they were preparing a paper on the coordination of nonsubstantive activities excluding collection and that they were having specific examples developed and he would let me have the paper by Friday.

25X1  
25X1 Talked to [ ] of OCR on coordination and he said he felt that coordination was progressing excellently on his level and a good deal had been achieved in the coordination of intelligence processing including the development on a common number system.

LBK/IG

SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

11 April 1957

25X1

Asked [ ] to make any revisions necessary in NSCID 17 as the Director had decided that 9 and 17 would not be combined.

25X1

Attended a meeting with General Cabell, General Truscott and Mr. [ ] to go over NSCID 1 and agreed with Cabell and Truscott that after this next draft is done, the three of us would sit down and do the final draft so that we could send it to the IAC this month.

Asked Fitzgerald to send up a copy of the PP Highlights for Dr. Killian.

25X1

Meyer asked if the DCI had approved/giving the pertinent parts of the I.O. Survey to the [ ] of Told him not to my knowledge so he said he would check.

Guthe dropped in and reported that they were preparing a paper on coordination and that he would try to let me have it next week. He also advised that they would probably have to get rid of [ ] inasmuch

25X1  
25X1

25X1

Asked the DCI if he had any items for Dr. Killian and he suggest/that we advised him of the [ ] ed case.

Checked with Cassidy on Hull's trip and he said that he had assumed that the State cable would urge the CIA man to coordinate but that inasmuch as it didn't we should take the initiative.

Advised the DCI that I would be going to [ ] in May on several matters.

25X1

Tietjen called to ask whether there would be any items in the TSS Survey affecting Medics. I told him that there would and that I would let him know when we got the report.

Talked to Houston about the Daub [ ] and he said that this was mainly to get to know Daub, who is Assistant Attorney General in charge of the C [ ] Approved For Release 2009/01/26 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003300020001-5 : Tompkins

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

11 April 1957 continued

25X1  
25X1

[ ] of the FI Staff came up to say that she was going to [ ] shortly and that she wanted me to know how much she had enjoyed her job on the FI Staff. She said that the Operations Staff was excellent and that she felt they were making a good deal of progress. We also chatted about the Women's Panel and careers for women in the Agency and she commented that her views had not changed much on this subject.

Kent came up to discuss the problem of what to do about capable 15's who had been in grade a long time. He suggested creating some 16 slots on the Board and perhaps developing a career rotation program. I said I would talk to Amory about it.

25X1

Asked [ ] for the [ ] report which the DCI wants to send to Dr. Killian.

Lunch with Assistant Attorney General Daub.

25X1

Told [ ] to add a sentence to the cable concerning entertainment for General Hull.

Met with the DCI, DDCI, DDI and Sheldon, [ ] on the current intelligence paper.

25X1

Baird called and asked if I would talk to [ ] and try to persuade him to take over the Management course.

25X1

Lawrence called and said that he would like to have on the 17th the latest GMIC material and the latest estimate on Soviet submarines. He also said that he would know more precisely later exactly what OSI material Dr. Killian wanted.

The DCI asked if I would prepare some notes for a talk he was to give to the Veterans of Strategic Services on Tuesday.

Gates Lloyd asked if I knew [ ] of the Class of '37. I told him I didn't but could probably find out about him.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

LBK/IG



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**TOP SECRET**

7 May 1957

25X1

25X1

[redacted] called to ask if you would talk to a group of "Senior Supervisors"; says they are a very alert group and have a lot of questions and a lot of pblems. In view of this, she suggested that rather than giving a regular speech that they be allowed to present their questions and problems and have more of a discussion period. I have committed you to 1130-1230 on 17 May.

25X1

25X1

Checked with [redacted] and Col. Edwards on whether or not there was any possibility that either of those offices had passed information on [redacted] to Judge Morris. [redacted] said their findings had been turned over to Security. Col. Edwards said they had done a complete check in the agency and that to the best of his knowledge such information had not been passed by this agency. He said Defense is also doing a check. He said his findings are all being forwarded to DCI. I gave Mr. Paul this message.

25X1

8 May 1957

25X1

25X1

Jack Blake called to ask if I knew whether or not you had a specific job lined up for [redacted]. I said I knew only what was in the correspondence back and forth to [redacted]. He said CI had offered him a definite assignment and that he, Blake, thought he would sign off on it as "a bird in the hand is worth more than two in the bush" from [redacted] point of view; that he could always be pulled from CI if need be. He wants to talk to you about this.

25X1

9 May 1957

25X1

25X1

[redacted] called. [redacted] called--wants to talk to you about lunch he had with D. L. which "disturbed" him. (Incidentally, I understand [redacted] has an appointment with DCI on 14 May; Alice thinks it concerns same conversation; also understands it has to do with [redacted])

ILLEGIB ✓

25X1

25X1

10 May 1957

Judge Robert Morris called.

25X1

25X1

Tuesday.

**TOP SECRET**

13 May 1957.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

14 May 1957

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1

Discussed WE SURVEY with [ ]

Went over STAFFING PATTERN with [ ]

25X1

J. C. KING came up to get a fill-in on what I had done in [ ]

25X1

NORMAN PAUL reported on activities in regard to his future assignment.

25X1

HELMS told me [ ] was coming in and I said I would send down the after-action reports on the DOOLITTLE and CLARK studies.

25X1

[ ] called to say that [ ] flatly refused to go to see

FOIAB6

25X1

[ ]

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

15 May 1957

At the Deputies' meeting the DCI requested a survey of publications which would in effect be a reasearch job into who published what publications within CIA, answering such questions as who decides to put out a publication, who decides on the distribution, and what degree of standardization there is.

GEN. CASSIDY called to say the President's Board would meet on 12 and 13 June. Wished to be briefed by CIA on the world situation, recent PP developments, and action on their recommendations.

The DCI asked that I set up a briefing for [ ] on the 17th 25X1 covering particularly our secrecy methods and career incentives.

25X1 Lunch for the [ ] attended by [ ] 25X1  
25X1 and WHITE, STEWART, [ ] and myself.

25X1 Talked to [ ] and indicated to him the action which I planned to take with which he agreed.

Chaired the PRC which reviewed the PP program and raised the following questions:

- (1) Have we ever evaluated cost of [ ]? 25X1
- (2) Do our air operations duplicate others?
- (3) How does RD&I fit into OIS?
- 25X1 (4) Why not give [ ] back?
- (5) What articles in US in "j"?
- (6) What is this secure air transport in the U.S.?

25X1 [ ]  
[ ] Talked to her and she indicated that she would like to stay with the Agency in her same job. I told her that I would carefully review the case and let her know as soon as possible.

25X1 [ ] Talked to [ ] about her. He said that she had gotten 25X1 to the stage where she was quite disruptive of the work of the staff and that she flatly refused to go see the doctors.

25X1 [ ] 25X1  
Suggested to [ ] that I did not particularly think [ ] would 25X1 appreciate a letter from the Director commenting on his picture in the paper.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

15 May 1957 (con't)

25X1 [ ] He called to inquire as to our procedures for passing material to Congress which I reviewed for him over the phone.

25X1 [ ] Talked to [ ] about her and he said he would give me a medical view as to whether she should be returned to her job. 25X1

16 May 1957

25X1 Called [ ] HELMS, WHITE, AMORY and PAUL for material to send to DR. KILLIAN.

25X1 [ ] Called GARRISON about [ ] and he sent me a memo on his last conversation with him. He also advised me that there was uncertainty as to whether the job that [ ] was last offered was still open. 25X1

25X1 [ ] She called and said that she wished to see DR. KILLIAN. I told her that I would call GEN. CASSIDY who I was sure would see her and that she could arrange through him to see KILLIAN. I also talked to [ ] about her and he agreed that she should be placed on sick leave until she was willing to take psychiatric treatment. 25X1

[ ] 25X1

25X1 NEA SURVEY: Talked to [ ] about the survey and the timing of his departure from this Staff. We agreed that he would leave about 1 June and that [ ] would finish the survey. 25X1

ROBERT CUTLER: The DIRECTOR buzzed concerning the meeting with CUTLER and I said that all of our material was in shape and that we should simply await CUTLER'S views.

25X1 [ ]: JUDGE ROBERT MORRIS of the Senate Internal Subcommittee called and asked if I would see [ ] I said that I would. 25X1

25X1 Advised [ ] that we would shift the DCI to 13 June for the meeting with the PRESIDENT'S BOARD and that she would expect him for lunch and for as long in the afternoon as he wished.

25X1 [ ]: Went over with [ ] case and we agreed to set up a meeting with the DIRECTOR. 25X1

25X1 [ ]: He dropped in to say hello.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

16 May 1957 (con't)

Together with DCI and GEN. TRUSCOTT, met with GEN. CUTLER and [ ] and COYNE to go over the briefing that CUTLER would give the PRESIDENT on the recommendations of the PRESIDENT'S BOARD. 25X1

17 May 1957


MR. JAMES BARKER: Together with the DCI, talked to BARKER on the subject of security matters affecting our employees and career incentives.

Attended DCI staff meeting.

WE SURVEY: Went over with [ ] plans for the future and told him that he would participate in the WE survey and gave him a copy of their area program to read. 25X1

Talked to the SENIOR SUPERVISORS' MANAGEMENT COURSE.

[ ]: GROGAN called concerning [ ] of OCR who had been asked to give a radio broadcast by USIA. GROGAN had indicated that he was opposed to it and I said I would check the files. 25X1



LESLIE HARRIS: MIKE BURKE called from New York and we agreed that he should bring HARRIS down for lunch on Wednesday, the 22nd.

JAMES BARKER: Acted as host at a luncheon for MR. BARKER.

TENTH ANNIVERSARY: Meeting of the 10th anniversary group at which we decided to go ahead on three ceremonies:

- (1) The laying of the cornerstone at Langley by the PRESIDENT;
- (2) A series of meetings to award employees 10th anniversary certificates.
- (3) A reception by the DCI.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

18 May 1957

**TELEVISION SERIES:** Discussed with the DCI the TV series and he indicated strong opposition to any attribution to intelligence of to CIA. We agreed that inasmuch as more than one organization was interested, we would adopt the policy of open access to the files.

**10TH ANNIVERSARY:** Also discussed with the DCI the 10th anniversary program and he asked that this be raised at the Deputies' Meeting on 22 May.

**PUBLIC SERVICE AID SOCIETY LUNCHEON:** Asked if he would be available to attend the luncheon for Public Service Aid Society on 21 June and he indicated he would.

**WE SURVEY:** Also covered with him the plans for WE survey and he indicated agreement of my directing this one and being out of the country during July.

**IG STAFF CHANGES:** I also advised him on the forthcoming IG Staff changes with [ ] leaving and [ ] joining the Staff.

20 May 1957

**STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE:** Delivered lecture on strategic intelligence to Army Strategic Intelligence School.

[ ] called on [ ] and I asked him to set up a meeting for tomorrow to review the case.

**DR. KILLIAN:** GEN. CASSIDY called and said that DR. KILLIAN would like to get together with MR. DULLES on the evening of 11 June and that on 12 June he would like to add [ ] to our presentation. On 13 June I suggested that the DCI come for lunch and then meet with the Board that afternoon.

[ ] called to say that he had straightened out the status of [ ] and asked what had been done concerning [ ] I said I had been delayed in the [ ] matter and that when he cabled [ ] he should say that we are working on it.

**MANAGEMENT COURSE:** BAIRD called to say that he believed the symposium with the Management Course had gone very well on Friday and asked if I was willing to continue it on that basis. I said that I was perfectly happy to do it that way or, if necessary, to talk to the Senior Supervisors that way and give the Management lecture on effective controls to the Junior Supervisors.

**WE and FE SURVEYS:** Talked to [ ] concerning the WE and FE surveys. We agreed that [ ] would participate along with [ ] on WE which we would start about the first of June and that [ ] would do the FE survey which we anticipate may take as long as six months.

[ ] (Personnel) called to advise that [ ] GS-12 Staff Employee, printing production specialist in the Office of Logistics, had died of a heart attack in Alexandria.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

20 May 1957 (con't)


25X1  
25X1

[ ] On the question of [ ] checked 25X1  
again with [ ] who said that the Medical Office had no objection to 25X1  
her returning to her job. I then checked with [ ] who said that he 25X1  
would like to have her back provided that the security matter could be  
cleared. I then checked with EDWARDS who said he would send [ ] over to 25X1  
review the security case with me.

21 May 1957

25X1

IG staff meeting.



25X1

Lunch with [ ] who wanted to advise me that DAVID LAWRENCE suspected  
Communist plots behind many newspaper articles and wanted access to either  
the DCI or myself to check these out.

25X1

[ ] Discussed her case with [ ] and said that I would 25X1  
call her in in the morning and tell her she could return to her job with CI  
if the security matter were cleared up. If she is willing to take the poly-  
graph I will send her down immediately to do it and urge her to relax and not  
to be worried about the machine. I also asked [ ] staff to have a car 25X1  
available to take her down so that we can do it promptly and she won't have  
time to work up a worry.

25X1

[ ] called to ask whether [ ] was cleared for AQUATONE. 25X1  
I told him that he was.

25X1  
25X1

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT: Talked to Helms about a DD/P person to work on the  
Semi-Annual Report to the Board and he named [ ]. He also named 25X1  
[ ] to work on the problem of discrimination. WHITE named [ ] 25X1  
[ ] to work on the Semi-Annual Report.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

21 May 1957 (con't)

25X1 [ ]: Talked to [ ] about her and [ ] will complete 25X1  
preparation of memoranda.

25X1 [ ]: [ ] briefed me on the case of [ ] and I told 25X1  
him that I would see her.

25X1 [ ] Stewart called concerning [ ] and said he would send over 25X1  
a letter which they were preparing to [ ] terminating him. 25X1


25X1 [ ] Talked to [ ] about him and he suggested I tell 25X1  
25X1 [ ] that I felt his best spot was in OSI and that following this I call  
25X1 SCOVILLE and urge him to keep [ ] busy.

25X1 [ ] called concerning her and I filled him in on the  
developments of last week including my conversation with [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ]: Called to report the death of [ ] staff 25X1  
employee, Intelligence Officer, GS-11, 57 years old. She died at her  
daughter's home in Arlington after a fairly long illness.

25X1

22 May 1957



25X1 DCI STAFF MEETING at which I mentioned the problem of the upcoming pro-  
posal by [ ] to send TSS people to [ ] our progress 25X1  
on the 10th ANNIVERSARY, the fact that the Agency spent [ ] on temporary 25X1  
travel last year.

25X1 [ ]

25X1 [ ] came in to ask me to help him to either find a job or  
make up his mind to retire.

Lunch with MIKE BURKE, LESLIE HARRIS and [ ] to discuss CBS TV. 25X1

CASSIDY called on the [ ] cases. 25X1

Attended PRC on NEA Program.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

23 May 1957

[redacted] 25X1

25X1 Met with [redacted] and other Security officers to discuss the case of [redacted] 25X1  
25X1 [redacted]. They were convinced that she had deliberately lied on the  
polygraph about taking pills and also about taking the money.

25X1 Discussed with GEN. TRUSCOTT the establishment of his Staff and agreed 25X1  
25X1 that he could have [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1 Had [redacted] come in to tell her I thought it was time she settled  
down and stopped fighting the Agency.

25X1 Lunch with [redacted]

Met with HELMS, CASSIDY, and CONOLLY and then with the latter two alone  
to discuss DD/P organization.

GROGAN came in to show me the article appearing in ESQUIRE and urge that  
I attend the meeting with him and the editors of ESQUIRE.

25X1 I told [redacted] I would help if possible with the [redacted] PROJECT but 25X1  
did not want to participate in it directly.

25X1 [redacted] called to say what a fine job [redacted] was doing. 25X1

24 May 1957

DCI staff meeting.

25X1 Lunch with [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] of Logistics came in and I advised him that I thought he had 25X1  
quite completely burned his bridges and probably should resign from the Agency.

[redacted]

25X1 Together with [redacted] Told him we would help 25X1  
25X1 him locate a job and would not in any way prevent him from getting one with  
[redacted]

25X1 [redacted] called and asked whether an appeal to the IG would be valid if  
he had already resigned. I told him no.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

27 May 1957

DISCRIMINATION: Meeting with [ ] to go over the plans of our meeting on discrimination. We met with [ ] Stewart, Edwards, [ ] and [ ] and stated that we felt that the Agency could become involved in a discrimination case unless we were very careful and that we felt that Logistics and OCR were most vulnerable. We urged that Personnel review the files of the college graduates in both Logistics and OCR and see if there were any that were transferable to the DD/P. We suggested that Logistics establish a rule that no WB employees were to be sent overseas and, further, that they transfer personnel from the Warehouse to another headquarters assignment before sending them overseas. Finally, we urged that Personnel accelerate its efforts to get a colored JOT.

NSCID's: [ ] said the DCI wanted the NSCID's annotated and had not gotten to any of them.

DD/I SURVEY: Amory called to ask when we would start the DD/I survey and I set up a meeting for him on Wednesday. We also agreed to meet on the Library problem then.

[ ] Carey called about [ ] of FBID who refused to go overseas because of an aged mother. We agreed to suggest transferring him to FDD and to have a more specific understanding as to when he would go overseas.

NSCID'S: [ ] called to say he would handle the NSCID's going to the IAC and I asked him to complete the annotations.


[ ] called concerning [ ] I told him that I had left it with [ ] that he should resign and then could appeal to me to examine the circumstances of his resignation.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

27 May (con't)

25X1



25X1


[redacted] talked to me about his career. In brief, I told him I agreed with his going to WH Division provided he planned to make a career there.

28 May 1957

IG staff meeting.

WE SURVEY: Met with 10 officers from WE to outline how we plan to proceed on the WE survey. I advised that [redacted] would be responsible for establishing the schedule and the ultimate production of the report.

25X1



25X1


[redacted] came in to ask my assistance concerning an unsatisfactory fitness report she received while with NEA/5. I said that I would look into the matter. I reviewed the file and found that whereas the fitness report may not be tops it is not too bad and in addition there are memoranda from herself and [redacted] which would counteract this.

25X1

25X1

Lunch with [redacted] who urged that I see HUGH CUMMING at an early date to talk about STATE-CIA relationships.

25X1



**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

28 May 1957 (con't)

NSCID's: The Director buzzed twice on the NSCID's and the President's action as a result of which I sent him the revised and annotated NSCID 2 and 3; found out from COYNE that the NSC action on the President's Board recommendations had been sent over to the Agency last week and asked COYNE to send me copies of GEN. CUTLER's briefing notes from his meeting with the President last Wednesday.

COYNE called to ask if we were reviewing each of the NSCID's. I said we were.

29 May 1957

Discussed with AMORY the DD/I office.

Met with AMORY, [ ] and discussed the LIBRARY problem.

Went down to WE for a meeting with [ ]

PRC meeting on EE Division program.

Told [ ] to go see CASSIDY next Monday.

[ ]

At the DEPUTIES' MEETING discussed potential RACIAL DISCRIMINATION in the Agency and I reported on [ ] discussions with [ ] of the [ ]

[ ]

31 May 1957

MIKE BURKE called from New York to say good-by.

CASSIDY called on President's Board matters. Talked to him about meeting of President's Board and agreed with [ ] that there was no point in trying to get the DIRECTOR and KILLIAN together.

[ ] I told him the case was in abeyance.

I participated in NEA Division round-up.


Went down to WE on survey.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

1 June 1957

25X1



3 June 1957

25X1

[redacted] called to say that [redacted] had died of a heart attack on Sunday.

25X1

I called Gen. Cassidy to ask him to see if Dr. Killian would dine with Mr. Dulles on 12 June rather than 11 June.

25X1

Attended DCI Staff Meeting at which I asked that there be a discussion of the 10th Anniversary on Wednesday; mentioned that we had emergency radios in [redacted]; mentioned that [redacted] had died; and reported that Cassidy was sending down four episodes from the TV series "Air Power."

25X1

25X1

25X1

Coyne called me to needle me on the request from Dearborn and I in turn needed [redacted].

25X1



Attended Senior Staff Meeting and at DCI's request reported on the recommendations of the President's Board.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

3 June 1957 (con't)

25X1 [ ] talked to me about some recommendation in the TSS survey and I suggested that, if for security reasons they could not respond in writing, they respond orally to the Director.

25X1 Asked [ ] to try and clarify WISNER's thinking on the 10th ANNIVERSARY matter.

25X1 Asked [ ] status of our transmitters in the [ ] and he said 25X1 that we had COMMUNICATORS in each place except [ ] and that there our system 25X1 could be handled by the Navy.

STEWART called to say that he was assigning [ ] to DD/I and this probably 25X1 would not take place for six weeks but that he might be downgraded; that they would like our recommendation on that point.

25X1 [ ]: Spent 1½ hours talking to him in WE.

25X1 [ ] came in considerably agitated over his reassignment from one slot to another. I told him that this was purely technical, had nothing to do with the job. He claimed that according to some book this took him out of policy status and put him in administrative status. I told him I would be glad to talk to him about it 125X1 would bring me the book.

NORMAN PAUL brought in a letter from SENATOR HARRY BYRD on our action on the HOOVER COMMISSION recommendations to which I said I would prepare the answer.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

4 June 1957

25X1 [ ] reported that he had taken care of the problem with DEARBORN directly.

Meeting of the IG Staff.

25X1 Met with CAREY, ASHCRAFT, [ ] and NORMAN PAUL to discuss Congressional briefings. We agreed that this would be focused in Mr. Paul's office and that we would put out unattributed reports within clearing time with the individual Congressmen and that where the Congressmen did not come to Washington after a trip, we would get the [ ] to call on them.

25X1 [ ]

25X1 [ ] came to see me at [ ] request to appeal his security case. 25X1 He said that he had been fully cleared of being a Soviet Agent, that he strongly resented the number of times he had been asked to take the polygraph, that he felt the entire case was based on anonymous allegations. I said I would review the case and talk to him about it later.

25X1 [ ] dropped in to say hello.

25X1 [ ] came up to appeal the case of [ ] 25X1

25X1 Together with [ ], talked to [ ] and left it with him that we would discuss his case with COL. WHITE which [ ] agreed to do. In the meantime I call 25X1 [ ] who did not have very much good to say about [ ] 25X1

25X1 Talked to EDWARDS about the [ ] cases and he said that he would bring 25X1 [ ] over to talk about them.

25X1 Called [ ] to tell him what I had told [ ] and he said that 25X1 he had told her almost the identical thing which was that she must settle down to work and do a good job or she is through with the Agency.

25X1 HOUSTON called on the [ ] case and said that he felt there was no danger of Agency involvement.

25X1 [ ] of SECURITY called concerning the case of [ ] and 25X1 said that EDWARDS suggested that we get it to PAY COYNE in view of this man's occasional use by the White House. I agreed to transmit it.

25X1 The DCI asked when I would see MARY BANCROFT and we agreed that she should call me at the [ ] on Thursday, 6 June.

25X1 ELOISE PAGE came up to leave with me some papers concerning [ ] and I 25X1 told her that I would see [ ] or KARAMESSINES before I left. 25X1

25X1 Went over with [ ] the schedule for the [ ] half of WE and told 25X1 him to arrange it so [ ] could join them in [ ] 25X1

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

5 June 1957

25X1

Together with Rita attended [ ] and wrote [ ] 25X1  
a note.

PRC meeting on the WH program.

Met with the DCI and discussed the following subjects:

1. The handling of [ ] and his desire to go to [ ]--the 25X1  
Director agreed with EDWARDS and myself and signed the paper prepared by Security.
2. The possibility of a [ ] MEMORIAL SCHOLARSHIP--the Directo25X1  
agreed that we might try it and see how it looks although he was not enthusiastic.
3. The question of Staff status for [ ]--the DCI agreed that 25X1  
we should pursue this further with [ ] 25X1
4. Security appeals by [ ] the 25X1  
Director agreed that we should review all of these cases.
5. We went over the agenda for the President's Board of Consultants.
6. I asked him who he wanted to run PSAS but he was unresponsive.
7. I mentioned the Semi-Annual Report to the President's Board and told 25X1  
him he would probably receive it from [ ] in my absence. 25X1
8. I suggested that he take a security man with him on his trip to [ ]  
which he protested but said he would consider it.
9. He said that he wished to have the President's Board of Consultants  
cleared for TALENT in one memorandum signed by him rather than separate  
signatures by each of them.
10. I reported to him on the [ ] case. 25X1
11. I gave him the papers on [ ] and advised him that [ ] would 25X1  
sit in with him when he saw [ ]
12. At the DCI's meeting reported on the session with CAREY, [ ] 25X1  
ASHCRAFT, [ ] and NORMAN PAUL on the subject of Congressional briefings  
and advised how it would work; also pointed out that the PSAS luncheon would  
be Friday, 21 June; we discussed the 10th Anniversary problem and agreed that  
it would be limited to a strictly internal ceremony for the awarding of cer-  
tificates to 10 year employees; I reported on the questionnaire from HCUA on  
Soviet diplomats and the Director urged that we get State to answer this for  
us; I advised of [ ] comments about intelligence support for the  
Secretary of State when he is travelling abroad and was told that this had  
been taken care of; I reported that my conscious bothered me on the subject  
of [ ] and that I felt that the U.S. government should put pressure on  
[ ] to stop the murderers. The Director asked that we conduct a survey on  
the subject of how cash is handled.


**TOP SECRET**

6 June 1957

25X1 Notes from [ ] during Inspector General's absence:

25X1 1. Col. Edwards called to suggest that information developed on [ ] 25X1  
[ ] be forwarded to the White House possibly through Pat Coyne. I told him  
I would refer the matter to you.

2. GEN. CASSIDY called to say that DR. KILLIAN would be unable to have  
dinner with the DCI on the evening of 12 June and also would be unable to see  
him prior to the Board meeting. [ ] was notified. According to 25X1  
Frank, Cassidy had his dates confused but there was no question about the 25X1  
message that Killian would be unable to see the DCI prior to the meeting.



25X1 4. Revision of NSCID #5 and memo of 3 June 1957 returned by Gen. Truscott  
with comment Karamessines' recommendations be tried on for size. I discussed  
with [ ] who agreed to prepare another revision to include suggested paragraphs.  
I returned to him the original memo together with a copy of the General's comment.

5. Mr. Wisner called to ask if I knew what you had in mind in the line  
of preparation for the Wednesday session of the President's Board. He was  
referring to your memo of 22 May 1957 by which Amory was scheduled to give the  
world round-up with Wisner and [ ] present to comment on significant 25X1  
PP developments. Wisner would like to hear from you on Monday so he will have  
time to prepare material if necessary.

25X1 6. [ ] called to say that a project in which he is interested  
involving a contract with [ ] will be up for consideration at Wednesday's PRC  
meeting. You should receive a copy by Monday noon. [ ] has some 25X1  
comments to make on this subject.

25X1 7. [ ] saw the DCI for more than 20 minutes on Friday afternoon.  
I was present. As predicted, he attempted to bring up much of the old story.  
The DCI was most patient but I believe recognized the futility of trying to  
convince [ ] that the Agency was acting in his best interests. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

6 & 7 June 1957  
New York City

25X1 [ ] cancelled his luncheon but expressed great regret and urged that we get together again at an early date.

25X1 Luncheon with [ ] and discussed his forthcoming move to [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] came in with a long dossier of items: [ ]

25X1 [ ] (3) he said he was going to file suit against [ ] for breach of contract and pointed out that this might possibly involve CIA; (4) he asked if we would see [ ] but pointed out that he was not an operator but more of an interpreter and translator; (5) he cautioned against the use of [ ] who he said talked too much; (6) he asked when I would be able to meet [ ] in [ ] and I said I would send him the schedule. 25X1

Meeting with [ ] see memorandum to DCI). 25X1

25X1 Called [ ] to inquire as to status of their project and he reported that the drafting was getting to the final stages.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

10 June 1957

Attended DEPUTIES' MEETING.

Lunch with JACK BLAKE.

Briefing on REPORTS and REQUIREMENTS at WE.

25X1

EDWARDS called to say that [ ] had known [ ] before and that he wanted to talk to him about them.

25X1

[ ] to make an appointment.

JOHN CASSIDY called to ask for the statistics on personnel strength of the Clandestine Services on 1 March 1954 which GEN. DOOLITTLE wanted.

Checked with [ ] on the termination figures that the DIRECTOR wanted.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

11 June 1957

**IG Staff Meeting.**

25X1 [ ] presented a 1½ hour briefing on the Senior Research Staff which is part of the DD/I survey.

25X1 [ ] who contracted polio in [ ] and who has now returned to 25X1 duty with FE Division, came up to report on his experience at Warm Springs.

25X1 [ ] formerly with [ ], came in to see if he could work 25X1 part time for us in [ ]. I offered him no encouragement but said that we would check and let him know.

[ ] 25X1

25X1 ELOISE PAGE came up to leave with me a memorandum on conversations with [ ] and to tell me about SCOVILLE's efforts to bypass her Division.

ASHCRAFT called to ask if they could deal directly with ODM on the doors. I told him yes.

25X1 [ ] called to ask if I had negotiated the [ ] matter. 25X1 I told him that I had not yet heard specifically.

Told NORMAN PAUL that I would check with the FBI on the HCUA letter.

HAROLD LAWRENCE called to ask if we could arrange for a place for the Baker group to work for a week. I said that I would check and let him know.

25X1 [ ] called to say that [ ] was anxious for a report on the evacuation 25X1 of scientists, on the [ ] matter, and on my schedule in Europe.

Talked to Wisner about the briefing of the President's Board scheduled for tomorrow.

25X1 CASSIDY called to say that Gen. DOOLITTLE wanted a briefing on the budget and I arranged for SAUNDERS and [ ] to be in their office at 2:00.

25X1 CASSIDY called and said that DOOLITTLE wanted a briefing on AQUATONE and in 25X1 the absence of [ ] I arranged through [ ] for JAMES CUNNINGHAM and [ ] to give the briefing. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

12 June 1957

25X1

Advised [ ] of our inquiry from HCUA and asked if he would check it out and see what should be done so that the FBI and ourselves did not file contradictory reports.

25X1

Meeting of the PRC on the SE PROGRAM, MECHANIZATION OF RI, and

25X1

25X1

[ ] called to ask whether we would be willing to consider [ ] for reappointment to the Staff. I told her that we had not planned to fill the GS-9 slot at this time.

25X1

AMORY and [ ] called in re the PRESIDENT's BOARD and the former reported that he hoped this method of presentation could be continued.

Checked with BAIRD about SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE using [ ] and he agreed this could be worked out. 25X1

13 June 1957

25X1

25X1

[ ] called from O/PER to advise that the husband of [ ] committed suicide last night. [ ] works in OSI. 25X1

25X1

[ ] accompanied by two employees of the [ ] briefed us on WE activities. 25X1  
25X1

Meeting of the 10TH ANNIVERSARY COMMITTEE at which it was decided that MR. PFORZHEIMER would have the new certificate drawn up on 8½ x 11 stationery, and the Notice to the field redrafted and would then hand carry these to the particular departments and to the Director for signed concurrences. I called COL. WHITE concerning the cost of this and he assured me that it would be taken care of, and I called [ ] and asked him to get the list of 10 year employees to the appropriate Deputies at the earliest possible dates.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

13 June (con't)

25X1 Met with [ ] to discuss intelligence studies inasmuch as they are meeting on it at [ ] on 13 and 14 July. I made 25X1 the following points:

1. that in case of disagreement by the Editorial Board, the decision of the Editorial Chairman, Dr. Kent, should be final;
2. that the publication should be classified SECRET, otherwise it would fail in its mission;
3. that some attempt should be made to include the IAC on at least an honorary basis;
4. that the first issue should not necessarily be linked to the 10th anniversary of the Agency but should strive for perfection and to come out later if necessary;
5. that for political reasons they should not worry too much about contributions from Donovan and Truman;
6. that I would endeavor to get the DCI to sign the Forward and did not believe a Notice or Regulation necessary.

WHITE called to warn me that the State Dept. had cancelled TRANSFER ALLOWANCES as of 1 May and that we had followed suit and that I would probably get complaints on it.

The DCI said that he was asked the question by DR. KILLIAN as to whether there was any coordination on communications in the intelligence field. Told him I would check it and prepare a reply.

GATES LLOYD called saying he was sending me a report on his trip to Europe and would like to talk to me before I go.

14 June 1957

25X1 Talked to [ ] concerning whether there was any method in the Field for giving priority to the transmission of intelligence reports. He said that there was not and that this would depend upon the arrangements at each place.

25X1 [ ] of LOGISTICS came up to say that he was resigning his GS-12 position after 10½ years because he had found it impossible to locate elsewhere in the Agency. He reviewed his career with me and apparently he has been trying to get out of LOGISTICS for about four years and, in the meantime, has turned down offers to go to [ ] and two other places. I told him that on the basis of his refusal of assignments, the chances of his getting any other positions were non-existent.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

14 June 1957

At the request of MR. SPENCER TAGGART, briefly addressed the State Dept. graduates of the National War College on how the IG's Staff worked.

25X1 Together with [REDACTED], went out to the National Institute of Health  
25X1 to see [REDACTED] of WH Division who was recently flown back from [REDACTED] 25X1  
25X1 [REDACTED] with a brain tumor.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

17 June 1957

Reported to DCI meeting that GEN. CASSIDY had called on the meeting of the President's Board and had advised that they do not plan to meet until 26-27 September and will make no further recommendations at this time. He also stated that they had asked him to continue looking at other components of CIA.

Briefing on PP activities of WE by [REDACTED]

25X1  
25X1

25X1

Luncheon for [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] came in to leave with me papers requesting a complete review of his case.

25X1

25X1

Took GEN. CABELL the report by GEN. HULL on his European trip and also the SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT to the BOARD. I asked him if there were any matters he wished me to look into in Europe and he cited an instance in [REDACTED] is alleged to have commented on certain [REDACTED] activities as offering a good chance for CIA to build the record against [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Advised [REDACTED] that I was going to [REDACTED] and would be happy to look into any matters for [REDACTED] or himself.

25X1

18 June 1957

25X1

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] came up to say good-by as he was leaving to take over as [REDACTED]

25X1

Lunch with COL. WHITE.

25X1

Discussed FI matters with [REDACTED]

25X1

The DCI buzzed about [REDACTED] and when he planned to go to [REDACTED]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

18 June 1957 (con't)

25X1

[redacted]  
Talked to both CAREY and EDWARDS re [redacted] and we all agreed that we should move in on the case.

25X1

[redacted], 25X1

19 June 1957

25X1  
25X1  
Talked to [redacted] and filled him in on the latest organizational and other developments in [redacted].

Lunch with RICHARD HELMS.

Attended PRC meeting on FE Program.

25X1  
[redacted] from COMMO briefed us on the [redacted] Communications set-up.

25X1

Met with the DCI and GEN. HULL (see memo for the record).

Met with NORMAN PAUL and [redacted] to discuss report to HCUA and agreed that perhaps the Director and Mr. Paul should go up and see AHRENS and WALTERS.

25X1

25X1  
[redacted] called about [redacted] and protested about his being polygraphed so often.

25X1

Called TIETJEN on the case of [redacted]

25X1

25X1  
25X1  
WHITE came in to ask if I would give up two rooms upstairs to make room for [redacted] who, in turn, is giving up space to GEN. TRUSCOTT. Turned matter over to [redacted]

25X1  
Asked [redacted] of Training to take over the matter of CBS films on AIR POWER.

20 June 1957

25X1  
[redacted] of Training gave me a report of their review of German language capabilities and I told him I would look further into the matter

25X1  
[redacted] talked about SRS (see notes, part of survey).

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

20 June 1957 (con't)

25X1

Discussed President's Board meeting with GEN. CASSIDY. See memo for the record.

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

[ ] came in to discuss his case and I urged him to go see COL. EDWARDS and tell him everything.

JAMES GARRISON came up to talk about Logistics in [ ]; seemed principally concerned about property financial accounting.

25X1

GATES LLOYD said that the principal matter that concerned him in [ ] was why [ ] had not given him and the SECRETARY OF NAVY a proper briefing.

25X1

21 June 1957

Discussed with [ ] his new job.

Attended PSAS luncheon.

WE briefing by [ ]

[ ] of OCI came up to give us a memorandum about OCI on his departure from the Agency.

COL. EDWARDS called to ask if I would like to take a pocket radio with me for security matters.

[ ] asked if I was writing a memo on GEN. HULL's recommendations which I said I was.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

22 June 1957

Discussed the following matters with the DCI:

25X1 1. Reviewed for him the items which the President's Board plans to take up in September. He is most interested in following through on the exchange of letters with the President on GEN. TRUSCOTT's appointment. He also is concerned about the progress report to the Board in September, and I suggested that he pay particular attention to getting some coordination on substantive matters and that there also be careful staff work by [ ] on 5412. 25X1

25X1 2. He asked if [ ] was thoroughly read into the matters of the President's Board and I told him that he was; he suggested that [ ] occupy my office and agreed to his attending the morning Deputies' Meeting.

25X1 3. We discussed at some length the move of MR. NORMAN PAUL to the [ ] Division and his replacement by [ ] He called in MR. WISN [ ] 25X1 to talk about this and also asked GEN. CABELL to hear my views on ARCHIE ROOSEVELT. I said that we had come to the conclusion that the NEA Division was about the weakest of the Area Divisions and badly needed good effective management.

4. He signed off on the [ ] 25X1

5. I mentioned to him the appeal of [ ] and he suggested I hand 25X1 the papers on this matter to GEN. CABELL. He also expressed considerable concern over the number of individuals in the Agency who weren't fully employed. I said we would have a list to GEN. CABELL by early next week.

Discussed with MR. AMORY the DD/I survey and advised him we wouldn't complete it until after my return, but that my tentative conclusion was that his office was run well but that he needed a full-time Deputy and that I was very dubious about the value of SRS.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

12 August 1957

Attended DEPUTIES' MEETING and reported on the various IG staff changes.

CASSIDY called and said he would like to start on the survey of the DD/S office and I asked WHITE to have somebody in CASSIDY's office at 1000 Tuesday with the organization chart of the DD/S.

25X1 [ ] came over to discuss the taking on of the LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL job and I assured him that I was very happy to have the job taken on by himself and the function transferred to the Office of General Counsel. I mentioned the fact that the DIRECTOR had advised me in [ ] that he wanted the LEGIS- 25X1 LATIVE COUNSEL in most instances to report to me and to see him on only matters of policy where he should be concerned. [ ] said this should be thoroughly 25X1 discussed because he thought that COL. WHITE felt differently. I said I thought the way to handle it was for WHITE, HOUSTON, [ ] and myself to sit down 25X1 and work out the details prior to the DIRECTOR's return. [ ] then went on 25X1 to say that he felt that some changes in the secretarial help for the LC might be in order and that he did not feel there was enough work for the two present girls, plus his own staff. We agreed that we should wait until PAUL got back in September and work out the details.

25X1 AMORY called to ask if [ ] was doing anything on POLISH TRADE for me. I told him no.

WHITE called regarding a STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING on Friday.

25X1 SHELDON reported that they have now received NSA law through USCIB channels and I advised him that [ ] had taken over this matter and would be coordinating it throughout the Agency.

13 August 1957

IG STAFF MEETING.

25X1 Met with [ ] to discuss WE SURVEY.

25X1 AMORY came down to mention several items. He said that ANDREWS had resigned as a result of the report by the librarians which he felt was very unfair and that he had determined to appoint [ ] and [ ] to the two jobs down ther 25X1 and had finally insisted on these appointments to the DIRECTOR and GEN. CABELL. He said that [ ] on his own had worked out the arrangements with GEORGE CAREY 25X1 of [ ] and that at one point PFORZHEIMER had come to him and asked permission 25X1 to go to CABELL to try to get [ ] appointed as AD/CR and himself, PFORZHEIMER, as DAD/CR. AMORY also said he, himself, had been considered for Assistant Sec'y of State for Policy and Planning but that because Walter ROBERTSON advised the Secretary of his views on the Far East, he had been turned down. Finally, he advised that his area had been cut by 68 jobs and that he had been determined to abolish the Senior Research Staff. Consequently, he hoped that I would be able to conclude the DD/I survey at an early date.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

13 August 1957 (con't)

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] called about the [REDACTED] case and said he had some papers on this subject he wanted to send me. I said I would look into the matter and talk to EDWARDS about it.

[REDACTED] called and said that [REDACTED] was going on leave at the end of the week and would like to go over the [REDACTED] situation with me before that. I said that we would call him on THURSDAY morning.

RICHARD ARENDS of HCUA called to say that they were interested in the Americans who had attended the YOUTH FESTIVAL in MOSCOW and would like to talk to us on this subject. I agreed to see MR. BONERA of the Committee.

[REDACTED]

**TOP SECRET**

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

14 August 1957

25X1

[REDACTED]

Asked EDWARDS to come over to talk about the [REDACTED] case. 25X1  
He said later that he would send over a summary of the [REDACTED] case. 25X1

[REDACTED] called.

Called [REDACTED] and advised him that the DIRECTOR was quite anxious that a very careful case history be prepared on the ABEL case. He said that he was preparing one and that he would send up to me the FBI report on the case.

Called HELMS regarding [REDACTED] and he advised that the DCI had made the decision on this case the day before he left and that as far as he knew there was nothing in it against [REDACTED]. Also asked HELMS about the MOSCOW YOUTHS and he advised that [REDACTED] were the two that had the details on this. Also advised HELMS I would be happy to have lunch with him or with him and WISNER to brief them on my trip. He said he would check with WISNER and call back.

Asked [REDACTED] to come over to lunch.

CASSIDY came over to meet with ANDREWS, REYNOLDS, [REDACTED] and 25X1  
[REDACTED] and myself to talk about the Agency's semi-annual report to the Board.

CASSIDY stayed to talk about various items concerning the President's Board. He said that WARREN UNNA of the WASHINGTON POST had been in to talk about CIA and that he was doing an article for the October issue of HARPERS on CIA and mentioned the following items of interest--that there seemed to be some friction between the FBI and CIA, and considerable friction between the military and CIA. UNNA is tying his article to the MANSFIELD BILL. CASSIDY mentioned that in working the OCR he discovered that the lists of material available put out by OCR were inaccurate and that people receiving them often went elsewhere to get the material because they felt they could get it quicker than by going to OCR. He also said that he had discovered that there was a common tendency to put out new requirements rather than try to dig the existing material out of the files. CASSIDY also mentioned that GEN. CUTLER had sent the Agency a new communication on the subject of Executive Director and that the Board was extremely interested in this subject and did not understand why the DCI was not more responsive. He said that MR. LOVETT had discussed this matter with the DCI just before he had left for [REDACTED] and felt that he 25X1  
had succeeded in persuading the Director to a certain degree. CASSIDY also mentioned that he had recently been making a survey of the consumers of intelligence production and had talked to Assistant Secretary of Defense SPRAGUE who had expressed not a very high regard for intelligence products. CASSIDY said that GODEL had gone to NSA and had been replaced by [REDACTED] and that 25X1  
[REDACTED] had told CASSIDY that he felt there was insufficient staffing of CIA operations in Washington.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

14 August 1957 (con't)

CASSIDY also said that he had mentioned to Dr. KILLIAN the fact that Board members came to Washington, looked at CIA and came up with specific suggestions which were not transmitted to the Agency. KILLIAN suggested that he prepare a list of these which he did and which KILLIAN discussed with the DCI and then handed to him. 25X1

LUNCH with WHITE who advised me that CASSIDY had told him that DOOLITTLE was considerably upset with the Agency because rather than reducing in size, as his group had recommended, it had continued to get larger and that DOOLITTLE felt that the Agency had ignored many of his recommendations. WHITE commented that he felt that this meant that the Agency had fewer and fewer friends on the outside.

25X1 [redacted] I told him that I planned to review the case thoroughly and would keep him informed.

25X1 [redacted] came up to ask if I would participate in a presentation to the NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE on 9 September and talk for 45 minutes on the organization and functions and mission of the CIA.

25X1 Met with [redacted] to discuss the latter's case (see memo for the record) and then called JUDGE MORRIS and advised him that my inclination 25X1 was to get [redacted] out of the country.

25X1 [redacted] called to ask if I were willing to fly to [redacted], I told him that I was. He also asked if I would attend a meeting on Thursday, 22nd, 2:00 PM in Room 3E1066 of the Pentagon with Mr. Charles WEAVER, x-71644, and with [redacted] to discuss the evacuation of key scientists. I told him I would think about it. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

15 August 1957

25X1

Lunch with COL. BAIRD.

25X1 [ ] called to say that [ ] was going on leave on MONDAY and therefore there was no urgency on getting an answer on the case at this moment.

25X1

25X1 GEORGE CAREY called to say that [ ] had asked [ ] to sit at a meeting that GEN. CARELL was going to have next week with [ ] and his lawyer. CAREY suggested that [ ] should be the one to sit in on it.

25X1  
25X1

16 August 1957

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

16 August 1957 (con't)

Meeting of the BUILDING STEERING COMMITTEE at which it was agreed that the fence around the area should be constructed and the gates manned prior to the start of construction; that the DD/P should have its views considered for having 75 square foot cubicles rather than 150 square foot; that the DD/I should discuss with the architects his desire to have the corridors in Wing 5 placed centrally; that the telephone exchange should not be moved to make a place for the [redacted] if this was to result in a considerably greater cost in telephone installation; that the architect should be apprised of the necessity of good lighting on the lower floors.

25X1

[redacted] came in to report on the meeting together with the Acting DCI and SEN. LAUSCHE who was questioning the desire of Agency support of a [redacted] newsletter publishing in the U.S. [redacted] also mentioned a meeting

25X1

25X1

25X1

19 August 1957

Delivered lecture to STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL.

25X1

Lunch with COL. J. C. KING and reviewed general developments in WH.

[redacted]  
again. KING feels it is just a question of time until [redacted] is removed forcibly but also feels that the [redacted] is one of the best in the Division. He also said that the Division could use [redacted] in any capacity after he is able to work again.

25X1

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

19 August 1957 (con't)


25X1



25X1 [ ] advised on the morning staff meeting and also we discussed the  
25X1 general location of personnel upstairs and agreed that for the time being we  
would insure that [ ] had an office by himself.

25X1 [ ] brought in a letter that he had written to a Congressman in reply  
25X1 to an allegation that he, [ ] had promised some money to a quack who  
believed that language analyses was very useful for intelligence purposes.

25X1



25X1 [ ] called on the HCUA matter and I told him that I would take it up  
with the Acting DCI.

25X1 [ ] called and wanted a fill-in on the trip.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

20 August 1957

25X1 IG STAFF MEETING. Advised of DCI's decision to reduce the Agency's ceiling to [ ] of the status of the new building, of the paper prepared in the Pentagon delineating the types of personnel that will be assigned to CIA, my desire to work out in writing IG Staff procedures to be discussed at the next Staff meeting.

CASSIDY called to ask to talk to me tomorrow on the President's Board next meeting.

[ ]

25X1

25X1 Briefed [ ] on the WE survey for approximately 1 1/2 hours.

Lunched with JAMEY ANDREWS and discussed some of the OCR problems. He urged me to keep in touch with [ ] in order to find out how things were going in OCR. He said that [ ] was very depressed because he had suggested [ ] for the Library report and felt that [ ] criticism of mechanization was sour grapes because [ ] had never been able to make it work himself. ANDREWS said that [ ] had been offered the #2 spot in the New York Public Library but was not really interested. ANDREWS said AMORY had decided that [ ] should continue as Chairman of the AHIP Committee and pointed out that this Committee had recently saved the Government

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1 [ ] dollar study of their paper problem. ANDREWS also suggested that the Liaison Division be transferred to [ ] particularly inasmuch as they were now preparing reports as a result of [ ] returning from overseas. He said that the head of the Liaison Division spent too much time trying to coordinate and was slow getting action.

25X1

25X1 [ ] reported his concern at the activities of the BAKER COMMITTEE which apparently is going into extensive discussions on all aspects of intelligence collection. I told him that I would check with GEN. CASSIDY and advise him.

[ ]

25X1

25X1 Asked COL. DAVIDSON of PPC to come up and talk about [ ]

25X1

25X1 Talked to [ ] about the [ ] case. He said that for the present GEN. CABELL had decided not to bring [ ] in on the meeting and that [ ] was now studying the legal aspects of the case.

25X1

25X1

25X1 [ ] called to ask whether any action was required on the letter from [ ] and I told him that there would be no action until after the Director returned.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

21 August 1957

GEN. CASSIDY came over to discuss the meeting of the President's Board in September (see memo on this subject). He also went on to say that the Board was very concerned about the ELINT effort and felt that the AIR FORCE was being non-cooperative. He said that the BAKER COMMITTEE, as well as members of his own organization, had commented on this subject at various stages. He cited particularly the fact that apparently the AIR FORCE was determined to do everything on its own using the gigantic installation at KELLY FIELD.

25X1 Asked [ ] of the PPC Staff to attend a meeting on evacuation  
25X1 of [ ] scientists in [ ] office on 22 August. [ ] said 25X1  
25X1 that he would check it out with [ ] and that one of them would attend.

25X1 Lunch with WISNER and HELMS and went over with them certain observations  
25X1 on my trip, mentioning particularly the lack of reality in war planning and  
25X1 my thought that we could save considerable man power by streamlining that  
25X1 effort; my belief that only the Joint Chiefs of Staff can do much about  
25X1 coordinating clandestine collection in Europe; my thoughts that the chiefs  
25X1 in [ ] might do better if separated from the responsibilities  
25X1 of running the station; and my feeling that we should consider very seriously  
25X1 processing intelligence reports in the field in order to satisfy the needs of  
25X1 the attaches and the military commands and to reduce headquarters personnel.

25X1 [ ] came in to thank me for my advice in suggesting that she  
25X1 take the job on the PP Staff. She says that it has worked out very well and  
25X1 that she is happy in the job. 25X1




R

**TOP SECRET**

21 August 1957 (con't)

25X1



22 August 1957

25X1

[redacted] O/Personnel, called to advise that [redacted] 67 years old, physical scientist in OSI, had passed away; no other details at this time.

25X1



25X1

25X1

[redacted] dropped in to say hello on the occasion of his taking over COVER BRANCH.

COYNE called about lunch.



25X1

Lunch with PARK ARMSTRONG who said he was worried about STATE relations with the DD/P, particularly OIR, IAD, and BI who prepare material for the DD/P and feel it may end up in a bottomless morass. He believes that a periodic briefing by somebody in the DD/P on what happens to this material would be of great use. He believes there has been little change in the current intelligence picture although our publications are better. He says that 80% of the CIB is duplicative of the DIPSUM and State cables which are used to brief the Secretary. ARMSTRONG suggests that maybe we should stop sending it to those agencies where it duplicates their material. We discussed the possibility of a joint current intelligence effort and he pointed out that for a period after the war, before SPS was transferred from the Pentagon to State, there was a joint current intelligence effort in the Pentagon. ARMSTRONG believes that the delineation of effort between ORR and STATE has worked out very well and that there is less suspicion on the analysts' level.



25X1  
25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

23 August 1957

25X1 [ ] called to say he wanted to get my views on inspection techniques.

[ ]

25X1

25X1 [ ] came to lunch.

25X1 Discussion with [ ] of his activities in the DD/I staff.

BONERA of HCUA met with [ ] to discuss the handling [ ] and it was agreed that [ ] and [ ] would go up to talk to ARENS to determine the type of approach that the Committee would make and the degree of our cooperation.

25X1

25X15X1

25X1 [ ] came up to brief me on the status of the Studies in Intelligence publication. They asked if I would talk to the Director about a research institute and also if I would prepare an article on the Battle of the Bulge for the next issue.

LAWRENCE called to find out whether BISSELL could see SELFRIDGE and ROCHESTER of the BAKER COMMITTEE and pointed out that they had not gotten a very good impression from their briefing in TSS. I advised him that BISSELL was unavailable and that a COMMO briefing would have to suffice for the moment.

26 August 1957

At DCI's STAFF MEETING GEN. CABELL asked that I complete the preparation for the report due the KILLIAN BOARD on the 10th and that we include in this report a comment by the DIRECTOR on the difficulties in obtaining a [ ]

25X1

25X1 [ ] He asked HELMS that [ ] prepare something on this.

25X1

25X1 I reported to the DEPUTIES' MEETING that [ ] had been appointed to a review job in [ ]; that we had had a meeting on the MOSCOW YOUTH FESTIVAL and would submit a proposal to the Acting DCI; and raised the question as to whether we were prepared for possible questions from the newspaper men going to China concerning DOWNEY and FECTEAU. HELMS reported on the latter that he believed everything was in hand on this subject.

25X1

25X1 [ ] dropped in to talk about his future assignment. I told him that unfortunately there was no opening on the staff at the present time and he said that he was inclined to take the I&R job. I told him to let us know if we could be of any help.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

26 August 1957 (con't)

25X1 [ ] brought over the NSA legislation paper and I said I would read it and let him have my comments.

Lunch with JACK BLAKE.

25X1 Spent 1½ hours telling [ ] how the inspection system worked.

25X1 [ ] dropped in to say hello.

25X1 [ ] called to see if I would see [ ] whom we are terminating. 25X1

25X1 [ ] said that the people concerned with Victory at Sea should talk to [ ]

27 August 1957

IG STAFF MEETING which was devoted almost exclusively to a review of IG staff procedures with the following conclusions:

(1) that it was advisable, wherever possible, to keep the head of the component currently informed of our findings and potential recommendations.

(2) that it would be well worthwhile to develop an IG handbook, both for the guidance of new members of the staff and for possibly showing all or part to units being surveyed.

(3) that we should send more precise and specific statements to the field on exactly what we were looking for and how we planned to look for it.

(4) that in preparing reports for the Director we should prepare longer summaries so as to give the Director in about 20 pages the most important part of any survey. 25X1

[ ]

25X1 Lunch with JUDGE ROBERT MORRIS who said he had nothing on his mind and that the Committee was going to recess until next year but that he hoped we would keep him in mind for any good [ ]. He expressed appreciation of the way we had handled [ ] case and of the fact that this would probably precipitate a review of our [ ]. 25X1

25X1 Talked to [ ] and told him that I would advise him of the reasons for his termination and that [ ] would work out the details. Also talked to EDWARDS who said that the three important factors in the case were 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

27 August 1957 (con't)

25X1




25X1

[ ] reported on a conversation with ED RIVINUS of State asked that we set up a high level briefing for the middle level foreign service officers. I talked to Baird about this and it was agreed that we would get the details and Baird would follow through.

WISNER called on my thoughts about war planning and I told him that I hoped to have my papers on this subject completed this week and would send them to the PPC Staff.

28 August 1957

25X1



**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

28 August 1957 (con't)

25X1

25X1

Lunch with PAT COYNE to discuss ways of backstopping the coordination effort. He said that he would be happy to meet with GEN. TRUSCOTT and the inter-agency representatives if we wished it. He also said he would recommend that the President's Board review the NSCID's prior to their submission to the NSC. I pointed out that there did not seem to be too much knowledge in the other agencies of the President's Board recommendations. He called back later to say that the President's letter to the DCI had gone out to all NSC members, all IDC members and all others concerned on the same day that it came over here.

**TOP SECRET**

**Page Denied**

DIARY

29 August 1957

25X1

GROGAN called and said that a man named HODGES on the Federal Power Commission had written a book about OSS activities in [ ] and that he had suggested to HODGES that he clear it with State.

25X1

Discussion with [ ] about the DD/I Staff. (See memorandum for the Record.)

25X1

[ ], Chief of FE Plans, came up to make some comments about the Agency inasmuch as he was leaving after 5 years. He feels that we have made some progress in handling the military but that some are still misassigned. He cited a captain who was a Russian language officer whom we sent to [ ] as a security officer, and an Air Force radar technician whom we sent to the [ ] to drive a jeep. Both of these he pointed out to [ ]. He felt that relations between the civilians and the military were much better and that we were pretty well over the days of junior civilian officers commanding senior military officers. He felt a lack of communication between the Chief of FE and his principal staff, and said that the Chief, FE, was only a senior case officer too remote from his organization. He cited the fact that although his Deputy, [ ] has been acting for 5 months as Chief of Plans, [ ] had stated on his Fitness Report that he did not know [ ] sufficiently well to review it. [ ] felt that the Agency was much too large and that the DD/P areas could be reduced as much as 50% without loss of inefficiency. He also said that he felt that [ ] people under non-official cover in [ ] could do as much as the [ ] people who were now there.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Lectured to the Operations Support Course.

(Continued)

29 August 1957 continued

25X1



25X1


[REDACTED] FECTEAU and DOWNEY and reported certain security steps taken to insure there would be no break in the official story concerning their activities.

25X1

BAIRD called to say that WHITE had given him and [REDACTED] considerable hell because they had brought the [REDACTED] case to me and that it could have been handled by the Director of Personnel.

25X1

25X1



LBK/IG

DIARY

30 August 1957

25X1 [ ] dropped in to say hello.

25X1 Reviewed with [ ] and the FE team their itineraries for foreign travel and the general progress of the survey.

25X1 [ ] dropped up at GENERAL CABELL'S suggestion to ask about "Agreed Activities." I told him that I was preparing a lengthy paper on it, which I hoped to have available by the time he got back from leave.

25X1 Lunch for [ ]

25X1 [ ] called to see if I would be able to attend a luncheon for Under Secretary McINTYRE of the Air Force, and I told him I was already engaged.

WHITE called to say that he had buzzed me about the [ ] case but that it had already been taken care of.

25X1

25X1 [ ] called to say that HAROLD LAWRENCE had come over for a briefing on the Soviet ICBM.

25X1 [ ] showed me a paragraph which the State man wanted to include in the semiannual IAC report which would say in effect that intelligence had failed in the Suez crisis and that there were gaps in the organizational procedures which needed correction. We agreed that he should brief GENERAL CABELL about it, and for the moment we would do nothing further because the State man was not cleared.

25X1

(Continued)

**Page Denied**



DIARY

3 September 1957

IG Staff Meeting at which we discussed security procedures in order to cut down on a rather large number of violations. It was agreed that a security checker, working on a weekly basis, would be advisable. Also, I mentioned the fact that in order to insure that everyone was kept busy and that the girls would feel reportable to one individual that I felt we should clarify the assignments as follows: [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[redacted]  
I also mentioned that Legislative Counsel Staff would be moving out of the building this week.

Meeting with NORMAN PAUL and then with PAUL and [redacted] to discuss the move of the Legislative Counsel Staff. We agreed that [redacted] should be found another job elsewhere in the Agency at this time because there were already 2 available secretaries in the office with [redacted]. We also agreed that [redacted] should transfer to the [redacted] office for a period of 3 to 6 months and then should be reassigned to a job at her present grade. I called [redacted] and asked him if he would please locate assignments for both of these girls before the end of the year. We also agreed that despite the Director's statements that he wanted the Legislative Counsel to coordinate his activities closely with me that WHITE and I would prepare a joint memorandum which would exclude me completely from any authority or responsibility for the work of the Legislative Counsel and that we would then present this to the Director.

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

Lunch with Gordon Stewart who called about honor awards. We agreed that they should go ahead on the basis of individual presentations in view of the uncertainty about the Tenth Anniversary celebration.

25X1

Asked [redacted] for some material on Longevity Awards.

GENERAL CABELL called concerning my memorandum that Pforzheimer's trip be cancelled and said that he was not going to take action because he had not been aware of the decision which had been made by Amory and the Director, neither of which were present.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Continued)

3 September 1957

GORDON STEWART called about the transfer of [ ] from staff to contract status and the fact that he was unhappy about his treatment by the Agency and wanted to see me. I told him I would see him tomorrow.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

[ ] called concerning [ ] and I told him to push ahead as quickly as he could.

25X1

Upon the suggestion of NORMAN PAUL, I asked [ ] to schedule the announcement of [ ]'s appointment as Legislative Counsel for the Senior Staff Meeting of Wednesday.

25X1

25X1

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

DIARY

4 September 1957

Attended the Deputies Meeting.

At the Senior Staff Meeting gave brief description of my trip.

VIRGINIA PILGRIM called and said that the President's Board wanted a "flannel Board" for their September meeting. I called [ ] of OCI and asked him if he would go to see HAROLD LAWRENCE and find out what they wanted.

25X1

[ ] came in and I told him there was nothing we could do about [ ] bill. He expressed regret, but besides from saying that he thought [ ] had misled both himself and the Agency, he appeared to be content that we did everything we could.

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

[ ] came in once again to appeal his case. (See memorandum for the record.)

25X1

At the request of Mr. Helms saw [ ] (See memorandum to the Director.)

25X1

25X1

42

4 September 1957 Continued

25X1

Called

[Redacted]

Reminded WHITE that the Director had asked me to review all cases where Security was going to request termination. He said that in preparing the Procedure Paper that they would keep this in mind, but that they generally preferred that I be the court of last appeal.

Asked WHITE if he would take care of eliminating the two slots--the GS-17 slot and the GS-7 slot--as a result of an incorporation of the Legislative Counsel's job into the Office of the General Counsel.

[Redacted]

25X1

LBK/IG

DIARY

5 September 1957

25X1

[redacted] of the Language Training Division came up and I explained to them that on my own time I would like to attempt to get my French, Spanish and German up to at least the intermediate stage. We agreed that it would be best to try French and Spanish initially, and they would work out for me a program of materials to be used. We agreed we would try an hour a day on each language; and if I found it too great a burden, I would cancel it. It was agreed that at the end of three months I would take the examination to see what I had accomplished and we could then judge how much our busy senior officials could do in this regard.

25X1

[redacted] called to report in.

CASSIDY called and asked to have somebody come over and talk to him next Monday on cover problems.

25X1

[redacted]  
Asked J. C. KING to be sure this was taken care of. Also mentioned it to STEWART.

25X1  
25X1

Lunch with [redacted] and we discussed in general some of the problems in [redacted].

Called CASSIDY to ask if anything should be done about briefing Colgate DARDEN. He said that DARDEN would not be back until the day before the Board meeting and that he would let us know if any briefing was required.

25X1

[redacted] case and I advised him that I had not had a chance to take it up.

25X1

(Cont.)

R

5 September 1957 Continued

Meeting with HELMS and [REDACTED]  
We agreed that they probably should be asked to resign but given a generous period in which to seek another job.

25X1

LBK/IG

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 September 1957

Attended a luncheon given by GENERAL CABELL for GENERAL JOSEPH CARROLL, Chief of the Air Force OSI. GENERAL CARROLL asked that the Agency intensify its efforts in the sabotage field.

PFORZHEIMER came in to discuss the Hic case. I said that I would review the matter in my DD/I survey, but that I did not understand why it was necessary to have two independently large libraries. He also made some critical comments concerning OCR and some favorable comments concerning the Library Report, which I told him I thought was a very poor job.

Briefed NORMAN PAUL concerning SENATOR KEFAUVER'S appeal to PFORZHEIMER on behalf of an FEC employee who was being terminated. We agreed that we would get the Office of Personnel to see this individual.

25X1

[ ] briefed me on an OSI case.

STEWART called me on the letter to [ ] and I suggested that he let me see it before it was dispatched.

25X1

25X1

[ ] to see if we could get some flu vaccine for the Ambassador's wife. I said that I would see what we could do about it.

25X1

Asked [ ] Chief of Cover Branch, to go to see GENERAL CASSIDY on Monday at 10:00.

25X1

25X1

Called J.C. KING concerning the cable from [ ] and said if the individual would come up from [ ] that I could probably persuade [ ] to handle the case the way we wanted it.

25X1  
25X1

25X1

HELMS called and expressed concern as to whether we had reached the right decision on the [ ]. I said that I had put down the pros and cons in a memorandum and that we could review it before making it final. I also advised HELMS that we would be preparing up here a memorandum on achievements of the Agency for the President's Board, and that I would send it down to him for comments.

(Cont.)

6 September 1957 continued

25X1  
25X1

Needed [ ] on assignments for [ ] and

25X1

[ ] .

LBK/IG



DIARY

9 September 1957

At the DCI's Meeting he asked that I look into the possibility of giving educational trips as incentive awards. He also asked that I check to see whether we had our applicants carried on IBM files.

Advised the Deputies Meeting that we had asked the Board <sup>about</sup> to brief COLGATE DARDEN and that he was unavailable; that GENERAL CASSIDY was covering the Cover problem; that the September 27th meeting would probably involve COMINT and the Baker Committee primarily, and the Board wanted to see the DCI alone.

Advised the Deputies meeting that [ ] had joined the IG Staff.

25X1

Addressed the National War College on the Subject of "Origin, Mission and Functions of the CIA".

Discussed the cable from [ ] with [ ] and we agreed that [ ] assignment to [ ] should be cancelled.

25X1  
25X1

LBK/IG

DIARY

10 September 1957

DCI buzzed concerning the situation in [ ] as he was seeing [ ]  
[ ] I told him that I thought that they were getting things  
under control and that I already had lunch with [ ] and talked to him  
about many of these subjects.

25X1  
25X1

25X1

IG Staff Meeting.

Asked [ ] to talk to [ ] which he said he would do.

25X1

Lunch with [ ] and [ ]

25X1

LBK/IG

25X1

Following members of the IG staff received the flu vaccine: Kirkpatrick.

11 September 1957

25X1



25X1

[redacted] came up to discuss two changes in the Program. The first was to list the category of items given under support. The second was to completely eliminate the statement of mission part. I agreed with this and suggested that he clear it with BISSELL.



25X1

EDWARDS called to ask what action had been taken on the Tenth Anniversary. I told him I was still trying to get a decision from the Director on it.

CASSIDY called to say that [redacted] had gotten to see MINNICH in the White House.

25X1

12

11 September 1957 continued

25X1  
25X1  
EDWARDS called and said that CASSIDY had asked him several questions about the allegation by [ ] that a U.S. intelligence agent [ ] had been working for the Soviets. Cassidy had also asked him about the article in Esquire by Enno Hobbing and the Director's responsibility for protecting sources and methods.

LBK/IG

25X1  
25X1  
Asked SECURITY if they have anything on [ ]

25X1

DIARY

12 September 1957

25X1

[ ] came in to bring me a paper addressed to the Director which was an appeal. He said he didn't want to present it to the Director now but asked me to keep it for safekeeping.

25X1

Asked [ ] to undertake three projects: (1) to develop a paper proposing a method for the IG Staff to analyze the effectiveness of substantive intelligence, (2) to prepare a paper proposing a new type of current intelligence publication, and (3) to undertake the long-term responsibility of gathering together in one place a brief handbook of IG philosophy and procedures.

25X1

Talked to [ ] about his future and he said that he would like to go to the DD/P area, eventually go overseas, and then come back into an executive position. We agreed that I should talk to HELMS about this.

CASSIDY called to say that the Board would like the DCI to come on the 27th and stay for lunch. They would like him to come on the 28th for lunch to discuss their proposed recommendations to the President.

CASSIDY called to say that DR. KILLIAN had received an anonymous phone call while at the Cosmos Club stating that if he wanted to find out what a foul mess there was in TSS, he should look at the IG's survey. CASSIDY pointed out that KILLIAN was at the Cosmos Club on Gaither Committee business.

25X1

CASSIDY called to ask if our [ ] man would come to see him on Monday at 10:00. Checked with [ ] this and arranged that [ ] [ ] would be there.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Took [ ] out to see [ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ] called and I told him that I was going to take the matter up with the Director and would advise him just as soon as I possibly could.

25X1

**Page Denied**

DIARY

13 September 1957

At DCI meeting advised them of a paper on the list of accomplishments for the President's Board and also of [ ] appeal to MINNICH in the White House. The DCI asked that there be added to the agenda for the President's Board: [ ]

25X1

[ ] He also said that he had suggested to CASSIDY that BISSELL brief the Board. The Director also suggested that we start developing a file on accomplishments and asked that I get from [ ] a memorandum [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

The DCI asked that I check with GEORGE CAREY and see what clearances [ ] should keep.

*AND GAN*

[ ] came in to fill me in on the latest developments in his field. He commented on a Los Angeles Times newspaperman's inquiry concerning how many people in the Agency ~~were~~ were getting the flu shots.

EDWARDS called concerning the items for the KILLIAN Committee and we agreed to go over them on Monday.

25X1

LBK/IG

[ ] (EE/Personnel) called to ask if we could make [ ] available for a one-week, half-days, training course called "Americans Abroad in [ ]" beginning 30 September. Was advised this is okay. Asked him when they would want her to transfer to the Division and he said probably October or November for departure after the first of the year.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

R

13 September 1957 (con't)

GEORGE CAREY called about the clearance for [ ] and I gave him the brief background on how the matter came up and said that I would prepare a memorandum on this subject to accomplish what the Director desired. 25X1

Discussed with EDWARDS the leak to the press concerning the Agency's handling of the flu vaccine. He seemed to feel that it had had such broad dissemination in the Agency that there was no possibility of tracing the leak. Also mentioned to him the fact that [ ] was leaving and he said he would arrange a VIP debriefing. Gave him the details on the phone call to KILLIAN and he asked me to find out who in TSS had read the report. Also discussed the [ ] cases with him. 25X1

[ ] brought in the DD/S problems for Board consideration. 25X1

Talked to HELMS about [ ] and he said they would be interested. Also asked him about [ ], and after cogitation he said he thought the real reason [ ] was let go from FI was lack of production. Also told him I suggested [ ] stopping in [ ] to which he agreed. We also discussed the leakage to the press on the flu vaccine. 25X1

Told [ ] about my conversation with [ ] He said that [ ] had told him that [ ] was an awful mess. 25X1

Met with [ ] to review the progress on the FE survey. 25X1

[ ]

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

16 September 1957

CASSIDY returned my call and stated that the individual who had called DR. KILLIAN was quite specific in saying he was a CIA employee and describing the situation in TSS as deplorable. Reported this information to EDWARDS.

25X1 [ ] called concerning the report due the President's Board on Recommendation #6. I advised him that I will check with CASSIDY and see whether they wanted it in writing.

25X1 [ ] came in with a suggestion from GEN. CABELL that we might overcome some of the Director's objections to the 10-year certificates by putting on the back a classification form which could provide for de-classification.

Meeting with EDWARDS, [ ] to review the security material the Director will need for the meeting of the President's Board. 25X1 25X1

GROGAN called to say that [ ] had inquired about the 10th anniversary of the Agency, but probably would drop the matter. 25X1

GEORGE CAHEY called about [ ] security clearance and I told him that I would prepare a memorandum which would keep a TOP SECRET clearance for him to be used on a WAE basis. 25X1

25X1 [ ] called to inquire about [ ] background and said there was a possible job for him on the PP Staff. 25X1

25X1 [ ] brought in a file which had been left in a New York taxicab by somebody in [ ] organization; and said the Director wanted my views on what to do with it. 25X1

25X1 [ ] came up to go over my proposal that the Project Review Committee annually review the Agency budget.

25X1 [ ] of OSI called to get an extension of time for preparing recommendations on problems for the President's Board to consider.

25X1 I talked to [ ] about [ ] He said that 25X1  
25X1 [ ] had stayed over to see SCOVILLE and had been told that his promotion would be considered along with the others entitled to promotion at this time. He also said that they had checked with [ ] who said that he had made 25X1  
25X1 no commitment to [ ] for a promotion.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

R

16 September 1957 (con't)

[REDACTED]

25X1

WESTON ~~PULLEN~~ of TIME, INC. called at the request of C.D. JACKSON and is going to come to lunch on WEDNESDAY.

17 September 1957

25X1

[REDACTED]

IG Staff meeting at which I discussed the general leakage from the Agency at some length and commented that I felt a large amount of this was coming from misguided employees who felt they were assisting the Agency, but who were only doing it damage. I urged that the Staff in their contacts with employees of the Agency point out to them the many channels of appeal, including that to the President's Board, and urge that employees keep their appeals in Agency channels until all recourse was exhausted. I stressed the fact that I felt that if this kept up and that a joint Congressional committee was established the days of CIA might well be numbered.

25X1 [REDACTED] called concerning the transfer of [REDACTED] and said that he thought all the papers were in order. I advised him that if that was the case, the Personnel people in the NEA Division didn't know it and that my interest was in getting our books cleared. 25X1

25X1 [REDACTED] called about [REDACTED] and said that he didn't know what we wanted in the letter. I advised him. [REDACTED] called later and said that 25X1 apparently [REDACTED] had left on leave without informing [REDACTED] what 25X1 to do.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

17 September 1957 (con't)

25X1  
25X1

25X1

CASSIDY called to say that he was going up to see DR. KILLIAN and asked if I could send him the accomplishments paper.

25X1 [ ] came in and I told her I didn't believe there was anything in the files that need concern her. She said that she had a possibility of an assignment in [ ] and wondered whether there would be anything to prevent this inasmuch as [ ] had told her it would be one year before she could go overseas again. I told her I would check her Personnel and Security files and talk to Medical Staff and advise her.

25X1 [ ] came up to once again talk about his case. I advised him orally of the pros and cons in the case as I saw them and said I would let him know just as soon as I had talked to the Director.

25X1 Talked to [ ] and HOUSTON about the NSA legislation, and checked with [ ] to find that the DCI was very much opposed to it. They were going to talk to GEN. CABELL about it and would carry on from there.

25X1

Went over certain items in the WE survey with [ ]

25X1

25X1 [ ] called to say that [ ] in WH had advised him that he couldn't get his home leave on his [ ] trip. I said I would check into it and told him to call me on Friday. He was also worried about not being able to get insurance to cover his family.

18 September 1957

25X1 [ ] called to say that GEN. CUTLER at the NSC Planning Board meeting yesterday indicated that he wished to send the IAC Status Report to the President's Board. He also indicated that he felt the report was "bland."

Meeting with O'CONNER, EDWARDS and ANGLETON on the [ ] case and it was agreed that the three of them would meet with [ ] and bring him into the details.

25X1  
25X1**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

*2*

18 September 1957 (con't)


25X1

Met with the DCI and went over the accomplishments list. He asked that an item be added on [ ] and also suggested RFE and that I talk to [ ] 25X1  
He also asked that I postpone MARY BANCROFT for a week.

Called MRS. BANCROFT and she agreed to come down with the NBC people on 3 October.

25X1

Lunch with WESTON PULLEN, Vice President of Time.



25X1

[ ] called and said that CABELL had approved of going over to brief CASSIDY [ ] 25X1


25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] called for an appointment and I so advised [ ] who said that they had lost track of a good deal of her movements because she had apparently broken off with [ ] who had recently gone to [ ] to talk to [ ] He said [ ] was now working at the [ ] Hotel. 25X1



**TOP SECRET**

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

19 September 1957

CASSIDY called to thank me for the accomplishments paper which he said was exactly what they wanted. He also said that the Board would review the IAC summary. He said Dr. KILLIAN had agreed to the Director taking up the NSA problem and to BISSELL briefing on his project. He asked for 10 organization sharts of the Agency for use at the meeting. He agreed to see [ ] at 0900 on 20 September to be briefed on the NSA legislation. 25X1

I asked him again about a briefing for COLGATE DARDEN and he said that DARDEN would be in town for only one hour on the 25th and that therefore he felt any briefing on our part was out of the question.

[ ] came in to discuss the method of presentation of the NSCID's and I suggested that he get [ ] assistance on this.

[ ] called to say that TSS wanted to set up an outside Board to review the audio-surveillance problem and that they would like to consult HAROLD LAWRENCE and to make use of the Science Advisory Committee. I told them to go ahead and suggested that any panel they establish include at least one good operator.

[ ] came in (see memorandum for the record). She asked if I would see her lawyer, [ ] and seek appeal to the Director for a hearing. She later called from [ ] office to say that she was unable to get him until October 3rd and that she wished I would hold up seeing the Director until after I talked to [ ]. I said that I would. I advised [ ] of the above and of the fact that [ ] was moving to New York and would be located in the [ ], after 1 October. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

Lunch with [ ] and in general listened to his complaints about the sad state of the world.

Asked [ ] to change the Director's calendar to show MARY BANCROFT's appointment for 1000, 3 October.

ANGLETON called to report on the meeting with O'CONNER and BAILEY. He said he thought the Department would make a strong point of lack of notification. ANGLETON also asked how much I wanted for the Director on the ABEL case. I asked for a brief summary. 25X1

[ ] of Training called to ask if I would talk to the Management Course on top management problems.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

19 September 1957 (con't) *✓*

SCOVILLE asked if they could delay getting their material to me until Monday and if it would be possible to send it directly rather than through

25X1 [ ] I said yes.

25X1 [ ] dropped in to talk about the placement problem of  
25X1 [ ] He said that [ ] did not have the slot and wanted  
25X1 to set up a new unit which would require getting new slots. He didn't  
25X1 think that this was going to work out and that therefore he ought to look  
25X1 elsewhere for a slot for [ ]. I told him to do this inasmuch as we  
25X1 didn't want to count on something that would not materialize.

25X1 [ ] called to ask that I check with BISSELL to see whether I [ ] should 25X1  
check into any of his matters in [ ] He also said that HAROLD 25X1  
LAWRENCE had pointed out that neither [ ] had ever read 25X1  
the report of the technological capabilities of the panel. I told him to  
go ahead and make the arrangements for them to read this.

20 September 1957

25X1


25X1

**TOP SECRET**


**TOP SECRET**

20 September 1957 (con't)

25X1



25X1 [ ] dropped in to say hello. He has recently returned from [ ] 25X1  
25X1 [ ] and is probably going to take over the [ ] 25X1  
25X1 [ ] came in to say that [ ] in general agreed on our proposal on  
current intelligence but felt the timing was not good at the moment.  
25X1 [ ] brought down the Bureau of the Budget report on [ ] and 25X1  
said GEN. CABELL wanted to take me up on my offer to write a reply.  
25X1 Lunch with [ ] 25X1



**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

23 September 1957

25X1

25X1  
25X1

[ ] O/Personnel, called to arrange interviews for [ ] with OSI [ ] and [ ] Deputy Comptroller. He said (Personnel) is also interested but there is a reassignment problem at the moment for the girl she would replace so we would hold off on that one for the moment. The appointments were arranged for this afternoon; consequently this postponed Frances' reporting to O/Personnel for detail until tomorrow.

25X1  
25X1

[ ] called to ask if I would talk to [ ] and perhaps [ ] would talk to the Director. 25X1

25X1  
25X1

[ ] asked if I would meet with the DCI at 2:30 together with [ ] to talk about [ ] 25X1

CASSIDY called to ask for the progress report on [ ] 25X1

25X1

[ ] reported that the DCI had noted my comment on the Department of Defense's action on the 10th anniversary and said that he appreciated that I didn't say "I told you so." 25X1

J. C. KING called to ask if I would see the Chief of the [ ] to officially greet him. Told him I would. 25X1

25X1

[ ] called to ask if I would see [ ] when he was here. Told him yes.

25X1

Talked to TRUSCOTT and [ ] concerning the type of report required for the President's Board meeting at the end of the week.

Addressed Management Course.

25X1

[ ] called to remind me that whenever we got in a position to talk about the mechanization of our registry they would appreciate being advised.

25X1

Went over regulations with [ ]

25X1

GORDON STEWART called concerning the proposal they had with regard to [ ] and I agreed. 25X1

Talked to both SCOVILLE and [ ] on TCP report. 25X1

[ ]

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

24 September 1957

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1 Took to the DCI the agenda for the President's Board. He wanted to add  
[ ] publicity, dissemination of intelligence, appearances before Congress.  
He wanted a list of speeches for last two years.

25X1 Met with [ ] and HOUSTON to go over the general problems of  
Legislative Counsel and we agreed that I would have no authority or responsi-  
bilities on this subject and the DCI would be so advised.

Met with TRUSCOTT and HOUSTON to go over NSCID #9.

25X1 [ ] came up to talk about the visit of [ ] 25X1  
and ask if I would officially greet him on behalf of the Director.

Asked BISSELL to hold time open on Friday to go before the President's  
Board.

25X1 Needed [ ] on finding a location for [ ] 25X1

25X1 Lunch with [ ]

The DCI and JAMES BARKER dropped in after lunch and talked mainly about  
the problems of publicity and relations with Congress.

25X1 Talked to [ ] about his meeting with [ ] and 25X1  
25X1 told him I would call [ ] to see whether there was any further talk.

25X1 Talked to [ ] about briefing of GOV. DARDEN.

[ ] 25X1

25 September 1957

Attended the Deputies' Meeting.

BISSELL dropped in for a lengthy discussion on [ ] progress on [ ] 25X1  
and the President's Board.

CASSIDY called concerning having BISSELL appear before the BOARD and  
advised that there was no need to see the BAKER report before the DCI  
appeared because the Board itself would not be briefed on it until Saturday.

[ ] 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

25 September 1957 (con't)

[REDACTED]

25X1

Talked to [REDACTED] about what the DCI wants on [REDACTED] for MR. HERTER and followed this up with discussion with ANGLETON on same subject.

25X1

Lunch with [REDACTED]

Gave [REDACTED] the DCI's memorandum on briefing of the Board on AQUATONE material.

Talked to DAVE BECKLER of ODM and HAROLD LAWRENCE on BAKER COMMITTEE report and advised the DCI against writing a letter to GORDON GRAY on this subject.

26 September 1957

25X1

[REDACTED]

Talked to TIETJEN and [REDACTED] about [REDACTED]. The medics will give him a rather thorough examination.

25X1

Received [REDACTED] together with J. C. KING and two of his staff. We agreed that we would be glad to help him in any ways possible.

25X1

Talked to [REDACTED] to change date of her meeting with the Director.

Went over some legislative matters with [REDACTED]

25X1

Suggested to [REDACTED] that he bring GROGAN in on the speech the Director was planning.

Attended lunch for [REDACTED]

Attended meeting of Career Council.

**TOP SECRET**

27 September 1957

25X1

[ ] dropped in to see if there was anything new about his reassignment. I told him you had talked to [ ] and that [ ] plans to see you about it.....R.C.M.

25X1

25X1

Went with the DCI to meeting of the President's Board. See memorandum for the record.

Attended a meeting with GEN. CARROLL of USAF/OSI on the article written by MARQUIS CHILDS. It was agreed that each agency would internally investigate to determine whether there were any leaks.

Met with the DCI to go over the matters for tomorrow's President's Board meeting.

25X1

28 September 1957

Went with the DCI to the meeting of the President's Board (See memorandum for the record).

**TOP SECRET**

2

30 September 1957

Attended the Deputies' Meeting and went over the 12 paragraphs of my memorandum on the President's Board meeting with the following actions:

1. Sheldon, Amory, [ ] Truscott, [ ]
2. At IAC tomorrow.
3. Bissell internally.
4. DD/P. Late November.
5. Answered.
6. OSI. Keep LKT advised.
7. DD/P.
8. Answered. Further report. NSA.
9. NSA.
10. Bissell will call.
11. OCI talk to Navy.
12. DCI to take up with President.

[ ] came in to ask about the interest of the President's Board in the estimate on guided missiles. I told him that it had been taken care of.

[ ] called about [ ] and I told him what we planned to do and he agreed.

Met with the FE group to discuss the last matters prior to their departure.

[ ]

[ ] called about the [ ] case and I told him I had not yet been able to work it out with the DCI.

JAMES KING of ODM came to lunch.

[ ] came up to discuss the case of [ ]. He said in effect that he would under no circumstances recommend [ ] return to the Clandestine Services and that he thought the general work performance of [ ] as a supervisor had been very low.

~~TOP SECRET~~

30 September 1957 (con't)

25X1 Checked with TIETJEN on [ ] medical report and they advised that they thought he sought the refuge of the doctors as an excuse; that they found him to be normal and healthy.

25X1 [ ]  
ANGLETON called to ask about the difference between PSAS and the WELFARE FUND.

1 October 1957

CASSIDY called concerning the findings of the Board on 26 and 27th and went over in general what they planned to recommend.

SHELDON came in to talk about my memorandum on current intelligence.

25X1 [ ] called about the War Planning paper and I advised him that it had not been finished as yet.

25X1 [ ] brought in a revision of NSCID #5.

25X1 SCOVILLE called to say that they have reviewed the case of the man in [ ] who had appealed to me and had written him as to why he was not going to get a promotion. I advised him that this concluded my interest in the matter. 25X1

[ ]  
GATES LLOYD came in to say that he had found very little on his [ ] trip which would concern our inspectors. 25X1

25X1 [ ] consulted on one of the surveys.

BOREL called to ask if the President's Board was interested in OCR and I told him that they were not at this time.

25X1 [ ] called to say that if we didn't do something about [ ] soon, it would be too late. 25X1

Met with DCI and GROGAN and we agreed that any TV sponsorship was out of the question.

The DCI asked if we would hurry up with the paper on [ ] 25X1

25X1 Lunch with [ ].

**TOP SECRET**

1 October 1957 (con't)

25X1

2 October 1957

Attended a meeting with Amory, Sheldon and Truscott and Karamessines to discuss my memorandum on a new current intelligence bulletin. The idea we advanced was generally well accepted and Sheldon said that they would work out plans and we agreed to have another meeting on 17 October.

TOD came in to expound on his philosophy concerning the NSCIDs and I agreed that his exercise seemed well founded.

25X1 [ ] called concerning [ ] and I told him I believed the matters of leave and hospitalization had been taken care of.

25X1 Went over the WE survey with [ ] and had lunch with [ ] 25X1  
25X1 [ ] to discuss additional items.

25X1 BLAKE called about [ ] trip.

25X1 Saw the DCI on the cases of the [ ] 25X1  
25X1 He agreed to a review of the [ ] case and to the termination of the [ ]. 25X1

25X1 [ ] reported on the [ ] case and said that he thought this probably might get off base during his absence.

25X1 [ ] DD/I staff, checked on ELINT.

**Page Denied**



**TOP SECRET**

3 October 1957

Attended meeting with the DCI, GROGAN, [ ] and MR. KATZ and MR. LANTZ of Figaro. After about 1½ hours discussion, the DCI said that he couldn't really make up his mind to go along with the project but would check with higher authority and asked if I would prepare a memo for him to talk to JIM HAGGERTY about it. 25X1

25X1 z [ ] who has been with the Agency about 10 years and served in ORE, OCI and Training, came in to say he was leaving the Agency because he couldn't seem to find a job to do. He seemed generally well disposed but commented on the fact that NEA had offered him the job as [ ] in 25X1 [ ] but that after telling him that it was urgent that he make up his mind, when he did make up his mind nothing happened.

WHITE called me about a meeting with Bureau of the Budget personnel and asked for my comments on the [ ] paper. 25X1

Addressed the Clandestine/Review course on the problems of the Clandestine Services and their future.

4 October 1957

DR. TIETJEN's flu vaccine didn't work. Absent from work today.

7 October 1957

CASSIDY called to say that DR. KILLIAN would like a roundup on what we knew about the Soviet satellite.

25X1 At the Deputies' Meeting reported on CASSIDY's request on the Soviet satellite and on the request for our action on the TCP. Also reported the problems with [ ] and advised that the CZECHS were once again bidding for the Montevideo telephone exchange.

At the Director's request, prepared a statement on the Consolidated Charities drive for presentation at the Senior Staff meeting and also made a brief presentation to the Senior Staff meeting on the recent meetings of the President's Board.

DCI commented that he had spoken to Ambassador HENRY TAYLOR to bring over a Swiss alpine rescue expert.

Advised Houston concerning [ ] statement that [ ] would call. 25X1 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

7 October 1957 (con't)

25X1

[ ] advised that the [ ] file has gone from [ ] to [ ] to 25X1  
Angleton. Mr. Kirkpatrick's letter to Christian Herter was given to Mr. Angleton 25X1  
to redo.

25X1

[ ] came up to seek advice on how to obtain a new job for [ ] 25X1  
I suggested that he enlist the assistance of both [ ] and Personnel Office. 25X1

Attended presentations ceremony and then lunch for the Civil Service  
Commission. Following the lunch I participated in the briefing and explained  
to them about our Career Service system and our Training program.

STEWART called about a man named [ ] who he said might be coming to 25X1  
see me.

GROGAN called about FDD.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

8 October 1957

25X1 Asked [ ] to refresh his memory on the DD/I survey and be prepared to assist me on it later this month.

25X1 [ ] came in with [ ] The only substantive matter discussed was his inquiry as to how we coordinated activities with the Air Force. I explained to him the IAC mechanism and generally how we handle it. 25X1

25X1 Talked to [ ] and we agreed he would report to SE next Monday.

25X1 Together with TRUSCOTT, met with HART PERRY and HARRY WILHELM of the Bureau of the Budget and discussed their figures for the intelligence community. [ ] were also present.

HAROLD LAWRENCE called to tell me about his trip to the Far East with the ROBERTSON COMMITTEE.

LLOYD called to ask if I didn't think TRUSCOTT should go to the meeting with the BUREAU OF THE BUDGET. I said that I did. 25X1

25X1 [ ] called and said that he planned to meet GEN. CABELL in [ ] 25X1  
25X1 [ ] on Tuesday and asked if I would let him have anything he needed to brief him.

~~TOP SECRET~~

*2*

8 October 1957 (con't)

25X1

Advised HOUSTON of [ ] request that I see [ ] and  
asked him if he would check on the 10450 aspects of the [ ] case.

25X1

25X1

25X1

LT. COMMANDER LIONEL KREISEL called to find out how he could get in  
touch with [ ] and J. C. KING.

25X1



**TOP SECRET**

9 October 1957


At the DEPUTIES MEETING I reported on HAROLD LAWRENCE's trip with the ROBERTSON COMMITTEE. I also reported on the meeting with the Bureau of the Budget and advised that I had prepared a memo for the record on this subject. I advised that we were looking into complaints of some of the activities at [ ] and that [ ] had joined the staff, while [ ] was going to RQM and [ ] to SE. I told the DCI that CHRIS PHILLIPS of CSC had expressed an interest in our training and that we planned to invite him to go to [ ] with the [ ]. I advised that I had been [ ] and that we were now having dealings with him on the subject of [ ]. I requested that the Deputies, particularly Mr. Amory and Mr. Wisner, keep in mind that I like to send evidence of good work to the President's Board, and reminded them that the semi-annual report for the President's Board was due on the 14th. Finally, I reported that the paper on [ ] had been prepared and supplied to Gen. Cassidy.

[ ] came up to tell me about the job he has been doing as special overseer of the Registry. He said that he thought the entire Registry needed reorganization and remanning and that he also believed that it should be headed by a GS-17 or 18 and that the Branch Chiefs should be GS-15s. He said he had already taken certain corrective measures such as briefing the analysts on which names should be carded, on better handling of 201 files, and in cleaning out the Registry of a lot of useless paper. He said that henceforth the Registry would not handle any administrative paper and would simply work with three categories--operational paper, names of a specific operational interest, and material of common concern. He said that there were [ ] The latter represent the names on some [ ] which have not been either typed or filed and would [ ]. He said that he had sent most of the [ ] back to the Divisions to find out whether they still wish to have them carded and found that in most instances they did not. He is thinking of having the analysts moved to the Divisions so that they will have better appreciation of operations. He said that he had already succeeded in eliminating considerable duplication in filing and carding between the Divisions and RI. He said that he was eliminating overtime as fast as he could and that it had reached a cost of [ ] a day in RI alone, and that he hoped to cut the time to only overtime for skeleton forces on weekends and at night.


**TOP SECRET**

9 October 1957 (con't)

25X1



BLAKE called concerning the dispatch to [ ] on PSAS and I explained to him the difference between PSAS and the WELFARE FUND, and suggested he talk to GORDON STEWART about clarifying the dispatch. 25X1




25X1

[ ] came in with a proposal that he be used under deep cover in [ ]. I asked him to leave the memo with me and advised that we would review it and see what could be done.

Called GROGAN to advise him of the [ ] blast and tell him I would send him copies. Also suggested to him that he get copies of the National Review article mentioned in it. 25X1

CASSIDY called to say that the Board would make its presentation to the President at 8:30 on the 24th and that they would be in town on the 11th to work on the report. He also asked me for the satellite memo and the TCP memo.

COYNE called me to ask whether I agreed to combine [ ] COYNE said he and CASSIDY would like to have lunch with me next week to discuss this problem. 25X1



25X1


Advised [ ] I had contacted [ ] and he would see [ ] and anybody else on the [ ] issue on Tuesday, 15 October at 4:00. Also advised [ ] on the [ ] case. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

10 October 1957

25X1




HAROLD LAWRENCE and CASSIDY came over to brief us on NSA communications. See Memorandum ~~for the Record to DCI~~ *dated 11 October 1957.*

25X1

[ ] called regarding the cable from [ ] and I told him that he should send a reassuring cable back explaining that any problems of reorganization in the Station would be given full consideration by the inspectors. 25X1

JAMES KING of ODM called concerning a friend who was a Harvard graduate in International Economics and might wish to make a career with us. I suggested he talk directly to GORDON STEWART or [ ] 25X1 25X1



11 October 1957

25X1

25X1

At the DEPUTIES' MEETING I advised of the communication from [ ] on [ ] of the group going with HAROLD LAWRENCE to the Far East, of LAWRENCE's briefing on delays in indications intelligence and of the fact that DR. KILLIAN and the BOARD were in town on 12 October and would present their report to the President at 0830 on 24 October. I also suggested that [ ] give the Director and the Deputies a briefing on the registry. I also advised that there was the question of contacting the students who had been to China and that I recommended we use the same policy with them that we did with the Moscow youths. The DCI agreed. 25X1


GATES LLOYD came over with the report on [ ] and said that they wanted more time to investigate the case. I told them to take it. 25X1

CASSIDY called to ask whether BISSELL could get to CAMBRIDGE before 24 October to tell DR. KILLIAN what conclusions and recommendations have been made.

~~TOP SECRET~~

11 October 1957 (con't)

25X1



25X1

Went over with [ ] his present activities and agreed to let him concentrate on returnees for the next week.



25X1

25X1

[ ] called concerning the misspelling of [ ] name in the cable.

25X1

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

[ ] called to say that they had swept the rooms of the President's Board and asked whether the report should be sent to the Board through us. I told him to send it directly to them with a copy to us.

25X1

[ ] called to say he wanted to bring [ ] up to see me on Monday. 25X1

GORDON STEWART called and asked me to refresh his memory on [ ] 25X1

25X1

[ ] howed me what he was doing on the NSCIDs.

25X1

Went over with [ ] the case of [ ] 25X1

14 October 1957

AMORY called to check whether BISSELL would report on AQUATONE on the semi-annual report to the President's Board or whether he should. I said I would check and let him know.

25X1

[ ] called to report on his trip to [ ] 25X1

[ ] called to inquire as to the best method to deal with [ ] 25X1  
I told him to play it perfectly straight and to assume that [ ] would do likewise. 25X1



**TOP SECRET**

25X1

14 October 1957 (cont)

COYNE and CASSIDY came over for a purely social lunch. CASSIDY advised that DR. KILLIAN's two principal concerns at the present were whether we knew the size of the warhead which the Soviets planned for the ICHM and whether we knew the state of the Soviet long range bombers.

GROGAN called to advise that AMORY had checked with him to find out who had released the story to ED MORGAN, and then had purposely told MARGUERITE HIGGINS ~~and~~ she had carried it in the N.Y. Herald Tribune on Sunday.

25X1 Asked Civil Service Commissioner CHRIS PHILIPS if he would like to go to [ ] with the [ ] next Monday. He declined as he has to make a speech in Massachusetts that day but asked if we would invite him again.

25X1 [ ] dropped in to say hello.

[ ] 25X1

25X1 Advised [ ] that the DCI had said to handle the Chinese students in the same way that we had handled the Moscow youths.

15 October 1957

IG Staff Meeting.

KOREN called for anything we had on the Syrian part of Latakia. I checked with SHELDON and we sent over to him the item we had.

25X1 [ ] called concerning the Robertson Committee trip and we coordinated a cable by phone.

25X1 [ ] called to say that [ ] wanted to talk about a part of the TSS survey when he got back. I also asked him about [ ] and he described him 25X1 as good but not outstanding. I also asked to be kept advised about the communicator in [ ] 25X1

TOP SECRET

15 October 1957 (con't)

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ] dropped in to say goodby and described the general status of his relations with the [ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ] called and said he was planning to come back to work and I called [ ] and urged that they give [ ] an office with a couch in it and urge him to spend as much time as he feels like in it and not hesitate to lie down whenever he feels tired or sick.

25X1

TRUSCOTT called about the communication reciprocity legislation and I told him what I knew about it and urged that if FBI and NSA were going to oppose it, we should not try to sponsor it. He agreed.

25X1

25X1

[ ] called and said that Security's position was that the less we had to do with [ ] the better.

16 October 1957

25X1

Attended the Deputies' Meeting.

PAT COYNE called and asked that I look at a memorandum from SHERMAN KENT to the IAC dated 11 October on SNIE 11-657.

BARNEY KOREN called and asked that I see if we had any late information on the IRBM.

AMORY dropped in to tell about a lunch with TOM LAMBERT of the New York Herald Tribune in which LAMBERT said that when CONGRESS investigates the missile problem, they plan to call intelligence first.

**TOP SECRET**

17 October 1957

25X1

[ ] called and said she would like me to talk to her supervisors; that she was still unhappy with her fitness report.

25X1

Met with AMORY, SHELDON and TRUSCOTT, et. al. on the new bulletin and agreed with the memorandum prepared by SHELDON. Later in the day I checked with SHELDON and he agreed to my sending copies to GEN. CASSIDY as an indication of action.

25X1  
25X1

[ ] called to say he was going to [ ] next week and I said I would send a letter to [ ] (which I never did).

25X1

CAREY called to ask if I would address the [ ]

25X1  
25X1

18 October 1957

25X1

Attended Deputies' Meeting and advised that State had turned down our request on the [ ]

25X1

Met with HOUSTON, [ ] on the [ ] case and we unanimously decided that the best technique was for the Agency to set up a board internally to review the case and that we would then be in a better position to advise the FBI that it was not a 10450 matter.

25X1

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

Advised [ ] that we had a job in the [ ] for her at her present grade which we thought she could handle very well and said that [ ] would be getting in touch with her.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Together with [ ] met with [ ] and reviewed some of our general conclusions which he could report back to the field on his forthcoming trip.

25X1  
25X1

Met with the DCI to hand him the memo prepared by the CI Staff on [ ] He went over it and did not like it; said that he would take it home to rewrite it himself. Also mentioned to him the [ ] case and he agreed with the decision not to use the polygraph.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

19, 20, 21 and 22 October 1957

25X1 Spent at [ ] working on Studies in Intelligence and the briefing  
25X1 of the [ ]

23 October 1957

Attended Deputies' Meeting.

25X1 Lunch with the [ ] and spoke to them afterwards concerning  
the general outlook of the Agency.

25X1 [ ] dropped in to say hello.

25X1 Both KENT and AMORY called me about the decision not to let the Studies  
in Intelligence go to the [ ] I suggested that they keep the DD/P  
advised of this problem and raise it at a Deputies' Meeting.

25X1 EDWARDS called and said that the earliest possible decision by the Director  
on the handling of the [ ] case would be useful.

24 October 1957

25X1 [ ] came in with the paper concerning the handling of cash in the Agency  
and asked that I draw a rough outline up for the DCI to use at the next senior  
staff meeting. He also asked the origin of the paper on the [ ] 25X1  
and I told him about the comment we had had from the Bureau of the Budget. 25X1

PAT COYNE called and asked for a [ ]  
I called EDWARDS and asked him if he would expedite this.

25X1 [ ] called and asked for the paper that WH had sent concerning a  
Brazilian who might be asked to testify before the Senate Internal Security  
Committee. He also asked for my advice on how to handle HCUA and [ ] I 25X1  
suggested he play it straight until given reason to handle it otherwise.

GEN. CASSIDY came over and handed me the notebook which DR. KILLIAN used 25X1  
in briefing the President. I said that I would read it and return it.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

24 October 1957 (con't)

25X1 [ ] came in to thank me for my assistance in getting him out of the country and I gave him the Post Office box to write to in the event of trouble.

25X1 Lunch with JIM ANGLETON <sup>during</sup> in which we discussed the [ ] case and also 25X1 the forthcoming inspection of the CI Staff. He seemed to be totally cooperative in regard to the inspection and said there were several things that he thought we could help with in regard to the Staff. He further suggested 25X1 that I talk to [ ] about the situation in [ ] 25X1

GROGAN dropped in to fill me in on the latest happenings in the public relations field.

25 October 1957

25X1 Attended a lunch for [ ] with Under Secretary HERTER and ICA 25X1 Director JAMES SMITH, CORD MEYER and the DDCI. SMITH seemed very receptive 25X1 to [ ] proposals and the DCI indicated we would back it. After lunch I introduced [ ] and urged that they work out a procedure for conferring regularly.

25X1 [ ] called and said that he had several matters which he wanted to talk about to me next week; that they had just reorganized FE Division headquarters and he trusted we had not put anything in writing in this regard.

25X1 Talked to the [ ] and told them what I thought the future 25X1 held for the Agency.

25X1 Per Rita's request I checked with D/Security re a report on [ ] 25X1 They advised that Col. EDWARDS had advised MR. COYNE personally and it was their understanding that no written report was necessary.....Doris

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
28 October 1957

WHITE showed me a letter to go to [ ] following our investigation<sup>25X1</sup> to which I agreed.

At the DCI's meeting he asked that I get together whatever papers were available on the protection of sources and methods for a discussion which he will have at the White House today on the Aviation Week articles. Called GROGAN and HOUSTON for whatever articles they had in order to get information they had. <sup>25X1</sup>

AMORY came in to talk about giving Studies in Intelligence to the [ ] and I urged that he check with DD/P before he pressed the matter too hard. He made some comment about the fact that he understood that in one of the lectures at [ ] they listed the DD/I as one of the greatest threats to the Clandestine Services.

At the Director's request, sat in on a lunch for Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to discuss the ABEL case. <sup>25X1</sup>



I called COYNE and he said that he was recommending the following actions on the Board recommendations: (1) to the DCI with copies to Secretary of Defense and IAC; (2) to the DCI with copies to the IAC and USCIB and with references to the Baker Committee and the review of NSCIDS; (3) to the Secretary of Defense and the DCI for a joint report on the status and adaptability to the needs of intelligence; (4) to the DCI with copies to the IAC.

GORDON STEWART called about [ ] and asked what I thought about his being assigned either to the [ ] or the General Counsel's Office. I told him the results of my investigation of his relief from the Clandestine Services but pointed out that generally his work competency had been fairly well regarded. <sup>25X1</sup>


MR. BLAKE called and said that he saw no point in setting up a lunch for [ ] and I agreed.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

28 October 1957 (con't)

25X1



29 October 1957

IG Staff Meeting.

DCI called to say that COYNE had gone over with him the suggested action on the four recommendations of the President's Board and that he had agreed with them.

EDWARDS called to ask if I could speed up the Director's action on the [ ] memo. He also asked if I could get a decision by the Director on the case of [ ]. He said he had sent the security information on [ ] to COYNE. He agreed that it would be a good idea for me to see [ ]

Called AMORY on the Bulletin and asked why items one and six were marked NOFORN dissemination. He said that this was probably due to DD/P objection.

AMORY called me on the United Givers Fund and said that he had checked and found that his area was far ahead of the figures that WHITE had reported.

[ ] called to report that [ ] was en route and that all had seemed to go well.

GROGAN called to say that AMORY had reported a phone call from JAMES RESTON of the New York Times saying they had received a letter from one [ ] objecting to the work of CIA. I advised GROGAN I knew all about the case and would be glad to brief anybody about it.

Called ASHCRAFT on [ ] and he said that they would be glad to use him if they could get a slot.

COYNE called and said the DCI had talked to him about the action on the Board recommendations and had agreed to all of them. He also said that the Director had asked him about the Aviation Week article and that he had told

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

29 October 1957 (con't)

him that the Attorney General had made a study on British Official Secrets Act and that I should look for a memo from [ ] dated 28 September 1953 on internal security legislation.

25X1

COYNE called to ask if I would check our files for a letter from GEN. SMITH to Secretary of Defense LEVITT dated December 11, 1951 on Chinese Nationalist forces. I got the document from the file and described it in detail to him so that they could locate it.

25X1

30 October 1957

At DCI staff meeting advised of the case of [ ]

25X1

EDWARDS called concerning the case of [ ] and said that he would appreciate it if in such cases we could send a memo of the case to him so that they could make a record of it.

25X1

[ ] called concerning the paper on Clandestine Collection and I told him I would send it down to him.

DCI called to say that GEN. GOODPASTER had called him to say that he thought a survey should be made of the time required for early warning messages and would I get together the necessary papers for him to talk to GOODPASTER on the subject after the NSC meeting tomorrow. Asked [ ] to come up and he explained the general problem after reading the Board's recommendations and had SHELDON do the same.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

31 October 1957

25X1

[ ] came in to just tell me that he was not very happy in the Budget Division. He had been up for the Budget Officer for ORR but apparently somebody else got the job ahead of him. He feels that he should be promoted but has been told that [ ] said he was too busy to consider personnel actions prior to leaving on a trip. [ ] did not want me to do anything about it and is simply keeping me advised of his life and hard times.

25X1

25X1

25X1

JAMES R. RESTON of the New York Times was brought in by Col. Grogan; I told him the facts in the case of [ ] and read him excerpts from [ ] letter to the President. I pointed out that this was basically a case of ethics and that the man simply had not agreed with what was U. S. policy. I also pointed out that [ ] had been on the research and not the operational side of the house.

25X1

25X1

Attended a lunch of the Institute for Political and Fiscal Education at the Metropolitan Club where they presented us with copies of "Democracy versus Communism" by K. Colgrove.

[ ]

25X1

Attended meeting of the Career Council.

25X1

GEN. CASSIDY called to ask if I would set up an appointment for him to talk to [ ] on the subject of War Planning which I did.

**TOP SECRET**

1 November 1957

WHITE spoke to me about the lengthy discussion of the Bureau of the Budget concerning the functions of the IG and said he would like very much to have me talk to MACEY and go over with him our reports and how we worked. Both the DD/P and DDCI repeated this to me.

Attended DEPUTIES MEETING.

25X1 [ ] called concerning [ ] and I told him I would talk to GORDON STEWART and try to get an extra slot for them for this man.

25X1

25X1

Got the DCI to sign the IAC, USCIB and CIA Semi-Annual Reports.

4 November 1957

Attended DEPUTIES MEETING; suggested that the BAKER Report called for dramatic action on the part of the intelligence community to the extent of setting up at Ft. Meade a special area for NSA and its related activities.

I advised HOUSTON that the Director had agreed to having a Board on

25X1 [ ]  
GROGAN brought over a statement the Director had prepared on what makes a good intelligence officer which the DCI wished me to concur in. Also checked on the intelligence experience of the top twenty officers in the Agency and advised him that according to the records, it would average 10 3/4 years.

**TOP SECRET**

R

4 November 1957 (con't)

25X1 Sent the file on [ ] and urged him to have the Director tell SEN. HOLLAND that she was not a very useful employee.

25X1 [ ] came up to work out the details for the visit of [ ] set up a meeting with the DCI and a luncheon for him to be given by me. 25X1

DR. KILLIAN dropped in while waiting to see the Director. I mentioned that I thought the four recommendations were very good and that a combination of USCIB and the IAC highly desirable. I also said that I thought the Baker Report was good and that I thought Ft. Meade should be turned over to NSA.

Attended a meeting of the Supergrade Board.

25X1 [ ] came up to give me a schedule of the [ ] course to which I will lecture next Tuesday. 25X1

5 November 1957

25X1 [ ] coming to see him and I told him it was about the

25X1

CASSIDY called to say that DR. KILLIAN had mentioned to GEN. WHITE that the colleges and universities did not receive Soviet scientific publications or their translations from the Government and that he felt it would be very useful if they could do so. I checked with GEORGE CAREY and he said they were working out a system whereby translations would be passed to the National Science Foundation and from there to colleges and universities. I passed this information on to CASSIDY.

WHITE called concerning preparing a study on personnel matters for the KILLIAN BOARD. I checked with CASSIDY and advised WHITE that I thought it best if the DCI took up this matter at the IAC first and then GORDON STEWART went around to see the various personnel directors of the other intelligence services following which we could prepare a study for the Killian Board. WHITE agreed to this.

25X1 [ ] brought down the [ ] projects and said the Director had signed off on them and that the Director wondered whether my views would change in view of the letter from [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

**TOP SECRET**


**TOP SECRET**

6 November 1957

TRUSCOTT called on the Board recommendations and I sent those down to him at his request.

Met with the group on the Current Intelligence Bulletin and concurred in the proposed memorandum for the DCI to send to the IAC.


25X1



25X1

[redacted] of WH called and asked if I would conduct a round up session for 3:00 on 15 November. I told him yes.

7 November 1957



25X1

TRUSCOTT called and asked if I would try to see the DCI and get him to read DR. KILLIAN's notes on Recommendation #2. I was able to do this at 1:00.

25X1

Called GORDON STEWART and asked him if he would try to get a special slot for [redacted] pointing out that this was at the request of WH and that I had talked to ASHCRAFT about it. I also asked STEWART if he would call in [redacted] and see if he could locate for him a temporary job somewhere in the Agency other than NEA or EE.

25X1

JOHN CASSIDY came over and gave me a copy of the State Department Semi-Annual Report to use as I saw fit. He said that he thought it would prove very useful, particularly in TRUSCOTT's type of work. He said he would also give me a copy of the Defense report and that this was a one way street inasmuch as the CIA report went only to the Board. He said that he thought the CIA report was very good, but that he thought that anybody who read the IAC and USCIB reports would immediately agree with the Board's recommendation that these two bodies be combined.

GEORGE CAREY dropped in and said that he and ASHCRAFT had been ordered by AMORY to fully back the exchange program being worked out by [redacted]. He expressed concern that CIA might get caught between the FBI and State and quoted [redacted] as saying to FOSTER DULLES, "You see those two lamp posts out there? If we don't do something about the FBI, we're both going to be hanging from them." CAREY also said that he had discovered lately that FDD had been

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

7 November 1957 (con't)

25X1 sending its unclassified documents to the National Science Foundation for  
 25X1 distribution to universities. CAREY also advised that as a result of my  
 25X1 recommendations, the Director was giving a big dinner for [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] CAREY also said that WHITE had  
 25X1 called him about some medal for [ ] before he retires but that he  
 25X1 was worried about this because [ ] was so bitter about the manner in  
 which he had been relieved from his post as Director of Personnel by CABELL  
 that he thought he might refuse the decoration.

25X1 EDWARDS called to advise that he had heard from ASHCRAFT that [ ] 25X1  
 25X1 has asked that somebody from SECURITY go out to talk to the minister in  
 25X1 Aldie; that [ ] had reported that his wife was getting a separation and he  
 was getting a divorce.

25X1 Lunch with [ ] was working on a plan to reduce  
 25X1 the size of the staffs. He also advised that he did not feel [ ] 25X1  
 was working out too well as [ ] 25X1

Delivered lecture to CI course.

Talked to PAT COYNE about making more background material available on  
 the thinking of the President's Board of Consultants. He said that he thought  
 this was a good suggestion and he would go to work on it.

25X1 Checked with [ ] on some of the aspects of the [ ] case. 25X1

[ ]

8 November 1957

25X1 At the Deputies Meeting reported on the letter from [ ] and the 25X1  
 25X1 fact that we would be having lunch with him, [ ] Also advise 25X1  
 25X1 of my discussion with COYNE and CASSIDY on releasing more of the background  
 material of the President's Board. Finally, I said that I agreed with SECURITY  
 in not using [ ] as a TSS consultant.

25X1 EDWARDS called to ask whether [ ] had been advised about the Board. I 25X1  
 25X1 told him that I thought [ ] had advised him. He said that [ ] had recently 25X1  
 gone to Immigration and that he thought he should talk to him. I agreed.

25X1 Lunch with [ ] See letter to [ ] this date for some of 25X1  
 25X1 [ ]'s opinions on the situation in [ ] 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

8 November 1957 (con't)

25X1 BAIRD called to ask if I thought he could mention to IOC some of CIA's recent successes such as [ ] I told him by all means.

25X1 GORDON STEWART and [ ] both called on [ ].  
25X1 STEWART plans to talk to him.

12 November 1957

25X1 Advised [ ] of the death of [ ]'s son and suggested the DCI write him a letter. 25X1

25X1 [ ] of WH advised that [ ] would not be here until next week.

25X1 Delivered the [ ] lecture.

Delivered the SIS lecture.

BLAKE called on a meeting on the [ ] and I advised him 25X1 that the question before the house was primarily concerned as to whether we should make an issue of the subject with STATE.

25X1 [ ] called to tell me about a meeting called by [ ] to discuss 25X1 reductions in the DD/P senior staffs. [ ] apparently started the 25X1 meeting by stating that the Inspector General had recommended that the staffs be reviewed two years ago and that the DD/P had asked for time to study the problem and that he, [ ] thought enough time had passed. [ ] said 25X1 that the Divisions all agreed that the staffs are too big, that PP Staff was neutral and the two violent objectors were ANGLETON and [ ] from 25X1 FI.

Called CASSIDY on the TWINING letter and he said this was apparently written by DOLPH and that he thought it was a ridiculous letter and the Board would pay no attention to it.

COYNE called to say that GEN. CUTLER had asked on the status of the Board recommendations and that he could not see any reports from this Agency of recent date. We went over the different recommendations and came to the following agreement: that reports were required on #2 - 1 September; #3 - January 1958; #4 - 1 September; #5-6-7-8a - completed; #9 - January 1958; #10 - wait and see. I told him that I would get a report over on #2 and #4 within the next couple of days.

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

13 November 1957

Deputies' Meeting.

25X1

Attended the funeral of [ ] son.

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

14 November 1957

25X1

[ ] came in to get some advice on his career.

25X1

COYNE called to say he had been reading Studies in Intelligence and thought it was an excellent publication; that he would like to be on the distribution list.

25X1

[ ] came down to say that the DCI did not want to raise the question of IAC personnel at this time and that he did not feel that this was the moment to send a letter to the President concerning his coordinating power.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

14 November 1957 (con't)

The DCI called about the RUSSELL BAKER article for the New York Times. He asked me to call GROGAN and tell him that he thought the article was too light to be published at this time, although he recognized it was his fault. He asked if I would get together with Grogan and develop some additional themes for the article. I advised Grogan of the Director's views and of the fact that he wanted the picture taking session for today cancelled. The DCI told me he was very concerned about the MANSFIELD briefing abroad and I reminded him that I no longer had responsibility for Congressional matters. He said that he thought [ ] should seek my advice on overseas briefings and I stated I would be glad to help as long as this was clear to Col. WHITE. At the Director's request I called MR. WISNER about a new cable to [ ] and after discussion with WISNER, drafted a cable with some comments for the DCI.

25X1

15 November 1957

At the Deputies' Meeting GEN. CABELL raised the question of the State Department briefing the KILLIAN BOARD on the Intelligence and Research Office. We all agreed this would be a good idea but I pointed out that we had just submitted semi-annual reports and that this was really the proper vehicle for State to use. I also advised the Deputies' Meeting that GEN. CASSIDY thought our Semi-Annual Report was excellent. I suggested to the Director and the DD/P that among the South American trouble spots was Cuba and that there was almost constant danger there of a major bloody explosion. I also showed them our portable recording device which we are now using on our field inspections. The Director seemed quite enthusiastic. Suggested it be used more broadly within the Agency.

GROGAN dropped in re the New York Times article and I gave him the memo I prepared on suggested subjects.

[ ] came down to discuss the [ ] case and I agreed with his conclusion and recommendation. I also asked him to take over the DD/I survey and to press forward with it.

25X1

SHELDON called in a state of considerable agitation about Recommendation #1 of the President's Board. I advised him that the action had gone to the DD/I on 6 November but that prior to that on 31 October I had prepared a memorandum for the Director suggesting specific actions, including an emergency IAC meeting. He said he would pick up the ball on this action and I sent him a copy of my 31 October memorandum.

**TOP SECRET**



~~TOP SECRET~~

18 November 1957

25X1 At the Deputies' Meeting the DCI asked about the advisability of his seeing [ ] I said that the odds were 50-50 that [ ] would be 25X1  
thrown out of office but that was true of nearly every [ ] official. 25X1  
I also mentioned that we had set up [ ] and therefore had a certain responsibility in this regard. 25X1

25X1 At 1150 with J.C. KING took [ ] to see the 25X1  
Director with [ ] KING dropped out of the following luncheon which was  
attended by [ ] 25X1

GEN. CABELL called about whether I had the ball on seeing MACY of the Bureau of the BUDGET and I advised him that WHITE and I had discussed it and felt that we would wait until after the current discussions on the present Budget had been completed.

25X1 [ ] called and I told him I would accept the invitation to come  
to [ ] January.

25X1 Met with [ ] on the DD/I survey and went over the outline  
25X1 which [ ] had prepared.

Called GROGAN to ask him to check the [ ] papers on the bombing of [ ] 25X1  
house. I also told him about the invitation to speak at [ ] and he said 25X1  
he thought it was a good idea and had no objection to the public use of my title.

CORD MEYER called to report on a discussion with [ ] concerning the 25X1  
FULTON LEWIS attack on FEC. I told him that we would keep our eye on the situation.

25X1 Called [ ] He said that they had no idea  
he would attack the Agency but that he had not particularly enjoyed his tour with FE.

25X1 [ ] called to tell of discussions with EDWARDS on his application  
for citizenship for his wife, and to point out that everything he had done in that regard had been checked out with Security in advance.

PAT COYNE called to ask about a letter dated 12 November from the DCI to GORDON GRAY with copy to CUTLER on Recommendation 8a. He said the letter didn't make sense. I told him I would check it and call him back.

Talked to BAIRD about the call from [ ] and asked him to put 25X1  
PAT COYNE on the mailing list for STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE.

J. C. KING called to ask what I thought we should do about the activities of CUBAN EXILES in the U.S. I told him I had prepared a paper on this subject and would get it to him before his meeting with STATE tomorrow.

25X1 [ ] called just to say he was still alive.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

19 November 1957

Showed the DCI the invitation from Princeton and he suggested that I accept and said he saw no reason why the acceptance could not be done officially and by title.

Called SHELDON on the exchange of letters with GORDON GRAY regarding Recommendation #1 and then called COYNE who said he had succeeded in sorting out the various comments and replies and that they now expected a reply from USCIB on December 3rd; a comment by the Special Committee on December 15th; and a report to the President to be made January 1st, probably orally, by DR. BAKER with the Special Committee in attendance. I checked with COYNE on the clearance of GEN. CUTLER for AQUATONE and he said he now had action to set up a briefing for both himself and CUTLER at an early date. I also checked with him on the MARQUIS CHILDS article and he suggested I send over our report although he knew nothing about it.

Lunch with MATT BAIRD at which we discussed the various lectures which I should give to Training and he promised to send over a suggested list of the ones he thought were most important.

25X1

MIKE BURKE called from New York concerning the CBS television series. See 25X1 memo to COL. GROGAN.

20 November 1957

Attended Deputies' Meeting at which there was a lengthy discussion on U.S. policy and I strongly advocated a drastic change in U.S. policy away from militarism. This received considerable support.

Called CASSIDY to ask if we could borrow back our file on the satellites which he obligingly sent us.\*AMORY called me to point out that several of the people in his immediate office were working on a highly sensitive project for which [ ] were not cleared and that if, as part of the DD/I survey, we wished to cover that, that I would have to do it personally.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

20 November 1957 (con't)

25X1 Called SAUNDERS re [ ] and told him of our discussion. He said that he was very pleased that I had seen [ ] because this would help in convincing him that their career preference statements meant something. 25X1

J. C. KING called to say that my paper on CUBA had been very well received at STATE and that they had been thinking of doing several of these things and now would probably proceed to do so.

ROBERT BEUEL called to see if I could be of assistance in obtaining for the Institute of Fiscal and Political Education a list of anti-Communist organizations in the U.S. I pointed out to him that we weren't the appropriate organization in this regard but that I would be glad to find out where he could get it.

Talked to EDWARDS about the FBI party.

25X1 [ ] of [ ] called to invite me to a lunch with two of the senior 25X1  
[ ] intelligence officers on December 10th.

ANGLETON called to inquire if I was going to the FBI party and to urge that I talk to TOLSON if I could.

Attended FBI party and had lengthy conversations with Mr. HOOVER on the subject of liaison between the two organizations and also on the ABEL case. He expressed great disappointment that ABEL had not received the death sentence and stressed the point that he did not know what agreement had been made between TOMPKINS and DONOVAN and said he did not want to know.

21 November 1957

DCI buzzed to ask if I would take his classmate, Mr. CARL MESSINGER, to the Princeton Club luncheon. I told him I would be happy to but it turned out that MR. MESSINGER had other lunch engagement. The DCI said he would like to talk to the Princeton Club. I arranged for him to do so on 20 February to which he agreed.

25X1 BAIRD called to tell me in mournful tones that he had caught hell at the DD/S luncheon for the [ ] case and asked if I would have [ ] come 25X1  
over and talk to him, which I said I would.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

21 November 1957 (con't)

25X1

[ ] dropped in to tell me that [ ] had tried abortively to find out what was behind his letter attacking CIA and that his brother refused to tell him and asked him who was trying to find out.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Saw PAUL O'NEILL at the Princeton Club luncheon and he said he is on the East-West Staff in State and would like very much to come over and talk to me at an early date. I told him I would give him a ring to come over for lunch.

25X1

[ ] described in some detail his work on the 5412 Committee. He pointed out that the DCI, CUTLER and [ ] always attend but that as far as Defense is concerned, often QUARLES will not be there, nor will SPRAGUE, nor will JACK IRWIN, SPRAGUE's deputy, and thus it will drop down to HAHR. He always accompanied the Director to these meetings; kept careful notes.

25X1

25X1

He then discussed OCB and said he proposed to get the DCI together with the [ ]

COL. EDWARDS called about a girl in OCR whose brother is a Communist and said he planned to ask her to resign from the Agency but that he wanted me to be alerted to it because she is colored and might go to NAACP. I told him to go ahead with the matter as he planned it.

25X1

[ ] called to say that USCIB had met on Recommendation #1 which had been followed by a meeting of the Communications chiefs and some intelligence officers which had then been followed by a panel meeting of the communicators in Defense. They all agreed that intelligence should have red line channels in multi-panel <sup>channel</sup> circuits coming into one central place in Washington and presided over by a czar.

25X1

Told [ ] that there was no possibility of his project going through and he should try to work it out on his own.

Talked to ANGLETON about a lunch for FBI and he said he would ask [ ] to see him.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

22 November 1957

25X1 [ ] of WE handcarried a memo re [ ] to Mr. Kirkpatrick and advised that the FBI had informed the Agency last night that they had heard an allegation in Miami that a plot was afoot to assassinate [ ] when he changed planes on his return to [ ]. They have asked us whether we want them to arrange with Miami police to give him protection. [ ] travel plans are still uncertain but we will discuss the matter with him and arrange a satisfactory protection on his way back to [ ]. WE arranged a briefing by the RI training officer for this afternoon 1600-1700 at [ ] request. 25X1

25X1 [ ] called to say he was seeing WISNER on Tuesday. I asked him to call me at 1100 on Monday as I wanted to check it out with the Director.

EDWARDS called to state that [ ] was now very much off [ ] who he said talked too much. EDWARDS also said that O'CONNOR had told him at the FBI party that State now planned to call in each of the [ ] men and tell them the operation was over and that further contact was out. 25X1

25X1 [ ], WE, called to ask if I would give a cocktail party for the [ ] on Tuesday, December 10th. He will arrange to get a room at the Army Navy Club and will prepare a guest list.

25X1 KARAMESSINES called to say that he had had quite a strenuous run-in with AMORY over Studies in Intelligence and that AMORY threatened to take copies along and give them to [ ] and he was going to take issue to the Director. KARAMESSINES said WISNER called the Director to say they were opposed to them and didn't want AMORY to do it.

GORDON STEWART called to ask if I would attend a lunch for Siciliano, the President's personnel advisor, on Wednesday, the 27th. I accepted.

25X1 [ ] called to ask if I would speak to the Mid-Career Foreign Service Officers on December 5th. I said I would. 25X1

25X1 Presided over round-up discussions with [ ] of [ ] also attended by COL. KING and [ ] of CIA. We suggested very bluntly that they keep out of politics and concentrate on Communism. 25X1

TOM BAILEY of State called to ask whether he or I was crazy and what did I mean about January when I spoke to him about January at the FBI party. I told him it was a simple case of wrong number.

25X1 [ ] had returned to the Army; that he believed he satisfied GEN. CASSIDY on the progress on relations between CIA and Army and that he was going to the war planning conference on next Tuesday and would like my views before he went.

~~TOP SECRET~~

25 November 1957

At the Deputies' Meeting reminded the group that the report to the NSC on the last recommendations of the President's Board was due on Saturday, the 30th. The DCI asked that I take up the matter with [ ] on the veterans of Strategic Services.

25X1

[ ] called and I told him I had mentioned the matter to WISNER who is planning to see him on Tuesday.

GORDON STEWART called and mentioned that I might hear from ROBERT BUTTON of USIA concerning a possible replacement for [ ] who recently died.

25X1

[ ] called to give me the suggested list for the cocktail party for the [ ] on Tuesday, December 10th.

Lunch with [ ].

Met with [ ] to review their findings on the FE survey.

[ ] of OSI called to ask if I could make available to HARRY REYNOLDS the papers which he had given us at the time of his contemplated resignation.

26 November 1957

[ ] (Personnel) called to advise that [ ] WE Operatio<sup>25X1</sup> Officer, age 62, died in his sleep of a heart attack. Apparently had a record of heart trouble.

IG Staff Meeting.

Called [ ] of Training to advise him of the possibility of the Civil Service Commissioners going to [ ] and asked that he find out what an appropriate date would be.

25X1

[ ] brought in the Director's Christmas greeting to the personnel which he asked me to concur in.

Spent about an hour with [ ] talking about war planning problems. He is going to Europe for a meeting with the European war planners.

EDWARDS called to ask if I could be any more specific about where the [ ] files were. I suggested that they look in the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration office.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

27 November 1957

25X1

[ ] (Personnel) advised that [ ] age 43, GS-9, OBI, died on 26 November; she was a Christian Scientist and cause of death was not specified, but believed to be cancer. Had been on LWOP since May of this year; in the Agency since April 1953.

25X1

25X1

CASSIDY called to say that ADM. CONOLLY wanted to be gone about three weeks and wanted to start in [ ] and finish in [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] came in to report his conversation with [ ] concerning the communications situation in [ ]. He agreed that a certain amount of the responsibility for this would have to rest on the Station Chief.

25X1

Lunch with ROCCO SICILIANO and JOE WINSLOW of the White House staff. They were receptive to a proposal that they go to [ ] to see our training installation.

25X1

25X1

[ ] called about [ ] to advise that he had a brother in the Agency. I told him we already knew this and that he had been unresponsive to an approach by his brother.

28 November 1957

Read the cables for the DCI and advised [ ] that there was nothing requiring the Director's early attention. The DCI came in later and asked if I would look into the matter of Soviet scientific and technical documents.


25X1-

25X1

Reviewed with [ ] developments in the FE Division and our relations with the Ambassadors.

29 November 1957

25X1



29 November 1957 (con't)

BAIRD called to say that MONDAY, JAN. 6th, would be a good day to take the Civil Service Commissioners to [redacted]

25X1

Lengthy Deputies' Meeting concerning mainly the NATO meeting in Paris and whether the DCI should be briefed as a member of USCIB on the Robertson report.

[redacted] called to say that HELMS concurred in his coming to the IG Staff and would talk to WISNER about it.

[redacted] called to say that he would be happy to have ~~BERNELL~~ <sup>BAGNALL</sup> come over and brief me on the Foreign Documents situation. I said I would call him.

[redacted] called to say that the Russian's paper was making the rounds and had gone to the White House and that we might expect calls on it.

Took the replies to the NSC into the DCI for signature. He disagreed with reply on Recommendation #1 feeling the language was too blunt in telling the Secretary of Defense what to do and, furthermore, did not show very much action on the part of CIA.

30 November 1957

Covered the DCI's office as he was home ill. Nothing of any importance.

2 December 1957

[redacted] (Personnel) called to report the death of [redacted] Machine Records, Admin. Assistant, GS-7, age 45; died on Saturday of heart attack; her husband is employed in Communications Office.

[redacted] attended Deputies' Meeting for me. Advised that the Director was insistent with SHELDON that the language on Recommendation #1 not be made any stronger.

Gave lecture to Basic Management Course.

[redacted] came in to seek my advice on his future career. He said that ROBERT MURPHY had asked him to come back to State and had indicated that he had the possibility there of becoming a career minister or even an ambassador but that he didn't know what his future was here. I suggested that he have a physical examination to see if he was qualified to go overseas and then talk to FRANK WISNER about his future here.



TOP SECRET

2 December 1957 (con't)

25X1 [ ] called to ask what the status of the concessions building was at Langley. I said I would check and let him know. R

25X1 [ ] called and said that WISNER, [ ] had now agreed to his release. 25X1

25X1 GROGAN came in with two requests to do outside writing, one from [ ] of the Management Staff to write a daily newspaper column entitled "You Be The Boss," and a second from [ ] of [ ] to write articles for RIVERS & HARBORS magazine. We agreed on the [ ] one 25X1 but felt that the [ ] one was dangerous. I checked with [ ] on 25X1 [ ] and he had approved of it. 25X1

25X1 GORDON STEWART called to say that [ ] would rather go down to [ ] in December. I told him I would see if we could make the change. 25X1

3 December 1957

IG Staff Meeting.

25X1 [ ] called to ask about the cable from [ ] concerning [ ] 25X1 I pointed out that I would be seeing [ ] before the Director and that we probably could have the matter all straightened out before then. 25X1

[ ] 25X1  
[ ] 25X1  
[ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] of WE called to clear with me the invitations which they planned to issue to the cocktail party for the [ ] 25X1

25X1 TOM BAILEY of State came over to ask if I could shed any further light on where the [ ] files might be in State. I described briefly for him the various dealings I had with State and he said that gave him several clues as to where to look. 25X1

[ ]

~~TOP SECRET~~

3 December 1957 (con't)

12

[ ] of WE called to say that [ ] had taken a rather untenable position on the subject of the cable received yesterday and that the Division was proposing that I advise the Ambassador of the correct facts and tell him that [ ] had been forbidden to pass on this information.

[ ] came up to say that in thinking of his future career he would like to be considered for a spot on the IG Staff. I told him that the Staff was filled for a year or so in advance but that we would put his name on the list and let him know should there be any possibility. I also suggested he talk to [ ]

[ ]

Lunch with [ ]

Asked HOUSTON about the work on the concessions and he said that they would report to the Steering Committee tomorrow. Also asked him whether there were any precedence for a Government employee writing a newspaper column on the same subject that he was concerned with in his regular job. He said he would check and let me know.

[ ] stressed the fact that something ought to be done to get TSS, Commo, [ ] and OSI working closely together. I assured him that I too was against sin.

**TOP SECRET**

4 December 1957

BAIRD called to suggest 16 and 17 December as a possibility for taking the Civil Service Commissioners to [redacted]

25X1

GROGAN called to ask if I would call CHARLES MacWHORTER in the Vice President's office to see if a French photographer, GERARD DeCAUX, who works for JOUR DE FRANCE, could possibly have time to photograph the Vice President some time before Saturday. [redacted] was anxious to make the arrangement. MAC WHORTER advised that the Vice President's schedule was filled but I took the opportunity to get him to come down to lunch next week.

25X1


The DCI rejected for the second time the proposed replies to the NSC on Recommendations #1 and #4 and asked that I develop both of them to a greater degree, add a sense of urgency, and get more accomplishments in them.

25X1

[redacted] came up to brief me on the action taken which included USCIB appointing an ad hoc committee to study the whole problem inasmuch as they rejected SHELDON's letter to Secretary of Defense based primarily on the fact that [redacted] said the letter would do no good and [redacted] said that intelligence communications needed a czar. In addition, an ad hoc committee on communications was established and this group was unanimous in feeling that a national network was needed with one center and one czar and electrical dissemination to all customers. This would require a red line system with override authorities from collection centers and would represent a contribution of facilities. The communicators felt that the three major areas to be studied were those of the recognition of significant intelligence; physical assets; and processing. Communicators also believed that four principles needed to be established: (1) that early warning traffic be identified by the intelligence community; (2) that the geographic area of sources be identified; (3) that there be one addressee in Washington and (4) that one senior intelligence officer be responsible for the entire mechanism.

25X1  
25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

5 December 1957

25X1 Discussed with [ ] of OTR and [ ] the inter-relationship  
25X1 of research on International Communism with the School of International  
Communism in OTR. [ ] said he found the material of SRS useful but  
not essential to his work. He said he used all of ICD's material, and also  
used the State Biweekly on International Communism. He felt that the  
greatest contribution they received was from overt sources and believed that  
the contribution from Clandestine Services was rather small. He did not  
feel a combination of his organization with ICD was feasible.

25X1 Asked [ ] to get the NSC letters signed.

25X1 [ ] of OSI called about a special subcommittee of the IAC  
which had been established on Recommendation #4. He said that GEN. LEWIS  
apparently wished to keep the subcommittee in existence pending further  
recommendations.

Addressed the Mid-Career Foreign Service Officers.

Lunch with AMBASSADOR HILL (Robert).

[ ]

25X1

Talked to Commissioners HARRIS ELLSWORTH and CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS who  
said they could probably go down to [ ] on 6th and 7th of January.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

6 December 1957

R

Meeting of the BUILDING STEERING COMMITTEE at which it was decided that an examination should be made before any decision was made on an internal telephone system. I suggested that they have one system for dialing phones in the building and a separate switchboard and code number for the part of the Agency left out of the building, and that the money they authorize might be put in a separate internal system but used to generally strengthen security. [redacted] suggested that the telephone lines be run in glass conduits which could be easily checked for any evidence of tampering. It was also agreed that the problem of a building for concessions would be studied by the lawyers but that no further action would be taken until closer to building time.

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

Review of the FE Division survey with [REDACTED]

25X1

9 December 1957

25X1

[REDACTED] called to say that he wanted me to advise New York that he might be a little late to dinner tonight because he was taking the Congressional which doesn't get in until 7:35. He also said two Russian Doctors were visiting his institute and two were with [REDACTED] and the visits were proving highly successful and informative. He said one of the Russians told him that as a result of this visit, he was convinced that the Americans were more like the Russians than any other people.

25X1

CASSIDY called to say that CONNOLLY had postponed his trip until March. He also said that no decision had been reached on when the Board would next meet but he thought it would not be until February. He also said no decision had been reached either on whether LOVETT would take over the Board or whether KILLIAN would stay on it.

[REDACTED] called to set up lunch.

PAT COYNE called to say he had received Recommendations #1 and #4 and wondered if the limitations referred to in Recommendation #4 pertained to BISSELL's project. I said that they did. He said he could not locate any reply on three (#3) and I told him that ZANDER and QUARLES' office had sent it over but that it probably was not specifically addressed to him. He asked about the briefing for CUTLER and himself on the BISSELL project and I said we were waiting to hear from him. I also asked about the items in NEWSWEEK and the press quoting ALLEN DULLES as saying that he advised

*re*

9 December 1957 (con't)

the NSC of the Soviet missile progress and got no response and no one would listen. I said we would check the testimony and send him the text.

25X1

[ ] called on Recommendation #1 and suggested that our reply go to the IAC.

25X1

[ ] called concerning the [ ] and said the cocktail party would be in the SEA ROOM on the 8th Floor. I told him I was going to invite [ ].

25X1


25X1

25X1

Asked [ ] to have BAGNALL come over to give me further details on Soviet scientific and technical literature.

PERSONNEL advised that the child of [ ] had died.

25X1



10 December 1957

IG STAFF MEETING.

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] called to say that BAGNALL was going with the Director to the Scientific Advisory Committee meeting and would come over to brief me on Wednesday about the foreign documents.

[REDACTED] discussed at length the progress of revision of NSCIDs and once again expressed his concern over the present state of the revisions. I told him that I hoped my memorandum to the Director on the Board Recommendations would help to stimulate his interest.

BAIRD called to say that the DC3 was not available for Monday, the 16th, to take SICILIANO and WINSLOW to [REDACTED]. He said that we could either use the DC6 or a Beachcraft which could take only three passengers. I told him to schedule the Beachcraft to take SICILIANO, WINSLOW and STEWART and that I would drive.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

Went over with [REDACTED] the progress on WE survey and we agreed that we would turn the individual sections over to the Branch Chiefs as they were completed and then ask the Branch Chiefs to come up and discuss them with us.



12

11 December 1957

COYNE called to ask if I concurred in their transmitting to the Secretary of Defense the Director's reply on Recommendation #4 of the President's Board. I said that we did. He also asked if the reference on Recommendation #4 was to the BISSELL project when we referred to new collection programs. I said that it was.

25X1


Lunch with

25X1

R

12 December 1957

25X1



J.J. BAGNALL came up and we went over the exploitation of Soviet scientific and technical journals.

Attended luncheon given by DCI for HARRY REYNOLDS.

BOEHM came in to see if CIA was interested in subsidizing his publication, Historical Abstracts. I asked him to come back next Monday and talk to the appropriate people. 25X1



CASSIDY came over to hand me the Dept. of Defense's semi-annual report.

25X1  
25X1 [redacted] dropped in and we discussed his work 25X1  
in the [redacted]



13 December 1957

Deputies Meeting.

Wisner talked to me about [ ] and said they would very carefully follow any suggestions to make sure his work was controlled and productive.

25X1

[ ] came in and presented his proposal. (See memorandum for the record.)

[ ] called to say that after talking to Col. Edwards she had decided not to pursue her case and was planning to retire.

[ ] buzzed about [ ] and asked if I would get into the case and see how vulnerable the Agency was.

Called [ ] and asked if he would send me everything they had on [ ] cigarette problem in [ ] I talked to Edwards and [ ] on this.

Reviewed progress of the FE survey with [ ] and others.

Met with the Director and he approved of taking [ ] on the staff. I advised him of my problem with [ ] and the [ ]

[ ] secured the Director's approval to distribution on their replies to NSC on President's Board to other IAC agencies. The DCI said that he would wait awhile before replying to COYNE on his statement to the Johnson Committee. I advised him of the SICILIANO visit to [ ] and of the projected visit of the Civil Service Commissioners. I also advised him of the Feb. 28 meeting of the President's Board. The DCI indicated that in the grievance regulation he wanted it specifically stated that appeals to him on grievances should be channeled through the Inspector General. Finally, I expressed to him grave concern over the use of [ ] and the fact that I was afraid we were vulnerable to criticism in this regard. He said he agreed completely and he was particularly concerned about the Convair. I so advised White and said we would look into it at an early date.

16 December 1957

At the DCI's meeting commented on the proposed briefing of the NSC on the Current Intelligence Bulletin. Also commented on his possible letter to Senator Johnson on leaks from that committee and suggested the addition of the following paragraph: "While I recognize the importance of keeping the public informed as to the nature of the threat to our security, I would most strongly urge that this be done in such a fashion so as not to give valuable information to the Soviet Union on our intelligence and the extent of our knowledge about their capabilities."

Attended lunch for [redacted]

Left for [redacted] at 3:00 PM.

17 December 1957

At [redacted] until 4:30 PM at which time I met with [redacted] of [redacted] and [redacted] concerning the FULTON LEWIS attacks on [redacted]. I told [redacted] that I would get all of our ammunition in line to cope with these attacks and that they should fire the leaks in the Agency.

18 December 1957

At the Deputies Meeting the DDCI asked if I would have somebody brief him on [redacted] and I asked [redacted] to do this. I advised them of the addition of [redacted] to the staff and gave them a brief biographical sketch of [redacted]

Together with [redacted]

Attended meeting of Supergrade Board.

19 December 1957

Attended PRC meeting which considered a combined TSS/Communications request for money to develop an automatic ELINT device to put near Soviet long range bomber bases and also a request for additional funds for TSS research.

25X1 Went over with [ ] the schedule for the meeting of the Foreign Service inspectors on 23 January.

25X1 CHARLES MacWHORTER of the Vice President's office came down for lunch together with AMORY, [ ]. Everything appeared to go well, but on leaving, when he was alone with [ ], MacWHORTER asked if as a 25X1 matter of policy this Agency supported the recognition of China. He did not mention AMORY by name but [ ] assumed that this was what he was talking about.

20 December 1957

25X1


25X1 Called [ ] to tell him that we proposed to go over branch by branch our reports and then give him the entire draft to read before submitting it to the DCI.

23 December 1957 ✓

25X1 At the Deputies Meeting reported the visit by [ ] and told  
25X1 them that he said [ ] was doing very well and that they wanted to have  
25X1 him as chargé d'affaires when both the [ ] were out of 25X1

[ ] I also reported on the President's Board's word of praise on  
our Semi-annual Report and that they would meet next on 28 February.  
I advised that GORDON STEWART and I felt that [ ] visit to [ ] 25X1  
had been very successful. Finally, I advised that the Civil Service  
Commissioners would be visiting [ ] on 6 January. 25X1

25X1 Lunch with [ ] 25X1



CASSIDY called to extend season's greetings.

25X1 [ ] called to say he was home with a minor heart attack and to ask  
my views on language compensation. I told him I thought the matter ought  
to be discussed at Career Council meetings.

24 December 1957

25X1 [ ] came up to brief the staff on the work he had been doing  
in RI. I later called HELMS to say that I thought [ ] should be put in 25X1  
for an award and he agreed but requested that the award be timed to be given  
25X1 [ ] upon completion of his work in the Registry.

26 December 1957

25X1 [ ] called concerning [ ] and I told him 25X1  
exactly what I had said at the Deputies Meeting which was simply that we 25X1  
knew her husband had once worked for [ ] and therefore there was a  
possibility she might know something about their operation but that I saw  
no reason why she shouldn't be approached for employment and possibly hired  
if we were generally assured she was not in touch with [ ] 25X1

At Deputies Meeting a general discussion of the Free Europe Committee  
matter and the DCI raised the question of the CBS dinner and stressed the  
fact that he wanted to make sure the Agency put its best foot forward.

25X1 Attended meeting held by DCI with [ ] concerning the 25X1  
[ ] problems and also attended by DDCI, DD/P, General 25X1  
Counsel, Col. Grogan, [ ] At the end the DCI  
asked if I would pull together all of the varied work that was being done.  
Later DCI asked me to come to a meeting with DDCI and Grogan to determine  
where the action responsibility lay. I said that I thought it should rest  
with the DD/P and that my responsibility was purely fact finding. Gen.  
Cabell asked if I would draw up a statement of responsibility.

25X1 HOUSTON called concerning the [ ] case and said he would send 25X1  
me the [ ] opinion.

25X1 [ ] called to ask if the letter to [ ] was satisfactory. I 25X1  
told him that it was and that we were under no obligation to use the man's  
services.

25X1 [ ] 25X1

27 December 1957

25X1 Together with [ ], reviewed the Scandinavian section of the WE survey 25X1  
25X1 with [ ]

[ ]

TOP SECRET

27 December 1957 (con't)

R

25X1

EDWARDS called on the [ ] case and said he had advised HULICK he had turned all of his papers over to me.

25X1

25X1

[ ] called concerning the trip of the Civil Service Commissioners to [ ] and I told him that as far as I know, the trip is still on. I said the only modification I would suggest from the last performance would be to have a briefing on the Agency before we leave Washington.

25X1

[ ] dropped in to report a visit with [ ] and said he thought he was doing very well and was going to accomplish a lot more than his predecessor.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] went over the [ ] case with me and we agreed that there probably was no money owed [ ] although the work period records were very poor and that consequently we should send a letter to him fully refuting his claim.

30 December 1957

25X1

CABELL called to ask if I would prepare a delineation of responsibility

[ ] I said that I would. Done.

25X1

[ ] checked to find out if IO knew that they were supposed to prepare notes for the DCI's briefing of Congress on the Free Europe Committee. I said I would remind them of it.

25X1

TOP SECRET



30 December 1957 (con't)

25X1

Talked to STEWART about [ ] and the visit of the Civil Service Commissioners to [ ] reported that we would know on Thursday whether [ ] was cleared.

BOREL called and asked if he could come up and talk to me about PFORZHEIMER.

HELMS called to say that [ ] who is now living in New Hampshire, was a friend of JAMES O'NEILL, editor of the American Legion publication which has recently been attacking the Agency. He asked if I wanted to talk to [ ] about the possibility of an approach to O'NEILL about these attacks. I said I did. (In later call from Helms' office, we were advised that subject would be back in town in about ten days and Helms' office will ask him to get in touch with LBK.)

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

31 December 1957

*re*

25X1

[ ] said he was sending over a paper on [ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ] called to say that they had dropped the [ ]  
[ ]

25X1

STEWART called to say they planned to pick up the Civil Service Commissioners at 1200 on Monday for a 2:30 takeoff.

HELMS called to urge that [ ] be included in any proposal for an incentive award for [ ]

25X1

25X1

KERMIT ROOSEVELT called to say goodbye and to express regret at not being able to get up.

2 January 1958

25X1 [redacted] called to report that the Crusade Board had decided to send a letter to FULTON LEWIS on Monday afternoon and that he was going to present it to the DCI for concurrence today and would send me a copy. I told him I wanted to get together with the Division to go over the details of what to look for in [redacted] and stressed the fact that this was an effort to help the Division and was not criticism. He said they welcomed it and would like to get together next Monday.

25X1 Called ANGLETON and said we would like to discuss with his people the SRS staff. He said he would get [redacted] to set it up and they would call us on Monday. Advised [redacted] of this. 25X1

25X1 PAUL BOREL came up to ask my views on WALTER PFORZHEIMER and [redacted]. He asked specifically whether I thought he should assume that he would have to keep PFORZHEIMER permanently or that [redacted] was there simply to take over at an early date. I said that I would not think he should accept either of these assumptions, and that he should proceed exactly as he saw fit. 25X1

25X1 Lunch with [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] called to say he had received a satisfactory explanation from [redacted] and that he would send the papers to me. He said he proposed on a probationary assignment dealing with [redacted] 25X1 I told him that after I reviewed the papers I would talk to him further.

25X1 [redacted] called to say that FULTON LEWIS, JR. had stated that he had turned his material over to SEN. EASTLAND and had also talked to SEN. JENNER and SEN. BRIDGES. [redacted] suggested that the Director be urged to take up the matter with Vice President NIXON to seek his advice. I said I agreed. 25X1

[redacted]

Talked to GROGAN about the FULTON LEWIS case and asked whether LEWIS had attempted to get the Agency's view on this problem. He said that he had not. I then asked whether there was any indication that anybody had consulted the Agency and he said he was under the impression that [redacted] had talked to GEN. CABELL about it. 25X1

12

2 January 1958 (con't)

25X1

25X1

[ ] called to say that FLANIGAN was cleared and STEWART advised that ELLSWORTH had invited FLANIGAN to come along on the 6th. I then reminded STEWART that [ ] had recommended another man in the Civil Service Commission to go along and STEWART said this was IRONSIDES and that he would ask him. I talked to CHRIS PHILLIPS who said he was unable to go because he was seeing LODGE in New York on the 6th or 7th. He said he would be in Washington until June and hoped very much he would get the opportunity to go.

Talked to GORDON STEWART about [ ] and said that I proposed to call him in and go over his problems one by one and advise him that in most instances he was talking about matters that he didn't know about and that he was forfeiting a generally fair work record. STEWART agreed. 25X1

Talked to HAROLD LAWRENCE about GEN. CASSIDY reviewing the NSCIDs. He said that they would like to and I said we would send them over at an early date.

Talked to ZANDER in MR. QUARLES' office and asked him to send <sup>ل</sup>a copy of the QUARLES memorandum to the National Security Council on Recommendation #3.

3 January 1958

25X1

[redacted]  
Lengthy discussion at Deputies meeting of the letter by [redacted] to  
Fulton Lewis, Jr.

25X1

TRUSCOTT came down to say, on my memorandum for regional coordinators, that he believed that the time was not propitious while they were having lengthy debate of NSCIDs and that he proposed initially to try and get our field chiefs to exert more effort in attempting coordination. He also showed me the memo he had prepared on Recommendation #2 and said that he felt that the Community was about ready to accept one U.S. intelligence board. He said he would provide me with drafts of NSCIDs to send over to Cassidy and Coyne next week.

Lunch with [redacted]

Meeting with [redacted] GROGAN and [redacted] to go over the  
suggested briefing notes for the DCI on the [redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

[redacted]  
He also agreed to read the drafts of NSCIDs and to the extension of the 15 January deadline on Recommendation #2 for two weeks. Finally, he reminded me that we had not sent him the DCI testimony on the Soviet guided missile program.

[redacted] called on [redacted] and I told him that I had read the material he sent up and did not believe this should disqualify [redacted] from employment here. I suggested that he clear it with Wisner and have Wisner touch base with the Director.

[redacted] came in to ask whether there was any possibility of joining the staff at this time. I told him no and he said he thought he would try to get the job in Strategic Division [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[redacted] came in to clear a letter which GROGAN had written to the UDELL Publications turning down their request to use our files for preparing a series on CIA.

I talked to [redacted] about the criticism he had made of the Agency and went over the following points:

(1) Lack of interest in developing an adequate scientific intelligence collection program.

a. [redacted]

3 January 1958 (con't)

25X1

[ ] ....

R

(2) No opportunity in CIA.

(3) No effort to correct problems in Agency--no unit to generate improvements from within the Agency.

a. expansion of IG's office.

(4) Can take more effective action against Communism on the outside.

- - - - -

1. A single staff to control exploitation of conferences:

- a. Says no focal point and then says [ ] named.
- b. [ ] - doesn't have all the facts.
- c. His chief complaint is DD/P didn't get it.

25X1

2. Central reference library for overt information on scientific organizations.

3. Calendar of scheduled scientific conferences.

4. Uniform operational methods:

- a. Criticizes DD/I activities.
- b. " debriefings.
- c. Little field cover for DD/I.
- d. OSI unit in the field.
- e. Add to staff----impractical and uninformed.

5. Improve Scientific Operations Branch:

- a. More delegation of authority.
- b. Availability of branch chief.
- c. More personnel.
- d. Elimination of paperwork.
- e. Improvement of files.

I told him that he was talking about things which he didn't know about in many instances and that he was most unfair to ELOISE PAGE and furthermore, that if we allowed subordinates to evaluate supervisors in all instances, we would have a form of Communistic anarchy. I suggested that he would probably run into frustrations in other forms of endeavor and pointed out that he had no idea of how many improvements were used to make the Agency better.

25X1

[ ] said that [ ] called collect and was told she could not accept the charges so the call came through prepaid. She told him the Director had the problem under consideration and would be in touch with [ ] shortly; he asked if she would drop him a line then and she told him she would try to (he asked when the Director would be in touch with him and she told him she hoped within a few days). He said he would be most appreciative if she would write and let him know.

25X1

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

12

4 January 1958

Met with LESLIE HARRIS and MIKE BURKE of CBS to discuss their interest in doing a Television series on CIA. They were advised that we did not think this time was propitious inasmuch as it was an election year and the Congress was showing its teeth but that we would not preclude doing it in the future. They seemed to anticipate this reply and did not go away mad.

6 January 1958

25X1 Met with [ ] to outline how we would go about our FEC survey.

25X1 [ ] brought down several of the problems of the FE survey.

LAWRENCE called to ask if we could give some assistance inasmuch as SAMMIE NEWMAN was ill.

Called BEN HOLDEN at New Haven to set up a time for [ ] to bring his son to see Yale. 25X1

COYNE called concerning the DECEMBER 17 letter that the DCI wrote to GORDON GRAY on the BAKER REPORT and pointed out that there had been two refusals to comment on this.

25X1 [ ] called to ask if it was all right to put [ ] in the time being and I agreed. 25X1

CAREY called concerning a followup discussion with DAN SCHORR of CBS regarding air raid shelters in Moscow. I told him by all means because SCHORR had not come to dinner but that I heard him state over TV they did not have any air raid shelters.

25X1 [ ] consulted me on our planned schedule of inspections and I told him we planned to do FI and CI starting sometime this winter, then DD/P office and then leave them alone.

7 January 1958

IG Staff Meeting.

Met with CORD MEYER to briefly discuss the problems of FEC.

The DCI buzzed me to ask me to go over the Bureau of the BUDGET memo concerning MACY's trip and also to talk to CASSIDY about a successor to DR. KILLIAN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

8 January 1958

At the Deputies Meeting I called attention to the PEARSON column in which the DCI was mentioned; passed on DR. KILLIAN's comments on the BAKER COMMITTEE REPORT; reported that we were providing the secretary for GEN. CASSIDY during the illness of his own; suggested that the DCI might be interested in reading "Where Do We Stand," the CBS 4 January program; and pointed out that ROBERT MORRIS had proposed an independent agency to handle [ ] 25X1

HELMS called to direct my attention to Congressman MAHON's not too favorable views concerning intelligence as expressed on TV Sunday.

25X1 Together with [ ] met with ANGLETON, [ ] 25X1  
 25X1 [ ] to discuss the CI Staff's views on International Communism and the SRS.  
 In general, they disagreed with SRS and pointed out three major issues--legality  
 25X1 of the Communist Party, the Nenni Socialist, and co-existence. They said  
 that [ ] ICD had about [ ] 25X1  
 They pointed out that they had a request from OSI Air Force for assistance  
 in research that its staff was doing on the subject "on the basis of a study  
 of Communist doctrine, could we predict when the Soviet Union could attack  
 the United States."

Had a brief discussion with [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] came in and we agreed that he would seek an informal  
 25X1 meeting with JAMES O'NEILL of American Legion and urge him to drop in to see  
 me. [ ] said he tho't O'NEILL's nose was a little out of joint because  
 he once tried to see the DCI and was put off.

9 January 1958

25X1 [ ] called to get my reactions on debriefing SEN. DWORSHAK. I told  
 him that we should do it regardless of DWORSHAK's rather hostile attitude 25X1  
 toward the Agency.

25X1 Together with [ ] spent about an hour with [ ] 25X1  
 going over the various problems in [ ]

ASHCRAFT called to say that [ ] had been in to see him and felt that 25X1  
 his marital difficulties were being solved and that he would come back to work  
 at an early date.

25X1 *language* [ ] of Training came in to see me to ask what my remembrance of the  
 Incentive Award Program was. I told him and he said that this was in accord  
 with all other members of the Career Council but that [ ] differed and 25X1  
 wanted to have it brought up before the Career Council. I said it was a lot  
 of damn nonsense.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

9 January 1958 (con't)

25X1

25X1 [ ] of CI Staff called to say they had been asked whether [ ] should go to training and did not think it was any of their business. I said I agreed and that I requested he go to training for the time being.

25X1 Met with EDWARDS, [ ] on the FEC matter and they briefed on their views.

Met with the DCI and cleared my [ ] on the FEC survey.

25X1

10 January 1958

Left Washington at 0930 for Princeton to participate in the Board of Trustees Panel on Government Service.

11 - 17 January 1958

25X1 [ ]

17 January 1958

25X1 Lunch for [ ]

25X1 Together with WHITE, [ ] and the FE survey team, met with BOB MACY of the Bureau of the BUDGET to discuss FE.

18 January 1958

25X1 Spent about 1½ hours with CORD MEYER giving him orally my reactions to what we had seen in [ ]

13 January 1958

25X1 [ ] wants to come up some time.

GEN. CASSIDY called--said it would wait.

25X1 [ ] stopped by to ask if you had had a chance to get together  
25X1 with [ ] whom [ ] had asked to see you--I told him [ ] had not  
called. 25X1

25X1 [ ] He may call 25X1  
or stop by next week.

COL. EDWARDS said DCI told him to talk to you reference [ ].  
EDWARDS will do so when you return.

25X1 [ ] just "called to chin."

.....RCM

14 January 1958

25X1 [ ] inquired about reply to note she brought up just before  
25X1 Christmas. [ ]

CORD MEYER wants you to call him soonest.

.....RCM

15 January 1958

25X1 [ ] called for five minutes of your time. He will call again 25X1  
next week.

25X1 [ ] asked if you can give SIS lecture on 11 February (Tuesday). I  
told him it would depend on whether or not you had to go on a trip and that  
we would call him.

Beginning Friday afternoon, 13 Jan., I called COYNE's office at least  
once a day inquiring whether or not he was there so we could send the hearing  
excerpts over. He was not in his office until Friday, 17 Jan., when they were sent.

.....RCM

r2

20 January 1958

Advised the DEPUTIES MEETING of the discussion with MR. MACY of the Bureau of the Budget on Friday; of the general results of our survey of [ ] in [ ]; of [ ] comment about [ ] and of [ ]

25X1  
25X1

25X1

Saw the DCI about the FEC survey and he said that he would like to think overnight about whether I should go to Europe or not; advised the DCI that I felt some of the faults in FEC were due to CORD MEYER's trying to hold too many things too close to his personal control; also advised the DCI that I took a very dim view of the failure of the staff and of the others that saw it in not forwarding the request from the Army for [ ] to the PRC; finally, I pointed out to him that DAVE SCHONBRUN had gotten hell from CBS for the questions he asked and the statements he made at the CBS dinner.

25X1

AMORY asked me about his serving on jury duty and said that he planned to tell them he would serve if it was their general policy to call individuals of his rank. I told him I concurred with this and suggested he check it out with HOUSTON.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

Told [ ] of my conversation with WHITE concerning his taking over the role of head of the Employment Review Board vacated by [ ] and asked that he see WHITE and discuss it with him, including the subject of whether he would need a full time secretary and who would provide it.

25X1

SHELDON called to ask whether <sup>he</sup> I should honor a request from IO to provide briefings on various satellite countries for the [ ] [ ] I told him I would check and call him back. I discussed this with [ ] who recommended against it on the grounds that it would [ ] would be widely known in [ ] and would also be a security hazard.


25X1

[ ] said he was releasing cable [ ] which was of interest to FEC survey.

25X1

20 January 1958 (con't)

25X1



25X1

[redacted] dropped in to say hello.

CORD MEYER called to say that [redacted] had resigned and said he would ask Security to ascertain what he is up to.

25X1

GROGAN dropped in to clear with me a memo which he had prepared for the Director covering the answers to certain questions proposed by Readers' Digest.

25X1

[redacted] proposed that in covering FEC we talk to VOA and particularly to MR. F. BAYOOR ZORTHIAN who is now Program Director in Washington.

25X1

[redacted]

21 January 1958

Meeting of the IG Staff.

Talked to Helms and Gates Lloyd re the [ ] Army acoustic listening device and told him I was not going to concur on the basis of the information provided. Helms said he agreed with me. 25X1

GROGAN briefed me on the NEWSWEEK speculation concerning some of the top level officials of the Agency competing for the DCI's job and told me of discussions with the NEWSWEEK diplomatic correspondent on this subject. 25X1

25X1 Lunch with [ ] 25X1

25X1 EDWARDS, GROGAN and [ ] came over to brief [ ] and myself on the security cases in [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] of the Comptroller's Office came over to say that he had been offered the post as principal Administrative Officer in [ ] but would not want to accept it if it would prevent him from coming to my staff. I said there was no opening on my staff in the foreseeable future and that he should go to [ ] and we would keep him in mind. 25X1

21 January 1958 (con't)

PAT COYNE called to say that DCI had just called him concerning the BAKER COMMITTEE report and that he had agreed to try and get ten copies of the Baker Committee Report so that the DCI could consult USCIB but he wanted to point out that this was not required in the NSC action.

22 January 1958

25X1 [ ] came in to say the DCI had been quite concerned about reading about an employee who left the Agency and stated that he had not had enough to do and he asked that something be done with all people with not enough to do. They should see the IG. He said the DCI commented on supervisors who gave employees good fitness reports and then announced their resignations were a gain to the Agency. I told [ ] I would take up both matters with the DCI.

25X1

25X1 [ ] came up to say he thought it would be of considerable assistance if my staff could do additional documentation in those cases where there was going to be possible termination action. Without being critical, he felt that perhaps we were over anxious to settle a case rather than to thoroughly document it.

25X1 [ ] came up to ask my advice on his future. He said he had received an offer from a new organization in Boston which were to be sub-contractors of [ ] and that it was a job that was exactly down his alley and it offered considerably more money. He said he wanted to get my advice on what I considered to be his loyalty to the Agency, his future in the Agency and his future in OCR. He also mentioned that he had not gotten a Rockefeller award and that this was a factor. I told him that I didn't think he should be too deeply concerned that he was not chosen to be Deputy Assistant Director of OCR, that there were other jobs in the Agency he could do and that he was very highly regarded in the Agency. I did point out, on the other hand, that he might have to be content to stay fairly much in position for several years ahead.

25X1 Met with GATES LLOYD, [ ], GORDON STEWART on the PSAS. We agreed to ask the lawyers to check to see whether we couldn't call PSAS exclusively for CIA. We would also ask them to check what sort of administration we should have for administering scholarships. We agreed I would write letters to external directors telling of our success and that I would prepare the external campaign.

25X1

advised

CHAS. McWHORTER of the Vice President's Office called to ask about the Vice President's address to the Assembly of Captive European Nations and the Lewis attacks. (See memo for the record.) Advised the DCI.

23 January 1958

Presided over meeting of the State Department Foreign Service Inspectors.

Lunch for GEN. PIERSON, Inspector General of the Army, followed by a brief briefing on CIA's organization.

25X1 [ ] of Personnel brought me the memo on how the Agency should get rid of below standard employees and I told him I agreed with it.

25X1 HAROLD LAWRENCE called to say that ADM. CONOLLY would be calling me next week concerning the trip to Europe. He wants to leave 15 March getting back [ ] 6 April. He would like to take his wartime aide, PAUL BOREL, with him.

Meeting with CAREER COUNCIL at which I urged the Council to seize itself of the problem of how the Agency should reduce in size in order to get into the new building. 25X1

24 January 1958

25X1 Met with CABELL and [ ] on the case of the leak to WARREN UNNA and later with SHELDON on the same subject, and called the DCI in Princeton to advise him of the WHITE HOUSE request for an FBI investigation. We recommended that the Director ask the White House to abstain from a decision until we had completed our own investigation. He agreed to this and I advised GEN. GOODPASTER who agreed.

25X1 Met with HOUSTON and [ ] who said that BESTERMAN of the House Judiciary COMMITTEE had advised them that GEN. WILLOBY was behind the FULTON LEWIS attacks and also that they were bringing [ ] back to the U.S. to testify. 25X1

25X1 Talked to [ ] GROGAN, SHELDON, [ ] concerning the WARREN UNNA story. (See memorandums for the record.) 25X1

25X1 HELMS called to ask if the name [ ] meant anything to me. [ ] wants to use him on his staff and [ ] had been reluctant to approve him because he thought he was a former [ ] man. I told him that it did not ring a bell with me, to go ahead and approve him. 25X1

25X1 [ ] came up to discuss the Scientific Operations Branch of the FI Staff and said that after reviewing it he had decided to recommend that OSI be asked to detail two or three people to FI to be the focal point for liaison and that the balance of the staff specifically handle operations. 25X1

24 January 1958 (con't)

25X1

[REDACTED]

BAIRD came up to discuss augmenting the [REDACTED] training with training in [REDACTED]. I told him that this seemed like a very good idea and to go ahead with it.

25X1

Review of the FE Division progress with [REDACTED]

25X1

Review of the FEC survey with [REDACTED]

25X1

GEN. PIERSON, Army IG, called to say that FULTON LEWIS had been in the Pentagon to see Personnel people. He also said that Personnel people were handling the [REDACTED] case. I warned him that the [REDACTED] case was probably the subject of LEWIS' broadcast next week and he said he would pass on this information.

25X1

GROGAN said he had checked with the Pentagon and that LEWIS had been seeing the Personnel people and had left very dissatisfied. He also said that LEWIS had called the [REDACTED] and also LINCOLN WHITE of State Department.

[REDACTED] to say he had lunch with JAMES O'NEILL and felt that O'NEILL now felt much better about the Agency. He said that there had been some misunderstanding involving the Worlds Veteran Federation. He also said O'NEILL would be down in Washington in a couple of weeks and would call me.

BAGNALL called to ask if I could find out who recommended [REDACTED] to the DCI.

25X1

[REDACTED] called to say that they were having a problem with [REDACTED] and that although he has a contract through February 1959, he refuses to work.

25X1

COYNE called to ask me to advise the Director that BAKER, KILLIAN, and CUTLER had decided that only four copies of the BAKER REPORT would be issued.

[REDACTED] called to report on the [REDACTED] case, which is the one in which the wife of one of our employees passed on a report to a newspaperman on the foreign aid situation in [REDACTED]. He also reported on [REDACTED] who was employed by FEC and who may be involved in a security case.

25X1

25X1



R

25 January 1958

Met with the Director to discuss the FEC and [ ] matters. I advised the Director that FULTON LEWIS spent yesterday and the previous day in the Defense Department, probably discussing the [ ] matters with G-1 personnel. He asked if I would be sure to keep [ ] advised of these particular matters. I said that I would. He also asked that I make sure that the [ ] office picks up the material from [ ] at his home on Monday. I advised him that IO, Security and my staff were each independently reviewing the FULTON LEWIS material and he asked that when this was completed, I provide [ ] with a memo on it. He then gave me several papers and memoranda as a result of the trip to [ ] and stated that [ ] was quite anxious to reply to the attacks and that he and [ ] would be seeing FULTON LEWIS the latter part of next week.

I reviewed for the Director fully the genesis of the [ ] story and recommended that he call GEN. GOODPASTER and advise him that we had completed our investigation and that he would be in a position Monday to show him our report. He placed a call for GEN. GOODPASTER.

I asked the Director if he remembered who talked to him about [ ] He believed it was at the home of [ ] and that it was [ ]

I advised the Director that [ ] was acting up again and that I would follow through on the case.

I advised the Director of my conversation with COYNE regarding only four copies of the BAKER COMMITTEE REPORT being available and he called GEN. CUTLER on this matter.

I asked him who was handling the matter of scholarships for our employees and he asked me if I would.

I reported to him very briefly on the Career Council discussion on the size of the Agency and reminded him that one year had passed since he had a dinner with senior people to discuss this matter and nothing had been done. I told him that 90% of our people thought the Agency was too big and recommended that either the Career Council or PRC be given responsibility for dealing with the problem.

**TOP SECRET**

27 January 1958

25X1

25X1 At the Deputies Meeting the DCI asked me to follow up with [ ] on the [ ] article; I reported on the fact that ADM. CONOLLY wanted to take BOREL with him; I also advised that [ ] had done a good job with JAMES O'NEILL of the American Legion. 25X1

25X1 STEWART called about [ ] letter.

GROGAN called concerning the request we had for information on the NKVD.

25X1 [ ] called concerning the action on Recommendation #1.

COYNE called to say that only eight pages of the BAKER REPORT had been changed and they had sent out 10 copies so far; that the Special Committee would meet on 6 February and that Baker would report to the President on 10 February.

HELMS called to report that [ ] had written a letter to Sen. RUSSE and STENNIS concerning CIA. 25X1

Lunch with JACK BLAKE.

25X1 Met with [ ] in the case of [ ] We were unanimous in agreeing that he should be told he could not fiddle around any longer and that he either get a job or CIA was through with him, and that I would tell him. [ ] will advise the DD/P and I will advise the Deputies. 25X1


25X1 Went to the WHITE HOUSE and showed GEN. GOODPASTER a copy of my report on the [ ] story. He accepted it but said he wanted to keep a copy to talk to one or two others but indicated he was in agreement with my recommendation that investigation by FBI would be unprofitable.

25X1 Together with [ ] met with HOWARD DONOVAN of State Inspectors and talked about [ ]. 25X1

28 January 1958

25X1

IG staff meeting.



**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

28 January 1958 (con't)

25X1

At the request of the DCI (relayed thru Grogan) attended a lunch with him and the DCI and a young lady from Good Housekeeping magazine who is doing an article on careers for women in CIA. I checked with [ ] and [ ] and both felt that progress had been made in the five years since our women's panel.

25X1

CORD MEYER called to ask if I would meet with DCI and himself to discuss the [ ] trip. In this connection [ ] dropped in and expressed his view that a really thorough management survey should be made. I said I agreed.

25X1

[ ] dropped in to say goodbye.

COYNE called and asked if I would give him a memo on the NSCIDs. He also reported that they would be considered by the Planning Board on 10 February.

SHELDON called to ask if we are going to follow up on the press leak and I said that I was preparing a memo.

CABELL called concerning the meeting with GOODPASTER and I reported to him on what had happened.

Called ASHCRAFT and asked him to check on how much the [ ] had gotten from [ ] concerning the Russians that had visited the Institute.

25X1

At the DCI's request called CAREY and passed on the fact that that Congressman DAN FLOOD had contact with some [ ]

25X1

STEWART called concerning a [ ] who might appeal to us.

25X1

[ ] reported that GOODPASTER had talked to the DCI about the [ ] story and was returning my memo for us to keep the action.

25X1

CASSIDY called and said that DR. KILLIAN would continue on the BOARD but that they were trying to persuade Mr. LOVETT to take the Chairmanship and that the meeting would be on February 28th.

TOP SECRET

29 January 1958

WHITE called concerning the KILLIAN BOARD recommendations on the DCI taking an interest in intelligence community personnel. I suggested that we let it ride until the DCI has a chance to discuss it with them at the 28 February meeting.

25X1 Met with [ ] and went over the proposals we would  
25X1 make in the [ ] survey.

Together with GROGAN, met with JOHN SCALI of the Associated Press and discussed the background of our top personnel.

25X1 CHARLES MacWHORTER of the Vice President's office called to say that  
25X1 he had had a talk with [ ] who had received quite a few inquiries as a result of the Fulton Lewis attacks and that he had reassured him that the [ ] was responding.

BAIRD called and asked if I would see [ ]

25X1

BOREL called and I told him he could forget about the possibility of going to Europe with CONOLLY.

25X1 [ ] brought down the DD/I survey and we went over it together.

25X1

GROGAN came in to talk about the Director's speech in New Haven.

COYNE called concerning Recommendation #2 and said that on the basis of the reply, he felt that there was very little the NSC could do except acknowledge it.

25X1

25X1 [ ], Personnel, called to advise of the death of [ ]  
GS-9, Machine Records. Absolute cause not certain, but believed to be heart attack. He is survived by a wife and one child; was 39 years old.

30 January 1958

25X1 ASHCRAFT and [ ] came in to talk about their problems with GROGAN in  
25X1 contacting newspapermen in [ ]. I suggested that they simply let the matter ride until I had a chance to write an Agency Notice on press contacts.

25X1

25X1 Met with [ ] of NEA, a JOT, who plans to resign from the Agency.

**TOP SECRET**

R

31 January 1958

HAL LAWRENCE called concerning the JACK RAYMOND story in the New York Times and said that Dr. KILLIAN and Mr. DEARBORN were considerably disturbed about this and asked if we could check as to the possible source. I advised the DCI and he stated that he had already received a call from Gen. GOODPASTER on it. I also checked with AMORY whose view was that it must have come out of the Pentagon. I advised CASSIDY of this who stated that he had been in HUGH CUMMINGS' office and had heard WILKINSON ask COMMINGS whether this shouldn't be deliberately leaked to the press. I advised the DCI of this and he reported that he was meeting with Gen. GOODPASTER on this subject and that they felt that COYNE should coordinate an Agency-wide investigation.

GROGAN later reported that INS had advised him that the story had been confirmed by them the night before in the State Department. He later advised that the press was now attributing the story to government intelligence. SHELDON advised that the DDCI at USCIB had instructed each agency to conduct its own investigation. I discussed this with COYNE who said he had been conferring with GOODPASTER on the subject. EDWARDS later advised that he had set up a special task force composed of [ ] to look into it from an Agency viewpoint. 25X1

EDWARDS called to say he was extremely concerned about the various scientists whom LAWRENCE might bring to the Agency in his role as an assistant to KILLIAN. I talked to LAWRENCE about this and he said he would come over this afternoon to talk about it. I also mentioned it to CASSIDY who said he was very concerned about it and intended to straighten it out with KILLIAN. LAWRENCE called back later and said he would not come over this afternoon and implied that because I had mentioned it to CASSIDY, it would have to be worked out on a KILLIAN to DCI level.

25X1 Called [ ] in New York and advised him that the DCI had  
25X1 cancelled the trip to [ ]

25X1 Explained to [ ] that we wanted his biographical sketch for  
use in reference to a press inquiry.

Lunch with BAIRD.

25X1 [ ] called concerning my memo on the Clandestine Services  
Instruction and said that he had received memos from FI and PP and was in  
general accord with our views. He said he would not reply formally unless I  
wished it and I told him not to bother.

25X1 JACK BLAKE expressed concern regarding [ ] and at his request I asked  
[ ] to drop in. Most of it revolved around [ ] working too  
hard. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

3 February 1958

At the Deputies Meeting I reported that ADM. CONOLLY planned to take a trip to Europe from 15 March to 16 April; that HAROLD LAWRENCE was working for both the President's Board and Killian; of the success of PSAS in raising nearly \$25,000 in its two years; and of the fact that HOWARD DONOVAN, Dept. of State Inspector, had thought we were completely in the right in [ ] at the time [ ] was being so critical of us. 25X1

Met with CABELL and SHELDON on the [ ] story at which time SHELDON reported his version of [ ] involvement. Reported the facts to the DCI in Princeton who asked that we take the matter over to Gen. GOOD-PASTER. 25X1

[ ] called to ask if it was all right to put [ ] into liaison with USIA. I said to go ahead because I felt that we could wait indefinitely on this matter. 25X1

Met with GATES LLOYD and [ ] on PSAS and the scholarship fund. 25X1

COYNE called to ask where the reply was on Recommendation #1 and I referred him to the memo of 28 January and the accompanying NSCID #7.

4 February 1958

IG staff meeting devoted primarily to [ ] report on the NSCIDs. 25X1

GEN. CASSIDY came over to discuss generally the review of State Dept. activities (see memo for the record).

Meeting of the PRC at which were discussed the [ ] for the Army for an acoustic listening device; the [ ] exchange in support of the State Department; and the Logistics project for the establishment of a centralized logistics station near [ ] 25X1

WHITE called to say that he wondered how far we were getting along on our review of Agency aircraft because he intended to sell one of the DC-3s if we kept the Convair.

Called DD/P to say that the DCI asked me to pass on to him my suggestion that [ ] would be a good man to look at RFE in [ ]. 25X1

STEWART called to ask if I could get an early reply on the [ ] letter. 25X1

Concurred in DD/I project 119-58 for [ ] for FY1958 for contract with the [ ] to study the economic variables that may influence the use of nuclear energy for electric power. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

R

5 February 1958

At the Deputies Meeting reported on the President's Board, the fact that it would meet 28 February and that Mr. LOVETT probably would not be present for the meeting and had turned down the chairmanship. I also advised that they had been looking into the subject of the Department of State research activities recently. Also pointed out at the Deputies Meeting that [ ] and [ ] apparently leading an opposition group to [ ] I said I considered this significant because the future of the [ ] government depends on Army support. I also said that [ ] was an old friend of ours, having been the first head of [ ] Finally, I advised the meeting that I didn't think the Agency was subject to criticism on the [ ] case inasmuch as I thought it had been handled well and pointed out that ARENS of HCUA had told a source of ours that they were not particularly interested in going into RFE. The DCI told me to follow through with GROGAN on the SCALI case and said he was particularly concerned on GROGAN's apparent determination that SCALI should not see SCOVILLE. He said that he considered SCOVILLE fairly overt and that my view should prevail.

[ ] called about getting a reader for [ ] and I asked BAIRD for his help.

Asked BAIRD who to seek advice from on mechanical translation and he recommended [ ]

Asked BAIRD what I should say at my talk at [ ] and he recommended that I give a general view on the state of the Agency.

HELMS called to say that on the subject of who would replace [ ] they had submitted a list to the DCI and had gotten a reflection from [ ] that the Director was not favorably inclined to [ ] and thought that [ ] should get it because he could better deal with high level people. HELMS said he didn't consider them to be in the same league. I said that I agreed and that I would so indicate if consulted.

[ ] called concerning a letter from [ ] I told him that I was replying to one and suggested he hold up his reply until he saw mine.

[ ] came in to say that he thought it very important that the DCI indicate at the next senior staff meeting his views on the revised NSCIDs. He also said that he thought that he and HELMS should go with AMORY to the NSC Planning Board meeting. I relayed this to HELMS.

[ ] dropped in to tell me about a comment from a friend of his on FEC and also to indicate his availability.

DDCI came down to advise me of the status of the [ ] leak. He said that he had asked HOUSTON to prepare a memo for the President and that perhaps I would be consulted.

[ ] called and asked me if I would check with DCI on the subject of his Princeton Club speech.

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 February 1958

25X1 CAREY called to say that GROGAN had been raising hell with [ ] because 25X1 [ ] had gone to see some newspaperman. I asked CAREY if they would just take it easy until I had an opportunity to get a new notice written which would clarify the matter.

Met with JOHN SCALI of Associated Press in the presence of COL. GROGAN and discussed the language development program, the Mansfield Bill and the general size of the Agency.

25X1 Discussed with [ ] the Executive Inventory and asked him to carry a copy of the memo I had prepared to STEWART for his consideration.

25X1 Asked [ ] to be sure that the DCI got a copy of the memo I had prepared on the attitude of the Foreign Relations Committee on the Mansfield Bill.

7 February 1958

25X1 Lunch with [ ]

25X1 Met with the FE group and discussed particularly the failure of operations [ ] I suggested that this was primarily a case of lack of leadership and that nothing could be accomplished by attempting organizational changes. It was generally agreed that this was the major issue involved and that that would be the approach undertaken in the survey.

CASSIDY called to confirm that the President's Board would want the DD/I, DD/P, DCI and myself to attend their 28 February meeting.

CASSIDY called to say that he had consulted with COL. EDWARDS on the subject of the security factors involved in HAROLD LAWRENCE working for both KILLIAN and the President's Board and that LAWRENCE would come over to talk to EDWARDS at a fairly early date on this subject.

EDWARDS called to report his conversation with CASSIDY on the above and to indicate that he was now satisfied that everything was being done that should be done.

STEWART called to say that he wanted to talk to me next week on the subject of career development and also on the matters which [ ] had discussed when 25X1 he came over yesterday.



**TOP SECRET**8 February 1958 R

Discussed with the DCI the [ ] case and he stated that he felt his termination stood irrespective of any resignation. He asked that I prepare a statement for him to make to the senior staff meeting on the subject of contacts with the press. We briefly discussed the replacement of [ ] and he indicated that he was possibly thinking of [ ] with [ ] as Deputy.

25X1

25X1

10 February 1958

No items raised at the Deputies Meeting.

BISSELL came in to say that he felt very strongly that a look should be taken at the procurement practices in AQUATONE. He pointed out that they had contracted for about [ ] and a total of about [ ] He said that he knew certain mistakes had been made in which sizeable amounts of money were involved. He also indicated that he was afraid that perhaps there might be an effort by Logistics to paint his operations in an unfavorable light. He therefore proposed that a group of three, composed of myself as Chairman and White and Houston as members, be designated to look at it. I said I agreed and he indicated that he would take the matter up with DDCI and DCI.

25X1

[ ] came in to say that he was planning to leave shortly for [ ] He was vague as to whom he would be working for or what he would be doing there but indicated that as he understood it he would be working on a contract basis [ ] He also said that Security had refused [ ] him even though he went to them at [ ] suggestion

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

STEWART came over to discuss his plan to have [ ] work on career development. He also said that he was planning to present very shortly to the Career Council the flexible T/O scheme and later the new pay plan, and said he would like to brief the IG staff on it first.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

P

11 February 1958

Gave lecture to S.I.S.

25X1

[ ] came down to discuss [ ] See memorandum for the record.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ] called to say that [ ] next Tuesday.

25X1

25X1

[ ] called to ask if I had any views on the winter meeting of the Quarterly Board. He also said that they were going to re-raise the matter of an unclassified version with EDWARDS. I said I agreed. He asked how I would like to receive the articles for the Spring issue and I said one by one.

CHARLES BOHRER came over to discuss the [ ] case. See memorandum for the record.

25X1

Met with AMORY, [ ] to start the OBI survey.

25X1

12 February 1958

25X1

At the Deputies Meeting advised that I was going to hold a meeting between GROGAN and [ ] in order to try and work out an amicable solution to their difficulties in contacts with the press. See Memorandum for the Record. Also mentioned to the Deputies Meeting the proposal from [ ]

25X1

Discussion with GROGAN, [ ] CAREY and the DCI concerning the flap at Friendship Airport. See Memorandum for the Record.

25X1

25X1

Discussion with [ ]. See Memorandum for the Record.

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

Discussed the [ ] case with [ ] who said that EDWARDS would brief me on it.

25X1

COYNE called to thank me for my memo on the NSCIDs and to ask what my other points were concerning #4. I indicated these. He said he understood at least one agency insisted on the DCID for #5 before they agreed to it. I said this was true.

GROGAN called to say that [ ] had submitted an article to ESQUIRE entitled "Serving as a Career."

25X1

Thursday, 13 February 1958

IG staff meeting.

-

25X1                   Talked to [ ] about [ ] and asked him if he would  
please draw up a memorandum of instructions for [ ] to follow.

25X1

25X1

-

25X1                   Met with HOUSTON, [ ] STEWART AND [ ] on the  
subject of [ ] and his threat to take legal action against the  
agency. We agreed to have a Security Office representative go see [ ]  
25X1 in [ ] and warn him that he was inviting trouble.

25X1

25X1

-

25X1                   Trip to [ ] to make commencement address to OFC.

Friday, 14 February 1958

25X1                   Returned from [ ]

LBKirkpatrick

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, 17 February 1958

EDWARDS called to say that he noticed [ ] had been in to see me and suggested we send a cable to [ ] trip. 25X1 25X1

He also asked that I review the [ ] file and see if I agreed with their decision. 25X1

I told EDWARDS that I had asked his office to prepare a memorandum to whomever in [ ] was going to handle [ ]. 25X1 25X1

-

[ ] brought in the DD/P comments on the NE/A report and said the DCI wanted to talk to me about them. 25X1

-

[ ] 25X1

-

[ ] brought in a letter from [ ] which the DCI had asked him to show me. 25X1 25X1

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 18 February 1958

AMORY said that he planned to tell the President's Board that the Bureau of the Budget had refused to approve our [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

-

Went over the [redacted] case with [redacted] and approved of the dispatch he planned to send to the field.

25X1

25X1

Also had a general discussion of Employment Boards with [redacted]

25X1

-

Talked to [redacted] about the [redacted] survey.

25X1

25X1

-

Advised [redacted] of the discussions I had had with [redacted] Hulick and Wisner concerning the latter's inquiry. [redacted] assumed that this was a result of meeting a former Air Force Secretary named Stewart.


25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

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
Wednesday, 19 February 1958

25X1 At the Deputies Meeting the DCI asked if I would reproduce the letter to

I also reminded the DCI that he wanted to talk about the over-all coverage on Russia and China.

25X1

-



-

Talked to GROGAN and EDWARDS about the call from O'Dell of the Washington Daily News who said that a very high official of CIA was being investigated for passing information to the Russians by fast means. Grogan advised him that we knew nothing about such an item and was later told they would not use it.

LBKirkpatrick

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 20 February 1958

25X1



-

WISNER called.

-

25X1

Told [redacted] that I had recommended to Security that they prepare a letter of instruction for whomever in [redacted] was going to handle

25X1

25X1



-

Attended Princeton lunch at which DCI spoke.

-

Attended Career Council meeting.

-

25X1

Approved Project for the procurement of additional land around the apartment building in [redacted]

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**



TOP SECRET  
Saturday, 22 February 1958

25X1



Friday, 21 February 1958

At the DCI's meeting the DCI asked that the following items be put on the agenda for the Board: [redacted]; NATO Estimates; Photo Interpretation.

25X1

-

DCI asked that I write a letter to the Secretary of Defense on the intelligence aspect in the Defense Department reorganization.

-


At DCI's request called Zander in Quarles' office to ask where the letter on net estimates was. He replied that it had been dispatched that morning.

-

LLOYD called me on the Convair and I told him that we are working on it.

25X1

-



-

GROGAN called to say that he had talked to [redacted] about an hour concerning the meeting that [redacted] was going to have tomorrow with Fulton Lewis.

25X1

-

PAPICH dropped in to say hello. I told him I wanted to have a lunch with the Bureau to renew old acquaintances.

Monday, 24 February 1958

In New York. See memorandum for the record.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, 25 February 1958

Returned from New York at 1545.

-

HELMS called about the [ ] project and said that he felt the Director was extremely sensitive about this one and would I check with him before we put anything on the record.

25X1

-

[ ] called about the understanding with Grogan. I suggested that he not make any issue of it at this time until we see how it works out over a period of a couple of months.

25X1

-

Advised the DCI that [ ] planned to make an independent appraisal on the handling of the [ ] case.

25X1

-

Told [ ] to forget about the medical record in the [ ] case.

25X1

-

[ ] called concerning a request from [ ] for the Director's testimony before the Senate Preparedness Committee. I told [ ] to tell [ ] to come through channels.

25X1

25X1

25X1

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, 26 February 1958

No deputies meeting.

-

DCI asked that I put in the President's Board briefing book two memoranda from Bissell.

-

Told [ ] to forget [ ] instructions regarding briefing and that I would check with the Director and advise him.

25X1

-

Gave Meyer over the 'phone a fill-in on our New York meeting.

-

Cassidy came over to say that the President's Board would hear Doctor Baker first, then CIA and then would have their own discussions. He also said that Cutler had referred the NSCIDs and our reply on recommendation 2 (24 Oct '57) to the Board for consideration. He also asked that he be put on the distribution list to receive IAC and USCIB minutes; this has been requested of ONE and OCI, respectively.

-

Archie Roosevelt came up to say goodbye.

-

Went over the President's Board material with the DCI; he asked that the estimate on the Soviet, weekly PP notes, copy of the draft net estimate, and the exchange with Quarles all be put in the book.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 27 February 1958

At IG staff meeting discussed the handling of cases, the meeting of the President's Board, the Free Europe Committee survey, and the Conolly trip.

25X1

[ ] called to say that a man named Michael Butler was wandering around Jordan describing himself as a close friend of Vice President Nixon. He asked if I would call the Vice President's office and check. I called McWhorter who checked their card file and indicated that they had never heard of [ ] I also told McWhorter that I was sending him some material on FEC.

25X1

25X1

[ ] called on (new) NSCID-7. He said the cost was not justified solely on the basis of traffic handled but that it was also a case of adding automatic relay stations for [ ] He said there were three justifications for the system: 1) the present system was inadequate; 2) it would be handling intelligence alone; and 3) it would be only an embryonic system under the present plans.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] dropped in, and stayed an hour.

25X1

[ ] called to ask whether we really needed three additional girls cleared. I explained to him the justification again.

25X1

Ray Kline and [ ] came up to talk about [ ] They also took occasion to mention what a fine job they thought [ ] was doing in surveying the China operations.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

27 February 1958 (cont'd)

25X1

Talked to Cord Meyer about the Newsome letter; the reply to [ ] Admiral Conolly's trip; and requested FEC material to send to the Vice President's office.

-

White called to say that [ ] would bring over some memoranda on personnel matters that might be included in the briefing of the President's Board. 25X1

-

Attended luncheon given by Houston for Malcolm Wilke, Assistant Attorney General.

-

25X1

Discussed the [ ] case with Edwards. (See Memorandum for the Record.)

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, 28 February 1958

At deputies meeting raised no items.

-

Attended meeting of President's Board from 1030 to 1630.


LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

Saturday, 1 March 1958

25X1



The DCI asked what was being done in regard to the investigation concerning the convair. I told him that it had barely started and that thus far it was simply a matter of gathering facts. He asked who was handling it and I said that thus far only myself and that as far as I knew the only people who knew about it were White and Cabell and he and myself. He said he wanted it held very closely and that what he wanted was something that he could use to justify the plane before a Congressional committee. I said that we didn't want another [redacted] that I thought greater use had to be made of the plane and urged that he send it out to [redacted]

25X1

25X1

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**



TOP SECRET

Sunday, 2 March 1958

Duty Officer.

-

25X1

DCI suggested that  be dropped as liaison.

He suggested that DD/C, DDCI, COP and Cassidy be invited to lunch with Hull on Tuesday.

He asked that we suggest to Killian that Hull be present at the NSC on the 13th.

I suggested that we suggest to Goodpaster that the members of the IAC be present on the 13th when the NSCIDs are considered.

LBKirkpatrick

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, 3 March 1958

Deputies Meeting - raised no items.

-

Senior Staff meeting. Reported briefly on meeting with President's Board. The DCI requested General Cabell to talk to General Schow on NSCID-4 preparatory to taking it up again at the IAC.

-

25X1 [ ] came in to ask if he could be of any assistance on the monthly letters. He also brought in a letter to Governor Adams from [ ] 25X1 and I suggested it be sent to Cord Meyer for preparation of reply.

-

25X1 Grogan came in to say he had just been discussing the question of leaks with the DCI and said that he had not seen either the final report on the [ ] leak or the [ ] leak.

-

Cassidy called to say Ryerson was worried about his security clearances in regard to his trip to the USSR. I called [ ] who said that 25X1 it would be necessary for Sheldon to give a waiver. I asked him to have Sheldon call me.

-

25X1 [ ] called to say that Lawrence had asked to come over to talk to him on NSCID-7. I suggested that Dr. Baker also come along as Killian had said that he wanted Baker in on this. ([ ] office called 25X1 on 4 March and said that Baker had not been able to come with Lawrence, but instead he and his committee of 8 would see [ ] on 12 March.) 25X1

-

Bissell called to ask if there had been any reaction to the memorandum he prepared on his role. I told him the DCI had asked me about it and that my only comment had been that I thought this was an attempt agreed to two months ago.

25X1

-

TOP SECRET

3 March 1958 (cont'd)

no employee had any vested interest in any one job, and that it was the supervisor's authority and responsibility to make such changes as he saw fit.

-

25X1 Edwards called to say he was leaving for Europe on 8 March to visit [redacted] and would be glad to do anything for us. I said we would let him know.

-

25X1 [redacted] came in and I gave him a brief fill-in on the Board discussion of the NSCIDS.

25X1

-

25X1 Cord Meyer came in and I gave him back the letter to [redacted] and told him the DCI thought it ought to be checked for the legal protection and that he also wanted to have it more clear that the letter had been referred to the 25X1 Free Europe Committee at the time. Meyer also said he would like to make certain changes in the Conolly cables, particularly urging Conolly to use a [redacted] 25X1 in going through [redacted]. He also said he would like to have [redacted] and [redacted] call Conolly before he left. I said I would advise Conolly.

LBKirkpatrick

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Tuesday, 4 March 1958

Talked to REBER about the briefing on Saturday at 11 o'clock for General Cutler, Pat Coyne and [ ] and he said that he would lay it on and advise Coyne. Bissell also called me on this and I suggested that they give an all-out briefing.

25X1

-

COYNE called about the [ ] comments on the NSCIDs and said they are sending copies over.

25X1

-

[ ] reported on the discrimination case and advised that after a two-hour conversation with the girl in question she had agreed to resign and had appeared to accept the fact that her work had not been up to standard.

25X1

-

[ ] went over for me the agreed activities situation in the [ ] station and suggested that I show the DCI the original agreement.

25X1

25X1

-

Meeting of the IG Staff at which [ ] of Personnel attended to discuss the "Selection Out" paper and the regulation on staffing and development complements.

25X1

-

[ ]  
been to the proposal for a security officer in [ ] I told him it had been favorable.

25X1

25X1

-

SHELDON came in to say that he had automatically put in a waiver for Ryerson's trip to the USSR.

25X1

-

TOP SECRET

4 March 1958 (cont'd)

Attended DCI lunch for Generals Hull and Cassidy, after which the DCI reviewed the meeting with the President's Board.

-

Went over the DD/I survey with

25X1

-

25X1

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, 5 March 1958

At the Deputies Meeting:

Advised that JCS comments on the NSCIDs were enroute.

Asked the DCI if he would check with General Cutler about inviting the IAC to attend the 13 March meeting of the NSC when the NSCIDs are to be discussed. He said he would.

Reminded the DCI that he planned to take up the Baker Committee report at the next meeting of the USCIB. Sheldon asked if I would give him a note on this.

25X1

Reported that [ ] was going to discuss NSCID-7 and the proposal for an early warning communications system with the entire Baker Committee on 12 March.

Referred to the "Selection Out Procedures" paper and urged that each deputy at his staff meetings pass the word on down the line to all supervisors that they should not refer to the paper or to any selection out procedure in telling an employee that he was incompetent. I suggested that all supervisors be instructed to base their statement on the fact that the individual was not up to agency standard. [ ]

OGC  
OGC  
FOIAB5

25X1

[ ] called to say he was seeing [ ] today and I told him to tell him that I would try to see him soon.

25X1

[ ] I told him that as far as I knew he was all right.

25X1

CASSIDY called to say that Lowry in State had advised that no agreement from Russia had been received on the Ryerson group. I told him that we had cleared the matter for Ryerson but thought that there should be a security briefing.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

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5 March 1958 (cont'd)

GROGAN came in to say that he had tried to reach me yesterday to check on an item wherein [ ] had been asked to go to the Washington Post to inquire as to the source of a story in answer to an Air Force requirement. Grogan had turned him down. I said that I agreed on the basis that it was unwise.

25X1

-

Attended Supergrade Board meeting.

-

Lunch with [ ] he went over th [ ]  
He also said that he wasn't very busy and wanted to do a special study; I suggested that he look at the career service system as the start of a long-term study.

25X1

-

Told [ ] to feel free to review the OBI survey with Amory when he sees him tomorrow.

25X1

25X1

LBKlrkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

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
**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 6 March 1958

Addressed Mid-Career Course of Foreign Service Institute.  
Afterwards lunched with

25X1  
25X1

-



25X1

-



-

TRUSCOTT came in to talk about the letter to the SecDef. See memorandum to the DCI this date.

-

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

6 March 1958 (cont'd)

25X1

Asked [ ] to check on Clare Engell as I thought it might be wise to ask him down to lunch.

-

25X1

25X1

CORD MEYER called about an inquiry from Senator Wiley's office concerning [ ] which had gone to State. I suggested that [ ] go up and brief Wiley.

-

25X1

25X1

[ ] called about the Director's comments on the [ ] project on East-West exchanges and I suggested that [ ] attend the Deputies Meeting tomorrow where it will probably be discussed. [ ] called on same item.)

25X1

25X1

-

[ ]

25X1

25X1

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

Friday, 7 March 1958

Attended DCI staff meeting.

-

Meeting of Building Steering Committee at which it was decided that a single telephone system would be put into the new building. I once again raised the question of getting District rather than Virginia rates and was advised that the telephone company maintained that Virginia rates might ultimately be less expensive. It was also decided that the Building Steering Committee would go out and look over the building site on Saturday, 15 March at 0930.

-

COYNE called to say that he had gotten word of the flap at the Friendship Airport on the Russian TU 104. He said they had been responsible for the aspect of the program wherein they used Geiger counters to determine if there is fissionable material. I told him that I knew all about it and would send over my memoranda.

-

25X1

[ ] came in to bring me an autographed copy of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's new book "Masters of Deceit".

-

Discussed the cover regulation with [ ] and agreed in his non-concurrence based on the fact that the regulation as written was too procedural.

25X1

-

Discussed the semi-annual report with [ ] and we agreed to leave the IAC and USCIB secretaries off the list of the original meeting. I also asked him to talk to General Cassidy about whether Cassidy would like to attend the meeting.

25X1

-

25X1

Discussion with [ ] on the President's Board comments on the NSCIDs. He urged that I press the Director to take them up at the IAC.

**TOP SECRET**

7 March 1958 (cont'd)

25X1 SHELDON told me that he would have to make a waiver for [redacted]. I checked the file and found that it said her father had never acquired U. S. citizenship, although it does not indicate that he is now deceased. The only other foreign relations are an aunt and uncle and grandmother on her husband's side who are living in Italy. I called Sheldon to point this out and he said he would review the case.

25X1 [redacted] called to ask when we plan to do the CI survey because  
25X1 [redacted] is planning a trip and they want all division chiefs present when we do it. I told him please not to interfere with the trip; that we would probably not start until mid or late April.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

Saturday, 8 March 1958

The DCI buzzed me and discussed at length the NSCIDs and the comments of the President's Board as a result of which I wrote a memorandum this date.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

Monday, 10 March 1958

Attended the DCI's meeting.

-

WHITE raised three subjects with me:

The persistent rumors, particularly overseas, that the DCI was about to retire. He said he had urged [ ] to get the Director to issue a statement on this.

25X1

He also said that he agreed in principle with my paper on overtime and that he wanted to study it and perhaps would suggest some modifications. I told him to go right ahead.

He also advised that [ ] would replace [ ] as Deputy Director of Personnel. I told him I generally thought that this was a good solution to two problems.

25X1

-

BAIRD called to ask if I would talk to [ ] about the situation in [ ] which disturbed him. I talked to [ ] for half an hour and he said that he had spent seven days in [ ] giving six hours of instruction per day to [ ]. He said that he had also briefed [ ] on two occasions. He questioned the value of the briefings to [ ] because most of the students were fairly openly [ ] out of the classroom and had felt that the U. S. government was contributing a great deal to support [ ]. He mentioned a comment by a student that the U. S. ambassador was hand-in-glove with [ ]. He said he considered it extremely important that when the course is concluded it be made very clearly known that the U. S. government did not take sides and that we are against Communists, not engaged in attempting to keep [ ] in power. I told him I would take up the matter with [ ] and asked [ ] to lunch on Wednesday.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

-

Called GROGAN to ask if the DCI was still going to do a column for Tom Stokes, and if so suggested that the first two paragraphs of the column Grogan suggested be changed so as not to affront J. Edgar Hoover. He said that the DCI was not using that particular column.

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

10 March 1958 (Cont'd)

Went over the progress of the OBI survey with

25X1

25X1

-

25X1

-

25X1

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 11 March 1958

IG staff meeting.

-

25X1 [ ] called to say that he was seeing [ ] and did I have any message for him. I said "no". 25X1

-

CASSIDY called to say that the Board was meeting on Friday, 25 April, and would like to have the Director and myself attend and would like particularly a progress report on the Baker recommendations.

-

25X1 COYNE called concerning the Friendship Airport incident and asked that whoever attended the NSCID-7 subcommittee meeting come brief him to give him the flavor. I talked to [ ] and he said he would ask [ ] to see Coyne. 25X1

-

25X1 GORDON STEWART called and said he would like to attend the luncheon for [ ], so I invited him.

-

Lunch for [ ] 25X1

-

Addressed the Clandestine Services Review course on the Problems and Future of the Clandestine Services.

-

[ ] 25X1

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Wednesday, 12 March 1958

At the Deputies Meeting:

Mentioned the fact that the President's Board would meet on April 25 and that the primary purpose would be to discuss progress on the Baker Committee report.

Also reported that [ ] was meeting with the full Baker Committee to discuss the problem of early warning communications.

Raised the question of [ ] and said that I did not concur with Grogan in recommending that it be discussed at the IAC. I suggested that both [ ] and Esquire be told that we thought the article was detrimental to national interest. This was agreed upon and I told Grogan to tell [ ] this. He reported that he had done so and that [ ] had expressed surprise that the article had not been appreciated. I told Grogan to make it clear to [ ] that if the article was published his future relations with the Agency would suffer.

Lunch with [ ] and at his request called both [ ] and Stewart on the staff status of [ ] and we arranged to get it instituted immediately.

We also discussed the performance of [ ]

I strongly recommended to [ ] to give the commencement address to the [ ] trainees stress the fact that it is non-political.

**TOP SECRET**



~~TOP SECRET~~

12 March 1958 (cont'd)

25X1

[ ] called on Recommendation 1 (24 Oct 57) and I stressed to him the fact that the misunderstanding apparently still existed on the cost of implementing this recommendation.

-

Told BAIRD about the comment by Helms on the propriety of my remarks to the Clandestine Services Review course.

Also told him that I had discussed the [ ] matter with the people in WH. 25X1

Also asked him whether there is any indication about my giving a talk at the CIC school at Fort Holabird.

-

25X1

Asked WHITE whether formal notice had ever been issued in regard to [ ] He said he didn't think so but to check with Houston. I checked with Houston and he said none had and they are still reviewing the matter.

-

Asked HOUSTON if a board had been set up on [ ] and he said that one was just about to be. 25X1

-

25X1

[ ]

-

[ ] 25X1

-

Mr. Stewarts' office (Valerie) called to say that [ ] would be in O/Personnel following day to convert from SA to SE, and comes on board on 17 March. They anticipate no problems. 25X1

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 13 March 1958

Meeting together with [ ] with the group on the semi-annual report for the President's Board.

25X1

25X1

-

HOUSTON invited me to lunch with [ ] on 25 March.

25X1

-

CASSIDY gave me a brief fill-in on the NSC discussion of the NSCIDs and said that both Hull and Killian felt that the meeting had gone <sup>very</sup> well.

-

CORD MEYER called about the FEC report and I told him it was on the way down.

-

GROGAN dropped in to talk about [ ] request to the Pentagon for release of personnel folders and I advised him that he was also dealing with the OSS archives.

25X1

-

GROGAN also reported that the DCI was apparently worried about good realtions with General Trudeau and evidently now realized that the President was a friend of Trudeau.

GROGAN also commented at some length about sources and methods.

-

BLAKE called about the [ ] cable and I told him it was all taken care of. [ ] also called about it and asked that a copy be forwarded [ ] for Col. Edwards.

25X1

25X1

25X1

-

Saw CABELL and together with him and Truscott went over the minutes of the NSC meeting. We then discussed the TSS survey and IG surveys in general. He commented that he thought that the surveys were going very well and had no suggestions to make. We then discussed [ ] and I told the DDCI that I couldn't use him on surveys or inspections.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

13 March 1958 (cont'd)

Checked with the DCI on a briefing for Trudeau and he said to go ahead and set it up.

-


25X1

[ ] called to report that [ ] talked to COYNE and that the Friendship Airport situation now seemed to be in hand.

25X1

25X1

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-

25X1

25X1

Read a critique of [ ] No. 5 by [ ] a psychiatrist, and suggested to Baird that he talk to [ ]

25X1

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Friday, 14 March 1958

At the Deputies Meeting:

Reported the telephone call from Robert Button, Director of the Voice of America passing on the information that General Sarnoff was concerned because he never had a detailed reply from the DCI on his 35-page letter of December. The DCI was glad that I had brought it up because he knew that he had received a draft reply and that apparently it was his fault that it hadn't been dispatched. I told Button I would call him back and give him some guidance on what to tell Sarnoff.

Suggested that we accelerate the briefing for Mr. Stans because I felt there were several items in the Macy trip that might prejudice him against the agency. The DCI said that he had not yet read the memorandum but would immediately.

Reported that Grogan had talked to [redacted]

25X1

Reported that I had given a lunch for [redacted] and considered that our relations with FBI were in good shape.

25X1

Reported that the Friendship Airport incident was now apparently satisfactorily settled.

Suggested that somebody prepare for the President a memorandum giving him the facts on how leaks occur in the government of the United States. (This went over like a lead balloon.)

-

25X1 [redacted] came down to talk about his copy for the OBI survey and I repeated to him what I had written on the buck slip--that it was badly organized; that it was poorly written; that it represented nothing more than a repeat of his notes; and that it wasn't worth [redacted] time to critique it. I then gave him a short but succinct lecture on how to write, stressing the fact that he should do an outline first and that each paragraph should be carefully arranged and that he should read the material back to himself and perhaps get others to read it simply to discover if the meaning was clear.

25X1


25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

14 March 1958 (cont'd)

25X1



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25X1

-

-

25X1

[redacted] asked if I would check with the NSC now for an extension on the war gaming deadline.

-

25X1



-

COYNE called to point out the forthcoming memorandum by the President directing the merger of IAC and USCIB. I asked him whether Cutler had made it clear at the NSC meeting that the President directed that this had to be done. He said he gathered from Cutler that he had made it clear.

Coyne then asked if we could send him a follow-up to that of ours of November 30 on recommendation 4 of the 24 October series.

-

CASSIDY called to say that he had not sent me a memorandum that the Board had done to the President on the merger of IAC and USCIB but would send it over today.

-

GROGAN asked if I would see Cornelius Ryan who is writing a book for Reader's Digest on D-Day and wanted to find out what OSS was doing that day.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, 17 March 1958

BAIRD called about [ ] and said that he had no objections to my talking to him but he would prefer that I not indicate that I had seen his comments on the course.

25X1

-

Attended DCI's staff meeting.

25X1

-

[ ]

25X1

-

[ ]

-

Attended luncheon for Senator Yarborough.

-

The DCI asked if I would write a short letter to the Secretary of Defense simply volunteering to be of assistance in the matter of the reorganization.

The DCI discussed the [ ] with me and reported to me on a discussion with General Edwin Clarke.

25X1

-

GENERAL HULL called up and said that he had a free hour and would like to be briefed on the [ ] I called Meyer who sent [ ] up and I briefly explained what to cover in the briefing.

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

17 March 1958 (cont'd)

25X1

[ ] called to discuss how to handle [ ] material with him. I suggested that he send it all back and ask him to re-write it. He said he would do over one section to give [ ] the necessary guidance.

25X1

25X1

-

I called WHITE to find out why [ ] had been recommended for re-employment. He said that this was one that had slipped by him but that he would take care of it.

25X1

-

25X1  
25X1

I alerted [ ] that he might get [ ] back and he said that they are crowded inasmuch as [ ] was returning, and asked if I would give him a little advance warning.

25X1

25X1

-

LBKirkpatrick

25X1

rcm

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 18 March 1958

At the IG Staff Meeting:

Reported on the NSC review of the NSCIDs.

Discussed the matter of leaks and the re-issuance of the notice on press contacts.

Reported on the directive by the President to merge IAC and USCIB.

25X1



Announced the National Healthy Agencies drive.


25X1

-



25X1

-



-

25X1



25X1

-



-

BAIRD called to say that he had been under the impression that I was going to arrange for him to brief Fulbright. I said that I had slipped up on this but would try to arrange in in the future.

25X1

-



**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 18 March 1958 (cont' 25X1

[REDACTED]

-

Went to see the CBS 20th Century film on brainwashing.

-

25X1

[REDACTED] called to ask how it happened that I prepared the letter to Fulbright and I told him that the Director had asked me to.

25X1

[REDACTED]

-

25X1

Discussed with [REDACTED] the IAC meeting on the Presidential order to merge the IAC and USCIB. He mentioned that General Lewis had said that he thought the President's Board needed education. He also mentioned that the DCI had told the IAC that this had not been his doing. [REDACTED] also mentioned that he was worried about the DDCI's approach on agreed activities which still seems to be that we do not concern ourselves with the quality of the operations run by other agencies. Finally, [REDACTED] asked if I would check to see if NSCIDs could be sent to the field.

25X1

25X1

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, 19 March 1958

At the Deputies Meeting:

25X1

-

BAIRD dropped in to say that the CSR had evaluated his talk as the most challenging and mine as the most inspiring. He went on to say that he couldn't answer many of the questions that he posed and felt that he was getting a very low calibre/<sup>of</sup> students from the DD/P.

25X1

-

[Redacted]

-

25X1

[Redacted]

-

25X1

[Redacted]

-

GROGAN brought in Cornelius Ryan and a Miss Ward who are doing a book for Reader's Digest on D-Day, and I gave him some contacts who knew about OSS' participation.

-

25X1

[Redacted]

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 20 March 1958

25X1



-

Went to the Princeton lunch club to hear Dean Acheson talk.

-

25X1



Advised WHITE of the letter on



25X1

White asked me if I shouldn't look into the CIA Library as he questioned our buying 12,000 books a year.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Friday, 21 March 1958

Attended the Deputies meeting - raised following items:

25X1 Reported that Col. Cushman in the Vice President's office had called regarding [ ] (he had talked to [ ] who called [ ] who called me), and that I had called Cushman back and gave him a brief run-down on the case; that he was completely satisfied on this subject.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

Reported on the discussion with Cornelius Ryan on his book on D-Day,

Advised that General Hull would see [ ] on 11 April and have lunch with the executive committee of the [ ] that day.

25X1

25X1

-

Called Stewart to ask him to check on the status of the [ ] and also to look into the question of the promotion of [ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ]

-

TIETJEN advised that [ ] had not come to see him.

25X1

-

[ ]

25X1

-

COYNE called concerning the book by William Kintner and asked whether by any chance [ ]

25X1

-

25X1 Asked HOUSTON to have one of his lawyers come over to sit in on the meeting with [ ]

-

[ ]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**Page Denied**

Monday, 24 March 1958

Deputies Meeting - no items.

-

25X1

-

25X1

-

25X1

[ ] called concerning the meeting at [ ] He said 25X1  
that Kent was ill with the flu and asked if I would run the meeting. I told him "yes".

-

ROBERT McCOLLUM called concerning Section 15 of the Immigration  
Law and the number of requests that he was getting from his people to bring in  
refugees of interest to us. He said he would like to have a meeting to straighten  
it out and that he had been dealing principally with [ ] 25X1

-

25X1

GROGAN twice brought in the column the DCI is doing for [ ] 25X1  
[ ] and I assisted in making suggestions.

-

25X1

Lunch with [ ] and Gordon Stewart. (Stewart will  
take the initiative in trying to find something for [ ] to do.) 25X1

25X1

-

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] reported on a telephone call from [ ]  
as a result of which I telephoned [ ] and told him that I was going to 25X1  
advise [ ] his week that he was relieved and urge him to take extensive  
LWOF [ ] straightened out. 25X1  
Approved For Release 2009/01/26 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003300020001-5

TOP SECRET

24 March 1958 (cont'd)

25X1

[redacted]  
(See memorandum to DCI dated 25 March.)

-

25X1

Lloyd GEORGE called to get my advice on whether I thought  
[redacted] would be a good one to head the Scientific Branch. I told him  
that I did.

-

25X1

[redacted] called to ask whether his going on temporary duty in May  
would interfere with our survey of the CI Staff. I told him "no".

LBKirkpatrick

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Tuesday, 25 March 1958

IG staff meeting:

Asked for items for the main portion of the next quarterly report.

Advised of the 28 March meeting of USCIB to consider NSCID-9.

Advised of the combined IAC-USCIB meeting on 22 April.

Advised that the DCI will be away from 28 March until 7 April.

25X1 Reported on the meeting with [ ] regarding the  
25X1 termination of [ ] for refusal to take a directed assignment.

25X1

-

25X1 [ ] called to say that [ ] was down-  
25X1 stairs asking for a sealed envelope which he had left in the safe marked  
"Personal". He asked whether it should be given to him. I consulted  
25X1 Mr. Houston who advised that either [ ] to open the envelope  
25X1 in front of him so he could examine it and see if there were any classified  
25X1 documents, or that [ ] certify in writing that there was nothing classified  
in it.

25X1

25X1

-

25X1 Called HELMS to inquire whether he had heard much comment  
25X1 regarding the [ ] book. He said "no".

25X1 Checked with HELMS as to who should attend the meeting with  
25X1 Robert McCollum and he confirmed that it should be [ ]  
and also suggested [ ]

25X1

-

Gordon STEWART reported that there was progress in getting

25X1

Called BOB BUTTON to tell him that the letter to General Sarnoff  
was on the Director's desk and that Sarnoff's letter had been given full  
consideration and been found to be very useful. He expressed his thanks and



~~TOP SECRET~~

25 March 1958 (cont'd)

25X1

then advised me that Allen had told him that he had to go overseas and offered him the post of public affairs officer under Ambassador Burgess for SHAPE and NATO. He said that his other two alternatives were possibly getting  or going back to NBC.

-

25X1


called to pass on the item of information that a Department of Agriculture employee with whom he is in a car pool told him. This fellow is very active in the Federal Workers Union and said that they handled "a lot" of our cases.

-

Attended lunch given by the General Counsel for Mr. J. Lee Rankin, Solicitor General of the United States.

25X1

-



LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, 26 March 1958

At the Deputies meeting:

25X1 Pointed out that the book by Kintner and Coffey, entitled "Forging the Sword," was creating consternation in the NSC. I advised that this had been financed by Carnegie, not by ourselves.

Reported on the dispatch from [ ] regarding the briefings of Conolly. 25X1

25X1 Reported that the Board of Editors of "Studies in Intelligence" was meeting at [ ] this weekend and asked if anybody had any comment. The DCI said "yes", he didn't like the Harvardian english in the lead of the article that had been written for him.

Told the DCI about the model building that Time, Inc. had built in order to work out their space problems.

25X1 The DCI asked that I remind him to talk to [ ] about [ ] 25X1

25X1 The DCI asked that I get for him the commendation of [ ] [ ]

25X1 [ ] briefed me on the meeting on [ ] and I advised him that I thought White was going to send the Navy a noncommittal reply. 25X1

25X1 [ ] called to say he wanted to talk to me about

25X1 The DCI buzzed me and at his request I briefed GROGAN concerning [ ] Grogan called later to say that he had heard from Ben Mandell as going to see the Vice President so I called Col. Cushman and 25X1 gave him [ ]'s background.

At the DCI's request, attended a large luncheon for [ ] Earl Newsom, Richard Condon and Richard Greenlee. 25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

26 March 1958 (cont'd)

HOUSTON buzzed me later about getting a job for [ ] and 25X1  
we agreed that this should be put on Gordon Stewart.

25X1

-



-

COYNE called to needle me on the comments on Recommendation 4.

-

Mr. KLEINERMAN of CBS came in to talk about the proposal that  
they do an item for next year on OSS. I suggested he talk to [ ] 25X1  
and said I would write [ ] about it and Grogan referred him to Mr. Baruch  
in the Army Pictorial Service.

25X1


LBKirkpatrick

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 27 March 1958

25X1



-

25X1

[redacted] called to say that [redacted] didn't know where to locate the OSS films. I told Grogan this and asked him to follow through.

25X1

-

Lunch with Jim Critchfield.

-

25X1

[redacted] brought in the memorandum from McCabe at the White House saying that the letter prepared on [redacted] was inadequate and I suggested that he get it immediately to [redacted]

25X1

-

COYNE called to ask whether the Roosevelt listed in Gulf Oil was ours and I told him of Kermit's departure.

-

Attended meeting of Career Council at which we gave general approval to the proposal for a new wage plan.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

Friday, 28 March 1958

At the Deputies Meeting:

Raised the Warren Unna article and the DCI asked that I work with Grogan on something that might be done to respond to this.

-

BISSELL dropped in after the Deputies meeting to express his great concern that the agency might be losing the support of the liberal democrats who he felt would be in control of the next Congress.

-

25X1 Asked [ ] to bring up the material on recommendation 4, and got Coyne's agreement to postpone the reply until Monday.

-

25X1 Left for [ ] at 1330 and presided over meeting of Board of Editors of "Studies in Intelligence", from 1900 to 2400.

Saturday, 29 March 1958

25X1 Presided over meeting of Board of Editors of "Studies in Intelligence" at [ ] from 0900 to 1200 and 1400 to 1630, at which time returned.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Monday, 31 March 1958

BAIRD called to ask about my opinion of Edwards work and I told him I thought it was excellent.

-

BAIRD called again to say that he had heard from [ ] that [ ] had written a 60-page report on Training but that it might not get past Dr. Tietjen.

25X1

25X1

-

[ ]

25X1

-

Talked to Scoville and Amory about recommendation 4 and asked Amory to put me on the distribution list of the Critical Collection Committee.

-

AMORY advised me that [ ] was going to extend for a year

25X1

25X1

[ ]

25X1

-

[ ] called to tell me that Helms was writing to [ ] He also voiced serious objections to the proposed new methods and sizes for regulations and asked that I look into it.

25X1

-

Lunch with J. C. King.

-

[ ]

25X1

-

LLOYD called concerning the thesis that [ ] had done at the Air College and I suggested that either Houston or myself call him and tell him that the paper was so full of errors and came to such faulty conclusions that if submitted it would reflect most adversely upon both himself and the agency.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

31 March 1958 (cont'd)

GROGAN called concerning Unna and I told him I would call him back when I had done something.

-

Advised COYNE that the report on recommendation 4 was enroute and to please guard the annexes with his life.

-

25X1 Doctor  came in to say goodbye . (See memorandum for the record, this date.)

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 1 April 1958

At the IG Staff Meeting:

Advised of the rejection by Defense of the modified NSCID-9.

Mentioned Col. White's concern at the fact that we bought 12,000 books for the library last year, and that his office was charged [ ] for books even though they received none.

25X1

Mentioned the fact that Col. White would be in Europe for the next ten weeks and Gates Lloyd would be Acting DD/S.

-

[ ] dropped in to once again express his concern over the DDCI's views that CIA has no authority to reject clandestine operations for other agencies.

25X1

-

HOUSTON called to ask me to lunch with [ ]

25X1

Houston also advised that he had received a copy of the bill for a new space agency. He said that he had discussed it with Bissell and Scoville and asked if I had any idea of who might have drafted it. I said that I was quite sure that [ ] could give him this information.

25X1

-

Lunch with [ ]. I asked him about [ ] acceptability in the DD/P area and the only light he could shed on it was that [ ] had not rejected [ ] as a candidate for the temporary duty in [ ] (I later advised [ ] of this.)

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] said that he is eager to find a new assignment for [ ] and has advised Helms and Wisner that [ ] is no longer acceptable as chief of the African branch.

25X1

25X1

-

[ ] advised that the agency had purchased 16 copies of [ ] book which he thought would satisfy the demand. I said I did not think he should buy any more.

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET



Tuesday, 1 April 1958 (cont'd)

25X1 GUTHE called about the semi-annual report to the President's Board  
and said that [ ] had relayed the information to him that he thought something  
should be included about the value of sources. After a long and rambling  
dissertation by Guthe, we agreed that this should be an indication of what the  
most valuable source was which could be least well done without.

-

25X1 [ ] dropped in for a lengthy discussion of his problems in the  
25X1 [ ] case. He said that he had been having considerable difficulties in  
getting the full information on this and had received less than good cooperation  
from IO.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Wednesday, 2 April 1958

No deputies meeting.

-

25X1

called to arrange an appointment.

25X1

-

[Redacted]

-

25X1

[Redacted]

-

At GROGAN's request and in the absence of the Director, called Jack Beale of Time. Beale said that he was working on a speech that Mrs. Luce was going to give at Princeton and had been hopeful that the DCI could shed some light on why there were more foreign service officers from Princeton than from any other University, excluding graduate schools. I told him about Woodrow Wilson's statement of Princeton in the nation's service and also of the SPIA, for which he expressed due appreciation.

25X1

-

[Redacted]

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

2 April 1958 (cont'd) 25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] also advised me that they had followed through on  
[REDACTED] lead that the government workers union had received complaints  
from CIA personnel and had been unable to uncover anything. We discussed  
methods of following through on this and considered the possibility of using  
[REDACTED] to make a direct approach to the union as Fair Employment Officer.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, 4 April 1958

25X1

CASSIDY called to ask if I would send a cable to [ ] advising them that Lawrence would be in the former on the 19th and 20th and the latter on 26th and 27th of April. Cassidy also stated that at the 25 April meeting the Board would like to hear from us on the Baker report; that they will hear from Samford on the same subject; and that Conolly and Hull will report on their trips. I told Cassidy we are looking into the problem of State Department pouches and that for the time being we are sending everything by Top Secret pouch because we found out that the Secret pouches were unescorted.

-

Went over the OBI survey with [ ]

25X1

-

25X1

25X1

25X1

-

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

I called [ ] about the possibility of an assignment for [ ] and he said he would mention it to J. C. King. He called back later to say that J. C. had talked to [ ] about it and that no decision had been reached because it was indefinite when [ ] was coming back.

-

I called Coyne and asked him for an extension on the action on recommendation 3 (of 20 Dec 56 group) -- war gaming -- from mid-July, and he said that he didn't think it was worthwhile requesting it now but that it would be looked upon with favor if we asked for it at the time. I also asked if we could send NSCID's overseas and he said he would check and let me know. He then reported on a meeting of the audio counter measures committee where CIA had been represented by [ ] who he had told to take up a certain matter with me. He said if I didn't hear from them shortly to let him know and he would needle them.

25X1

-

Congressman Clair Engle called to say that he would like to come down to lunch some time in June, after the primary.

25X1

[ ]

~~TOP SECRET~~

4 April 1958

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

Advised [REDACTED] that he was being placed on leave. (See memorandum for the record.)

25X1

Told [REDACTED] that I felt that his primary work should be in the field of individual cases, the Employment Review Board, and back-stopping me on the career service council. I said he seemed handicapped in the surveys and he agreed. He said that he didn't specifically like personnel work and indicated that if [REDACTED] were ever open he would like it.

25X1

Talked to [REDACTED] about his career and advised him that Helms would let me know in the next week.

Advised the DDCI of the action in regard to [REDACTED] and he said he could do nothing but confirm this action.

25X1

Asked ANGLETON if he knew of any [REDACTED] and he said "no".

25X1

Doctor Tietjen advised on his discussion with [REDACTED] at which he told him to get medical treatment and advised him that we would determine his future with the agency only after that had taken place.

25X1

LBKirkpatrick

**Page Denied**

Monday, 7 April 1958

At the Deputies meeting:

Advised of Warren Unna's inquiry to one of our employees about the notice on contacts with the press.

DCI asked that I come up with some recommendation on what to do with the Harper's article.


Received the DCI's approval for the unclassified section of "Studies in Intelligence" and he agreed that it should not be passed to foreign intelligence services, but that individual articles upon request might be cleared for passage.

Called attention to the Bob Hope program and the DCI indicated a desire to see it. (Asked Grogan to try and get the film for reproduction.)


-  
HOUSTON called to say that [ ] had explained his thesis as coming exclusively from overt sources and not representing his views. 25X1

25X1

-



-



25X1

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 April 1958 (cont'd)

COYNE called concerning the President's Board recommendations and said he was going to suggest to Cutler that the DCI be asked to indicate progress on old recommendations (20 Dec 56 group) 2 and 4 within six months.

-

25X1

Lunch with

[redacted]

-

25X1

[redacted] called to set up a meeting on my clandestine collection paper.

-

25X1

[redacted] called to ask if HULL would be here for the 22 April meeting of USCIB and IAC.

-

25X1

[redacted] called to ask whether I had any more ideas on a job for

-

KENT called to ask me to see [redacted] about some ideas he had on the foreign service mid-career training course.

25X1

-

25X1

BLAKE called

[redacted]

-

25X1

[redacted] and I went over the OBI survey.

-

25X1

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, 8 April 1958

25X1

[REDACTED]

-

25X1

HELMS called [REDACTED] and said he would like a few more days to work on this. I said that I consider the important factor here is coming up with a specific job offer for some date in the future as an indication that he was wanted back in the clandestine services. I said that I considered him a valuable employee who should not be lost if we could avoid it.

-

25X1

[REDACTED]

-

Luncheon with Mr. Robert McCollum of State.

-

25X1

[REDACTED]

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 10 April 1958

25X1

[ ] came down to ask whether I had heard any further developments on his future and I told him "no".

25X1

[ ] AMORY called up to ask whether we had any record of Frances who, according to a friend of his, was representing himself as working for CIA. I said I would check and let him know.

BAIRD called up to read me a highly laudatory letter from Cmdr. Asher about OFC-12. I told him I would use it in my talk.

25X1

Asked [ ] to take care of the Bob Hope film in my absence.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] Met with the DCI and briefed him on the latest developments of the case. He approved of our recommended action.

25X1

[ ] dropped in during this discussion and we advised him of our plans, with which he agreed.

We also discussed with him the Warren Unna article and he said Mr. Hoover had described this as "junk".

Told the DCI I wanted to ask Hugh Cumming over to lunch to discuss the OBI survey.

Showed the DCI the memorandum on a talk to the American Society for Industrial Security. He said to check with Grogan.

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

10 April 1958 (cont'd)

Discussed the matter of scholarships for CIA personnel with the DCI and he authorized me to proceed with this subject.

-

Suggested to DCI that we might persuade the President to write a brief article for "Studies in Intelligence". He was enthusiastic.

-

Mentioned to the DCI the [ ] and he said to get ahold of Kermit Roosevelt and to try and get our records correct. 25X1

-

Advised DCI of status of [ ] 25X1

-

25X1 [ ] brought down our comments on the Bureau of the Budget report. 25X1

-

[ ]

-

25X1 Drove to [ ] and delivered commencement address to OFC-13.

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, 11 April 1958

25X1

At [ ] took an inspection trip around the base and discussed with the staff the possibilities of a DCI visit. Returned to Washington approximately 1500.

-

25X1

Went over with [ ] the TSS comments on the [ ] part of the survey and also the DD/I survey. 25X1

-

The DCI buzzed to ask if I would review some books on Communist fronts.

25X1

-

[ ]

-

25X1

25X1

Talked to [ ] of Training and Gates Lloyd about the fact that [ ] had not been advised of the rents to be charged on the housing and Logistics had had one year in which to come up with these figures and that I thought it was a damn disgrace that they had not done so.

-

ANGLETON called to express great concern about the I & NS legislation which might give them the authority to conduct name checks.

LBKirkpatrick

Saturday, 12 April 1958

25X1

Meeting with the DCI and J. C. KING to discuss a projected trip to [ ] which the DCI thought was unwise at this time.

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

Monday, 14 April 1958

CABELL buzzed to ask if the April 25 date was firm for a Board meeting. I said that it was and asked if he wished me to try and get a particular time for the DCI because of a conflict with the DDCI. He said "no".

25X1                      Talked to Stewart, [ ] case and 25X1  
got the papers on the case from [ ] before they had reached the Director.

25X1                      [ ] came in to talk about the coordination problems. I also told  
him that COYNE had said if we asked in July for an extension of the deadline  
on recommendation 3 (of 20 Dec 56 group) we would get it and that he was  
checking on sending NSCIDs abroad.

25X1                      BAIRD called to ask if I had found out if the DCI would go to  
[ ] He also said that possibly OTR was partly to blame on the houses.

25X1

25X1

25X1                      Saw Morton B. Jackson, regional director of I & NS, together with  
[ ], and arranged that they should further discuss a means for  
Jackson to get information from us on [ ]

Called COYNE on the Rockefeller report and he said he would send over some material.

Also reminded him to check on our sending the NSCIDs overseas.

25X1                      Worked over the [ ] We agreed that we would 25X1  
persuade the Director not to sign the termination order.

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

14 April 1958 (cont'd)

25X1

Lunch with [ ] (See memorandum for the record.)

25X1

While talking with him checked with [ ] ; Lloyd and Baird  
on [ ] and Grogan on [ ]

25X1

-

25X1

25X1

[ ]

Security called to say that the I & NS liaison man  
had been trying to find out who over here had seen [ ] Told him not to

25X1

25X1

tell I & NS and advised [ ]

-

25X1

[ ]

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

[REDACTED]

Tuesday, 15 April 1958

25X1

IG Staff meeting; [REDACTED] also attended.

-

Talked to Gordon Stewart about [REDACTED] and also advised him that we wanted to work out a procedure on selection outs. 25X1

-

COYNE advised me that NSC action 1685, approved 17 March 1957, reiterated the practice of limited dissemination of NSCIDs [REDACTED] 25X1

-

Discussion of the President's Board with CASSIDY and he asked

25X1

[REDACTED]

-

DCI asked for items that Killian might be taking up with him on the President's Board; send him a suggested agenda.

-

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] called to say they were sending up some comments on [REDACTED] letter. He also asked if I would be host to a luncheon for twelve [REDACTED].

25X1

Lunch with [REDACTED]

-

Tom BAILEY of State came over to discuss the [REDACTED] case and said that they were about ready to turn the files over to us as soon as Mr. Herter approved. 25X1

-

25X1

[REDACTED]

**TOP SECRET**

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, 16 April 1958

At the Deputies Meeting:

25X1

Advised the DCI that he might get a call from Herter on [REDACTED]

Set up the Bob Hope film for 1030 Saturday morning.

Pointed out the item in the New York Times that Soviet visas were now available within seven days.

25X1  
25X1

Advised that [REDACTED] was now in the Veterans Hospital

Recommended that the DCI not give [REDACTED] any satisfaction.

25X1

Discussed the Communist Front books. The DCI asked that I follow through on this and meet with IO, Grogan and [REDACTED]

25X1

OGC

DCI also asked that I undertake a study of what use, if any, could be made of general officers who applied to the agency.

FOIAB5

-

25X1

-

I asked DCI to go down to [REDACTED] and he agreed to; I advised his office of the dates.

25X1

-

Together with Baird and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and told them our ideas on scholarships.

25X1

25X1

25X1

-

25X1

25X1

25X1

Called [REDACTED] and advised Amory's office that we had no record.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

16 April 1958 (cont'd)

25X1

or not.

called me to ask whether the Director had agreed to speak

OGC

FOIAB5

25X1

[Redacted]

Attended PRC meeting on Character and Level.

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Thursday, 17 April 1958

25X1

-  
BAIRD called on the May 15 date for the DCI to go to [ ]

-  
DCI buzzed to ask if I would look over certain books on  
Communist front organizations and consult with Grogan and IO.

25X1

-  
Met with [ ] Grogan and [ ] concerning  
methods for publication of [ ], See memorandum to  
DCI dated 17 April 1958.

25X1

25X1

25X1

-  
Talked to LLOYD about the trip to [ ] my discussion  
with Houston and Stewart on appeals; also the Macy report and the desire to  
keep the Director from answering too precipitously .

25X1

-  
Lunch with [ ]

-  
Meeting with [ ] (See memorandum for the record.)

-  
Also talked to following: [ ] Stewart; [ ]

25X1

25X1  
and [ ]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, 18 April 1958

Met with Gates LLOYD and discussed with him the problem of the psychiatric staff. He agreed to call in Tietjen and ask whether it was true that he had established himself as head of the psychiatric division.

-

At the Deputies meeting the DCI discussed the agenda for the President's Board meetings. He asked the DDCI to cover NSCID-9 and agreed activities, and the SA/DP/DCI to cover Aquatone. He asked that I ask General Cassidy as to whether the Macy report might come up.

-

The DCI asked that I make a practice of calling to the attention of the staff meeting any articles that might appear in the public press concerning CIA.

-

25X1 Met with the DCI, DDCI, DD/S and COP regarding the resignation of [ ] and the disintegration of the Psychiatric Division. It was agreed that initially Lloyd would follow through with Tietjen and that I would review the case and recommend action to be taken.

-

[ ]

25X1

-

Review of the FE survey.

-

Called Hugh Cumming and asked him to lunch to discuss the NIS program.

-

25X1 Asked [ ] to lunch and to see the DCI.

-

25X1 [ ] called to ask for clarification on the type of article that was wanted for the Studies in Intelligence.

-

~~TOP SECRET~~

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

*April*  
Monday, 21 ~~June~~ 1958

Attended Deputies meeting.

-

At General Truscott's request sat in on the briefing of the DCI regarding the combined meeting of USCIB and IAC.

-

Host at lunch for two lve members of the

25X1

-

General Cassidy came over to talk about the President's Board meeting. (See memorandum to the Director.)

-

DCI asked that I get a memorandum on  for his meeting on April 29 with

25X1

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 22 April 1958

IG Staff meeting.

-

Discussed with [ ] the OBI survey.

25X1

-

[ ]

-

CASSIDY dropped in to say that he thought the combined meeting had gone well but felt Amory had asked a stupid question.

-

COYNE called to say that he felt the meeting had gone all right but that perhaps a mistake had been made in not making the President's position more clear.

-

Lunch with [ ]

25X1

-

[ ]

-

[ ] came over to go over forthcoming items on the career council agenda.

LBKirkpatrick

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

Wednesday, 23 April 1958

25X1

[ ] came in to say that he had made up his mind to pick apples, but that his wife hadn't yet agreed.

-

LLOYD reported that he had discussed the psychiatric division matter with Tietjen and would send a memorandum for the record.

-

Stewart called to say that [ ] was being selected out.

25X1

-

PRC meeting on the SR division.

-

Met with DCI on agenda for President's Board.

25X1

-

[ ]

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, 24 April 1958

25X1

[ ] came over to wait for [ ] but he never appeared.<sup>25X1</sup>

-

Asked HELMS for suggestions as to where accomplishments of the clandestine services could be obtained. He suggested the semi-annual report to the President's Board.

-

Told BISSELL that DCI wanted him to talk about Aquatone and he said there were certainly policy matters that had to be taken care of and he would talk to the DCI about it.

-

[ ]

25X1

-

25X1

BAIRD came in to review the program set up for the DCI at [ ] to which I agreed and asked that he send a copy to the Director.

-

Bob THAYER came over to say that he had been assigned by Cummings to be a trouble shooter and asked my thoughts. I said I felt we should straighten out our financial support and that I considered the work of State in support of estimates to be important and good; the NIS work satisfactory; and the current intelligence work an area of major duplication.

-

25X1

Lunch with [ ] who had little to add to his previous discussion except that he had been told by Tietjen not to talk to Col. White as it would just create difficulties and consequently he had never seen White during the three-month period between his resignation and his last day of work. He said he did not know why I [ ] was not coming on board. He said the views expressed in his memorandum were those of his entire staff.

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~



**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 24 April (cont'd)

25X1

Talked to [ ] who indicated that he might be asked to negotiate with the Russians on TV exchanges.

-

25X1

Both [ ] called to needle me on the questions before the Director on the [ ].

25X1

-

25X1  
25X1

[ ] and [ ] called to say that they had not been able to contact [ ] to suggest that we drop the matter.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, 25 April 1958

At the DCI meeting briefed the Director on the latest developments including Cassidy's call about the employment of retired officers and the fact that the critical collection problems might come up.

-

Meeting with the President's Board. (See memorandum for the record.)

25X1

-

At my request, Karamessines came up to talk about the FI/PD work shop when they had 16 weekly meetings with the psychiatric division. His general conclusions were that [ ] was better able to get the points across than [ ] and that he frankly did not understand what the psychiatrists were talking about most of the time and disagreed with their constant endeavor to turn each session into a group therapy meeting.

25X1

25X1

-

At the DCI's request had SHELDON look up and then send to Killian the UP item on the statement of the Russian scientists at the Brussels fair regarding the next Soviet sputnik.

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, 28 April 1958

At the DCI's meeting:

25X1 Asked who was taking care of [ ] request  
to go see the H-bomb tests. The DCI said he had spoken to [ ] about 25X1  
it and asked [ ] to get IO to prepare a formal letter and also a justifi-  
cation.

25X1 Also asked the DCI if there was any urgency on the publica-  
tion of the [ ] and he said no. Informed [ ] of both of the 25X1  
above items.

25X1 [ ] called from Philadelphia to say that he would be 25X1  
back on Thursday. I talked to CAREY and [ ] about it and they 25X1  
are considering putting him either in the [ ]

Called TIETJEN and asked him to come to lunch on Thursday  
to discuss the psychiatric program.

CASSIDY came over to discuss the meeting of the President's  
Board. (See memorandum for the record.)

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 29 April 1958

Asked AMORY to set up a briefing for Ryerson, but it later developed that he had been fully briefed on all substantive matters when he was in Washington last week. So I talked to [ ] about it and he agreed that they could send a man to [ ] who could cover all of the security aspects.

25X1

25X1

AMORY asked me to include [ ] on the CUMMINGS lunch, but Cummings cancelled and there was no lunch.

25X1

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, 30 April 1958

25X1

[ ] buzzed to say that if the Director was reluctant to sign the letter to Blake that he thought one from me would suffice.

-

CASSIDY called and I told him that I was suggesting that Mr. Ryerson not bother to come to Washington on Friday inasmuch as we could accomplish the same thing by sending a man to Chicago.

-

Attended Deputies meeting; raised no items.

25X1

-

[ ]

-

25X1

25X1

Saw the DCI and he signed the letter to [ ] read the memorandum<sup>25X1</sup> on the President's Board; received the memorandum that Baird wrote for his trip to [ ] said he hadn't had a chance to read "Studies in Intelligence" yet; and asked that I alert WE to alert [ ]<sup>25X1</sup>

[ ]

-

[ ]

25X1

-

[ ]

25X1

-

25X1

[ ] came in to say that the Director's responsibilities in regard to the clandestine services were the same as General Samford's in regard to NSA activities.

-

COYNE called and I told him that I would try to get the comments on recommendation no. 4 (of 24 Oct 57) over to him ssonest.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

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30 April 1958

Coyne also said he had had a call from [ ] and that they had consulted Houston, which was satisfactory to him. 25X1

-  
Called PAUL O'NEILL at State and asked him to lunch; also asked him to find out from State the names of some Princetonians who were experts on [ ] 25X1  
He called back to add the name of Allen Lightner to the ones we discussed and to advise that David Bruce would be in the United States at that time.

-  
25X1 Called [ ] and asked that he send me the Council of Europe's  
25X1 report on [ ]; also if they would prepare a memorandum on the [ ] 25X1  
to go to the Board.

-  
25X1 PAUL BOREL called to ask if I had heard from the DD/P concerning the  
five copies of [ ] had asked for. I told him  
I would talk to Helms who had said he would take care of it and suggested that the  
library go back to SE and see if they would withdraw their request.

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

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**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 1 May 1958

GATES LLOYD called to ask whether [ ] should do anything about looking at the Inland Steel building in Chicago and we agreed that he might just as well look but that it wouldn't have any any affect on our building. 25X1

-

Lunch with TIETJEN and a lengthy discussion of the psychiatric program.  
(See memorandum for the record, this date.)

25X1

-

Meeting of the staff to discuss selection out with the decision that [ ] would prepare the paper for discussion with Mr. Houston and Mr. Stewart.

-

25X1

[ ] dropped in and we had a general discussion of his future and I carefully reiterated that he would have to stop drinking or his career with the agency was over.

LBKirkpatrick

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Friday, 2 May 1958

Attended Deputies' Meeting.

EDWARDS came in to discuss his European trip.

25X1

Meeting with [ ]  
to discuss my paper on Clandestine Collection.

Lunch with LAWRENCE HOUSTON.

Meeting on selection out with HOUSTON, STEWART, [ ] We reached a  
general agreement on procedures which STEWART will write up and circulate.

25X1

[ ] called to ask if I had seen the Nuclear War paper that his  
reserve group had done. I told him that I had.

Talked to WISNER about [ ] and he said he would call him in and  
give him hell about his article in Esquire.

EDWARDS called to ask if I had seen what the Pope had said about the  
polygraph. I told him no and he said he would send over a paper which he had  
prepared on the subject.

COYNE called about NSCID #7 and Recommendation #4. I gave him the status  
of the replies.

GROGAN came in and we agreed that WISNER would be the appropriate one to  
call in HOBGING to tell him how damaging we thought his latest article in  
Esquire was; I suggested to him that we make a book out of the DCI's speeches;  
we discussed the possible assignment for [ ]; I told him about the  
talk at [ ] and the general reaction and he advised me that there was con-  
siderable resentment in the lower ranks of the Army because they felt CIA  
looked down its nose at them; he asked me to read the book, "The Counterfeit  
Traitor," and be prepared to discuss it with somebody from Hollywood who is  
making a movie out of it.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

R

Tuesday, 6 May 1958

**IG Staff Meeting.**

25X1 [ ] called concerning [ ] career designation and also said 25X1  
25X1 that he was going to transfer [ ] right back to Contact Division.

25X1 [ ] of Security called to say that they would check on the people 25X1  
who might be involved in working on any production about [ ]

25X1 GROGAN called about [ ]

Called MICKEY LADD to advise him I was sorry to say the Director would  
not be able to speak to his organization in September.

25X1 Advised [ ] of the meeting with [ ] 25X1  
25X1

[ ]

25X1 [ ] came down to advise me of the Director's thoughts on the letter  
to DAVID SARNOFF.

25X1 EDWARDS called about [ ] s allegations.

Meeting of PRC on EE Division.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Wednesday, 7 May 1958

[REDACTED]

25X1

CASSIDY called to say that the BAKER COMMITTEE was meeting on the 14th of May and would like to meet with any members of USCIB that had any questions concerning their report.

25X1 [REDACTED] came up to discuss [REDACTED]'s proposal for the Veterans of Strategic Services and took an almost completely negative view on the proposal. I told him that I did not think he could stop it by taking a negative view and he seemed a little more amenable.

25X1

25X1 CASSIDY called to say that one of GEN. HULL's reactions on his trip to [REDACTED] was that he felt that military commanders had received less than the full and proper information on the plans and intentions of current operations.

Lunch with PAUL O'NEILL who is now working on the exchange program in State.

Chaired PRC which dealt with the WE Division.

25X1

[REDACTED]

COYNE called and said that they were planning to set a 15 June deadline for revision of NSCID #7 and the submission of the report on Critical Intelligence; that the DCI was to see the President next week after the NSC meeting on NSCID #8; that he was checking on NSC action 1833-B concerning Comparative Estimates and asked whether the Director's letter to GEN. TWINING was the last communication on this, I told him that it was; that there would be a new Baker Committee report prepared sometime in the Fall.

25X1 [REDACTED] called to report on a visit to brief RYERSON in Chicago. He said RYERSON suggested (1) that CIA brief his entire group; (2) that CIA look at his report before publication; (3) he asked whether he could take the book, "Inside Russia," with him; (4) he wanted to know whether there was any restriction in the use of cameras; and (5) would I agree with his telling the newspaper men going with him that either they should agree to what conditions he wanted to put on their writing or that they would not go with him.

25X1 [REDACTED] head of ELINT Staff, was leaving the Agency.

[REDACTED] was asking to return to the Agency.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 8 May 1958

25X1

Called CASSIDY to ask him about the RYERSON briefing and he said to go ahead and set it up directly. [REDACTED]

25X1

GATES LLOYD called me about the Appropriations Committee hearings and asked if I would prepare a brief statement on the recommendations of the Clark and Doolittle Committees.

25X1

Lunch with [REDACTED]

Met with the DCI, DDCI, [REDACTED] and we briefly discussed the allegations by [REDACTED].

25X1

25X1

Met with [REDACTED] and the FE Survey team to discuss [REDACTED] reactions on his trip.

25X1

25X1

BAIRD called.

25X1

[REDACTED] came over to say he would appreciate my keeping in mind the possibility of a job for him either on this staff or overseas.

**TOP SECRET**

Friday, 9 May 1958

At the Deputies Meeting reported on the proposed discussion with the BAKER COMMITTEE and the IAC; advised that DARDEN and HULL were planning jointly to look into the Planning Staff of the [redacted] reported on the briefing of Mr. RYERSON and of his questions concerning cameras inside Russia, briefing of the rest of the steel group, and how to handle newsmen.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] called and said that he had requested a reassignment.

25X1

J. C. KING called and said that he was going to [redacted] and had I heard from [redacted] I said "no."

25X1

25X1

[redacted] came in and said he would like to come with the IG Staff. I said that he should tell J. C. KING this and I would take care of the rest.

Meeting with ANGLETON, [redacted] to discuss how we plan to conduct the CI survey.

25X1

25X1

Lunch with DR. TIETJEN.

Meeting in DDCI's office on USCIB.

**TOP SECRET**

Monday, 12 May 1958

Attended DCI meeting at which he asked me to take up the matter of

[redacted]

[redacted] talked to me about his future career and asked if I had any idea of what the Director had in mind. I said I didn't and suggested that the best way to handle this was for him to ask the Director and try to get a decision while he was here.

Asked [redacted] to send over whatever details they had on the [redacted] case. 25X1

Called PAUL O'NEILL about the briefing for MR. RYERSON and GUY CORRIGAN called back to report that one had already been set up for the 20th, and the Department of State would prefer that others not receive same security briefing.

[redacted]

[redacted] on separate occasions came in to talk about the combined IAC-USCIB meetings and their general reactions to what had happened.

Lunch with [redacted]

[redacted] stopped in and discussed briefly his work. 25X1

[redacted]

[redacted] came up to discuss his career and ask whether I thought he should move to the DD/P area. I told him I thought this would be impossible and that I thought he ought to find out just exactly where his future went in the DD/I area, and that if it was not to his liking, the only alternative I could suggest was to get out of the Agency.

**TOP SECRET**

✓

Tuesday, 13 May 1958

25X1

[ ] called to report another request from MACY for the survey on  
FE Division and told me that he had turned him down.

25X1

IG staff meeting.

25X1

[ ] of WE called to make certain suggestions in my talk to [ ]

BAIRD called.

GROGAN came in to discuss the report written by somebody in Army Special  
Operations which went greatly into the psychological warfare field. We agreed  
that the Agency would take the position that this should not be published. 25X1



Discussion with GEN. TRUSCOTT on NSCID #1.

25X1

Talked to [ ] EDWARDS; HELMS; GROGAN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

R

Wednesday, 14 May 1958

CASSIDY called about DR. BAKER and I told him that I would alert the proper people to meet with the BAKER COMMITTEE at that time.

Attended Deputies' Meeting.

25X1 [ ] of CI Staff, who is being selected out, came in to see me and sat in on the meeting. We told him that his appeal at this time was premature and that we would take it up at the proper time.

25X1 [ ] called and I told him we would list his house for him.

25X1 [ ] advised me that his wife had been hospitalized.

CASSIDY advised that ALLYN COLE had circularized the USCIB and that a meeting had been set up with DR. BAKER.

[ ]

25X1

Thursday, 15 May 1958

GEN. CASSIDY called.

MR. HOUSTON called.

MR. WISNER called.

25X1 MR. BAILEY came over from STATE to say they were ready to open the [ ] files to us and I called [ ] and asked him if he would make the necessary arrangements. 25X1

Lunch with CORD MEYER.

Friday, 16 May 1958

25X1

Drove to West Virginia due to death of uncle.

[ ]

**TOP SECRET**

Monday, 19 May 1958

25X1

Raised no items at the Deputies' Meeting.

EDWARDS advised me of a security investigation he had done concerning TSS work and asked me if he could send it over for me to look at prior to deciding whether to give it to

BAIRD came in to express grave concern over a move which he understood had started to give the responsibility for assigning JOTs to the career panels. We discussed this at length and I assured him that I would endeavor to support his position.

Lunch with

Tuesday, 20 May 1958

25X1

IG staff meeting.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 20 May 1958 (con't)

25X1 [ ] called and said that HAROLD LAWRENCE had called him and asked  
to see him, but he didn't know whether in this instance LAWRENCE was represent-  
ing KILLIAN or the President's Board. I told him that I didn't know either  
25X1 and advised him of LAWRENCE's trip with [ ] on ELINT and the BAKER 25X1  
25X1 recommendations. [ ] said that LAWRENCE had mentioned [ ] and our  
base there.

The DCI called me in and asked me to prepare an outline for him for a  
presentation tomorrow at 3:00 P.M. to the combined CIA subcommittees of  
Senate Armed Services and Appropriations. (See outline of presentation)

CASSIDY called and said he wanted to keep me advised of developments  
and that he and GEN. HULL were scheduled to see WISNER tomorrow at 10:00 A.M.  
This was later changed to 2:00 P.M.

COYNE called to discuss NSCID #8. He questioned the recommendation  
that this be considered by less than the full NSC, but ultimately came around  
to agree with this recommendation. He also questioned issuing this before  
the new #1 but I stressed that it was felt here that this would assist in  
implementing the new #1 and he questioned the lack of inclusion of ELINT.  
I said that I felt that it was the philosophy here that these things should  
be taken gradually and evolved.

25X1 HELMS called me to say that J. C. King had received a letter at his home  
from [ ] asking that [ ] be removed and that 25X1  
25X1 his question to me was whether there was another assignment in the Agency  
for [ ] I told him that I didn't think there was another assignment  
for him, that his work on my staff had been unsatisfactory, which J.C. knew  
25X1 at the time that he took him, that I had received several indications that  
he had performed very badly in [ ], and that he was generally held in  
low repute by his associates in the Division. HELMS said in view of this  
that he would tell KING to withdraw him and get rid of him.

KARAMESSINES called to advise that he was sending up the material that  
WISNER had used before the House Appropriations Committee to assist me in  
preparing the material for the Director for the Senate Committee.

25X1 [ ] to fill me in on the details  
of Communications for the Director's briefing.

25X1 [ ] came up to say hello and said they wanted to  
thank me for all the support they got from headquarters following my visit.

COYNE called on Recommendation #4 and we agreed that he should set up  
a meeting with the President for CUTLER and the DCI for 29 May.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Wednesday, 21 May 1958

At the DCI's meeting he asked that I include in the material for the Senate Armed Services briefing a table on our personnel strengths going back several more years, a statement of the major recommendations of the President's Board, and an indication of how much communications work we do for others and where we have provided the only communications available to the Government during crises. He also asked that I check the Budget figure that was incorrect. I suggested to him that he not use the personnel chart and that he possibly use the pictures in Mr. WISNER's book on the Soviet air field and rocket installation. I also urged that he take along the Deputies to back stop him at this meeting.

At the DCI's meeting advised of COL. ROCKMAN's (of the Army IG Staff) looking into the [ ] case, of my discussion with [ ] of [ ] criticism of the Agency and my intention to have him to lunch, and of the meeting with the President on May 29th on Recommendation #4.

BISSELL advised that there was no PRC and urged me to enjoin the Director to be careful about the project on ARC.

Called STEWART for the personnel figures at 10:45 and [ ] ultimate brought them over at 1:45.

Called [ ] on the commo material.

Attended meeting on NSCID #1.

COYNE advised that Thursday, the 29th, was firm for the meeting with the President on Recommendation #4.

Lunch with MR. HOUSTON.

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

12

Thursday, 22 May 1958

25X1 [ ] called for Mr. Stewart to report that [ ] and 25X1  
25X1 [ ] promotions to GS-9 have been effected, probably as of beginning of  
this pay period.

25X1 Cassidy called and said that he and Gen. Hull had a very good briefing  
by WISNER, [ ] on the [ ] 25X1

DR. TIETJEN had lunch with me to further discuss the psychiatric program.

25X1 [ ] reported that the Director would not go to [ ] on 5 and 6 Ju 25X1

HOUSTON called to report that PETER FRELINGHUYSEN had reported out a  
bill on CIA.

HOUSTON called to find out where he could get information on [ ] 25X1  
and I referred him to either IO or to the Alien Branch of Contact Division.

25X1 [ ] asked if I would take over his lecture to Management Course.

GATES LLOYD called concerning [ ] I told him he worked for Staff D. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

Friday, 23 May 1958

25X1 TIETJEN called to say that he needed advice as to where to discuss the role of the Medical Staff in research, and pointed out that he had learned of a project in [ ] I suggested that he talk to Mr. Bissell about this, which he agreed to do.

25X1 CORD MEYER called to say that EDWARDS had arranged to  
25X1 meet with [ ] to discuss the problem of  
25X1 [ ] He also said that [ ] had asked him if  
he would talk to me about having us nominate a candidate to be Inspector  
General of the [ ] 25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

2

**TOP SECRET**

Saturday, 24 May 1958

Attended meeting on NSCID #1 at which the final version was agreed upon. There was also discussion as to whether anything should be said about NSCID #8 at the time that NSCID #1 was circulated.

Sunday, 25 May 1958

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1

Discussed with the DCI the request by [ ] of [ ] for us to nominate an individual to be Inspector General of the [ ]. We went over the list of alumni and present members of the staff and the DCI reacted most favorably to [ ]. He advised me to study a little further the possibility of [ ] taking the job.

25X1

25X1

DCI asked that I remind him to bring up the HERTER letter at the Deputies Meeting on Monday.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

*R*

Monday, 26 May 1958

COYNE called to inquire as to why we changed our views on NSCID #8 and to say that he agreed with the change. He also asked the status of action on Recommendation #4 and I said I would plan to send him some papers on this. He also asked if we could find out for him whether there was anything on

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

EDWARDS called.

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

Tuesday, 27 May 1958

COYNE came over to meet with SHELDON and myself and go over certain questions on NSCID #8. It was agreed that he would prepare notes for GEN. CUTLER on this subject and SHELDON would prepare them for the DCI in preparation for the 5 June meeting.

25X1 [ ] came in to apparently say that he was leaving and had not gotten very much satisfaction from TIETJEN. I told him about my discussion with TIETJEN and the general lines that we were planning to follow, and aside from saying that TIETJEN had not been very specific about how much he would be used as a consultant, he had very little else to add to his previous statement.

25X1 of [ ] called to ask if I would give the Management Lecture in place of [ ] June at 11:00 A.M. I told him I would.

25X1 HELMS called about [ ] status. I told him I had nothing to add to my previous statements. He said he thought they would take the "Acting" off his title. We generally discussed the unpopularity of war planning and left it at that.

Lunch with JACK BLAKE.

Wednesday, 28 May 1958

At the DCI's meeting mentioned the articles about CIA which JOHN SCALP had written; reported that COYNE had advised that NSCID #8 would be considered after the NSC meeting on 5 June; advised that MAC~~Y~~Y of the BUREAU of the BUDGET had asked on three occasions for the FE survey and had been refused; said that COL. ROCKMAN of the Army IG Staff had been over to see us on the [ ] 25X1 case and that I thought there would be no problem on that; suggested that a cable be sent to [ ] suggesting certain measures to be taken in the event of civil war or riots.

25X1 Lunch with [ ]

25X1 [ ] came over. I advised him of COL. ROCKMAN's visit. He said he would check with SEN. HOBLITZELL about lunch. He also asked that I write a line to Congressman FLOOD on [ ] 25X1

25X1 Attended PRC meeting on SE and asked whether the question of the Army putting a man in [ ] had been settled; why there was no guidance on [ ] also asked if <sup>their</sup> contacts with opposition were sufficiently good, and praised their language training and monthly letters from [ ] 25X1

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

Wednesday, 28 May 1958 (con't)

25X1

[REDACTED]

Discussed the question of an Inspector General for [REDACTED]  
and he suggested either [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] *HE*

25X1

COL. EDWARDS called concerning a JOT who is currently working in the Office of Sen. NEWBERGER of Oregon on whom he would like my advice.

Thursday, 29 May 1958

Attended Security lecture.

GROGAN called to ask if I thought it was agreeable to stop the monitoring of the FULTON LEWIS broadcasts, and I told him "yes." He also dropped in and said that he proposed to send a letter to Defense saying that we didn't agree in the publication of the operations book and I said that I concurred with him. He also mentioned that the DCI seemed to be very concerned about some newspaper articles that were attributed to AMORY.

25X1

Gave [REDACTED] his fitness report.

Discussed revitalization of Clandestine Collection with [REDACTED]

Together with [REDACTED] went over the recommendation of the FE survey with [REDACTED]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

R

Monday, 2 June 1958

Attended the Deputies' Meeting.

Attended the Senior Staff Meeting.

Met with Col. GROGAN.

Met with Col. BAIRD.

COYNE called regarding NSCID #8 and said that consideration of it had been changed to Friday, 6 June, after the Cabinet meeting.

25X1  
25X1

[redacted] came in and we had an amicable discussion about [redacted]

Lunch with WHITE to talk about his trip to Europe.

Tuesday, 3 June 1958

25X1

[redacted]

GEN. CASSIDY came over (see memorandum for the record).

25X1

GROGAN brought in [redacted] with the SCALI articles and we went over them with him.

Wednesday, 4 June 1958

Attended Deputies' Meeting.

HELMS and WISNER came down and we discussed the future of [redacted] 25X1  
HELMS said they definitely wanted him back in the Clandestine Services and was quite enthusiastic about using him for the Inspector General of [redacted]. WISNER 25X1  
was less enthusiastic and suggested [redacted] I advised [redacted] of the above 25X1  
discussion and said that I would pursue the [redacted] 25X1

Lunch with JOHN TIETJEN to talk about psychiatry.

PRC meeting which approved the PP program and [redacted]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

2

Wednesday, 4 June 1958 (con't)

25X1

[redacted] Operation and to urge a thorough review. I told him I would send a memo to the Director.

25X1

on [redacted] called to say they were going to follow through on checking

25X1

[redacted] came in to discuss a job on the staff. He indicated that WE had told him that there was probably no opening there but that he was also going to talk to NEA.

25X1

[redacted] called about DAVE GARROWAY doing a TV program on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and that Security was worried that he might show some pictures of our buildings. I discussed this with the DCI who agreed with me that action on our part might appear foolish and was not necessary. I did, however, warn HELMS to keep his spooks out of sight.

The DCI buzzed me to ask about the NSCIDs and the JCS and I assured him that they had received copies of all of them..

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

[redacted] formerly of WH, came up to seek assistance for [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted]

Thursday, 5 June 1958

25X1

Went to [redacted] to give talk to the OFC graduates.

Friday, 6 June 1958

25X1

At [redacted] (also on 7 + 8 June.)

Monday, 9 June 1958

Reported to Deputies' Meeting on three items at [redacted] (1) that I was pleased to see colored officers in each of our operational courses; (2) that I had inspected the new gym and houses and found them excellent; (3) that I was pleased to see a reserve officer training course being given there.

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Monday, 9 June 1958 (con't)

25X1

[REDACTED]

BAIRD called about [REDACTED] who came over to tell me that Security had forbidden her going to any foreign embassies even though she was a close friend of the step daughter of the [REDACTED] and the daughter of the [REDACTED] I told her to forget the whole thing and I would take it up with Security.

Met with DCI, DDCI, COP/DDP, DD/S, and BISSELL and we were advised that the DCI had decided he would not have an Inspector General review of the [REDACTED] but instead would establish a high level board composed of DDCI, DD/P, IG, DD/S and SA/R&D to review the Operation based on reports prepared by the DD/P.

EDWARDS called to alert me to a problem which had arisen as a result of

[REDACTED]

Comptroller to follow up on collection and that I was only trying to prime the pump.

COYNE returned through this office an envelope addressed to ANGLETON and containing an analysis of each of the six Latin American countries which DR. MILTON EISENHOWER was supposed to visit. COYNE had passed this paper to CUTLER who, in turn, had sent it to GEN. GOODPASTER and others.

[REDACTED] called and said he was in active discussion with NEA who seemed to want him. I told him it would be best if he went with NEA.

[REDACTED]

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 10 June 1958

At IG staff meeting discussed the apparent Agency restrictions on contacts with Embassy personnel; [ ] raised the question of discrimination against women; there was general review of war planning.

The DCI buzzed me to ask whether in TRUSCOTT's absence [ ] was senior. I told him that as far as I knew, neither was. I called HELMS and asked him if he knew the status of a deputy for TRUSCOTT and he said that he understood that [ ] had accepted the job.

[ ] called and reported an incident in which JOHN MAR of the State Department had apparently told [ ] that a girl named JANE BARTLELL, CBS, said she got plenty of information from [ ] of CIA. I told [ ] I would call TED KOOP about this. [ ] also asked me about [ ]

[ ] came in to discuss the general status of NSCID #1.

CASSIDY called to ask that I have somebody from NEA Division come over tomorrow at 11:00 to talk about the [ ] Project. I called [ ] and he said he would make arrangements for the above. He also advised me that they were hiring [ ]

[ ] called to say 'hello.'

[ ] who is leaving to be [ ] came in to say goodbye.

[ ] came down to talk about his medical claim and I suggested that he drop it. He also discussed the idea of having one person agree to all printing requests. I suggested he prepare a memorandum to DD/S.

CORD MEYER called and said he assumed [ ] did not want the [ ] job. We also agreed to a memo to the Director on the [ ] case.

[ ] called to say how impressed he was with [ ] and to urge that we get him into the organization.

Lectured to Clandestine Services Review Course.

[ ] came up to tell his sad plight of not being allowed to take a French course and to allege once again that [ ] I turned the matter over to [ ] to see whether a fresh look could prove anything.

**TOP SECRET**

R

Wednesday, 11 June 1958

Attended DCI's meeting.

25X1 Advised J. C. KING that I would be unable to attend his party for Jim  
[redacted] because I would be in Princeton for my reunions.

25X1 HOUSTON called to say that the Bureau of Internal Revenue was checking  
[redacted] income tax returns and I advised that I saw no reason why we should  
intervene in any way.

Lunch with COL. WHITE to review further some of his comments on his  
trip and also to discuss selection out procedures.

Attended PRC which considered the FE and WH programs.

25X1 [redacted] called me about an article which the DD/P wanted to get circulate 25X1  
and I suggested that he call [redacted] 25X1

[redacted]

In PAT COYNE's absence talked to ASH at the NSC and asked him to send a  
copy of the CUTLER memo to Defense.

25X1 DCI buzzed me on the training project bill concerning an area within an  
area at [redacted] and I explained to him exactly how it would work. He agreed  
that it sounded feasible and signed off on the project.

Thursday, 12 June 1958

Met with Mid-career Foreign Service Officers' Course.

Talked to GEN. CABELL about the TSS responses on their [redacted] and 25X1  
the fact that if it were left on the record I would be forced to make an  
official reply. He decided to return their comment to DD/P and indicate that  
it was not acceptable.

25X1 [redacted] called on the item in NEWSWEEK on CIA.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Friday, 13 June 1958

At the DCI's meeting reported that the reply would go to GEN. CUTLER by the 15th on Recommendation #1 of the President's Board. Pointed out that the two run-off candidates for the governorship of South Carolina had both been on the Clark Task Force--ERNEST HOLLINGS and DON RUSSELL; described the incident in which somebody had tried to get information on [ ] and said that I 25X1 had urged Security to put out a memorandum on telephone security. Reported on the [ ] case and that she had resigned, and on the [ ] case and the 25X1 fact that we were going to get her transferred overseas; noted the NEWSWEEK item mentioning CIA's view on trade with the Communist Bloc.

Left for Princeton at noon.

Monday, 16 June 1958

At the Deputies meeting the DCI advised that he thought he would have to cancel again his trip to [ ] I suggested that he try to make it for an afternoon and an evening and he said he would try to do that. I also advised that I would give [ ] a short summary on [ ] and reminded him that he was going to telephone [ ] He asked me if I would telephone [ ] instead.

I humourously advised the Director that a source of unknown reliability had reported seeing the Director of Central Intelligence in close conversation with the well known socialist Norman Thomas.

CASSIDY called and asked if I would arrange for a briefing of himself by [ ] [ ] asked that Cassidy come to his office because he wanted to have five or six men involved, and [ ] asked whether he should be completely frank. I told him that he should.

Gave Management talk.

[ ] called concerning his French course and his material and I told him that I had turned it over to one of the men on the staff who would get in touch with him.

[ ] called to ask if it was all right for [ ] to sit in on the Cassidy briefing inasmuch as he is going [ ] I told him yes.

BAIRD called about the DCI's trip to [ ] and I advised him of the current status.

With [ ] went over the status of the CI survey.

TOP SECRET

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16 June 1958

25X1

[ ] called and said that True Magazine wanted to do a profile on the Director and the agency and I told them to turn them down.

-

TRUSCOTT called and suggested I send the latest draft of NSCID-1 to both Cassidy and Cutler.

-

25X1  
25X1

25X1

ASHCRAFT called and asked if anything could be done about [ ] career designation. I told him that I would have to take it up at the career council and that there was really no other designation that he could have. I also asked him how [ ] was getting along and he stated that he was just fine and that there was absolutely no evidence of drinking.

-

25X1

25X1

[ ] who will leave shortly to become the chief of station [ ] came in.

-

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] who will be leaving shortly to be the chief of station [ ] came in. [ ] and I discussed the case of [ ] and I told him generally what I had put in my memorandum to COP. I stressed the fact that I thought the case was his responsibility as the new station chief and that under ordinary circumstances there was no question but that [ ] should have been terminated.

25X1

LBKlrkpatrick

25X1  
25X1

Told [ ] office (Lois) that we had received files on selection 25X1 out cases of [ ]

[ ]

MR. HULICK called to ask if there was a deadline on paper concerning 5412 which they were preparing for the President's Board. He was advised that it should be ready by 1 July.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, 17 June 1958

IG Staff meeting. Devoted a large part to discussion of selection out cases. There was particular reference to the appar<sup>ent</sup> arrangement between the DD/P and Director of Personnel to put all DD/P personnel advised that they were being selected out into the Interim Assignment Section/Personnel. I asked [ ] to visit the IAS unannounced and to find out what was going on and to talk to as many people as he could.

Together with [ ] talked to [ ]  
[ ] the CI Staff. (See memorandum for the record.)

CORBETT also showed me a project he had written out for the future employment of [ ] who will first complete the study of the [ ] organization, and then will go to [ ] working for [ ] I told him that it looked quite good.

[ ] called to say that his people had been advised by Defense that they had sent back a report to Cutler saying that they could not report on the Rapid communications matter until 15 August.

COYNE called to ask if our report had been submitted and I advised him that it was sent over last Saturday.

L.B.Kirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

R


**TOP SECRET**

Wednesday, 18 June 1958

25X1 At the Deputies' Meeting suggested to the DCI that he abandon his thought of a trip to [ ] this Spring because of his heavy schedule. He agreed but expressed regret. I so advised [ ] of Training and told him that the DCI was very sorry to have to do this but that the present crisis occupied him just about full time and that last Saturday there had been an IAC meeting both at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock. 25X1

COYNE called to ask if I would check our papers on the subject of the comparative intelligence estimate about which there is to be a meeting tomorrow following the NSC meeting. I obtained from [ ] the Director's package of papers on this subject and checked them with COYNE over the phone. 25X1

COYNE called acknowledging receipt of the paper on war planning which I had sent him. He said he thought it had several holes in it and I told him it was purely for information and as an indication that we were working on the recommendation in question. 25X1



Attended PRC meeting on NEA.

George

GROGAN brought in Mr./SEATON and Mr. Robert Denton to discuss the book "The Counterfeit Traitor" which Paramount is planning to make into a motion picture.

TIETJEN called and asked if I would talk to BISSELL to pave the way for a discussion on his part with BISSELL on Medical Staff efforts in the field of human motivation.

25X1 [ ] called to say that HEIMLICH was needling him about seeing the Director. I advised [ ] of my efforts to prepare for the Director some material to show Senator HICKENLOOPER. [ ] 25X1

Thursday, 19 June 1958

25X1 [ ] called for Gordon STEWART to say that [ ] had talked 25X1  
25X1 [ ] and also to several of his supervisors about the possibility  
of a transfer; he also talked to A&E who indicated that [ ] potential was 25X1  
25X1 limited. [ ] indicated to [ ] that there was no possibility now, but  
that they would keep him in mind. He appeared to be satisfied with this.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

19 June 1958 - Thursday (con't)

25X1 Asked [ ] if he knew anything about the "Counterfeit Traitor" and he said that PFORZHEIMER had done some research on it and had the best information.

25X1 [ ] brought down the letters for [ ] for my approval. 25X1

25X1 [ ] called concerning NSCID #7 which apparently was the only serious matter that came up in his briefing of GEN. CASSIDY about the [ ] operation.

Spent two hours with [ ] talking to [ ] 25X1 of the Special Investigations Division of the CI Staff. (See memo for the record)

25X1 [ ] came in and said he had thoroughly reviewed the [ ] case and 25X1 was sending it back to Personnel to discover if they had thoroughly canvassed the rest of the Agency for a spot for him. He also showed me the form he had developed as a check list for the use of the staff which I told him was excellent and suggested that he send a copy to GORDON STEWART to see and return. 25X1

25X1 Called STEWART about [ ] and asked if he would try and locate him elsewhere in the Agency. He said he would turn the matter over to [ ] and ask him to see if he could relocate [ ]. STEWART said he welcomed the 25X1 case because he had a feeling such people often felt frustrated and possibly some rotation of them would be desirable.

25X1 [ ] of Security called to say that it was all a terrible mistake that they had taken over the servicing of my post office box and that they would return it forthwith to the couriers.

25X1 Discussion with [ ] of his claim for his injury and also of his tour in [ ]. I called HOUSTON about it and told him [ ] wanted to 25X1 discuss the matter with somebody on his staff.

20 June - Friday (1958)

ILLEGIB 25X1 [ ] Called [ ] and told him to go ahead and set up the SOS group for Monday morning, 2 July. He also raised the question of [ ] private 25X1 bill and I told him that I thought we ought to support it.

25X1 I called ANGLETON concerning [ ] making available to [ ] 25X1 certain of his files to review and suggested that they be ones that concerned individuals that [ ] did not know.

ANGLETON called back to ask what [ ] future assignment was going to be and then said he was interested in possibly getting him either as his deputy or as COP. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

Friday, 20 June 1958 (con't)

GROGAN advised me of the submission to the Senate by the President of GEN. CABELL's promotion. He also discussed at some length the press conference that WISNER had staged for some TIME people and of the fact that he told WISNER he thought it had been badly done and would prove the MARK CLARK recommendation that we did not know enough about the Soviet Union. He said he planned to discuss it with the Director.

25X1 [ ] came up to ask for clarification on the annual report to the NSC. I told him I would check with COYNE and advise him.

Called MATT BAIRD to ask if he could speed up [ ] request for training in Arabic and he said he would need some support from the Branch so I told him I would speak to [ ] about it. BAIRD asked me if I would fly down to [ ] next week as he wanted to take some headquarters girls down and needed me as chaperone. 25X1

25X1 [ ] brought in his successor and I spent about an hour telling him about the functions of the IG staff.

25X1 [ ] called to say that he thought the Russian fishing fleet off Nova Scotia was there to relay radio messages.

25X1 [ ] talked to me about [ ] 25X1

[ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] called to say he had had lunch with [ ] and that 25X1  
25X1 he was opening an office in [ ] and I should anticipate his approaching me  
25X1 [ ]

Monday, 23 June 1958

Attended Director's staff meeting. 25X1

CORD MEYER called about [ ] and we agreed that [ ] should be told that Washington had agreed on his stipend being stopped and that I would talk to him. 25X1

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

Monday, 23 June 1958 (con't)

Lengthy discussion with WIN SCOTT about himself and [ ] 25X1  
and at his suggestion I called [ ] and asked him to invite Congressman 25X1  
DON JACKSON of California to lunch tomorrow.

25X1 [ ] called me about an ELINT project using [ ] 25X1  
and I told him I had already signed and sent it on.

25X1 Together with [ ] spent two hours with [ ] Chief of 25X1  
Special Projects Division of CI Staff.

7 GROGAN came in to report his conversation with the DCI on the excessive  
and unreported contacts by WISNER and AMORY with the Press and the general  
fact that WISNER apparently felt that TIME had made MAXWELL TAYLOR  
castoff of the Army and that it might be able to make him DCI.

25X1 [ ] came in and I advised him that we could not possibly spend any  
money on his project until we had more information. (See memorandum for record).

COYNE called to inquire whether Gen. CABELL's promotion indicated any  
change in the organization. I told him no. He also advised that he was meeting  
tomorrow with CASSIDY and Gen. TRUSCOTT to discuss NSCID #1.

Called GORDON STEWART about [ ] and urged that he try to get her a 25X1  
job overseas if he could do so.

25X1 [ ] called about HAROLD LAWRENCE and asked when he was representing  
Dr. KILLIAN and when the PRESIDENT'S BOARD. I said that I didn't know but  
suggested that when in doubt he ask LAWRENCE or call me.

GROGAN advised that the dinner with CBS had been set for 15 July in  
New York City.

**TOP SECRET**

**SECRET**

R

Tuesday, 24 June 1958

IG Staff meeting.

Went to CI Staff and was briefed by [ ] on the work of the Research and Analysis Division.

25X1

Lunch with Congressman JACKSON of California and WIN SCOTT followed by a brief discussion mainly about the CIA building.

CASSIDY called to inquire as to the background of GEN. CABELL's promotion. I told him that this was part and parcel of the Director's efforts to elevate the stature of intelligence.

CASSIDY asked for the financial figures on the [ ] and I called [ ] to ask him to provide them.

25X1

[ ] called to ask to come up and see me to talk about [ ]

[ ] called to ask if he could use me as a reference to ASCHER BRYNES in Commerce.

[ ] came up to ask advice on his career inasmuch as he had had a brief attack while in [ ] was worried about taking him to [ ] I told him that in view of the operation which he had had and his preparation to go to [ ] that I thought he should go right ahead with it.

Wednesday, 25 June 1958

25X1

At the DCI's meeting reported on the threatened law suit by [ ] on behalf of [ ]. Also advised that we had had a pleasant luncheon with Congressman DON JACKSON.

[ ] called to alert me to a possible call from [ ] He said they had gotten very little information from him.

[ ] called to say he was sending up the information requested by CASSIDY on the funds required for the [ ]

25X1

[ ] called to say that MACY was coming over on Monday to be shown the review mechanism in the DD/P. We agreed that one of my staff would accompany this briefing.

Spent one hour briefing [ ] who is slated to be the next head of [ ]

25X1

Attended PRC meeting on the IO Division.

**TOP SECRET**

*P*

Wednesday, 25 June 1958 (con't)

Talked to EDWARDS and STEWART about the [ ] case and his potential employment by the Office of International Trade Affairs of the Dept. of Commerce. 25X1

EDWARDS told me that <sup>I</sup>he might have an appeal from [ ] who was being selected out and who is now making allegations against three of the field chiefs. 25X1

STEWART called to thank me for the material on the [ ] case which he said was very helpful and thought would help to improve the work of his people. 25X1

[ ] came up to bring me the report on [ ] and describe their planned action. He then discussed the general status of the staffs and I told him that I agreed with his plans. 25X1

[ ] called about the Executive Inventory, and I told him I would try and get his notebook back to him soon. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 26 June 1958

25X1

[ ] called about [ ] saying that he had another letter from him. I told him the status of the case and he seemed appreciative that some- 25X1 thing had been done.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] came in and I read him the excerpts on [ ] from ADM. CONOLI 25X1 report which were generally favorable. He said the DCI told him that he planned 25X1 to go to [ ] leaving Washington about 20 August. I told [ ] I would keep 25X1 him informed about the DCI's plans. He said I could reach him at [ ] 25X1 25X1

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

12

Friday, 27 June 1958

BAIRD called about the training bill and I told him that I would take it up with the Director.

At TRUSCOTT's request met with him and HOUSTON and went over the Dept. of Defense's draft of NSCID #1. We all agreed that there was really not much purpose in discussing this directive further with Defense and that the DCI should probably advise them that he would go forward on his own.

25X1 Lunch with the DCI, [ ] J.C. KING, WISNER and [ ] for a general 25X1  
25X1 review of the work of the [ ] DCI also talked to [ ] and 25X1  
25X1 [ ] about the training bill.

Told HELMS that I was recommending that [ ] go to Training on 1 August 25X1  
to take over as head of the [ ] He said that 25X1  
he agreed to this and that at the end of a year there would be a job for him  
in DD/P.

25X1 [ ] came down and we discussed the situation in War Plans Branch  
25X1 and I alerted him to the possibility that he would probably be hearing from  
[ ]

25X1 Met with [ ] and went over the CI survey. I urged them  
to start writing the first draft at the earliest possible date.

COYNE called to ask how many retired officers we took. I explained to him and he said he was inquiring on behalf of a friend.

25X1 Talked to [ ] and told him to go ahead with preparing the list for the  
SOS breakfast.

**TOP SECRET**

✓

Monday, 30 June 1958

Attended DCI's meeting.

Talked to BAIRD about the training bill and assured him that the Director was doing everything he possibly could.

25X1 [ ] called and said that HAROLD LAWRENCE was coming over to talk to him about radar intelligence. 25X1

25X1 GORDON STEWART called to ask if I had developed any ideas on [ ]  
[ ] I told him that I had not yet but would raise the matter with the Director.

25X1 [ ] called and suggested [ ] as a possibility for the [ ] 25X1  
Inspector General job.

[ ]

25X1 [ ] and I went over the plans for the SOS breakfast.

**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 1 July 1958

25X1

BAIRD called to ask if he could announce that [ ] would be taking over the [ ] on 1 August so I had [ ] call him, and they agreed that the announcement should be made.

25X1

BISSELL called and said he was about to send a memorandum to the Director on the TSS survey. I suggested that he do so and that I would go along with whatever action he indicated because I thought the matter had been delayed long enough.

Meeting of the IG staff.

[ ] called with a bitter complaint about the rude treatment she received in the Medical Staff from a [ ] I said that I would take this matter up with DR. TIETJEN.

25X1

[ ] of ORR called about [ ] and wondered whether he might be getting in difficulties on a problem of racial discrimination. I told him that my only concern was that the case should be well documented and that if it was well documented and indicated that [ ] work was below the standard of others in the unit, that he should not hesitate to proceed with selection out.

25X1

25X1

Together with [ ] went over the seating list and other arrangements for the SOS breakfast.

[ ] of WE brought up a new balance sheet on [ ] which I signed. He said he would send us a copy.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

R

Tuesday, 1 July 1958 (con't)

GROGAN dropped in to say that he had talked to both [ ] and AMORY on contacts with the press and told them that the DCI had instructed him to tighten up the controls. He also said that CBS dinner was now arranged for them to be the host and that apparently a large number of CBS hierarchy would be present. I told him I had only one request in that regard and that was that all of the people going to New York not fly in the same aircraft, and that perhaps two planes should go with the DDCI in one and the DCI in another.

25X1

Wednesday, 2 July 1958

Meeting with the Republican Congressmen of the SOS Club for breakfast.

Met with the DCI and DD/S to discuss and revise the letter to the Bureau of the Budget on the training bill.

[ ] came in to discuss the progress on NSCID #1 and we talked about his career. I told him that I would try to sound out GEN. TRUSCOTT on his future but that I thought it was to his interest to clarify it at an early date.

Asked [ ] the reasons behind the Director's concern over the SOS breakfast seating arrangement and who was invited.

Lunch with KERMIT ROOSEVELT who says that [ ] has the details on Project [ ]

Together with [ ] discussed for two hours the work of the International Communist Division with [ ]

GROGAN called to say that in accordance with the Director's instructions he had given McCABEY of TRUE magazine some material on the Agency and told him that I would talk to him when he was ready and that he could then see the Director for 15 minutes. He also said that the HANSON deal was on and that the Director wanted him to write a book on International Communism to be the counterpart of Mr. HOOVER's book on U.S. Communism.

[ ] called and we agreed that the FREYLINGHUYSEN lunch for 8 July would still be on and that he would invite [ ] AMORY and HOUSTON. He said [ ] would check with Sen. HOBLITZELL's office and also at [ ]

STEWART called about [ ] and said that at the moment they did not have a place in the [ ] office without making one but thought that one would develop in a matter of weeks. I also urged him to look into the international possibilities inasmuch as I thought there would be no problems about custody of the children.

**TOP SECRET**

Wednesday, 2 July 1958 (con't)

25X1



Thursday, 3 July 1958


25X1      Talked to [ ] about NED ROBERTS' trip and he said they would advise their stations and also talk to ROBERTS directly on this.

25X1      I also mentioned to [ ] that [ ] had been up to see me and that I was very impressed by the job he had done and suggested that he would be a very good man to give full time training in Arabic. [ ] 25X1  
said they had approved that training for [ ] 25X1

25X1      Took a trip around the building site with [ ] (see my notes on pertinent facts concerning the building). 25X1

25X1      Called COYNE to see if we could get a postponement to 15 August on the report on war gaming. He said it sounded reasonable to him but he would let me know as soon as CUTLER approved. I so advised [ ] 25X1

25X1      Saw the DCI and advised him that [ ] would be going to Training on 1 August; he said, in answer to my inquiry concerning [ ] 25X1  
that he thought it was worth making the effort to bring somebody like this into the Agency; he approved my trip to New York and also asked me to give him a list on the CBS dinner for 15 July; I advised him of my trip around the building site; he also said he would be willing to attend an OSS cocktail party in New York if I set it up. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Thursday, 3 July 1958 (con't)

25X1 I called [ ] and told him that I was going to New York the week of  
25X1 the 15th and would see [ ] he said he would tell [ ] when he was 25X1  
in New York next week.

25X1 EDWARDS called me to say that nothing had happened concerning the Security  
25X1 Officer at [ ] I told him that I would take it up with [ ] when 25X1  
I had lunch with him [ ]

Monday, 7 July 1958

Attended Deputies Meeting.

25X1 COYNE called to report that the NSC had discussed the NSC report and  
asked whether this should come from the Director; they had taken no action.  
[ ] came up and I advised him of this and we agreed that we should probably  
prepare the Director's comment, but that this should not be coordinated.

GEN. CASSIDY came over for lunch and left with me the semi-annual reports  
of State and Defense.

25X1 Together with the rest of the staff, went down to talk to [ ] 25X1  
about the starting of the FI survey and FI-CI relations. It was our general  
consensus that this was a rather useless meeting.

25X1 Called [ ] and suggested to him that we have a cocktail party for  
the Director in New York. He said he would check around and call me back.

25X1 CASSIDY asked that [ ] prepare a report on the [ ] 25X1  
indicating specifically how many actions were approved by OCB Special Group,  
how many expenditures were specifically approved and on what dates. I saw  
25X1 [ ] in the hall and he said he had prepared a paper for me and would have  
it up shortly, giving all these facts.

Tuesday, 8 July 1958

IG staff meeting which was devoted primarily to a description of how to  
handle cases. I said that I generally wanted individual problems to be  
listed as cases if they involve more than giving advice or were time-consuming

**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 8 July 1958 (con't)

as I considered the case system one method of measuring our workload. I said that when an individual first came to them and they decided that it would be a case, they should ask their secretary to get a case number from this office so that the name could be recorded, but that their secretary should maintain the case file until the case was closed. I pointed out that there were several categories of cases, namely perennial cases about which we notified General Counsel, Security and Personnel each month; additional items on old cases; and new cases. I said that I hoped that they would use the quarterly report as an incentive to close out their cases, particularly if they had been continuing for some time. I said that we would include selection out cases if the case was appealed to us, regardless of whether the appeal was at the specified time. I pointed out that they often had other things to do which go in the quarterly report, specifically stating that such matters as [ ] reviewing the use of retired officers was a project which we should report on periodically. I concluded by indicating that I thought the quarterly report was a valuable management tool to record the work of this staff and that it would indicate whether the approximately [ ] that the staff costs the Agency, and thus the tax payers, each year was being well spent.

Together with [ ] went down to talk to ANGLETON and [ ] about work in the CI Staff. The principal part of our discussion was devoted to special projects, specifically [ ] and one or two pension projects.

Lunch for PETER FRELINGHUYSEN. The Director dropped in at the end of lunch and we adjourned to his office. The Director asked FRELINGHUYSEN about his bill for a watchdog committee and they discussed this briefly. FRELINGHUYSEN, when he left, said that he thought it had been a profitable visit and that he would like to come back again soon.

[ ] came in, the former to say goodbye and the latter to say hello.

TRUSCOTT came down to discuss the Bureau of the Budget calculation on intelligence expenditures. I called [ ] to ask him whether we received written guidance on how to prepare this calculation and he said that we did but that we didn't see the guidance given to other agencies.

COYNE called to say that CUTLER had approved the 15 August date for the war gaming report and I so advised [ ]

[ ] called and said he had talked to [ ] about the cocktail party and that he thought it would be a good idea. I said I would make a final check with the Director and call him back.

**TOP SECRET**

R

Wednesday, 9 July 1958

Attended the Deputies' Meeting, most of which was occupied by discussion of the press conference that the downed fliers will hold.

Lunch with [ ] primarily to discuss the candidates for the [ ] Inspector General job.

GROGAN called to say that [ ] the fellow in ONE who had written the satirical article about missile warfare, had called in an effort to find out who turned it down and why. I told GROGAN that I might discuss this briefly with KENT.

[ ] called to say he had a paper on PRC and he wanted to sit with me while I read it. I told him to send it up; if I had any questions, I would call.

Thursday, 10 July 1958

DCI asked if I recalled a man named [ ] (whose wife is named [ ] who is alleged to be in OSS.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

R

Thursday, 10 July 1958 (con't)

Saw the DCI and gave him the material on the VSS cocktail party. We also discussed who should go to the dinner and I told him I would make the necessary arrangements. He asked whether I thought [ ] would be a good man on Comparative Estimates. I told him I did.

25X1

Suggested to [ ] that he make the necessary arrangements for the DCI's travel in New York City.

[ ]

25X1

Called [ ] and had a lengthy conversation regarding [ ] whom he does not think very highly of. Also asked him about Soviet economic penetration in Latin America and he said that OCI had prepared material on that for DCI. I also mentioned to him the possibility of a trip to the Caribbean area and asked him to talk it over with J. C. KING.

25X1

Called CORD MEYER and needled him on my request for material on the [ ] I also discussed with him my projected lunches with [ ].

In view of a call from CONGRESSMAN TABER's office to the DCI's requesting [ ] home address, I checked with GEORGE CAREY and he assured me that [ ] was behaving all right and that TABER was a friend of his father's.

WHITE called me about the [ ] case and asked me to review it and then discuss it with him and STEWART.

[ ] called from New York and confirmed our dinner arrangement for 16 July.

Hosted a lunch for HAROLD STEWART, Chief of the National Park Police.

[ ]

[ ] of the Cover Branch came up to reappeal his case.

Met with [ ] on two of his cases.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Friday, 11 July 1958

[ ] called about a [ ] case and I said inasmuch as I might be seeing [ ] next week that we should get the facts earliest. He said he would send up [ ] on Monday.

[ ] called to ask if he could use my name as a reference. I told him yes.

[ ] called concerning briefing notes for IAC meeting on Tuesday and I said I would prepare them.

J. C. KING called to say he thought my idea of a trip to [ ] was a good one and would help them considerably.

At the DCI's meeting suggested that Operation Alert be used to assist in preparing our reply on Recommendation #2. The DCI agreed and I prepared the necessary memos. Also suggested that [ ] be taken out to the new building site. I mentioned [ ] seminar on international police problems at the USC and [ ] on the [ ] said he would take care of.

[ ] came in to say that he recommended that [ ] be briefed by our people while in [ ]. I said that I agreed. He also asked my views on how we should insure that the DCI was properly located in the next executive pay bill.

MR. HELMS called to say that there were certain things in [ ] that he wanted [ ] to come up and talk to me about as he didn't think they should be written up in the survey. I said okay. I then explained to him how we planned to go about the balance of the DD/P survey and he agreed.

**TOP SECRET**

Tuesday, 15 July 1958

[REDACTED]

25X1

I also mentioned the report that we would have to make on Recommendation #2 as of 15 August. AMORY maintained that [REDACTED] would be able to work on this and that he and [REDACTED] would collaborate on the reply.

25X1

The DCI noted that he had personally talked with [REDACTED] and had telephoned [REDACTED] in an effort to get a meeting with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and pointed out that we are taking the initiative in soliciting these meetings and that he was developing a record on this subject.

25X1

Left for New York at 11:00 A.M.

Meeting of the Veterans of Strategic Services group at [REDACTED] house. (See memorandum for the record.)

25X1

Dinner with CBS (See memorandum for the record.)

July 15 - 20, 1958

In New York.....See memorandums for the record on meetings with [REDACTED]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

The following items were noted during the IG's absence (tdy in New York) from 15 - 18 July; were furnished the IG on his return:

15 July

25X1 A [ ] called and said he had met you at [ ] and that 25X1  
you had mentioned getting together a group of agency musicians. He said he was  
25X1 here for the day only; that he had mentioned this to a friend who had been practicing  
ever since. The friend is [ ] (in the school of International Communism)  
if you wish to call him and talk about it.

25X1 [ ] called; the division was asked to get 25X1  
in touch with him. It was arranged for [ ] to come up here at 11:00 25X1  
on 16 July; [ ] will spend some time with him in the IG's absence, after  
25X1 which [ ] will take over. Also arranged for [ ] to see the IG 25X1  
in New York on Saturday, 19 July.

16 July

25X1 [ ] (WH) wanted to say good-bye; is leaving on Friday; 25X1  
said he was sorry to have missed you.

25X1

17 July

25X1 President's Board called for nine SNIE's which had been forwarded to 25X1  
them by memorandum dtd 17 January 1957 bearing signature of [ ]  
25X1 Arrangements were made with [ ] to send them directly from OCR.

President's Board requested all recent NIE's and SNIE's on the Middle East. These were procured from OCR and forwarded through this office.

25X1 [ ] said he had given [ ] the page numbers of the 25X1  
IG recommendations in the NE/A survey, but did not mention that he had prepared  
the paper on the same subject.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

17 July (cont'd)

25X1 [ ] called to say he is on his way, a little ahead of schedule;  
sorry to have missed you and to give you his best wishes.

25X1 [ ] just returned from the field where he had met you and  
would like to drop in and pay respects. (Lunch was later set up for 23 July.)

25X1 A [ ] (?) who said she had met you in [ ] last summer 25X1  
25X1 through [ ] would like to see you for some advice. ( [ ] apt. 315) 25X1  
(Appointment was later scheduled for 22 July; she called that date to say her  
problem was solved but that she appreciated the courtesy nevertheless.)

18 July

25X1 [ ] stopped in to say goodbye; sorry he missed you, but  
hopes to see you soon.

25X1 [ ] dropped in to chat and possible luncheon.

25X1 [ ] advised he had nothing particular to talk  
25X1 about so they did not see him. [ ] said he would have seen him anyway  
but that developments caused him to be rather busy.

25X1 [ ] called for an appointment with the IG  
only. (Appointment was later scheduled for 22 July.)

25X1 [ ] asked if you would be available for SIS lecture on 28 July  
from 1330 to 1500. (Told them okay.)

25X1 [ ] would like to see you on Monday afternoon. (This  
was later scheduled for 4 o'clock on 21 July.)

DCI signed dispatch you had prepared on Cabell's promotion and it was  
forwarded for printing.

25X1 [ ]

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**TOP SECRET**

Monday, 21 July 1958

DCI's meeting was devoted largely to discussion of the Middle East crisis and what the U.S. role should be.

25X1 [ ] called and asked whether we should burn [ ]  
I said I would check the Director and let him know.

25X1

[ ]

25X1 At the DD/S' request, WHITE and STEWART came over on the [ ] case. 25X1  
They wanted to show [ ] and myself a memorandum which they had  
prepared on it and see if it met with our approval. They alleged that there  
was an inconsistency in the memos which [ ] pointed out was not 25X1  
true and the DD/S was obviously miffed that we had twice disapproved of the work of  
Office of Personnel. I pointed out that this particular exercise would  
probably be beneficial in that the work would probably be done correctly  
hereafter. We then brought [ ] into the meeting and discussed the

25X1

[ ]

25X1

25X1 [ ] called about [ ] and I told him that I would see 25X1  
her and discuss her problem. 25X1

25X1 I called [ ] to ask if he knew either [ ]  
He said he didn't.

COYNE called on NSCIDs #1 and #6 and I told him that I expected that  
they would be forwarded to the NSC shortly. He then asked whether I thought  
that the USCIB report on ELINT would recommend that it be put under NSA.  
I told him that it would.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

R

21 July 1958 (con't)

25X1

[ ] came in to say that he had been on the OCB Staff for more than two years and would like to come back and, if possible, go to DD/P. I said that I thought he should do this and that if he wished, I would take the initiative in forwarding his papers to the DD/P. He asked that I do this.


25X1

[ ] OSI, called in a high state of excitement to say that he had taken a French exam and passed it and had been told by Training that he was entitled to get \$100 except that he did not get it because he was not a member of Career Service. He claimed that he had never been told why he was not a member of Career Service. I said I would check and let him know.

25X1

[ ] called and I asked him to lunch on Wednesday.

25X1



Tuesday, 22 July 1958

IG staff meeting at which we had a lengthy discussion and analysis of the FI/CI Staff, including the justification for the existence of the CI Staff<sup>25X1</sup> and where Staff D should be located.



**TOP SECRET**

**Page Denied**



**TOP SECRET**

22 July 1958 (con't)

25X1 [ ] called and said he would send over [ ] fitness report 25X1  
for me to fill out covering the period of his work on this staff.

25X1 I called EDWARDS and told him that I had talked to [ ] about 25X1  
25X1 the [ ] security job and that a great deal of the problem seemed to revolve  
around relocating [ ]

25X1 I asked [ ] if he was aware of the fact that [ ] worked 25X1  
25X1 for us in [ ]. He said that he was not and did not think the Director  
was. I told him I would raise it with the Director.

COYNE called to say he had received the 21 July reply on Recommendation #4  
of the BAKER COMMITTEE. He asked whether I didn't think this could be  
handled by a voting slip rather than special meeting of the Special Committee. 25X1  
I told him yes but said I would check it out with the Director.

Wednesday, 23 July 1958

25X1 [ ] of OSI called to say that I was going to check  
on his career status and why hadn't he heard. I told him he was correct, that  
we were going to check on his career status but that we had not gotten to it  
and he should realize that this was a busy staff. [ ] was extremely 25X1  
angry that he was going to be deprived of \$100 because he was not a member of  
career service. I pointed out that I had participated in forming the regula-  
tion which said non members of the Career Staff would not receive language  
awards. He went on to say that SEN. LANGER wanted a thorough investigation  
made of the Agency and he thought this was a good thing. I said he was entitled  
to his opinion but that the pertinent issue at the moment was to answer his  
question as to why he was not a member of the Career Staff and that when we  
had closed that bridge we could discuss other matters. He said he had assumed  
that when he did not get Career Staff status, they were trying to get rid of  
him. I indicated that this was probably correct.

**TOP SECRET**

R

23 July 1958 (con't)

At the DCI's meeting pointed out that the selection out cases were now getting numerous and that everybody at the meeting should be aware that these contained numerous problems. I then mentioned that CONG. SIMPSON's office had called about the case of [ ] and that [ ] had talked about going to SEN. LANGER. / I raised the question of the report on [ ] that had been prepared for the President's Board and the Director said to release it. I pointed out that the Director's concern about the political implications of the report on [ ] would be much more serious if this were a Congressional watch dog committee and that this should be carefully considered before agreeing to MANSFIELD's proposal. / I asked the DCI if he thought the reply on Recommendation #4 of the Baker Committee couldn't be handled by vote slip. He agreed. / I pointed out the latest development in the [ ] case. / I reported that [ ] had set up for us meetings with [ ] and the [ ] who were being brought [ ] GEN. CABELL said he did not feel that Operation Alert gave us any clues for a reply on Recommendation #2 of the President's Board. I said that I agreed. He then went on to say that concerning the proposal on defectors, this material had been turned over to the Inter-Agency Defector Committee to prepare a paper.

GEN. TRUSCOTT and I discussed the preparation of the report on Recommendation #2 and he said [ ] was available to work with [ ] on this. We then discussed who would run his office in his absence and he said that he considered [ ] co-equals and that they were under instruction to check anything out with either CABELL or myself in his absence.

I told WHITE that I would like to go to our [ ] some-time at an early date and he said he would make a note to LOGISTICS that next time a plane was going down, I would be advised. I also pointed out that I had not been to [ ] dropped in later to say he would like to take me down for a full day. We agreed on a Tuesday or Thursday and he said that he would put it on his calendar for probably some-time in August or early September.

[ ] called to pass on a report (which I believe came from the effect that a number of top newspapermen in Washington resented the lack of cooperation from CIA and the fact that a certain number of newspapermen seemed to have special privileges here. He cited the case of

**TOP SECRET**

23 July 1958 (con't)

RICHARD HARKNESS seeing the Director on the day of the coup in [redacted]. [redacted] said he would not tell me his source and that for obvious reasons he could not put this through official channels but he hoped I would pass it on to the Director. (I called [redacted] to tell him that I did not want this item used but that I was getting more than a little tired of the attitude of [redacted] and others in thinking they had sources they would not reveal to senior officials of the Agency. I warned him that one of these days there would be a showdown on it.)

25X1

I called CASSIDY to advise him that the reports on [redacted] and 5412 were en route. He asked me also to check up on how our communications stood up in the crisis.

25X1

With [redacted] had lunch with [redacted] who is here on home leave and taking the courses on liaison and CE. [redacted] thought quite well of the courses but made two rather interesting comments--one to the effect that he had not been promoted to a 13 and had the distinct impression that in order to get this promotion he had to return to headquarters at the end of another two years which he thought was rather foolish in view [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Meeting of the CAREER COUNCIL.

ROBERT AMORY advised that he was seeing KENWORTHY of the N.Y. TIMES because the N.Y. TIMES BUREAU did not feel that they were getting satisfaction with GROGAN.

TOP SECRET

Thursday, 24 July 1958

25X1 Went to lunch at [ ] apartment with [ ] 25X1

Meeting of the Supergrade Board.

Attended award presentations for two TSS men.

GEORGE CAREY passed on the information that he had heard that the Vice President was seriously concerned about the views of JOHN BAKER.

25X1 [ ] dropped in to discuss briefly the situation in [ ] 25X1

25X1 AMORY called to say that MARCY of the Senate Foreign Relations was complaining about the Director dodging a meeting with them. I suggested he refer this entire matter to [ ] who came over to discuss it with me.

ASHCRAFT called to ask if I had any ideas for a job for [ ] 25X1

25X1 Houston buzzed to say that he had a call from a MISS HENDERSON of Senator Case's office following a call or visit (not sure which) from [ ]. Mr. HOUSTON said they had called him because his name had come up in conversation; they indicated [ ] was headed for GEN. CASSIDY's office. I read to Mr. HOUSTON our most recent items in the case report and said that GEN. CASSIDY had read the case file, etc. I believe Mr. HOUSTON planned to call CASSIDY just to alert him of the possibility of a visit from [ ] You may wish to talk 25X1 to HOUSTON about this further.....rcm.

Friday, 25 July 1958

25X1 Lunch with [ ]

Discussion of the problems in FI with the survey team.

25X1 DCI asked if I knew what GEN. HULL was coming over to see him about. I replied in negative. I then met with DCI and GEN. HULL and Director asked me to pull together material on [ ] crisis for meeting with Senate Foreign Relations.

TRUSCOTT asked me to be sure to keep CASSIDY informed on NSCIDs.

25X1 [ ] brought me the paper which TRUSCOTT had written clarifying his status and he appeared to be satisfied with this.

25X1 Discussed with DCI: [ ]-he was aware that G. was working for us; 25X1 [ ] had warned him that [ ] was inclined to spread rumors; AMORY's 25X1 insistence in meeting newspaper men and disregard for instructions; and [ ] 25X1 [ ] radio set.

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

25 July 1958 (con't)

25X1

[redacted]

I also asked him to speed up the preparation of material for PRC review of the budget. 25X1

Discussed with HOUSTON-- [redacted]  
on a Joint Committee, and the

GROGAN came in again to complain about the illicit contacts with the press by ROBERT AMORY.

Personnel Office called to say that MR. STEWART yesterday received a call from NORRIS of the Civil Service Commission Examining Board. 25X1  
[redacted] 25X1

OGC

FOIAB5

Monday, 28 July 1958

No Deputies' Meeting.

Delivered lecture to the Strategic Intelligence School.

Tuesday, 29 July 1958

IG staff meeting followed by the Deputies Meeting.

25X1 [redacted] came over to discuss the complaint against the Medical Staff; I did not reveal to him the identity of the complainant.

25X1 Talked to [redacted] about the [redacted] cable and he sent [redacted] up, 25X1 who went over the cable with me and then briefed me on the DCI's discussion with GEN. EDWIN CLARK.

25X1 [redacted] suggested I get from [redacted] the State Dept. files on [redacted] if I 25X1 would find them of interest.

25X1 [redacted] called from N.Y.C. and said that he had talked to TOM 25X1 [redacted] about the [redacted] IG job and that [redacted] promised to give him an answer in a month. He said that he thought the odds were 60 to 40 that [redacted] would take it 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

Wednesday, 30 July 1958

25X1

[ ] came in and said that the revised NSCIDs would be ready to go to NSC early next week. I so advised COYNE.

25X1

[ ] called and said that DCI briefing of Senate Foreign Relations had gone very well.

DDCI asked me to send him some material on [ ] to take over to House Armed Services.

25X1

25X1

I called ANGLETON and asked him to send up the file of the work that [ ] had been doing.

25X1

25X1

EDWARDS called about the Security Officer job for [ ] and I pointed out that [ ] felt it was a question of relocating [ ] before we did anything else.

25X1

25X1

COYNE called to ask if we would have any objection to HAROLD LAWRENCE handcarrying the ELINT study up to BAKER to read. I said no inasmuch as I understood this Committee's charter included review of that.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

31 July 1958 (Thursday)

25X1

[REDACTED]

Lunch with [REDACTED]

25X1

EDWARDS called to say that he had had his exit interview with [REDACTED] and warned him in strongest terms about any mud slinging concerning [REDACTED].

25X1

[REDACTED] called and asked if I would set up an appointment for [REDACTED] to see ED SAXE of CBS. I called SAXE's office but he is in Europe until mid-August. I advised [REDACTED] and said I would call him later.

25X1

EILEEN KELLY of PARAMOUNT Pictures. NA 8-8190. called to find out if we had a further analysis of the [REDACTED]

25X1

Friday, 1 August 1958

At DCI's meeting discussed the request by House Appropriations for closer liaison with one of their staff men.

[REDACTED] asked if he could go to New York to get his will cleared up. I agreed.

Lunch for [REDACTED] by the Staff at the Watergate.

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

Monday, 4 August 1958

Deputies' Meeting. Said nothing and was told to do nothing.

Senior Staff Meeting at which DCI asked if I would undertake to review with GROGAN CIA history and recommend what should be done about it.

Meeting with [ ] on selection-out.

[ ]

25X1

Tuesday, 5 August 1958

Called GROGAN and suggested that he let the Washington Post know that we did not particularly appreciate their snide way of handling [ ] employment in the article on the death of his child.

25X1

IG staff meeting attended by WHITE, STEWART and [ ] at which we reviewed the selection-out program.

25X1

Called ANGLETON to ask him to send somebody up for the meeting on [ ]

[ ] brought up his draft of a paper on [ ] and I went over it with him.

[ ] brought over a paper which the DCI's office had sent them on outside boards and suggested we could answer it better than they. I agreed.

[ ] brought down the reply on Recommendation #3 and I commented on it.

[ ]

Called J. C. KING concerning [ ] and he agreed we could have him when he returns from [ ]

Meeting with CAREY, EDWARDS, [ ] GROGAN and [ ]. memorandum for the record dated 12 August 1958.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

5 August 1958 (con't)

J. C. KING came up and briefed me on my [ ] trip.

25X1

[ ] dropped in to say goodbye prior to leaving for [ ]

25X1

[ ] came in to say hello and we briefly discussed his work there.

25X1

6 August 1958, Wednesday

Called SHELDON to ask that he send some people to brief me on my trip.

Called GARRISON to defer our lunch and visit to the [ ] Warehouse until after my return.

25X1

At the DCI's meeting suggested that one of the subjects for discussion at the President's Board would be service attaches; that another would be our relations with Congress.

Advised the DCI of the status of the [ ]

25X1

DCI asked that I review the consultants list and suggest the deletion of those not in regular use.

He also asked that [ ] send to FRANCIS BOLTON the status of our language program.

Cassidy came over to discuss the President's Board. See memorandum for the record dated 11 August 1958.

CASSIDY called later to ask why the IAC had taken up comparative evaluations as he understood this was to be quite closely held. I suggested that GEN. HULL might discuss this with the DCI.

Called KING and asked him to check as a matter of priority on [ ]

25X1

EDWARDS called and said that TSS had recently used [ ], who wrote the letter for [ ]

[ ]

**TOP SECRET**

6 August 1958 (con't)

25X1 [ ] dropped in to ask if there were any areas of disagreement between  
CIA and FBI and I told him quite frankly that I had heard of some unhappiness  
25X1 on our side about their handling of the surveillance of a courier to one of the  
25X1 [ ] He said that they recognized that their surveillance had been  
[ ] had and that as a result they had revised their whole technique in handling

25X1 [ ] called to ask whether he should show [ ] his fitness report. 25X1  
I said I would leave it up to him.

Thursday, 7 August 1958

25X1 KING and [ ] came up to brief [ ] and myself on the countries 25X1  
25X1 where we are going. They were followed by [ ] of OCI. 25X1

25X1 [ ] came in with a draft of a letter to [ ] 25X1

25X1 WHITE dropped in with briefing notes on [ ] expense accounts 25X1  
25X1 [ ] and the audit report on [ ] 25X1

Meeting of PRC at which we approved the budget figures for FY 1960 and the  
projection for FY 1961.

Called ANGLETON to ask if he wanted to read the draft of the CI survey, and 25X1  
inasmuch as he was going on leave, we agreed that we would leave this until we  
both returned.

25X1 GARRISON advised me of a complaint of misfeasance concerning head of their  
[ ] warehouse and that he and EDWARDS were investigating the matter and  
would advise me as soon as they had ascertained the facts.

Discussed with WHITE the manpower level paper which has to go forward with the  
budget and we agreed that the Director would probably not go along with any  
increase.

**TOP SECRET**

**Page Denied**

8-28 August 1958

25X1

Left Washington at 1245 to tour and inspect [redacted]

Arrived Washington 28 August at 2405.

29 August 1958

At the DCI's meeting gave a brief summary of my views on the Latin American trip. The Director said that he wanted me to brief Assistant Secretary Rubottom and also to send a copy of my report to the Vice President.

2 September 1958

IG staff meeting at which principal discussion concerned selection out cases and report of the trip to Latin America.

[redacted] came up and we discussed primarily the [redacted] in view of the lunch with [redacted]


Lunch with [redacted] which reported on this). In addition to what was contained in that cable, [redacted] again asked that we expedite our views on a minister for his embassy. He now has a list of 4 potential

25X1

CABELL and [redacted] came down to discuss the [redacted] case. CABELL objected to our memorandum on it saying that it did not identify as to why it was written and as far as he could see, contained very little in addition to that in the Director of Personnel's memo. He requested that we prepare memos on appeals from selection out cases only in those instances where there is an appeal and that we then indicate our recommendation for either upholding the selection out or upholding the appeal. He requested that in those instances where we found errors in procedure or activities of the Agency we put them in separate memoranda.


2 September 1958 (con't)

CABELL buzzed on the report required by the NSC and said that he did not think that the 60-page report which had been prepared was what was wanted and asked what I would think of cutting it down to about three or four pages. I said that I thought this would be acceptable and pointed out that we had also been requested to provide a brief covering memo giving the Director's personal views as to progress. He said that he did not feel that this would conflict with 25X1 what he had in mind.




n

25X1

 asked if I would address one of their review courses in his office on 18 September at 11:15 A. M.

3 September 1958

25X1




25X1



3 September 1958 (con't)

25X1



Talked to [redacted]. (See report of interview with returnee).

Called [redacted] N call on

4 September 1958

Spent 45 minutes briefing Gen. CABELL on the Latin American trip.

GROGAN called to say that JERRY GREEN of the Washington Daily News had a story on [redacted] who claims that he talked about a proposition to ALLEN DULLES. I confirmed this and GROGAN checked back with GREEN who will handle the article favorably toward the Agency.

Called [redacted] and asked him to send a cable to [redacted], suggesting that they arrange a trip under orders for [redacted]

Lunch with [redacted]

Meeting with STEWART, [redacted] GATES LLOYD and [redacted] on PSAS. We agreed on the agenda for 17 September, set a goal of \$20,000 for this year's campaign, and also agreed to set aside several thousand dollars to be placed in the hands of the Comptroller to be drawn upon by the authority of any station chief when needed for an emergency, with a notice to this effect to be circulated to the field immediately.

STEWART showed us a letter on the executive pay bill and I said I would check with the President's Board to determine whether they would be willing to send it. STEWART also checked with me on [redacted] and said he would ask her to come see me.

GROGAN called about the article about AMORY and reported that he had sent the original to the Director at the time it came out.

5 September 1958

At the Deputies Meeting I said I was going to invite Adm. "Mary" Miles over for lunch as a public relations gesture in view of his unhappy experience with OSS. GEN. CABELL said he thought this was a good idea and would like to attend if possible.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Suggested to [ ] that he write a memo on the Latin American trip covering particularly the questions of attitude. Also approved his taking leave from 17 September through 7 October.

6 September 1958

"Studies in Intelligence" group met in Inspector General's office.

8 September 1958

At Senior Staff Meeting I gave a brief review of my trip to Latin America.

Lunch with GEN. CASSIDY at which we discussed the meeting of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities on 2 October.

At KENT's request, read the latest estimates on [ ] and advised him that I agreed with it.

25X1

25X1

25X1

GROGAN advised that [ ] had requested permission to resume teaching a course at [ ] on political parties. I told him that I saw no reason to object to this.

GATES LLOYD called to ask how [ ] was doing in [ ] and I told him all right.

25X1

25X1

[ ] reviewed the [ ] case with me and I told them that I thought we should wrap up the action as quickly as possible and then do any investigation in Security that might be required.

25X1

8 September 1958 (con't)

Met with the FI group to review progress on the survey.

25X1 [ ] came in to bring his paper on his alleged mishandling by the Agency. He said he could be reached at [ ] 25X1

Told GORDON STEWART that GEN. CASSIDY had been receptive to the PBCFIA sending a letter on the Executive Pay Bill and that I would check it out with the Acting DCI.

25X1 Talked to [ ] and advised them that he had returned and that we would now try to settle him here.

25X1 [ ] called and I urged that he keep a very careful eye on [ ] 25X1 to make sure he did not get off the beaten track.

25X1 HOUSTON said he wanted to come over and bring [ ] who is his 25X1 representative in [ ]

GROGAN called to say that a letter was being sent to me which had been received from Congressman Teague and raised questions concerning Amory's speeches.

EDWARDS came over to bring the [ ] file and to say that the matter 25X1 concerning them most was his correspondence with a woman in Russia. EDWARDS also mentioned to me the case of [ ] who is being selected out 25X1 and who is counter-attacking vigorously and implying that several of the [ ] 25X1 have not been competent.

25X1 Talked to [ ] case and told him that I thought we ought 25X1 close it out just as quickly as possible.

9 September 1958

IG staff meeting.

Lectured to the Foreign Service Officers' Mid Career Course.

25X1 [ ] said that [ ] had sought him out for lunch and in effect said he was getting no backing from the CI Staff and that unless he could get the program moving, he probably would get out.



9 September 1958 (con't)

HOUSTON called me about the TEAGUE letter and I pointed out that CABELL knew TEAGUE and perhaps he would be willing to talk to him about it.

25X1 [ ] called to say he had asked [ ] to see me this week before he left. 25X1

25X1 [ ] came up to talk about revisions in the presentation at [ ]

10 September 1958

25X1

[ ]  
TIETJEN, at his request, came over to review the progress in the Psychiatric Division. He has handed the chieftanship to [ ], has another doctor 25X1 coming into the Division later this winter who trained at Cornell Medical Center in New York. He is in the process of analyzing the three principal roles of the Psychiatric Division, namely selection, clinical, and operational. He is going to set up a card file so that some experience graph can be developed.

25X1

25X1 [ ] came in to discuss his career. I told him that on my own initiative I would like to appeal his medical turn-down. 25X1

25X1 [ ] came in to say goodbye.

25X1 [ ] came down to see if I had any ideas on what followup there should be on the TSS survey and I suggested that this be taken up with the DD/P.

25X1 [ ] came to lunch. [ ]  
25X1 [ ] I told [ ] to call [ ] at [ ]  
25X1 [ ]

Attended funeral service for [ ] at Ft. Myer.

25X1

11 September 1958

25X1 Saw CABELL to discuss the NSA visit which he said to go ahead and set up. Also discussed the cable to the Director on the President's Board, whether there should be a DCI comment on the NSC report. We discussed whether Photo Intelligence should be on our charts and agreed this was a likely subject for discussion at the staff meeting. Finally, we reviewed in some detail the case of [ ] and he agreed to turn down the appeal. He also suggested that in the future I personally review all selection out cases with him. 25X1

[ ] 25X1

[ ]

12 September 1958

No deputies meeting.

25X1 [ ] called and I told him that I had discussed the case with GEN. CABELL and that after careful and deliberate consideration it had been regrettably decided that he would have to leave the Agency. I told him however that I would talk to the Personnel Office and attempt to insure that he was put in the most favorable possible light when inquiries were received from other agencies.

25X1 [ ] came up and brought a file of [ ] papers that had come 25X1 from State. He also said that [ ] was abroad and that he would be back in October at which time I could talk to him about his claim against [ ] 25X1

25X1 Called CRITCHFIELD and told him that I would appreciate his talking to [ ] which he said he would do, and I called [ ] and told him to 25X1 call CRITCHFIELD.

Lunch with BAIRD.

12 September 1958 (con't)

25X1 [ ] called and said that they had finally caught up with [ ] 25X1  
25X1 [ ] but that he did not have very much to offer.

25X1 [ ] came in and said that she had two questions: first, was there  
anything in her record that might preclude her being rehired. I told her that the  
problem had primarily concerned her husband and that it had been a matter of  
conduct rather than security and that as far as being rehired was concerned, if  
her conduct was satisfactory her work record was sufficiently good so that she  
would have no problem being rehired. Her second question concerned a possible  
25X1 transfer to [ ] I said that this would depend on the time that this occurred  
and where i [ ] they would be located. I said that after passage of several  
years the people involved might very well not even be in [ ] any more and 25X1  
that there would be no problem.

[ ] 25X1

15 September 1958

25X1 At the deputies meeting discussed the question of putting a photo intelligence  
center indication on the charts of the Agency used to brief outsiders. After general  
discussion of this, GEN. CABELL ruled that it was all right to put them on the 25X1  
charts. I also advised the deputies of the problem with [ ] and said  
that he might well try to come into the Agency through any media. Also GEN. CABELL

[ ]

[ ] 25X1

[ ] 25X1

15 September 1958 (con't)

25X1

[redacted] came in to leave with me a folder of correspondence with her ex-husband. I told her that I wanted to make it very clear to her that whereas I would advise him that she was in a part of the Agency where service overseas was required and that we would appreciate his not placing obstacles in the way of her going overseas, that beyond that the Agency will do nothing further as this was a matter between them.

[redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[redacted]

25X1

Called STEWART and pointed out to him the almost untenable position we were putting people like [redacted] in and suggested that his staff modify their statements. 25X1

Asked STEWART what had transpired between himself and [redacted] See memorandum for the record, this date.

25X1

25X1

GEN. CABELL called to say that he would prefer to have me rather than [redacted] sit in on the interview with [redacted] because he thought that [redacted] might react adversely to having two Generals present.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] called to say that [redacted] would be in town shortly and I said that I wanted to see him. 25X1

[redacted]

16 September 1958

IG staff meeting at which which we discussed the future program for the staff.

Reviewed the FI survey with [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

25X1

[redacted] n

25X1

Sat in with the A/DCI for a meeting with [redacted]. See memorandum for the record. 25X1

[redacted]

EDWARDS called me concerning [redacted] I told him I would send him a memo on it and he pointed out that [redacted] who was now in [redacted] and was known to be an [redacted] had gotten in touch with [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

ANGLETON called and said he wanted to come up and talk about [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] called to say that he and DR. TIETJEN had reached an impasse on the DD/I project. He said that he had been asked for an interim report in July which he supplied but had never heard any comment on until he called to ask about it two weeks ago when he was told that another report was due September 15. He asked to see DR. TIETJEN but TIETJEN said he would see him only after he talked with [redacted] I asked him what his work with this group showed and he said while it was incomplete and they planned to meet 3 or 4 times this Fall, it tended to confirm some of the stresses that had been noted among Agency personnel, particularly in regard to the effect of working in a security agency on personal lives. There seemed to be a strong feeling indicated that there was a variability of security requirements and people felt they never really knew what security would want under certain conditions. [redacted] said his group started out with 12 or 13 but ended up with 10 in the senior grades in ORR. I thanked him for calling and said I would look into it.

25X1

25X1

25X1

←

17 September 1958

25X1 [ ] talked to me about making a speech before the staff of the Inter-American Defense Board on 14 October. I said I would do it.

25X1 [ ] of PP Staff called to clarify what was desired for the briefing of the PBCFIA on gorilla warfare. I told him that I thought this should emphasize our role in unconventional warfare rather than anything such as limited war.

25X1

25X1 REBER came down and I asked him if he would object to my seeing whether I could persuade [ ] to take on the job of shepherding [ ].  
25X1 He suggested I write [ ]

25X1 [ ] of ONE came up to tell me about a security violation which he had had. It seems that at 12:30 Monday morning a folder had been discovered in his office and that he was held responsible for all of the material in the room. He had not been in the office since 3:30 Friday afternoon and there are several safes in the place to which at least 7 people have the combination. I told him that under these conditions he should appeal the responsibility because the guards were supposed to check the room several times each day and that there was obviously a chance that others might have left the folders out. He did not wish my intervention at the time and said he would follow my advice.

Lunch with ANGLETON. See memorandum for the record.

Meeting of the PSAS trustees at which time we agreed to the proposal of putting some cash in the hands of the Comptroller so that station chiefs can advance money without prior reference to Washington.

25X1 [ ] came in to leave with me her statement of her sad case.

BAIRD called about the letters and said he had been informed that they would have to go through CABELL.

25X1 HOUSTON called about the [ ] case and said he thought he would hold it for the Director.

18 September 1958

25X1 [ ] came over to say he had heard various rumors and reports  
25X1 about [ ] and wondered what the facts were.  
25X1 [ ] came in looking for a job and I gave him the pertinent forms  
to fill out.

Talked to Contact Division field personnel on general status of the intelligence community.

25X1 Talked to both [ ] and WHITE concerning the letters for the American  
25X1 Heritage course. [ ] said he had sent them to WHITE and WHITE said he was  
holding them because [ ] thought the Director would want to sign them.  
I told them both I thought this was a case which the Director should not sign them  
and urged they be released for BAIRD's signature. WHITE later saw me at PRC  
and said he had shown the letter and list to GEN. CABELL who refused to have  
anything to do with it whatsoever and said they should be held for the Director's  
return.

Attended PRC meeting at which we agreed to double up the program review  
next year and meet from 3:30 to 5:00 on Thursdays. We also agreed to have  
individual sessions with DD/I and DD/S to review their annual programs. DD/I  
suggested that we particularly review the work of the Photo Intelligence Center,  
OSI and ORR.

19 September 1958

25X1

[ ]

25X1 [ ] called and I made an appointment for him with [ ] and ask  
25X1 that [ ] keep me advised of the discussions.

25X1 [ ] came in and we discussed the [ ] case. I suggested that he  
give WHITE his conclusions and recommendations to read. He did this and reported  
back that WHITE took a very critical view of the case and thought that the sooner  
she was terminated the better.

Lunch with PAT COYNE.

19 September 1958

BAIRD came in to discuss what he should tell WHITE about the [ ] course and I told him he should be perfectly direct and tell WHITE he cleared with me because he considered I was better qualified to offer advice than anybody else. BAIRD called back later and said WHITE had been fairly reasonable on it and simply pointed out that the Director had criticized him for not clearing signs that were put up and he therefore did not feel BAIRD should go ahead on his own.

Review of progress of FI survey with [ ]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

22 September 1958

[ ] of Training called to say that they had been advised that one of the MP's at [ ] had made a complaint to the Army IG. He asked me who the Army IG was and whether he was cleared. I said that the Army IG was Gen. PEARSON and that while he had not been given any special clearance by the Agency he obviously had necessary clearance for any discussions that might be involved.

Lunch with J. C. KING. Spent about two hours briefing him on my [ ] trip.

25X1  
25X1



2

23 September 1958

Devoted bulk of IG staff meeting to discussing with [ ] overall  
problem of Agency requirements. We referred him to ELOISE PAGE's article  
in the forthcoming issue of Studies in Intelligence and urged him to talk to

25X1

[ ]

and I set up an appointment for him to talk  
to [ ]

25X1

[ ]

25X1

STEWART called about the [ ] case and asked if we had completed our  
review. He said he particularly appreciated our asking [ ] to write out his  
allegations because he (STEWART) did not feel that his people had done a very  
good job in interrogation.

25X1

HOUSTON dropped in to say that the Army had set up a contract with  
American University to prepare a study on resistance movements in World War II,  
and that they planned to use France as a case in point. We agreed that [ ]  
would be an ideal man to see about this.

2

23 September 1958 (con't)

25X1

Lunch with [ ] See memorandum for the record.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

[ ] called re the matter at [ ] He said our people 25X1  
saw GEN. PEARSON's Executive Officer; the conversation came around to who is  
the controlling office in this matter which involved [ ] He said our boys 25X1  
explained that it was classified information. The EO then asked if this had any-  
thing to do with Mr. Kirkpatrick. Our people said that it did. A Lt. Col. APPLETON  
has been designated by GEN. PEARSON to handle this complaint and future complaints.  
APPLETON will be security cleared. PEARSON may call as a matter of protocol.....  
drm/rcm.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, 24 September 1958

Houston called and asked if I had heard the two reports concerning Mansfield's views about the agency to the effect that he liked Allen Dulles but he didn't trust the Agency. I told him that I had.

25X1 Houston also pointed out that his office had received a request from Security from [ ] asking whether she could take leave to work in the office of Kenneth Keating who is running for the Senate from New York. I said it should be turned down and mentioned the fact that I had to see her on certain associations.

25X1 [ ] I called and/asked him to lunch.

25X1

Lunch for Admiral MILTON MILES. attended by [ ]

25X1  
25X1

Advised HOUSTON of the letters from Senator Lausche.

25X1

25X1 [ ] called to ask if I would support [ ] candidacy for the National War College.

Went over the CI survey with [ ]

25X1

25X1 [ ] brought over the papers on the [ ]

25X1

25X1 KARAMESSINES called to see if he and [ ] could come up to go over the papers for the President's Board.

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

Thursday, 25 September 1958

25X1

Together with [ ] went to NSA to discuss certain matters in connection with our survey of [ ] We talked to [ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ] Also had lunch with the above group, except [ ]

25X1

25X1

[ ]

25X1

25X1

KARAMESSINES [ ] came over with the Limited Warfare paper and the one on [ ]

DCI called me down and asked if I would undertake to make a study of what sort of a system we could set up so that the children of employees overseas who are attending school in the United States would have somebody in Washington that they could call in the event of emergency or to seek advice./ He also asked if I would see if some system could be worked out where we would use less pseudonyms and cryptonyms in cables and dispatches. He said that he was constantly plagued when abroad by being unable to understand the cables from Washington./ He said that he was only in [ ] for a day but that he was seriously disturbed about the ability of [ ] to do that job./ He asked if I knew [ ] in [ ] and said that he thought he was doing an outstanding job./ He asked whether [ ] who ran [ ] was any good and I told him that he was probably lazy but quite smart./ I also suggested that [ ] would be a good candidate to run TSS.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Attended meeting of Career Council to choose candidates for the National War College and Harvard School of Advanced Management.

CORD MEYER called to say that [ ] lawyer is threatening to bring suit immediately.

25X1

LBKirkpatrick

Friday, 26 September 1958

Attended Deputies meeting and reported on the visit to NSA; the Lausche letters; [redacted] and the lunch for Admiral Miles. 25X1

25X1

-

25X1  
25X1

[redacted]

-

25X1

[redacted] called to ask the title of my speech on 3 October.

-

25X1

I called [redacted] to tell him to cable [redacted] to call off his lawyer. 25X1

-

Coyne called to say that [redacted] had requested 25 copies of NSCID-6 and to ask whether we thought this was excessive or permissible. I called Sheldon and he said he saw no reason why it shouldn't be granted. I called Coyne back. 25X1

-

25X1

[redacted] came to lunch. (See memorandum for the record.)

-

25X1

Called [redacted] to ask about getting some films processed.

-

25X1

Called BAIRD to tell him that I plan to talk to the Director over the weekend about the [redacted] program.

-

Reviewed the course of the FI survey.

LBKirkpatrick

~~TOP SECRET~~

29 September 1958

CASSIDY called about the meetings of the President's Board and I told him we would send over an agenda for the Director's discussions.

COYNE was advised that we had no objection to disseminating NSCID #6 in 25 copies to NSA.

25X1 [ ] and I went over the CI Staff and I gave him several areas for further exploration.

25X1 [ ] came up and I reviewed with him rather briefly the subjects I plan to discuss with the new JOTs.

25X1 Lunch with [ ]

25X1 Called [ ] concerning [ ] He said that he had received the 25X1 material and discussed it with [ ]. He recalled to my attention that 25X1 they had once before considered [ ] for an assignment up there and had been very impressed with his qualifications. He said that he would go over to talk to 25X1 [ ] and would let me know. When [ ] called in I told 25X1 him that we were making progress on his case.

EDWARDS called concerning [ ] and asked if I was aware 25X1 of some security problems in regard to him. He said he would send over a mem 25X1 on the subject.

~~TOP SECRET~~

12

The DCI commented that he thought the scientific attache program was a failure.

He saw [ ] and thought that he should be used.

He would like to see a [ ] expert in Europe and was advised there were already four [ ] officers there.

He asked who was drawing together the papers in the [ ] case and was told it was the CI Staff.

He commented that [ ] deputy was not too good and might be succeeded.

In [ ] he felt that [ ] had done a fine job and was THE American in [ ]

He felt the [ ] situation was better but that there was a fight going on over [ ] He also felt we were pushing the [ ] case too hard.

He saw [ ] and discussed the [ ] with him and thought we ought to let [ ] buy a part of it. He also told [ ] we should step up our work in [ ]

In [ ] he feels that we are in the best position we have been in in a long time. He was highly complimentary of the job [ ] as done and praised his genius in teaching English in an effort to gain influence in the [ ]

[ ] he pressured [ ] on the returnees and also mentioned the problem to the Minister of Interior. He feels we should watch the handling of our relations with the [ ] underground and asked where the contact with [ ] was coordinated. He also mentioned the fact that the [ ] were seriously concerned about [ ]

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

30 September 1958

25X1 Called BAIRD to make sure he was advised about the state of  
[redacted]s wife's health.

25X1 [redacted] called on the 5412 meeting and said he would send up  
the papers after they had met with the Board.

Meeting of the IG staff.

25X1 [redacted] dropped in to say hello and advised that he would  
report for duty about the first of the year.

KARAMESSINES brought up the material for the President's Board.

25X1 [redacted] came in. See memorandum for the record.

25X1

25X1 Sent [redacted] the correspondence and all attachments from Admiral  
Milton MILES.

1 October 1958

BAIRD called me on the JOT lecture.

Asked WHITE to get the amended cost on the [redacted] 25X1

Called EDWARDS to ask him to check on [redacted] 25X1  
Security had no information.

Lunch with GARRISON and inspection of the [redacted] warehouse. 25X1

Met with DCI and turned over to him the material for the President's Board. 25X1



**Page Denied**

R

SECRET

2 October 1958 (con't)

25X1 Asked ASHCRAFT to contact DEAN RUSK's office and get the letters they received regarding  25X1

BAIRD dropped in to say that the Director had ruled out all the people on the American Heritage course whom the Director himself would have to invite or introduce.

CASSIDY called and asked if the Director would meet with the Board tomorrow at 2:30. He later called and said the Board did not feel it was necessary for the Director to come over again. 25X1

3 October 1958

25X1 Lunch with HELMS

Delivered talk to the JOT class on--"What is an Intelligence Officer?" 25X1

SECRET

TOP SECRET

6 October 1958

2

25X1 [ ] Advised theDeputies Meeting of [ ] scheme to get [ ] 25X1  
[ ] to finance his trip to Vienna; 25X1  
25X1 of the efforts I was making to relocate [ ]  
and of my visit to [ ]

25X1 Attended Senior Staff Meeting at which GEORGE CAREY asked if I  
would talk to the [ ] field chiefs on 23 October at 3:30. The DCI asked  
if I would give him a memorandum on the loose ends in regard to the recommenda-  
tions of the President's Board.

Met with WHITE and BAIRD to discuss the [ ] course 25X1  
and agreed on the speakers.

25X1 Lunch with [ ] at which we generally discussed the relations  
25X1 with the [ ] He then told me about his difficulties in finding three (3)  
25X1 replacements for the staff of the Board of Estimates. He said he had taken  
this up with [ ] but that he would keep me advised of his  
successes.

Called CASSIDY to arrange about HULL's going to the JCS briefing.  
The DCI objected to CASSIDY's going so I suggested to CASSIDY that he call  
COL. HILLIARD himself. He said he would and he also advised that he had  
changed his mind about going.

25X1 [ ] called and said that [ ] had been in to see 25X1  
him and that he could shed some light on her story. I told him I would call  
him when I had had a chance to review the case.

25X1 [ ] of Security called and said that [ ] had made an inquiry about 25X1  
25X1 [ ] who was applying there for a job. I told him to advise [ ] of 25X1  
the facts in the case.

Met with the FI inspection team to review the progress of the inspection.

25X1 [ ] called about the meeting with MAC~~E~~Y and I said I thought we  
ought to do it as quickly as possible.

ASHCRAFT called to advise they had gotten the letters from DEAN RUSK  
and that they were not too exciting.

25X1 [ ] called to say that Security would be perfectly happy to  
have me review the speeches of the InterAmerican Defense Board.

R

7 October 1958

IG staff meeting.

25X1  
25X1

[redacted] came in to say goodbye.  
[redacted] came in to brief me on what had transpired thus far at the briefings of MAC~~KEY~~.

CASSIDY came over to brief me on the conclusions and probable recommendations of the President's Board. See memorandum for the record.

GROGAN came over to say that the Hollywood people who are producing THE COUNTERFEIT TRAITOR would be here the week of 20 October and would like to have further discussion with me.

ATTENDED the Director's luncheon for [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] dropped in. See returnee interview card.

25X1  
25X1

Called [redacted] to ask him to see [redacted] and he in turn asked me if I could help them locate [redacted] a job. I called SHERMAN KENT about [redacted] and he said no in 22 languages.

25X1

25X1

Talked to [redacted] and he will start the circuit around the New England colleges next week.

8 October 1958

25X1

Spent the day with [redacted] inspecting our installations in the [redacted]. See memorandum for the record.

~~TOP SECRET~~

9 October 1958

25X1

[ ] came in to talk about what he wanted to do when he got back. He said he wants very much to take over [ ] if he can persuade the DD/P to allow him to report directly to the DD/P and he can concentrate on the [ ] He called back to say that he had had lunch with HELMS and HELMS agreed to this.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[ ] dropped in to say hello. [ ] of I&R came in and I gave him a quick review of the various WH problems in the different Latin American countries.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Met with the DCI to have him sign the letter to LAUSCHE about [ ] and the letter to the [ ] He asked me to call [ ] concerning his discussion with [ ] which I did. He asked me to call [ ] to tell him to revive the Khrushchev speech of three years ago attacking STALIN, which he did. He also asked that I ask RED WHITE to get together the figures on the Convair without attracting attention to the review.

25X1

[ ] called to say that he and [ ] were worried about their being the finance mechanism in the [ ] case. I said that we could take care of that very easily.

25X1

Lunch with ROBERT MACY and FRANK ECKER of the Bureau of the Budget which was also attended by WHITE, [ ]

25X1

Delivered talk to the Clandestine Services Review course.

25X1

□

~~TOP SECRET~~

R

10 October 1958

25X1

[redacted] came in to ask whether the Director had raised either the subject of limited warfare or an American volunteer group at the President's Board meeting. I said no. He asked whether I knew if the Director agreed with the limited war paper. I said no and suggested that he get HELMS to raise it at the Deputies Meeting on Monday to get the Director's view.

GEN. TRUSCOTT came down and I briefed him generally on the President's Board meeting.

He then told me about the visits of [redacted] concerning the adverse I&R report on war planning and of the session that they had had with GEN. CABELL in which GEN. CABELL said to leave it as it is. GEN. TRUSCOTT said he thought there was considerable need for a change. con-25X1

WHITE called me about the MACY visit and said that MACY had forgotten about his concern about communications but that he might raise any of the following subjects: PP efforts in friendly versus denied areas; evaluation of operations and projects; war plans; TSS; [redacted] country teams; the over-all evaluation of CIA's effort; and the PRC. 25X1 25X1

[redacted]

25X1

BAIRD called and said that Security had turned down five of the potential speakers and he asked me to appeal to them on [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] said I would.

25X1

Talked to [redacted] and gave him a mandate to go ahead with the New England universities.

Talked to the JOTs on the future of American intelligence.

25X1

25X1

Told [redacted] he could ride with me to [redacted] next week. 25X1

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

**Page Denied**

**TOP SECRET**

13 October 1958

Attended the deputies' meeting.

25X1 [ ] advised me that he had had an interview with [ ] and had 25X1 informed him of the decision and our concurrence in his selection out. EDWARDS called me later and I advised him that the case had been finished up here and gone back to Personnel.

25X1 [ ] Staff called to ask me to check with the Vice President's office to see if he was making a speech on the 23rd of October concerning Theodore Roosevelt in which he could make a reference to the anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution. I gave the DCI a note on this to take up with the Vice President at the NSC meeting if he was there, but the DCI returned it saying the Vice President was not there. On Wednesday I was able to reach CUSHMAN in the Vice President's office who checked for me and found out that the Vice President was intending to make a speech in New York on the 23rd and that they would be interested in commenting on the Hungarian Revolution. I so informed 25X1 [ ] and asked that he have the material that they wanted in CUSHMAN's office, Room 361, Senate Office Building, by close of business 16 October.

Called HOWARD RUSK about the Director's back and told him the diagnosis that TIETJEN gave to him. He recommended that Dr. CHARLES WISE be called in on the case.

WHITE confirmed my attending his staff meeting Wednesday, the 22nd of October, at 1100 A.M.

25X1 Lunch with [ ] 25X1

[ ] 25X1  
Reviewed the progress of the FI survey with the FI group.



R

SECRET

14 October 1958

Meeting of the IG Staff at which time I asked for any ideas they might have for my talks to the various deputies' staff meetings and also for our projected work which I want to present to the Director next week.

CASSIDY called to say that on the November 20th meeting GEN. HULL stated that he wanted a briefing by the "Indians" and that they would have 4 or 5 hours to spend on it.

25X1

[REDACTED]

Talked to the Inter-American Defense Board.

25X1

Lunch with [REDACTED]

Meeting with the DCI. See memorandum for the record.

Review of proposal for selection out with [REDACTED] See memoran25X1 for the record.

25X1

[REDACTED] called me about the Vice President's speech.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

12

15 October 1958

Arranged with DD/I to attend his staff meeting on Friday, 31 October.

Advised the Deputies' Meeting of the request of GEN. HULL for a meeting on 20 November;

said that GEN. HULL was going to request a meeting with the Director to go over their recommendations;

pointed out that the lunch with ADM. MILES had already paid dividends and that he had introduced us to [ ] who might prove to be a valuable source;

reported on my recent discussion with [ ]

25X1

DCI buzzed me to tell me of [ ] trip abroad.

25X1

25X1

[ ]

Both [ ] and DCI buzzed concerning GEN. HULL's coming in tomorrow afternoon at 2:00 and I secured the DCI's permission to be at [ ] at the time. I checked with GEN. CASSIDY who said that he was not going to be coming with GEN. HULL.

25X1

[ ]

came down to go over his report on Military Personnel.

25X1

[ ]

25X1

[ ]

Attended meeting of the Career Council to select Defense School candidates.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(L)

16 October 1958

25X1

Left for [ ] at 0900 to give the graduation talk to OFC course and to go over the master plan for the development of the base.

17 October 1958

25X1

Returned from [ ] at 1200.

25X1

Talked to C [ ] who was brought over by GEN. CASSIDY. See Memorandum for Director of Personnel dated 23 October 1958.


25X1

[ ] called about the talk to the Strategic Intelligence School.

25X1

[ ] called to make sure they had sent up the material I wanted on

25X1



Meeting of the PSAS at which we voted to deposit money with the Comptroller and give the station chiefs certain freedom of action and also broaden the base of the executive committee.

Met with the DCI to go over the latest recommendations of the President's Board.

Arranged for Gen. CASSIDY to talk to GEN. CABELL on Monday morning.

25X1



~~TOP SECRET~~

20 October 1958

At the Deputies' Meeting the DCI asked who helped people returning from overseas in getting settled and with schooling problems, etc. WHITE will undertake to look into this and will consult with me.

I called BAIRD about the DCI's views on the [redacted] and he said 25X1  
he would come to see me on Tuesday.

I told GROGAN I would go to the Press Club to see the CBS presentation. 25X1

[redacted]

Spoke to the University Consultants.

Lunch with the University Consultants.

Spoke to the Strategic Intelligence School.

GEN. CASSIDY came over to report on the present status of their report. He said that he was going to try and persuade MR. LOVETT to drop the paragraph from the report that they saw no value in cold war operations. He said he had pointed out to GEN. HULL that if the President asked about this particular statement they would be hardpressed to justify it. He said that he thought it should be recognized that what the Board had said in effect in this report without putting it in so many words was that CIA lacked leadership and that he thought that anybody with a reasonably open mind reading this report would recognize that they said this. He said that it was fairly obvious to him that either somebody was paying no attention to the Inspector General reports or that these were erroneous; that the Board did not feel they were erroneous.

21 October 1958

IG Staff Meeting. 25X1

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

21 October 1958 (con't)

BAIRD called and said in addition to talking this afternoon about the American Outlook program, he would also like to talk about [ ]

25X1

Lunch with [ ] I told him that we were planning to visit each field station at least once a year. He said he had no objection to this.

Met with BAIRD, [ ] and WHITE on the [ ] program. We agreed to try and do something in which the Director would not in any way be personally involved. BAIRD suggested regional orientation.

22 October 1958

At the Deputies' Meeting advised the Director that our report on the utilization of military officers was completed and that copies were available to the Deputies. Also pointed out that in last month's separations 22 left the Agency to go back into the academic field. The Director asked that I get in touch with [ ] who Mr. LOVETT had indicated might be interested in coming with the Agency.

[ ]

[ ]

Attended the DD/S staff meeting and lunch to discuss the work of the IG staff and our general philosophy of operation.

KARAMESSINES [ ]

[ ] a week from Sunday and would like to talk to me in advance about this.

LARRY HOUSTON called to say that [ ] would like to talk to me about his career. I told him I would give him a ring.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

12

23 October 1958

25X1 Together with the FI survey team met with [ ] and  
[ ] of [ ] to talk about their work. 25X1

Attended DD/P staff meeting to discuss the philosophy behind  
IG surveys.

GROGAN called to ask when I could see SEATON next week to talk  
about the picture they are producing.

25X1 [ ] called about our nonconcurrence on R 20-250 and I said  
I thought this was a matter the DD/S should solve.

Attended presentation ceremony at which [ ] received a 25X1  
medal on the occasion of his retirement. 25X1

[ ]

Gave a talk to the chiefs of the Contact Division field offices.

24 October 1958

Attended Deputies' Meeting.

25X1 [ ] called to ask if he could use me as a character reference. 25X1

[ ]

R

24 October 1958 (con't)

25X1 HOUSTON called to say that there are one or two minor interpretations in [ ] report on retired military personnel but nothing of sufficient 25X1 importance to warrant recalling the report.

[Redacted]

Review of the FI survey.

[Redacted]

25X1

27 October 1958

25X1 Gave talk to [ ] on background of CIA.

25X1

[Redacted]

Lunch for GEN. SHEPHERD.

Discussed with BAIRD the American Outlook part of the JOT course. We agreed that it would be reduced to one week and that he would develop it 25X1 from his own resources. I agreed to give the concluding talk on December 5.

*Changed to Dec 12*

[Redacted]

R

28 October 1958

Meeting of the IG staff.

25X1

Lunch with [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

29 October 1958

[REDACTED] of OTR called to say that he heard that I had made a statement at a lecture that the new space agency was looking for people with area and language knowledge. I said this was not true.

25X1

Attended Deputies Meeting.

BISSELL dropped in and we discussed at some length the TSS problem. He agreed on the necessity of a change at the head of TSS and also raised the possibility of transferring all of its research to another part of the Agency. He also showed me the memorandum which he had written bringing in the Medical Office on our recommendation concerning research in influencing people. We also discussed [REDACTED] and agreed that we should prepare for a possible attack.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

Called CASSIDY to talk about the paragraph in their report concerning covert operations. He said he was meeting with GEN. HULL to discuss this tomorrow and urged that the Director not press the issue any further. I so advised the Director and he said he would not plan to press it at this time.

25X1

Turned the [REDACTED] case over to [REDACTED] and asked that he thoroughly review it and see what steps we should take to see that she has an appropriate career.

25X1



R

29 October 1958 (con't)

25X1

[REDACTED]

Met with GROGAN, SEATON and DENTON to discuss [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] I told them that I would read the script and then would contact [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] to see if he knew anything about it, and suggested that they  
modify a considerable part of the book and treat it as fictional.

[REDACTED] came in to ask me about his career and I strongly urged  
that he stay on the DD/I side of the house.

30 October 1958

Spent the day in [REDACTED] working on the [REDACTED] case and 25X1  
discussed with them the probable attack on [REDACTED] 25X1

31 October 1958

Attended the DD/I Staff luncheon to give my sales talk on the Inspector  
General's Staff.

Went over the FI and CI surveys.

Met with DCI to discuss President's Board material. He said that he was  
extremely concerned about the negative attitude on covert operations and also  
about the recommendation on an executive directorship. He asked that I work  
out some response on these which would meet the Board's points.

Called EDWARDS to say that I was very favorably impressed by [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] and also appreciated the help of [REDACTED] office 25X1

31 October 1958 (con't)

CASSIDY called to advise me that they had taken the paragraph out of the report on covert operations.

Called GROGAN to ask him to get [redacted] a25X1  
copy of THE COUNTERFEIT TRAITOR.

GROGAN advised me that MARTY SOMMERS of Saturday Evening Post had warned him about an article by ROBERT DEANDORFER which was very hostile to CIA. GROGAN and I agreed that we would urge DEANDORFER to come and talk to us. The Director buzzed on this and I told him what we planned to do and he approved.

3 November 1958

Attended Deputies' Meeting.

WHITE advised me of a problem concerning [redacted] who 25X1  
apparently had misrepresented himself to the Comptroller's Office on his  
[redacted]

Senior staff meeting.

CASSIDY called and said he would like to talk to the officer who had written PAPERMILLS and FABRICATORS for Studies in Intelligence. He also said he was very impressed by the quality of this publication.


[redacted] came up and we discussed the [redacted] secu25X1  
case and he agreed with my proposal to write an appeal to the Office of Security.

Lunch with [redacted]

[redacted] came in. I gave him the papers I had prepared for him together 25X1  
with [redacted] letter. He seemed very pleased.

3 November 1958 (con't)

25X1



4 November 1958

25X1 [redacted] briefed the IG staff on the status of mechanical translations.

DCI buzzed to ask what further should be done in the [redacted] case and I informed him that I thought everything had been done that we could do and that she would now be terminated but we would assist her if she asked for help. He also asked for some additional papers on the [redacted] case. 25X1 25X1



25X1

25X1 Asked [redacted] to send over LESTER HILL's bill for an Institute of International Medicine.

25X1 Called KING on the [redacted] case and asked that he send to me all of the material on the case so that I could draw up a summary for the Director.

TOP SECRET

4 November 1958 (con't)

25X1



25X1 Called [redacted] about the Basques. He knew nothing of any meeting with the Director.

25X1 Lunch with [redacted]

DCI called about the letter to [redacted]

25X1

25X1 [redacted] called about the projected trip to [redacted] for GOV. DARDEN, and KEN BELIEU. I told him I would support it vigorously. 25X1

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

5 November 1958

25X1

Advised [ ] of my conversation with her husband and told her that I would get Personnel to expedite her assignment overseas.

Attended Deputies' Meeting.

Talked to BAIRD about the JOT program and told him I would check with the Director concerning the use of DAVID LAWRENCE to give an analysis of the elections.

25X1  
25X1

[ ] went over the [ ] case with me and I asked him to prepare a full report on it which could be given to the Director. 25X1

[ ] R

25X1

[ ] called to tell me about his trip around AFRICA and I said I would get together with him at an early date.

25X1

[ ] came down and brought a letter to [ ]. I concurred in 25X1

25X1

[ ] 25X1  
[ ] 25X1

Called STEWART and asked if he would expedite assigning [ ] overseas. Also asked him to check and see whether [ ] had any 25X1 holds on her overseas assignment.

25X1

[ ] brought down a suggestion that we include a section in each survey directed toward whether the unit concerned was making progress toward the accomplishment of its overall objectives.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

6 November 1958

Called COYNE about the report of the President's Board. He said he would keep me advised of its progress but that at the present GORDON GRAY had it himself and planned to discuss it with the President at an early date.

25X1 Lunch with [ ] He talked to me at some length 25X1  
about the serious situation which he felt the Agency was getting into; viz. a viz.

25X1 CRITCHFIELD called to find out how much steam there was behind  
assigning [ ] to Germany. I told him the facts and he said he would get  
right on it.

25X1 [ ] came in and said that [ ] of the 25X1  
American Legion would be in town during the first week in December. I said 25X1  
to invite him in and we would set up a lunch for him.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

7 November 1958

Met with DCI and gave him an oral rundown on the new Congress. He suggested that I put it in memorandum form for reference.

I told him what I planned to put in the report to the President's Board on his office--stressing the NSCIDs, USIB, and his trip to Europe. He agreed.

25X1

I suggested he ask BAIRD to come in and give him the briefing he gave on the language development program.

I also advised him of my discussion with CASSIDY. See below.

CASSIDY called and said that during the first week in December ADM. CONOLLY and GOV. DARDEN wanted to go to [ ] 25X1

that [ ] was coming over on Wednesday to discuss OCB annexes;

that CONOLLY felt the Board should have taken action concerning the Director's pay;

that he would see [ ] s at 2:00 P.M. Wednesday. I advised [ ] of the time. 25X1

[ ] brought down another annex on the CI survey. 25X1

25X1

HELMS called concerning the meeting with the President's Board on the 20th and said that he was planning to have an organization meeting with [ ] on Monday and would advise me of the results.

[ ] called to recommend [ ] as a possibility for my staff. 25X1

25X1

[ ] called to find out if I knew of any good house with four bedrooms for a Navy captain.

[ ] came over and we reviewed Congressional relations. He expressed great unhappiness with the way things were going and said that he felt WHITE was not very interested in Congressional relations; that he had been left out of the Budget hearings; that the reason we missed on the training bill was because it had been referred to the Comptroller's Office, and that he had not even heard about it until it was too late; and that most of the ideas that he had proposed met with a negative, if not hostile response. I told him I would try to discuss this with the Director next time I found him in a reflective mood.

**TOP SECRET**

DIRECTORS' MEETING, 10 November 1958

Meeting started at 0915 in order to permit the DCI to keep a 1000 appointment in the White House.

The Director opened the meeting with a discussion of the TSS supplementary appropriation request of [ ] which was approved by PRC some time ago. He said he was uneasy about TSS and questioned the desirability of having it appropriate funds for stockpiling. He was of the opinion that this was a poor practice since the users had no responsibility for it and therefore TSS could be placed in the position of acquiring equipment on its own authority which might never be used. This was debated by HELMS and BISSELL without effective result. BISSELL admitted he had not yet taken over the management of TSS and had not thoroughly reviewed its R&D program. The DCI wanted to know what the Agency had to show for approximately [ ] spent by TSS in R&D over the past five years. BISSELL and HELMS are to try to find out and discuss further with the DCI. 25X1

This led to a more general discussion of the results of the BOB meeting last Friday. Apparently it was a most unsatisfactory meeting without concrete results. The net was that the Agency would be expected to take a cut of [ ] 25X1

25X1 [ ] A sour note was struck in the outcome of a private session between the DCI and SAMS. The Director said he made no commitments but according to MACY, SAMS was under the impression the DCI had agreed to substantial cuts. The Director announced his intention to speak to SAMS further.

There followed general discussion of some operational matters and the DCI left a few minutes before 1000.

A rump session took place with WHITE bringing up the matter of the budget again with some added comments on the Friday meeting. He also told of his conversation with the DCI on reduction of personnel. He said the Director was most positive on this score but would not commit himself to a specific objective. He does not want to order a percentage cut and won't decide on how much of a reduction he wants to achieve. WHITE took the position that there was a choice of only two methods; the arbitrary percentage cut (he spoke in terms of 2 per cent), or the manpower task force to study the situation and recommend ways of reducing the rolls. Another subject that was brought up at this session had to do with the speed up of communications to increase the flow of intelligence information from the Field. Both HELMS and SHELDON agreed that what was first needed was a better method of screening the flow so that material of little or no significance could be eliminated before dissemination. Apparently there is a committee for this problem also

[ ] at 25X1  
on




25X1

25X1

it was agreed that [ ] would be offered up as chairman in the initial stages of consideration of the substantive problem and [ ] would become chairman when the technical or physical stages were reached.

NOTE: One aspect of the DCI's method of handling these meetings disturbs me considerably. The subject of the TSS supplementary appropriation was brought up out of the blue. The sequence of events is rather easy to reconstruct. The DCI had a bad time with BOB, particularly on the size of R&D expenditures. The TSS proposal came to his attention thereafter and he siezed upon it as a matter for discussion at the meeting. He apparently didn't give the proposal much thought in terms of its own merits or as it related to the over-all R&D program. Those present were obviously unprepared to discuss the subject and the comments made by HELMS and BISSELL, with a small contribution by WHITE, were strictly from the top of the head and, naturally, defensive. What disturbs me most is that by this kind of action the Director precludes sound and thorough consideration of a problem by his principal officers and denies himself the good judgment they may be capable of offering.



**TOP SECRET**

12 November 1958

25X1

[ ] called me--the Director also called--about [ ] 25X1  
I advised them that we would go ahead and take the necessary steps for her termination. I so advised Stewart who said they were in the process of trying to talk her into taking a disability retirement.

Met with COL. GROGAN.

13 November 1958

Called CASSIDY about the DCI and DDCI sitting in on the November 20th briefing and he said that it was his clear indication that the Board wanted to meet at the working level.

GATES LLOYD called me about MARTIN LUTHER KING and the request he had had from Princeton concerning his speaking up there. I told him that my opinion, for what it was worth, was that KING was a member of the agitators of NAACP who were continually keeping the race issue stirred up and who were actually doing a great disservice to the country.

25X1

[ ] came up to discuss the [ ] case and sa 25X1  
that they would not give him the penalty of two weeks leave without pay and would put him on a job where he would not be so susceptible to getting another violation and that they would also review with Security the possibility of changing their security system.

25X1

25X1

25X1

CRITCHFIELD [ ] dropped in and we discussed in general the situation in [ ] CRITCHFIELD asked me what could be done about [ ] I suggested that he check with [ ] on the FI St 25X1  
who I thought was working on her retirement program.

25X1

Talked to [ ] three times, WHITE once, and [ ] about 25X1  
getting the phone in the car changed.

[ ]

**TOP SECRET**

**Page Denied**

~~TOP SECRET~~

12

19 November 1958

25X1



21 November 1958

25X1 Attended Deputies' Meeting. Reported on CASSIDY's statement that the meeting with HULL and DOOLITTLE had gone very well. Reported that CONOLLY would be going to [ ] on Dec. 9th and 10th. Reported that the President's Board would submit its report to the President on the 16th of December.

25X1 Called WHITE to say that CASSIDY had agreed that it was all right for MACY to go to [ ] at the same time as CONOLLY.

Talked to STEWART about [ ] and told him that our 25X1 recommendation would be that she be given a chance at another job in the DD/P area.

25X1 Lunch with BAIRD who asked if I would start the 1 December briefing at [ ] with a roundup of the organization of the Agency and how Training fitted into it.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

24 November 1958

At the Deputies' Meeting I advised that GEN. CASSIDY had called to ask that we work out an itinerary for GEN. HULL to take a three-week trip around the WH area during March. I stated that I had advised COL. J. C. KING of this and that he would submit an itinerary for approval shortly. 25X1

I also reported briefly on my trip with [redacted] and said that after talking to him I was even more convinced than previously of the fact that we did not handle [redacted] correctly and the whole program should be subject to revision. The Director said he agreed. 25X1

At 1130 attended a meeting with [redacted] WHITE, CABELL and the Director on Congressional activities. [redacted] will prepare all of the correspondence but I am to initiate preliminary informal negotiations with friends of SEN. MANSFIELD to determine whether we should make an approach to him before the session. 25X1

GEN. CABELL came down to discuss:

(1) [redacted] comments on the [redacted] matter and the matter of a new chief for TSS. I raised the question of [redacted] as a potential chief of TSS and also mentioned [redacted] CABELL was unresponsive to [redacted] should stay where he is but seemed receptive to both [redacted] 25X1  
25X1  
25X1

(3) Concerning our recommendation that there be a re-appraisal of the Strategic Intelligence Officer slots abroad. He showed me the memos from the DD/I and DD/P and we agreed the matter should rest here. 25X1

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

24 November 1958 (con't)

R

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1  
25X1

[REDACTED] brought in the [REDACTED] paper on TSS.

25X1

[REDACTED] came in to explain why he had sent the letters to FDD for translation.

25X1

[REDACTED] brought in the Director's comments re the report to the President's Board and I told him in no uncertain terms that in the future I wanted to get the Director's comments personally and that I would come in at any time, whether Saturday, Sunday or holiday.

25X1

BAIRD called to say that two of the Congressional staffers could not go to [REDACTED] next week and [REDACTED] wondered whether they could be worked in with the President's Board members. I told him "no" and so advised [REDACTED] who came over to talk about it.

25X1

25X1

25 November 1958

IG staff meeting.

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] came up and we discussed a possible assignment on the IG Staff. I told him I would not be able to make a decision until the Director approved a paper that was before him, but I would try to let him know in a couple weeks.

25X1

[REDACTED]

HELMS called to say that [REDACTED] had prepared and was sending up to the President's Board the memorandum on budget and personnel that DOOLITTLE had requested.

25X1

25X1

Lunch with [REDACTED]. See memorandum for the record.

**TOP SECRET**

12


25 November 1958 (con't)

25X1



26 November 1958

25X1




25X1

BRONSON TWEEDY dropped in and we briefly discussed activities in



25X1

REBER called to say that he was temporarily chairing a committee to examine the overall communications problem and asked whether we wanted to sit in. I referred the matter to



25X1

called to express his pleasure at the decision to abolish the I&R Staff and to say that he always felt there should be one inspection staff and he felt this was a good step forward. I thanked him for his sentiments and pointed out that they were identical to mine. I said I wanted to talk to him and to HELMS about what, if any, they would expect from us in addition to what we had been doing and also about the problem of personnel.

**TOP SECRET**

*[Handwritten mark]*

26 November 1958 (con't)

25X1 GATES LLOYD called to ask if we had ever done a survey of Project  
[redacted] I told him that  
we had not.

25X1 Lunch with [redacted] 25X1

[Large redacted block]

28 November 1958

25X1 At the DCI's meeting a considerable portion of the time was devoted to  
discussing my statement on the status and future of the IG Staff. The Director  
read the recommendations and then signed the memo, but upon BISSELL's  
request I agreed to let each of the Deputies see the memorandum on an eyes  
only basis./ The Director agreed to an inspection of his immediate office./ 25X1  
Mr. BISSELL suggested that we schedule an inspection of Project AQUATONE  
at an early date/and we all generally agreed that when [redacted]  
[redacted] and myself should sit down and  
discuss an inspection of the DD/P's immediate office.

25X1 Lunch with [redacted] and his brother-in-law, who is vaguely interested  
in working for us.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

28 November 1958 (con't)

25X1

[redacted] came in to once again ask for a Board hearing on her termination. Mr. HOUSTON was present. See memorandum for the record. I called COL. EDWARDS about the meeting and told him we would send over a memo on the meeting when it was done.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

12

1 December 1958

[REDACTED]

25X1

Talked to CASSIDY about the CONOLLY schedule at [REDACTED] and he thought the schedule was appropriate.

25X1

Went to [REDACTED] with Congressional staff members -- returned 2 December at 3:00 P.M.

25X1

2 December 1958

Returned from [REDACTED] at 1500.

25X1

3 December 1958

At the DCI's meeting advised that CONOLLY would be going to [REDACTED] next Tuesday;

25X1

that GEN. CASSIDY was going to [REDACTED] tomorrow to discuss FBID [REDACTED] with GEORGE CAREY;

25X1

pointed out that there was an item in the paper concerning [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Talked to CASSIDY about [REDACTED] papers and he told me to keep them in our file.

25X1

[REDACTED]

Lunch with Patrick COYNE.

GATES LLOYD called me about the item in the Alumni Weekly and said somebody in Justice was going to write to correct it and what did I think they could say about CIA. I told him I saw no objection to name BAIRD, LLOYD and myself by title.

**TOP SECRET**


**TOP SECRET**

3 December 1958 (con't)

25X1

[redacted] came up to tell me that he was "willing to serve on the IG staff" if we wanted him. I thanked him and told him I would let him know after the DCI made the decision on the size of the staff.

25X1



4 December 1958

25X1



25X1

[redacted] asked me to sit in on a meeting between the DCI and AL BELMONT of FBI at 1030. I did so. See memorandum for the record. I also called [redacted] to advise them of the meeting and to be prepared for the [redacted] case being publicized.

25X1  
25X1


25X1



Went to THOMAS CORCORAN's to lunch to discuss the Mansfield Bill with him and JAMES ROWE.

Attended meeting of the Career Council.

25X1



**TOP SECRET**

4 December 1958 (con't)

25X1

[redacted] called to say he had just returned from West Africa and was ready to talk to Mr. Kirkpatrick whenever he wished.

25X1

[redacted] .....rcm

5 December 1958

25X1

25X1

At the IG staff meeting reported on the status of the Agency budget; told of the trips to [redacted] by the Congressional staff members and the projected one by ADM. CONOLLY;

25X1

25X1

reported on the [redacted] appointments to the DD/P--and the fact that [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] and

discussed the ambivalent position of the DD/I in regard to career service.

COYNE called to say that at ROBERT MACEY's request, FRANK ECKER of the Bureau of the Budget had come to discuss counter audio surveillance with him and he did not think there would be any further questions from MACEY on this.

25X1

25X1

Lunch with [redacted]

25X1

Together with WHITE, [redacted] LLOYD and [redacted] spent 3 1/2 hours reviewing the recent developments in RI.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] ....drm

**TOP SECRET**

R

6 December 1958

25X1

25X1

Asked [ ] if he was aware of the story of [ ] involvement with the [ ] and he said he was not. 25X1

8 December 1958

At the DCI's meeting asked the DCI for guidance on the SMITH lunch and he told me to see him later.

25X1

Also reported that ADM. CONOLLY was ill and would not be going to [ ]

DCI asked me to keep prodding WHITNEY SHEPARDSON on the OSS project.

25X1

[ ] buzzed to say that after reading GEN. TRUSCOTT's memo on his discussion with GEN. HULL, the DCI asked that I give him a memo listing briefings of the HULL Board on [ ] and also what other different agencies CIA briefed on the [ ] 25X1 25X1

Gave talk to the Mid Career Foreign Service Officers course.

Gave luncheon for AMBASSADOR EARL SMITH. (See [ ] memo on this conversation.) 25X1

[ ]

**TOP SECRET**

9 December 1958

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

[ ] called and asked me to check with CASSIDY on whether he wanted the [ ] material on a continuing basis. I did and he didn't, and I told [ ].

Meeting with GEN. CASSIDY. See memorandum for the record.

25X1

Meeting with [ ] See Memorandum for the Record.

Attended the Director's lunch for Ambassador EARL SMITH--more of the same.

10 December 1958

25X1

At the DCI's meeting [ ] briefed on the NIS program.

~~TOP SECRET~~

11 December 1958

Delivered lecture on American Heritage to JOT group.

Met with EDWARDS and HOUSTON on the [ ] case.

25X1

25X1

[ ]  
Went over the matter of overpayment with HOUSTON to determine whether this would constitute lawful violation of any Federal statutes.

25X1

12 December 1958

25X1

Called [ ] concerning my lunch with [ ] and he said he would let me know if they wanted any assistance on the matter with C. D. JACKSON.

25X1

Attended the Deputies' Meeting.

25X1

13 December 1958

Met with the Director and told him of my projected lunch with  
SENATOR MANSFIELD;

reviewed the latest developments in the [ ] case:

25X1

25X1

showed him the letter from [ ] expressing appreciation  
for the briefing at [ ]

25X1

got him to go along with the policy of Studies in Intelligence in not  
distributing it as a periodical to foreigners but letting them have individual  
articles if this was useful, and also that we had felt that it was too soon to  
take on people from other agencies on the Board;

he signed the letter to DAVID SARNOFF;

he was quite surprised and flabbergasted concerning the cost of the  
intercom.

15 December 1958

Attended the Deputies' Meeting.

Met with HELMS, [ ] to discuss the  
abolition of the I&R Staff. HELMS told us that they wished we would do more  
evaluations of projects in our future surveys.

25X1

Lunch with [ ]

Called BAIRD to see if they could use [ ] as a language teacher.  
He said he thought they could--to check with [ ]

25X1

25X1

KARAMESSINES asked if he should attend the [ ] briefing. I told  
him it was entirely up to him.

25X1

25X1



**TOP SECRET**

16 December 1958

IG staff meeting which discussed the President's Board recommendations.

[REDACTED]

25X1

Went to "M" Bldg. to see the Minicard demonstration and to visit the Historical Intelligence Collection.

Lunch with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] asked if we could brief JOHN EISENHOWER and I said I would want to clear it with the Director which I did and so advised him.

CASSIDY came over to advise me of the meeting of the Board with the President. See Memorandum for the Record.

Together with [REDACTED] listened to the Director's discussion with MR. LOVETT.

Called [REDACTED] to ask him to revise the schedule on the HULL trip.

Talked to CAREY about keeping [REDACTED]

25X1

GROGAN advised he would be on leave until 6 January and had told Mr. [REDACTED] to come to me if he needed help.

17 December 1958

Advised BAIRD that I would not be going to [REDACTED] and would therefore talk to the OTR party.

HELMS dropped in and read over the report of the President's Board.

Together with GEN. CABELL and [REDACTED] briefed CARL MARCY of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

[REDACTED]

25X1

Lunch with [REDACTED]

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

17 December 1958 (con't)

25X1      Talked to STEWART about the request from Air Force for information  
on [ ] and he suggested sending them a correct but basically unresponsive  
reply pointing out only his virtues.

25X1      Talked to [ ] about coming on the staff.

[ ]

25X1

Sat in on the debriefing of SENATOR HUMPHREY.

18 December 1958

25X1      [ ] buzzed to ask if I would prepare some notes for the Director  
to use in talking to the OTR party tonight.

25X1      [ ] About what I do not  
know this date.

25X1      Called GEORGE CAREY and asked him to check on the alleged taking  
of CIC reports by [ ]

HOUSTON was asked to check on the customs matter in the [ ] cas25X1

WHITE called to say he had talked to [ ] on manpower so that 25X1  
there would be no misunderstandings.

COYNE called to say he had no report on when implementing orders  
would be issued on the recommendations of the President's Board.

GEN. CABELL came down and read the memo on the meeting of the  
President's Board with the President and we discussed the recommendations  
of the Board.

He also brought down his manpower memo and then came back at 1215  
to meet with the Manpower Task Force and went over the memos with them.

short

Made a / address to the OTR Christmas Party.

TOP SECRET

19 December 1958

Attended the Deputies' Meeting and advised that HAROLD LAWRENCE was leaving the President's Board;

described the case of [REDACTED]; got the impression that there was an inclination to terminate;


reported on the first meeting of the Manpower Task Force;

advised that [REDACTED] had received her BEC claim.

25X1

The Director asked that I follow very closely the case of [REDACTED]

25X1



Lunch with [REDACTED] and MAJOR JOHN EISENHOWER and briefed him on the Agency's organization.

COYNE called to advise that he and JOHN EISENHOWER were meeting with GORDON GRAY tomorrow to discuss the recommendations of the President's Board.

CORD MEYER called to say he had sent up some material for the 13 February meeting.

Meeting of the Manpower Task Force.

20 December 1958

25X1 Met with the DCI to tell him of my luncheon Monday with Sen. MANSFIELD; of the fact that [ ] were joining the staff; of the briefing of JOHN EISENHOWER.

I also told him of the meeting with the Manpower Committee and asked if it was agreeable to him if they advised the Chair. He said he wanted them to.

I also suggested that he suggest to Mr. BISSELL that he go down to the DD/P area to pay a courtesy call inasmuch as he had not yet been down and had not talked to Mr. HELMS. The Director said he appreciated this suggestion and would do so.

25X1 The DCI asked if I would check to find out whether the Contact Division had dealings with [ ]

22 December 1958

Attended Deputies' Meeting.

COYNE and CASSIDY came over to report that at a meeting with GORDON GRAY yesterday GRAY had asked COYNE by what right GEN. CASSIDY had told a senior official of CIA what had been said at the President's meeting with the Board. GRAY said that Mr. DULLES had told him that one of the senior officials had been fully briefed on the meeting and had written a memorandum of it. COYNE said he told GRAY that it was his understanding that the Board kept the Agency fully informed and that he didn't think this was a violation of the privileged meeting. I read them both the preface to my memo on the meeting and told them that only Gen. CABELL and the Director had read it.

Meeting with EDWARDS, STEWART and HOUSTON on the subject of leaks occurring as a result of people talking too much to former employees. We agreed that a specific approach on this would probably not only not be effective but get in the press, but that perhaps a general statement by each staff would be useful.

Lunch at the Carlton with Sen. MIKE MANSFIELD and Mr. JAMES ROWE. See memorandum for the record.

23 December 1958

CORD MEYER called to see if I got the RFE material and what I thought of it. I told him I got it but had not read it.

25X1 [ ] called to ask if he could send down a tape recording for us to transcribe, and that he would like an original and one copy.

At the IG staff meeting advised them that DCI was away; that the President's Board would meet on 13 February; and of our plans for additional space on the third floor.

25X1 CABELL came down and discussed the case of [ ] and also 25X1 that of [ ] He said he planned to discuss both of these cases with 25X1 the DCI.


25X1 [ ] came in and spent one hour reviewing his work in [ ]

CASSIDY called concerning the discussion yesterday and said that he felt that I had been a victim of my boss' indiscretion.

25X1 GEN. TRUSCOTT called to ask if I knew anything about somebody requesting [ ] I told him I didn't.

24 December 1958

25X1



~~TOP SECRET~~

24 December 1958 (con't)

The DCI asked that I get together a list of subjects of authors in CIA who had written for the public print.

Briefed the DCI on my discussion with Sen. MANSFIELD and Mr. ROWE.

29 December 1958

25X1

R

[REDACTED]

TIETJEN called to thank me for the book.

I spent about 45 minutes briefing [REDACTED] on the staff and gave him the FE and OBI surveys to read. 25X1

25X1 [REDACTED] alled to say he had heard from [REDACTED] and to ask about his status. I gave him a quick rundown on it. 25X1 25X1

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

29 December 1958 (con't)

25X1

[ ] called to say he had talked to somebody just back from [ ] and that morale was in bad shape there.

25X1

25X1

HELMS called to say he had a letter to [ ] which thanked him for the [ ] and that he thought it was a pretty poor letter and would I mind writing it over since I knew [ ] I told him to send it up.


25X1

25X1

30 December 1958

IG staff meeting.

25X1



GEN. CASSIDY called and advised that GEN. HULL's trip to [ ] was cancelled because he had been recruited to work on the military aid program and was leaving on 24 January to go to [ ] GEN. HULL would like to be briefed on our activities in those areas before he goes and would like to meet the people while there. The DRAPER Committee will handle his transportation and reservations. GEN. CASSIDY said he would plan to go to [ ] himself. I notified MR. HELMS and [ ] and [ ] of the above.

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1



**TOP SECRET**

30 December 1958 (con't)

25X1

112

BAIRD called to say that he had been asked by DD/S to nominate potential candidates for the IG Staff and that he was going to suggest

25X1

I asked [ ] to take over as case officer on the [ ] matter and also to read the CI survey.

25X1

25X1

I called EDWARDS on the [ ] case and he said he would have a report over to me by Monday. I also asked him to nominate someone to do an article for Studies in Intelligence on the polygraph, and to deal directly with [ ] on this.

25X1

25X1

He told me that he was suggesting [ ] to the DD/S as a possible candidate to the IG Staff.

25X1

[ ] came by to wish me a happy new year and gave me a quick fillin on the Audit Staff. He now has a staff of [ ] auditors and 4 are secretarial. [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

He said he was looking carefully at the procedures of the Comptroller because he was convinced there was great opportunity for saving money in the handling of the budget.

25X1



SECRET

✓

31 December 1958

25X1 [ ] called to say they were terminating some panels and that we  
might be getting some repercussions. I asked him to send [ ] up 25X1  
25X1 to brief [ ] and myself next Monday.

25X1 [ ] called about the Manpower Task Force and I told him  
of my discussion with the Director who gave us the charter and asked that we  
write the directive.

11 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Revision of NSCID 5 - FI/Plans Comments

REFERENCE : Draft Revision dated 9 December 1957

I have underlined on the attached draft changes which have been made since the last draft, dated 14 October, which was considered by the IAC. Where feasible, I have entered in parentheses the words which appeared in the 14 October draft and which have now been changed.

The following comments are keyed to specific paragraphs of the attached draft:

1.(a) Change in definition - see no objection.

2.(d) The addition of "when he considers it necessary" appears to have been introduced to make this provision more palatable to the services. Although we can undoubtedly live with this addition if necessary, its deletion is recommended since it is anticipated that the negotiation of the draft DCID concerning coordination of cover will probably be made more difficult. It is certainly essential that all non-official cover be coordinated with CIA and that the majority of cases requiring official cover also be coordinated. In effect therefore our proposed DCID will require the coordination of most cover arrangements. "When he considers it necessary" seems to imply that cover arrangements will be coordinated in the minority of cases. ✕

No objection to deletion of last sentence.

3. Description of CIA as the national clandestine service has been deleted. Retention would of course be to our advantage. Addition of responsibility "for all U.S. clandestine activities" all right from our point of view but may bring objections from the services since phrase is not restricted to field of intelligence.

3.(d) This is CI problem but "access" to CI index to me implies the right to insert military personnel into CIA for such access. The CI Staff will, of course, suggest alternative wording. In my opinion, we at this point should include some statement to the effect that CIA will make available to Departments and Agencies such information in this index as operational security permits.

✕ COVER DIV. IS DRAFTING NEW LANGUAGE.

600487

Page Two

4.(a) "Additional" changed to "supplementary." You had some reservations about this being interpreted in such a manner that the services will be supplementing our efforts in the national interest as contrasted with departmental interests.

5. In our last memorandum to DDC we recommended against the change of "they" to "Departments and Agencies" on the grounds that under such a provision it would be possible for the services to require this Agency to submit to them guidance in the form of collection requirements on a continuing basis.

7. Since "areas" in first line has been changed to the singular, the same change should be made in the sixth line, which should read "or from such an area."

The new provision for keeping military commanders appropriately informed on CIA liaison relationships with foreign military establishments raises the following questions in my mind:

a. Is the Commander of USAREUR to be briefed on CIA liaison within the entire area of USAREUR jurisdiction? For example, do we brief him on our liaison with the [redacted]

STAT

b. Do we do the same for USAFE and add [redacted]

STAT

c. In most cases it is the Attaches who should be kept so informed rather than military commanders. Note might again be made of our statistics - of 26 countries in which we liaise with military elements there are only 7 in which Army commanders conduct similar liaison plus 4 countries where Army ~~tees~~ <sup>units</sup> under the control of the Department of the Army also conduct liaison.

8.(a) Although of <sup>very</sup> particular value at this time, it is interesting to note that in the very first draft revision submitted by FI to the IG on 29 March 1957, we provided for representatives of the DCI conducting espionage and counterintelligence being under the direct command of the U.S. Theater Commander. Every draft from then on referred to the CIA Force and the CIA Commander. We have gone full circle and are now back after fourteen drafts and nine months to essentially what we initially proposed. Nonetheless, it appears that to a limited degree we have backed away slightly on the position gained in the Command Relationships Agreement.

9. I leave the comments to CI on this paragraph.

Distribution:

Original - CFI  
1 - DCFI, 1 - CI

[redacted]  
Chief, FI Plans Group

STAT

**SECRET**

11 December 1957

**PROPOSED CHANGES IN PARAGRAPH 3-d OF DRAFT OF NSCID  
NO. 5**

**Version 1**

1. Add: "The Departments and Agencies shall receive information from these central files in accordance with procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee."

**Version 2**

2. Add: ". . . and shall receive both information and services in support of their responsibilities."

**Version 3**

3. Delete: ". . . to which all Departments and Agencies shall contribute on a continuing basis all pertinent material collected by them."

**SECRET**

"d. Make mutually agreeable arrangements with Departments and Agencies for such cover support as may be needed by the Central Intelligence Agency. When he considers it necessary, coordinate arrangements for such cover support as may be required by other Departments and Agencies to carry out the clandestine activities authorized in paragraph 4, below. Arrangements for cover made with the Military Services or Department of Defense components will be in accordance with procedures established by the Department of Defense."

Recommend the underlined portion above be deleted and the entire paragraph be reworded as follows:

"d. Make mutually agreeable arrangements with Departments and Agencies for such cover support as may be needed by the Central Intelligence Agency. Coordinate arrangements for such cover support as may be required by other Departments and Agencies to carry out the clandestine activities authorized in paragraph 4, below, except when cover can be provided without utilizing the facilities of <sup>DEPARTMENTS OR SERVICES</sup> or becoming identified with other governmental or <sup>OPERATIONS</sup> non-governmental activities. ~~Arrangements for cover made with the Military Services or Department of Defense components will be in accordance with procedures established by the Department of Defense.~~"

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Registry

21180

DD/S

57-0203

MAR 4 1957

*awf*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Recommendations to Prospective Employers of Agency Personnel

1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. Inquiries from prospective employers of present or former Agency employees are usually addressed to the Office of Personnel, although some go directly to supervisory officials. Our replies are usually fairly brief, going to verification of employment data: salary level, dates of employment with the Agency--not under cover status, and general evaluations, e.g., "reasonably satisfactory," "entirely satisfactory," "cooperative," "reliable," etc. When requested, we provide a general job title such as Administrative Assistant, File Clerk, Communications Technician, Economics Researcher, etc. Normally we add a statement that our files contain no derogatory information on the subject. These procedures are often handled by phone calls, especially when the prospective employer has a local establishment.
3. Upon request, we provide a fairly complete analysis of work experience, with the assistance of the individual's former supervisors. Every effort is made, within current security restrictions and advice, to answer such inquiries so that the job prospects of a former employee are advanced and are not damaged by our replies. When our replies are addressed to other security and defense organizations of the Federal government they generally include more detailed information with respect to job experience, length of service with the Agency and performance evaluation.
4. Any information imparted is taken from the official personnel records, which contain cover-security restrictions developed by the Central Cover Branch or Office of Security. For example, while an individual is in cover status, or when he resigns, the Central Cover Branch furnishes the Office of Personnel with the proper cover information for periods of employment since the person first entered on duty with the Agency. Similarly, questionnaires requiring more extensive information on work experience are completed with the assistance of, or by, the component to which the employee was formerly assigned. These replies are double-checked by a senior Office of Personnel staff member so that sensitive information is not revealed. When a file indicates that a former employee was separated because of security considerations, the Office of Security is consulted before the reply is prepared.
5. For security reasons, we have considered it inadvisable to provide separating employees with general recommendation letters. However, unsolicited recommendations are occasionally furnished to outstanding employees. Any

MORI/CDF Pages 3 thru 8.

CONFIDENTIAL

*cc - Setys*  
*ER*

SUBJECT: Recommendations to Prospective Employers of Agency Personnel

period of employment abroad, under either official or non-official cover, is an important consideration in preparing such letters since we must avoid recognizing such service as CIA unless the letter can be classified. Samples of such letters are attached.

6. We believe there are disadvantages to a general practice of issuing recommendations to employees leaving the Agency, including the following:

a. Not all employers are willing to use such statements. Many prefer to receive an evaluation directly from the former employer.

b. This system is not very flexible for the agency which does not always intend to treat inquiries from all prospective employers exactly the same. For example, we tend to be a little more precise with, and reveal more information to, other Federal agencies engaged in the security and defense functions.

c. It would probably become apparent to some employers that if a former member of the Agency does not have such a letter some derogatory information on him led to his removal or resignation.

However, we believe our present procedures might be improved by providing summary reference information as a standard item on all reports of separation. Such statements would be prepared with the assistance of the appropriate supervisor.



25X1

Deputy Director  
(Support)

Attachments

Approved For Release 2006/08/08 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004300160109-0

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**SECRET**

793

# UNITED STATES EMPLOYEES OVERSEAS

AN OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT SUBMITTED  
TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL APRIL 1958

NSC review(s) completed.

Volume II  
COUNTRY STUDIES

**SECRET**

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SECRET

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NSC review(s) completed.

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Glossary of Military Abbreviations  
Used in Volume II

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AFB ..... Air Force Base  
ARMISH ..... Army Mission  
JUSMAG ..... Joint United States Military Assistance  
Group  
KATUSA ..... Korean Augmentation Troops, U. S. Army  
MAAG ..... Military Advisory Assistance Group  
MAP ..... Military Assistance Program  
SETAF ..... Southeastern Task Force  
TERM ..... Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission  
USAFE ..... United States Air Force, Europe  
USAREUR... .. United States Army, Europe

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CG ..... Commanding General  
CH ..... Chief  
CINC ..... Commander in Chief

SECRET

SECRETINTRODUCTION

In addition to the basic assignment of reporting the agencies' general administrative practices bearing on the improvement of foreign attitudes toward U. S. citizen government employees overseas, paragraph 6(c) of NSC Action 1752 indicated that detailed attention be given to the specific problems and the administrative practices developed to cope with them in certain countries designated "trouble spots." Subsequent action by the Board Assistants designated the following countries for specific examination as part of this study:

China (Taiwan)	Korea
Ethiopia (including Eritrea)	Libya
France	Morocco
Germany	Philippines
Greece	Saudi Arabia
Iceland	Spain
Indonesia	Thailand
Iran	Turkey
Italy	Viet-Nam
Japan	

This Volume II contains studies for each of the 19 designated countries consisting of a background statement, a table of the American personnel strength (not counting dependents), rationales for the agencies' changing force levels, and statements of the administrative practices developed by the agencies in the countries to cope with aspects of the problem of improving foreign attitudes toward U. S. citizen employees.

On compiling the agencies' practices, it was found that they could be grouped logically under six major categories, namely, Personnel Factors, Use of Land, Local Economy, Jurisdiction, U. S. Vehicles, and Community Relations. For each of these categories, there has been established a statement of the broad "problem" and the practices designed to cope therewith. The various factors and elements contributing to each "problem" and includible within it are covered extensively in Volume I, of this report.

The personnel strength data for the several countries include troop strengths and civilian U. S. citizens directly hired and contractor hired, as reported currently by the agencies which utilize the preponderant number of U. S. citizens overseas, namely, the three military

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departments, the Department of State, the U. S. Information Agency, and the International Cooperation Administration. A statistical summary of U. S. personnel stationed in the 19 designated countries as of July 1, 1957, and their estimated strength in those countries, as of June 30, 1958, is found in the Annex to Volume II. The numbers of dependents overseas in the 19 countries are not included because they are not currently available on a uniform reporting basis. However, such data are being obtained and will be presented to the OCB in the annual statistical report pursuant to item 6(a) of NSC Action 1752. When supplied, these data will be reported as of March 31, 1958. The data in the Annex to this volume omit also the relatively minor overseas employment reported by the other civilian agencies such as Department of Justice, Department of Commerce, Atomic Energy Commission, Veterans Administration, and General Services Administration, since worldwide, this employment as of November 1957 totalled only about 1339.

In September 1957 the "desk officers" of the Department of State were asked to prepare background statements for the 19 designated countries summarizing and updating the submissions from the Chiefs of Mission to ensure that the country studies would reflect the current facts. A further review of these background statements was made by the "desk officers" of State, USIA, and ICA on January 15, 1958, for the same purpose. The "background statements" were not intended to be "country papers" as in the normal context of the latter term.

CHINA (TAIWAN)

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 3,646

Civilian Personnel - 223

TOTAL 3,869

A. BACKGROUND

The attitudes of the Chinese on Taiwan toward the United States, its policies, and its citizens residing there are largely determined by the direction of U. S. foreign policy and its implementation. Apart from attitudes shaped in this manner, the presence of a sizeable group of Americans, concentrated principally in the capital city and enjoying a standard of living far superior to their Chinese counterparts, invariably produces certain irritants and generates some resentment among the native population. Despite the existence of these irritants, the Chinese would be greatly distressed at the withdrawal of significant numbers of American military personnel from Taiwan.

Unlike the situation in other countries, there are no large American bases in Taiwan. Care has been exercised to use as little arable land as possible for the few U. S. installations, and the presence of Americans on Taiwan has not caused a labor shortage nor has it resulted in a scarcity of goods. On the other hand, certain problems frequently associated with sizeable numbers of American troops have arisen, mainly connected with traffic accidents, bar room brawls, and drunkenness. Punishment in such cases has been imposed by U. S. military authorities but such action has not always come to the attention of the Chinese people nor has adequate compensation to injured Chinese nationals been proffered in all instances. Misbehavior by American military personnel, combined with exclusive U. S. jurisdiction over offenders, evokes the specter of "extraterritoriality." On balance, however, the record is favorable. Over a long period of years relations between Chinese and U. S. citizens have probably been more cordial than those of China with any other Western country. For policy reasons the Chinese welcome the presence of American troops and officials on Taiwan. There are good personal relationships and a high degree of

**SECRET**CHINA (TAIWAN)A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

cooperation between most Americans and Chinese on Taiwan.

The May 24, 1957 riot in Taipei must be regarded as a serious and disturbing event, not affecting so much the basic policy of cooperation but pointing up imperatively the necessity for taking precautions against similar occurrences. Assistance has been given to Chinese police in improving riot control methods. Both the Chinese and Americans are acutely aware of the danger of permitting frictions to develop and of the necessity for taking precautionary steps to avoid possible sources of resentment.

In summary, there is uniform awareness of and concern for the essentiality of maintaining good relationships. The attainment of this objective is dependent on continuing to make careful selection of personnel, insuring their effective orientation prior to and after their arrival in the area, and the enforcement of discipline where necessary to insure that American personnel will conduct themselves in such manner so as to avoid becoming involved in local incidents.

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SECRETCHINA (TAIWAN)B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	3,646	3,760	+ 114
Total Civilian	<u>223</u>	<u>308</u>	+ <u>85</u>
Grand Total	3,869	4,068	+ 199

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	3,646	3,760	+ 114
Civilian Personnel	<u>4</u>	<u>29</u>	+ <u>25</u>
TOTAL	3,650	3,789	+ 139

STATE

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56

- 3

25X1

ICA

145

209

+ 64

25X1

USIA

15

14

- 1

25X1

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CHINA (TAIWAN)

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

I. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

- (1) MAAG personnel are given a basic orientation program upon arrival in Taiwan, supplemented by further voluntary detailed orientation in lectures offered by the Asia Foundation and other cultural groups.
- (2) Basic language instruction is mandatory for the majority of Army officers and enlisted men assigned to the Army section.
- (3) ICA follows the practice of interviewing the dependents of ICA officers being assigned to Taiwan as an additional step to insure likely adaptability of the family to the local Chinese community.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

- (1) The U. S. civilian agencies and the military have voluntarily held to a standard wage pattern which has eliminated any serious labor problems.

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CHINA (TAIWAN)

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(2) All U. S. agencies are voluntarily participating in a housing committee in a successful effort to lower rents. The Chinese government, at the request of MAAG, has authorized construction of houses for U. S. personnel.

(3) Forty-five per cent of all military personnel have been assigned duty outside the Taipei area.

c. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practice

A fund for ex gratia payments to Chinese killed or injured by Americans has been established and insurance coverage on American automobiles has been broadened.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) The local American School accepts Chinese children on a space-available basis after the needs of American children have been met.

(2) The ICA Mission Director gives length-of-service awards to local Chinese employees in recognition of longevity of their service.

(3) Ex gratia payments for injuries or damage inflicted by Americans are made from a fund

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CHINA (TAIWAN)

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

created and controlled by the Embassy as the result of having placed a small surcharge on all liquor purchased at the commissary.

(4) USIS officers and their wives teach English to the Chinese on Taiwan, and USIS libraries are in constant use by local nationals from all walks of life.

(5) Procedures for prompt settlement of damage claims arising out of MAAG operations are being reviewed to insure that this does not become a source of friction.

(6) MAAG cooperates actively with Chinese government agencies to resolve differences between U. S. and Chinese personnel and to keep down the number of local incidents by and against U. S. personnel. Indoctrination efforts on the part of the Chinese government with its own people has had ameliorating effect.

(7) USIS activities have been redirected to emphasize the "local" approach, and relations with the local press have been bettered as the result of mutual efforts to explain U. S. views and differences in customs.

(8) There has been reasonable participation by American personnel and their dependents in such organizations and activities as:

- a. Local chapter work in the Women's Anti-Aggression League, the International Women's Club, and Rotary International;
- b. Joint Sino-U. S. Boy Scout activities; and
- c. A "Used Clothing Program," provided by

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CHINA (TAIWAN)

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

San Francisco civic organizations and  
administered by MAAG Taiwan.

(9) MAAG personnel are assigned duty with units  
garrisoning the offshore islands, thereby sharing  
in the danger and privations involved.

2. Problems Peculiar to Taiwan

None reported.

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SECRET\* ETHIOPIA

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 1,024

Civilian Personnel - 204

TOTAL 1,228

A. BACKGROUND

Ethiopia is oriented toward the West, particularly the United States, to which it looks for political support and military and economic assistance. Although the Imperial Ethiopian Government has been disappointed with the magnitude of U. S. aid programs and our political support on certain issues, no appreciable change is anticipated in its friendly attitude or policy of collaboration provided the U. S. position in the Near East continues as at present and provided that sufficient military and economic assistance is extended to them in coming years.

It should be noted that existing U. S. military facilities (located in Eritrea, which is under the control of Ethiopia) are confined to a communications relay base operated by the U. S. Army Signal Corps. Since the primary mission of this base is communications, it does not boast a display of weapons of war or military planes such as are found at other bases, especially in Europe and North Africa. Thus, it does not give the local population an indication of the military might and power of the U. S.

The economic benefits are the primary reason for acceptance by the Eritreans of present U. S. operations in Eritrea. During the three year period 1954-1957 approximately U. S. \$3,600,000 (78% of the annual budget of Eritrea) was contributed annually to the local economy as a result of the construction and operation of the base. At the height of construction between 2,500 and 3,000 locals were gainfully employed. After the three year period it is estimated that approximately U. S. \$1,350,000 (30% of the Eritrean budget) will be contributed to the local economy and a total of 800 locals will be gainfully and regularly

\* See Footnotes of Part B

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ETHIOPIA

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

employed. While the Eritreans thus accept these operations because of the economic impact they have on the country, the Imperial Ethiopian Government in Addis Ababa has also indicated its acceptance of these operations because of the stabilizing influence they have in an area where there is possible political dissidence against the Imperial Government.

There is no evidence of any general antipathy toward U. S. military personnel at the present time. "Incidents" have been held to a minimum and relations between U. S. troops and the local population are uniformly described as good -- sometimes excellent -- by local officials. A higher standard of living for the white man, including automobiles, is an accepted way of life in Eritrea as the result of 40 years of Italian occupation and 12 years of British administration. Rigid enforcement of traffic regulations by MP's has kept traffic accidents to a minimum and there is no present difficulty in this regard.

The base rights agreement in Eritrea gives the U. S. military exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases involving their personnel, but vests civil jurisdiction in the local courts. Relations between the military police and the local police are excellent and there have not been any serious jurisdictional problems. In fact, relations in this context are so good that even civil action cases are released to the military for settlement. A possible source of future trouble might reside in the Moslem population of the area who could become hostile to the presence of U. S. troops if our foreign policy brought us into open conflict with the Arab countries.

There is no evidence that the presence of U. S. operations in Eritrea has resulted in higher retail prices or an increase in the cost of living for the local population. The operation of a Post Exchange and a Post Commissary, coupled with duty-free APO privileges, make the local U. S. military operation pretty much self-sustained. There

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ETHIOPIA

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

is no competition between the military and the local population for local consumer items. What friction exists in this sense with the local population stems from a feeling on the part of local merchants that military personnel do not personally spend enough in the local economy, even though military personnel probably spend more money in the local economy than most merchants realize.

Some competition for housing has existed in the past but will disappear completely in the future as new housing becomes available at the base. The withdrawal of Americans from the housing market may be a source of some resentment in the future. A total of 1,900 acres of land is under lease for U. S. operations in Eritrea. Only approximately 200 acres of this total are occupied exclusively by the military. The use of the remaining 1,700 acres for antenna fields has not interfered with their cultivation by the land owners. If these farming operations were not permitted the occupation of this land would pose a very real and serious problem in this country.

Though not found in government circles, some popular prejudice against American Negroes, particularly those in uniform, exists in Eritrea. Eritrean Coptic Christians and Ethiopians generally consider themselves to be of the Caucasian race and tend to look down on and resent the American Negro. Any influx of Negroes in numbers could therefore lead to difficulties.

There are no existing issues involving wages or rentals. Eritrean government officials have occasionally indicated in various ways a general resentment against the employment of Italian and other European nationals at the local base, in the apparent belief that only Eritrean nationals should be so employed. The hard facts are, however, that Eritreans are not qualified in the skills required for local operations. Eritreans are, however, given first preference in the filling of all positions for which they are qualified.

SECRET\* ETHIOPIAB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	1,024	1,031	-/ 7
Total Civilian	<u>204</u>	<u>251</u>	-/ <u>47</u>
Grand Total	1,228	1,282	-/ 54

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\*\* DEFENSE

Military Personnel	1,024	1,031	-/ 7
Civilian Personnel	<u>15</u>	<u>15</u>	-/ <u>0</u>
TOTAL	1,039	1,046	-/ 7

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<u>STATE</u>	34	44	-/ 10
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<u>ICA</u>	152	188	-/ 36
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<u>USIA</u>	3	4	-/ 1
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\* All figures include Eritrea  
 \*\* DOD figures are as of September 30, 1957.

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ETHIOPIA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practice

ICA's USOM has taken action to hire marginally-qualified Ethiopians and to institute in-service and on-the-job training programs to qualify them for continuing employment in the mission and in their government. Wherever possible, the military base at Asmara employs Eritreans. The Groove-Steers-Shepherd construction firm has with some success established a training program to develop additional skilled labor force. When the firm leaves, the local contractors and the Army will hire the better grade of skilled laborers.

b. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practice

The best of relations are maintained between the U. S. military and local Ethiopian troops. The latter are furnished training films and lent other assistance by the U. S. military. Pursuant to field recommendations, a Public Affairs Officer has been assigned and is now at Asmara. The base at Asmara operates both a radio and a TV station which have been instrumental in promoting good relations with the articulate part of the local population. More probably could be done by

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ETHIOPIA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cont'd)

concentrating local charity efforts -- such as U. S. contributions to the Ethiopian Red Cross, the Ethiopian Women's Welfare Fund, and the Mt. Entoto Orphanage -- so that they would receive a maximum amount of favorable publicity. Dependents' membership in the International Women's Club of Addis Ababa, the YMCA, and in the local churches is a strong contributing factor to increased good relations with Ethiopian nationals.

2. Problems Peculiar to Ethiopia

Among some Ethiopians there is a feeling of prejudice against Negroes.

Practice

Civilian agency personnel officers are aware that there is some Ethiopian racial prejudice. The assignment of Negro personnel to Ethiopia is not precluded by the agencies as a matter of policy. The needs for the services of the individual are weighed carefully, however, in relation to the possible embarrassment of the employee, limitations on the effectiveness of the employee in accomplishing program objectives, and the possibility of the assignment presenting a further cause of possible friction with the Ethiopians. ICA's staff has some Negro employees who have served in Ethiopia until now without difficulty.

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FRANCE

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 55,300

Civilian Personnel - 2,893

TOTAL 58,193

A. BACKGROUND

There is neither enthusiasm for the American presence nor a strong emotional objection to it by the French. The situation is largely explained by the fact that there is relatively little contact between the U. S. forces and the local population in France. The French hold personal privacy high in their scale of values and live within a very close family circle. At the same time, U. S. forces have generally shown a definite tendency to isolate themselves from the French community. As a result, on a typical U. S. base -- with its schools, theater, post exchanges, clubs and sport facilities -- there develops a virtually self-sufficient social life for the men, the officers, the wives and the children. The United States-French-Canadian Inter-governmental Committee, known as the Inter-Allied Committee, has functioned since 1951 with the express purpose of breaking down these social barriers to improve community relations. Success has not been as great as hoped, but neither have tensions developed to the degree anticipated. On the contrary, since both groups involved seem to prefer only limited association, American presence is considered as a matter of course. "Incidents" have been few in number and superficial in nature. Post commanders have, in general, been perceptive and there are spectacular examples of encouraging developments, as in the region near the Chateauroux Air Base where the communist vote actually declined, apparently because of the presence of American forces.

The U. S. military forces employ approximately 25,000 French civilians -- nearly a quarter of the number of civilians the French Ministry of National Defense itself employs. The fact that the U. S. forces are a major employer in France generally has a favorable and direct

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FRANCE

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

impact on those segments of the French population directly involved economically. In the labor-management field, the Army and Air Force have generally had an excellent record.

Criminal and civil jurisdiction problems could be the most serious single cause of friction with the local population. However, remarkable success has been achieved in this field and no serious jurisdictional problems are currently reported.

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SECRETFRANCEB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	55,300	54,198	- 1,102
Total Civilian	<u>2,893</u>	<u>2,760</u>	<u>- 133</u>
Grand Total	58,193	56,958	- 1,235

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	55,300	54,198	- 1,102
Civilian Personnel	<u>2,367</u>	<u>2,258</u>	<u>- 109</u>
TOTAL	57,667	56,456	- 1,211

<u>STATE</u>	368	412	+ 44
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<u>ICA</u>	100	48	- 52
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<u>USIA</u>	58	42	- 16
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FRANCE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practice

Among State, USIA and ICA personnel there is greater linguistic ability in French than in many of the other languages, and it is a requirement for assignment to top-level positions. In addition to the Foreign Service Institute and other training facilities, a French-language school has been established at Nice. Mandatory French language instruction is conducted at certain military installations. Voluntary language instruction is available at most others. The practice is to employ native teachers.

b. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practice

State, ICA and USIA have established no special administrative practice directed toward this problem. To counteract the feeling against American automobiles--all easily identified by special "CF" license plates--the U. S. military has conducted the following programs: a driving safety courtesy campaign, a U. S. Army Traffic Safety Advisory Council which includes French civilian community representatives, a command-wide participation in "Back the Attack on Traffic Accidents," a production

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FRANCE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cond't)

of "Highway Follies of 1956" based on driving conditions in Europe, driver training classes, annual vehicle inspections, and the "Operation Lifesaver" program. These efforts have reduced the number of traffic accidents and established the beginning of a real understanding on the local levels.

c. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

- (1) The Embassy has a special Housing Advisor and the military a Special Housing Office to assist new American personnel in obtaining housing and arranging rental agreements. To further ease the housing shortage, a family housing construction program has been started under the Surplus Commodities Act.
- (2) In order to prevent U. S. goods from appearing on the black market, French customs officials are now permitted to inspect receiving records at the PX's and commissaries to verify actual receipt of goods forwarded from APO's.
- (3) There is some resentment over the use of PX's and commissaries. Recent agreements providing for the sale of French products in PX's and commissaries at export prices should improve this situation.
- (4) Security regulations permitting, programs which encourage the advancement of French personnel to supervisory positions are being carried out. To counteract further the language barrier between local employees and U. S. supervisors, local personnel are taught the English language.

FRANCE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cond't)

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) To develop better local relationships an inter-allied committee was formed. The committee encouraged joint school programs; joint youth activities and arrangements for U. S. personnel to visit French homes. The U. S. military now employs French nationals as Civilian Community Relations Advisors. Installation commanders select the advisors subject to the approval of the French Liaison Mission.

(2) Efforts are being made to improve Franco-American relationships by: reaching French and American military youth through an exchange of material between the U. S. Armed Forces Information Service and the French Army newspaper "Le Bled"; increasing emphasis on the integration of Boy and Girl Scout activities, French and American; responding to requests for appearances of U. S. military bands throughout France.

2. Problems peculiar to France

None reported.



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GERMANY

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 250,340

Civilian Personnel - 5,648

TOTAL 255,988

A. BACKGROUND

The United States has a large complex of bases in Germany and a greater number of troops there than in any other foreign country. Despite this fact the problems involved in stationing these troops are not as acute as in many other countries. It can be generally stated that most Germans are just as desirous of having U. S. forces in Germany as Americans are. Although this situation may change, it is more likely to do so in a framework of shifting international developments so broad that many of our basic concepts would have to undergo concurrent revision. The Federal German Government is well aware of the dependence of German security on the presence of U. S. forces in Germany and on U. S. nuclear retaliatory power. A prime object of German policy is to insure that U. S. forces remain with them and there is no substantial public pressure for their withdrawal. In fact a sizeable reduction of these forces at the present time would produce an adverse reaction among Germans.

The U. S. economic aid and refugee relief programs and our occupation responsibilities in Germany have either been completed or very largely removed from the scene. Hence, primary considerations are the attitudes and frictions involving U. S. military forces stationed in Germany.

The presence of U. S. forces in Germany has not created unmanageable problems in terms of emotional impact on the population. The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and USIS conduct extensive and active public relations programs to facilitate harmonious relations between the troops and the population. Although there was an upsurge of serious incidents in 1956, the number of such occurrences has subsided following corrective measures taken by the Army. Current opinion polls in

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GERMANYA. BACKGROUND (Continued)

Germany (reported as recently as December 30, 1957, in the New York Times) reflect a relatively favorable public attitude toward the behavior of U. S. troops. There are of course isolated unfavorable situations but the picture can be said to be good. Incidents will continue to occur where there is the greatest concentration of U. S. troops, notably in the Kaiserlautern area. The German public does seem to be developing a sensitivity to the presence of Negro troops. Competition for women represents little problem, primarily because there is a marked shortage of men in Germany. There is some envy and resentment created by the higher standards of living of Americans but it is of no great significance.

The Federal Republic continues to pay support costs to the United States and other visiting forces justified by the delay in building up Germany's own forces. The Bundestag and the general public reluctantly acknowledged the necessity of paying such costs through March, 1958. If further support costs are insisted upon, it can be assumed that the matter will be a most sensitive one as regards German political and public opinion.

In summary, German public sentiment and government attitude will be largely conditioned by the German sense of security. As long as a Soviet threat exists and German forces are weak, there will be no basic change in German attitudes to the continuation of U. S. forces at present levels.

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GERMANYB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	250,340	242,521	-7,819
Total Civilian	<u>5,648</u>	<u>5,514</u>	- 134
Grand Total	255,988	248,035	- 7,953

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	250,340	242,521	- 7,819
Civilian Personnel	<u>4,968</u>	<u>4,899</u>	- 69
TOTAL	255,308	247,420	- 7,888

<u>STATE</u>	485	446	- 39
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<u>ICA</u>	8	8	0
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<u>USIA</u>	187	161	- 26
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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) An extensive indoctrination program for troops is begun on shipboard and continues throughout a soldier's tour in Germany by means of films and the Troop Information Program. "The Commander's Call" provides the base commander the opportunity to talk to individuals and point out changing local conditions.

(2) USAFE has established a mandatory language program. Instruction is also available in military educational centers, as well as in elementary and high schools.

(3) Army has undertaken a program to transfer those with low IQ's and past records that might indicate proneness to crime and accidents.

(4) USAREUR conducts an active publications program. Titles of pamphlets designed to assist troops in adjusting to a foreign environment are: "Travel and Recreation in Europe," "Germany and Western Defense," "By Our Acts," "Your Rights and Obligations in Germany," "Maneuvers-Rehearsal for Victory," "As Others See Us," "Taxis without Trouble," and "Your Weapon Can Kill."

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GERMANY

PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES - continued

(5) USAREUR has an effective off-duty language program which includes USAFI courses, University of Maryland courses and encouragement of individual study through publication of typical words and phrases. On-duty language training is made available to officer personnel meeting language aptitude qualifications. Limitation of funds and military training requirements preclude compulsory on-duty language training for all military personnel.

(6) Commanders encourage troop use of educational facilities available. These include: 159 Army Education Centers in USAREUR, a branch of the University of Maryland (48% of its enrollees study languages), and dependent schools which offer language training for all age groups. Formal study is supplemented by short on-duty vocabulary drills in troop units, and a coordinated radio and newspaper program offering language training helps.

(7) Extensive troop and dependent orientation is given to encourage community relations objectives. Three or four hours of orientation are given in the United States, three or four hours upon arrival in Europe, and approximately twenty hours yearly thereafter. Subjects include host country history, customs and traditions, rights and obligations of troops stationed abroad, NATO organization and programs, and advice on use of local transportation, payment of debts, and other personal problems.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U.S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution and do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) Practically all Army training team personnel live on the economy in proximity to German Army

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

installations to which they are assigned. These persons must patronize German stores, rent German housing, and live, in general, as do German military and civilian personnel.

(2) Heavily taxed items, like liquor, cigarettes, gasoline and coffee are rationed by U.S. forces to comply with German requests in return for German cooperation regarding taxes on importation of items for armed forces use.

(3) Armed forces regulations have withdrawn commissary privileges from many classes of non-governmental personnel, thus eliminating a potential source of complaint because of local tax loss. This practice also applies to PX facilities.

(4) In general, the wages of local employees and their social and fringe benefits are comparable to those paid by local business, with rare and minor exceptions.

(5) On-the-job training is provided for local personnel, with mobile training units brought in if necessary. The object is to raise the skill level as high as is practicable. English lessons are given the workers to facilitate communication with U.S. supervisors. There is room for considerable improvement in training these local employees but progress is being made.

c. Problem -- U.S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U.S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practices

Command-wide participation in the "Back the Attack on Traffic Accidents" campaign which includes:

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

Use of graph presentations and driver manuals to acquaint drivers with European driving conditions and rules.

Increased suspension of licenses following offenses.

Remedial driving classes.

Vehicle safety inspection (military and private).

Radar speed check by military.

Driver proficiency contests.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U.S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) USAREUR has an extensive and effective community relations program throughout communities adjacent to their facilities in Germany. The Commander-in-Chief has called upon all Commanders to give emphasis and personal attention to community relations activities. The Commander-in-Chief himself participates in numerous activities and gives endorsement to others. Fifty-five Community Advisory Councils have been established in cooperation with civilian communities to discuss problems and plan joint activities.

Local commanders are given maximum latitude in determining activities best suited to local communities. All Staff Agencies responsible for development of policies and procedures are required to give full consideration to possible impact of actions on the community.

Close coordination is maintained among the three Services, USIS, host governmental agencies, the Bonn Council, and the German-American Troop Community Relations Working Group.

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(2) U.S. servicemen are encouraged to accept invitations to visit European homes, and American families are encouraged to invite Europeans to their homes. This cordiality is especially appreciated during the Christmas holiday season. At this time in 1956 over 6,000 American servicemen visited homes of Europeans. Visits are also exchanged between European school children and U.S. Army school children. Private organizations in the city of Hamburg on two occasions have invited large groups of American servicemen for weekend visits as guests to their homes. Such visits have been very successful and civilian agencies have promised assistance in expanding the idea. The USAREUR-wide Christmas community relations activities labelled "OPERATION GOOD CHEER 1957" included Christmas parties for orphans, visits to homes, and assistance to refugees and the aged in the form of charitable activities.

(3) The USAREUR command maintains close working relationships with the European press at all levels. USAREUR headquarters recently initiated a press tour program for selected editors and publishers of the German press association, radio, weekly news magazines, major dailies, and other publications circulated widely throughout Germany. Monitors at USAREUR headquarters select daily and weekly newspapers from which they prepare daily press summaries and studies of reaction to the presence of American troops. Press relations are generally excellent.

(4) USAREUR endorses and encourages voluntary contributions by Army personnel; during 1956 gifts were estimated at \$175,000. Recipients included hospitals, orphanages, refugee camps, religious and civic organizations and homes for the aged. Dependent women's groups are especially active in this type of work.



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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

Individual participation in local clubs and hobby groups -- sports, stamp collection, cultural and scientific pursuits -- is encouraged. Participation in local festivals and holiday celebrations is widespread. For the past five years, German-American friendship week has been celebrated in the Federal Republic annually, sponsored by 34 German-American groups. Thousands of American servicemen participate with German neighbors in this event,

Bands are especially good emissaries, and twenty U. S. Army bands have conducted numerous public concerts or participated in public events during the past year. The all-soldier 7th Army Symphony Orchestra has played ninety-eight concerts to an estimated audience of 84,825 Europeans during the past year. The U. S. Army Field Band completed a tour of European countries in which forty-three concerts were given.

Competition between U. S. and German clubs includes basketball, soccer, fencing, boxing, field hockey, and track and field events. Such activities are limited, however, by the degree of proficiency of one country's team in sports typically associated with another country.

(5) The Chief of MAAG has developed excellent relations with the local press through periodic interviews and participation in public ceremonies in connection with turn-over of U. S. equipment.

(6) Aside from the organized efforts of the military commands, extensive activity is carried on by USIS through all media, stressing personal participation by Americans -- speakers, musical groups, orchestras, bands, glee clubs, inspection flights and visits, and open house days at military bases.

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(7) Damage to public facilities caused by U. S. troops is promptly handled by the U.S. Command by reimbursement or whenever possible repair of the damage.

(8) In anticipation of increased noise from newer airplanes, extensive community relations programs have been implemented including:

- (a) Establishing aviation committees with base and local personnel;
- (b) Showing films explaining the noise to communities;
- (c) Briefing community leaders and explaining the noise;
- (d) Giving jet familiarization to the press and opinion leaders;
- (e) Giving children tours of jet bases;
- (f) Issuing directives to commanders stressing noise control and directing booming at altitudes high enough not to affect the community; and
- (g) Emphasizing the greater security provided by new aircraft.

(9) Community relations are best where there is a maximum of contact between the local population and troops. Troops are encouraged to join local clubs and cultural societies, participate in athletics, and attend concerts. Conversely, American athletic contests, concerts, and base open houses are well attended by Germans.

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES(Continued)

(10) German officials, U. S. military leaders, and State and USIA representatives supervise the over-all community relations program. Working with this group are councils of mayors. On the community level there are also three Area Command-level Councils and forty-three sub-area or post councils. These last groups meet monthly or bi-monthly to plan constructive activities. There is also a European Community Relations Working Group, meeting quarterly and composed of representatives from the USA, USAF, USO, State, and USIA.

(11) The German Red Cross and the USAF jointly sponsor "Operation Kinderlift," which annually flies 10,000 German refugee children out of Berlin for vacations in West Germany.

(12) Service personnel and dependents contribute time and make substantial contributions of money to local charity activities for benefit of orphanages and refugee camps. Wives of all Army personnel are encouraged to belong to the local Women's Club which is an international organization and sponsors monthly teas and luncheons.

(13) CINCUSAREUR has declared community relations to be second in importance only to military defense. Both troop and public information programs, utilizing all available media, have been intensified in the interests of community relations.

(14) Individual U. S. professional groups periodically invite their German counterparts to visit American installations and act as hosts during such visits. Examples of such group activity are:

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES(Continued)

- (a) Sixty German nurses were invited to the U. S. Army Hospital to visit with American nurses;
  - (b) In recognition of the anniversary of the U. S. Army Medical Corps, the U. S. Army Hospital was host to 110 German civilian doctors for a half day; and
  - (c) With the introduction of the new NAC DIAL system on the telephone exchanges, a tour was arranged for officials of the Deutsche Post (German Government Communications Department) to visit the nerve center of the system and inspect the modern innovations.
- (15) Widespread interest is taken in German orphans and school children and all commands arrange for them to make occasional visits to American installations. The following two programs exemplify this interest:
- (a) Two hundred fifty Frankfurt elementary and high school German children were invited to be guests at a visit to a U. S. Army airstrip near the city. The children had the opportunity to examine various types of aircraft and equipment.
  - (b) Thirty-five German orphans from West Berlin were taken on a day-long excursion to visit the U. S. Rhine River Patrol Headquarters in Wiesbaden.

2. Problems Peculiar to Germany

None reported.

GREECE

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 1,038

Civilian Personnel - 203

TOTAL 1,241

A. BACKGROUND

The attitude of Greece toward the United States is conditioned by a long history of friendly relations between the two countries. The continuing emigration of many Greeks to the United States and the large number of Americans of Greek extraction provide close continuing ties. Historically, the United States is recognized as having been sympathetic toward Greece in its long struggle to achieve national independence. In the post-war years, relations between Greece and the United States have become particularly close because of the large scale program of U. S. military and economic assistance which many Greeks believe kept their country from falling under Communist domination. Consequently, the basic attitude of the Greek Government and people is friendly and well disposed toward the United States.

Greece is a weak country, economically and militarily. As a result, it has traditionally sought the support and protection of some great power or group of powers. Greek foreign policy is based on cooperation with the United States, membership in NATO, and opposition to Soviet communism, but future attitudes depend largely on progress toward a settlement of the Cyprus question. The degree of cooperation will also be dependent upon the level of U. S. economic and military aid. Any termination or substantial reduction of aid levels to Greece could lead to a review of U. S. operating facilities and to Greek claims that the United States was not adequately supporting its NATO ally. In addition to political and psychological effects, there could result a reduction of Greek military effectiveness through internal budget cuts.

Personal relations between U. S. personnel and the Greek populace have been uniformly good. There are

SECRETA. BACKGROUND (Cond't)GREECE

sufficient numbers of Greeks who speak fluent English that no serious language barrier exists between Americans and Greeks. The two nationalities share a common religious background and a cultural heritage of independence and freedom. The extrovert personality of the average Greek has readily responded to the normally outgoing approach of the average American. As a result of these factors, there have been no particular problems encountered in establishing good personal relations with the Greek public, notwithstanding the recent unfortunate incident where certain extremists bombed the USIS library.

The principal friction between Greece and the United States relating to the presence of U. S. personnel in Greece arose over the question of privileges granted by the Greek Government, which gave all U. S. military personnel in Greece the same complete immunity from Greek civil and criminal jurisdiction as is enjoyed by diplomatic personnel. In this situation U. S. immunity, translated as "extraterritoriality" by the Greeks, became widely resented and developed into a local political issue and eventually into friction between the two countries. After long negotiations, a bilateral understanding based on the standard NATO Status of Forces Agreement was signed on September 7, 1956. The document provides that (a) U. S. personnel would be liable under Greek law for criminal actions occurring in non-duty status, and (b) jurisdiction would be relinquished in cases involving civil matters. However, Greece agreed to waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction under Article 7 of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement in all cases except where Greek authorities determine that it is of 'particular importance' that jurisdiction be exercised by Greece. The status of the joint U. S. Military Aid Group, however, was not affected by the bilateral agreement and it remains a potential source of friction. Any economic impact of U. S. military facilities in Greece has been minimal.


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	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	1,038	740	- 298
Total Civilian	<u>203</u>	<u>191</u>	<u>- 12</u>
Grand Total	1,241	931	-310

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	1,038	740	-298
Civilian Personnel	<u>43</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>- 9</u>
TOTAL	1,081	774	-307



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
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GREECE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practice

U. S. military and U. S. civilians receive mandatory thirty-hour language courses on duty. An additional thirty-hour course is available off-duty. Dependents are urged to take both.

b. Problem -- Use of Land

To ensure that U. S. requirements for land are held to the absolute minimum consistent with U. S. programs and that withdrawal of the land from local use creates the least problem for the local government and minimizes the impact on the local economy.

Practice

In expropriating land for use of U. S. Defense Forces the host government was allowing long intervals between acquisition and payment. Informal intervention by U. S. authorities sped local administration practices so that landowners could be paid more quickly by the host government.

c. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.



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GREECE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cond't)

Practices

(1) Ration quotas have been imposed on the sale in PX outlets of soap, cigarettes, Kleenex, toothpaste, soap powder, etc. In the interest of better control, a new series of gasoline coupons has been issued. Liquor purchases are prominently marked. Household effects brought in are inventoried, and changes must be reported. Punitive action has been taken against violators.

(2) Current policy is to use Greek contractors exclusively, and all current contracts are with Greek firms, resulting in the exclusive use of Greek labor for construction. In addition, approximately 50% of the supply contracts are awarded to Greek firms (the remainder go to third country bidders).

(3) On-the-job training is offered to local personnel, along with English language instruction, military instruction, and management training for supervisors.

(4) Local labor is used insofar as possible for maintenance and operation of machines, buildings and grounds, for food service and retail sales.

d. Problem -- Jurisdiction

To ensure that the rights of U. S. personnel under the Constitution are safeguarded, without creating resentment by needless challenge of the basic sovereignty of the host country.

Practices

(1) Absence of authority for the Greek Government to exercise any criminal or civil jurisdiction over American forces was an increasing source of ill will among the local population. The problem was resolved by a Status of Forces Agreement.

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GREECE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cond't)

(2) To counter unfavorable publicity in the local press, USIS sometimes releases courts-martial results.

(3) U. S. military police patrols, accompanied by Greek military police, are sometimes sent into areas outside of bases for the purpose of maintaining order among the U. S. personnel.

e. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practices

(1) While liability insurance is not compulsory under Greek law, it is required for U. S. forces personnel who have private vehicles registered under the XA series of Greek license plates.

(2) The Air Force has assigned a non-commissioned officer as full time safety technician. When the accident rate was high in 1956, all private driving was suspended for four days by the Air Base Commander. A midnight curfew was inaugurated, which is still in effect for lower grades. Those under twenty-five must have approval to buy a car, and disciplinary action is taken against negligent drivers. Accident prones have been deprived of driving privileges.

f. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

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GREECE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cond't)

Practices

(1) Dependents are very active in several fields which have produced concrete results. American women's clubs participate in many charitable and cultural activities which create good will. Boy Scout and Girl Scout organizations in Greece have very comprehensive programs designed to promote better relations and their activities outside the metropolitan area have been most effective in reaching an element of the Greek population which does not usually come into contact with Americans. Charitable work done by Scout organizations, particularly during the Christmas season, has received very favorable publicity in the Greek press. In nearly all adverse newspaper publications the target has been U. S. policy (Cyprus issue is a case in point) rather than U. S. personnel actions.

(2) USIS publicizes humanitarian acts of U. S. Armed Forces, such as delivery of emergency vaccine from Germany by jet plane and evacuation of disabled children from mountainous area by Sixth Fleet helicopter. USIS is notified of "incidents" involving U. S. forces often before Greek journalists learn of them and this helps minimize adverse news-treatment. Wives of American personnel cooperate in a range of community welfare and humanitarian projects.

2. Problems Peculiar to Greece

None reported.

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ICELAND

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 5,326

Civilian Personnel - 252

TOTAL 5,578

A. BACKGROUND

Iceland's strategically important geographic position and its membership in NATO is well established and sufficiently accepted by the majority of the population to have given a moderate, limited sense of collective security to the populace as a whole. Moreover, suspicions of Soviet motives have grown in proportion to the growth of Iceland's economic dependency on the East. The prestige of the United States in Iceland is generally high. Tempering this, however, is a suspicion that the United States with its tremendous power and influence might tend to overwhelm their little island unless the Icelanders are extremely careful in all their dealings with Americans.

The Icelandic Communist party received nearly 20% of the popular vote in recent elections and makes every effort to exploit Iceland's feeling of isolationism and dislike for certain aspects of American culture to encourage resentment against the United States. Its concentrated propaganda efforts have been only moderately successful. While Communist and some nationalist elements often display hostility toward Americans, a substantial majority of Icelanders are receptive to friendly relations with Americans if they are treated as equals and especially if Americans display an appreciation of Icelandic history and culture.

World War II and the Air Age have brought Icelanders into immediate contact with many previously unknown aspects of Western culture. As a result, Iceland has had to assimilate rapidly certain aspects of an alien culture, particularly those of a material nature. Although U. S. military personnel are generally restricted to the base area, it has been impossible, under the circumstances, for Iceland to prevent many members of its population from coming into contact

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~~SECRET~~ICELANDA. BACKGROUND (Continued)

with Americans and thereby absorbing some aspects of Western civilization. Some irritation and resentment of American culture, especially among older elements of the Icelandic population, has been inevitable.

There is some Icelandic jealousy of American PX and commissary privileges on the military base but this is not an important issue. More important to Icelanders working at the base is the attitude of American personnel, especially U. S. civilian construction personnel in supervisory positions, and it is therefore imperative that this attitude remain sympathetic and comprehensive.

USIS carries on a tailored program through its press, motion picture, information center, exhibits, exchange of persons and visiting artists activities. Each of these activities has shown favorable tangible results.

ICA has a small but active technical assistance program with an annual budget of about \$100,000, operated presently under direction of the Economic Counselor of Embassy. Approximately 50% of these funds are used for training Icelanders for special skills required for the construction and maintenance of the defense facilities, thereby making possible additional employment of Icelanders on the military base. The ICA programs are considered highly effective in promoting understanding between Icelanders and Americans at Keflavik. They provide Icelanders with a feeling of pride that they are able to take on greater responsibilities in connection with construction and maintenance activities at the base. In addition, since March, 1956, the United States through ICA has made available to Iceland in direct dollar loans and indirect credits of other currencies the equivalent of \$18.6 million for major projects.

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ICELAND

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	5,326	4,983	- 343
Total Civilian	<u>252</u>	<u>273</u>	<u>- 21</u>
Grand Total	5,578	5,256	- 322

DEFENSE


Military Personnel	5,326	4,983	- 343
Civilian Personnel	<u>231</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>- 19</u>
TOTAL	5,557	5,233	- 324



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To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) Reports from the country indicate that the U. S. Government agencies are not giving adequate recognition, in making their selections of personnel to serve in Iceland, to the unusual nature of the Icelandic people. The latter, with a highly developed sense of self-reliance, are extremely sensitive to any form of guidance or direction that may be construed as interference. This characteristic calls for the selection of individuals possessing the utmost tact and skill for dealing with Icelanders. All agencies must therefore use extreme care in selecting personnel assigned to Iceland. In view of the isolation, darkness, and unfavorable climate, which exists during most of the year, greater than normal emphasis must be placed on the physical and psychological strength of all personnel assigned to this country.

(2) All military personnel, immediately upon arrival, receive a two-hour indoctrination lecture. A second indoctrination program is received upon reporting to the assigned unit. These programs cover Icelandic laws, customs and agreements, together with the policies of the Defense Force regarding conduct.

(3) There is an Icelandic language program on the Base TV. Voluntary language classes on the Base

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ICELAND

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

are conducted by an Icelandic civilian at a cost of \$20 per person per course of 10 weeks duration.

(4) There are weekly guided tours by bus during the summer months to nearby areas of scenic or historical interest. These are sponsored by the Base Service Club from non-appropriated funds. Food and lodging are paid by the individual.

(5) Military personnel who prove to be undesirable are removed from the host country through military procedures. Civilian personnel who prove undesirable are removed at the employer's expense, provided they have completed the prescribed overseas tour, otherwise they are removed at their own expense.

b. Problem -- Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) Indigenous labor requirements are made known to the local Icelandic Hiring office, a government operated agency, which in turn refers applicants to the prospective employer for interview.

(2) There are present in Iceland certain dependents of U. S. civilian and military personnel entirely on the responsibility of the employee, that is in an "unauthorized status." These persons are not permitted to enter the "Agreed Area." Icelanders who work and live "on-post" (the "Agreed Area") get commissary food at special prices, not over the counter, but through agreed-upon procedures relating to payment of wages.

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ICELAND

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(3) All U. S. consumer goods are contraband outside the "Agreed Area"; all vehicles are therefore searched upon departure.

(4) Responding to the Icelandic Government's desire that U. S. dependents not be permitted to live on the economy, the U. S. Army restricts assignment of dependents to the number that can be accommodated on the military installation.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) At the insistence of the Icelandic government not more than 6% of Army unit's population (including dependents) may be outside the "Agreed Area" at any one time.

(2) Curfew imposed upon U. S. Forces personnel and their dependents who reside in the "Agreed Area" reflects the general attitude of the Icelandic Government, i. e., keeping social contact to the absolute minimum. Further, the Government has made it clear that it does not desire support of charities, or charitable acts, from U. S. military agencies or individuals. The Defense Command, therefore, forbids participation in such activities.

(3) Army personnel are required to be in uniform when outside the "Agreed Area" for ready identification and to minimize the prospect of undefined charges.

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ICELAND

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

2. Problem peculiar to Iceland

Problem -- Assignment of Negro Troops

The Icelandic Government has requested that Negro troops not be assigned to that country.

Practice

Although it is Department of Defense policy to make overseas assignments without regard to race, creed, or color, the request of the Icelandic Government is honored.

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INDONESIA

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 33

Civilian Personnel - 254

TOTAL 287

A. BACKGROUND

With the exception of the common revolutionary experience, historical and cultural ties between the United States and Indonesia have not been strong. A 300-year period of Dutch colonialism precluded any significant intercourse between the American and Indonesian people until after World War II. Personal relations between the two peoples are still relatively restricted. Only about 2,000 Americans are presently in the country.

Indonesia is intensely anti-colonialist in outlook and therefore remains suspicious of Western powers as it strives for a neutral and nonalignment position between the Communist bloc and the Western powers. Indonesia lacks political maturity, administrative and technical skills, and has a very low standard of living. Indonesians are eager for the assistance of the United States and other advanced nations in improving these conditions. An effective propaganda program against the United States and Western powers is being carried on by the Indonesian Communist party and by the Communist diplomatic representation in Indonesia.

Private American enterprises, particularly oil installations and rubber estates, make a substantial contribution to the Indonesian economy. Although the problems of these companies have been many, they have managed to maintain reasonably good relationships with the Indonesian government and people. The U. S. economic assistance program to the country has demonstrated

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INDONESIA

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

U. S. willingness to help Indonesia improve the living standard of its people. Such assistance has been eagerly sought and well received by Indonesians.

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	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	33	31	- 2
Total Civilian	<u>254</u>	<u>283</u>	+ 29
Grand Total	287	314	+ 27

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	33	31	- 2
Civilian Personnel	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	33	31	- 2

<u>STATE</u>	70	70	0
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<u>ICA</u>	161	188	+ 27
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<u>USIA</u>	23	25	+ 2
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SECRETINDONESIAC. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES1. Common Problemsa. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) Because of current strained relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands and the hostilities and sensitivities created during the colonial and post-colonial period, care must be taken in assigning personnel to Indonesia. State, USIA and ICA carefully screen all individuals. Recently-naturalized citizens of Dutch origin and those whose spouses are Dutch by birth are not usually selected. Americans who are fluent in the Dutch language are counselled against general use of the language. A Dutch name, or recent service in the Netherlands, is not considered as necessarily militating against service in Indonesia.

(2) The agencies concentrate efforts on orientation at headquarters and at the post, stressing the history of Dutch-Indonesian relationships and the importance, particularly at this time, of adjustment to these relationships.

(3) In view of the high tide of nationalism and Indonesian sensitivity (comparable to a national inferiority complex), it is considered very desirable to have American personnel in the country who can speak Indonesian. It is reported that all officers assigned to the Soviet Embassy can speak the language

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C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

at the time of their assignment. Courses in the language have been scheduled by the Foreign Service Institute for Fiscal Year 1958 and 1959; both State and USIA have assigned personnel to take these courses. ICA's post report includes a selection of the essential sentences and phrases which all assignees are urged to learn before arrival at post. The three agencies encourage all officers to obtain a working knowledge of Indonesian as soon as possible after arriving at the post.

b. Problem - Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practice

The Indonesians resent employment of resident Chinese by the civilian agencies, who in the past have hired them in clerical, maintenance, and other administrative functions because of the lack of skilled Indonesians to fill such positions. The agencies are attempting to confine their employment of locals to native Indonesians wherever possible, even though pre-service and in-service training slows down the work of the missions.

2. Problems Peculiar to Indonesia

None reported.

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IRAN

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 477

Civilian Personnel - 582

TOTAL 1,059

A. BACKGROUND

Despite an historical basis for suspicion of things "foreign," the Iranian Government has willingly entered into mutual security and aid programs with the United States. These programs contribute to the strength of the Iranian forces charged with the maintenance of internal security and national defense, to the capacity of the Iranian people for economic and social development, and to the political strength and quality of the Iranian Government. As a result, U. S. agencies having activities in Iran have been fortunate in enjoying a generally close and friendly association with the government, the people, and the press.

It is difficult to assess which of the various programs has had the most favorable impact insofar as U.S. policies and the presence of U.S. citizens are concerned. The military assistance program, particularly that portion devoted to equipping Iranian armed forces with modern weapons, has attracted the interest of the Shah and top government leaders. The relationships of the general public with Americans have been largely through the country-wide U.S.-sponsored agriculture, education, and public health programs.

Since Iran shares a common problem with many other countries, a dearth of technical and managerial skills, the technical assistance program may be expected to have a significant effect over the years and engender an increasing volume of good will for the United States. Every U.S. technician involved in a technical cooperation project has been specifically requested and accepted by the Government of Iran. The USIA public information program is of particular value in making U.S. programs and motivations fully appreciated.

The mere presence of relatively large groups of Americans in Teheran and other urban population centers has not resulted in controversy either in the political milieu or in the press. Competition for housing, which in the urban areas has been unavoidable, has not resulted in any serious displacement insofar as the marginal housing and low income groups of Iranians are concerned. Significant labor shortages have not occurred, although foreseeable build-ups of some aspects of the military construction programs may have limited and localized effects.

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Relations between individual Iranians and Americans have been limited by the cultural and language differences. USOM and Embassy personnel are thoroughly indoctrinated regarding the importance of strict observance of local customs, particularly as they pertain to religion. Realistic rates for currency exchange minimize the likelihood of black market activities.

Some concern has recently been expressed over the absence of any formal jurisdictional arrangements for U.S. military personnel in Iran. The present informal, exclusive jurisdictional arrangement enjoyed by the United States in Iran has not resulted in any embarrassment or problems, and any endeavor to achieve formal underwriting of existing informal arrangements could well prove to be retrograde in effect.

In summary, an unusually favorable climate now encompasses the presence of U.S. personnel in Iran. The Shah points to this American "presence" as indicative of U.S. support and as justification for his abandonment of Iran's traditional neutrality in favor of joining the Baghdad Pact and orienting the country to the West. The concern of the Iranians is directed toward any actual or apparent withdrawal of U.S. personnel from the area. Offers of technical assistance from the Soviets have been refused on the grounds that such assistance was already being given by U.S. technicians. The Iranians are a mercurial people, however, capable of complete reversals of attitudes should any development occur which affects their strong sense of nationalism or their pride of race and independence. A serious political crisis in the Middle East involving Iran could, therefore, bring about a precipitous change of attitude not only toward the United States, but also toward the West.

IRAN

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	477	470	- 7
Total Civilian	<u>582</u>	<u>647</u>	<u>+ 65</u>
Grand Total	1,059	1,117	<u>+ 58</u>

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	477	470	- 7
Civilian Personnel	<u>123</u>	<u>152</u>	<u>+ 29</u>
TOTAL	600	622	<u>+ 22</u>



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
<u>STATE</u>	117	117	0
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<u>ICA</u>	310	350	<u>+ 40</u>
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<u>USIA</u>	32	28	- 4
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IRAN

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) Elimination of the language barrier is a basic problem which receives special emphasis. Courses in both English and Farsi are offered by the Iran-American Society. Stressing joint study, lectures are given which deal with such topics as the social, scientific, literary, cultural, industrial, public, commercial, and educational programs of Iran and the United States.

(2) At six-month intervals, orientation courses of one-week duration are conducted. Attendance by Army personnel is mandatory. Iranian customs, culture, commerce, and beliefs are emphasized. Courses are conducted by fully qualified American and Iranian lecturers. Semi-annually a four-hour ARMISH-MAAG lecture is presented which is devoted largely to proper American conduct in Iran. The lecture-orientation course program is considered to be effective.

(3) U. S. Army personnel are urged to read the following:

Iran, Past and Present (Wilbur)  
Introduction to Iran (Groseclose)  
Pageant in Persia (Filmor)  
I Sing in the Wilderness (Surafgar)  
The Unveiling (Payne)  
Hadji Baba of Isfahan (Morier)  
Strange Lands and Peoples (Douglas)

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IRAN

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES(Continued)

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practice

Competition for scarce housing, a potential irritant for ARMISH and MAAG personnel, is alleviated by strict rules requiring the utilization of the American Embassy's housing service. Iranian personnel are employed to assist in appointments with landlords, inspections, and preparation of leases. This is considered by the Army to be an effective practice in avoiding misunderstandings that could undermine otherwise satisfactory community relationships.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) USIS coordinates all official American press releases, and other agencies do not maintain direct relations with the Iranian press and radio. ARMISH-MAAG maintains an Armed Services Radio Station having an estimated audience of 35,000.

(2) A proposed U. S. radio station at Teheran will be a factor in increasing Iranian understanding of the American way of life.

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IRAN

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(3) Participation in local civic and charitable organizations is extensive. For example, the proceeds of a recent movie were presented to two orphanages at Tehran. ARMISH-MAAG publicizes and supports all charitable events. All military personnel are encouraged to seek membership in the Iran-American Society, a Teheran civic organization established to develop understanding and friendly relations between Iranians and Americans.

2. Problems Peculiar to Iran

None reported.

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ITALY

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 10,221

Civilian Personnel - 795

TOTAL 11,016

A. BACKGROUND

The popular impression of the United States in Italy is still one of almost legendary wealth, power, freedom, and generosity. Most Italians view the United States as a country not to be feared but as a friendly one from which many benefits have come. This attitude stems somewhat from the large emigration from mainland and insular Italy to the United States since the turn of the century, but also is due in part to a substantial majority of Italians who want at all costs to preserve Italian freedom and therefore to avoid absorption into the Soviet bloc. Italian foreign policy is based on reliance on NATO and close bilateral collaboration with the United States. With Yugoslavia considered committed to the East and with Soviet bases in Albania, only a few miles from the Italian coast, Italian governments and the democratic parties which support them require the physical presence of U.S. forces as a stabilizing force and guarantee.

There is public esteem for U. S. military forces and the U.S. civilians who work for U.S. Government agencies in Italy. The Italian Government minimizes incidents that occur. Public relations are excellent. Our troops, by their behavior, their wearing of civilian clothes off duty, their pursuit of family interests in the company or under the open scrutiny of Italians, have all caused feelings of mutual understanding to develop. On the negative side, the automobile accident rate among U.S. forces in Italy is high enough to cause concern, although not higher than the general average for the areas in which they are stationed. Though the Communists (numbering more than 1,500,000) sometimes criticize the U. S. presence in Italy, our role is generally accepted and has never been a real issue.

On the economic side, the presence of U.S. military forces has not caused shortages of local goods or labor. On the contrary, because there are, 1,500,000 unemployed in Italy, hiring local labor gives the Italian economy much needed and appreciated relief. There have been few problems connected with the utilization of land by U.S. forces. The most important individual problem was settled when the persons whose livelihoods would have vanished with the absorption of the land into an American base were promised employment on the base. Special arrangements were made for the development of a non-Communist labor cooperative, La Portuale, in Leghorn to handle the cargoes received by American troops

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in Italy. The American Embassy at Rome has made clear the U.S. political interest in retaining La Portuale in operation, and the U.S. Government, through other programs in Italy, has promoted the cause of free trade unions against their Communist competitors.

In addition to the extensive activities of USIS, which have been recognized as especially effective, the following other U.S. programs and activities have maintained or improved a favorable attitude toward U. S. citizens in Italy:

(a) The Military Defense Assistance Program, under which some \$1.6 billions of military equipment, supplies and training have been invested in Italian defense forces in order to bring the forces up to agreed NATO force goals.

(b) The Off-Shore Procurement Program, designed to provide in Italy a source of supply for NATO forces and a military production base capable of expansion in time of war and to render a degree of economic assistance.

(c) The Facilities Assistance Program, which has sought to develop in Italy plant production or repair facilities which could be used for the benefit of all NATO forces.

(d) The PL-480 Programs. These have made possible assistance in two ways. They have provided needed surplus agricultural commodities without expenditure of foreign exchange and have generated substantial lira funds for economic development loans. The programs also have provided surplus agricultural products to supplement the Italian school lunch program which is now progressing through its third year. The latter phase of the PL-480 program has not only been beneficial to the children of Italy but has provided some of the best and most widespread publicity the U. S. has received in Italy. The distribution of surplus commodities through voluntary agencies under the PL-480 Title III program has also been worthwhile because it has appreciably relieved the burdens of a significant segment of the poorest classes of Italian people.

In summary, U. S. prestige in Italy has been well established over a long period of time. The Embassy at Rome however states that events occurring during the fall of 1957, such as the Soviet ICBM, Sputnik, and Soviet penetration of Syria on the one hand, and the Little Rock affair, the Vanguard failure and the President's illness on the other, produced a

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genuine if temporary falling off in the Italian public's confidence in U.S. leadership. During recent months the Italian Communists have attempted to develop a strong press campaign in an effort to gain popular support for the Soviet proposals for a general arms reduction, a ban on nuclear tests and the ouster of all foreign troops from national territories. Despite the fact that the Italian people are strongly opposed on ethical and humanitarian grounds to the use of nuclear weapons, and despite the fact that the Communists' campaigns have had an opportunity to deepen Italian concern and anxiety over atomic warfare, they have not developed enough force to alter drastically Italy's present defense and foreign policies and favorable attitudes toward the United States.




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ITALYB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	10,221	10,372	+ 151
Total Civilian	<u>795</u>	<u>878</u>	+ 83
Grand Total	11,016	11,250	+ 234

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	10,221	10,372	+ 151
Civilian Personnel	<u>467</u>	<u>575</u>	+ 108
TOTAL	10,688	10,947	+ 259




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<u>STATE</u>	260	256	- 4
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
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ICA	20	7	- 13
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USIA	48	40	- 8
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ITALY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) SETAF conducts an orientation and indoctrination program in Italian history and customs for military personnel.

(2) Italian language is taught in all SETAF schools, through clubs, University of Maryland extension courses, private tutors, and on duty for selected personnel.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) Free trade unions complained through the Ministry that the authorities at Camp Darby were anti-union and had refused to discuss legitimate complaints with representatives of the unions. As a result of discussions between the Embassy and SETAF, the official Army position was made clear. While prohibited from organizational activities during working hours, free unions are permitted to function at Camp Darby, and personnel officers are available at all times to discuss grievances with their representatives.

(2) Local Italian labor is paid in accordance with wage rate surveys which establish parallels with local wage rates for similar types of work.

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(3) The black market exists in the Naples area but is considered to be almost non-existent elsewhere. Rationing and periodic surveys are effected to insure control.

(4) Contractors are all local. Construction supplies are approximately 90% local. The remainder are essentially special U. S. materials. All labor is local.

(5) Training films of a technical nature having civilian application to various local labor groups are provided.

c. Problem -- Jurisdiction

To ensure that the rights of U. S. personnel under the Constitution are safeguarded, without creating resentment by needless challenge of the basic sovereignty of the host country.

Practices

(1) A study of incidents in Naples showed that many occurred because of the language barrier. A joint Italian Police and Navy Shore Patrol was set up, backed by a bi-lingual Italian Police Officer, and where possible, English-speaking Italian policemen were put on the beat with the SP's.

(2) The legal officers maintain close contact with local prosecutors on problems of the military commands in maintaining discipline and morale. The commands cooperate fully with police in the maintenance of discipline. This includes specific local arrangements for the use of military police and dual patrols of the Carabinieri and the Military Police.

d. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practices

(1) The automobile accident rate is no higher than the general average for various areas, but accidents involving Americans receive disproportionate press play. The impression is given that a great many such accidents occur involving Americans'

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driving "luxurious" cars. All commands have instituted automobile safety inspections, special traffic courts, severe penalties and careful indoctrination.

(2) All installations conducted press tours to demonstrate the vehicle registration program. Volunteers from among the news media representatives were invited to have their cars go through the inspection procedure.

(3) Italian drivers are employed to the maximum practicable extent for operation of official vehicles. This definitely reduces criticism of the U. S. Army deriving from vehicle accidents.

e. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) U. S. commands in Italy act under the general direction of the Embassy in developing their local programs of troop-community relations. USIS consults periodically with the military representatives and appropriate Embassy elements on problems affecting troop-community relations, assists in the development of projects to resolve difficulties and whenever advisable, concentrates its activities in areas where American military forces are located. Specific USIS activities include the distribution of publications on U. S. history and present American issues, the establishment of centers of American studies and courses of American studies in Italian universities, the distribution of American periodicals, and the exchange of persons.

(2) SETAF accepts invitations to participate appropriately in community activities. Band concerts are given frequently for Italian audiences as a part of religious and civic celebrations, particularly in small towns.

(3) American personnel participate frequently in both official and personal relationships with their Italian counterparts -- teachers, students, doctors, dentists, chaplains, law enforcement officials, lawyers, and judicial authorities.

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(4) In order to gain Italian understanding and support for SETAF, NATO, and the United States, the information program is based on four factors:

- (a) Intensive indoctrination of SETAF personnel and extensive publicizing of these activities to the Italian public;
- (b) Specific programs -- releases, conference, and press tours -- for specific problems, letting the Italian public know what is being done by Americans to correct or alleviate unpleasant situations;
- (c) Public and private charities which almost automatically result in good public relations and publicity; and
- (d) Development of "People-to-People (personal contacts) relationships in fields of common interests.

(5) In September 1957, "People-to-People" councils were established at each installation, with military, civilian employee and dependent membership. The councils report and exchange ideas on what can be done voluntarily to increase personal contacts in fields of common interest. This program is an extension of existing community relations programs.

(6) One of the major contributors to the SETAF community relations program is the SETAF Army Band. It is a command policy to have the band participate in Italian community programs when invited to do so and when the programs are not of a commercial nature. Once the band is scheduled for a program the band leader contacts the local sponsor and requests that the local band, if any, be invited to attend the event. The local maestro is also given a personal invitation to conduct the SETAF Band in any number on the program.

(7) U. S. military and their dependents participate in local civic and charitable organizations:

- (a) Officer, NCO, EM Wives' Clubs invite Italian Women's groups to social and cultural events. All U. S. military families live in Italian neighborhoods; there are no "Little Americas."

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- (b) Italian military, ecclesiastical, and civic officials are invited to attend social events and demonstrations, such as Organizations Day, and Armed Forces Day.
- (c) Units, clubs and youth groups engage in year-round charitable activities, particularly for institutions such as orphanages, Boys Town, and "old folks" homes. Many units have "adopted" orphanages for monthly support, and their Christmas activities expand their monthly charity programs. Such charities to orphans and old people are channelled through recognized Italian agencies. The latter, rather than the command, publicizes the practice. This makes a more palatable and acceptable contribution to understanding in the public press.

(8) CG, SETAF, directed the organization of a Community Relations Council at each installation for free exchange of thought on mutual problems. Cash incentive awards are paid to Italians for ideas, suggestions, and efforts toward improvement of community relations.

(9) The U. S. forces and individuals are always willing to assist the local government and disaster stricken individuals and make a practice of acceding to requests for or volunteering assistance. For example, the command assisted in recent snow disasters in Italy, and when called upon by a local editor to assist a paralytic who was in dire need of a wheel chair, a chaplain contacted members of his congregation and a donation was made.

(10) Full advantage is taken of the opportunities for developing good community relations through press briefings and news releases. For example:

- (a) Daily releases are made in the Italian language and journalistic style to Italian media on command activities such as troop information orientations being given, ceremonies, American holidays and customs, cultural activities and hobbies, Lira expenditures in Italy, awards, construction projects, safety campaigns and charities.

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- (b) An "open door" policy is practiced for all unclassified material to permit Italian media to obtain material with which to tell the American story to their readers and thus satisfy natural curiosity existing in Italy. Press conferences, and tours are set up for special programs, particularly those pertaining to "problems." Italian communist media representatives are excluded from information furnished to other media representatives.
- (c) Press tours are conducted of the dependent school system, with particular emphasis on the Italian language classes. This is a continuing project throughout the school year. Also, a press tour of the construction program was undertaken. This tour and its accompanying briefing stressed the expenditures being made by SETAF and how that money was flowing into the local economy. The utilization of local labor was also emphasized.
- (d) Prior to the move of Hq SETAF from Camp Darby in Leghorn to Verona, the local Verona news media representatives were given a detailed briefing on the move. It was pointed out that the move would cause no large-scale dismissals of Italian personnel. It was further explained that each employee affected by the move would have the opportunity to transfer to Verona if they so desired and that they would receive salary protection (salaries in Verona are generally lower than in Leghorn). Not one Italian employee lost his position through this move. Employees desiring to stay in Leghorn were absorbed in the SETAF Support Command. The move to Verona was planned with all public relations aspects carefully considered. The move to Verona was conducted in two stages, each a week apart. Making the move in this manner avoided overcrowding of Italian highways, undue alarm to the Italian populace, and the effects of a sudden influx of U. S. military personnel in Verona.

## 2. Problems Peculiar to Italy

None reported.

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JAPAN

## STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 98,196

Civilian Personnel - 6,825

TOTAL 105,021

A. BACKGROUND

In Japan the size of the U.S. military installation overshadows the U. S. civilian agencies' personnel. Hence the usual problems of U. S. presence are mainly those involving military personnel. U. S. bases exist in Japan as the result of the World War II peace treaty arrangements and not by the invitation of the Japanese. In the five years since the occupation ended Japan has become a full-fledged member of the international community and evidences strong desires to chart its own independent course in world affairs. Increasingly, Japanese nationalism, neutralism, and atomic theories are contributing to growing pressures for disengagement and for revision of the present unilateral treaty arrangements. These pressures have eased since the announcement last June of the 40% reduction in U.S. forces stationed in Japan (from almost 100,000 on July 1, 1957, to a planned level of about 60,000 on June 30, 1958).

The economic impact of the presence of Americans in Japan is a positive factor for better relations as indicated by the fact that in 1956 U.S. base personnel and their dependents accounted for the conversion of \$273 million into Japanese yen. Our presence there also provided employment for 200,000 Japanese and contributed to an over-all favorable balance of payments of \$293 million. The negative aspects of the economic impact are measured in terms of 267,848 acres of land which are utilized for U.S. facilities in Japan.

Although frictions are virtually unavoidable in a situation where large numbers of Americans have been transplanted into a country with which they were largely unfamiliar, our military authorities have acted wisely and effectively to minimize sources of friction. There is organized opposition from a hostile press, the Socialist party, the country's largest labor federation, and from the Communists to the presence of U.S. personnel in Japan in their present numbers and to our military bases and the lands they withhold from needed agriculture production. Recent articles in the American press, however, indicate that in general relations of American personnel with the local population in Japan are among the best of any country where U. S. personnel are stationed.

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There are four areas in which administrative improvements would serve to minimize the reaction to the presence of U. S. forces and bases in Japan. These are: (1) an expansion of community relations programs; (2) the prompt settlement of claims and the provision of immediate solatium where warranted; (3) liberal retirement allowances and concessions for Japanese employees reduced in force; and (4) easing of restrictions against Japanese entering housing and other non-operating facilities occupied by U. S. personnel.

In the much publicized "Girard" case, the American Embassy reported on November 20, 1957, following Girard's conviction and release on suspended sentence, that "particularly pertinent in the court's thinking was recognition that U. S. military authorities had shown anxiety about the future of the bereaved family and have formulated measures of consoling them and have completed arrangements to give the family a sum of money as soon as the acquiescence of the family is received." (This has now been done.)

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JAPANB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	98,196	61,030	- 37,166
Total Civilian	<u>6,825</u>	<u>5,683</u>	- <u>1,142</u>
Grand Total	105,021	66,713	- 38,308

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	98,196	61,030	- 37,166
Civilian Personnel	<u>6,503</u>	<u>5,379</u>	- <u>1,124</u>
TOTAL	104,699	66,409	- 38,290

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	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
ICA	42	45	-/ 3

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USIA	66	50	- 16
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C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, mores, and laws of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) Orientation of incoming service personnel and dependents includes information on Japanese customs, legal requirements connected with the joint administrative agreement between Japan and the U. S., and a discussion of individual problems. For the past year, as military personnel depart the United States, they have been given a special edition of Stars and Stripes containing important points for their orientation to life in Japan.

(2) Military personnel assigned to MAAG Japan are given a mandatory on-duty orientation and Japanese language course 5 days per week for 30 days. Facilities also are available for more advanced language instruction.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) The Japanese Government is concerned about unreported sales of second-hand appliances by U.S. personnel, since this results in a tax loss for Japan. Stringent military rules have been established to prohibit this practice.

(2) PX goods are rationed, dollar limits are prescribed on total grocery bills at commissaries; the sale of liquor is rationed, and PX patrons are identified to avoid implication of U.S. forces in black market activities. Also, spot checks are made and stiff penalties given offenders.

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(3) The Japanese custom is life-time employment, with a single employer, at one job. To ease the effect of reductions in force, the U.S. gives as much notice as possible of impending reductions, assists in job replacement, and pays liberal separation allowances.

(4) Grievance machinery has been established and greater local influence has been allowed in personnel policies especially regarding working conditions of large numbers of Japanese on U.S. bases.

c. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practice

More extensive bodily injury and property damage insurance coverage is required for privately owned motor vehicles of U. S. security forces personnel. This has had a good effect upon Japanese-American relationships.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) Basic community relations activity is centered in community relations advisory councils located at each Army installation. Twenty of these councils are currently active and meet at least once each month with joint U. S.-Japanese representation. Chairmanship alternates monthly between Japanese and U. S. senior representatives. The program is carried out in accord with DOD Directive 5410-7 except for provisions applicable only to the continental U. S. The program includes pertinent provisions of the President's People-to-People Program. These councils jointly sponsor meetings of cultural groups, sports events, music concerts, exchanges of visits by groups of dependents and Japanese ladies to each other's homes, meetings of professional groups, tours by Americans to Japanese points of interest, open houses at Army installations, celebrations of Japanese festivals and Army special occasions, classes in languages, flower arranging, cooking, art, crafts, customs and judo. Information about the United States and

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Japan is exchanged, especially for publication in local government-sponsored papers such as Kanagawa Community News. These joint activities are in addition to the primary function of the councils which is to adjust and reconcile points of possible difference or friction at the local level. Indirectly the council operations produce additional benefits by providing important Japanese personalities with an insight into U.S. attitudes and methods of operation which could be had in no other way.

(2) To facilitate relations with the Japanese press, U. S. military headquarters maintains a liaison office in the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan in downtown Tokyo. The liaison officer and members of the Public Information Division are members of the Correspondents Club, participate actively in its functions, and are on intimate professional and social terms with individual representatives of the Japanese and international press. The liaison office provides press representatives with ready access to Army communication facilities for the transmission of queries and replies and serves as a distribution point for Army press releases.

(3) Commanders at all levels are encouraged to participate in local community life. These include use of bands, color guards, or troops in local festivals, conducted tours for groups, especially children, donations of time and service to community engineering and building projects, support and maintenance of orphanages by cash, goods, and services, assistance in local disasters, participation and attendance at sport events and other community activities. Reported donations to charitable institutions in the form of goods and services on the part of units, individuals and Chaplains' funds averaged approximately \$40,000 per quarter in FY 57. In addition, withdrawal of elements of this command from outlying stations has permitted the donation of buildings to various charitable and non-profit organizations. These donations have been amply covered in English language and vernacular press with credit to the U.S. forces. Extensive publicity is given in troop information media, and in the English and vernacular press to citizenship courses conducted at Army installations for Japanese wives of service personnel. This is considered to be indirect but valuable community relations activity in the demonstration of official concern for the welfare and successful assimilation of prospective U. S. citizens.

(4) Continuing support and professional assistance are furnished the Eighth Army Memorial (Severance) Chest Surgery Hospital. This project is of inestimable value in maintaining favorable attitudes toward the United States.

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- (5) Subordinate commanders meet with prefectural Governors on a continuing and regular basis. Similarly, the Commanding General, USARJ, meets periodically with all the prefectural Governors to discuss requirements on a case-by-case basis.
- (6) Condolence calls are made by USAF personnel on the families of people killed in accidents involving Air Force personnel. Cash collected from Air Force personnel is given; appropriate prayers are offered; and emergency medical care and housing, as needed, are provided. Effort is made to secure local press cooperation.
- (7) Although isolation from the local community by using compound-type housing has posed no particular problems, opportunities for living in the local communities are stressed as a matter of command policy.
- (8) All USAF commands recognize promotion of favorable community relations as a vital factor in the accomplishment of their missions. For Example:

(a) Aside from professional agitators, many of Fukuoka's half-million Japanese did not like our airmen and the sound of our screaming F-100's. The Fukuoka City Council had already implored the USAF to get out -- to move our base. The Communists and the Socialists had gone to the central government in Tokyo with their evacuation petitions. The Air Base Commander acted by having "open house" for various groups of townspeople including students, housewives, newspapermen, police, and politicians. To each group he explained that the USAF was at the base for the benefit of the Japanese as well as the Americans.

A series of town-base community programs was started. During these meetings the Japanese were quietly told that if the base went so would go \$38,000,000 a year in local spending. Local papers were kept advised of such new developments as USAF rules to cut down jet noise. Keeping newsmen posted of developments, plus providing them with a direct telephone line to the city, resulted in a vastly improved press. Airmen pitched in to build an orphanage in town. Base fire engines pumped water for drought-stricken farmers. American wives made friends among Japanese wives.

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Just when everything seemed to be going smoothly, a jet smashed into a C-47 over the city, demolishing 12 Japanese homes. This incident could well have been the end of Japanese-American friendship in this area. The Base Commander averted disaster by personally rushing to the spot, ordering perimeter tents for the homeless Japanese, providing them with three weeks basic supplies, and expediting claims for financial settlement.

The success of this all-out effort can best be judged by the fact that instead of blasting our airmen for wrecking Japanese homes and endangering Japanese lives, the mayor, governor and newspapers expressed sympathy for the three airmen killed in the plane crash. A Communist attempt to stage an anti-American demonstration at the scene of the crash the next day collapsed when the Japanese crash victims refused to cooperate.

(b) Over 200 children from Fussa-muchi Jr. High School toured Yokota Air Base at which time they made sketches of the base with water colors. The teachers selected eight outstanding paintings to present to the Base Commander who had the pictures hung in the headquarters building.

(c) When fire razed nearby Furumaki, the personnel of Misawa Air Force Base quickly went to the aid of their Japanese friends. Three and one-half truckloads of clothing were gathered for the destitute families. Sixteen mattresses, 86 blankets, and a number of quilts were gathered from the salvage yard and were distributed to the people through the church.

SECRET



SECRETKOREA

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 69,823

Civilian Personnel - 1,054

TOTAL 70,877

A. BACKGROUND

The Republic of Korea is firmly allied and closely identified in its national interest with the United States. In general there is fundamental agreement on basic policies between the two countries. The favorable Korean attitude toward the United States is conditioned by the following factors:

(a) the U. S. position as a leader of the free world with which the ROK identified its national survival; (b) the U. S. role and contributions in the military action against the Communist aggression of June 1950; (c) post-hostilities U. S. economic aid; (d) U. S. military aid and assistance which has built up a strong Korean defense force; (e) U. S. support and sponsorship of the ROK in the United Nations and in international relations.

There are, however, four major areas of disagreement between the two governments. Korea advocates force while the United States advocates peaceful means to achieve unification of Korea. Korea disagrees with U. S. policy with respect to the armistice agreement. Korea frequently attacks the United States for its policy towards Japan and accuses the United States of being pro-Japanese. Lastly, Korea strongly desires a "status of forces" agreement, which the United States is unwilling to enter into, under an armistice situation.

U. S. economic aid is of such magnitude that it overshadows the economic benefits generated by the presence of American personnel. Since under-employment exists in Korea, U. S. presence has not created a labor shortage. Relations between U. S. troops and the local population have been greatly enhanced as a result of the American Forces Assistance to Korea Program (AFAK). By assisting local communities under this officially-sponsored program in the rebuilding or construction of schools, orphanages, hospitals, community buildings,

SECRET

SECRET

KOREA

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

churches, irrigation projects and the like, U. S. military personnel have gained the friendship and sympathy of the Korean people. The AFAK has been evaluated as being the most effective means thus far used for maintaining favorable local sentiment towards U. S. personnel in Korea.

In general, friendly relations exist between Koreans and Americans. There is no evidence that the higher standard of living enjoyed by American civilians and military forces causes any resentment. Indications of Korean discontent and frustrations over their economic and social lot are increasing but they are related to the basic political, economic and social problems of the country itself rather than to an unfavorable comparison with the standards of U. S. citizens.

SECRET

SECRETKOREAB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	69,823	55,119	- 14,704
Total Civilian	<u>1,054</u>	<u>1,365</u>	+ <u>311</u>
Grand Total	70,877	56,484	- 14,393
=====			

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	69,823	55,119	- 14,704
Civilian Personnel	<u>456</u>	<u>632</u>	+ <u>176</u>
TOTAL	70,279	55,751	- 14,528

25X1

<u>STATE</u>	63	65	+ 2
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SECRETKOREAB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA (Continued)


	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
<u>ICA</u>	511	648	+ 137



25X1

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<u>USIA</u>	24	20	-	4
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25X1

SECRET

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KOREA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

I. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practice

A special training film and brochure have been prepared for orientation of all U. S. soldiers on arrival in Korea. This film covers Korean customs and ways of life.

b. Problem -- Use of Land

To ensure that U. S. requirements for land are held to the absolute minimum consistent with U. S. programs and that withdrawal of the land from local use creates the least possible problem for the local government and minimizes the impact on the local economy.

Practice

U. S. forces have taken care to use as little arable land as possible for their installations.

c. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

- (1) The institution of the Korean Augmentation Troops,

SECRET

SECRETKOREAC. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

U. S. Army (KATUSA) was effected during the Korean hostilities under the stress of military necessity. Use of KATUSA remains a vitally important factor in the U. S. Army's capability in Korea. Twenty percent of these quasi-military individuals serve with combat elements. U. S. Army supporting elements frequently contain as high as forty-four percent KATUSA. At the present time only food, clothing, and certain items such as cigarettes and soap are provided KATUSA. The U. S. soldier on a purely voluntary basis usually contributes small sums each month toward providing their KATUSA comrades with such items as haircuts and theater admissions or other recreation fees.

(2) The shortage of adequate family-type housing has seriously restricted civilian agencies, particularly ICA, in the assignment of an adequate number of qualified personnel to Korea. Most of the civilian personnel assigned to Korea are single or serve without dependents at post. The Korean public therefore does not see most Americans in their normal cultural and social family setting. Opportunities for Koreans to see Americans in normal family settings will increase as more housing becomes available. Both military and civilian agencies are working to resolve the housing problem as rapidly as possible within the financial resources made available for house construction and renovation.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) The United Nations Command, the Embassy, and the USIS established a Joint Community Relations Committee which held its first meeting on November 20, 1957. Basic activity is centered in community relations advisory

SECRET

SECRETKOREA**C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)**

councils located in communities in areas where there is a substantial population of U. S. personnel. Seventeen of these councils are currently active and meet at least once each month with joint American and Korean representation. Chairmanship alternates monthly between Korean and U. S. representatives. The program is carried out in accord with DOD Directive 5410-27 except for provisions applicable only to the Continental United States and modifications to suit local conditions. The community relations advisory council provides an effective channel for notification of proposed military actions affecting the community; provides the command with advance information concerning problems and situations which affect the military; fosters improvement and understanding of relations between the military and civilian community; and aids in eliminating possible areas of friction. Through this medium the commander and the troops under his command are publicly identified with the interests of the local community and establish and maintain cordial working relationships with the civilian officials and local population.

(2) The following Army activities have been and are continuing to be effective in shaping and maintaining attitudes:

- (a) Individual and Army unit support of orphanages by donations of cash, food, and clothing;
- (b) Individual and Army unit construction of school facilities from scrap material;
- (c) Free medical treatment to as many as 500 Koreans per month;
- (d) Provision of the services of Army surgeons to Korean hospitals for special and emergency cases; and
- (e) English classes are being held by U. S. soldiers on a voluntary basis. Korean social groups

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KOREA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

and Korean soldiers associated with U. S. units participate enthusiastically.

(3) A press liaison office has been established in downtown Seoul which eases transportation difficulties for news media representatives. All releases and other items of interest are disseminated through the liaison office which furnishes a very effective contact point between the information office and local media representatives. Regular visits are made to news media offices by the information officers and members of their staffs, and social contacts during off-duty hours are encouraged. Due to a shortage of local transportation, all possible assistance is given in transporting media representatives to front-line units and other newsworthy areas. Close liaison has been established with the ROK Office of Public Information and effective exchange of information is carried on.

(4) On completion of a TV studio in March 1958 arrangements will be made for joint Korean and U. S. presentations. Arrangements have recently been made with the ROK Office of Public Information to exchange cultural literature and films.

(5) Commanders at all levels are encouraged to approve their organization's participation in local community life in such activities as local festivals. They have permitted community engineering use of troop labor and equipment on such activities as playground construction. Reported donations to charitable institutions, in the form of goods and services on the part of units and by individuals' and Chaplains' funds, have averaged approximately \$2,000 per month.

2. Problems Peculiar to Korea

Local Economy -- Black Market Activities

There is an extensive black market ring operating in Korea. It is so effective that U. S. equipment and supplies

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KOREA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

are frequently offered on the black market at prices lower than PX and commissary prices. All agencies in the country have been well aware of the black market problem for a number of years and have been concentrating on the problem but as yet no complete solution has been found.

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SECRETLIBYA

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 5,539

Civilian Personnel - 510

TOTAL 6,049

A. BACKGROUND

Libya is an extremely poor country which relies to a very large extent on foreign assistance. There is little historical or cultural connection between Libya and the United States although Libya was important as a Barbary Coast state in the early 1800's. There has been practically no emigration from Libya to the United States and few U. S. tourists or missionaries have ever gone to Libya. There has always been a high degree of acceptance of U. S. operations in Libya mainly for economic reasons, since the Libyan budget is entirely dependent upon "invisible exports" in the form of foreign financial grants earned by entering into military base agreements, treaties, and other aid. There is at present a high degree of Libyan government support for continued U. S. operations, as this is a lever for obtaining increased U. S. economic and technical assistance. The Libyan-American Base Rights agreement runs until 1971 and there is no apparent desire to curtail U. S. operations. Rather, Libya has encouraged an expansion of the facilities under the agreement. This acceptance of U. S. operations for economic reasons has been confined, however, to the educated and informed groups. The man in the street has no knowledge of nor interest in military matters and does not realize the extent to which his individual economic well-being depends on foreign -- especially U. S. -- subsidies to his government.

Developments in the whole of the Middle East and North Africa rather than specific U. S. actions in Libya will determine future trends of local Libyan sentiment and the Libyan's government's attitude toward U. S. operations. It is probable that any reduction of U. S. forces in Libya would cause grave official misgivings, since the personal spending of U. S. military personnel and their dependents is a factor of real importance in maintaining the local Libyan economy. This is especially true in Tripolitania. The current spending rate of

SECRET

LIBYA

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

Wheelus Air Base and its personnel and dependents in the Libyan economy is estimated conservatively at about \$8 million a year. Considerable unemployment would be caused by curtailment of activities at Wheelus Air Base, since large numbers of Libyans are employed there as laborers and lower-grade clerks and in the city of Tripoli as household servants. An unusual opportunity to better community relations has been offered the United States in the recent Libyan appeal for assistance in teacher training and in higher education in order to make it possible to reduce the number of Egyptians now in these fields.

The problems of American-Libyan adjustments are the usual ones attending any large U. S. military installation in a foreign country. In Libya these have to do principally with taking agricultural lands for the airbase and other military installations, the noise of jet aircraft in the vicinity of the airbase (near the city of Tripoli, which like many American communities in the vicinity of busy airfields, is most unhappy with the noise and risk), and problems involved in the entry and operation of American automobiles.

LIBYA

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	5,539	5,063	- 476
Total Civilian	<u>510</u>	<u>445</u>	- <u>65</u>
Grand Total	6,049	5,508	- 541

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	5,539	5,063	- 476
Civilian Personnel	<u>348</u>	<u>262</u>	- <u>86</u>
TOTAL	5,887	5,325	- 562

25X1

STATE

34	38	-/ 4
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25X1

ICA

123	139	-/ 16
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25X1

USIA

5	6	-/ 1
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25X1

SECRET

LIBYA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

I. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practice

In addition to the usual range of administrative problems affecting U. S. civilian personnel serving in Arabic countries -- Pan-Arab spirit and intense nationalism, strict religious and social customs, etc. -- the inability of most Americans to speak Arabic is resented by Libyans, who believe that we consider their culture unimportant. Also Libyan officials find it difficult to comprehend the tour of duty policy used in the past of keeping personnel at post only about two years especially in view of the time it takes Americans to adjust to the cultural differences.

The civilian agencies recognize the problem of necessity for Arabic language training but cannot report any satisfactory solution other than encouraging and facilitating their personnel's obtaining a rudimentary ability in Arabic when serving in Libya and other Arabic-speaking countries. They emphasize teaching English to local employees, and where interpreters are used they try to obtain the most reliable and non-objectionable (i.e., those of non-Italian descent). ICA and USIA are encouraging a second tour of duty in Libya where feasible. State does not differentiate tours of duty in Libya from those elsewhere in the world. State personnel who have completed a tour of duty in Libya, as elsewhere, may be either returned after home leave or assigned to another post.

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LIBYA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

b. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practice

The hazardous traffic situation on the crowded two-lane highway between Wheelus Air Base and Tripoli causes many accidents, always blamed on the American -- civilian or military -- who is involved. In addition the American's large showy automobile itself emphasizes the already painful discrepancy between the Libyan's transport standards -- a donkey or on foot -- and the American's standard practice of using his car to go everywhere. This has created a serious community relations problem.

Even in the principal cities, public transportation is extremely poor and is seldom used even by resident Europeans and well-to-do Libyans and officials. Hence the American personnel have to use automobiles. The military have taken strong measures to control traffic and curtail accidents through an extensive traffic safety program.

c. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) Since the government opposes the importation of skilled labor or the use of resident foreigners, the U. S. civilian agencies, wherever possible, employ Libyans as local employees even if it means breaking a single position

SECRETLIBYAC. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

down into its several smaller components and hiring more people. ICA's program is directed extensively toward training in the teaching, public administration, health, and agricultural fields.

(2) Unemployment and underemployment have been large problems in Libya. U. S. labor requirements - contribute substantially to the alleviation of this problem, since USAF policy gives preference to Libyan nationals. The Commissioner of Labor of Tripolitania refers candidates for positions and they are hired if found qualified. If Libyan nationals are not available foreign nationals are hired, with the consent of the Government.

(3) An informal council of personnel officers, in constant contact with the Libyan Government, coordinates labor policies and practices and keeps wages in line with local scales.

(4) Training programs for Libyans are developing skills useful to USAF operations and for the Libyan economy generally.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) The effect of a Soviet -Egyptian campaign in 1956 to inspire resentment of noise and fear of off-base accidents was blunted by tours and lunches on the base for officials and notables of surrounding villages.

(2) MAAG Libya, only recently activated, has not yet formulated an accurate objective analysis of the effects of its community relations program. A formal program

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LIBYA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

is being developed. In the interim, personnel of this headquarters strive constantly to win popular acceptance of American objectives in Libya.

(3) Base tours, press conferences, and briefings for community leaders are being held to offset community criticism of jet noises and jet familiarization rides are given to show why the noise exists and why it will increase. Directives have been dispatched to commanders stressing the control of noise and restricting booms to altitudes where there will be no effect.

2. Problems Peculiar to Libya

None reported.

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MOROCCO

## STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 12, 511

Civilian Personnel - 1,105

TOTAL 13, 616

A. BACKGROUND

Moroccans feel that their newly won independence is compromised by the presence on their soil of numerous French, Spanish, and U. S. military forces, without the restraint of detailed agreements having Moroccan acquiescence. The French military have incurred deep-seated hostility in Morocco in recent years due to vigorous continued repression of the Algerian rebellion. The Spanish military have become increasingly unpopular as a result of their military action in defense of the enclave of Ifni. Also, the Government of Morocco regarded as a threat to itself the joint French-Spanish military operations in February 1958 against irregular armed elements in the areas near Morocco's southern frontier. The Government of Morocco has recently called upon both Spain and France to agree in principle to withdrawal of their military forces from Morocco. While the United States enjoys the good will of most Moroccans, and its economic assistance is welcomed, the presence of American troops is felt by many to be an obstacle to Moroccan efforts in obtaining withdrawal of European forces.

On the whole, U. S. forces in Morocco are not directly objected to by the local population and do not constitute a social irritant. In fact, the U. S. forces employ about 5,000 Moroccans and many others benefit indirectly from U. S. presence. But since few Moroccans regard the Soviet Union as a threat to Moroccan independence or as a potential aggressor against Morocco, the presence of U. S. air bases in a strategic sense is seen more as conveying a danger of Moroccan involvement in world war than as a measure for the common defense. And, more immediately, nationalist political leaders are reluctant to grant "special privileges" to any aliens, including U. S. troops, without compensating advantages for Morocco. In this atmosphere negotiations for a detailed base agreement have continued in Rabat since May 1957 without agreement on many of the issues involved in a status of forces treaty. The visit of

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MOROCCO

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

King Mohamed V to the United States between November 25 and December 13, 1957, has however contributed to better understanding between the United States and Morocco and resulted in a joint statement in which the Governments of the United States and Morocco expressed their desire to proceed, by means of provisional solution, to the appropriate adjustments of present conditions regarding the armed forces of the United States in Morocco.

The economic impact of the U. S. presence is the major factor supporting an amicable relationship. A bilateral economic agreement in April 1957 and \$20,000,000 in economic assistance made available in FY 1957 tended to create a favorable climate among the Moroccan people, even though it may not as yet have resulted in tangible economic benefits for the average Moroccan.

In the area of community relationships there is relatively little intimate personal contact between U. S. citizens and Moroccans. Inter-marriage is extremely rare and competition for women is almost non-existent. Particular attention has been given by military commands to the importance of briefing newly arrived personnel on local customs and mores. Provision of government housing on U. S. bases also has tended to minimize opportunities for inter-cultural relationships. The civilian agencies have so few employees in Morocco that their problems of adjustment are minimal vis-a-vis those involving military personnel.

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~~SECRET~~MOROCCOB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	12,511	10,963	- 1,548
Total Civilian	<u>1,105</u>	<u>932</u>	- <u>173</u>
Grand Total	13,616	11,895	- 1,721
=====			
<u>DEFENSE</u>			
Military Personnel	12,511	10,963	- 1,548
Civilian Personnel	<u>1,017</u>	<u>823</u>	- <u>194</u>
TOTAL	13,528	11,786	- 1,742

25X1

<u>STATE</u>	54	55	-/+ 1
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25X1

<u>ICA</u>	7	27	-/+ 20
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25X1

<u>USIA</u>	27	27	0
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MOROCCO

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

I. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) Voluntary language classes are conducted on most military installations in Morocco. Also, USAFE has a mandatory program which requires the participation of all Air Force military and civilian newcomers in a six-weeks, one-hour-per-day French language course.

(2) Under pertinent regulations the overseas commander has authority to return military dependents to the United States when their conduct is prejudicial to American interests.

(3) Troops and other military personnel are housed on-base insofar as possible. Official social contact is maintained only on the Base Commander level. All personnel are indoctrinated to show good conduct in visits to settlements and cities.

b. Problem -- Use of Land

To ensure that U. S. requirements for land are held to the absolute minimum consistent with U. S. programs and that withdrawal of the land from local use creates the least possible problem for the local government and minimizes the impact on the local economy.

Practice

On much of the agricultural land taken for U. S. bases, Moroccans are allowed to continue cultivation, although the

SECRET

SECRET

MOROCCO

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

land is within the confines of the base. At Novasseur, for example, 2,000 acres are cultivated under such arrangements.

c. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practice

In addition to command-wide programs such as the SAC "Operation Life Saver," a vigorous program of enforcement of on-base traffic safety rules and systematic indoctrination on driving hazards and requirements is presented to all military, civilian, and dependent personnel.

d. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) Of economic benefit to Morocco was construction in 1951 of a \$380,000,000 complex of air defenses. Previously inexperienced Moroccan laborers, under tutelage of Army engineers, became craftsmen and operators of heavy construction equipment, and good working relationships were established.

(2) Field reports indicate that a significant problem would arise if sudden reductions in U. S. base operations or technical aid were to occur, thereby requiring curtailment of employment opportunities for approximately 5,000 Moroccans. Reductions, if required, would be phased so as to minimize the economic impact on the local economy.

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MOROCCO

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(3) Until recently the scarcity of housing had been a windfall to French and other European landlords. The building of considerable on-base housing has removed much of the competitive pricing. This is a source of disappointment to the landlord group, but of satisfaction to the European renters who had been priced out of the more desirable housing.

2. Problems Peculiar to Morocco

None reported.

SECRET

PHILIPPINES

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 9,730

Civilian Personnel - 969

TOTAL 10,699

A. BACKGROUND

The long and close association of the United States with the Philippines has left there a unique depositary of good will and understanding. During the period of U. S. rule American administrators, teachers, and missionaries were active throughout the country. Their enthusiasm and idealism engendered a profound pro-American sentiment which remains undiminished particularly in the rural areas. The Philippines are solidly allied with the democratic free world and support the same positions as the United States on most questions concerning world affairs. The country's policy is strongly anti-communist and has not yet been seriously affected by fellow travelers or the self-styled "Asian neutralist."

It must however be recognized that the Filipino's native pride and sensitivity, together with the desire for the equality of status that is considered attainable only through greater independence, have given rise to a spirit of nationalism which has increasingly complicated relations on the government level. Also, certain powerful local politicians have utilized problems arising out of U. S. military bases in the Philippines to stir up public feelings and have organized a number of important press and intellectual figures into a political force motivated by chauvinist nationalism.

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PHILIPPINES

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

Social relations between members of urban American business groups and their Filipino colleagues are fairly active. The same is true of U. S. civilian agencies personnel and their counterparts in the Philippine government. Relations between U. S. military personnel and Philippine nationals, however, are unfortunately more restricted, particularly in rural areas where differences in language, customs, and levels of income are social barriers.

Without question the most obvious current irritant to good U. S. -Philippine relations is the administration of U. S. bases. Collective security to the average Filipino is a vague and ambiguous concept because the contribution of the Philippine armed forces has been seriously limited. Largely for this reason the Filipino does not identify his country with the American installations nor does he perhaps fully understand the U. S. defense activities as elements of the area collective security system.

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
SECRET

PHILIPPINESB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	9,730	9,265	- 465
Total Civilian	<u>969</u>	<u>1,079</u>	<u>+ 110</u>
Grand Total	10,699	10,344	- 355

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	9,730	9,265	- 465
Civilian Personnel	<u>561</u>	<u>658</u>	<u>+ 97</u>
TOTAL	10,291	9,923	- 368



25X1

<u>STATE</u>	161	181	+ 20
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
25X1

<u>ICA</u>	187	185	- 2
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25X1

<u>USIA</u>	60	55	- 5
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25X1

SECRET

PHILIPPINES

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practice

Each newly assigned employee is furnished a brochure outlining the Philippine cultural, economic, political, and religious background. In addition, military personnel and their adult dependents attend a 12-hour orientation course conducted by the U. S. Embassy, in addition to a JUSMAG orientation.

b. Problem -- Use of Land

To ensure that U. S. requirements for land are held to the absolute minimum consistent with U. S. programs and that withdrawal of the land from local use creates the least possible problem for the local government and minimizes the impact on the local economy.

Practice

Filipino farmers are allowed to cultivate lands which are inside the boundaries of U. S. bases whenever this is possible without compromising the security of the base.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

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PHILIPPINES

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (continued)

Practices

(1) Military commands participate in local civic and charitable organizations and events both by monetary contributions and voluntary personnel services.

(2) Wherever security requirements permit, the activities of JUSMAG are planned and coordinated with the armed forces of the Philippines. This stresses the concept of teamwork between the two nations.

(3) JUSMAG participates extensively in representational and hospitable activities with personnel of the armed forces of the Philippines. Extensive use is made of the JUSMAG officers' open mess and the JUSMAG non-commissioned officers' open mess for this purpose, and both official and non-official civilian groups are frequently included in these activities.

(4) Since early 1957 a U.S. Public Information Officer has been attached to the Clark Air Force Base. This officer is attempting, with the cooperation of the base commander, to develop the local Filipino's sense of responsibility for the base system and to create an appreciation of the true mutuality of the defense arrangement.

2. Problems Peculiar to the Philippines

None reported.

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SAUDI ARABIA

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 195

Military Personnel - 1,369

Civilian Personnel - 67

TOTAL 1,436

A. BACKGROUND

Although Saudi Arabia's emergence as a significant entity in international affairs and the United States' assumption of a major role in the Middle East are of recent date, U.S. -Saudi Arabian cooperation extends back to the mid-1930's when U.S. oil companies obtained the concession now held by ARAMCO. In the intervening two decades relations have expanded into many fields, but oil operations and military affairs have been dominant. Since World War II approximately 7,000 American private citizens have been residing in the ARAMCO communities in the Dhahran area in addition to some 1,400 U.S. government personnel and dependents, largely concentrated at Dhahran Airfield.

The economic impact of the U.S. official presence is very small compared to that of ARAMCO. There is little resentment of the higher American standard of living, and a friendly "live and let live" relation obtains between U.S. citizens and indigenous people. This is due principally to ARAMCO's assiduous efforts over many years to maintain good relations between its American employees and the local population, including the company's Saudi employees.

The traditional Saudi restriction on foreign activity in Saudi Arabia has precluded American missionary or educational activity in that country, as well as any exchange-of-persons programs. A gradual breakdown of these barriers may be indicated, however, by the fact that some 35 or 40 Saudi Arabian students, 15 of whom have official support from the Saudi Government, are currently in U.S. educational institutions, and a number of Saudi air cadets are being trained in the United States.

The physical, cultural, and religious characteristics of Saudi Arabia virtually eliminate certain problems which are commonly encountered in other countries, though a number

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A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

SAUDI ARABIA

of special problems affecting the U.S. presence are caused by these same characteristics. The puritanical Moslem social customs generally limit social intercourse between Americans and Saudis. Saudi Arabia's strict religious and social customs and political sensitivity raise unique problems in selecting personnel for service in that area. The non-acceptability of persons of Jewish faith, prohibition of any drinking, difficulties related to the position of women in the local society, and the necessity of living entirely separate from the local population but subject (in theory) solely to Saudi jurisdiction are typical problems.

Saudi religious law also has an important bearing on the problem of civil and criminal jurisdiction. Saudi Arabia has not recognized U.S. jurisdiction over U.S. civilian employees and dependents or U.S. military personnel. These persons are theoretically subject to Saudi law which provides harsh punishments for even minor offenses. In practice, however, Saudi officials have always agreed to sentence Americans to either a fine or deportation in lieu of a more severe punishment. The jurisdiction question nevertheless remains a serious potential problem.

A further source of difficulty is caused by the contrast between the highly developed political and administrative system with which Americans are familiar at home and the rudimentary institutions of the Saudi Arabian absolute monarchy. Saudi officials often seem to be uncooperative or dilatory in their dealings with Americans, though much of this can be explained by the poor organization and lack of qualified personnel which characterize the Saudi bureaucracy at nearly all levels.

Communist propaganda is not a serious problem in Saudi Arabia, but nationalist and frequently anti-West propaganda emanating from Egypt and other Arab states does have an important impact. Saudi Arabia is the site of the holy shrines of Islam and in a real sense is the religious center of the Moslem world. As yet overt public sentiment has followed the Government's official line of cooperation with the United States, but there is much sympathy for Nasser's "positive neutralism." This may become a factor to reckon with, particularly if official U.S. -Saudi relations become cool.

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A. BACKGROUND (Continued)SAUDI ARABIA

Basically, future popular attitudes will depend to a large extent on the issues that affect Saudi Arabia's interest: U.S. arms to Saudi Arabia, the effectiveness of U.S. training programs and other activities in the country, the fortunes and influence of Nasser, the Baghdad Pact, Israel, Aqaba, and the like. These issues loom large in the minds of a growing portion of the Saudi people. The attitude of Saudi officialdom at nearly all levels tends to fluctuate with the political atmosphere. For example, a U.S. move which is interpreted as favoring Israel in the Arab-Israeli dispute will frequently be reflected in an uncooperative attitude on the part of Saudi officials and occasionally in unfriendly gestures by private citizens.

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	1,369	1,696	+ 327
Total Civilian	<u>67</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>+ 3</u>
Grand Total	1,436	1,766	+ 330

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	1,369	1,696	+ 327
Civilian Personnel	<u>28</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>- 3</u>
TOTAL	1,397	1,721	+ 324

25X1

STATE

39	44	+ 5
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25X1

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SAUDI ARABIAB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA (Continued)

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
<u>ICA</u>	0	0	0
<u>USIA</u>	0	1	+ 1

25X1

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES1. Common Problemsa. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U.S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) The civilian and military agencies have scrupulously avoided selection of any but the most qualified personnel for assignment in Saudi Arabia. Intense indoctrination is conducted at headquarters and at the post for personnel and dependents.

(2) U.S. personnel live somewhat isolated in Embassy or Consulate compounds and in the Eastern Province obtain most of their shopping needs through Dhahran Airfield or ARAMCO facilities. Perforce, especially in the Eastern Province, they maintain little social exchange with Saudis except for requisite official representation. U.S. agencies, however, encourage their personnel to expand their social contacts with the local community wherever possible.

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SAUDI ARABIA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

Civilian agencies limit the tour of duty and insist on the maximum use of local leave out of the country for employees' morale and health reasons.

(3) Language barrier has been the greatest obstacle. Recently 18 positions have been designated as requiring language mastery. This measure is designed not only to increase the on-duty effectiveness of the Army element, but to lay the groundwork for more responsiveness to repeated overtures from natives for purely social (off-duty) and community-type activities. Concurrent language instruction has been made mandatory.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practice

The Dhahran Airfield occupies only desert, hence the problem of taking agricultural land has been avoided. A modest agricultural project has been started which it is hoped will not only supply vegetables for local consumption but also contribute towards the spread of knowledge of scientific methods of agriculture.

c. Problem -- Jurisdiction

To ensure that the rights of U. S. personnel under the Constitution are safeguarded, without creating resentment by needless challenge of the basic sovereignty of the host country.

Practice

American military personnel in Saudi Arabia are under strict instructions to avoid trouble of any kind with Saudi officials and other indigenous personnel with whom they come in contact.

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SAUDI ARABIA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

- (1) Most important on the U.S. side as a measure of allaying resentments is full recognition that the Dhahran Airfield is "His Majesty's Airfield." The base is unmilitarized (arms for any purpose being prohibited) and police jurisdiction is cooperatively shared (U.S. jurisdiction, when exclusive, being limited to areas, notably buildings, exclusively used by American personnel).
- (2) There are occasional requests for U.S. military participation in civic and charitable events in Saudi Arabia. Worthwhile requests are supported extensively but the scarcity of such requests amounts to a virtual absence of U.S. military participation in these functions.
- (3) Saudi Arabian natives are invited to attend U.S. military social functions. Off-duty English classes are made available to Saudi Arabian employees, and continuous efforts are made to establish solid friendships at all social levels.
- (4) In all joint activities, Saudi officials are clearly indicated as the officials in charge. At Dhahran the passport and customs formalities and many aspects of the daily operation of the airfield are conducted by Saudi officials. These activities bring a fairly large number of U.S. personnel into close working contact with local officials whose attitudes and working methods often make severe demands on the patience and good humor of U.S. personnel.
- (5) Buffet luncheons for local officials and evening activities of a quasi-official nature are periodically held.

2. Problems Peculiar to Saudi Arabia

Persons of the Jewish faith are excluded.

Practice

No attempts are made to assign persons of Jewish faith to duty in Saudi Arabia.

SPAIN

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 2,769

Civilian Personnel - 679

TOTAL 3,448

A. BACKGROUND

The principal United States objective in Spain is the construction and utilization of a complex of naval and air bases which are approaching operational readiness. Although not a member of NATO, Spain has a commitment to collective security deriving from its bilateral agreements with the United States and its older bilateral alliances with Portugal for the defense of the Iberian Peninsula.

While the Spanish Government is committed to a course of increasing cooperation with the United States and the West, the term "Spanish Government" cannot be equated with "Spanish people". Adherence to this commitment is thus faced with what is in reality neutralism on the part of the "Spanish people." Only a few Spaniards identify themselves completely with their Government, its actions and objectives, and there exists an under-current of resentment toward United States activity in Spain.

With the possible exception of the Portuguese, the Spanish standard of living is the lowest in Western Europe. This means that American non-commissioned officers are better paid than fairly high-ranking Spanish commissioned officers. The increase in the number of privately owned vehicles belonging to Americans further emphasizes our presence and serves as a symbol that makes glaringly apparent the great difference between Spanish and American standards of living. In this connection there has recently been an increase in slashed convertible tops, flattened tires, and scratches on American owned automobiles. Spanish driving habits are different from and even dangerous by American standards, and this has contributed to several accidents involving U.S. personnel. Though some of these have been significant and troublesome, it is, nevertheless, true that the number has been comparatively small to date. At present there are fewer than 110,000 privately owned passenger vehicles in Spain, most of which are small and antiquated, a fact that will make the increasing number of American automobiles stand out in greater contrast and will undoubtedly produce accompanying irritations.

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SPAINA. BACKGROUND (Continued)

Another important point of potential friction in Spain relates to religious differences. Though there has so far been no evidence of resentment over the marriage of American personnel to Spanish girls or against the competition for women, as the number of young unmarried Americans increases with the manning of the bases and the periodic rotation of SAC combat wings, the religious differences between Catholic Spain and large numbers of Protestant U.S. personnel may eventually become a more serious issue.

Envy of Americans has so far been directed mostly toward the comparatively higher standards of living, the existence of commissary and post exchange privileges, and exemptions from payments of taxes and import duties. These, however, are reactions common in all foreign countries where the United States has bases, and it is not believed that the Spaniards have been more emotional than have others at the time such bases were established.

In summary, there are signs that Spain, after a period of involuntary isolation, is gradually becoming more accustomed to the presence of foreigners. This is particularly true in the case of tourists who for the past two years have constituted Spain's largest source of foreign currency earnings. However, as long as Spanish economic problems remain pressing and the Spanish standard of living so low, it must be concluded that the emotional impact of increasing numbers of Americans there will continue to constitute a potentially serious difficulty requiring sensitive handling.

Civilian and military authorities have recommended the following administrative actions, many of which have been carefully planned in advance of the build-up:

1. Stationing a minimum of United States personnel in the country;
2. Careful selection and indoctrination;
3. Rigidly enforcing discipline and promptly punishing violators;
4. Discouraging the wearing of uniforms in public; and
5. Attempting to anticipate potential sources of difficulties.

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SPAINB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	2,769	8,186	+ 5,417
Total Civilian	<u>679</u>	<u>794</u>	+ <u>115</u>
Grand Total	3,448	8,980	+ 5,532

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	2,769	8,186	+ 5,417
Civilian Personnel	<u>527</u>	<u>646</u>	+ <u>119</u>
TOTAL	3,296	8,832	+ 5,536

25X1

STATE	94	89	-	5
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25X1

ICA	40	45	+ 5
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25X1

USIA	18	14	- 4
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25X1

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SPAIN

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) In the case of the military, only persons who want to be assigned to Spain are sent there, and they are carefully selected. The result has been exemplary behavior.

(2) Military personnel are given periodic briefings and civilian dress is mandatory off-base and after duty.

(3) The military "Sponsor System" is considered to be an important morale factor in community relations in Spain. When personnel first receive their orders to Spain, they hear from an opposite number already in Spain, generally of the same rank, type of work and family status. Living and working conditions are thus explained before the man leaves for Spain. Upon arrival, he is met, billets are arranged and local conditions are explained. Since it is in the beginning that basic attitudes about the host country are formed, the Sponsor System can materially aid during this formative period.

(4) Mandatory 60-hour Spanish-language instruction is given to all military personnel, as well as realistic, intensive indoctrination on Spain, its customs, ways of life, and troop responsibilities.

(5) State has a Spanish language facility at Mexico City to which personnel of all agencies may be assigned for language instruction.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

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SPAIN

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

Practice

A U. S. Housing Board has been established to control rents and rental contracts are examined for legality. Inflationary impact is minimized.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

- (1) Prior to activation of new facilities, JUSMAG establishes a Field Liaison Officer to lay groundwork for good troop-community relations. At three bases, SAC assigned base commanders approximately one year prior to base activation for this purpose.
- (2) Local press representatives have been invited to inspect MAAG supplies and military construction in an attempt to keep them up-to-date.
- (3) In the face of potential difficulties, it is essential that every effort be made to establish a close personal relationship between senior program officials and influential Spaniards. This is viewed as particularly important by USIA, which must conduct an effective program of public relations with the Spanish people regarding the United States presence. The impending military build-up in Spain, which will multiply problems in the troop-community relations area, indicates that the agencies should review current allotments of representation funds to determine whether those allocated to program and diplomatic officers in Spain are sufficient.

2. Problems peculiar to Spain

None reported.

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THAILAND

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 403

Civilian Personnel - 520

TOTAL 923

A. BACKGROUND

Historically the Thai populace has been most friendly to Americans. The United States, unlike France and England, has never exhibited ambitions regarding Thai territory. American missionary efforts in Thailand, and study in the United States by many Thai students, have contributed to the good relationships. The past two years, however, have seen recurring opposition expressed in newspapers and by politicians, attacking the United States and its programs as well as Thailand's foreign policy of close association with the United States. The cost of Thailand's contribution to the joint military support program has proved to be a matter of concern to the Thai Government and is a ready subject of criticism for opposition newspapers and politicians. Until now direct Communist propaganda is not believed to have widespread appeal. It is probable however that repetition of such propaganda will have an adverse effect.

Personal relations between Americans and Thais are probably the most significant factor in Thai attitudes toward Americans. Unsympathetic, overbearing, or discourteous behavior by Americans (or Occidentals taken for Americans) creates a pronounced reaction among Thai observers. There is also considerable suspicion that Americans look down on Thais as colored people.

Because of the relatively few unmarried American personnel in Thailand, inter-marriage or competition for women has had little effect as a source of friction. Likewise, automobile accidents have played only a small part. It should be noted that American military personnel in Thailand are not permitted to import American automobiles. The Thai Government has provided smaller European cars at its own expense, which has caused some internal criticism of the Thai Government since it adds to the cost of the nation's total defense budget. Economic factors -- such as American competition for scarce goods, land, or labor -- as well as the difference in living standards appear to have had little effect on Thai attitudes to date. The principal criticism pertaining to scarce housing comes not from Thais but from foreigners in Thailand with whom Americans are in competition for the better types of housing.

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THAILAND

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

To maintain the present good relationships, USIS has assigned first priority to supporting the "American presence" in Thailand. Despite leftist-inspired criticism of U.S. aid programs, the economic assistance rendered by ICA in the fields of public health, agriculture, education, and communications has had an important influence on Thai attitudes toward the United States. The malaria-eradication program is an outstanding example.

In summary, relationships of Americans in Thailand have been historically good and have been successfully maintained. The newspaper and political opposition to a foreign policy which identifies itself closely with the United States has resulted in one incident of significance in which Americans were attacked by a Thai mob. If this opposition continues to be expressed it may bring about a change in the present favorable climate for acceptance of American personnel in Thailand.

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SECRETTHAILANDB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	403	391	- 12
Total Civilian	<u>520</u>	<u>526</u>	<u>+ 6</u>
Grand Total	923	917	- 6
=====			

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	403	391	- 12
Civilian Personnel	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>+ 1</u>
TOTAL	408	397	- 11

25X1

<u>STATE</u>	95	87	- 8
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25X1

<u>ICA</u>	383	401	+ 18
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25X1

<u>USIA</u>	37	32	- 5
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25X1

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THAILAND

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U.S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. Government and its people.

Practice

Scrupulous adherence by JUSMAG personnel to their roles as advisors and not commanders has lessened Thai-expressed resentment at the allegedly despotic air assumed by some JUSMAG personnel. This expression was particularly common among Thai officers being instructed by JUSMAG enlisted personnel and has led to the assignment of JUSMAG enlisted personnel to the training of only the Thai lower military echelons.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practice

JUSMAG has made great effort to reduce expenses, particularly Thai-borne JUSMAG support expenses.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) All JUSMAG officer personnel associate extensively with the Thais, who are very sociable and hospitable. The families of U.S. enlisted men find it difficult to mix socially with their Thai counterparts because a common meeting ground is usually lacking.

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THAILAND

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(2) Public relations for the Country Team in Thailand are coordinated under the direction of the U. S. Ambassador by a central committee under USIS.

(3) CHJUSMAG Thailand encourages participation by military personnel and their families in organizations aimed at promoting Thai-U. S. understanding; e.g. American Association Thailand, American University Alumni Associations, Women's Clubs, and charities such as an International Bazaar to create funds for crippled Thai children.

(4) CHJUSMAG Thailand promotes attendance by U. S. military families at Thai formal functions and informal parties and provides for thorough indoctrination of U. S. families on Thai-U.S. relationships.

(5) CHJUSMAG has established a reciprocal language instruction program for selected Thai military personnel and for U. S. military personnel and their dependents. Thai military personnel instruct the Americans in Thai, and U. S. military dependents instruct the Thais in English.

2. Problems Peculiar to Thailand

None reported.

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SECRETTURKEY

## STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 4,210

Civilian Personnel - 469

TOTAL 4,679

A. BACKGROUND

The Turkish attitude towards the United States is conditioned by a strong distrust of Russia and all things Russian including Communism, a realization that the United States can through its military, economic and technical aid programs strengthen Turkey's security vis-a-vis the Soviets, and a desire to be of the West. Thus, the Turkish public and government are generally prepared to accept without an attitude of distrust or suspicion the presence of large numbers of Americans.

U.S. aid is not viewed as the principal reason for Turkish reliance on the collective security concept and Turkish identification with United States foreign policy. Turkish leaders have been convinced since the end of World War II that only by identification with the United States can Turkey expect to achieve the degree of security to which she aspires. Native leaders are aware of Turkey's shortcomings in the field of security which arise principally from an insufficiency of technically qualified and skilled personnel for her armed forces. They are aware that Turkey would not be able to defend herself in a nuclear war in her present state of military development. It seems clear that Turkey will welcome the stationing of friendly foreign troops on her soil until her military capability constitutes a deterrent to foreign aggression. This is despite the fact that the Turks, through many years of exploitation by other nations, are naturally inclined to be suspicious of foreigners.

Most of the Americans in Turkey today are military personnel and their dependents. Their assignments include for the most part service in connection with the military assistance program, support activities and the NATO command headquarters at Izmir.

The individual Turk, like the individual Frenchman, could hardly be expected to like the higher standard of living enjoyed by U. S. military or official civilian personnel. Until recently there had not, however, appeared in Turkey any articulate or organized resentment against Americans there fostered by the higher standard of living which the Americans enjoy. Many Turks, while recognizing that Turkey is still an underdeveloped country, believe that Turkey is on its way toward achieving a higher standard of living and government leaders do not discourage this belief.

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TURKEY

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

Recent reports indicate that the generally favorable state of relations may be changing adversely. Urban Turks are showing resentment of the PX facilities, free import privileges, and the favorable exchange rate which, until recently, permitted the American to enjoy a high standard of living while the Turks' economic situation constantly weakened. The number of "incidents" involving American military personnel is growing, largely as a result of an increase in the number of Americans and particularly a more than proportionate rise in the number of youthful airmen and soldiers. These "incidents" more often than in the past are testing the patience of a great number of Turks in all walks of life.

In summary, while there was a generally favorable climate of acceptance of Americans in Turkey until recently, there has been noted over the past year some latent "anti-American" feeling which has at times caused real concern to U. S. authorities. The need for continuing precautionary measures is apparent and cannot be over-emphasized.

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SECRETTURKEYB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	4,210	5,886	+ 1,676
Total Civilian	<u>469</u>	<u>593</u>	<u>+ 124</u>
Grand Total	4,679	6,479	+ 1,800

## =====

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	4,210	5,886	+ 1,676
Civilian Personnel	<u>136</u>	<u>243</u>	<u>+ 107</u>
TOTAL	4,346	6,129	+ 1,783

25X1

## =====

STATE

89

90

+ 1

25X1

## =====

ICA

225

240

+ 15

25X1

## =====

USIA

19

20

+ 1

25X1

SECRET

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TURKEY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U.S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. Government and its people.

Practices

- (1) ICA reports that biographic data on all its personnel being assigned to Turkey are cleared with the Turkish Government. Persons of Armenian descent are not proposed. Extensive and specialized orientation for newly assigned personnel is conducted in Washington and supplemented on arrival at Ankara. ICA reports that a good number of its personnel request return for extra tours of duty in Turkey.
- (2) Shortly after arrival in Turkey, Army personnel assigned to JAMMAT, DA civilians, and dependents attend an orientation period which emphasizes the necessity for continuing satisfactory Turkish-American relationships and outlines the actions which Americans may take to assure attainment of this objective. This orientation is given either by the Chief, USA Element, or his Chief of Staff.
- (3) Army officers and enlisted personnel of JAMMAT are required to attend a 20-hour course of instruction in Turkish. This course is conducted by the USA Element. Military personnel assigned to Ankara are required to participate in an additional 60 hours of Turkish language instruction.
- (4) Army personnel are required to attend a one-hour lecture once each month devoted to Turkey and her customs. These periods are presented by American and Turkish guest lecturers.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U.S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain,

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TURKEY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (continued)

Practices

- (1) The agencies have changed to use of the "tourist rate" of TL 5.75 per \$1.00 exchange for Turkish currency instead of the open market rate of about TL 12. While this caused some objection, particularly by the clerical personnel in the American colony, it has alleviated somewhat the hardship on the civilian agencies' local employees, who were also included under the new rate of exchange.
- (2) CINCUSAFE has sent personal letters warning against black market activities in U.S. currency. U.S. dollars are used only in U.S. facilities, while Turkish lire are used in the local market.
- (3) A survey was made to determine comparability of wage and fringe benefits and job requirements. The new wage and benefit scale equalizes U.S. standards and the general average.
- (4) On-the-job training is difficult because of the newness of many of the U.S. organizations. Emphasis is on training locals to assist in immediately performing established jobs. Classes are also planned in English, typing, military correspondence, and shorthand.
- (5) To make best use of the large numbers of illiterate and unskilled Turkish laborers, jobs are "engineered" -- that is, they are broken down into small components that can be learned through the acquisition of a single, simple skill.
- (6) A helpful step in Izmir was the USAFE crackdown on PX privileges. These privileges had been a subject of severe criticism and a source of alleged black market activities.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U.S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

- (1) The following organizations and administrative practices work toward continuation of the good relations existing between Americans in Turkey and their Turkish hosts:
  - (a) The Activity Coordinating Committee, which is composed of representatives from military organizations and major civilian U.S. Government agencies in Turkey, considers all aspects of American-Turkish relations and develops

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TURKEY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

programs and makes recommendations to the Country Team. For example, the committee recently developed a Troop-Community Relations Program entitled "Operation Good Neighbor." It has also established a rental control board, and deals with local officials on questions such as the setting of uniform rates for taxi fares.

- (b) The Activity Coordinating Committee reacts immediately to information received on any major disaster occurring in Turkey. Arrangements are made for the prompt initiation of clothing collections and fund drives among the American community. Recent examples are the contributions made to victims of the earthquake which occurred in southwest Turkey and the flood in the suburbs of Ankara.
  - (c) The Community Relations Program is reviewed continuously by the Country Team.
  - (d) All incidents involving Americans which may affect adversely Turkish attitudes are reported promptly, and necessary investigations and corrective action are initiated without delay.
- (2) Membership is encouraged in the Turkish-American Association, a social and cultural activity. The Board of Governors of this organization is comprised of both Americans and Turks. A particularly important activity of this organization is the English language training program for Turkish members.
- (3) A bi-national sports program is conducted between U. S. Service teams and Turkish teams.
- (4) A most important activity is the considerable amount of entertaining of Turkish people in the homes of Americans. This provides a means for the development of a better understanding between host and guest.
- (5) Although the Army has no unilateral program in this area, its personnel participate in the following activities as members of the American community in Turkey:

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TURKEY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

- (a) Unit and individual donations to Turkish charitable organizations.
- (b) Support of Turkish orphanages.
- (c) Contribution of Braille typewriters and other equipment to the Turkish School for the Blind.
- (d) Organizing and conducting a rodeo for the city of Ankara that permitted a contribution of approximately \$4,600 for the relief of victims of the Ankara flood.
- (e) Christmas parties for Turkish children.
- (6) USIS is expanding its program to emphasize people-to-people contact through the expansion of its Bi-national Center and by working with a newly established University Association in Istanbul.

2. Problems Peculiar to Turkey

None reported.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~VIET-NAM

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 726

Civilian Personnel - 452

TOTAL 1,178

A. BACKGROUND

Today the principal emotional factor affecting relations between U.S. citizens in Viet-Nam and the Vietnamese is the local pride of independence. There is a general recognition throughout Viet-Nam that the United States has been an important if not an indispensable force in the achievement of Vietnamese independence. Viet-Nam takes a very realistic attitude toward and is highly appreciative of American assistance because of the immediate and continuing threat to its own security. Although not a member of SEATO (as such membership would violate the Geneva Agreements) Viet-Nam is one of the states included in the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty, and the Vietnamese Government and the educated people are well aware of the importance of the U.S. military protection afforded them through SEATO.

There are no U.S. "forces" in Viet-Nam as such but only a small number of MAAG and TERM personnel. A substantial reduction in the size of these missions would be viewed with concern by the Vietnamese government and well-informed Vietnamese citizens. In spite of the presence of thousands of French troops in the past, the average Vietnamese does not appear to dislike foreign servicemen nor to resent their presence in the country. Among the educated classes there is some antipathy toward the idea of foreign forces being stationed in Viet-Nam, but the total number of American military in the country is so small and it is so relatively inconspicuous that the total impact has been negligible. The relationship of MAAG personnel with the local population and with the Government of Viet-Nam is generally good. The most obvious measure which could be taken to allay local resentments is to send only high quality personnel into Viet-Nam. All personnel to serve in Viet-Nam should be selected with greatest care after a thorough examination of their records. It would also be wise to keep the operation as inconspicuous as possible but at the same time to develop effective public relations and to seek ways by which MAAG might contribute support through existing facilities to local civic and social activities.

Americans in Viet-Nam generally enjoy a vastly higher standard of living than the average Vietnamese, but there is likewise a great difference between the standards of living of well-to-do Vietnamese

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and the European community on the one hand and the average man on the other. The difference in standards of living is not believed to be a significant cause of resentment against Americans as a group. Many Europeans and wealthy Vietnamese and Chinese also drive American cars, and the Americans have not been singled out for criticism on this point. Fortunately, there have been few traffic accidents involving U.S. service personnel and consequently few opportunities for local critics to use this as an issue.

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SECRETB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATAVIET-NAM

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	726	782	+ 56
Total Civilian	<u>452</u>	<u>653</u>	<u>+201</u>
Grand Total	1,178	1,435	+257
=====			

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	726	782	+ 56
Civilian Personnel	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	727	783	+ 56

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<u>STATE</u>	91	85	- 6
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<u>ICA</u>	326	542	+ 216
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<u>USIA</u>	34	25	- 9
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SECRETVIET-NAM**C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES****1. Common Problems****a. Problem -- Personnel Factors**

To ensure that U.S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. Government and its people.

**Practices**

(1) An orientation course has been established for official members of the American community and for their dependents.

(2) Agencies have exercised care to select only the highest quality personnel for service in Viet-Nam and to give them and their dependents all possible orientation before departure and on a continuing basis in Viet-Nam.

**b. Problem -- Local Economy**

To ensure that U.S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

**Practice**

American agencies have tried to maintain wage schedules for Vietnamese employees based on local rates, but there has been unavoidable competition for employees of all kinds with a resultant rise in wages. The expanding Vietnamese economy is perhaps as much responsible for this as the presence of MAAG.

**c. Problem -- U.S. Vehicles**

To minimize resentment against U.S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

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C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (continued)

Practice

Military vehicles used by U.S. agencies have been repainted in non-military colors, and steps have been taken to reduce the number of U.S. official vehicles carrying diplomatic license plates.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U.S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) CHMAAG encourages U.S. personnel to take an interest in Vietnamese children, to compete in sports, and to cooperate in a variety of charitable activities. Examples of these activities are:

Vietnamese children's parties in military messes.

Sports competition in volley ball and soft ball.

Charitable contributions of military families to hospitals, flood disaster victims, orphanages, and leprosariums.

(2) Attendance by U.S. officials at Vietnamese official ceremonies.

(3) Promotion of better adjustment between U.S. personnel and the Vietnamese is directly related to the effective lowering of the language barrier. French is widely used, especially in official circles and the upper social strata, but the rise of nationalistic spirit in this newly independent people has created an intense interest on the part of the local population in learning English. The agencies have organized and conducted English courses, principally for Vietnamese military personnel and local employees of the agencies. In FY 1956 over 1,000 officers and men took a three-months MAAG-sponsored course. Instructors are for the most part American community wives, and the program is administered by the Vietnamese-American Association. In addition, MAAG advisors in the field are encouraged to conduct informal English classes on a voluntary basis during their off-duty hours.

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C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (continued)

(4) Display of the U. S. flag on buildings and vehicles has been restricted to a minimum.

(5) Metal property signs bearing facsimiles of the U. S. flag which were posted on residential property during the war years have been removed.

2. Problems Peculiar to Viet-Nam

None reported.

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SECRETSUMMARY OF OVERSEAS PERSONNEL IN DESIGNATED COUNTRIES 1/

	July 1, 1957			Estimated July 1, 1958			Net Changes		
	Military	Civilian 2/	Total	Military	Civilian 2/	Total	Military	Civilian 2/	Total
GRAND TOTALS	532,681	23,704	556,385	476,487	23,245	499,732	-56,194	- 459	-56,653
<u>COUNTRY</u>									
China (Taiwan)	3,646	223	3,869	3,760	308	4,068	+ 114	+ 85	+ 199
Ethiopia (including Eritrea)	1,024	204	1,228	1,031	251	1,282	+ 7	+ 47	+ 54
France	55,300	2,893	58,193	54,198	2,760	56,958	- 1,102	- 133	- 1,235
Germany	250,340	5,648	255,988	242,521	5,514	248,035	- 7,819	- 134	- 7,953
Greece	1,038	203	1,241	740	191	931	- 298	- 12	- 310
Iceland	5,326	252	5,578	4,983	273	5,256	- 343	+ 21	- 322
Indonesia	33	254	287	31	283	314	- 2	+ 29	+ 27
Iran	477	582	1,059	470	647	1,117	- 7	+ 65	+ 58
Italy	10,221	795	11,016	10,372	878	11,250	+ 151	+ 83	+ 234
Japan 3/	98,196	6,825	105,021	61,030	5,683	66,713	-37,166	-1,142	-38,308
Korea	69,823	1,054	70,877	55,119	1,365	56,484	-14,704	+ 311	-14,393
Libya	5,539	510	6,049	5,063	445	5,508	- 476	- 65	- 541
Morocco	12,511	1,105	13,616	10,963	932	11,895	- 1,548	- 173	- 1,721
Philippines	9,730	969	10,699	9,265	1,079	10,344	- 465	+ 110	- 355
Saudi Arabia	1,369	67	1,436	1,696	70	1,766	+ 327	+ 3	+ 330
Spain	2,769	679	3,448	8,186	794	8,980	+ 5,417	+ 115	+ 5,532
Thailand	403	520	923	391	526	917	- 12	+ 6	- 6
Turkey	4,210	469	4,679	5,886	593	6,479	+ 1,676	+ 124	+ 1,800
Viet-Nam	726	452	1,178	782	653	1,435	+ 56	+ 201	+ 257

1/ Excludes dependents which will be reported on June 30, 1958.

2/ U.S. citizen employees of State, ICA, USIA and Defense, including those employed under agency-financed contracts.

3/ The majority of Department of Defense personnel have been relocated elsewhere in the Pacific area, notably Okinawa.

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9 February 1959

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 21  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X  
1. DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S G  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HS 70-2  
DATE 448 REVIEWER:

State Dept. review completed

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 February 1959

DAILY BRIEF

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OK  
25X1  
Geneva talks. Soviet pressure on the United States and Britain for an unequivocal response to the USSR's demands for a permanent test-cessation agreement suggests that Moscow is preparing the record in anticipation of an early break off. The Soviet delegate said on 6 February that the talks are deadlocked and warned that the delegates may part "in a few days" without being able to submit reports to their government because the Western powers have failed to present their full position. [redacted]

OK  
USSR - Communist China: Premiers Khrushchev and Chou En-lai on 7 February signed an agreement under which the Soviet Union will supply China with 78 heavy industrial enterprises worth five billion rubles (\$1.25 billion at the official rate), according to a press report. The Chinese will pay for these projects with commodity exports, just as they are paying for at least 156 "aid" projects the Soviet Union is already helping them build. Although considerations of military aid and political support are cause enough for the recent Chinese backdown on ideological claims, Moscow may have used the economic-assistance issue as another lever to hasten Peiping's retreat. [redacted]

25X1

OK  
Yugoslavia-USSR: Tito's recent extension of his impending visit to the UAR later this month and the inclusion of Greece in his itinerary will probably cause a further intensification of his current dispute with the bloc. He probably will be in Damascus on 21 February for the celebration of the first anniversary of the founding of the UAR. A display of unity between Tito and Nasir on this occasion will strengthen Moscow's belief that Tito is promoting current differences between Cairo and Moscow. The USSR also is likely to be concerned about possible discussions during the Yugoslav leader's visit to Athens on ways to strengthen the Balkan Pact. [REDACTED]

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No  
USSR-India: {The previously postponed visit of Soviet President Voroshilov to India has been announced by Moscow for late February. The trip apparently will not include a visit to Nepal returning King Mahendra's June 1958 visit to the USSR, despite reported recent Soviet pressure on the Nepal Government for such a visit. While the Soviet head of state's visit to India will be largely for ceremonial purposes, the USSR will probably attempt to use the visit to reap propaganda gains from Soviet aid programs such as the Bhilai steel plant, which was formally opened on 4 February. } [REDACTED]

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No  
Iran-USSR: {Iranian Court Minister Ala has advised Ambassador Wailes that the Shah, who is also informing the British, now has decided to sign the bilateral defense agreement with the US. Ala also stated that the Shah had seen a Soviet delegation and that the USSR had agreed to proceed with a nonaggression pact on Iran's original terms, provided Iran did not sign the US agreement. These terms reportedly provide that the Soviet Union cease hostile propaganda against Iran and that Iran not permit foreign bases on its territory. According to Ala, the Shah told the Soviet delegation he would consider their offer. The Shah feels the Soviet Union would not go ahead with the pact if Iran signed the US agreement, but Ala indicated that Iran would like to conclude both agreements. Ambassador Wailes told Ala he }

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9 Feb 59

DAILY BRIEF

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[ was authorized to sign the bilateral defense agreement provided Iran did not conclude the Soviet nonaggression pact, but he agreed to submit this question to Washington.]

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### III. THE WEST

OK Austria: A concerted effort by official and nonofficial Austrian elements to persuade the cabinet to ban the Communist-front World Youth Festival scheduled for Vienna in late July has apparently failed. Since there is strong public opposition to the festival and since it is being actively boycotted by all non-Communist youth groups, there is a growing possibility of extensive disturbances during the festival. [REDACTED] (Page 9)

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9 Feb 59

DAILY BRIEF

iv

[REDACTED]

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### USSR Preparing Record for Possible Breakoff at Geneva

The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement on 8 February demanding an unequivocal Anglo-American response to Moscow's insistence on a permanent unconditional test-cease agreement, in combination with recent Soviet moves at Geneva, suggests that Moscow is preparing the record in anticipation of an early breakoff of negotiations. The statement's detailed criticisms of the Western position on the key issues of duration of the treaty and voting procedures in the control commission were designed to present the USSR's stand in the most favorable light.

On 6 February chief Soviet delegate Tsarapkin said the conference was deadlocked and warned that the delegates may part "in a few days" without being able to submit a report to their governments because the Western powers have failed to present their full position. Tsarapkin criticized the "piecemeal" methods used by the United States and Britain in introducing their draft articles.

Other recent Soviet statements also suggest that the USSR is preparing its position for a breakoff. On 22 January Moscow charged officially that failure to reach agreement on the duration question was not only blocking progress of the negotiations but was making the talks "senseless." On 30 January, after introducing a draft article which would give veto rights to the three nuclear powers on the control commission, Tsarapkin criticized the US and Britain for withholding their "long-promised" proposal on duration. Then, in an unusual move which suggested preparation for a showdown, he summarized for the record the USSR's over-all position at the talks. Tsarapkin charged on 5 February that a recent State Department press release criticizing Soviet insistence on veto rights had distorted the Soviet position and had prepared the ground for a conference break.

On the same day, Khrushchev warned in his final speech to the 21st party congress that the USSR would "never agree" to allowing



the Western powers, under cover of inspection to violate the sovereignty of the USSR. He charged that the United States and Britain apparently intend to "drag things out" at Geneva while they prepare public opinion for disruption of the negotiations.

As a final move before a breakoff, the Soviet delegate may propose that the nuclear-test issue be discussed at any future high-level East-West conference.

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Soviet Union and Communist China Sign New Economic Agreement

Premiers Khrushchev and Chou En-lai on 7 February signed an agreement under which the Soviet Union will supply China with 78 heavy industrial enterprises worth five billion rubles (\$1.25 billion at the official rate, which overvalues the ruble). These enterprises will include chemical, coal, oil, and metallurgical plants as well as electric-power plants.

China will pay for these projects with exports, just as it is paying for at least 156 "aid" projects--worth more than \$2 billion--the Soviet Union is already helping to construct. Most of the original projects are either finished or under construction, and Peiping and Moscow probably agree that China's economy is ready for another large injection of Soviet assistance to further its Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62).

Although considerations of military aid and political support give sufficient cause for the Chinese backdown on ideological claims, Moscow may have used the issue of economic aid as another lever to hasten Peiping's retreat. The Chinese Communists have recently been effusive in their praise of the USSR as a model for economic development, and on 6 February Foreign Minister Chen Yi said that Soviet technical specialists brought valuable "political" as well as economic and scientific knowledge at a time when they were badly needed at home to help with the Soviet Seven-Year Plan.

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Tito's Middle East Tour to Add Fuel to Bloc-Yugoslav Dispute

The decision to extend considerably Tito's forthcoming visit to the UAR late this month and to add Greece to his itinerary will probably result in a further intensification of his current dispute with the bloc. Tito will probably be Nasir's guest at the 21 February celebrations in Damascus on the first anniversary of the founding of the UAR. Such a show of unity at this time is likely to cause more concern in Moscow than was the case last summer when the two met in Yugoslavia on the eve of the Iraqi revolution. The Soviet Union has charged that Tito has been instrumental in promoting current differences between Cairo and Moscow.

Tito's visit to Greece in March is cited as being unofficial, but the present rapport between Belgrade and Athens makes official talks likely. Should the current talks between the Greeks and Turks on the subject of Cyprus prove successful, the Balkan Pact will probably be discussed during Tito's stay in Greece. Athens has recently indicated a desire to strengthen the pact--which Khrushchev attacked in his speech to the 21st party congress--if the Cyprus issue is settled. The Yugoslavs have repeatedly expressed a desire to get the pact "back on the track"--to them it is an important manifestation of active coexistence--and they should be receptive to any Greek initiative.

Belgrade has responded sharply to attacks on Yugoslavia in Khrushchev's closing speech and in the Soviet party congress resolution, calling them "rude interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia." Moreover, Soviet presidium member Mukhitdinov's criticism of Belgrade's policy of friendship with Afro-Asian countries was labeled by a Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat spokesman as "uncalled-for and impermissible interference with Yugoslav foreign relations." The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow told Ambassador Thompson on 5 February that it now was clear the dispute "had never been ideological, but was a question of Yugoslav independence."

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### III. THE WEST

#### Austrian Cabinet Declines Bid to Ban Communist-Front World Youth Festival

A concerted effort to persuade the Austrian Government to withdraw its permission for the Communist-front World Youth Festival to convene in Vienna next July apparently has failed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The only remaining possibility of preventing the Vienna meeting is to maneuver the preparatory committee itself into withdrawing.

It seems certain that the festival, which is expected to draw some 30,000 participants, will raise embarrassing problems for Austrian neutrality. There is strong public opposition to the meeting, and all of Austria's non-Communist youth groups are committed to countermeasures of one kind or another. Outside support for these groups and the large refugee population resident in Austria pose the danger of demonstrations and disturbances.

Chancellor Raab and other Austrian leaders who decided last year in favor of authorizing the festival were influenced both by monetary considerations and by the belief that exposure of Communist participants to Western influences would be desirable. The authorization was also in keeping with the appeasement tendencies evident in Vienna's foreign policy last year, however, and the government may fear that a ban at this late hour might provoke a sharp Soviet reaction.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**THE PRESIDENT****The Vice President****Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
Scientific Adviser to the President  
Director of the Budget  
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization  
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination  
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy  
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration  
The Counselor  
Director, International Cooperation Administration  
The Director of Intelligence and Research

**The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
The Secretary of the Army  
The Secretary of the Navy  
The Secretary of the Air Force  
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
The Director, The Joint Staff  
Chief of Staff, United States Army  
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army  
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of the Interior**

The Secretary of the Interior

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director

**United States Information Agency**

The Director

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**TOP SECRET**

STATUS OF ACTIONS ON  
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT STUDY GROUP ON  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**TOP SECRET**

21 August 1961



T O P S E C R E T

21 August 1961

REPORT

BY

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ON

IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF  
JOINT STUDY GROUP ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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REFERENCES:

- A. The Joint Study Group Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government, dated 15 December 1960.
- B. Report on Implementation of Recommendations of Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government, dated 1 May 1961.

1. The status of actions taken to date in implementing all of the recommendations of the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government (Reference A), as approved by the President on 18 January 1961, are reported in the following pages.

2. This report brings up to date the first report on this subject, dated 1 May 1961 (Reference B).

Prepared by  
The Coordination Staff  
of the Director of Central Intelligence

TS #172991  
Copy # 5

T O P S E C R E T

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T O P   S E C R E T

Recommendation No. 1

To reorganize military intelligence consonant with Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. The Secretary of Defense on 1 August 1961 issued DOD Directive 5105.21 which established the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and provides that guidance to the Director, DIA, will be furnished by the Secretary of Defense, by the JCS acting under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense and by the U. S. Intelligence Board. The effective date for activating DIA is 1 October 1961 at which time the assumption of responsibility for its assigned functions will be initiated on a graduated basis. The Director, DIA, has been designated as agent to monitor Defense's full compliance with all approved Joint Study Group Recommendations applicable to the Department other than those which fall within the National Security Agency area of responsibility.

It is considered that the objectives of Recommendation No. 1 will be met when the DIA has assumed the specific functions and responsibilities assigned by the directive.

Recommendation No. 2

Resources required by reorganization under Recommendation No. 1 to be drawn from existing resources.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. It is considered that the concept embodied in the directive creating the Defense Intelligence Agency is generally consistent with the objectives of this recommendation.

TS #172991  
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Recommendation No. 3

Closer control of intelligence budgeting procedures by the Secretary of Defense.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. Consolidation and coordination of budget procedures for intelligence operations and activities throughout all elements of the Department of Defense will be effected on full implementation of the directive creating the Defense Intelligence Agency. Effective procedures combining the cryptologic budgets have been operating for three years.

Recommendation No. 4

Improvements in selection, training and rank of personnel assigned to intelligence duties.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. At the request of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), the military departments have made available a comprehensive statement of policy governing each department's provision for career development of officers who are more than ordinarily involved in intelligence and related activities. These statements, together with related background material, have been analyzed in the Office of Special Operations, and discussions have been initiated with the Office of Manpower, Department of Defense, to explore approaches to improved management principles, including selection and training, which might enhance the career status and improve the professional competence of individuals assigned to intelligence duty.

It is considered that the Defense Intelligence Agency on assumption of its functions as provided in the directive will take the necessary action to meet the objectives of this recommendation.

Recommendation No. 5

Encouragement of the military services to maintain and develop clandestine collection capabilities.

Action Responsibility: Defense

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T O P   S E C R E T

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Status. The military services have been indirectly encouraged to maintain and develop clandestine collection capabilities by the implementation of other Joint Study Group recommendations, namely, those which concern Service personnel selection and career development, training of Service personnel for clandestine intelligence work by CIA, and improved field coordination procedures. More direct encouragement will depend upon the impetus given by the Defense Intelligence Agency in carrying out its assigned responsibilities with respect to plans, programs, policies and procedures for Department of Defense collection activities. The military departments have already been requested by the Department of Defense to study means of implementing this recommendation and submit their findings.

Recommendation No. 6

Improvements in the Special Security Officer system.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. The Department of Defense has investigated and taken corrective action in accordance with this recommendation, insofar as it is applicable within the Special Security Officer system itself. The possibility of duplication of service to non-military consumers as between the Special Security Officer system and the Central Intelligence Agency cryptolink service is now being considered by the Coordination Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Recommendation No. 7

Re-examination of feasibility of placing more electronic intelligence resources of unified commands under control of Director National Security Agency (NSA).

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. The Director, NSA, has established a group including representation from the Joint Staff to study the requirements of commands and the allocation of U. S. FLINT resources, and where improvements can be made.

T O P S E C R E T

Recommendation No. 8

Strengthening control of Director, National Security Agency, over service cryptologic agencies.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. Even before the issuance of the Joint Study Group Report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had been concerned about developments in the concept of partnership between the National Security Agency (NSA) and the service cryptologic agencies. As a result of the efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the operational control line from the Director, NSA, to field collection units has been strengthened and made more direct, while still retaining the organizational relationship between the service cryptologic agencies and those offices in the National Security Agency concerned with Army, Navy, and Air Force matters. In an analogous instance, the Joint Processing Center [REDACTED] has been brought directly under the control of the Director, NSA.

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Recommendation No. 9

Reappraise adequacy of research and development for electronics intelligence.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. A group composed of representatives from the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) and the National Security Agency, has studied approaches to the implementation of this Recommendation. This group has: (a) reviewed with the National Security Agency the capabilities and limitations of existing research and development programs for electronics intelligence (ELINT) purposes; (b) determined that major deficiencies now appear to center on ELINT data processing, analysis and dissemination; (c) discussed the Strong Report of 1958 in the light of current activities and studies now in progress; (d) generally agreed that qualitative and quantitative aspects of ELINT collection and processing capabilities be kept under constant review to ensure proper assignment of priorities and consistency with the current strategic situation.

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T O P S E C R E T

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Recommendation No. 10

Reappraisal of security standards for foreign born translators to alleviate translator shortage.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. On 23 May 1961, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) approved a report by its Committee on Communications Intelligence, in coordination with the Security Committee and the Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications, containing the following major findings:

a. In fields other than communications intelligence, there are no linguist problems which require alleviation by modification of security procedures and practices.

b. In the field of communications intelligence, policy previously established by USIB concerning use by the National Security Agency (NSA) of foreign born voice linguists in the United States is sufficiently flexible to permit their use to satisfy current requirements contingent upon the availability of such linguists and funds for their employment. In order to meet a lack of voice linguists in the Service cryptologic agencies for use in overseas facilities, particularly in areas where situations of emergency or hostilities are most likely to arise, the Director, NSA, proposes to use non- U. S. linguists under the emergency provisions of existing directives and subject to certain safeguards which would tend to minimize the risks involved.

Recommendation No. 11

Greater emphasis on intelligence responsibilities in the indoctrination of State Department personnel.

Action Responsibility: State

Status. Pursuant to this recommendation, the Department of State is placing increased emphasis on intelligence indoctrination of State Department personnel, primarily through: (a) a more active program of briefing Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Mission; and (b) an effort to direct greater attention to this factor in the Department's general training programs, such as the Foreign Service Institute. The problem is a long-term, continuing one, and the Department's approach to the task is clearly responsive to the objectives of the recommendation.

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T O P   S E C R E T

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Recommendation No. 12

Improved career management for intelligence personnel in military departments.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. This recommendation is closely related to Recommendation No. 4 on improved personnel selection and training, and both have been studied jointly by the Department of Defense. The Office of Special Operations has initiated discussions with the Office of Manpower to develop management, selection and training principles to enhance the career status and improve the professional competence of individuals assigned to intelligence duty. The further implementation of this recommendation will now be assumed by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Recommendation No. 13

Central Intelligence Agency's clandestine training facilities as a service of common concern.

Action Responsibility: Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with Defense.

Status. Representatives of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are engaged in a detailed examination of the clandestine training facilities courses and material controlled by the CIA and the Department of the Army. Similar arrangements with respect to the Department of the Air Force and the Department of the Navy are in abeyance pending completion of the Army Study.

The Secretary of Defense, in connection with the recently approved actions to establish the Defense Intelligence Agency, has directed the Director of the Office of Organizational and Management Planning Studies, to submit to him by 1 October 1961 recommendations for the assignment of Defense-wide responsibilities for specialized types of intelligence training, to include consideration of those specialized intelligence training programs which can be provided to Defense by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Based upon these studies, recommendations will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence as to actions to implement this Joint Study Group recommendation.

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Recommendation No. 14

Review compartmentation of sensitive information to insure adequate dissemination.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. On 21 February 1961, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) assigned to its Security Committee, in coordination with the Committee on Communications Intelligence and the Committee on Documentation, responsibility for developing recommendations for the implementation of this recommendation. Within this committee structure, an ad hoc working group chaired by the National Security Agency and composed of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, Army and Air Force, is studying the compartmentation of broad categories of intelligence, has reviewed related activities of the Watch and Overhead Reconnaissance Committees of the USIB, and is now preparing its report.

Recommendation No. 15

Determine the adequacy of staffing level of the National Indications Center and ensure the committee's access to necessary sensitive information.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. With respect to the manning of the National Indications Center (NIC), the Watch Committee considers the present authorized manning level to be adequate and notes that the Duty Officer complement will be fully manned within a month. With regard to ensuring that all information pertinent to the NIC's mission reaches the Center promptly, USIB is being requested to assist Watch members in improving channels for operational information within the intent of NSC 5438, and to concur in an allocation to Watch Committee members and the National Indications Center of such special clearances as are required for the full use of any information bearing on the Watch Committee mission.

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Recommendation No. 16

Establishment of a National Photographic Interpretation Center.

Action Responsibility: Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Status. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 8 , approved on 18 January 1961, established the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). The Center is functioning and is administered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a service of common concern, with personnel provided by CIA and the military services consistent with available space and facilities.

Current plans provide for the establishment of NPIC in permanent quarters in Building 213 in the Naval Weapons Plant not sooner than fourteen months. While the establishment of NPIC in Building No. 213 will provide centralized photographic interpretation facilities during peace time, there is no provision for relocation of this facility during periods of national emergency.

Recommendation No. 17

Central Intelligence Agency use of non-official cover.

Action Responsibility: Central Intelligence Agency

Status. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is making realistic efforts to expand the effective use of non-official cover. CIA published on 1 March 1961 an excellent analysis of the problems and pitfalls in the use of non-official cover, based upon Agency experience over the years, to assist in the expansion of the use of non-official cover in a well-planned and operationally sound manner. The Cover and Commercial Staff of CIA is currently making a detailed analysis in great depth of the non-official cover possibilities in four countries as a "pilot" study. The proposal from the CIA Stations in each of these four countries for further non-official cover are being studied in Washington by this Staff and conclusions and recommendations are presently being prepared. These studies have derived increased importance and timeliness in view of the current re-examination by the Department of State and CIA

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of the need for existing official cover with a view to an orderly reduction. Such re-examination will require a careful appraisal of the possibilities of non-official cover in order to ensure that the over-all clandestine collection capability is not impaired.

Recommendation No. 18

Greater Community attention to counterintelligence and security overseas.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. On 28 February 1961, the United States Intelligence Board assigned responsibility to its Security Committee, in coordination with the Committee on Communications Intelligence, for the preparation of recommendations for the implementation of this recommendation. An ad hoc working group chaired by the Central Intelligence Agency and composed of representatives of the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force and State, has undertaken this task. The principal efforts of the group are concerned with personnel and physical security standards and procedures relating to overseas installations and the relationship of the counterintelligence function to this program. The group is exploring proposals to promote uniformity in overseas security programs and a fuller exchange and use of counterintelligence information by Security Officers responsible for such programs.

Recommendation No. 19

Continuing exploitation of intelligence opportunities by Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGS) and military missions.

Action Responsibility: Defense.

Status. As a result of recent actions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there is now a greater awareness of intelligence requirements on the part of MAAG and Mission personnel, resulting in greater contributions of intelligence information.

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Recommendation No. 20

Increased intelligence support to unified and component commands by information reports from Central Intelligence Agency field stations.

Action Responsibility: Central Intelligence Agency

Status. For the past several years the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has, through the [redacted] laterally disseminated to CINCPAC and component commands all telegraphic and dispatch information reports originating with the stations in the Far East, as well as direct dissemination from CIA Washington of reports such as the daily Central Intelligence Bulletin. Within the past year the following actions have been taken to provide intelligence support of a similar nature to other commands: (1) Instructions have been issued and facilities established for lateral dissemination of selected Agency telegraphic information reports to EUCOM through the [redacted] to CINCSOUTH through the CIA representative [redacted] to CINCNELM through the [redacted] and to CINCLANT through CIA Headquarters to the Agency representative at CINCLANT Headquarters in Norfolk; (2) procedures have been established for CIA Headquarters to pouch to the [redacted] [redacted] all intelligence reports received from Agency stations throughout Latin America, for passage to CINCARIB; (3) the JCS has solicited the views of all unified and component commanders concerning the present level of CIA intelligence support being received and additional support required.

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Recommendation No. 21

Establishment of a central requirements facility.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Recommendation No. 22

Use of Central Intelligence Agency Office of Central Reference as a reference facility.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

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Recommendation No. 23

Integration of collection requirements manuals, and creation of integrated country requirements guides.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. Efforts to implement these three recommendations have made little progress because of the uncertainty and differing views in the intelligence community as to the meaning and intent of these recommendations, and reservations as to the need for the particular kind of remedial action which they seem to call for. In addition, implementation of these three recommendations depends to some degree upon the ultimate organization of intelligence within the Department of Defense. (The Defense Intelligence Agency which is now being established will coordinate requirements which are generated within the Department of Defense and should thereby facilitate community-wide coordination in this field.)

A number of steps have been taken in exploration of possible implementation procedures: At the suggestion of the DCI's Coordination Staff, the Office of Central Reference of Central Intelligence Agency has examined the feasibility of controlling, recording, and indexing requirements on punch cards, and has reported that this is feasible, and that the primary problem lies in whether the intelligence community can agree on the kind of service which is wanted from the punch cards. The Coordination Staff also suggested that the Department of State make an effort to determine whether it is feasible to expand the annual intelligence reporting guidance program for overseas posts to include the interests of other agencies, and thus serve as the basis for "integrated requirements guides on a country-by-country basis." The Coordination Staff prepared a draft outline of requirements procedures and placed it in the hands of representatives of each agency in the intelligence community for study and comment, but reactions to this outline have been so divergent that the Coordination Staff concluded that some form of pilot project should be undertaken first.

The United States Intelligence Board on 11 July requested the Director of Central Intelligence assisted by his Coordination Staff to develop terms of reference for an ad hoc committee concerning requirements for Southeast Asia, as a pilot project in implementation of these three recommendations, taking into account the experience gained by an ad hoc TSIB committee established on 5 July to examine into collection capabilities on southwest Communist China, North Vietnam, and Communist-

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controlled areas of Laos. As a basis for making recommendations to the DCI and USIB, the Coordination Staff is undertaking an examination of current requirements for a selected country to analyze the problems involved in preparing a coordinated community-wide requirements guide.

Despite the lack of community consensus as to the precise meaning of these recommendations, the individual departments have been reviewing and seeking means for improving their own requirements procedures. As indicated above, under present plans, the Defense Intelligence Agency will be charged with responsibility for coordination of all requirements originating within the Department of Defense. The Department of State has initiated, on a limited scale, a program of annual guidance to Foreign Service posts for reporting in fields of primary interest to the Department. Several offices within CIA are experimenting with new requirements formats.

Recommendation No. 24

Coordination of overt and clandestine requirements by chiefs of mission.

Action Responsibility: State, Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies carrying on intelligence activities abroad.

Status. The DCI's Coordination Staff has prepared a draft procedure for implementing this recommendation which was designed to provide the basis for transmitting comprehensive and coordinated guidance for our chiefs of mission abroad and the various agencies carrying on foreign overt and clandestine intelligence activities. Consideration of this draft procedure has not yet been completed since a final determination with respect to the coordination of overt and clandestine requirements awaits a decision on the more difficult question as to the duties and functions of our chiefs of mission abroad with respect to foreign clandestine activities.

Meanwhile, however, much progress has been made on this latter subject and a preliminary guidance cable, coordinated with the Department of State, has been sent to all Central Intelligence Agency Field Stations.

As soon as a final determination has been made with respect to clandestine activities, it is believed that the coordination question, covered by Recommendation No. 24 can rapidly be resolved.

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Recommendation No. 25

Annual evaluation report to the National Security Council to pay specific attention to collection, and similar evaluations to be requested from each chief of mission and military commander.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. The President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs has, by memorandum dated 11 July 1961, advised the Director of Central Intelligence that it is no longer necessary to submit the Annual Report on the Status of the Foreign Intelligence Program. The need for such information will hereafter be covered by current and ad hoc reports as necessary. This action, however, is not interpreted as eliminating the need for improved means of evaluating intelligence collection activities. Accordingly, the Coordination Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence through its augmented membership has now undertaken an examination of existing systems within each of the agencies for evaluating collection efforts, as a basis for a report and recommendations to the DCI for United States Intelligence Board consideration.

Recommendation No. 26

Coordination of military requirements by Defense.

Action Responsibility: Defense

Status. The directive establishing the Defense Intelligence Agency provides that it will be responsible for the assembly, integration and validation of military requirements, assignment of priorities thereto, and for the establishment of a Defense Collection Requirements Registry and Facility.

Recommendation No. 27

Transmission of political information overtly acquired by Central Intelligence Agency through mission's political section.

Action Responsibility: State and Central Intelligence Agency

Status. The substance of this Recommendation has been agreed Central Intelligence Agency and State policy for some time. The CIA regulation concerning the general subject of field

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station reporting has recently been revised and contains a section covering this subject. In addition, the Office of the Deputy Director (Plans) of CIA has sent a dispatch to all field stations and bases calling this particular Recommendation to their attention and requesting full cooperation in its implementation.

Recommendation No. 28

Achievement by the Director of Central Intelligence of coordination through normal command channels.

Action Responsibility: Director of Central Intelligence (Coordinator).

Status. The Director of Central Intelligence has continued to make increased use, whenever appropriate, of command channels in handling coordination problems. For example, these channels were used for exchanging views regarding Recommendation No. 1 (Defense organization), initiating action on Recommendations No. 13 (clandestine training) and 39 (Research and Development), and establishing the Coordination Staff pursuant to Recommendation No. 29.

Recommendation No. 29

Establishment of a Coordination Staff, separate from any agency, to support the Director of Central Intelligence in developing solutions to coordination problems.

Action Responsibility: Director of Central Intelligence (Coordinator)

Status. The Coordination Staff currently consists of an Assistant for Coordination and Deputy Assistant appointed by the DCI, three members assigned from Central Intelligence Agency, and one member each detailed from State, Army, Navy, Air Force and National Security Agency. Consideration is being given within Defense to furnishing one additional staff member from Defense. Liaison arrangements have been made with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission. The principal activity of the Coordination Staff has been assisting the DCI in following up on implementation of approved Joint Study Group (JSG) Recommendations. In particular, the staff has taken the lead in

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assisting the DCI and USIB regarding actions to implement certain JSG Recommendations relating to requirements, evaluations, USIB management role, annual program reviews, USIB committees, and cost and manpower data. In addition, the staff has actively participated in actions on many other JSG Recommendations, sought through consultations and briefings to identify and help solve other inter-agency coordination problems (e.g., space surveillance), and assisted in advising the DCI on specific coordination questions (especially regarding clandestine collection).

Recommendation No. 30

Reduction in membership of United States Intelligence Board, phased with Defense reorganization.

Action Responsibility: Defense - Director of Central Intelligence.

Status. When the above recommendation was considered by the National Security Council on 12 January 1961, the Secretary of Defense reserved his position as to the manner of reorganizing military intelligence under Recommendations No. 1 and 2, and the NSC Action stated that steps regarding the "organization and functions of the USIB should be taken in phase with the carrying out of the related internal adjustments within the intelligence components of the Department of Defense."

These internal adjustments are now being made and the new Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will be activated as of 1 October 1961. The directive setting up the DIA provided that it would be represented on the USIB. It did not resolve the question with respect to the possible representation on the United States Intelligence Board of other Defense elements.

It is understood that this matter will be the subject of discussion between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence before final action is taken.

Recommendation No. 31

Establishment by United States Intelligence Board of a management group to analyze and propose solutions to community problems of



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non-substantive administration and management type. The National Security Council agreed that the functions proposed for the management group should be performed by the Coordination Staff of the DCI.

Action Responsibility: Director of Central Intelligence -  
United States Intelligence Board.

Status. The Coordination Staff is still giving primary attention to administrative and management problems arising in the course of implementing recommendations of the Joint Study Group. It is, in addition, identifying and seeking solutions to problems involving two or more agencies which might require United States Intelligence Board attention, e.g., it is currently examining problems relating to space surveillance. Specifically, it has recommended, and USIB has approved, a procedure whereby the Coordination Staff will review all new plans for periodic intelligence publications in Washington to prevent duplication.

Recommendation No. 32

Annual review by United States Intelligence Board of intelligence plans and programs.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board jointly with the Director of Central Intelligence.

Status. The Coordination Staff of the DCI has completed and submitted to the United States Intelligence Board a report summarizing the over-all FY 1963 programs in comparison with FY 1962 programs. This report is based upon information submitted by each member of the Intelligence Community concerning its foreign intelligence program for FY 1963. While shortcomings exist in the initial effort, due largely to the short period of time allowed for development of a format and instructions, and for the preparation of the various program submissions themselves, the Coordination Staff believes that considerable valuable experience has been gained to facilitate future program reviews, and that certain useful comments and recommendations have evolved from the review just completed.

Recommendation No. 33

Review of committee structure of United State Intelligence Board.

Action Responsibility: Director of Central Intelligence  
(Coordinator)

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Status. At the 25 July United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting, the decision was made that the Communications Intelligence Committee and Electronics Intelligence Committee should be merged.

Augmentation of the membership of the Coordination Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has made it possible to initiate a review of the functions and activities of the other USIB committees on a selective basis. As the study progresses, reports with conclusions and any recommendations for changes will be submitted to the DCI for USIB consideration.

Recommendation No. 34

Transmittal of intelligence guidance to unified commands through channels directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (except National Security Agency communications).

Action Responsibility: Defense.

Status. It is noted that this function will now be assumed by the new Defense Intelligence Agency.

Recommendation No. 35

Control and command by unified commanders over intelligence activities of component commands.

Action Responsibility: Defense.

Status. The National Security Council deferred action on this recommendation.

Recommendation No. 36

Chiefs of mission to take positive steps to effectively coordinate all overt intelligence collection and reporting activities.

Action Responsibility: State.

Status. The Department of State has, since January 20, 1961, emphasized this recommendation in briefings of all chiefs of mission and other personnel departing for overseas posts.

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The Coordination role itself has long been outlined in the Foreign Service Manual. In addition, the Department has under consideration a circular instruction to all diplomatic missions abroad re-affirming and re-emphasizing previous directives concerning the affirmative responsibility of chiefs of mission to coordinate overt collection activities overseas.

Recommendation No. 37

Operational clandestine coordination continued by Central Intelligence Agency field stations, but referral to Director of Central Intelligence before proposed operation is rejected.

Action Responsibility: Director of Central Intelligence (Coordinator).

Status. The Director of Central Intelligence sent a personal dispatch to all of his designated representatives abroad on 14 June 1961 calling Recommendation No. 37 to their attention and instructing them to make every effort to resolve differences locally; and pointing out that if there is disagreement between the designated representative and an agency concerning a problem under Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 5/1, which cannot be resolved in the field, the matter shall be referred to Washington for resolution by the Director of Central Intelligence, each agency using its own channels for referral. Copies of the dispatch were given to the military agencies prior to its being sent to the field and the military agencies were requested to issue complementary messages to military installations abroad. The Departments of the Navy, Army and Air Force have each sent complementary messages to appropriate commands abroad.

Recommendation No. 38

Determination as to activities which properly are foreign intelligence, and an improved system for utilizing dollar and manpower data in the entire U. S. foreign intelligence effort.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. Assistance to the United States Intelligence Board in determining which activities properly are foreign intelligence is being undertaken by the Coordination Staff in conjunction with the annual review of intelligence plans and

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programs discussed above under Recommendation No. 32. The Coordination Staff will, in preparing subsequent instructions, develop an improved basis for appraising the level and allocation of effort in future program reviews, including appropriate utilization of dollar and manpower data. Implementation of the directive creating the Defense Intelligence Agency will assist these processes materially.

Recommendation No. 39

More effective coordination of research and development activities for intelligence purposes.

Action Responsibility: Defense and CIA.

Status. Representatives designated by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, together with a representative of the Coordination Staff, are studying means and procedures for achieving the objective of this recommendation. In the course of this study, two areas of coordination relative to research and development have been identified. The first area is concerned with coordination of scientific and technical efforts themselves; with respect to this area of coordination, the representatives are in agreement as to a proposed mechanism and procedure. The second area of coordination is concerned with community-wide evaluation or assessment of the intelligence usefulness of proposed research and development projects. Differences remain to be resolved by the representatives concerning the need and mechanism for this area of coordination.

It is recognized, however, that the extent and diversity of research and development activities within the Department of Defense create, in addition to the problem of obtaining continuous comprehensive knowledge of such activities, a further problem of achieving an awareness by the scientists and technicians of intelligence needs and recognition that a development originated for another purpose can be exploited to solve an intelligence problem.

Recommendation No. 40

Monitoring the development of automatic data systems for storage and retrieval of intelligence information.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

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Status. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) assigned this problem to its Committee on Documentation (CODIB) and approved the establishment of an ad hoc full time, community-wide staff to examine in detail the long-range information processing problems of the USIB agencies in the light of current and projected developments in the field of data handling. The tremendously increasing volume of information becoming available and the rapid development of new systems and concepts in this field, will make the solution of these problems one of the most difficult and important yet undertaken in the community, and require the wholehearted cooperation of departments and agencies.

Recommendation No. 41

Added attention to foreign developments in agent communications.

Action Responsibility: Central Intelligence Agency.

Status. The Central Intelligence Agency has well-established technical liaison channels with the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan to ensure current knowledge of any developments in these countries pertinent to the problem of agent communications. Developments in other countries possessing a potential in the field of telecommunications are also reviewed periodically for this purpose.

Recommendation No. 42

United States Intelligence Board to strongly support counter-audio surveillance efforts.

Action Responsibility: United States Intelligence Board.

Status. On 28 February 1961, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) assigned to its Security Committee responsibility for recommending such action as would be necessary to implement this recommendation. The report of the Committee, which is awaiting USIB consideration, recommends positive actions to be taken to improve the counter-audio surveillance efforts of the departments and agencies, and further recommends that the USIB support the recommendations contained in the annual report of the National Security Council Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures. This latter mentioned report has not yet been acted upon by the National Security Council.

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Recommendation No. 43

Establishment by the intelligence community of specific arrangements for planning its work and anticipating its problems.

Action Responsibility:   United States Intelligence Board.

Status.   Activation of the Coordination Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence constitutes a specific arrangement for assisting the intelligence community to plan its work and anticipate its problems.   At the request of the Staff, and with USIB approval, the members of the community have submitted statements outlining the principal variations of their planned fiscal year 1963 plans and programs from those of FY 1962, and the long-range implications of these variations.   The Staff has analyzed these statements and prepared for USIB consideration a summary report together with certain recommendations.   Experience in preparing this report and discussion and action by USIB thereon should assist the community in undertaking additional and more thorough examination of planning arrangements and procedures.

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3 January 1962

THE COORDINATION STAFF  
of the  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mission

1. The general mission assigned to the Assistant for Coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on 21 April 1960 and under which the new Coordination Staff now functions is to "assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the coordination of intelligence activities of the Government, as prescribed by statute and National Security Council directives."
2. Specifically, the mission encompasses responsibility "for continuous study, review, and submission to the Director of possibilities for increasing integration, reducing duplication, and improving coordination within the national intelligence effort."
3. The responsibilities of the Assistant for Coordination and the Coordination Staff were subsequently expanded when on 18 January 1961 the President approved the action of the National Security Council (NSC) on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group (JSG) on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government. (JSG Recommendations No. 28, 29, 31, 32, and 33 included in TAB A.)
4. In accordance with JSG Recommendation No. 29, a Coordination Staff was established under the personal supervision of the DCI and charged with supporting him in taking leadership and initiative to develop solutions for coordination problems by identifying and promptly recommending solutions to such problems, especially through surveys of intelligence activities.
5. The functions in JSG Recommendations No. 31, 32 and 33 for a management group of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) were assigned to the Coordination Staff, namely, to analyze and propose solutions to non-substantive community problems of an administrative or management type; to review the future plans and programs of each member of the intelligence community for consistency and proper allocation of effort at the beginning of each annual budget cycle; and to review the functions and activities of the several committees and sub-committees of the USIB.

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### Composition

6. The concept of the Coordination Staff, based on the description in the JSG Report, is "a full-time group of intelligence professionals owing primary allegiance to the intelligence community rather than to any one member agency" with membership "drawn from the foreign intelligence community-at-large."

7. The Staff currently consists of an Assistant for Coordination (AC/DCI) and Deputy Assistant appointed by the DCI, three members from the Central Intelligence Agency (one each from DD/P, DD/I, and DD/S), and one member each detailed from the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, and one member from the National Security Agency (NSA). Liaison officers to the Coordination Staff have been assigned from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). For the time being, informal liaison is being maintained with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

8. The Coordination Staff was established officially on 18 January 1961 and progressively acquired its members. The

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(See attached biographic data - TAB B.)

9. The Coordination Staff functions as a staff for the Director of Central Intelligence (Coordinator). It is not a committee where the members are representing the positions of their parent departments or agencies. Their duties are assigned by the AC/DCI, although in performing them they spend a considerable part of their time in their parent agencies, including attendance at regular agency staff meetings. Coordination Staff members are thereby able to keep informed regarding their agencies' activities and views, and to provide the Staff with necessary information.

### Activities

10. Initially, the principal activity of the Coordination Staff was to assist the DCI relative to the implementation of approved JSG recommendations, taking the lead regarding certain

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recommendations and participating in or keeping informed on the implementation of others. As actions to carry out most of the approved JSG recommendations have been completed or are well under way, the Coordination Staff has increasingly devoted its attention to other interagency coordination problems. Examination of certain of these problems has been directed by the DCI, while other problems have been identified and examined by the Staff on its own initiative. The specific activities of the Coordination Staff are summarized below.

11. Annual Program Review. (JSG Recommendations No. 32, 38 and 43) One of the first undertakings of the Staff was to arrange and conduct for the USIB a review of the programs of each member agency for Fiscal Year 1963 compared with FY 1962. The USIB on 14 October 1961 approved recommendations based on this review for appropriate action by interested agencies. Utilizing the valuable experience of this initial annual effort, the Coordination Staff is now making plans in consultation with the agencies for a more comprehensive and effective review of FY 1964 programs during the coming year. A review of this nature is an essential first step in community-wide planning for the future. It also provides essential background to aid the DCI in his coordination role.

12. USIB Organization. (JSG Recommendations No. 30 and 33) The Coordination Staff has been examining progressively the structure and functioning of the USIB committees. At the direction of the DCI, the Staff is now preparing recommendations regarding revisions in USIB organization and functioning to take effect when the USIB membership is changed in phase with the activation of DIA.

13. Intelligence Requirements. (JSG Recommendations No. 21, 22 and 23) Under USIB auspices, the Coordination Staff has been actively working with the member agencies in seeking improved means of developing and coordinating requirements for intelligence information. As a result, a number of experiments and studies have been initiated, and individual agencies have taken actions to strengthen their requirements procedures. The Coordination Staff has completed a pilot study of existing requirements concerning Indonesia, which indicated that in this case there is no significantly wasteful or confusing duplication. The Staff assisted CIA and DIA in developing compatible systems for recording their respective requirements.

The Staff prepared a draft outline of community-wide requirements procedures, which evoked reactions from the various agencies raising serious question as to the need or value of such additional coordination machinery. Based on its extensive

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work relating to the requirements problem, the Coordination Staff is preparing reports for USIB consideration which conclude that JSG Recommendations No. 21 and 22 and a related USIB action on Southeast Asia requirements are unnecessary under existing conditions, particularly since the creation of DIA. The Staff, however, is keeping the problem of interagency coordination of requirements under continuing scrutiny.

14. Evaluation of Collection. (JSG Recommendation No. 25)  
The Coordination Staff is, on its own initiative, looking into the kinds of efforts which each agency makes in evaluating its intelligence collection efforts. The Staff expects that from this study it will be able to determine the extent to which current evaluation practices are compatible and can be made the basis for more fruitful coordinated programming of future collection efforts.

15. Research and Development. (JSG Recommendation No. 39)  
Representatives of CIA, Defense and the Coordination Staff have developed proposals for achieving better coordination of research and development projects for intelligence purposes, including USIB assessment of their potential value for intelligence purposes. Submission of these proposals to the DCI and the Secretary of Defense has been awaiting completion of a study of internal arrangements within Defense.

16. Clandestine Collection. (JSG Recommendations No. 5, 13, 17, 20 and 37)  
The Coordination Staff has kept abreast of the major policy problems in coordination of clandestine collection as they have arisen, and has made suggestions concerning them to the DCI and to the elements in CIA which carry on the day-to-day work in this field in Washington. In particular, the Coordination Staff assisted in the drafting of new instructions to the DCI's designated representatives overseas in response to Recommendation No. 37 of the Joint Study Group, and has from time to time given informal suggestions to DD/P elements concerning significant policy questions which have arisen in the coordination process. In this connection, the Coordination Staff has kept in mind Recommendation No. 5 of the Joint Study Group which urges that the military services be encouraged to increase their clandestine collection activities. The Staff has also kept informed on actions related to JSG Recommendation No. 13 concerning the opening of CIA's clandestine training facilities to those elements of the military services which have a clandestine collection program, and has provided the Director of Training of CIA specific guidance as to scope of the effort which the JSG envisaged.

The Coordination Staff has also followed the progress of CIA efforts to expand the sound use of non-official cover for staff personnel abroad. The Coordination Staff has given guidance to elements in the CIA which have been taking steps to provide greater intelligence support to military commands through the development of mechanisms for providing lateral and simultaneous dissemination of CIA field information reports.

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17. Scientific and Technical Intelligence. (President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Recommendation No. 15 of 4 October 1961) Following the President's approval of the reference recommendation by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the DCI directed the Coordination Staff to make, for USIB consideration and submission to the White House, an assessment and report on the problem of improving the collection, coordination and analysis of intelligence concerning the scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet Bloc. A preliminary draft response is being reviewed by the Staff in the light of informal reactions by the DCI and other USIB members. The Staff plans to conduct a continuing examination of this important field of intelligence.

18. Publications Review. The Coordination Staff is responsible, in accordance with a USIB-approved procedure, for reviewing all new plans for periodic intelligence publications in Washington to prevent duplication.

19. Reports for the DCI. The Coordination Staff has been charged with drafting certain reports for the DCI to submit to the White House regarding the status of implementation of approved JSG and selected PFIAB recommendations. Reports regarding the status of all JSG recommendations have been prepared as of 1 May and 21 August 1961, and another semi-annual report is due 1 March 1962. The Staff has also contributed portions of reports and briefings by the DCI to the PFIAB regarding recommendations relating to coordination of the foreign intelligence effort.

20. Revisions of NSCIDs and DCIDs. The Coordination Staff advises and assists the DCI regarding revisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) and Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs) designed to achieve improved coordination within the intelligence community. For example, the Staff has in particular cases prepared draft amendments to an NSCID and participated with a USIB committee in drafting revisions of a DCID, as well as submitting the Staff's views directly to the DCI on any such changes in NSCIDs and DCIDs.

21. Staff-Initiated Projects. In addition to the above specifically assigned activities, the Coordination Staff has also examined coordination problems with a view to determining whether recommendations for action by the DCI may be warranted. Current problems of this type are the following:

Arrangements for space surveillance.

Intelligence support to the U. S. Disarmament Administration.

Production of basic intelligence, other than the National Intelligence Surveys.

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Community use of external research facilities outside Government.

Research on international communism, especially international organizations and inter-party relations.

22. Staff Briefings. The AC/DCI is frequently requested to give briefings on the subject of the DCI's coordination of the foreign intelligence effort, and the related activities of the Coordination Staff. These briefings are normally arranged by the CIA Office of Training, either in special cases for key officials or as part of the regular training or orientation courses.

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TAB A

EXTRACTS FROM RECOMMENDATIONS OF  
THE JOINT STUDY GROUP REPORT ON FOREIGN  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT

"28. The Director of Central Intelligence should take action to achieve more effective coordination within the intelligence community using the normal command channels, as distinct from staff channels, of the departments and agencies concerned.

"29. The Director of Central Intelligence should be supported in taking leadership and initiative to develop solutions for the problem of coordination by the establishment of a coordination staff, under his personal supervision and separate from any operational responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency or other department or agency. This staff should seek to identify at the earliest possible time and promptly recommend solutions to coordination problems, especially through surveys of intelligence activities as authorized by National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1.

"31. To strengthen its role in management of the intelligence community, the United States Intelligence Board should establish a management group which would analyze and propose solutions to non-substantive community problems of an administrative or management type. This group would be composed of one senior representative of each member of the United States Intelligence Board.

"32. The United States Intelligence Board, through the recommended management group, should review the future plans and programs of each member of the intelligence community for consistency and proper allocation of effort at the beginning of each annual budget cycle. Its views should serve as a basis for guidance and coordination to the intelligence community and for reporting to the National Security Council annually.

"33. The management group referred to above should review the functions and activities of the several committees and sub-committees of the United States Intelligence Board. This review should include consideration of possible changes in the committee structure and improved reporting procedures."

S-E-C-R-E-T

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TAB B

BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON MEMBERS OF THE COORDINATION STAFF  
OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied

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TAB A	Remarks at CIA Military Reserve Meeting on 21 January 1963
TAB B	Notes Prepared for DDCI Use in Briefing Senator Stennis on 25 January 1963 (Briefing cancelled)
TAB C	Speech to the Clandestine Services Review Course on 13 February 1963
TAB D	Welcoming Address to National War College Class of 1963 on 18 April 1963
TAB E	Address to Intelligence Review Course on 19 April 1963
TAB F	Request to Address Clandestine Services Review Course 17-26 June 1963
TAB G	Address to DD/S&T Personnel on 6 August 1963
TAB H	Address to the Scientific Advisory Board on 9 September 1963
TAB I	Remarks at the Clandestine Services Review Course on 30 September 1963
TAB J	Closing Address to Clandestine Services Review Course on 9 October 1963
TAB K	Welcome Address to National War College Class of 1963-64 on 14 October 1963
TAB L	Address to the Intelligence Review Course on 25 October 1963
TAB M	Welcome Address to Project USEFUL on 28 October 1963
TAB N	Closing Address to Midcareer Course No. 1 on 15 November 1963
TAB O	Address to Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy on 15 November 1963





15 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI

SUBJECT: Notes for Your Talk to the Senior Seminar  
in Foreign Policy at 3:45, 15 November,  
in USIB Conference Room

1. Yours will be the Agency's closing remarks. Prior to your appearance, the students will have heard a brief welcoming address from DCI; a rundown on the intelligence community and the history of CIA from Kirk; the relationship of intelligence to the formulation of policy from Ray Cline; the role of science and technology from Bud Wheelon; and the clandestine services from Dick Helms.

2. Suggest your remarks include the following:

I. Appropriate remarks on the value of having the student members of the Seminar aboard in order that they can become better acquainted with the Agency's capabilities and resources. This knowledge can and should be put to use by these students as they assume their various tasks in government agencies.

II. We think highly of the Senior Seminar program and beginning next year, we are sending two Agency students to each running of the Seminar.

III. Note the value of the students' recent opportunities to see and hear about the role of various US Government elements involved in international relations and power. They have seen military installations at Norfolk, the Edgewood Arsenal and have visited Quantico. They have heard a talk on national military power by Marine General Shoup and Air Force Major General Rodenhauer. Yesterday, they visited NSA and today the students are here with us.

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IV. Next March the Agency will make a presentation to the students on the Agency's role in counterinsurgency. [redacted] the Chief of our Special Operations Division will make the presentation. We also plan to include a display of covert paramilitary equipment. This display has been seen by President Kennedy and was of considerable interest to the staff and students of the National War College who spent a day here with us last month.

V. Appropriate remarks on our pleasure at having had the students here with us.

H. Knoche

6 November 1963

General Carter:

You will recall that you agreed to deliver closing remarks to the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy (State Department's once a year program which is somewhat analogous to the National War College class) at 4:45--to 5:00, on Friday, 15 November. Training has now invited you to the luncheon they are holding for this group on that date at 1245, in the North Dining Room. Your calendar is free at that time. Wish to:        Accept        Regret.

*Gen Carter said, "maybe, do they have to know right now?"*

*11/11 - Regretted, since General Carter must attend DCI's luncheon for Ambassador Jones of Indonesia.*

Bernie

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*Memorandum*

STAT

TO :

[redacted]  
70D-6011 Headquarters

DATE: 13 November 1963

FROM :

Registrar, OTR *Wes*

SUBJECT:

Visit of Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy

DDCI may wish to select his closing remarks from among these suggested topics:

A. A very brief mention of the Agency mid-career course that has just concluded and DDCI's role therein. (Should General Carter's presentation at the mid-career course delay his arrival here, we plan to extend Mr. Helms' question and answer period in the interim).

B. Mention of the use of this Conference Room for scheduled meetings of the USIB and the role of DDCI on behalf of CIA in deliberations of the Board.

C. DDCI can particularly note to the student members of the Senior Seminar on Foreign Policy their recent opportunities to both See and to Hear about the role of U. S. Government elements in the field of International Relations and Power, (their present study topic):

To See      Installations at Norfolk  
                 Edgewood Arsenal  
                 Quantico

To Hear     Talks on National Military Power  
                 by General Shoup, Marine Corps,  
                 by Major General Rodenhauser, Air Force,  
                 Followed by Yesterday Afternoon - at National  
                 Security Agency, Today - at the Central  
                 Intelligence Agency

"I understand that the post-luncheon schedule at CIA today necessitated a postponement of your popular "Public Speaking" session normally scheduled with [redacted] We too, think quite highly of [redacted] and have used him on a regular basis for the past eight years in Conference Leadership and Effective Speaking Courses conducted under Agency auspices."

STAT  
STAT

D. "In March 1964 another period of time in the Senior Seminar will be allotted to CIA for the presentation of the Agency's role in Counterinsurgency. The Chief, Special Operations Division in DD/P has accepted an invitation from [redacted] your course director

STAT

(whom, I am sorry to learn, is currently convalescing from an operation). Not only will the SOD office be responsible for the presentation of the Agency's role in Counterinsurgency, but we also plan to include a display of covert paramilitary equipment that attracted favorable attention from the President of the United States when he viewed it and provoked considered interest from the Directing Staff, Student Body and Faculty of the National War College last month when they spent one day here."

E. Time permitting, some brief referral to the 6 November issue of the Agency News Letter can be made, (copy attached). Mention of an item or so may serve to give our visitors both a sense of currently being informed and levelled with on Agency Organization and Activities, as well as to create an implicit awareness of CIA's continuing efforts towards solving the difficult problem of keeping supervisory personnel at Headquarters and at Field Installations up-dated.

F. Assertion of CIA's strong belief in the effectiveness of the Senior Seminar Program as attested to by our proposal, favorably received by the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, to send two Agency students hereafter to each running of the Senior Seminar.

G. Close on our pleasure in having the visiting party for a full day with the hope of (1) Creating better understanding of our capabilities, and (2) Gradually producing a realistic and mature understanding of the Agency among Senior U. S. Officials who should understand our role.

Attachment: a/s

STAT

13 November 1963

[redacted]  
70D-6011 Headquarters

Registrar, OIR

Visit of Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy

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                 by General Shoup, Marine Corps,  
                 by Major General Rodenhauser, Air Force,  
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Attachment: a/s



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6 November 1963

AGENCY NEWSLETTER

TO ALL SUPERVISORS:

1. The past few months have been a period of intense activity at Headquarters. The Cuban crisis having calmed down somewhat, we now find ourselves in the middle of the Vietnamese crisis. Much has been written and will be written about the Agency's role in the crisis and certain aspects of it have political overtones. In a newsletter such as this there is not space to permit a complete analysis of the performance of the Agency, but I believe the question you would most like answered is whether you can be proud of what the Agency has done in South Vietnam. The answer is "Yes, you can be very proud". You are familiar, after the Cuban crisis, with the fact that once a situation develops into this magnitude it is almost impossible to protect our operations, and once they are opened to scrutiny they are often misrepresented and misinterpreted, so I want to take this opportunity to tell you that we here in Headquarters consider that the Agency's performance in South Vietnam has been first-rate. We are confident that the top executives of our Government, members of Congress and the press are becoming more and more aware of the importance of the Agency in carrying out national policy.

2. It should be of particular interest to the personnel in the GS-13 to GS-15 category that the first Mid-Career Training Course began on 7 October with 30 students representing all major components of the Agency. This Course is part of the Agency Mid-Career Training Program which establishes the principle that each Career Service will make a critical assessment of each of its members at his mid-career stage to evaluate his prior experience, accomplishments and potential. This will serve as a basis for planning an appropriate program for his future training and growth to insure that the individual will be of most value to his Career Service and to the Agency. The training program will be tailored to each individual's needs, taking into consideration his prior experience and training as well as his probable future development and responsibilities. The training may be stretched over several months or years. The Mid-Career Training Course, of approximately six weeks duration, is one part of the Mid-Career Training Program. Among other topics, the Course covers the functioning of the various components of the Agency; the

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functioning of other agencies of the US Government, particularly those with intelligence and action responsibilities, and the Agency's relation to them; also covered are foreign and domestic political and other factors affecting US Government policy and actions. To give you an indication of the quality of the Course, the following individuals, in addition to almost all the top officers of the Agency, were speakers at the first course: Allen Dulles, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, G. Mennen Williams and Dean Acheson.

3. The Director and all other senior officers of the Agency have been doing everything possible to see that the Early Retirement Bill is enacted into law. As you are aware, its purpose is to afford an improved retirement system for a portion of the employees of CIA. Generally only those career employees whose work is oriented toward the conduct and support of intelligence activities abroad are to be covered under the system. It was determined that rather than establish an entirely new system, the Agency would follow precedent established in the retirement field by Foreign Service legislation. Consequently, the Bill authorizes the establishment of a separate retirement system for the Agency which is substantively identical to that of the Foreign Service. It is estimated that approximately thirty percent of all Agency employees will qualify for coverage under this system. The Bill provides for voluntary retirement at age 50 if an employee has 20 years of Government service and at least five years of service with the Agency. Where individuals in GS-14 and above are retired involuntarily, they would be entitled to draw an immediate earned annuity regardless of age. Where the employee involuntarily retired is grade GS-13 or below, he would be entitled to severance pay equal to one month's pay for each year's service not to exceed 12 months and, if otherwise eligible, to deferred annuities at age 60. It is believed the enactment of this legislation will fulfill Agency needs and will enable the Agency to keep a younger service by retiring people earlier and providing for them a more equitable annuity. It will, we believe, significantly improve the career structure of CIA and will permit greater efficiency and flexibility to Agency management and administration generally.

I am certain you will be interested in these remarks of Mr. McCone when he discussed the Bill before the House Armed Services Committee on 23 July:

"I have now been associated with the Central Intelligence Agency for almost two years and I have been Director since the 29th of November 1961.

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"During the period of my service with Secretary Forrestal in 1947 and 1948, and as Under Secretary of the Air Force in 1950 and 1951, and more recently as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1958 and 1961, I naturally had a very considerable contact with CIA. Hence, through direct participations in recent years, and through a less intimate but still important contact over a long period of time, I have been able to personally evaluate the quality, integrity, and the dedication of the employees of the Agency.

"It is my belief that the caliber of the personnel of the Agency is unequalled in any other agency of Government and, for that matter, any private industry with which I have been associated. I can say very frankly that I have never been surrounded by a group of men of greater intellectual quality or more sincere dedication of purpose than the men associated with me in the Central Intelligence Agency.

"For the most part, the senior men and women in the Agency possess a most unusual academic background, and, in addition, a high degree of professionalism gained through uninterrupted service extending over a great many years with the CIA and its predecessor organizations.

"With world conditions as they are, and in view of the serious responsibilities assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency by law or by Presidential directives, I believe it essential that the superb quality of men and women of CIA be maintained and indeed be improved, and, moreover, that the dedication of these employees be recognized by the provision of adequate benefits.

"I believe the enactment of this legislation will be a positive step in this direction. The legislation will significantly improve the career structure of the Agency and will permit greater efficiency in personnel management of the Agency."

"The task of the Central Intelligence Agency is a most serious and difficult one. We are charged by law with the responsibility of furnishing to the President and his policy advisers evaluations concerning the intentions of other countries, most particularly of the Communist bloc. Upon these evaluations

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hinge a great many basic decisions which affect the security and the future of the United States, and, for that matter the free world.

"We in the Government can afford nothing less than the best in personnel who shoulder this responsibility, and the proposed Central Intelligence Agency retirement system will in my opinion do a great deal in maintaining the quality of that which we now have and in encouraging its continual improvement.

"I therefore heartily endorse this legislation, and I urge its early and favorable consideration by the Congress.

"As this committee knows, Lt. Gen. Marshall Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, serves as the General Manager of the Central Intelligence Agency. This is a necessary arrangement if I, as the President's principal intelligence officer, am to be free to consider problems of the intelligence community as a whole.

"General Carter, therefore, is the man in CIA most familiar with all of the details of this legislation and best equipped to present the matter to you and to answer your questions.

"However, this is a subject which has been close to me in CIA and in the State Department when I was studying this problem as a member of Secretary Dulles' personnel policy committee, and also in the Defense Department as well.

"In introducing General Carter and asking that he continue this presentation, I wish to assure you of my support of this legislation and my desire to answer any questions you may care to direct to me."

You will also be interested in the remarks of Congressman Rivers on 4 September when he was discussing the proposed Bill before the House Armed Services Committee:

"Let me at the outset say, Mr. Chairman, that we worked pretty hard on this bill. It affects one of our vital agencies. It is doing an outstanding job . . .

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"In our opinion, many CIA employees serve under conditions which are as difficult, probably more dangerous and onerous than the conditions which led to improved retirement benefits for the Foreign Service and certain personnel of the FBI and other agencies.

"CIA employees who will come under this proposed system are obligated, in writing, to serve anywhere in the world according to the needs of the Agency, as is the case in the Foreign Service and the military, but unlike the normal civil service employee. The Agency has a definite need to maintain a young service by encouraging earlier retirement and in some cases directing earlier retirement. The voluntary early retirement features of the proposed legislation will serve this end."

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The Bill has passed the House and is now before the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

5. The Field will be interested to learn of the broadened effort the Agency has mounted to create a better understanding of our capabilities on the part of the military and the State Department. We are now giving briefings to the senior military schools (such as the National War College), interdepartmental seminars (conducted by the Foreign Service Institute), and the State Department senior seminar group, on the mission and functions of the Agency and its role in counterinsurgency. As part of this program the faculty, student body and directing staff of the National War College visited the Agency on 14 October to attend lectures and briefings. We believe these efforts are having a good effect in gradually producing a realistic and mature understanding of the Agency among senior US officials who should understand our role.

6. Along these same lines, "The 100 Universities Program" gives a new dimension to Agency recruitment and public relations. During the week of 4 November, 20 senior officials, drawn from the four Deputy

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[REDACTED]

We have gained immensely in practical knowledge as a result of the Cuban crisis, and as you are aware we have made a number of practical adjustments based on this experience. However, much remains to be done.

8. There have been several major organizational changes in the Agency about which you should be aware. On 6 August 1963 Mr. McCone approved the reorganization of the DD/R, redesignated the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology; Dr. Albert D. Wheelon was named Deputy Director. The DD/S&T retains the Office of Special Activities, the Office of Elint and the Office of Research and Development. In addition, the Office of Scientific Intelligence was moved from DD/I to DD/S&T and the Automatic Data Processing Staff was moved from DD/S to DD/S&T and renamed the Office of Computer Services. At the time of the reorganization the DCI gave the following reasons for establishing the DD/S&T:

- a. To insure the professional coupling of all Agency scientific and technical assets and programs.
- b. To enlarge and improve Agency scientific and technical environment.
- c. To facilitate the development of the scientific and technical career services.
- d. To give flexibility in the collection and analysis of scientific and technical material.
- e. And, finally, to facilitate shift in skills as changing requirements demand.

The DD/S&T will continue to support National Intelligence Estimates through ONE and coordinate fully with DD/I all scientific and technical intelligence production for consumers outside the Agency.

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The Office of Computer Services pools the majority of Agency capabilities and equipment in this field.

Dr. Wheelon also replaces the DDCI as Chairman of the Agency Research and Development Review Board, comprised of the Chief of the Technical Services Division, the Director of Communications, the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, and the Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center. This Board was established for the purpose of reviewing and integrating research and development activities, and scientific and technical efforts, in the various Agency components concerned. The Board also ensures that all scientific and technical activities are constantly related to the broadest interpretation of the Agency's mission and constitutes a reviewing body for the Agency's research and development effort as a whole.

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9. As you can see we have been making a major effort to give our scientific and technical activity the important place the times call for. As a further step to bring excellence to our scientific and technical effort, the DCI on 16 June 1963 appointed [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The purpose of this Board will be to advise the Director on the adequacy of the Agency research and development effort and point out possible application of newly emerging scientific developments to the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency. [REDACTED] is ably assisted by top-notch experts from the American industrial and academic scene.

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10. Another change of real significance has been the appointment of Mr. John Bross to be Deputy to the Director for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation. On 6 September 1963 the DCI sent a memorandum to the members of the USIB which stated:

"At the time of my appointment as Director of Central Intelligence and later by letter of 16 January 1962, the President directed that I maintain, with the Heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned, a continuing review of the programs and activities of all Departments and Agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities.

"The purpose of this directive was to ensure proper coordination of all elements of the Intelligence Community and to provide effective guidance to them in the interest of

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ensuring efficiency and completeness of coverage with a minimum of waste and duplication. To date I have discharged these responsibilities personally, working directly with you or your representatives on the United States Intelligence Board.

"I now feel that to carry on this work more effectively a small staff reporting directly to me is necessary. Therefore I am appointing Mr. John A. Bross as my Deputy for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation and have directed him to organize the necessary staff. He will be responsible for the review and evaluation of programs of the Intelligence Community as a whole. He will represent me in my capacity as Director of Central Intelligence as contrasted with my responsibility as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"Initially it is my intention that Mr. Bross and his staff concern themselves primarily with the development of a community-wide intelligence activity inventory to establish the totality of the United States foreign intelligence effort in terms of activities performed, their objectives, and the resources committed to their support. Such an inventory will serve as a basis for community-wide program evaluation and will facilitate judgments concerning the relative cost and effectiveness of particular programs, thereby contributing to sound decisions concerning our investment of money and manpower in our intelligence effort.

"In addition, Mr. Bross will review and evaluate for me the actions of the USIB committees and members of the Intelligence Community taken to implement the Priority National Intelligence Objectives as established at regular intervals by USIB. The PNIO's set forth the most important tasks to be undertaken by the Intelligence Community, and thus serve as a guideline for the community's activities. The reviews will be submitted to the United States Intelligence Board periodically."

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11. This Newsletter is designed to give all Supervisors, in both Headquarters and the Field, a brief review of the latest major developments concerning the Agency. Further distribution is up to the individual supervisors, but after it has served its purpose, please destroy it.



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick  
Executive Director

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FSI

THE SENIOR SEMINAR  
IN FOREIGN POLICY

Class of 1963-64

VISIT TO

CIA

CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
HEADQUARTERS BUILDING

15 November 1963

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The Central Intelligence Agency  
extends a most cordial welcome  
to the FSI Senior Seminar  
in Foreign Policy.

Conference Room  
7E-26

Introductions by  
PAUL CHRETIEN  
Assistant to the Director

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## PROGRAM

900-0915	THE ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence	1145-1245	THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN CIA Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and Technology
915-1010	THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency  The components of the U.S. intelligence community; history and development of the Central Intelligence Agency		New techniques in intelligence collection. Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) and its significance.
010-1030	Discussion	1245-1300	Discussion
030-1045	Coffee	1300-1400	Luncheon—North Dining Room
045-1130	THE RELATION OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE FORMULATION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY Ray S. Cline, Deputy Director for Intelligence  Intelligence support to policy making; CIA's contribution to the intelligence community; production of National Intelligence Estimates and their role in policy formulation	1400-1515	THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans  The Clandestine Services as an instrument of U.S. policy. The coordination of major actions and the obtaining of policy decisions from the Department of State, the Special Group, and the White House
130-1145	Discussion	1515-1545	Discussion
		1545-1600	CLOSING REMARKS General Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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## ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES

This classified program will be collected from you as you leave the conference room after General Carter's closing remarks. There will be a security officer at the main entrance of the building, first floor, to receive your visitor's badge as you depart.

A telephone is available in the anteroom of the conference room.

Restrooms are located off the corridor between the elevators and the conference room.

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14 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

SUBJECT : Graduation Speech to Mid-career Course

Here are some of the things which happened, or were said, which may give you some background:

During the first two weeks at the Farm which were devoted to a discussion of the Agency:

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[ ] the only pre-JOT who has taken the Mid-career Course before he took the JOT course and acted nobly as bus driver and got cheered every time he went around the corner without getting the rear wheels over the curb. (You are being requested to give him an Honorary Diploma!)

The best jobs done in presentation were by Kirkpatrick and Cline and Colby and Wheelon. The last made us all feel the importance of technical intelligence collection. So did Lundahl.

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The most revealing professional secret unloaded was [ ] who bluntly said that the CE world was so sacred it shouldn't be discussed even in the Agency family. I understand he is now walking around with a bodyguard.

Mr. A. W. D. was superb as always, and told us that in fact intelligence is a difficult and dirty business that can only be entrusted to people with the G-Damnedest highest principles.

The second two weeks at the Brookings Institution were interesting but had too many political scientists. The most interesting parts were those which discussed the power factors in the U. S. Government, e.g., the White House, the Bureau of the Budget, and A.I.D.

The last two weeks were concerned with "World Affairs."  
[redacted] the anthropologist, told us that we were really entitled to consider ourselves different from the Australian aborigines, but Dean Acheson wasn't so sure. Anyhow, Acheson felt we are all different from General DeGaulle. He hopes that we are all different from George Kennan.

STAT

Mr. McCone said that he had discovered that the Course had been so successful that its members had decided that they were able to pull off a coup in the Agency and seize power. He didn't mind this particularly, as long as it was kept to the Deputy Director level, but there was a level at which this sort of an idea should stop!

Every officer in the Agency was most helpful in presenting the course, as were many high level outside speakers. One of the best student reflections I heard was that government officials were really a very able and fine lot of people.

There were a number of very nice things said about the Course. My impression was that people felt honored by being in it and learned a very great deal.

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# MIDCAREER COURSE



OCTOBER 7 - NOVEMBER 15, 1963

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

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25X1

CHAIRMAN

25X1

ASSISTANT CHAIRMEN

25X1

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

25X1

COURSE ASSISTANT

## Midcareer Course No. 1

### Part II

The Government

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**Monday, 4 November**

**Tuesday, 5 November**

THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

0815 Convene at Headquarters  
Building (Bus Stop)

0900 WELCOMING ADDRESS  
0910 FOB 6  
Room 70059

0910 BRIEFING ON NASA  
1010

1010 Coffee Break  
1020

1020 Films  
1130

1130 Lunch  
1245

1245 Bus to Goddard Space Flight  
Center, Greenbelt, Maryland

1330 Tour of the Facility  
1600

1600 Depart for Headquarters  
Building

Dr. Hugh Dryden,  
Deputy Administrator  
or  
Dr. Robert Seamans,  
Associate Administrator

Thomas Jenkins, Direc-  
tor of Management Re-  
ports

Officers of NASA

0900 PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL  
1100 SECURITY

William Bundy, Assis-  
tant Secretary of Defen-  
se for International Secu-  
rity Affairs

The role of ISA in policy  
and strategy in crises.  
Relations with the Intel-  
ligence Community and  
with CIA in particular.

Preparatory Reading

Lyons, Gene M., "The New Civil - Military Relations",  
American Political Science Review, March 1961.

Rostow, W. W., "American Strategy on the World Scene",  
Department of State Bulletin, 16 April 1962.

Taylor, Maxwell D., "Our Changing Military Policy",  
Army, March 1962.

Supplementary Reading

Abshire, David M., and Richard V. Allen, editors,  
National Security, New York, Praeger, 1963.

Hammond, Paul Y., Organizing for Defense, Princeton  
University Press, 1961.

Kissinger, Henry A., The Necessity for Choice, New  
York, Harper, 1961.

Strausz-Hupe, Robert, et al, Forward Strategy for  
America, New York, Harper, 1961.

1115 THE U.S. INFORMATION  
1300 AGENCY

Thomas C. Sorensen,  
Deputy Director (Pol-  
icy and Plans) of the  
United States Informa-  
tion Agency

The role of the USIA in  
support of U. S. foreign poli-  
cy. Problems of projecting  
the American image abroad.

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**Wednesday, 6 November**00 Lunch  
0000 Reading  
0000 CONCEPTS OF MILITARY  
00 STRATEGY

The continuing controversy  
on U.S. Politico-Military  
strategy against the Com-  
munist Bloc

Supplementary Reading

See reading for "Problems of National Security."

Supplementary Reading

See reading for "Problems of National Security."

0900 AMERICAN PROBLEMS IN  
1030 UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN  
CULTURES

An anthropological view of  
the newly developing coun-  
tries with emphasis on their  
deep-seated cultural charac-  
teristics.

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1030 Break  
10451045 Discussion  
12001200 Lunch  
13001300 Reading  
14001400 Continuation of Morning  
1515 Session

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1515 Break  
15301530 Discussion  
16301630 Reception for  
1730

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Thursday, 7 November

Approved For Release 2006/07/25 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001400110004-3

0900  
1100

PROBLEMS OF LATIN  
AMERICA

Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Preparatory Reading

Benedict, Ruth, "The Growth of Culture", in Man, Culture and Society, edited by Harry L. Shapiro, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956.

Mead, Margaret, "The Underdeveloped and the Overdeveloped", Foreign Affairs, October 1962.

Murdock, George Peter, "How Culture Changes", in Man, Culture and Society, edited by Harry L. Shapiro.

Supplementary Reading

Brookings Institution, Development of the Emerging Countries, Washington, D. C., 1962.

Kurzman, Dan, Subversion of the Innocents, New York, Random House, 1963.

Millikan, Max F., and Donald L. M. Blackmer, editors, The Emerging Nations, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1961.

Staley, Eugene, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries, New York, Praeger, 1961.

The strategic importance of Latin America to U.S. National Security. The extent of the Communist effort in the area, with particular reference to the Leftward Movement of Brazil.

Preparatory Reading

Alexander, Robert J., "Agrarian Reform in Latin America", Foreign Affairs, October 1962.

Harr, Charles M., "Latin America's Troubled Cities", Foreign Affairs, April 1963.

Supplementary Reading

Adams, Richard W., et al, Social Change in Latin America Today, New York, Harper, 1960.

Alexander, Robert J., Communism in Latin America, New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1957.

Lieuwen, Edwin, Arms and Politics in Latin America, New York, Praeger, 1961.

1115  
1300

DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA

G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

The development of groupings of states within Africa and their links with outside powers. The concepts of Pan-Africanism. Soviet and Chicom efforts to gain political footholds in Africa.

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Friday, 8 November

0900 THE MOVEMENT TOWARD  
1200 EUROPEAN UNION, POLITI-  
CAL AND ECONOMIC

The progress of economic integration to date. The attitude of European leaders in the public and private sectors toward cooperation with Americans on economic, military, and political overseas policies.

Preparatory Reading

Deutsch, Harold C., "The Impact of the Franco-German Entente", Annals, July 1963.

Kintner, William R., "The Projected European Union and American Military Responsibilities", Annals, July 1963.

Kohn, Hans, "The Future of Political Unity in Western Europe", Annals, July 1963.

Lerner, Daniel, "As Britain Faces the Continent: How Its Leaders Weigh Their Choices", unpublished paper of the Center for International Studies, Mass. Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Lerner, Daniel, "Will European Union Bring About Merged National Goals?", Annals, July 1963.

Lerner, Daniel, and Marguerite N. Kramer, "French Elite Perspectives on the United Nations", International Organization, Vol. XVII #1, 1963.

Wuorinen, John A., "Scandinavia Looks at European Unity", Current History, March 1962.

Supplementary Reading

Cerami, Charles A., Alliance Born of Danger, <sup>STAT</sup> New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1963.

Haas, Ernest B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958.

Kitzinger, U. W., The Challenge of the Common Market, New York: Praeger, 1963.

Lichtheim, George, The New Europe, New York: Praeger, 1963.

1300 Lunch  
1400

1400 Reading Period  
1500

1500 NATO AND THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY Dean Acheson, Former Secretary of State  
1545

NATO and the Atlantic Community viewed as a political and military entity. The inception of NATO. Its weaknesses. Its possible role in the Atlantic Community.

Preparatory Reading

Acheson, Dean, "The Practice of Partnership", Foreign Affairs, January 1963.

Buchan, Alastair, "Partners and Allies", Foreign Affairs, July 1963.

Herter, Christian A., "Atlantica", Foreign Affairs, January 1963.

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Supplementary Reading

**Monday, 11 November**

Birrenbach, Kurt, The Future of the Atlantic Community,  
New York, Praeger, 1963.

Buchan, Alastair, NATO in the 1960's, New York,  
Praeger, 1963.

Strausz, Hupe, Robert, et al, Building the Atlantic  
World, New York, Harper and Row, 1963.

HOLIDAY

1600 Question Period  
1630

1630 Reception for Mr. Acheson  
1730

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**Tuesday, 12 November**

900 THE DEVELOPMENT AND  
200 PROBLEMS OF SOVIET  
FOREIGN POLICY

The historical background of the present situation in Soviet policy making. The internal factors delimiting Soviet foreign policy decisions. The external factors delimiting foreign policy decisions. Problems and dilemmas for the future.

Preparatory Reading

Ulam, Adam B., "Nationalism, Pan-Slavism, Communism" in Russian Foreign Policy, edited by Ivo J. Lederer, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1962.

Supplementary Reading

Beloff, Max, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941, London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1947-1949.

Fischer, Louis, The Soviets in World Affairs, 1917-1929, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1951.

Mackintosh, J. M., Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1962.

200 Lunch

300

300 Reading

400

1400 U. S. POLICY TOWARD  
1700 EASTERN EUROPE

Speaker to be announced

STAT

U. S. political objectives in Eastern Europe. Congressional and public pressures on the policy makers. The impact of U. S. policy and policy changes on Eastern Europe.

Preparatory Reading

Current History, May 1963, pages 257 to 304.

Supplementary Reading

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, New York, Praeger, 1961.

Wolff, Robert Lee, The Balkans in Our Time, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956.

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Wednesday, 13 November

900 CHICOM FOREIGN POLICY  
015 IN HISTORICAL PERSPEC-  
TIVE

Historical roots of Chinese attitudes toward the non-Chinese world. Role of Communist doctrine in the direction of ChiCom foreign policy objectives, both long-term and short-term.

Preparatory Reading

Appadorai, A., "Chinese Aggression and India", International Studies, July-October 1963.

Fall, Bernard B., "Peking Strikes South", Current History, September 1963.

Langer, Paul F., "China and Japan", Current History, September 1963.

Searls, Guy, "Communist China's Border Policy", United Asia, July 1963.

Supplementary Reading

Barnett, A. Doak, Communist China and Asia, New York, Harper, 1960.

Barnett, A. Doak, Communist China - Continuing Revolution, Headline Series #153, 1962.

Boyd, R. G., Communist China's Foreign Policy, New York, Praeger, 1962.

015 Break  
030

SECRET

1030 Discussion  
1200

1200 Lunch  
1300

1300 Reading  
1400

1400 THE GROWTH OF THE NA-  
1515 TIONAL RESEARCH AND  
DEVELOPMENT EFFORT

The forefront of science. What lies beyond in technology. The relation of science and technology to over-all Agency operations and the international scene.

Preparatory Reading

Kistiakowsky, George B., "Science and Foreign Affairs", Department of State Bulletin, 22 February 1960.

Price, Don K., "The Scientific Establishment", Science, 29 June 1962.

Supplementary Reading

Dupre, J. Stefan and Sanford A. Lakoff, Science and the Nation, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1962.

Price, Don K., Government and Science, New York, New York University Press, 1954.

Snow, C. P., Science and Government, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1961.

SECRET

1515 Break  
1530

Thursday, 14 November

1530 Discussion  
1700

0900 THE EFFECT OF SINO-  
1200 SOVIET RELATIONS ON  
OTHER COMMUNIST COUN-  
TRIES

The impact of the Sino-  
Soviet rift on non-bloc Com-  
munist parties.

Preparatory Reading

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "Threat and Opportunity in the  
Communist Schism", Foreign Affairs, April, 1963.

Zagoria, Donald S., "The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the  
West", Foreign Affairs, October, 1962.

Supplementary Reading

Crankshaw, Edward, The New Cold War, Moscow vs.  
Pekin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 19

Zagoria, Donald S., The Sino-Soviet Conflict. 1956-19  
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962.

1200 Lunch  
1330

1330 Reading  
1500

1500 THE UNITED NATIONS Speaker to be announce  
1545

Strengths and weaknesses.  
Accomplishments and fail-  
ures. Organization and pro-  
grams. Peacekeeping opera-  
tions.

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Supplementary Reading

**Friday, 15 November**

25X1

Burns, Arthur L., and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces, New York, Praeger, 1963.

Nicholas, H. R., The United Nations as A Political Institution, London, Oxford University Press, 1962.

1545 Coffee Break  
1600  
1600 Question Period  
1630

0900 Preparation of Critiques  
1000

1000 Discussion of Course  
1200

1200 Lunch  
1400

1400 Closing Address  
1445

Lt. General  
Marshall S. Carter,  
Deputy Director of  
Central Intelligence

1445 Presentation of Certificates  
1500

1500 Closing Administration  
1530

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D R A F T

*need to know -*  
*flexibility - funds*  
*personnel*

Welcoming Speech to Project USEFUL No. 10

*Monday, 28 October*

Good morning. It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Central Intelligence Agency.

It's nice to see so large a group. You are the tenth group scheduled to participate in Project USEFUL since its inception at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1954, and I know your time here will be well spent. You have been selected by your parent Services to meet with us to be briefed on the nature of our work here at CIA.

Over the next two weeks a number of our senior people will talk with you on subjects designed to give you a good deep look at CIA. I hope that after these two weeks you will return to your organizations with a better understanding of CIA's role in national security. I invite you particularly to relate what you learn here to the problems you face and to be thinking of the ways in which this Agency can be of use to the military establishments, particularly in wartime.

The speakers who will follow me will cover in some detail the organization of the intelligence community and the various jobs that are done here in CIA. Let me describe these in general terms for you.



The intelligence community is composed of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence Bureau of the State Department, the intelligence components of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the National Security Agency, the FBI, and the Intelligence Office in the AEC. The top officials of each of these components meet weekly as members of the United States Intelligence Board. The Board is chaired by Mr. McCone as Director of Central Intelligence.

The USIB acts as a sort of Board of Directors of the intelligence business. Two of its most important functions are to discuss and approve National Intelligence Estimates and to determine, after due consultation with policymakers, the Priority National Intelligence Objectives. These Objectives are in the form of \$64,000 questions which we must try to answer to the policymakers' satisfaction. The Priority Objectives include such topics as Sino-Soviet preparations for attacks against free world countries.

To accomplish its task of trying to get the answers to such important questions as these, each agency in the intelligence community collects the kind of information it is best suited to collect, makes it available to other intelligence agencies, and analytical work begins. In addition to these efforts by each of the agencies in the community, there are certain national assets available to the community. These include the National Security Agency at Fort Meade.

The NSA, ~~the~~ the cryptologic service of the US, ~~is~~ is charged with the responsibility for gathering communications intelligence and electronic intelligence. Information of this type is brought together at NSA, analyzed, <sup>correlated</sup> ~~related~~, and disseminated to the intelligence community.

In addition there is the National Reconnaissance Office which is <sup>res</sup>ponsible for all overhead photography. It functions under the Secretary of Defense and executes plans developed jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense.

There is the National Photographic Interpretation Center, known as NPIC. NPIC receives, analyzes and reports on the production of overhead reconnaissance. NPIC is under the CIA which is the Executive Agent for national photographic interpretation.

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This is no small community. The work requires something in excess of 100,000 men and ~~x~~ women. Its budget is estimated at something between \$2 and \$4 billion a year depending upon just what is allocated to intelligence and what is allocated to reconnaissance as a normal function of the armed <sup>s</sup>ervices.

In CIA our two main functions are: (1) the collection of foreign intelligence and (2) the analysis, correlation, production and dissemination of finished intelligence.

When I speak of finished intelligence, I am referring to such things as National Intelligence Estimates which make vital and important forecasts of situations lying ahead. These Estimates cover a wide range of subjects. The most important is perhaps the annual estimate dealing with the Soviet capability for long -range attack against the continental US, but there are equally important estimates covering such topics as, "Prospects for Stability in Ceylon."

In addition the CIA turns out finished current intelligence daily and weekly. These are brief assessments of critical developments taking place around the world.


The preparation of an intelligence product of this kind requires an elaborate supporting structure of up-to-the-minute communications and a quick reaction time among our analysts who must be able to ~~fix~~ ~~put~~ piece together a number of fragments to develop a quick and meaningful summary of what the fragments portend.

In our clandestine offices in CIA the major effort is built around the collection of foreign intelligence <sup>for use in the</sup> ~~to p~~ with preparation of finished intelligence for the policymakers. In addition to these collection efforts, we have found it necessary over the years to build

capabilities in other fields which we are frequently called upon to use. These include propaganda, psychological warfare, counter-intelligence and paramilitary operations.

As examples of what I am talking about, we must be able to provide paramilitary instruction and hardware on short notice to countries in various parts of the world upon direction of higher authority. We must keep a close tab on the Sino-Soviet intelligence apparatus, and we work closely with the FBI in developing plans to <sup>7</sup>forte penetration efforts by the enemy.

I want to emphasize to you that the CIA, despite what you read in the press, does not operate unilaterally, it does not make policy and it uses its capabilities only when directed to. Covert US actions, wherever they may take place around the world, are only undertaken upon approval by the White House, State Department, Defense, or all three.



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X With the need for secrecy in much of our business, we become natural targets, particularly of the press, for criticism.

This is something we have learned to live with. We can neither trumpet our successes nor openly defend ourselves in event of attack.

While I am on this subject, let me discuss the South Vietnam situation to straighten out the picture as presented by the press.

In 1961, when the US made its commitment to ~~pick~~<sup>pick</sup> up South Vietnam and put an end to Viet Cong x insurgency, the US military Special Forces were not totally prepared to take over the responsibility for the immediate training of the necessary number of South Vietnamese forces to combat the insurgency. MAAG was already overburdened with the training of the South Vietnamese army and we were asked to assume the function of covert training in various counterinsurgency fields in South Vietnam.

As the size of the war effort grew, CIA's activities in these fields expanded and it became impossible to keep our activity as covert as we would have liked. Gradually, over the past 18 months, as the US military became capable, we began to transfer phases of our activities to the military. Even so, parts of the activity remained with us by direction of General Harkins even though it was somewhat beyond our normal charter. Our activities are what General Harkins wanted, and expected. It was what the Country team wanted and expected. It was the subject of review periodically in Washington. There was general approval of the manner in which we were handling this task that had been given us.

While carrying out these tasks in the CI field, the CIA station in Saigon continued to forward intelligence reports of the political situation in South Vietnam. The record of this reporting shows that it has been remarkably accurate. We saw the tarnishing of the image of the Diem government in the eyes of the South Vietnamese people; we noted the success of the war effort and we noted that the tarnishing of the Diem regime had not seriously affected the war effort, but as the Buddhist problem became acute, we also predicted that if the Diem government did not correct and reform itself in some way soon, the war effort would be seriously affected.

station  
Our ~~situation~~ has reported countless ~~times~~ rumors of coups and coup planning by the South Vietnamese military but it was the station's and the intelligence community's evaluation that a coup attempt would probably touch off civil war and that the only ultimate victor would be the Viet Cong.

At no time has the Station in Saigon or has CIA in Washington taken unilateral steps in this situation. Criticism of us has, to a great extent, been malicious; it has been wrong and it has been detrimental to the interests of the United States. We are happy that Secretary McNamara and General Taylor's recent trip has once and for all put this criticism to rest and we hope we will hear no more about it.

Gentlemen, as I said before, we welcome you, and I am sure you will find your time here enjoyable and as the project name implies "USEFUL".

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DRAFT

Welcoming Speech to Project USEFUL No. 10

Good morning. It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Central Intelligence Agency.

You have been selected by your parent Services to meet with us to be *on the nature of our work here at* briefed concerning the organization and mission of CIA. *it's nice to* I am gratified to

see so large a group. You are the tenth group scheduled to participate in Project USEFUL since its inception at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1954, and I know your time <sup>here</sup> will be well spent. Unfortunately, ~~Project USEFUL No. 9, scheduled for last year, had to be canceled due to the Cuban crisis.~~

Over the next two weeks ~~we plan to have~~ a number of our senior people *designed to give you* will talk with you on subjects ~~which have been carefully selected to assure that~~ you receive, within the "need-to-know" principle, a good deep look at CIA.

~~The program is primarily oriented to point out this Agency's capabilities to support you in wartime.~~ I hope that after these two weeks you will return to your organizations with a better understanding of <sup>CIA's role</sup> ~~the role which~~ CIA plays

in national security ~~and with~~ I invite you *particularly to relate what you learn here to the problems you face and to the ways in which this Agency can be of use to the military establishment, particularly in wartime.*

I would like to address the remainder of my remarks to some matters which I hope you will use as background to understand why we have a Project USEFUL and why we impart this type of information to you. I would

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downgrading and  
declassification



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like to discuss these major points: the relationship of intelligence to policy - the relationship of intelligence to security - and last, some problems of coordination.

### INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY

As you well know, traditionally, intelligence has been a support function to policy formulation and policy implementation. The policymaker turns to intelligence for answers to the questions which he must resolve before he makes decisions. Most of his answers will come from overt intelligence organizations. For answers to the more difficult questions, he turns to clandestine intelligence collection organizations which sometimes can supply him with the key information upon which his decisions will be based. I will be the first to admit that we do not always find the complete answer to the policymaker's questions, nor is he always completely satisfied with our result. We do find, however, answers to many of his "knottier" questions. The relationship between the policymaker and the intelligence organizations which serve him is an outgrowth of the completeness and accuracy of the intelligence provided. Sometimes the relationship between the two is not as good as it should be because the policymaker does not know the capabilities and the limitations of the intelligence organizations which support him.

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Those of you who are involved in policy planning, and depend upon us for support, need, therefore, to have some knowledge of CIA. Project USEFUL is one way of accomplishing this.

### INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

Intelligence is part of the basis for policy or contemplated action which will become apparent at some later time; therefore, it is essential that intelligence protect the interests or potential intentions of the policymakers from inadvertent or other types of exposure from those against whom policy will be directed. Furthermore, intelligence uses certain techniques in arriving at the answers to policy questions which, if revealed, could shut off the flow of further information, or possibly lead to national embarrassment. The key device in protecting the interests of those whom we serve is compartmentation -- a device subject to a great deal of interpretation. Normally the greatest efficiency in any organization is accomplished by the best communication, both vertically and laterally. Compartmentation limits communication and consequently hinders efficiency and coordination. There continually exists the question of how much communication is allowable without sacrificing effective performance.

Through Project USEFUL we are attempting to give you, or communicate

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to you, certain information which I feel will allow for better working relationships between people in your organization and CIA.

### INTELLIGENCE AND COORDINATION

If we examine the total intelligence picture of the United States Government, as well as the relationship between covert action programs and overall policy, we find a number of major factors which greatly influence effective coordination. These are: 1) a policy-directed division of labor, 2) multiplicity of organizations, 3) bigness, 4) lack of uniformity in organizational patterns for similar or related functions, and 5) interdependence in order to accomplish the overall mission.

Let us examine a couple of these factors. Bigness should be looked at in conjunction with compartmentation and control. Normally the bigger an operation, whether in Government or business, the greater the problem of achieving effective coordination. Add to this compartmentation and there always exists the possibility of attitudes developing in subunits which can lead to bureaucratic hardening of the arteries.

Now let us look at the problem of interdependence among intelligence organizations to accomplish the overall national security mission. There does not exist in the intelligence community or national planning structure

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a self-contained unit which consumes its own product. If such an organization could exist, it would serve little purpose and undoubtedly would operate at minimal efficiency. Planners rely on producers of intelligence. Producers rely on collectors. Producers also rely on other producers for sources of data and checking hypotheses. Collectors rely on other collectors for collection data. Therefore, since this interdependence is obviously present, we must not overlook opportunities to utilize the facilities and capabilities of other intelligence organizations. USEFUL will help point out how we are dependent on you and you are dependent on us.

Project USEFUL is an effort which will in the long or short haul produce a working team -- a team dedicated to the task of assuring that the full impact of intelligence is brought to bear on the serious questions of national policy in peace or in hot war. I hope you will find the next two weeks enjoyable and, as the project name implies, "USEFUL".

**SECRET**

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

## Project USEFUL No. 10

**28 October - 8 November 1963**

**Monday, 28 October 1963**

**0900 - 0945      Registration**

1000 - 1015      Welcome

Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director of Central  
Intelligence

25x1

**1015 - 1030      Introduction to Course,  
Purpose and Scope**

## Chief, War Plans Staff

**1040 - 1100 Administration and Security**

Operations School,  
Office of Training

25X1

## 1110 - 1230 The Background of CIA

Lyman Kirkpatrick  
Executive Director,  
Central Intelligence Agency

**1230 - 1330      Lunch**

**1330 - 1450 CIA Organization and Functions  
and the National Security  
Structure**

Paul M. Chretien  
Briefing Officer, Office  
of Training

**1510 - 1600      Coordination Factor**

**John A. Bross**  
**Deputy to the DCI for**  
**National Intelligence**  
**Program Evaluation**

**GROUP 1**  
**Excluded from automatic**  
**downgrading and**  
**declassification**

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

S-E-C-R-E-T

Tuesday, 29 October 1963

0930 - 1030    The Mission of the DD/I

Ray S. Cline  
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

1045 - 1200    CIA Intelligence Depositories

[REDACTED]  
Special Assistant to the  
Assistant Director, Office  
of Central Reference

25X1

1200 - 1300    Lunch

1300 - 1415    CIA Intelligence Research  
Methods

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Intelligence School,  
Office of Training

25X1

1430 - 1520    The National Intelligence  
Survey Program

[REDACTED]  
Deputy Assistant Director  
for Basic Intelligence

25X1

1530 - 1630    The Office of Operations

Joseph Larocque, Jr.  
Assistant Director  
Office of Operations

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Wednesday, 30 October 1963

0900 - 1100	The National Photographic Interpretation Center	<u>Arthur E. Lundahl</u> Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
1110 - 1230	The National Indications Center and Watch Committee	<div data-bbox="922 764 1281 831" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 221px; height: 32px; display: inline-block;"></div> Director of the National Indications Center
1230 - 1330	Lunch	
1330 - 1500	Production of National Estimates	<u>Sherman Kent</u> Assistant Director of National Estimates
1510 - 1630	Mission of the DD/S&T	<u>Albert D. Wheelon</u> Deputy Director (Science and Technology)

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S-E-C-R-E-T

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

Thursday, 31 October 1963

0900 - 1030	The Mission of the Clandestine Services	<u>Richard Helms</u> Deputy Director (Plans)	
1040 - 1200	Clandestine Collection of Information	<div data-bbox="940 772 1292 827" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 217px; height: 26px;"></div> Deputy Chief, FI Staff	25X1
1200 - 1300	Lunch		
1300 - 1420	Covert Action Operations	<u>Cord Meyer, Jr.</u> Chief, Covert Action Staff	
1430 - 1600	Counterinsurgency	<div data-bbox="924 1163 1252 1241" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 202px; height: 37px;"></div> Special Assistant to the Chief, CA Staff	25X1


**S-E-C-R-E-T**



**S-E-C-R-E-T**

**Friday, 1 November 1963**


**0900 - 0950     Counterintelligence  
Responsibilities**

  
**Chief, Research and  
Analysis Group,  
Counterintelligence Staff**


25X1

25X1

**1000 - 1120     Paramilitary, Air and  
Maritime Operations**

  
**Chief, Special Operations  
Division**

**1130 - 1230     Evasion and Escape  
(Panel)**

  
**Office of Training**

25X1

**1230 - 1315     Lunch**

**1315 - 1405     CIA War Planning, Global  
War Plan, Command  
Relationships Agreement**

  
**War Plans Staff  
Operational Services Staff**

25X1

**1415 - 1500     Military Requirements**

  
**War Plans Staff  
Operational Services Staff**

25X1

**1510 - 1630     The Far East**

**William E. Colby  
Chief, FE Division**

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

Monday, 4 November 1963

0900 - 1020	The Soviet Union	<u>David E. Murphy</u> Chief, SR Division	
1030 - 1200	Eastern Europe	<u>Bronson Tweedy, Jr.</u> Chief, EE Division	
1200 - 1300	Lunch		25X1
1300 - 1430	Technical Support for Covert Operations	<div data-bbox="971 976 1334 1035" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 224px; height: 28px;"></div> Chief, Plans and Training Staff Technical Services Division	
1440 - 1600	Africa	<div data-bbox="956 1148 1255 1207" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 184px; height: 28px;"></div> Chief, AF Division	25X1

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**S-E-C-R-E-T**

S-E-C-R-E-T

Tuesday, 5 November 1963


0900 - 1010      Western Europe



25X1

Chief, WE Division

1020 - 1130      The Western Hemisphere



25X1

Special Assistant to the Chief  
WH Division

1140 - 1245      The Near East

James H. Critchfield  
Chief, NE Division

1245 - 1345      Lunch

1345 - 1515      Machine Systems in the Agency

Joseph Becker  
Assistant Director for Computer  
Services, DD/S&T

1530 - 1630      Preparation and Submission  
of Questions for Review  
Seminar

-7-

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Wednesday, 6 November 1963

25X1

0900 - 1015      CIA Personnel Staffing in  
Wartime

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Mobilization and Reserve  
Branch, Office of Personnel

25X1

1040 - 1200      Communications Support for  
CIA's Wartime Mission and  
Communications Exhibit

[REDACTED]  
Training Officer, Office  
of Communications

1200 - 1300      Lunch

25X1

1300 - 1500      Logistic Support for Agency  
Activities (Panel)

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Planning Staff  
Office of Logistics

-8-

S-E-C-R-E-T

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

Thursday, 7 November 1963

0900 - 1000      CIA Training for the Military

25X1

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Plans and Policy  
Staff, Office of Training

1010 - 1100      Security Support for CIA's  
Wartime Mission

Robert L. Bannerman  
Director of Security

1110 - 1215      Medical Support to Clandestine  
Operations

25X1

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Operations  
Division, Medical Staff

-9-

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

S-E-C-R-E-T

Friday, 8 November 1963

0900 - 0950	Review Seminar	<u>War Plans Staff</u>
1000 - 1050	Continuation of Seminar	
1100 - 1130	Closing Remarks	<u>John A. McCone</u> ★ Director of Central Intelligence
1130	Preparation of Written Course Critique and Final Administration	

★ General Carter introduced DCL.  
Plg 8 Nov 63

-10-

S-E-C-R-E-T

ARNO, David H.	Major, USAF	Plans and Program Officer, Counterinsurgency Plans Division, Directorate of Plans, PACAF
AVEDON, Herbert	Civilian, DA	Psychological Warfare Specialist <sup>STAT</sup>
BERKELEY, Randolph C. Jr.	Colonel, USMC	Assistant G-2, HQMC, Arlington, Virginia
BOETTCHER, Louis Henry	Lt. Colonel, USA	Concept, Doctrine and Organ- ization Division, Special Doctrine and Equipment Group, USACDC Fort Belvoir, Va.
BRISTOW, John B.	Lt. Colonel, USMC	Assistant G-2 Operations Headquarters, FMFLANT
BRYCE, David G.	Captain, USN	Instructor, Economic Capa- bilities Division, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
CALLENDER, James M.	Colonel, USMC	Head, Amphibious Warfare Section, Development Programs Division, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Development)
CAMPBELL, Donald L	Lt. Colonel, USAF	Chief, Communications Security Branch, Security and Electronic Warfare Division, Communications-Electronics (J-6), Joint Staff
CATTERLIN, Richard R.	Colonel, USAF	Director of Intelligence, Special Air Warfare Center, Eglin AFB, Florida
CHAMBERLIN, William C.	Colonel, USMC	Western Hemisphere Branch, Regional Plans and Policy Division, J-5, Joint Chiefs of Staff

COOK, Julian A	Colonel, USA	Subsidiary Activities Plans Officer, Plans Division, CINCLANT Staff
CURLEY, Clyde W.	Cdr. , USN	Plans, Policy and Coordination Branch, Intelligence Division, Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
DAVIS, Sidney R.	Lt. Colonel, USAF	Executive Officer, Technical Divison, Directorate of Collection, ACS/Intelligence, HQ USAF
DEAN, Joseph R.	Colonel, USA	Director UW Division J-3 SOTFE
DEMPSTER, Kenneth C.	Collonel, USAF	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff Operations, J-3, HQ USSTRICOM
DYAR, Joseph E.	Captain, USN	Head, Support Plans Section Navy Plans Branch, Strategic Plans Division (Op-605F)
FINLAYSON, James C.	Lt. Colonel, USAF	Assistant UW Plans Officer Air Force CINCLANT Staff
FLEGEAL, Foster F.	Colonel, USA	War Plans Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army
FURNAS, Wendell J.	Cdr. , USN	Intelligence Plans, Policies and Special Operations Officer, CINCUSNAVEUR Staff
GARRETT, Franklin T.	Lt. Colonel, USA	Special Warfare Directorate, ODCSOPS DA



HAMILTON, Richard L.	Lt. Colonel, USAF	Operations Planning Officer, Atlantic/Western Hemisphere Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, HQ USSTRICOM
HAVEY, James H.	Colonel, USAF	Commander, 3826th Command and Control Group, Head- quarters, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
HAYES, Harold A. Jr. ,	Colonel, USMC	Head, Strategic Plans Section Plans Branch, G-3 Division Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.
HEINL, Robert D. Jr.	Colonel, USMC	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, FMFLANT, Norfolk, Virginia
HENNIGAN, John R.	Captain, USA	S-3, Area Specialist, Head- quarters 10th Special Forces Group (ABN), Bad Tolz, <sup>STAT</sup> Germany

JARNAGIN, James L.	Colonel, USAF	Chief, Special Air Warfare Division, Directorate of Operations, HQ USAF
KERR, Edward E.	Captain, USN	Assistant Branch Head, Com- posite Support Branch, Office of the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence Division
KIZIRIAN, John	Major, USA	Plans Officer, J-2 Directorate, USSOUTHCOM.
LINDAHL, Thomas E.	Colonel, USAF	Deputy COMSOTFE

MERRICK, John L.	Cdr. , USN	Assistant, Special Weapons Plans Branch, Strategic Plans Division (Op-604G)
METCALF, George T.	Colonel, USA	The Joint Staff, Office of the Special Assistant for Counter-insurgency and Special Activities (SACSA), Pentagon
MILOTTA, David E.	Colonel, USA	Faculty, The National War College
MINOR, Gerald E.	Captain, USN	Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2 Division, Hq Alaskan Command
McMAHON, Robert E.	Colonel, USA	Director of Operations, ACofS, G-2, Hq USARPAC
NIELSEN, Ariel W.	Brig. Gen. , USAF	Deputy Director for Plans, J-3 Division, Headquarters US European Command
PHILLIPS, Thomas A. Jr. ,	Major, USAF	Assistant Professor and Director of Administration, Department of History, USAF Academy, Colorado
REYNOLDS, Norman G.	Colonel, USA	Deputy Director of Intelligence J-2, HQ USSTRICOM
ROTH, Robert C.	Colonel, USA	Chief, Operations Branch, Collection Division OACSI
ST. SAUVER, Richard T.	Lt. Colonel, USA	Faculty Adviser, Faculty Group B, Armed Forces Staff College
SANSOUCY, Horace A.	Cdr. , USN	Amphibious Force Intelligence Officer
SHEPHERD, Lemuel C. , III	Lt. Colonel, USMC	Op-92B1D - Assistant for Regional Defense Treaty Matters
SIMONETTI, Lino D.	Colonel, USAF	Chief, Plans Office, J-1, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SMITH Charles A.	Major, USA	Plans Officer, J-3 Directorate, USSOUTHCOM
SMITH Donald T.	Colonel, USAF	Assistant DCS/Plans, Headquarters, Military Air Transport Service, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
WILSON, William V.	Lt. Colonel, USA	Airborne/Special Forces Officer, Plans, Policy and Operations Directorate, JTFFOUR
WORREL, Albert A.	Colonel, USAF	Faculty Adviser, Faculty Group A, Armed Forces Staff College
WYNNE, Lawson P.	Colonel, USAF	Member, Pacific, Far East Branch, Plans and Policy Division, Communications-Electronics (J-6), Joint Staff

ALTERNATES

CANTLAY, George G.	Colonel, USA	Staff and Faculty, U. S. Army War College
DELAMATER, Benjamin F.	Colonel, USA	Chief, Special Warfare Branch, Special Warfare/Civil Affairs Division, DCSUTR, HQ USCONARC
GREEN, Zade W.	Civilian, DAF	Chief, Intelligence Division Office of Intelligence, US Air Force, Southern Command
HIMIC, Steve Paul	Lt. Colonel, USA	Plans, Programs and Intelligence Division, Special Doctrine and Equipment Group USACDC, Fort Belvoir, Va.
MARTTINEN, Alpo K.	Colonel, USA	Special Warfare Directorate, ODCSOPS DA

McWHINNEY, William W.	Colonel, USA	War Plans Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army
ST. LAWRENCE, Thomas J.	Major, USA	Unconventional Warfare Plans Officer, CINCPAC
SCHWEITER, Leo Henry	Colonel, USA	The Joint Staff, Office of the Special Assistant for Counter-insurgency and Special Activities, Pentagon
SHORT, James C.	Colonel, USMC	The Joint Staff, Office of the Special Assistant for Counter-insurgency and Special Activities, Pentagon
SWAIN, Walter M.	Civilian, DA	Action Officer, Coordination Branch, Collection Division OACSI
VAN TASSELL, Frederick E.	Colonel, USA	Deputy G-2, USARSOUTHCOM

S-E-C-R-E-T

## Attachment 1

Project USEFUL Speaker Guidance Sheet

For the 1963 presentation of Project USEFUL, the Joint Staff has been invited to nominate 50 Officers. A review of the list of nominees received to date shows that these Officers are, for the most part, engaged in planning, training or operations in the fields of unconventional warfare, psychological warfare, or intelligence. All major commands, both overseas and in the Continental United States, will be represented. All Officers who will attend have been informed that the information they receive at Project USEFUL is on a strict "need-to-know" basis.

Objectives: The primary objective of this program from the Agency's viewpoint is to maintain and improve Agency-Department of Defense cooperation and coordination through a more effective understanding of CIA on the part of the military. Thus, we hope to inform these Officers of our capability to support the military effort in wartime and, conversely, to let them know what types of support we need from them in order for us to carry out our missions. For individual speakers, this is the opportunity to acquaint a large number of officers, with whom you or people in your component will assuredly work in the future, with those matters which will facilitate the accomplishment of your tasks.

Approach: In previous courses, the audience has reacted more favorably to presentations which stressed the positive contributions which the Agency can make to the Intelligence Community and to the Military in time of war. While recognizing the difficulties inherent in clandestine or covert operations, a positive approach towards their solution will be appreciated by the Officers. Lecturers in the past have effectively used historical examples to illustrate major points. References to current or sensitive operations should be avoided.

Please bear in mind that for a number of these Officers, Project USEFUL is their first close acquaintanceship with CIA. It might be well to avoid, or to spell out, internal Agency terminology with which they are not familiar. From past experience, we may expect frank and direct questions, a strong desire to understand, and an appreciation of the contributions which the CIA is making towards the attainment of National objectives.

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
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S-E-C-R-E-T

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**SECRET**

25X1

22 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Suggested Topics for Comment by the DDCI in His  
Address to the Intelligence Review Course.

Members of the Intelligence Review Seminar are experienced analysts in production and support work. They are now in mid-career and are taking two weeks from their desks to review the current status of the intelligence profession, from the point of view both of the Agency and the Community. They are interested in a top-echelon

- ① view of the future of the Agency - in possible organizational changes; ?
- ② community relationships, particularly with regard to DIA and State;
- ③ and the role of intelligence in the formulation of security policy.
- ④ They are concerned about past mistakes and successes, neither of which
- ⑤ are necessarily always clear from the analyst's vantage point. They  
appreciate a frank exchange of views, hopes and expectations from  
their Agency executives.

C/IOF/IS/TR

25X1

**SECRET**

SECRET

25X1

22 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Suggested Topics for Comment by the DDCI in His  
Address to the Intelligence Review Course.

Members of the Intelligence Review Seminar are experienced analysts in production and support work. They are now in mid-career and are taking two weeks from their desks to review the current status of the Intelligence profession, from the point of view both of the Agency and the Community. They are interested in a top-echelon view of the future of the Agency - in possible organizational changes; community relationships, particularly with regard to DIA and State; and the role of intelligence in the formulation of security policy. They are concerned about past mistakes and successes, neither of which are necessarily always clear from the analyst's vantage point. They appreciate a frank exchange of views, hopes and expectations from their Agency executives.

[REDACTED]  
C/IOF/IS/TR

25X1

SECRET



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**SECRET**

Executive Registry

63-7927

18 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Suggested Topics for Consideration by the  
DDCI in His Intelligence Review Presentation  
on 25 October, 1145 Hours.

1. The Intelligence Review Course is designed to provide an opportunity for experienced personnel to review the current state of the intelligence profession; to examine organizational changes and inter-relationships; to review intelligence objectives and requirements; to examine the current status of the intelligence process and to consider future trends.

2. Members of the seminar have suggested consideration of such topics as the following:

(1) "Present status and outlook for career planning and career development:

- Dir Pers*
- a. role of internal training;
  - b. role of rotation for on-the-job training;
  - c. role of foreign assignments; and
  - d. role of incentives for self study.

"To improve professional competence of present employees, so that they may have an opportunity to fill the future personnel needs of the Agency in:

- D/PW*
- a. middle management;
  - b. computer and machine processing;
  - c. technical and scientific areas; and
  - d. job vacancies in other components of Agency."

(2) "Will the rigidity of career service lines continue to effectively prevent - assignment of individuals to duty with other career services?"

(3) "Why are experienced and professional Agency employees who are declared surplus by one component not used to fill vacancies in another component, e.g., 71 surplus OCR professionals experienced in writing are reportedly not to be acceptable to DDP to fill reports officer vacancies?"

*Dir Pers*

**SECRET**

SECRET

✓ (4) "From recent articles, and comments in this course (Intell Review) DIA seems to be trying to out-CIA the Agency. Have you any comments on this?"

✓ (5) "In his capacity as coordinator of the overall USIB intelligence efforts, just how much influence can the DCI exert to eliminate needless duplication of effort -- particularly with respect to DIA/CIA relationships?"

(6) "What are the benefits, if any, of being appointed to the Career Service?"

(7) "Has the Agency explored the feasibility of regular short tours of duty with other government or private research agencies, in order for employees to improve their substantive competence?"

25X1



MATTHEW BAIRD  
Director of Training

SECRET

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General Carter:

About a month ago we asked whether you would be willing to address the Intelligence Review course on its closing day, 25 October, as requested by Mr. Baird. At that time you indicated you wished to "play it by ear." Mr. Kirkpatrick addresses the group on Tuesday, 15 October (second day of the course) at 1:45-3:00.

Are you willing to give the closing address at 2:45 on Friday, 25 October? Yes ☒ No

STAT

*Called [redacted] 10/14 - advised her DDCT would give this speech, but changed time to 11:45 due to conflict at 2:45.*

STAT

Barbara (11 Oct)

*[redacted] was asked on 16 October to have suggested remarks prepared:*

S-E-C-R-E-T

*Bark*  
*Burn*

## INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

### COURSE OBJECTIVES

To provide an opportunity for experienced personnel to:

- (1) review the current state of the intelligence profession;
- (2) to examine organizational changes and inter-relationships;
- (3) to review intelligence objectives and requirements;
- (4) to examine the current status of the intelligence process; and
- (5) to consider future trends.

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

INTELLIGENCE REVIEW (7)  
14 - 25 October 1963

Room 1A13

FIRST WEEK

Monday, 14 October

0845-0930 Registration; Introduction to the Course

0945-1030 Some Current Challenges to the U.S.


1100-1200 Exhibit

1300-1340 Film: Watch on the Mekong

1400-1445 Office of the Inspector General

1500-1600 The HIC

1610-1630 Seminar Organizations: Appointment of Chairmen



25X1

Earman

Pforzheimer

Tuesday, 15 October

0900-1010 Role of Intelligence in the Formulation of National Security Policy

Cooper

1030-1200 Role of the DD/I

Cline

1300-1330 Seminar meetings

1345-1500 An Appraisal of the Central Intelligence Concept

Kirkpatrick


1515-1630 Film: Acquisition of Agents (Parts I - V)

Wednesday, 16 October

0900-1015 Legislative Relationships

Warner

1045-1200 Forecast of Intelligence Support Needed in Policy Determination



1300-1415 The Collection Guidance Staff

25X1


Hitchcock

1445-1600 The Collection Factor

Panel

1600-1630 Seminar meetings

25X1




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S-E-C-R-E-T  
-2-

Thursday, 17 October

0900-1010 Indications Intelligence: NIC; Current Status  
1030-1200 Military Intelligence: (DIA-CIA Interrelationships)  
1235 Film: Photography in the USAF (Optional)  
1300-1410 State Department Intelligence  
1430-1545 Photographic Intelligence: Role of the NPIC  
1550-1630 Seminar meetings



Lundahl

Friday, 18 October

0900-1030 Research and Reference Facilities: Problems and future developments  
1045-1400 The Production Factor: Problems and responsibilities of CIA in the production of National and other categories of Intelligence.  
1415-1530 Panel Discussion  
1600-1630 Seminar meetings



(1045-1110)  
(1115-1140)  
(1145-1210) Chamberlain  
(1300-1325)  
(1330-1355) Kent


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SECOND WEEK

Monday, 21 October

0900-1015 The Clandestine Services: Intra-Agency relationships  
1030-1115 The DDS&T Mission  
1130-1200 Role of the Computer in Analysis  
1300-1415 The Support Function and Role in CIA  
1435-1455 Film: Small Town  
1505-1605 Security of Intelligence  
1610-1630 Seminar meetings



Wheelon

Becker

White

Bannerman

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T



S-E-C-R-E-T

-3-

Tuesday, 22 October

0900-1000 Personnel Policies and Problems  
1020-1120 Logistical Support Activities  
1130-1200 Area Film: Latin America  
1300-1400 The Agency's Fiscal Program  
1430-1530 Medical Support of Agency Activities  
1545-1630 Seminar meetings

Echols

25X1

Wednesday, 23 October

0900-1000 Training Trends and Developments  
1020-1120 Management in an Intelligence Agency  
1130-1200 Seminar meetings  
1300-1415 International Communism: Current Status  
1430-1630 Counterinsurgency  
Film: The Village Refuses to Die

Thursday, 24 October

0900-1000 Foreign Intelligence Organizations: The U.S.S.R.  
1020-1120 Foreign Intelligence Organizations: The U.K.  
1130-1200 DODS: Present Status  
1300-1430 Film: Acquisition of Agents (Parts VI-VIII)  
1430-1630 Preparation of Seminar Reports

25X1

Friday, 25 October

0900-1200 Seminar Reports  
1315-1430 Critique and Final Administration  
1445 Closing Address

Gen. Carter

S-E-C-R-E-T

STAT

SUSPENSE - 11 October

I called [ ] in [ ] office on 10 Sep,  
told her I had brought this matter up with General  
Carter but that he had given neither a yes nor a  
no reply -- that we would put the memo in suspense  
for about a week before the course and bring it up  
with General Carter again; and that we would be  
in touch with OTR at that time.

Barbara (10 Sep)

ILLEGIB

STAT

[ ]

Pls note that ExDir is addressing the  
course at the beginning -- I thought ExDir and DDCI  
agreed that usually they would not both address the  
same group ? ? ? ?

rita

STAT

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SECRET

3015

Executive Registry

63-6785

29 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Invitation to address the Intelligence  
Review

1. The Office of Training will present the fall running of the Intelligence Review in October. This seminar for senior Agency personnel reviews the current state of the intelligence profession, examines organizational changes and interrelationships, and considers future trends.

2. I should like to invite you to address the class again at its closing session on Friday, 25 October at ~~1445~~ that afternoon.

11:45



25X1

MATTHEW BAIRD  
Director of Training

ATTACHMENT: Intelligence Review schedule

SECRET

GROUP 1  
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downgrading and  
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

INTELLIGENCE REVIEW (7)  
14 - 25 October 1963

DRAFT  
21 Aug '63

25X1

FIRST WEEK

Monday, 14 October

0845-0930 Registration; Introduction to the Course  
0945-1030 Some Current Challenges to the U.S.  
1050-1200 An Appraisal of the Central Intelligence Concept  
1300-1340 Film: Watch on the Mekong  
1400-1445 Office of the Inspector General  
1500-1600 Management in an Intelligence Agency  
1610-1630 Seminar Organizations: Appointment of Chairman

Kirkpatrick

Earman

25X1

Tuesday, 15 October

0900-1010 Role of Intelligence in the Formulation of National Security Policy  
1030-1200 Role of the DD/I  
1300-1330 Seminar meetings  
1345-1500 The Coordinating Factor: Current Approach to problems of coordination in the Intelligence Community  
1515-1630 Film: Acquisition of Agents (Parts I, II, III, IV and V)

Cooper

Cline

25X1

Wednesday, 16 October

0900-1015 Legislative Relationships  
1045-1200 Forecast of Intelligence Support Needed in Policy Determination  
1300-1415 The Collection Guidance Staff  
1445-1600 The Collection Factor  
1600-1630 Seminar meetings

Houston

25X1

Hitchcock

Panel

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T


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downgrading and  
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T  
- 2 -

25X1

Thursday, 17 October

0900-1010 Indications Intelligence: NIC; Current Status  
1030-1200 Military Intelligence: (DIA-CIA Interrelationships)  
1300-1410 State Department Intelligence  
1430-1545 Photographic Intelligence: Role of the NPIC  
1550-1630 Seminar meetings




Lundahl

Friday, 18 October

25X1

0900-1030 Research and Reference Facilities: Problems and future developments  
1045-1400 The Production Factor: Problems and responsibilities of CIA in the production of National and other categories of Intelligence.  
(1045-1110)  
(1115-1140)  
(1145-1210)  
(1300-1325)  
(1330-1355)



Panel  
Guthe



Kent

25X1


1415-1530 Panel Discussion  
1600-1630 Seminar meetings

SECOND WEEK

Monday, 21 October

25X1

0900-1015 The Clandestine Services: Intra-Agency relationships  
1030-1115 The DDS&T Mission  
1130-1200 Role of the Computer in Analysis  
1300-1415 The Support Function and Role in CIA  
1435-1455 Film: Small Town  
1505-1605 Security of Intelligence  
1610-1630 Seminar meetings



Wheeler

Becker


White

Bannerman

Tuesday, 22 October

0900-1000 Personnel Policies and Problems  
1020-1120 Logistical Support Activities

Echols



25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 3 -

Tuesday, 22 October (Cont'd)

1130-1200 Area Film: Latin America  
1300-1400 The Agency's Fiscal Program  
1430-1530 Medical Support of Agency Activities  
1545-1630 Seminar meetings



25X1

Pfortzheimer

Wednesday, 23 October

0900-1000 Training Trends and Developments  
1020-1120 The HIC  
1130-1200 Seminar meetings  
1300-1415 International Communism: Current Status  
1430-1630 Counterinsurgency



25X1

Thursday, 24 October

0900-1000 Foreign Intelligence Organizations: The U.K.  
1020-1120 Foreign Intelligence Organizations: The U.S.S.R.  
1130-1200 DODS: Present Status  
1300-1430 Film: Acquisition of Agents (Parts VI, VII and VIII)  
1430-1630 Preparation of Seminar Reports



25X1

Barnes

Friday, 25 October

0900-1200 Seminar Reports  
1315-1430 Critique and Final Administration  
1445 Closing Address

Gen. Carter

S-E-C-R-E-T

**SECRET**

DD/S 63-3709

Executive Registry

63-6785

29 August 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT : Invitation to address the Intelligence Review**

1. The Office of Training will present the fall running of the Intelligence Review in October. This seminar for senior Agency personnel reviews the current state of the intelligence profession, examines organizational changes and interrelationships, and considers future trends.

2. I should like to invite you to address the class again at its closing session on Friday, 25 October at 1445 that afternoon.

**MATTHEW BAIRD**  
Director of Training

**ATTACHMENT: Intelligence Review schedule**

29 AUG 30 1963

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification



K

NOTES FOR GENERAL CARTER'S WELCOMING REMARKS

These points are suggested for development in General Carter's seven minute welcoming remarks:

A. Comments on CIA's Place in The National War College Curriculum for 63-64

If not mentioned by General Wooten, recognition would appear to be in order that this session will be the third "exposure" to CIA speakers during NWC's Course Number 3, entitled "Formulation of National Security Policy."

- (1) Mr. McCone addressed the combined classes of The National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on Wednesday morning, 9 October.
- (2) Mr. Kirkpatrick will have talked with NWC on Friday afternoon, 11 October--immediately prior to this program.

B. Comments on the Likelihood that the Visit to Headquarters Building can now be considered as an Annual Affair

- (1) As indicators of the latter, we have:
  - (a) The apparent success of last spring's initial visit and
  - (b) A return this fall.

C. Comments on Modifications from Last Year

- (1) General Griswold expressed particular interest in having the '63-'64 class hear about:
  - (a) The Agency's role and capabilities in counterinsurgency.
  - (b) The technical intelligence presentation, and
  - (c) The photographic intelligence coverage.
- (2) We have targeted our presentations to cover these specific topics; two this morning and a third in the afternoon.
- (3) After luncheon, each of our guests will have the opportunity to visit two areas within the Building. One is an exhibit of Agency publications and intelligence products and the other is a display of covert paramilitary equipment. I sincerely hope that our day will prove highly worthwhile.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

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(This Notice is NOT to be filed in Agency manuals. Please comply and destroy.)

LOGISTICS

30 September 1963

ANNUAL VISIT OF NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE CLASS TO HEADQUARTERS BUILDING

1. The Student Body, Faculty, and Directing Staff of the 1963-64 Class of The National War College will be guests of the Agency on Monday, 14 October 1963. The annual visit is scheduled considerably earlier in the academic year than was the case for the 1962-63 class.

2. The group will arrive by bus at 8:45 a.m. and will be admitted via the tunnel entrance for a morning academic program in the CIA Auditorium. After luncheon in the North Cafeteria, the group will be divided for visits to selected areas on the first and ground floors in the south end of the building. At midafternoon the group will reassemble for a final CIA presentation in the Auditorium and depart shortly after 4:00 p.m.

3. The presence of 160 senior military and civilian guests requires adjustments and cooperation on the part of Agency employees, particularly during the luncheon hours. These are the changes for 14 October only:

a. North Cafeteria will be used exclusively by the conference group and by Agency alumni of The National War College and other Agency hosts, during the lunch period.

b. Other official visitors will be permitted the use of the North Dining Room if accompanied by Agency employees. The building exit near the North Cafeteria will be locked.

c. Agency employees not involved with visitors will be expected to use the South Cafeteria. The Cafeteria Manager has urged fuller use of the South Cafeteria during the slack periods, 11 - 11:45 a.m. and after 1 p.m.

4. All employees are requested to cooperate in observing these necessary adjustments during the luncheon hours. The Agency wishes to extend complete hospitality to The National War College guests and to other official visitors who will be here on 14 October, and to make their visit an impressive and successful occasion.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

L. K. WHITE  
Deputy Director  
for Support

DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES

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You indicated you wished to see the exhibits at Area A and Area B, mentioned on the attached, either on Thursday or Friday of this week if they were completed at that time. The exhibit at Area A will not be ready until about 11:00 on Monday morning. The man in charge of setting up the exhibit said that if you wished to see it then, he felt there would still be time to remove and/or adjust anything which displeased you prior to the time the NWC group would visit the area (at 1:30). *OK*

Re the static display at Area B, it will not be set up until late Friday afternoon, at the earliest. *OK*

Will you plan to wait until Monday at 11:00 to see both displays? Yes ☐ No ☒

SECRET

MORNING

0845-0855    Arrival and processing of guests, Tunnel Entrance.

0855-0900    Assembly in CIA Auditorium.

0900-0910    Welcome by Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Introduction by Major General Sidney C. Wooten, USA, Deputy Commandant for Military Affairs, National War College.

0910-0950    "Soviet Missile and Space Problem--An Example of S&T Intelligence," Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, CIA. Introduction by Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director, CIA.

0950-1020    Question period, moderated by Colonel David E. Milotta, USA.

1020-1045    Coffee 25X1

1045-1125    "The Agency's Role and Capabilities in Counterinsurgency,"  Special Group Assistant for Counterinsurgency, CIA. Introduction by Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick.

1125-1140    Break

1140-1210    Question period, moderated by Colonel Charles F. Knierim, USAF.

1210-1215    Summary and administrative comments, Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick.

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AFTERNOON

1215-1230 Movement, via tunnel and escalator, to luncheon in North Cafeteria.

1230-1320 Luncheon with CIA Alumni of National War College and program participants.

1320-1330 Preparation for group visits and movement of sections to areas of interest, accompanied by CIA Alumni of National War College.

1330-1410 Section I. Visit to Area A, room 1A-07. Exhibit of intelligence products, including panorama of publications produced by CIA.  
Section II. Visit to Area B, room GE-0418A. Display of covert paramilitary equipment.

1410-1415 Movement of each section to second area.  
Leave first floor via Stairway No. 3 (1C-07).  
Leave ground floor via Stairway No. 4 (GD-29).

1415-1455 Section I. Area B, Room GE-0418A.  
Section II. Area A, Room 1A-07.

1455-1500 Sections reassemble in CIA Auditorium.

1500-1545 "The Agency's Role in the Evolution of Photographic Intelligence." Mr. Arthur C. Lundahl, Chief, National Photographic Intelligence Center, CIA. Introduction by Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick.

1545-1600 Question period, moderated by Colonel Robert C. Cassibry, USA.

1600 Closing remarks. Lieutenant General Francis P. Griswold, Commandant, National War College.

By 1610 Departure.

SECRET

Monday, 14 October Visit of National War College Class  
Reserved Seating - Auditorium  
(Right to Left Facing Stage)

At lunch  
table w/DDCI

- A101 Lt. General Marshall Carter, USA
- A102 Lt. General Francis Griswold, USAF, NWC Commandant
- A103 Rear Admiral William A. Sutherland, Jr., USN, Deputy - Academic
- A104 Major General Sidney C. Wooten, USA, Deputy - Military
- A105 Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown, Dept. of State, Deputy - Foreign Affairs

A106 Dr. Albert Wheelon - First Morning Speaker

A107  - Second Morning Speaker

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A108 Dr. Arthur Lundahl - Afternoon Speaker

A109  Acting Director of Training

STAT

At lunch table  
w/DDCI

- B101 Colonel Victor N. Cabas, USAF (Student - Executive Council)
- B102 Colonel Samuel McC. Goodwin, USA (Student - Executive Council)
- B103 Captain Percival W. Jackson, USN (Student - Executive Council)
- B104 Mr. Herman Pollack, Dept. of State (Student - Executive Council)

B105

B106 Colonel Milton Taylor, USA (Executive Officer)

B107 Mr. James Gustin, Dept. of State (NWC Project Officer)

B108 Colonel David E. Milotta, USA (First Moderator)

B109 Colonel Charles Knierim, USAF (Second Moderator)

B110 Colonel Robert Cassibry, USA (Third Moderator)

A6

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NOTE: Commandant and his Deputies, plus student members of Executive Council will occupy Luncheon Table No. 1 with General Carter and Jack Earman.

LUNCHEON TABLE ASSIGNMENTS

Table No.

	1	Lt. General Carter	Mr. Earman	
	2	Mr. Kirkpatrick	Mr. Cooper	
	3	Mr. Borel	Colonel Stevens	
	4	Colonel White	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>	STAT
	5	Mr. Karamessines	Mr. Edwards	
	6	Dr. Wheelon	*Colonel Milotta	
	7	Mr. Cline	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>	STAT
STAT	8	Mr. Morell	Mr. Warner	
	9	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>	STAT
	10	Mr. Houston	Mr. Blake	
STAT	11	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>	*Colonel Knierim	
	12	Mr. Lundahl	*Colonel Cassibry	
STAT	13	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 40px;"></div>	STAT
	14	Mr. Lloyd	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 40px;"></div>	
STAT	15	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>	*Colonel Taylor	
	16	Mr. Chamberlain	*Lt. Colonel Goldner	
	17	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 40px;"></div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>	STAT
	18	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 40px;"></div>	Mr. King	
STAT	19	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 40px;"></div>	*Mr. Gustin	
	20	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 40px;"></div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>	STAT

\*From NWC Staff and Faculty



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# **NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE**

**CLASS OF 1963-64**

***VISIT***

**CIA HEADQUARTERS**

**LANGLEY, VIRGINIA**



**14 OCTOBER, 1963**

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

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The Central Intelligence Agency  
extends a most cordial welcome  
to the Class of 1963-64  
of the National War College.

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## ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES

Smoking. During your visit here, smoking will be permitted except while you are in the Auditorium or visiting displays in Rooms 1A-07 and GE-0418A.

Facilities. Public telephones, drinking fountain, and restrooms are located in the downstairs area of the Auditorium. Telephone calls on government code may be placed at the rear of the Auditorium; this phone is also being held open for relaying any emergency calls from The National War College.

Purchase Items. A cigarette machine has been placed in the tunnel area (where you received your badge and programs). When you visit the exhibit in 1A-07 you will be next to a vending area for purchase of cigarettes, soft drinks, candy, etc. A coin changer is also available.

Upon Departure. The badge and classified program issued you will be collected outside the Auditorium. You may retain the personal brochure; should you temporarily mislay it when here, please check with your Executive Officer in a day or so. Some of you may prefer to claim your hat as you re-enter the Auditorium; if not, the hat rack will be re-located for your convenience near the departure area.

SECRET



# ***NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE***

CLASS OF 1964

Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter

**THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The United States has carried on intelligence activities since the days of George Washington, but only after World War II have they been systematized on a government-wide basis.

The organization first formed for this purpose was authorized in a letter-directive dated 22 January 1946, in which President Harry S. Truman instructed the Secretary of State (James F. Byrnes), the Secretary of War (Robert P. Patterson), the Secretary of the Navy (James V. Forrestal), and his own personal representative (Admiral William D. Leahy), to constitute themselves as the "National Intelligence Authority." The Authority was directed to plan, develop, and coordinate "all Federal foreign intelligence activities" in order to "assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security." The members of the Authority assigned persons and funds from their departments to form the "Central Intelligence Group," which was the operating body for the NIA. The "Group" was headed by a "Director of Central Intelligence" appointed by the President.

The National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and its operating component, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), were in existence for twenty months in 1946 and 1947. Under the terms of the National Security Act of 1947 (which became effective on 18 September 1947), they were superseded by the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The first Director of Central Intelligence was Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, U.S. Naval Reserve, who served as head of the Central Intelligence

Group from 23 January 1946 to 7 June 1946. The second was General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, U.S. Air Force, who served from 10 June 1946 until 1 May 1947. The third was Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, U.S.N., who served as head of the Group from 1 May 1947 until it became the Central Intelligence Agency on 18 September 1947, when he became the first Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Admiral Hillenkoetter served as head of the Agency until 7 October 1950.

The fourth Director of Central Intelligence was General Walter Bedell Smith, U.S.A., who served from 7 October 1950 to 9 February 1953.

The fifth Director of Central Intelligence was Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles, who served as Director from 26 February 1953 to 29 November 1961.

Mr. John Alex McCone, the present Director of Central Intelligence, was designated for that position by President Kennedy on 27 September 1961. He was given a recess appointment and sworn into office on 29 November 1961 in the White House. The oath of office was administered by Earl Warren, the Chief Justice of the United States. Mr. McCone's nomination was unanimously approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee following a public hearing held on 18 January 1962, and the Senate confirmed his nomination on 31 January 1962.

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is Lieutenant General Marshall Sylvester Carter, U.S.A. The White House announced on 9 March 1962 that the President had selected Major General Carter to be the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. He was nominated by President Kennedy on 12 March 1962 and confirmed by the Senate on 2 April 1962, with the rank of Lieutenant General.



There are four Deputy Directors for particular functional responsibilities in CIA, as follows: Deputy Director (Intelligence); Deputy Director (Plans); Deputy Director (Research); and Deputy Director (Support).

The CIA's headquarters building is located in Langley, near McLean, Virginia. Its post office address is Washington 25, D.C.

The responsibilities of the CIA derive from two acts of Congress -- the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, 26 July 1947), as amended; and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (Public Law 110, 20 June 1949), as amended. Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act states:

"For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Central Intelligence Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council --

"(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

"(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

"(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And Provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

"(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security

Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

"(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

The National Security Act, as amended, specified that both the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate. An amendment of 4 April 1953 authorized such appointments to be made either from individuals in civilian life or from commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in active or retired status, provided that "at no time shall the two positions ... be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers ..."

A further act of 1956 (the Federal Executive Pay Act, Public Law 854) established the annual basic compensation of the Director and the Deputy Director at \$21,000 and \$20,500, respectively.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (Public Law 110, 20 June 1949) supplemented the National Security Act with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency as follows:

(1) exempted the Agency, in the interest of "the security of foreign intelligence activities of the United States," from such existing Federal laws as require "the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency";

(2) specified that the appropriations or other moneys made available to the Agency "may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds"; and that "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director, and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified";

(3) permitted the Agency to negotiate purchases and contracts without advertising under certain conditions, such as for supplies or services the nature of which should not be publicly disclosed;

(4) permitted the Agency to transfer to and receive funds from other Government agencies, for activities authorized under the National Security Act, including the reimbursement to other agencies for personnel assigned or detailed to the Agency;

(5) permitted the Agency to contract for special research or instruction for Agency personnel at outside institutions;

(6) provided for special travel allowances and related expenses for Agency personnel assigned to duty outside the United States;

(7) granted the Director of Central Intelligence authority to approve the entry into the United States of certain aliens and their families, up to one hundred persons annually, subject to the determination (by the Director, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization) that such entry is "in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission"; and

(8) by an amendment in 1951, authorized the Agency to employ up to fifteen retired officers of the Armed Services who have been retired for reasons other than physical disability, and provided that such officers could elect to receive either their retired pay or Agency compensation.

Under these acts of Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence is the Government's principal intelligence officer. He serves as the principal adviser to the President and the National Security Council on all matters of intelligence related to the national security. CIA's responsibilities are carried out subject to various directives and controls by the President and the National Security Council.

One such directive, issued on 16 January 1962 by President Kennedy to the Director of Central Intelligence (with copies to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the

Atomic Energy Commission), further defines the responsibilities of the

DCI as follows:

"In carrying out your newly assigned duties as Director of Central Intelligence it is my wish that you serve as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer, and as such that you undertake, as an integral part of your responsibility, the coordination and effective guidance of the total United States foreign intelligence effort. As the Government's principal intelligence officer, you will assure the proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of intelligence from all sources and its prompt dissemination to me and to other recipients as appropriate. In fulfillment of these tasks I shall expect you to work closely with the heads of all departments and agencies having responsibilities in the foreign intelligence field.

"In coordinating and guiding the total intelligence effort, you will serve as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, with a view to assuring the efficient and effective operation of the Board and its associated bodies. In this connection I note with approval that you have designated your deputy to serve as a member of the Board, thereby bringing to the Board's deliberations the relevant facts and judgments of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"As directed by the President and the National Security Council, you will establish with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board the necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all levels.

"With the heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned you will maintain a continuing review of the programs and activities of all U.S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities with a view to assuring efficiency and effectiveness and to avoiding undesirable duplication.

"As head of the Central Intelligence Agency, while you will continue to have over-all responsibility for the Agency, I shall expect you to delegate to your principal deputy, as you may deem necessary, so much of the direction of the detailed operation of the Agency as may be required to permit you to carry out your primary task as Director of Central Intelligence.

"It is my wish that you keep me advised from time to time as to your progress in the implementation of this directive

and as to any recommendations you may have which would facilitate the accomplishment of these objectives."

The Director of Central Intelligence, as the President's representative, and as the Government's principal intelligence officer, is chairman of the United States Intelligence Board. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is a member, representing the CIA. The other members are the heads of the intelligence organizations in the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of the National Security Agency; the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Acting in consultation with the U.S. Intelligence Board, the Director of Central Intelligence makes recommendations to the National Security Council concerning the intelligence structure of the Government as a whole, to insure that each element is functioning properly in the national intelligence effort.

Similarly, after coordination with that Board, the Director presents to the National Security Council "National Intelligence Estimates," prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency working with representatives of other governmental intelligence organizations and, at times, with cleared civilian experts. These estimates cover specific foreign situations of national security concern, or the world situation generally. They may embody a unanimous opinion, or may contain dissenting views by one or more of the participants.

By means of these coordinated estimates, along with related types of intelligence reports and evaluations, the Central Intelligence Agency exercises its responsibility to insure that the information going to the President and his principal advisers on foreign policy and national defense -- the members of the National Security Council -- is timely, consistent, and complete. The CIA brings together the judgment of intelligence officers in all departments and agencies on the major issues of fact and interprets them for the benefit of the President and his advisers.

In addition to its coordination activities, the CIA provides various "services of common concern" to the U.S. intelligence organization generally. It conducts independent research in fields of economic and scientific intelligence; monitors foreign news and propaganda broadcasts; and collects intelligence abroad. It also provides specialized library and translation services, including both mechanized and manually operated data-processing facilities, to the various elements of the U.S. intelligence organization.

CIA's facilities and techniques for the indexing, abstracting, translation, storage, and retrieval of intelligence information have been praised as "the most comprehensive information system now in operation," by the Committee on Government Operations of the U.S. Senate, in its report of 24 May 1960 entitled "Documentation, Indexing, and Retrieval of Scientific Information." Among the features of this system described at length in that report (pp. 16 ff. and 62 ff.) are specialized miniature photography, facsimile-printing devices, and punch card indexes extending

to more than 40 million cards, used for retrieving documents automatically.

The Central Intelligence Agency does not duplicate and rival the existing intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other U.S. Government agencies. It makes maximum use of the resources of existing agencies. It helps put an end to unnecessary duplication.

Applicants for Central Intelligence Agency employment are given a full security investigation after they have been provisionally approved, following preliminary tests. Some are eliminated because they drink too much, talk too much, or have relatives behind the Iron Curtain which may make the applicants subject to foreign pressure; others are screened out because they have contacts which render them undesirable for service in this highly sensitive Agency.

Because of the nature of its duties, required by law and by considerations of national security, the Central Intelligence Agency does not confirm or deny published reports, whether true or false, favorable or unfavorable to the Agency or its personnel; never alibis; never explains its organization; never identifies its personnel, except for the few in the top echelons; and does not discuss its budget, its methods of operation, or its sources of information.

The Central Intelligence Agency is directly accountable to Presidential authority and control. This accountability is exercised in a number of ways, notably through the National Security Council, which is privy to CIA's activities and programs generally; through the Bureau of the Budget, on fiscal matters; and by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was established by President Kennedy on 4 May 1961. It represents a reactivation, with broadened terms of reference, of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which had been established by President Eisenhower in 1956, in line with recommendations made in 1955 by the Hoover Commission. The Board of Consultants was headed, first, by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr. (president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), from January 1956 to February 1958. He was succeeded by Major General John E. Hull, U.S.A. (Ret.), on 28 February 1958. Dr. Killian returned as chairman when the new Board was named by President Kennedy, and served from May 1961 to April 1963. He was succeeded by Mr. Clark M. Clifford, Washington, D.C., attorney, on 23 April 1963.

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The Board's functions, defined by Executive Order of 4 May 1961 are:

"... The function of the Board shall be to advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States which are required in the interests of foreign policy and national defense and security. ... In the performance of its advisory duties, the Board shall conduct a continuing review and assessment of all functions of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of other executive departments and agencies having such or similar responsibilities in the foreign intelligence and related fields, and shall report thereon to the President each six months or more frequently as deemed appropriate. The Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of other departments and agencies concerned shall make available to the Board any information with respect to foreign intelligence matters which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to the President. The information so supplied to the Board shall be afforded requisite security protection as prescribed by the provisions of applicable laws and regulations."

qua

On appropriations and related legislative matters, the Director of Central Intelligence has contact with several committees of the Congress,



particularly the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and their respective subcommittees dealing with CIA affairs.

President Eisenhower, speaking on 3 November 1959 on the occasion of the cornerstone laying at CIA's new headquarters building at Langley, Virginia, characterized CIA's work as follows:

"... In war nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions and intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peacetime the necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources, requirements and attitudes prevailing in the world. They are essential to the development of policy to further our long term national security and best interests. To provide information of this kind is the task of the organization of which you members of CIA are a part.

"No task could be more important.

"Upon the quality of your work depends in large measure the success of our effort to further the nation's position in the international scene.

"By its very nature the work of this agency demands of its members the highest order of dedication, ability, trustworthiness and selflessness -- to say nothing of the finest type of courage, whenever needed. Success cannot be advertised: failure cannot be explained. In the work of Intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism -- their reward can be little except the conviction that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts. I assure you this is indeed true. ..."

President Kennedy, speaking to the personnel of CIA at its headquarters, Langley, Virginia, on 28 November 1961, said:

"Your successes are unheralded -- your failures are trumpeted. ... But I am sure you realize how important is your work, how essential it is -- and in the long sweep of history how significant your efforts will be judged. So I do want to express my appreciation to you now, and I am

confident that in the future you will continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as you have in the past."

The American Legion, at its 42nd National Convention at Miami Beach, Florida, on 18 October 1960, adopted the following resolution on the Central Intelligence Agency:

"WHEREAS, the American military intelligence effort in the past seven years has taken great strides toward fully apprising the government of the United States of the true status of the military strength of our communist enemies, and

"WHEREAS, the effect of this intelligence effort has been to immeasurably strengthen the American military position and prepare this nation to more effectively meet the communist challenge, and

"WHEREAS, the continuance of this intelligence effort is an absolute necessity in order to adequately protect our nation against the type of surprise attack characterized by the Pearl Harbor incident,

"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the American Legion in National Convention assembled in Miami Beach, Florida, October 17-20, 1960, urges the full continuation of the American intelligence effort in every particular deemed effective for the protection of our nation, and expresses full confidence in the Central Intelligence Agency, for its foresight in providing for the protection of our nation against surprise attack by our enemies."

THE DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, USNR  
23 January 1946 - 7 June 1946

Lieutenant General Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg, USAAF  
10 June 1946 - 1 May 1947

Rear Admiral Roscoe Henry Hillenkoetter, USN  
1 May 1947 - 7 October 1950

Lieutenant General (later General) Walter Bedell Smith, USA  
7 October 1950 - 9 February 1953

Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles  
26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961

Mr. John Alex McCone  
29 November 1961 -

THE DEPUTY DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. Kingman Douglass  
1 February 1946 - 11 July 1946

Brigadier General (later Major General) Edwin Kennedy Wright, USA  
July 1946 - 10 March 1949

Mr. William Harding Jackson  
2 October 1950 - 3 August 1951

Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles  
23 August 1951 - 26 February 1953

Lieutenant General (Later General) Charles Pearre Cabell, USAF  
23 April 1953 - 31 January 1962

Lieutenant General Marshall Sylvester Carter, USA  
3 April 1962 -

JOHN ALEX MCCONE

John Alex McCone, the sixth Director of Central Intelligence and the fourth Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was designated for that position by President John F. Kennedy on 27 September 1961. He was given a recess appointment and sworn into office on 29 November 1961, in the White House, by the Chief Justice of the United States, Earl Warren. On 15 January 1962 President Kennedy submitted the nomination of Mr. McCone to the United States Senate. After a public hearing on 18 January 1962 he was unanimously approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee. On 31 January 1962 his appointment was confirmed by the United States Senate.

President Kennedy, at the swearing-in ceremony on 29 November 1961, said:

"I want to say what an honor it is and what a pleasure it is to have Mr. McCone back in the national service.

"This appointment, ... that he was willing to take it, indicates how important it is, and how important I feel it is, as well as members of the Government and Members of Congress believe it to be.

"He has not only the responsibility as Director of CIA, but also coordinating the work of all the Intelligence community, and I know that he will give his attention to both these functions upon which so much of our security depends.


"We want to welcome you here and to say that you are now living on the bull's eye, and I welcome you to that spot."

On 27 September 1961, at Newport, R. I., the President announced that he would name Mr. McCone to succeed Mr. Allen W. Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board. The President said:

"We (the President and Mr. Dulles) are both extremely pleased and satisfied that Mr. John McCone, who has served his country in important positions of responsibility, as Undersecretary of the Air Force in the administration of President Truman, as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in the administration of President Eisenhower, has agreed to once more come and accept a position of high responsibility.

"He has had broad experience. Coming once again to Washington represents a real sacrifice for him. I know that all of us who are concerned with our present responsibilities are extremely happy to have his counsel, extremely happy to have him associated with us.

"He will come, in about two weeks, and work with Mr. Dulles, and in November (1961) will assume the responsibility."



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Mr. McCone's official service with the U.S. government dates from the fall of 1947, when he was appointed by President Harry S. Truman as a member of the President's Air Policy Commission, of which Thomas K. Finletter was chairman. In that position Mr. McCone helped to formulate the military-preparedness aspects of the Commission's report, "Survival in the Air Age," issued on 1 January 1948. From March to November 1948 he served as Special Deputy to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, and handled the preparation of the first two budgets of the newly established Department of Defense. In May 1950 he was appointed Under Secretary of the Air Force, with special responsibilities for the aircraft procurement program and the construction of overseas bases, including the planning of the base complexes at Thule, Greenland, and in North Africa. Upon his resignation in October 1951 to return to private life, Mr. McCone was presented the Exceptional Civilian Service Award, which cited him for his part in the doubling of American military aircraft production during that critical year of the Korean War.

During President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration Mr. McCone served in a number of capacities. In 1954 he was a member of Secretary of State Dulles's Public Committee on Personnel (the Wriston Committee), which was concerned with increasing the effectiveness of the career services of the Department of State, both in Washington and abroad. On 6 June 1958 President Eisenhower nominated him for a five-year term as a member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. The nomination was approved by the U.S. Senate on 9 July, and on 14 July 1958 he took office and was designated as Chairman of the Commission. He served until

the close of President Eisenhower's administration in January 1961, when he resigned to return to private life.

Mr. McCone has participated in a number of civic, philanthropic, and educational activities. He has been a director of the Stanford Research Institute, a trustee of the California Institute of Technology, and a regent of the Loyola University (Los Angeles), and he was one of the founders and the first president of the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, established in 1954. In 1955 Pope Pius XII made Mr. McCone a Knight of St. Gregory, and in 1956 awarded him the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Sylvester. In March 1956 Mr. McCone served as President Eisenhower's Personal Representative to the Vatican at the Pope's 80th birthday celebration, and in 1958, with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, he represented the President at the funeral of Pope Pius XII.

Mr. McCone has honorary degrees from several universities including the University of California, Notre Dame University, Fordham University, Clarkson College of Technology, and the Catholic University of America.



LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARSHALL SYLVESTER CARTER, U.S. ARMY

Marshall Sylvester Carter, Lieutenant General, United States Army, became the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on 3 April 1962.

On 9 March 1962 the White House announced that President John F. Kennedy had selected General Carter to be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, on the recommendation of Mr. McCone, the Director. On 12 March 1962 the President submitted General Carter's nomination, with the rank of Lieutenant General, to the United States Senate for confirmation. After public hearing he was approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee, on 29 March 1962, and was confirmed by the Senate, on 2 April 1962. On 3 April 1962 he was sworn into office at CIA Headquarters.

General Carter was born at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, on 16 September 1909, the son of Brig. Gen. and Mrs. C.C. Carter. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1931, with the Bachelor of Science degree. In 1936 he received a Master of Science degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was graduated in 1940 from the Coast Artillery School, and in 1950 from the National War College. He was married on 14 July 1934 to Preet Nichols. They have one son and two daughters.

During World War II General Carter served in Panama, in China, and in the War Department General Staff. In addition, in 1943 he was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Cairo Conference of the Four Heads of State. From July 1945 to January 1946 he was stationed in the China Theater, first as Deputy G-5 at U.S. Theater Headquarters, in Chungking, and later as G-5, in Shanghai. He became Assistant Executive to the Assistant Secretary of War, in Washington, in January 1946, serving until March 1946.

From March 1946 to March 1949 General Carter served with General George C. Marshall, first as special representative in Washington in General Marshall's China Mission and, from January 1947 on, as special assistant to Secretary of State Marshall. While at the Department of State he also served on the U.S. Delegations at the following international conferences: the Council of Foreign Ministers, in Moscow, 1947; the Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Peace and Security, in Rio de Janeiro, 1947; the General Assembly of the United Nations, in New York City, 1947, and in Paris, 1948; and the Ninth International Conference of American States, in Bogota, Colombia, in 1948.

From March to July 1949 General Carter was on duty in London with American Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas, serving as his Deputy for Military Assistance Programs for Europe. Concurrently he served as Deputy Chairman of the European Correlation Committee. In these capacities he held the personal rank of Minister.

After a year on training and command assignments in 1949-50, in Washington and Japan, General Carter was transferred to the Department of Defense, where he served as Executive to Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, 1950-51, and to his successor, Secretary Robert A. Lovett, 1951-52. Subsequently he held the following command positions in the United States and overseas, from 1952 to 1962:

- Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Alaska and 71st Infantry Division, November 1952-May 1955;
- Commanding General, 5th Anti-Aircraft Regional Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois, June 1955-June 1956;
- Deputy Commander, Anti-Aircraft Artillery Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, June-November 1956;

Chief of Staff, Continental Air Defense Command,  
Colorado Springs, Colorado, November 1956-  
December 1959;  
Chief of Staff, North American Air Defense Command,  
Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1957-  
December 1959;  
Chief of Staff, Eighth U.S. Army Korea, December  
1959-February 1961;  
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Defense Center,  
and Commandant, U.S. Army Air Defense School,  
Fort Bliss, Texas, March 1961-March 1962.

From Second Lieutenant, on 11 June 1931, General Carter became  
a temporary Brigadier General on 8 April 1947 and a Major General  
on 21 December 1955, with date of rank from 1 July 1951. On 2 April  
1962 he was confirmed by the Senate in the rank of Lieutenant General.  
His decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf  
Cluster, the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Bronze Star  
Medal, and decorations from the Republic of China and the Netherlands.

J

MSC

CONFIDENTIAL

9 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

SUBJECT : Suggested Comments for Clandestine Services  
Review Course, 1400, 9 October 1963

1. In general when giving the final talk to the Clandestine Services Review Course, I have couched it in broad terms as far as the future of the Agency and of the career service is concerned. I have not had a question period, so for your purposes I would think perhaps a few generalities, either before or after a question period, would be appropriate.

2. I would suggest that you briefly touch on the following subjects:

a. The continued necessity for all employees to develop increased professionalism, both through training and experience.

b. The fact that competition for promotion will become increasingly intense.

c. The fact that the Agency will continue to attempt to select out those who drop by the wayside or are less competent.


d. The fact that we should recognize that there will be continued pressures for the Agency to do more but that we should not expect additional money or manpower.

e. The absolute necessity for personnel security.

f. The fact that the Agency is going to look more and more to supervisors to be good managers.

g. The fact that the Agency offers the best career possibilities in the U.S. Government to those who are deserving.

STAT

  
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick  
Executive Director

CONFIDENTIAL



Approved For Release 2006/07/25 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001400110004-3  
REMARKS AT CLANDESTINE SERVICES REVIEW COURSE - 30 SEPTEMBER 1963

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I HAVE KICKED OFF OR PRONOUNCED THE BENEDICTION AT SO MANY  
OF THESE CSR COURSES, I FEEL I SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRADUATED BY THIS  
DOWN  
TIME. BUT, WHEN UNCLE MATT ASKS ME /REPEATEDLY, I'M ALWAYS  
FLATTERED, AND FIGURE IF YOU CAN STAND IT, I'M WILLING--WHICH  
REMINDS ME OF AN INCIDENT.

(TELL THE WITTING/WILLING STORY. MATT SAYS IT'S ALWAYS  
GOOD FOR A BIG YUK-YUK.)

ACCORDING TO THE PROGRAM, THIS IS BILLED ONLY AS "OPENING ADDRESS", WHICH ALLOWS CONSIDERABLE LATITUDE. I COULD PERHAPS TALK ABOUT AGENCY ORGANIZATION. BUT THAT IS SOMETHING WE ARE CONTINUALLY CHANGING--FOR, WHAT WE HOPE, IS THE BETTER. AND I WOULD PREFER TO PASS THAT SUBJECT UP FOR THE MOMENT--UNLESS YOU HAVE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS LATER--BECAUSE I'M SURE THERE IS A RUMOR IN THE HALLS TO COVER EVERY CONCEIVABLE ORGANIZATIONAL



CONTINGENCY. ALSO, IF I TOLD YOU ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION NOW,  
IT MIGHT WELL HAVE CHANGED BY THE TIME I GET BACK UPSTAIRS.

IN  
MY PRINCIPAL INTEREST IS PERSONNEL AND IMPROVEMENT OF  
SUPERVISORY AND PERS MANAGEMENT. SINCE ALL OF YOU FILL SOME  
ROLE IN SUPERVISORY MGMT, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS YOUR  
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THAT ROLE.

1) HAVE NO DESIRE TO MILITARIZE--BUT DO WANT OUR SUPERVISORS

TO HAVE FEELING WITH THEIR PEOPLE AS THE CO. CMDR. HAS TO HIS  
CO., AND AS PLTN SGT TOWARD HIS PLTN. DON'T EXPECT YOU TO BE  
IN BED WITH YOUR EMPLOYEES--BUT I DO EXPECT SUPERVISORS TO  
KNOW WHAT MAJOR PROBS THEIR EMPLOYEES HAVE WITH A VIEW  
TOWARD HELPING THEM--BOTH CAREER-WISE AND PERSONAL. KNOW  
& DEVELOP THEIR CAPABILITIES! HELP THEM OUT OF THEIR SHORT-  
COMINGS! TREAT THOSE WITH WHOM YOU ARE WORKING AS YOU YOURSELF

WANT TO BE TREATED.

2) FITNESS REPORTS - RESPONSIBILITY FOR REALISTIC REPTS.

ELIMINATE DELAYS IN FILING THEM. MAKE THEM REALISTIC. IT'S  
WELL ENOUGH TO PUT GLOWING MATERIAL IN THEM, BUT THEY SHOULD  
ALSO CONTAIN REALISTIC COMMENTS WHERE THE EMPLOYEE CAN  
IMPROVE. BUT DON'T KNOCK THE EMPL IN A REPT UNLESS YOU HAVE  
ALREADY DISCUSSED HIS WEAKNESS WITH HIM, HAVE SHOWN HIM HOW

TO IMPROVE, AND GIVEN HIM A CHANCE TO IMPROVE. BUT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO LOOK AT A MAN'S FITNESS REPTS AND BE ABLE TO SEE WHERE HE IS FLUBBING. WE ARE DOING OUR BEST TO CENTRALIZE ALL PERS FILES & HAVE MADE GREAT STRIDES TOWARDS THIS--SOFT FILES, HARD FILES, SECURITY FILES, MEDICAL FILES, ETC.

THIS ALL ADDS UP TO THE FACT THAT AN INDIVIDUAL DESERVES EVERY POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION BEFORE WE START PLAYING AROUND

WITH HIS CAREER. TO GET THAT CONSIDERATION, YOU MUST KNOW YOUR EMPLOYEES WELL, HELP THEM, DEVELOP THEM. ENCOURAGE THEM TO USE AGCY FACILITIES. UNTIL A BETTER ONE COMES ALONG, THE I. G. IS A DAMNED GOOD CHAPLAIN IF YOUR SUPERVISOR CAN'T HELP YOU WITH A PROBLEM.

FROM MGMT STANDPOINT, WE HAVE ALSO BEEN WORKING ON VARIOUS THINGS TO IMPROVE THE EMPLOYEE'S LOT.

1) EARLY RETIREMENT

2) UPGRADING AGENCY SUPERGRADE STRUCTURE <sup>BY</sup> ~~90%~~ 90%--

NOT AS A PAY RAISE, BUT AS CHANGE IN GRADE STRUCTURE WHICH WILL  
BE FELT ALL THE WAY DOWN TO THE LOWEST GRADES IN AGENCY.

3) HAVE ACHIEVED BETTER PAY SCALES FOR OUR SCIENTISTS &  
TECHNICIANS.

4) MID-CAREER TRAINING PROGRAM. ACCENTING HEAVILY.

WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO HAVE RECORDS OF ALL EMPL AT MID-CAREER  
LEVEL ASSESSED TO DETERMINE FURTHER TRAINING NEEDED. NEXT  
MONTH, STARTING FIRST 6-WKS MID-CAREER COURSE WHICH IS TO BE AS  
GOOD AS ANY OF COURSES AT SR. WAR COLLEGES AND WHICH WILL  
PROVIDE A LOOK INTO AGCY MGMT & ORGANIZATION AS WELL AS OTHER  
GOVT DEPTS & PROBS IN MGMT WITH VIEW TOWARD BROADENING THE  
EMPL TO ACCEPTING INCREASED RESPONSIBILITIES.

5) RECRUITMENT-CONTINUALLY EXPANDING. IDEA TO GET BEST PEOPLE AVAILABLE INTO AGENCY. IN NOV, WILL COMMENCE "100 UNIVERSITIES PROGRAM" IN WHICH OUR BEST REPRESENTATIVES WILL TALK TO FACULTY & STUDENTS ABOUT THE AGENCY IN 100 UNIVERSITIES & COLLEGES ACROSS THE ENTIRE U. S.

6) MERIT AWARDS: I'M A GREAT ONE FOR RECOGNITION. LET'S GIVE MERIT AWARDS WHERE THEY ARE DESERVING AND WHEN THEY



ARE DESERVING. THE FASTER YOU CAN PROCESS A MERIT AWARD  
THE HAPPIER I'LL BE.

-----

I DON'T WANT TO BE TRITE, I KNOW I'VE SAID THIS MANY TIMES,  
AND I DON'T HESITATE IN REPEATING IT. I'VE TOLD THIS TO MEMBERS  
OF VARIOUS CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.  
I'VE SERVED IN STATE & SEC OF DEF'S OFFICE & NOWHERE HAVE I

Notes Used by General Carter at Clandestine Services Review Course  
on 30 September 1963

-12-

FOUND A MORE HIGHLY DEVOTED & HIGHLY INTELLIGENT GROUP OF  
PEOPLE THAN HERE IN AGCY. THIS INCLUDES ALL LEVELS. NOWHERE  
IS GREATER PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY THRUST UPON PEOPLE, WHICH HAS  
SUCH A BEARING ON THE SECURITY OF OUR NATION. NOWHERE HAVE  
I SEEN PEOPLE SO RECEPTIVE TO THIS.

QUESTIONS.

**Page Denied**

## S E C R E T

Monday, 30 September 1963

0830 - 0845	Registration	[Redacted]	25X1
		Training Assistant	
0845 - 0915	Introduction to Course	[Redacted]	25X1
		Headquarters Training, Operations School, OTR	
	Introduction of General Carter	Matthew Baird Director of Training	
0930 - 1000	Opening Address	Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
1010 - 1110	The National Security Structure	Paul M. Chretien Briefing Officer, OTR	
1115 - 1200	Mission, Function and Organization of DDI	Mr. Chretien	
1300 - 1330	Office of the Inspector General	John S. Earman Inspector General	
1330 - 1400	Office of the General Counsel	Lawrence R. Houston General Counsel	25X1
1410 - 1500	Office of the Comptroller	[Redacted] Acting Chief, Fiscal Division, Office of the Comptroller	
1510 - 1545	Cable Secretariat	[Redacted] Cable Secretary	25X1
1555 - 1645	Exploitation of Overt Sources		25X1
	Foreign Broadcasts	[Redacted] Chief, Liaison and Requirements Staff, FBIS/00	
	Contacts	[Redacted] Chief, WE Branch, Contacts Division, 00	25X1

Tuesday, 1 October 1963

0830 - 0900	Reading Period	CSR Kit	25X1
0900 - 0930	Current Intelligence	[Redacted] Briefing Officer, OCI	

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Tuesday, 1 October 1963 (continued)

25X1

0940 - 1040 Office of Central Reference

[redacted]  
Special Assistant to the  
Assistant Director, OCR

1050 - 1200 Photographic Intelligence

To be announced

1300 - 1330 The Mission of the Clandestine  
Services

Thomas H. Karamessines  
Assistant Deputy Director  
(Plans)

25X1

1340 - 1430 Foreign Intelligence Staff

[redacted]  
Chief, Operations Group,  
FI Staff

25X1

1440 - 1530 Covert Action Operations

[redacted]  
Deputy Chief, CA Staff

25X1

1540 - 1630 Counterintelligence Operations

[redacted]  
Chief, Research and Analysis  
Group, CI Staff

Wednesday, 2 October 1963

0830 - 0900 Reading Period - Submit Questions for Seminar on Intelligence

0900 - 0950 Official and Nonofficial Cover

Panel Composed of Representa-  
tives from Central Cover

25X1

1000 - 1030 Operational Services

[redacted]  
Training and Qualifications  
Review Officer, CS

1030 - 1120 Reading Period

CSR Kit

25X1

1130 - 1230 Special Operations Division

[redacted]  
Chief, Special Operations  
Division

1330 - 1430 Reading Period

CSR Kit

25X1

1440 - 1530 Technical Services

[redacted]  
Chief, Plans and Training  
Staff, TSD

25X1

1540 - 1630 Counterinsurgency

[redacted]  
Special Assistant to the  
Staff Deputy, CA Staff

S E C R E T

Thursday, 3 October 1963

0830 - 0900	Reading Period	CSR Kit	
0900 - 0950	Current Communist Activities	[REDACTED] Deputy for Production, CI/ICG	25X1
1000 - 1050	Soviet Operations	David E. Murphy Chief, SR Division	25X1
1100 - 1200	The Chinese Communist Target	[REDACTED] Deputy Chief, FE for China	
1300 - 1400	Communist Party Penetration Program	[REDACTED] Chief, International Communism Group, CI Staff	25X1
1410 - 1520	Propaganda Programs	Representative from Propaganda Group, CA Staff	
1530 - 1630	Seminar on Intelligence	Ray S. Cline Deputy Director (Intelligence)	

Friday, 4 October 1963

0830 - 0900	Reading Period - Read Paper on ELINT	CSR Kit	25X1
0900 - 0950	[REDACTED]		25X1
1000 - 1050	Cuban Operations	[REDACTED] Deputy Chief, Special Affairs Staff	25X1
1100 - 1200	Eastern European Satellite Operations	[REDACTED] Deputy Chief, EE Division	
1300 - 1630	Operations in Developing and Changing Countries		25X1
1300 - 1345	Africa	[REDACTED] Deputy Chief, CA, AF Division	25X1
1350 - 1435	Near East	[REDACTED] Chief of Operations, NE Division	25X1
1445 - 1530	Latin America	[REDACTED] Special Assistant to the Chief, WH Division	
1540 - 1630	Southeast Asia	William Colby Chief, FE Division	

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Monday, 7 October 1963

0830 - 0900	Reading Period - Submit Questions for Mr. Helms		
0900 - 0950	Division D/FI Staff	[REDACTED]	25X1
		Division D/FI Staff	
1000 - 1050	Scientific Intelligence	[REDACTED]	25X1
		Chief, Scientific Intelligence Group, FI Staff	
1100 - 1200	The Intelligence Collection Cycle	To be announced	
			25X1
1300 - 1350	Contingency and War Plans in Support of the Military	[REDACTED]	
		War Planning Officer, War Plans Staff, OPSER	
1400 - 1450	Clandestine Services Records	[REDACTED]	25X1
		Chief, RID Training	
1500 - 1550	The New Clandestine Services Records System	[REDACTED]	25X1
		Chief, Systems Group, CS	
1600 - 1645	Organization and Functions of the DD/S&T	John F. Blake	
		Executive Officer, DD/S&T	

Tuesday, 8 October 1963

0830 - 0900	Reading Period	CSR Kit	25X1
0900 - 0950	Clandestine Services Project Approval System	[REDACTED]	
		Chief, Covert Action Section, Programs and Projects Group, CS	
1000 - 1100	Support Activities of CIA	Col. Lawrence K. White	
		Deputy Director (Support)	
1110 - 1200	Office of Personnel	Emmett D. Echols	
		Director of Personnel	25X1
1300 - 1345	Mobilization and Emergency Relocation Planning	[REDACTED]	
		CIA Emergency Planning Officer	
1350 - 1450	Communications (and Display)	[REDACTED]	25X1
		Training Officer, Office of Communications	
			25X1
1500 - 1600	Medical Support to Operations	[REDACTED]	
		Chief, Operations Division, Medical Staff	

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Wednesday, 9 October 1963

0830 - 0900	Reading Period	CSR Kit	25X1
0900 - 0950	Security in CIA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 15px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> Deputy Director of Security	
1000 - 1100	Seminar on Clandestine Services	<u>Richard Helms</u> Deputy Director (Plans)	25X1
1110 - 1230	Insurance, Benefits and Services Available in CIA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 120px; height: 15px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> Chief, Benefits and Services Division	25X1
		<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 120px; height: 15px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> Chief, Insurance Branch	
1330 - 1400	Preparation of Critiques		
1400 - 1500	Closing Address	<u>Lyman B. Kirkpatrick</u> Executive Director of CIA	
1500	Final Administration	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 180px; height: 15px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div>	25X1

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S E C R E T



TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE 9/26/63

TO: Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter  
7D-6011 Hq.

REMARKS:

Attached is the schedule for the  
CLANDESTINE SERVICES REVIEW COURSE to  
be held in Room 1A-13 . You are  
scheduled to lecture at

0930 hours, 30 September 1963

FROM: [ ] Training Assistant  
Room GD-6510 HQS. - [ ]

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STAT

25X1

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**SECRET**

Executive Registry

63-7217

DD/S 63-3940

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Deputy Director of Central Intelligence**THROUGH :** Deputy Director (Support) *mm* 9 SEP 1963**SUBJECT :** Address to Students in Clandestine Services  
Review Course

1. The Clandestine Services Review Course, which you addressed on three previous occasions, is scheduled for the period 30 September through 9 October 1963. It would be very much appreciated if you would again deliver the opening address on Monday, 30 September. The class will be conducted in Room 1A-13, Headquarters Building, and for scheduling purposes we have allocated the period from 0930 to 1000 hours for your presentation. If that time is not convenient to you, we will be glad to make an adjustment.

2. This course is conducted primarily for Clandestine Services officers who have recently returned from overseas tours. When you previously addressed similar groups, you spoke for approximately twenty minutes and allowed the balance of the time for a question and answer period. That worked out very successfully on previous occasions. Please feel free to select a subject of your choice, for the schedule will simply list "Opening Address." However, since the majority of students will be field returnees, I submit the following for consideration:

- a. The new look in CIA regarding organization, policy and personnel handling under Mr. McCone's and your leadership.
- b. The relationship and standing of CIA with the President and the National Security Council.
- c. The relationship and standing of CIA with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community and particularly DIA.
- d. Are any major organizational changes planned or contemplated?

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

SECRET

3. I sincerely hope that you will be able to find time in your busy schedule to meet with this group. If so, I shall come to your office immediately before 0930 hours on 30 September to escort you to the classroom.



25X1

MATTHEW BAIRD  
Director of Training

- 2 -

SECRET



*Intelligence Community  
Remarks  
9 Sept 63*

DCI's TWO RESPONSIBILITIES:

1) PRINCIPAL INTEL OFCR OF GOVT REPORTING DIRECTLY  
TO PRES AND NSC.

2) DIR OF CIA.

LETTER FROM PRES 1 JAN 62 ASKING DCI TO ASSUME ACTIVE  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATION & EFFECTIVE GUIDANCE OF  
INTEL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE

INTEL COMMUNITY IS ENORMOUS & COMPLICATED. INVOLVES FULL-TIME EFFORT OF MORE THAN 100,000 CIVILIAN & MILITARY PERSONNEL. COST EXCEEDS \$2 BILLION ANNUALLY. EXTENDS TO EVERY NATION IN WORLD.

INTEL DOES NOT MAKE POLICY BUT HAS VERY GREAT EFFECT ON POLICY. ALWAYS A DANGER OF GAPS WHICH IS FAR MORE DANGEROUS THAN OVERLAPS. WE MUST ALWAYS ENSURE WE ARE USING EVERY REASONABLE MEANS TO ACQUIRE INFO, TO EVALUATE THE AFFAIRS, CAPABILITIES & INTENTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES & THEREBY MAKE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO FORMULATION OF NATL POLICY.

COMPONENTS OF INTEL COMMUNITY

a) CIA - FAR-FLUNG ORGANIZATION THROUGHOUT WORLD. COLLECTION OF RAW INFO IS SOMETIMES OVERT; MOST TIMES COVERT OR CLANDESTINE; BUT MANY TIMES, SCIENTIFIC & TECHL. RECEIVES INFO FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF INTEL COMMUNITY WHICH IS ASSEMBLED, EVALUATED, REPORTED & DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT GOVT.

b) ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE

c) STATE



d) DIA - RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATION OF ALL INTEL WITHIN DOD; SUPPORTS JCS, & THRU THEM, THE JOINT & SPECIFIED COMMANDS UNDER EXPLICIT DIRECTION OF JCS.

e) AEC, WHOSE INTEL COMPONENT PRIMARILY GATHERS INFO CONCERNING DEVELOPMENT OF BOTH MILITARY & PEACEFUL NUCLEAR RESOURCES OF SOVS, CHICOMS & POSSIBLY OTHERS.

f) FBI - CHARGED PRIMARILY WITH INTERNAL SECURITY, BUT ALSO IMPORTANT IN FOREIGN INTEL FUNCTION.

COMMUNITY HAS ASSETS OF ALL THESE AGENCIES. BUT THERE ARE ALSO NATL INTEL ASSETS--WHICH REQUIRE SERVICES OF, & SERVE

NEEDS OF, MORE THAN ONE DEPT OR AGCY OF SERVICE. THESE ARE:

a) NATL SECURITY AGENCY - LARGE ORG RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL ELECTRONIC & COMMO INTEL. HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED OPERATION REQUIRING MEN OF HIGHLY SPECIALIZED DISCIPLINES & FINEST TECHL DEVICES.

b) NATL RECONNAISSANCE OFC - OUTGROWTH OF RECON EFFORT OF CIA WITH U-2. OPERATED JOINTLY BY DOD & CIA.

c) NATL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER - OPERATED BY CIA & SUPPORTED SUBSTANTIALLY BY DOD. ANALYZES, INTERPRETS & REPORTS RECON RESULTS. EXAMPLE: OCT MISSILE CRISIS & EVENTUAL CONFRONTATION WITH USSR IN CUBA.



HOW THESE MECHANISMS ARE PULLED TOGETHER. PRIMARILY  
RESPONSIBILITY OF CIA TO EVALUATE & DISSEMINATE INFO TO  
THOSE WHO NEED TO KNOW. PRIMARILY DONE BY:

a) BD OF NATL ESTIMATES - 12 SENIOR, ABLE MEN WITH VAST  
EXPERIENCE IN INTEL, MILITARY OR ACADEMIC FIELDS. SUPPORTED

BY STAFFS OF ENTIRE INTEL COMMUNITY, THEY STUDY WITH COMPLETE DETACHMENT & FREEDOM FROM OTHER DUTIES. DIRECTED BY DCI, IT REPORTS DIRECTLY TO DCI. AS THE GOVT'S PRINCIPAL INTEL OFCR.

b) USIB - DCI CHAIRMAN REPRESENTS PRES. OTHERS ARE PRINCIPAL INTEL OFCRS OF STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AF, JCS, DIA, FBI, AEC, NSA AND CIA. ALSO SUPPORTED BY INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES:

- 1) GUIDED MISSILES AND ASTRONAUTICS INTEL COMM. (GMAIC)
- 2) JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTEL COMM. (JAEIC)
- 3) COMM ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE (COMOR)

Address to the Scientific Advisory Board - 9 September 1963

8

USIB ALSO ESTABLISHES SCHEDULES FOR BNE, ESTABLISHES  
OPERATIONAL RQMS & PRIORITIES FOR INTEL COLLECTING MACHINERY  
(NSA, NRO, NPIC), AND REVIEWS AND PASSES UPON ESTIMATES.  
NOT ALWAYS UNANIMOUS.

DEDICATION OF ALL THESE PEOPLE IN SUCCESS OF INTEL COMMUNITY.

~~President~~  
Introduction  
to Kinzel Panel  
9 Sept 63

File  
Speicher

Fact that you are here, I hope, hits home great intensification in the intel community of the scientific & tech approach to the intel problem. I think we in Agency ahead of other contributors to the intel community. I think it mandatory we stay ahead.

We have, during last 1 1/2 years, been trying to develop methods of strengthening Agency input to this natl effort in the scientific field — because, in the intel input, clandestine collection and covert operations ~~aren't~~ <sup>aren't</sup> enough. The thousands employed in overt research in libraries and of newspapers, <sup>and of translations of foreign journals</sup> aren't enough. Now is the tremendous effort, <sup>enough which is</sup> put into overt collection activities.

Our scientific & tech assets must fill in gaps. These ~~are~~ <sup>activities</sup> will be covered ~~in detail~~ in detail by the professionals during the day.

Agenda - 9 September 1963

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|--------------------|---|------|
| (1) Arrive 8:45    | - USIB Conference Room.   |      |
| (2) 8:55 to 9:00   | - Opening statement by Dr. Kinzel.  |      |
| (3) 9:00 to 9:30   | - Security, contracts, questions and coffee.  |      |
| (4) 9:30 to 10:00  | - Mr. McCone - CIA Welcome.   |      |
|                    | - General Carter - Structure of intelligence community and basic CIA organization.          |      |
| (5) 10:00 to 10:45 | - TSD: [redacted]   | STAT |
| (6) 10:45 to 11:15 | - COMMO: [redacted]   | STAT |
| (7) 11:15 to 11:30 | - Dr. Wheelon, DD/S&T Organization and Philosophy; Comment on OCS and SEI.                  |      |
| (8) 11:30 to 12:00 | - OSI: Dr. Chamberlain.   |      |
| (9) 12:00 to 12:45 | - Lunch.  |      |
| (10) 12:45 to 2:00 | - OSA: Colonel Ledford and Mr. John Parangosky - Reconnaissance-Development and Operations. |      |
| (11) 2:00 to 2:30  | - NPIC: Mr. Lundahl.  |      |
| (12) 2:30 to 3:15  | - OEL: Mr. Miller.  |      |
| (13) 3:15 to 3:30  | - Break.  | STAT |
| (14) 3:30 to 4:00  | - ORD: [redacted]   |      |
| (15) 4:00 to 4:50  | - Dr. Kinzel and Committee.   |      |

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Scientific Advisory Board Members

KINZEL, DR. AUGUSTUS B(RAUN), Union Carbide Corp, 270 Park Ave., New York 17, N.Y. METALLURGY. New York, N.Y, July 26, 00; m. 45; c. 6. A.B., Columbia, 19; B.S, Mass. Inst. Tech, 21, D. Met. Eng, 22; D.Sc, Nancy, France, 33; hon. D. Eng, N.Y. Univ, 55; hon. D.Sc, Clarkson Tech, 57. Metallurgist, labs, Gen. Elec. Co, Mass, 19-20, 22-23; Henry Disston & Consults, Pa, 23-26; from metallurgist to v.pres, UNION CARBIDE & CARBON RES. LABS, INC. DIV, UNION CARBIDE CORP, 26-48, PRES, 48-, V.PRES. RES, CORP, 55-, dir. res, 54-55, v.pres, Electro Metall. Co. Div, 44-54, dir, Haynes Stellite Co. Div, 47-49. Lectr. & instr, Temple, 25-26; guest lectr, Int. Cong. Acetylene & Welding, Rome, Italy, 34, London, England, 36; Soviet Metall. Cong, Moscow, Russia, 36. Chief consult, Manhattan dist, Los Alamos Sci. Lab, 43-45; Argonne Nat. Lab; Oak Ridge Nat. Lab; consult, Knolls lab, Gen. Elec. Co. Mem, eng. adv. cmt, Brookhaven Nat. Lab; chmn, Naval Res. Adv. Cmt, 53-54. mem, 54-; adv. panel gen. scis, Office Secy. Defense, 54-57; Defense Sci. Bd; special adv. cmt, U.S. Dept. Commerce; chmn, div. eng. & indust. res, Nat. Acad. Scis; chmn, Welding Res. Council, 52-55; v.pres, Engrs. Joint Council, 59, pres, 60. Distinguished serv. award, Am. Soc. Metals, 48; Metal Progress Hall of Fame, 53; Morehead medal, Int. Acetylene Asn, 55; medal powder metall, Stevens Inst. Tech, 59; medal, Indust. Res. Inst, 60. In charge metals br, Tech. Indust. Intel. Cmt. & econ. warfare br, For. Econ. Admin, Europe, U.S.A, 43-45, Pri. Gen. Nat. Acad; Welding Soc. (Miller medal, 47); Inst. Min, Metall. & Petrol. Eng. (pres, 58-59; Douglas gold medal, 60); Eng. Found. (chmn, 46-49); fel. N.Y. Acad; Benjamin Franklin fel, Royal Soc. Arts. Atomic energy; chemicals; plastics.

BECKMAN, Dr. Arnold O(rville), Beckman Instruments, Inc., 2500 Fullerton Road, Fullerton, California, CHEMISTRY. Cullom, Ill, April 10, 00; m. 25; c. 2. B.S, Illinois 22, M.S, 23; Ph.D (photochem), Calif. Inst. Tech, 28. Res. engr, Bell Tel. Labs, 24-26; instr. chem, Calif. Inst. Tech, 26-29, asst. prof, 29-40; v.pres, Nat. Tech. Labs, 37-39; PRES, 39-50; BECKMAN INSTRUMENTS, INC, 50-; ARNOLD O. BECKMAN, INC, 42-; HELIPOT CORP, 44-Trustee, Calif. Inst. Tech; Calif. Inst. Res. Found; S. Calif. Air Pollution Found. U.S.M.C, 17-19. A.A; Chem. Soc; Electrochem. Soc; Instrument Soc. (pres, 52). Applied chemistry; development of scientific instruments; photochemistry.

BREWER, PROF. LEO, Dept. of Chemistry, University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif. CHEMISTRY. St. Louis, Mo, June 13, 19; m. 45; c. 3. B.S, Calif. Inst. Tech, 40, Great West, Dow fel. California, 42, Ph D. (chem), 43. Assoc CALIFORNIA, 43-46, asst. prof. CHEM, 46-50, assoc. prof. 50-55, PROF, 55-, assoc, radiation lab, 47. Guggenheim Mem. fel, 50. Baekeland award, 53. With Atomic Energy Cmn; Manhattan Dist. Proj, 43-46. Assoc. ed, 'Jour. Chem. Physics. 'Nat. Acad; A.A; Chem. Soc; Electrochem. Soc; Coblentz Soc; Combustion Inst; Fedn. Am. Scientists; Int. Union Pure & Applied Chem. Theory of solutions; reaction rates; high temperature chemistry and thermodynamics.

EYER, JAMES A, University of Rochester, Institute of Optics. Rochester, N.Y, Dec. 18, 29; m. 60. B.S, MIT, 51 (Physics). Ph.D. Univ. of Rochester, 57, (Optics & Physics). Asst. Prof. University of Rochester, Institute of Optics, 57-, Assistant Director, Institute of Optics, 63; Sigma Xi, Optical Society of America, Society of Photographic Scientists and Engineers. Image Evaluation, Optical Systems Analysis, Photographic Theory, Physical Optics, High Speed Photography, Time Resolved Spectroscopy.

PIERCE, DR. JOHN ROBINSON, Bell Telephone Labs, Inc, Murray Hill, N.J. ELECTRONICS, ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING. Des Moines, Iowa, March 27, 10; m. 38; c. 2. B.S, Calif. Inst. Tech, 33, M.S. 34, PhD. (elec. eng), 36. Mem. tech. staff, BELL TEL. LABS, INC, 36-52, dir. electronics res, 52-55, DIR. RES, elec. communications, 55-58, COMMUNICATION PRINCIPLES, 58- Ballantine medal, Franklin Inst, 60. Nat. Acad; fel. Phys. Soc; Acoustical Soc; Rocket Soc; fel. Inst. Radio Eng. (Liebman mem. prize, 47; ed, 54-55); British Interplanetary Soc. Vacuum tubes; microwave oscillators and amplifiers; low voltage microwave reflex oscillator; high current electron guns; traveling-wave amplifiers; satellites.

STEVER, PROF. H(ORTON) GUYFORD, Dept. of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 39, Mass. AERONAUTICS, ASTRONAUTICS. Corning, N.Y., Oct. 24, 16; m. 46; c.4. A.B., Colgate, 38, hon. D.Sc, 58; Ph.D. (physics), Calif. Inst. Tech., 41. Mem. staff, radiation lab & instr, Army-Navy Officers' Radar Sch, Mass. Inst. Tech, 41-42; sci. liaison officer, London mission. Office Sci. Res. & Develop, 42-45; mem. secretariat, nat. guided missile cmt, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 45; exec. officer, guided missiles program, MASS. INST. TECH, 46-48, asst. prof. aeronaut. eng, 46-51, assoc. prof. 51-55, PROF. AERONAUT & ASTRONAUT, 56-, assoc. dean eng, 56-59. Chief scientist, U.S. Dept Air Force, 55-56; Boyd lectr, Ohio State, 59. Consult, 46- Mem. guided missiles tech. evaluation group. Res & Develop. Bd, 46-48; sci. adv. bd. to chief staff, U.S. Dept Air Force, 47-, v.chmn, special cmt. space tech, Nat. Adv. Cmt. Aeronaut, 58, res. adv. cmt. missile & spacecraft aerodyn, Nat. Aeronaut. & Space Admin, 59-, mem. Defense Sci. Bd; adv. panel, cmt. sci. & astronaut, U.S. House Rep. Presidential Cert. Merit, 48; civilian serv. award, U.S. Dept Air Force, 56; Scott gold medal, Am. Ord. Asn, 60. A.A; fel. Phys. Soc; Rocket Soc; fel. Inst. Aerospace Sci. (v.pres, 58,pres, 60-); fel. Am. Acad. Gas discharge; Geiger counters; cosmic rays; radar guided and ballistic missiles; hypersonic aerodynamics; shock tubes; transonic aircraft; nuclear propulsion of aircraft; condensation in high speed flow; space flight.

TOBIAS, PROF. CORNELIUS ANTHONY, Donner Lab, University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif. PHYSICS, Budapest, Hungary, May 28; 18; nat. m. 43; c. 2. Tech. Univ., Budapest, Hungary, 39; Hungarian-Am. fel, California, 39, M.A, 40, Ph.D. (nuclear physics), 42. Physicist, DONNER LAB, CALIFORNIA, 42-45, instr. biophys. & fel. med. physics, 45-47, asst. prof, 47-50, assoc. prof, 50-55, PROF. MED. PHYSICS, 55-Ed, 'Adv. Biol. Med. Physics. ' Mem. subcmt, Nat. Res. Council; radiation study sect, Nat. Insts. Health. Phys. Soc; Radiation Research Soc. Biophysics; biological effects of radiation; cancer research; space medicine.

MORENOFF, Jerome (Executive Secretariat), Scientific Asst. to DD/S&T, CIA. AB (Math) '58, BSEE '59, MSEE '60, Columbia Univ. J.D. (Juris Doctor) '63, George Wash. Univ. Law School. Military Service: Lt.JG-USN, '60-62, Assigned to National Security Agency (NSA), Wash. D.C., Electronic Engineer and Computer Systems Analyst. Received awards from Vice Adm. L. Frost (Dir.NSA), Adm. T. H. Robbins, Jr. (Commandant, Potomac River Naval Command). IT&T, Nutley, N. J., '59-Electronic Engineer.

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14 August 1963


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT : Report on DDS&T Meeting in the Auditorium  
on 6 August

1. The meeting was opened by Gen. Carter who explained the background of the decision to create the DDS&T and mentioned the principal personnel and organizational changes resulting therefrom. The General said parenthetically that in his 16 months with the Agency he had noticed a tremendous reluctance to change things. However, he felt that there were now compelling reasons to make the aforementioned change. In particular he cited the tremendous need today to strengthen the Agency's scientific and technical approach to problems to insure that the Agency retained its lead in this field. The General listed the five principal assets of the new Directorate--OSI, OSA, ORD, O/ELINT and Office of Computer Services. He commented that the potential of these offices was tremendous and that it was now desirable to have them pulled together. Reasons for this were to:

a. insure the professional strength of all S&T assets, to enlarge the S&T environment, and to expand and sharpen skills;

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b. facilitate long range career development of the professional S&T service and to develop this in the analytical as well as experimental parts of the business; and

c. to attract and retain the highest S&T skills and to develop a technical "surge tank" to facilitate shifting assets to meet unexpected demands.

2. The General announced that Dr. Wheelon would head the new Directorate. His new deputy would be Col. Giller and his executive officer would be Jack Blake of DDS. The General said that any change is painful, particularly to those who will lose an organizational member. He said that many pros and cons could be argued, and that his decision has taken considerable soul searching, compassionate understanding, and an effort to avoid misunderstanding. His only course, now that the decision has been taken, is to ask everyone to try to make the new organization work and to improve it. The General then introduced Dr. Wheelon.

3. Dr. Wheelon said that the time for discussion was now over, that a decision had been made and that the thing to do was to get organized and tackle the problems ahead. During the last month he had been much aware of the many rumors which

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had produced a period of instability. He wished now to shut off speculation by saying that he did not contemplate any major reorganization in DDS&T, nor did he plan any personnel changes for the foreseeable future except to fill vacancies.

4. Dr. Wheelon then discussed how the major components would fit together to meet desired goals. He discussed his five offices in turn as follows:

Office of Scientific Intelligence

5. He cited rumors that the analytical functions would be sacrificed to the collection effort and vice versa. He said that no such choice had been made, and that OSI would function as before. He mentioned 5 principal ways in which OSI contributed the Agency's analytical effort:

- a. contributions to ONE;
- b. contributions to OCI publications;
- c. OSI's own publications (Scientific Intelligence Digest);
- d. OSI memoranda;
- e. contributions to "demand response" papers (for the DCI and White House) which require broad coordination.

6. Dr. Wheelon said that OSI would continue as before to contribute to the Agency's production effort with respect to a., b., and d.; with respect to c., he hoped to continue

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the SID while trying to make it more professional and to widen its distribution. With respect to e., Dr. Wheelon hoped that OSI would continue to participate in preparation of DDI all-source and all-skill papers and that OSI would continue to be represented in DDI coordination panels. Dr. Wheelon reiterated that there would be no real change in OSI's support to the DDI, to the USIB committees, and to the intelligence community.

7. Dr. Wheelon took note of some anxiety that OSI's separation from the Intelligence Directorate would somehow reduce its contribution to that Directorate. He wanted to pledge, however, that OSI would supply even better contributions than in the past. Dr. Wheelon then explained his two most important points:

a. He did not intend to have to resolve coordination problems with Ray Cline. He expected that this would be done on the working level. (This was stated constructively, as an instruction to his people to show good sense and settle their problems on the working level.)

b. He did not intend to establish reporting channels which competed with the DDI.

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Office of Computer Services

8. This new office will pull together Agency computer talent and researchers, with the exception of the NPIC [redacted] programs. The skills involved in operating computers, principally mathematics and electrical engineering, are similar to other S&T skills. People using computers as large slide rules for research should be very close to the computer operations. Dr. Wheelon felt that this was a natural location for the Agency computer assets, that they could make a great contribution, and that centralization of this function helps avoid competing against ourselves. He concluded by saying that in discharging DDS&T's responsibility to other parts of the Agency, it is OCS's obligation to do a first rate job.

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Office of Research and Development (ORD)

9. This is a small organization which will be built slowly and solidly to support other offices.

Office of ELINT

10. Dr. Wheelon says this is in good shape and that it is clear what it has to do. He senses that with the erosion of the US overseas position, it will be necessary to shift increasingly from overt to covert ELINT collection. He says O/ELINT's business base is expanding accordingly, and he

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feels that it is important to be ready and able to meet growing Community needs and to develop new equipment.

Office of Special Activities

11. Dr. Wheelon sensed a certain uneasiness regarding the future, particularly as a result of opinions expressed by senior military officers in the Pentagon. Dr. Wheelon said that the Agency has shown that it can make a very significant contribution in adopting new programs and developing workable systems, and he feels that CIA should continue to play a significant role in the national reconnaissance program.

12. Speaking generally now, Dr. Wheelon explained that his approach to a problem was to invite frank discussions with interested parties before a decision was made, but that once a decision had been made by him he expected that everyone would help to make it work. If anyone thinks the wrong decision had been made he had the right of appeal to Dr. Wheelon, and he invites such appeals.

13. This was the end of Dr. Wheelon's statement and he then invited questions from the floor. The first question related to what working hours would be. Dr. Wheelon said that the Agency tries to do more than it comfortably can. He feels overworked himself. He thinks, however, that we

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should be willing to ask if we are really strengthening ourselves for the long term by being overworked for a short term. He thought that we should occasionally have the courage to ask management to make a decision on this question.

14. The second question related to S&T assets of TSD. Dr. Wheelon said that most of these people were really not very scientific, contrary to the popular impression. There was a small group, however, engaged in advanced engineering projects, but it was even more operationally orientated than OSA. He said he really didn't know much about TSD, implying that its relationship to DDS&T had not been seriously considered up to that time. He commented, however, that he had the impression that TSD was not looking as far ahead as TSD and DDP would like, and said that it was really ORD's job to back-stop TSD in this respect.

15. The third question related to the leadership of the five offices of DDS&T. Dr. Wheelon said that Col. Ledford would continue to head OSA with Jim Cunningham as his deputy; the Office of ELINT would continue to be headed by George Miller and with Col. Nelson as his deputy; ORD would be headed by Col. Giller (also A/DDS&T). With respect to OSI, Dr. Wheelon commented that both he [redacted] had left the OSI for another job and [redacted] would be holding the bag for

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awhile." With respect to the Office of Computer Services, "Joe Becker would continue to play a large part." Dr. Wheelon added that this was the situation tentatively, and that these details had not had careful thought. He urged everyone to cease speculation and get back to work.

16. Gen. Carter then reappeared on the stage and said that some of the questions confirmed his concern that compartmentation is neither a desirable or necessary evil. He wanted to say that it was now essential to block compartmentation when it inhibited successful completion of a task. (He was not questioning compartmentation to protect clandestine sources.) The General said he could see no sense in a man not offering to assist the fellow next door just because he belonged to another part of the organization. He said that the Agency was a young organization with outstanding people, but that it could fall apart if its people could not present an Agency position when they were dealing with problems outside of the Agency.

17. Referring to the question of working hours, the General said that he could assure everyone that working hours would be no fewer. If complaints about working hours were to be taken to management they should be addressed to Dr. Wheelon, because for his (DDCI) part he had great difficulty in solving

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this problem. In connection with the long working hours, the General wanted to stress the outstanding reputation of the Agency for being able to deliver the goods rapidly. He gave assurance that the Agency's flexibility of response was unsurpassed, and that at the highest level of government the Agency position is treated with the greatest respect. He urged that everyone "work like dogs" to protect and enhance this reputation.

18. He then remarked that some day a show would be put on regarding professionalism in the Agency. He said that 60% of the top 600 people in the Agency hold Master's degrees or higher honors. He said that over 600 people in the Agency were fluent in Russian, and that 5 Agency members could speak Swahili. He said that no other Agency could match this.



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Executive Staff

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I am Lt. General Carter, the Deputy Director and it so happens for the next week or ten days, the Acting Director. I wanted to talk to you all this afternoon for a short time because we are about to undergo some changes in the <sup>general</sup> organizational field and in my sixteen months here at the ~~pickle~~ ; pickle factory I have <sup>noted</sup> a tremendous reluctance to change so it seemed only fitting and perhaps timely for you to take a look at the character who is introducing a change and for me to tell you some of the reasoning behind that change. I do not have to beat the drum, I hope, on the great intensification in the intelligence community <sup>of</sup> and the scientific and technological approach to the intelligence problem. I think we in the Agency are ahead of other contributors to the intelligence community and I think it is mandatory <sup>that</sup> to do everything in our power to stay ahead. The importance of the scientific inputs to the national intelligence effort I do not have to explain to you. But, I think it is timely to tell you of the assets that Mr. McCone and I have considered as being immediately available in the community, or as you were, in the Agency for direct application to scientific intelligence both in the collection ~~an~~ in the analysis of intelligence and we have over the last fourteen months been trying to develop methods of strengthening the Agency input to this national effort in the scientific field. If I may interrupt here a minute, I am going to speak for about ten minutes and there will be a speaker after me so I suggest Don that you and the rest of the boys who either came in late or trying to get out early, help yourself to a seat. Our <sup>possible</sup> ~~possible~~ assets in the intelligence field have been five. OSI on

the analysis end of the business; the Office of ELINT which is as you know is becoming so much more important every day to our scientific and technical intelligence and also in carrying out a part of CIA's responsibility in the National Reconnaissance Plan and the National ELINT Plan. OSA, which is carrying CIA's responsibility in the National Reconnaissance Program and which has had a very remarkable and distinguished record. I don't know whether you know it or not and I repeat it because I have heard it from high ranking people in the Department of Defense that had it not been for the Agency we would not have had a U-2 and certainly had it not been for the U-2 we would not have had to revise our National Intelligence Estimates. This keeps you occupied periodically. So, it has been very helpful in keeping us in business and in revising the national intelligence posture. They have done a very remarkable job and I see a tremendous future in the OSA. ORD has a long way to go but no limits to its expansion capabilities. The basic research for all of these operational divisions, as well as other Agency components, to my mind has no limits; and, finally - our computing activities, especially scientific computing and analysis plus the technical selection of new systems ~~will~~ and more effective ways of improving the systems that we're presently have in use. There is a large ~~amount~~ amount of R&D still left in this field. Now looking over these assets and on the basis of the last year and a half of watching these assets operate, Mr. McCone and I have felt it is now desirable to pull them all together and for

several reasons. One important one was to insure a professional coupling of all of the scientific and technical assets that we had to enlarge the scientific and technical environment particularly so that we can sharpen our skills and keep them sharp, to facilitate the true honest long-range development of a scientific and technical career service and to have a high degree of flexibility in our experimental as well as analytical side of the business.

It will facilitate also the common use of consultants particularly by OSA and OSI. It will provide the lodestone or a nucleus for I hope attracting and retaining the highest scientific and technical skills, and having a very mediocre education in hydraulic engineering I must say that it gives us a technical surge tank in which we can shift assets to meet problems which arise quickly and unexpectedly; and finally and I think this is extremely important, it will insure because of the multiplicity of organizations that will be within this new directorate, it will insure a very close tie-in between foreign systems and our own systems. In other words we are creating a great mass of technical know-how to combine with the high speed that we are presently under and the high degree of flexibility which we are privileged to have in the Agency through our most unusual unique legislative authorities. We have chosen Dr. Albert Wheelon to be the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology. I have changed the name also from DDR to DDS&T, only a little less euphonic but I think much more explanatory of your functions. Colonel Giller will remain as Deputy and Jack Blake of DDS will provide the substantial support and operational facility required to be the



Executive Officer to arrange space, this is building space, for your promotions, to arrange for all of the manifold operations required to run a Directorate of this size both management wise and administratively and I hope he will do that not only effectively but quickly. Now, the Directives were signed last night and these Directives appoint Dr. Wheelon, Mr. Blake - Dr. Wheelon will also take my position as Chairman of the Research and Development Review Board of the Agency, to change the name from Research to Science and Technology, to transfer the Office of Scientific Intelligence to DDS&T, to rename the Automatic Data Computer Staff to be the ;Office of Computer Services and transfer that to the DDS&T. Now any reorganization or any shift of personnel from one Agency to another is painful. It is painful to the ~~a~~ people who are losing a member. ~~It~~ <sup>It is</sup> must a mild amputation, ~~It is~~ <sup>It is</sup> a complete separation. There are many many pros and cons and we can argue these pros and cons ~~back and~~ backward and forwards as ~~has been done~~ I have been doing, as I am sure many of you have been doing for the past sixteen months. The point I want to make is that it has taken a great deal of ~~researching~~ <sup>work</sup>, a high degree of compassionate understanding, an equally high degree of ~~argumentative~~ <sup>argumentative</sup> misunderstanding to develop all the pros and cons to the point where the decision has been taken. Consequently, my only recourse now is to ask each of you to do everything you possibly can to insure that this organization not only works, that you make it work, and that you improve our overall system. This is our one idea - to make it work to the best interest of the Agency and inevitably if it works to the best interest of the Agency it is bound to work to the best interest of each of us and all of us.

I would like Dr. Wheelon to step up here so that you will see what he looks like and to expand somewhat; ~~on his~~ on my views and indicate exactly/ how he intends, I would hope, to running the Deputy Directorate of Science and Technology. Bud would you come on up here. ~~7~~

Thank you very much. I had a couple of ~~stories~~ <sup>submitted for publication</sup> stories but I was overwhelmed by the feminine multitude. The loss of those stories is a very great loss indeed.

Well let me begin by associating myself with the remarks of General Carter thoroughly and completely and indicating that in fact the time just passed has been a time of a good deal of thoughtful consideration, a proper debate and finally a decision. We think we have a decision and this is the way it is going to be and now the problem before us is in fact to consolidate the organizations that now make up DDS&T, to establish the coupling the professional relationships between them, and then to get this momentum. — This mass times a velocity moving forward so as to have a great impact on the problems that are constantly coming up before us. Now by way of introduction to that let me say that during a period of decision and debate such as we have just been through ~~for nearly almost the last month~~ since I returned from overseas and General Carter presented me with this series of basic questions about how to do these things, I made my report to them that I am very much aware of the fact that the rumor bee-h bell has been working at very high velocity with a great momentum itself. We have been informing one another about what the decisions are to be taken, the reason, and it has been a period of unproductivity and instability because of this. I have a pretty fundamental

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 \* General Carter speaks again later, following Dr. Wheelon's speech. See page 22.

OSA - Colonel Jack Ledeff Ledford, an Air Force Officer on assignment to CIA with a very fine record, is the Assistant Director for the Office of Special Activities. His Deputy is Jim Cunningham, a CIA Career Staff Employee. The Office of ELINT is headed by George Miller and his Deputy [redacted] The Office of Research and Development right now is headed by Ed Giller, who is also my Deputy, who is acting in that capacity. That is not as pressing a problem as someone might think, however, because it is not such a large group now that one doesn't really have a large line management role. It is more a matter of getting the right things started and of course that is Colonel Giller's forte. In OSI we have a ~~deube~~ double embarrassment there because formally I was the Assistant Director and there were two Deputies - [redacted] and of course I have gone off <sup>to</sup> on loftier perches [redacted] has too. As a matter of fact he has gone to the DDI Collection Staff and so that leaves [redacted] kind of holding the bag for awhile. What did I leave out? The Office of Computing Services - I think Joe Becker certainly has been the guiding <sup>light</sup> of this thing since the beginning and will certainly be playing a very large part in the Office of Computing Services. We really haven't had a chance to think through many of these details this far and <sup>So part of your question anticipates the careful thought that a question like this requires.</sup>

Are there other questions? I have lots of time. Well, I sense that we have hit a dry well ~~now~~ here - let me say that I think the important thing now is to just simply cease the speculation and go back to the very major assignments that lay before us. General Carter, do you want to add something?

*Subject has*  
One or two of the questions seem to be the ~~problems~~ that have

were worried me in the Agency ever since. I have been here and it is  
a feeling <sup>of compartmentation</sup> that ~~I think the time has come in the Agency to bring down~~ <sup>break</sup>  
~~as much as we can compartmentation where it advances or inhibits.~~ <sup>thing on a necessary level.</sup>

The thing that bothers me about the Agency compartmentation is

<sup>more sophisticated</sup>  
I think the time has come in the Agency to break down as much as we can  
compartmentation <sup>where it</sup> ~~which~~ prevents or inhibits our <sup>functional</sup> ~~professional~~ respon-  
sibilities. Now, I can understand compartmentation when we are perhaps  
protecting an agent who is somewhere in bed in the Kremlin. <sup>(this is a colloquialism)</sup> We don't  
want everybody in bed (as <sup>colloquialism</sup> ~~colloquism~~). We certainly don't want

everybody and his brother to know who is sleeping with whom and  
<sup>working in cell</sup> ~~sensing that you have all that~~ wonderful information. Well, I can  
understand that but I can't see any reason whatsoever in an <sup>agency</sup> ~~agent~~

<sup>as</sup> sensitive as this and as security conscious and with so many <sup>contributions</sup>  
~~across the board from one element to another~~

. I can't see any reason for such a degree of compartmentation that  
we can't offer our assistance to the guys <sup>kept to</sup> ~~us~~ because he happens to  
be in another section of the organization. It takes a long time to  
break down something like this and there are certain inherent dangers to  
it but-believe-me-as-young-as-it-is-and-with-the-outstanding-representati  
we-have-beth-b-for-its-people-and-for-its-actions-this-Agency-can  
pull-apart-unless-we-have-always-an-Agency-concept-and-an-Agency  
purpose-when-ever---we-are---(garbled)

but-believe-me-this-Agency but believe me this Agency as young as it is  
and with the outstanding <sup>reports</sup> ~~reports~~ it has both for its people and <sup>for</sup> ~~its~~  
<sup>actions</sup> ~~actions~~, this Agency can pull apart unless we have always an Agency  
<sup>acts</sup> ~~acts~~

concept and an Agency presentation whenever we are outside of this particular ~~ball~~ pail of tears. Whenever you hear or whenever you see a *tenancy* or if you forget it yourselves to think well, I am the DDS&T Agency or I am the ~~DDT~~ <sup>DDP</sup> or this is the DDP position and we are talking to anyone who is not annointed like all of us are, then I think you are giving the Agency a disservice and you are certainly doing yourself a disservice..Once you leave the pickle ~~p~~ factory, ~~the~~ *the* Agency concept, the agency projection that we must continue to get across.

The question about the number of hours I think that I can assure you that your working hours will be no less and at Dr. Wheelon's suggestion that if you have too much to do and too many projects to do to complain to the management. As far as I know he is putting the finger on me because I am the next step in the management. If you are doing too much complain to Dr. Wheekon and let him solve the problem because I have great difficulty in solving that type of problem.

Bel eve me, the reputation of this Agency for delivering <sup>*the good*</sup> a ~~quite~~ flexible response is unprepared. There isn't another Agency in this Government that can get an answer so quickly and in most cases it is a good answer. In any event it is quick. Sometimes you work your brains out day in and day out and you never get a response as to whether or not it has paid off. I have had the great good fortune of substituting for Mr. McCone at Cabinet Meetings and at Special Meetings and at other meetings in which the President and Senior Members of the Cabinet have been present and believe me when the Agency viewpoint is put forward, *and* ~~or~~ when it is an Agenc y paper, it ~~is~~ is treated with the greatest of respect. Your Staff here as an Agency is something that we must, ~~like~~ *all of us*

<sup>To</sup>  
~~all~~ work like dogs to protect and enhance. Someday we will put on  
 a song and dance here for <sup>your</sup> ~~all~~ the <sup>professionalism</sup> professionals within the Agency  
 and I think you should know now that 60% of the Senior 600 people  
 in this Agency have Masters Degrees or better. We have 45<sup>0</sup> people  
 who speak Russian and read Russian adequately enough to perform their  
 jobs. There are five <sup>people</sup> who speak Swahili. *What other agency has 5*  
GRA GARBLED *people who speak Swahili?*

Most of them have professional background and in their years of  
 dedicated service in the Agency and in the intelligence field, nobody  
 can put a finger to it. They just can't come close to it and it is  
 inevitable that the product to be developed is going to <sup>have</sup> ~~be~~ that  
 same high degree of professionalism.

*[Signature]*

*Garbled*

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6 August 1963

**Suggested Points for General Carter's Opening Remarks:**

1. Importance of Scientific Intelligence - both collection and analysis - to present national effort.
2. McCone and I have been examining ways to strengthen CIA contribution to, ~~and assimilation of~~, national effort in this field.
3. Our principal assets in this field have been:
  - a. OSI - analysis end of business
  - b. OEL - ELINT which is becoming so important to S&T intelligence - OEL carrying out CIA part of the National ELINT Plan
  - c. OSA - carrying CIA's responsibility in National Reconnaissance Program - with a distinguished history.
  - d. ORD - basic research for these operational divisions and other Agency components as it develops ~~continuing~~ <sup>its own</sup> scientific capability.
  - e. Computing Activities - especially scientific computing and analysis plus technical selection of new systems and more effective ways of programming existing ones to do new jobs.
4. We have decided to pull these together for several reasons:
  - a. Ensure close professional coupling
  - b. Enlarge the scientific and technical environment in which we can sharpen our skills.
  - c. Facilitate S&T Career Service development and have flexibility in ~~experimentative~~ <sup>experimental</sup> and analytical side of business.
  - d. Common use of consultants, contractors in OSA, OSI, etc.

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2.

- e. Provide ~~lead~~<sup>stone</sup> for attracting and retaining S&T types
- f. It gives us a technical ~~storage~~<sup>surge</sup> tank in which we can shift assets to meet problems which arise quickly and unexpectedly.
- g. Insure tie-in between analysis of foreign systems and development of our own.

BUT h. Basically to join the momentum, i. e., Mass, Times, Speed, together so as to make greater impact on rising problem.

- 5. Have chosen Albert W. Wheelon to head up new organization. Edward B. Giller will continue as Deputy.
- 6. Have selected Jack Blake of DD/S with substantial support and operational experience to be Executive Officer to put the new organization together quickly and effectively.

*Directives signed last night*

*Any reorganization is painful - at times  
disruptive - Pros + Cons - Soulsearching -  
Decision Making -*

*My one idea is to make this one  
work to best interests of Agency,  
and therefore all of us -*

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F

SECRET

Executive Registry

63-4718

*General Carter unable to address  
at this course. (*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Support)  
SUBJECT : Address to the Clandestine Services Review Course

1. The Clandestine Services Review Course, which you addressed on three previous occasions, is scheduled for the period 17 through 26 June 1963. It would be very much appreciated if you would again deliver the opening address on Monday, 17 June. The class will be conducted in Room 1A 13 Headquarters Building, and for scheduling purposes we have allocated the period from 0930 to 1000 hours for your presentation. If that time is not convenient to you, we will be glad to make an adjustment.

2. This course is conducted primarily for Clandestine Services officers recently returned to Headquarters from overseas tours. When you previously addressed similar groups, you spoke for approximately fifteen to twenty minutes and allowed the balance of the time for a question and answer period. That worked out very successfully on previous occasions. Please feel free to select a subject of your own choice, for the schedule will simply list "Opening Address." However, since the majority of the students will be field returnees, I submit the following for consideration:

- a. The new look in CIA regarding organization, policy and personnel handling under Mr. McCone's and your leadership.
- b. The relationship and standing of CIA with the President and members of the National Security Council.
- c. The relationship and standing of CIA with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community and particularly DIA.
- d. Are any major organizational changes planned or contemplated?

SECRET

SECRET

3. I sincerely hope you will again be able to accommodate the Office of Training. If your busy schedule permits you to accept this invitation, I shall come to your office immediately before 0930 on 17 June to escort you to the classroom.

Matthew Baird  
Director of Training

EST MA 82 8 51 HRL

EST MA 82 8 51 HRL

SECRET

**MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record**

General Carter could not deliver the opening address because he was going up on the Hill with the Director. Training subsequently asked if General Carter would speak to the class on the last day of the course, either before or after Mr. Kirkpatrick's speech. It was decided that it was not necessary for both DDCI and Executive Director to speak to the class; Training was thus advised that one of the two would deliver the closing address. As it turned out, General Carter was unable to do so since he had to leave for the West Coast that day. Mr. Kirkpatrick gave the speech.

[Redacted Signature]

(DATE)

STAT

E

*speech file*

REMARKS TO INTELLIGENCE REVIEW COURSE, 19 APRIL 1963

NO COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS INTENDED. KNOW YOU'RE ANXIOUS TO GET DIPLOMAS AND HEAD FOR NEAREST BAR. FACT THAT YOU'RE ALL EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL AND HAVE SPENT TWO WEEKS LISTENING TO AGENCY'S TOP PEOPLE, BEST THING I COULD DO IS DEBRIEF YOU AND SEE WHAT I CAN PICK UP.

COCKTAILS AND EXPERIENCE REMIND ME OF AN INCIDENT I EXPERIENCED ABOUT WEEK AFTER JOINING AGENCY, (TELL THE WITTING/WILLING STORY) OR, EARLIER EXPERIENCE, (BRAZILIAN EMBASSY STORY INVOLVING THE TWO "OLD GOATS")

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RATHER THAN DELIVER USUAL GRADUATION CHARGE TO A CLASS GOING INTO NEW ASSIGNMENTS, LET ME TICK OFF A FEW IMPRESSIONS OF THE AGENCY WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST:

TWO QUESTIONS MOST OFTEN ASKED FROM OUTSIDE THE AGENCY: "IS THE AGENCY TOO BIG, OR IS IT OVERSTUFFED AND OVERSTAFFED?" THE SECOND: "HOW GOOD ARE THE PEOPLE IN IT?"

WITH RESPECT TO SIZE, INTELLIGENCE IS NOT SUBJECT TO PRECISE MEASUREMENTS. IN MILITARY, SIZE CAN BE ESTABLISHED FROM ANALYSIS OF ROLES AND MISSIONS WITH

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CONCLUSION THAT SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL ARE ABOARD AND MONEY IS SPENT PROPERLY. ACTIVITIES OF BUSINESS CAN BE MEASURED BY PRODUCT, PRICE & PROFIT. EVEN MOST GOVT. AGENCIES & DEPTS CAN BE MEASURED, SUCH AS POST OFFICE DEPT., TREASURY, AEC & AGRICULTURE. HOWEVER, WE IN AGENCY HAVE NO PRECISE RQM WHICH CAN BE MEASURED BY A YARDSTICK. WE HAVE SURVEYED AGENCY ACTIVITIES AND MANPOWER UTILIZATION THOROUGHLY, HAVE CONCLUDED THAT, SO LONG AS THERE IS NEED FOR THE SCIENTIFIC & CLASSICAL TYPES OF INTEL; FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SUCH



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INTEL; FOR TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS OF BOOKS, ARTICLES, SPEECHES, ETC., ON POLITICAL, TECHL, ECON & SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS--& THAT ALL THIS IS ASSIGNED TO THE AGENCY-- THEN, WE ARE NOT OVERSTAFFED. IMPLICATION IS THIS: AN INTEL AGENCY CAN BE ANY SIZE--LARGE OR SMALL-- DEPENDENT UPON NEEDS OF GOVT./WITH THE US's WORLDWIDE RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS POSITION OF LEADERSHIP, NEEDS FOR INTEL ARE VERY SUBSTANTIAL.

ON QUALITY AND COMPETENCE OF PERSONNEL, I CAN SAY--HAVING SERVED IN STATE DEPT, DEFENSE & MILITARY--

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I SINCERELY BELIEVE AGCY PERS HAVE HIGHEST LEVEL OF COMPETENCE IN GOVT. MR. McCONE ALSO BELIEVES THIS, AND WITH HIS INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND, HE ALSO INCLUDES BUSINESS IN HIS COMPARATIVE EVALUATION.

IN LINE WITH THIS, MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN & WILL CONTINUE TO BE WRITTEN ABOUT INTEL PERFORMANCE IN CUBAN CRISIS. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT OUR PERFORMANCE WAS EXTRAORDINARILY GOOD. ADMITTEDLY, THERE ARE AREAS IN WHICH WE MUST DO MORE AND WORK HARDER, BUT WE ARE TAKING CORRECTIVE MEASURES AND I FEEL WE CAN BE PROUD OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CITATION CONFERRED UPON

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INTEL COMMUNITY AND NO FURTHER ENDORSEMENT IS NEEDED. BUT IT HASN'T BEEN JUST CUBA. WE CAN BE PROUD OF OUR CONTRIBUTIONS IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD: COUNTER-INSURGENCY SUPPORT IN SO. VIETNAM AND LAOS; OUR EFFORTS IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA; AND OUR REGULAR UNHERALDED WORK IN THE REST OF THE WORLD. DOMESTICALLY, WE CAN'T OVERLOOK THE REAL SIGNIFICANT AND IMPORTANT MISSION OF CIA AND THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN COLLECTING ANALYZING AND CORRELATING INTEL AND THE THOUGHTFUL ESTIMATING AND MEANING OF SUCH INFO, A GREAT DEAL

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WHICH IS OVERT, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF BOTH SHORT -  
RANGE EFFECTS ON SECURITY OF THE US & FREE WORLD.

INTERNALLY, WE ARE ALSO TRYING TO DO MANY THINGS:

1. MID-CAREER TRAINING PROGRAM DESIGNED TO  
BROADEN PERSPECTIVE, TO ENCOURAGE EXCHANGE OF PERS  
BETWEEN COMPONENTS, AND PREPARE INDIVIDUALS FOR  
GREATER RESPONSIBILITY.
2. CREATION OF NEW RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT BOARD  
TO ASSURE COORDINATION AND CROSS-FERTILIZATION INSIDE  
AGENCY.

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3. CONCERTED EFFORT TO INSURE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR CAPABILITIES BY MILITARY & STATE. INCREASED NUMBER OF LECTURES TO SENIOR DEFENSE COLLEGES, BRIEFINGS OF AMBASSADORS, AGENCY ROLE IN CI AT FOREIGN SERVICE CI COURSE, NATL WAR COLLEGE VISIT YESTERDAY FOR FIRST TIME.

4. EMPHASIS ON JOT PROGRAM; ACCELERATED PERS PROGRAMS (INCLUDING EARLY RETIREMENT AND BREAKING GRADE HUMPS IN PROMOTION SYSTEM.)

Notes Used by General Carter in Addressing Intelligence Review  
Course on 19 April 1963

9.

THESE ARE SOME THOUGHTS OF THINGS GOING ON. HAVE  
NO DESIRE TO OVERSTAY MY VISIT, OR HOLD UP YOUR PROCESSING  
OUT, OR TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD. ALTHO, THAT REMINDS ME  
OF ONE MORE EXPERIENCE WHICH I WILL HIT AND THEN RUN.  
(TELL STORY OF NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR'S WIFE IN PARIS)

2 April 1963

STAT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

**SUBJECT : Suggested Topics for Consideration by the  
DDCI in His Intelligence Review Presentation  
on 19 April, 1445 Hours.**

1. The Intelligence Review Course is designed to provide an opportunity for experienced personnel to review the current state of the intelligence profession; to examine organizational changes and inter-relationships; to review intelligence objectives and requirements; to examine the current status of the intelligence process and to consider future trends.

2. Members of the previous running of the course suggested consideration of such topics as the following:

(1) What challenges face an Intelligence Officer at mid-point in his career in CIA?

(2) What is the relationship and standing of the Agency with the President, the National Security Council and members of the Intelligence Community?

(3) How will the roles of CIA and the DIA fit together in future intelligence activities? Are we tending toward one big intelligence organization or toward establishment of two distinct and possibly unrelated agencies?

(4) Are any major organizational changes planned or contemplated?

Chief, Orientation Faculty, OTR

STAT

**ATTACHMENTS:**

- (1) Schedule
- (2) Roster of Students

S-E-C-R-E-T

## INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

### COURSE OBJECTIVES

To provide an opportunity for experienced personnel to:

- (1) review the current state of the intelligence profession,
- (2) to examine organizational changes and inter-relationships,
- (3) to review intelligence objectives and requirements,
- (4) to examine the current status of the intelligence process, and
- (5) to consider future trends.

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
---





S-E-C-R-E-T

- 2 -

SECOND WEEKMonday, 15 April

0900-1015 The Clandestine Services: Intra-Agency relationships  
 1030-1115 Automatic Data Processing  
 1130-1200 The DD/R Mission  
 1300-1350 Technical Services in Support of the Agency's Operations  
 1415-1530 The Support Function and Role in CIA  
 1545-1630 Seminar meetings

[ ] 25X1  
 Becker  
 Scoville  
 [ ] 25X1  
 White

Tuesday, 16 April

0900-1020 Film: Acquisition of Agents (Parts III & IV)  
 1045-1145 Security of Intelligence: CIA and the Intelligence Community  
 1145-1200 Film: Small Town  
 1240-1310 Film: Southeast Asia (OPTIONAL)  
 1315-1415 Personnel Policies and Problems  
 1430-1510 Logistical Support Activities  
 1520-1600 The Agency's Fiscal Program  
 1600-1630 Seminar meetings

Bannerman  
  
 25X1  
 Echols  
 [ ]

Wednesday, 17 April

0900-1000 Legislative Relationships: Future Legislation affecting the Agency  
 1020-1110 Training Trends and Developments  
 1120-1200 Film: Latin America  
 1300-1400 Medical Support of Agency Activities  
 1420-1530 Role of the DD/I  
 1545-1630 Seminar meetings

Houston 25X1  
 [ ]  
 Cline

Thursday, 18 April

0900-1000 Foreign Intelligence Organizations: The U.K.  
 1020-1120 Foreign Intelligence Organizations: The U.S.S.R.  
 1130-1200 Office of the Inspector General  
 1300-1350 Preparation of Seminar Reports  
 1400-1500 Photographic Intelligence: Role of the NPIC  
 1520-1630 Preparation of Seminar Reports

25X1  
 [ ]  
 Earman  
 Lundahl

Friday, 19 April

0900-1200 Seminar Reports  
 1315-1430 Critique and Final Administration  
 1445- Closing Address

Gen. Carter

S-E-C-R-E-T

STAT

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gen. Carter

FROM : Chief, Orientation Faculty, IS

SUBJECT : Participation in the Intelligence Review

1. The following summary of grade levels and years of service of students enrolled in the Intelligence Review Course may be of help to you in preparing your presentation:

Median grade: GS-13.

Average length of service: 11 years.

2. In the past, officers in these seminars have been interested in agency and community interrelationships and possible future trends, as well as in past errors and successes.

3. If you have any question about your participation or if you require any additional administrative support, please call

4. The Office of Training appreciates the importance of your participation in this program on 19 April.

25X1



25X1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

DTR 1864  
DP/S 63-0627

1. Training

63-1397

18 FEB 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

**THROUGH :** Deputy Director (Support)



2/16/63

STAT

**SUBJECT :** Invitation to address the Intelligence Review

1. The Office of Training will present the Intelligence Review for experienced professional personnel in April. This seminar provides an opportunity to review the current state of the intelligence profession, to examine organizational changes and interrelationships, and to consider future trends.

2. I should like to invite you to address the class at its closing session on Friday, 19 April at 1445 that afternoon.



STAT

Acting Director of Training

**ATTACHMENT:** Intelligence Review schedule

63-0627

S-E-C-R-E-T

# INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

## COURSE OBJECTIVES

To provide an opportunity for experienced personnel to:

- (1) review the current state of the intelligence profession,
- (2) to examine organizational changes and inter-relationships,
- (3) to review intelligence objectives and requirements,
- (4) to examine the current status of the intelligence process, and
- (5) to consider future trends.

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
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S-E-C-R-E-T

INTELLIGENCE REVIEW (6)

8 - 19 April 1963

(Room 1A13)

FIRST WEEK

Monday, 8 April 1963

- 0845-0930 Registration; Introduction to the Course
- 0945-1030 Some Current Challenges to the U.S.
- 1050-1145 International Communism: Current Status
- 1245-1340 Film: Watch on the Mekong
- 1350-1450 Interests and Objectives of Developing States
- 1510-1610 An Appraisal of the Central Intelligence Concept
- 1615-1630 Seminar Organizations: Appointment of Chairmen

Tuesday, 9 April

- 0900-1010 Role of Intelligence in the Formulation of National Security Policy
- 1030-1200 Forecast of Intelligence Support Needed by the NSC and the Community for the Next Five Years
- 1300-1330 Seminar meetings
- 1345-1500 The Coordinating Factor: Current Approach to the problems of coordination in the Intelligence Community
- 1515-1630 Film: Acquisition of Agents (Parts I & II)

Wednesday, 10 April

- 0900-1015 Role of the DD/I
- 1030-1200 The Collection Factor: Current Situation, problems and future capabilities
- 1300-1340 The Requirements Problem
- 1350-1450 Communications
- 1510-1545 Film: W/T
- 1600-1630 Seminar meetings

Thursday, 11 April

- 0900-1010 Indications Intelligence: NIC; Current Status
- 1030-1200 Military Intelligence: DIA-CIA Interrelationships
- 1300-1410 State Department Intelligence
- 1430-1630 Counterinsurgency

Friday, 12 April

- 0900-1030 Research and Reference Facilities: Problems and future developments
- 1045-1400 The Production Factor: Problems and responsibilities of CIA in the production of National and other categories of Intelligence (1045-1110) (1115-1140) (1145-1210)
- 1415-1530 Panel Discussion (1300-1325)
- 1600-1630-Seminar meetings (1330-1355)

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 2 -

SECOND WEEK

Monday, 15 April

0900-1015	<u>The Clandestine Services:</u>	Intra-Agency relationships	
1030-1115	<u>Automatic Data Processing</u>		Becker
1130-1200	<u>The DD/R Mission</u>		Scoville
1300-1350	<u>Technical Services In Support of the Agency's Operations</u>		
1415-1530	<u>The Support Function and Role in CIA</u>		White
1545-1630	Seminar meetings		

25X1

Tuesday, 16 April

0900-1020	Film: <u>Acquisition of Agents (Parts III &amp; IV)</u>	
1045-1145	<u>Security of Intelligence:</u> CIA and the Intelligence Community	Bannerman
1145-1200	Film: <u>Small Town</u>	
1240-1310	Film: <u>The Middle East (OPTIONAL)</u>	
1315-1415	<u>Personnel Policies and Problems</u>	Echols
1430-1510	<u>Logistical Support Activities</u>	
1520-1600	<u>The Agency's Fiscal Program</u>	
1600-1630	Seminar meetings	

25X1

Wednesday, 17 April

0900-1000	<u>Legislative Relationships:</u> Future Legislation affecting the Agency	Houston
1020-1110	<u>Training Trends and Developments</u>	Baird
1120-1200	Film: <u>Latin America</u>	
1300-1400	<u>Medical Support of Agency Activities</u>	
1420-1530	<u>Photographic Intelligence:</u> Potential; role of the NPIC	Lundahl
1545-1630	Seminar meetings	

25X1

Thursday, 18 April

0900-1000	<u>Foreign Intelligence Organizations:</u> The U.K.	
1020-1120	<u>Foreign Intelligence Organizations:</u> The U.S.S.R.	
1130-1200	<u>Office of the Inspector General</u>	
1300-1630	Preparation of Seminar Reports	

Earman

25X1

Friday, 19 April

0900-1200	Seminar Reports
1315-1430	Critique and Final Administration
1445-1600	Closing Address

S-E-C-R-E-T



25X1

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REMARKS TO NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE CLASS OF 1963  
18 APRIL 1963

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SINCE THIS IS FIRST VISIT OF A SENIOR DEFENSE COLLEGE CLASS ON THE AGENCY PREMISES, IT IS A PRIVILEGE TO WELCOME CLASS OF '63. MANY AGENCY HANDS SITTING ABOUT YOU DATE BACK TO THE CLASS OF '49, SO WE ALSO HAVE AN ALUMNI REUNION GOING ON TODAY.

(PERHAPS INJECT CARTER WITTICISM HARKING BACK TO YOUR NWC TENURE.)

*like what?*

ILLEGIB

HAPPY WE ARE A PART OF YOUR TWO-WEEK PHASE ON COUNTERINSURGENCY. COUNTERINSURGENCY IS NOT NEW. AS YOU SWALLOW DEFINITIONS OF THE MANY FACETS OF CI AND REVERT TO "CUSTER'S LAST STAND" AND VARIOUS ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY FORCES AND OUR DEPARTMENT OF STATE (LONG BEFORE WE HAD AN OSS OR A CIA), YOU FIND THAT THIS COUNTRY HAS BEEN IN CI BUSINESS SINCE ABOUT 1776, AND PERHAPS EARLIER. SO, WHILE CI IS NOT NEW, WE HAVE NEW GROUND RULES WITHIN WHICH TO OPERATE, NEW DEFINITIONS, AND NEW PEOPLE BREATHING DOWN THE BACKS OF THE NECKS

A sexy catchall -

3  
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OF THE OPERATING FORCES. CERTAINLY WITH A GOVERNMENT  
AS MONSTROUS AS OURS, FACED WITH THE MANY PROBLEMS WE  
NOW FACE WORLDWIDE, THERE IS A CRYING NEED FOR  
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL AS  
WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT LEVEL.

I'M TOLD SOME OF YOU HAVE BEEN IN COLOMBIA RECENTLY  
ON YOUR JUNKET. WE PROPOSE TO HAVE THE CHIEF OF OUR  
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION, COLONEL KING, RELATE TO

STAT

I was there in 1948 - Harry

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TO KEEP YOU AWAKE THIS AFTERNOON, WE PROPOSE  
TO KEEP YOU IN SEMI-CONTINUOUS MOTION BY A SERIES OF  
TOURS AND DEMONSTRATIONS--SOME OF IT FROM THE SEXY  
SIDE; SOME OF IT FROM THE DEADLY ROUTINE THAT IS PART  
OF THE ASSEMBLY LINE OF ALL AGENCIES.

WE SHALL DISPLAY SOME OF THE PARAMILITARY  
*have been used for*  
EQUIPMENT WHICH WE ~~CAN~~ USE; SOME PHOTOGRAPHIC  
*4*  
INTERPRETATION TECHNIQUES AND METHODS; SOME FILM  
CLIPS OF CLANDESTINE TRAINING TECHNIQUES; AND SOME

Notes Used by General Carter for Welcoming Address to National War College Class of 1963 Who Visited the Agency on 18 April 1963

6

COMPLICATED AND EXPENSIVE AUTOMATED OPERATIONAL  
FILING MACHINERY. WE HOPE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A  
GLIMPSE OF SOME OF OUR AGENCY ACTIVITIES WITH AN IDEA  
TOWARD SUGGESTING TYPES OF SUPPORT WE CAN POSSIBLY  
PROVIDE YOU WHEN YOU GO OUT IN JUNE TO YOUR NEW MILITARY  
AND DIPLOMATIC ASSIGNMENTS.

CIA Report



Revised Morning Agenda

Speakers by Order of Appearance

0910-0913	3 minutes	<input type="text"/>	(Introduce General Carter)	STAT
0913-0920	7 minutes	General Carter		
0920-0921	1 minute	Colonel M. Baird (Introduce Dr. Wheelon)		
0921-1015	54 minutes	Dr. Wheelon - General Rodenhauser Address		
1015-1035	20 minutes	Coffee Break		
1035-1045	10 minutes	<input type="text"/>	(Moderate Question Period)	STAT
1045-1046	1 minute	Colonel Baird (Introduce Col. J. C. King)		
1046-1145	59 minutes	Colonel King Address		
1145-1200	14 minutes	Break		
1200-1229	29 minutes	<input type="text"/>	(Moderate - King Question Period)	STAT
1230		Colonel Baird - Dismiss group for lunch		
1230-1245	15 minutes	Move to North Cafeteria		

C

Notes Used by General Carter for Speech Delivered on 13 February 1963  
to the Clandestine Services Review Course

- 
- A. HOW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE IMPROVED  
THE AGENCY'S PUBLIC IMAGE, AND THE  
RELATIONSHIP AND STANDING OF CIA WITH  
THE PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF THE  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

(ATTACHED FOLDER )

*over*  
2

- 
- B. THE NEW LOOK IN CIA REGARDING  
ORGANIZATION, POLICY AND PERSONNEL  
HANDLING UNDER MR. McCONE'S AND  
GENERAL CARTER'S LEADERSHIP.

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C. THE RELATIONSHIP AND STANDING OF CIA  
WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE U. S.  
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

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D. HOW DID CIA RATE AND COMPARE WITH  
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE  
COMMUNITY DURING THE CUBAN CRISES  
LAST FALL?

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E. ARE ANY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES  
PLANNED OR CONTEMPLATED?

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22 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Support)  
SUBJECT : Address to the Clandestine Services Review Course (13 Feb 63)

1. Thank you very much for accepting my invitation to address the students in the next running of the Clandestine Services Review Course.

2. For your information, I am attaching hereto a copy of the schedule for this course together with a breakdown of the student composition by Sex, Grade, Division and Career Designation.

3. For scheduling purposes we have listed your talk as the Opening Address. It is felt this will give you the freedom to pick a topic of your choosing. As a suggestion, however, in view of the fact that practically all of the students are recent returnees from overseas posts and have not been stationed at Headquarters for some years, I submit the following for consideration:


*How recent developments have improved the Agency's public image.*  
a. The new look in CIA regarding organization, policy and personnel handling under Mr. McCone's and your leadership.

b. The relationship and standing of CIA with the President and members of the National Security Council.

c. The relationship and standing of CIA with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

d. How did CIA rate and compare with other members of the Intelligence Community during the Cuban crises last fall?

e. Are any major organizational changes planned or contemplated?

  
Matthew Baird  
Director of Training

25X1

Attachments:  
As indicated

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63-345

10 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : A Deputy Director (Support) J.Y.Z. 14 JAN 1963

SUBJECT : Address to the Clandestine Services Review Course

1. The Clandestine Services Review Course, which is conducted primarily for Clandestine Services officers recently returned to Headquarters from field assignments, is scheduled for the period 4 through 13 February 1963. You recall you made an appearance at two previous runnings of this course, and it would be gratefully appreciated if you would again deliver the opening address to the students on 4 February 1963. The class will be conducted in Room GD 2608 Headquarters Building, and for scheduling purposes we have allocated the period from 0930 to 1015 hours on the opening day for your presentation. If that time is not convenient for you, we will be glad to make an adjustment.

2. On the occasion of your two previous appearances in this course, you devoted approximately twenty minutes to a talk each time on a subject of your own choosing and allowed the balance of the time to answer questions submitted by the students. We plan to follow the same procedure this time, for it worked out very successfully before.

3. A copy of the schedule will be sent to you prior to 4 February together with a breakdown of the student composition.

25X1

4. I sincerely hope you will again be able to accommodate the Office of Training. Since I will be out of the country on TDY on 4 February, I have asked [redacted] my Deputy Director to come to your office immediately before 0930 on 4 February to escort you to the room where the course will be held, if your busy schedule permits you to accept this invitation.

25X1

[redacted]  
Matthew Baird

Director of Training 20 JAN 63

SECRET

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

## MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

You will recall that you have agreed to address the Clandestine Services Review Course on their closing day. Mr. Kirkpatrick is giving the closing address and they have asked if you will speak just prior to that -- anytime between 1:00 and 2:30 tomorrow afternoon. They thought you might like to do as you have in the past -- speak about 20 minutes and then allow some time for answering questions. What time would you like to plan on making this address? 2:00 - and keep

Attached papers are for your use in connection with address.

*going until Kirk arrives  
from Quantico*

12 Feb 63

(DATE)

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B

*Cancelled*  
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DDCI Briefing for Senator Stennis (03 0001) **SECRET** 24 January 1963

CUBA

I. CUBAN ECONOMY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE

- A. INADEQUATE SUPPLIES AND POOR DISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMER GOODS, PARTICULARLY FOOD AND CLOTHING, ARE MAJOR IRRITANTS AMONG PUBLIC
1. FOOD RATIONING, BEGUN LAST MARCH, HAS NOT ASSURED IMPARTIAL DISTRIBUTION OR ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF NEEDED GOODS.
  2. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH GRUMBLING AMONG PUBLIC AND OCCASIONAL OPEN PROTESTS, BUT OUR INFORMATION SUGGESTS SHORTAGES ARE NOT MAJOR INDUCEMENTS TO OPEN REVOLT.

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B. NO SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT IN ECONOMY IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

1. PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT THIS YEAR'S SUGAR CROP--  
MAINSTAY OF ECONOMY--WILL BE LESS THAN LAST YEAR'S POOR  
CROP OF 4.8 MILLION TONS.
  - a. AVERAGE ANNUAL CROP NEARLY 6 MILLION TONS
  - b. SUGAR PRICES ON WORLD MARKET NOW NEAR 40-YEAR HIGH, BUT  
CUBA MAY NOT BENEFIT MUCH SINCE A GOOD PORTION OF ITS  
SUGAR EXPORTS GO TO SOVIET BLOC FOR BARTER.
2. NEGOTIATIONS NOW UNDERWAY ON LEVEL OF CUBA'S 1963 TRADE  
WITH SINO-SOVIET BLOC.
  - a. PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENTS ON TALKS HAVE BEEN VAGUE AND  
HAVE MENTIONED ONLY THAT TRADE WILL INCREASE THIS YEAR.

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- SECRET
- b. IF CUBA-BLOC TRADE INCREASES THIS YEAR OVER LAST, IT WILL MEAN THAT CUBA RECEIVING COMMODITY CREDITS FROM BLOC, SINCE CUBA WILL HAVE FEWER EXPORTS THIS YEAR TO PAY FOR NEEDED IMPORTS.
  - 3. CUBA'S COMMERCE WITH NON-BLOC COUNTRIES CONTINUES TO SHRINK.
    - a. THIS, IN TURN, MAKES IT INCREASINGLY EXPENSIVE FOR USSR TO KEEP CASTRO AFLOAT.
    - b. NON-BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA HAS FALLEN OFF FROM A PRE-CRISIS RATE OF ABOUT <sup>76</sup>~~37~~ VOYAGES PERMONTH TO ONLY 34 IN THE NEARLY TWO MONTHS BETWEEN THE LIFTING OF THE QUARANTINE ON 20 NOVEMBER AND 15 JANUARY.
    - c. THE SOVIET BLOC HAS INITIATED A NEW SHIPPING SERVICE TO CUBA IN AN EFFORT TO FILL THE GAP.

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- d. CUBA IS DEPENDENT ON THE BLOC FOR ALMOST 80 PERCENT OF ITS IMPORTS, INCLUDING ALL ITS PETROLEUM AND AN INCREASING PROPORTION OF CONSUMER GOODS.
- e. UNLESS THE SOVIET BLOC IS WILLING TO INVEST EVEN MORE HEAVILY IN CUBA, SOME OF THE GRANDIOSE DEVELOPMENT PLANS WORKED OUT EARLIER IN THE CUBAN-SOVIET PARTNERSHIP WILL HAVE TO BE DEFERRED IN THE INTERESTS OF SIMPLY KEEPING THE COUNTRY AFLOAT.

II. POLITICALLY, THERE IS NO DETECTABLE CHANGE IN THE CASTRO REGIME'S GOALS AND METHODS.

A. CASTRO STILL DEDICATED TO IMPLANTING THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN CUBA AND IS DETERMINED TO SURMOUNT ALL OBSTACLES.

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- Approved For Release 2006/07/25 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001400110004-3
- B. SOMETIME EARLY THIS YEAR HE IS EXPECTED TO LAUNCH HIS FORMAL POLITICAL MACHINE, "THE UNITED PARTY OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION," MODELED AFTER BLOC COMMUNIST PARTIES.
1. PREPARATIONS FOR FORMATION OF PARTY HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SOME MONTHS AT MEETINGS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY OF LOCAL UNITS OF THE PROVISIONAL "INTEGRATED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS," THE PRECURSOR OF THE FORMAL PARTY.
- C. RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY REGIME LEADERS ON SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE HAVE SOUGHT TO CREATE IMPRESSION OF IMPARTIALITY.
1. CASTRO WAS APPARENTLY ANGERED BY SOVIET MISSILE WITHDRAWAL, BUT AWARE THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO JEOPARDIZE SOVIET ECONOMIC LIFELINE HE REALIZES HE MUST GO EASY.

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a. ALSO, HE SEEMS EMOTIONALLY MORE ATTUNED TO THE CHINESE

COMMUNIST "HARD" LINE AND HIS PUBLIC SPEECHES ON 2 AND 15  
JANUARY REFLECT THIS.

D. CASTRO'S CONTINUED HATRED FOR THE UNITED STATES IS EVIDENT IN  
ALL HIS SPEECHES AND, DESPITE RUMORS, NO ATTEMPT BY HIM AT  
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH US IS LIKELY.

E. RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY REGIME LEADERS EMPHASIZE IMPORTANT  
ROLE THEY SEE FOR CUBA IN LEADING THE "ANTI-IMPERIALIST  
REVOLUTION" IN LATIN AMERICA.

1. THEY ARE ADAMANT IN REJECTING ANY IDEA THAT THE "REVOLUTION"  
CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN ANY WAY OTHER THAN THROUGH VIOLENCE.
2. INCREASED CUBAN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE SUBVERSION IN LATIN  
AMERICA SEEM LIKELY IN COMING MONTHS.

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3. ONE OF CUBA'S MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF SUBVERSION IS THE

THE TRAINING IN CUBA OF THOUSANDS OF "STUDENTS" FROM OTHER  
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN TACTICS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE  
AND IN MARXIST-LENINIST INDOCTRINATION.

a. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT LAST YEAR AT LEAST 1,000 AND PERHAPS  
AS MANY AS 1,500 INDIVIDUALS FROM OTHER LATIN AMERICAN  
COUNTRIES RECEIVED TRAINING IN CUBA IN GUERRILLA WARFARE.

F. WHILE MOST OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE  
CASTRO REGIME, THOSE ENGAGED IN ACTIVE RESISTANCE ARE RELATIVELY  
FEW.

1. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN SCATTERED ANTI-REGIME  
ACTIVITY IN RECENT WEEKS, ESPECIALLY IN THE PROVINCE OF  
LAS VILLAS IN CENTRAL CUBA.



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- a. BUT GUERRILLA BANDS IN THE MOUNTAINS THERE APPEAR  
UNCOORDINATED AND THEIR ACTIVITIES MORE OF A HARASSING  
NATURE THAN REPRESENTING A THREAT TO THE REGIME.
- b. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT OF 22 JANUARY CLAIMS 21 PEOPLE  
WERE EXECUTED RECENTLY IN LAS VILLAS FOR ATTEMPTING  
TO REVOLT AND JOIN GUERRILLAS IN MOUNTAINS.
2. IN GENERAL, POTENTIAL FOR ACTIVE RESISTANCE IS HIGH IN CUBA,  
BUT THE REGIME'S PERVASIVE AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY NETWORK  
MAKES IT SEEM FOOL HARDY TO CUBANS CONSIDERING OPEN ACTION  
AGAINST REGIME.
  - a. IN ADDITION, THEY LACK WEAPONS AND MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS  
AMONG THEM AND THEIR LEADERS IN EXILE ARE DIVIDED AMONG  
THEMSELVES.

## III.

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MILITARILY THE CASTRO REGIME CONTINUES TO BE THE BEST EQUIPPED  
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION RETAINS ITS MILITARY<sup>25X1</sup>  
PRESENCE IN CUBA.

A. ON THE BASIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE SOURCES,  
WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SINCE LATE OCTOBER THE SOVIETS HAVE  
WITHDRAWN [ ] STRATEGIC MISSILES AND [ ] JET BOMBERS AND THEIR  
RELATED EQUIPMENT. <sup>25X1</sup>

1. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS REPRESENTS ALL STRATEGIC WEAPONS  
PLACED IN CUBA BY THE SOVIETS.

B. IN ADDITION, SOME 5,000 OF THE NEARLY 22,000 SOVIET MILITARY  
PERSONNEL IN CUBA AT THE PEAK OF THE CRISIS HAVE BEEN  
WITHDRAWN.

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
*speech file*

## GENERAL CARTER'S SPEECH AT 21 JANUARY 1963 RESERVE MEETING

*(as transcribed from tape of speech)*

Thank you. I am not sure I need that microphone. If I do, give me a hand signal some place, preferably in the back, and I'll come join you. I had not realized until I was just introduced that I had any military control over the male members of this pickle factory. It would appear that perhaps certain portions of the Articles of War might be utilized by me and vice versa to establish the Central Intelligence Agency in a manner which would justify all of us retaining our military status. That's a rather deep question. I'm not sure whether I'm being taped here. If I am, you're going to have to look it over two or three times and see what the implications are. I have continually maintained since I have been here in the Agency that under no circumstances would I attempt to militarize it. I am glad I said that because it would be totally impossible to attempt it in the first place; this is based on a purely normal nine months gestation that I have been with you. There is very little that I can say about your reserve program or our reserve program because if you did not have a very active interest in participating in it and if you did not believe that it had some value then you would not be here. And this rather worrisome chore which I am now undertaking, and worrisome because as you see I have to hold onto this podium or lectern here being totally unprepared, would not be necessary. So accordingly, I would like to hit just a few high spots, perhaps tell a couple of very worn out anecdotes and eat up the first 15 or 20 minutes of this one point program so you can get ahead with the rest of your more erudite and perhaps sexier training in the bowels of the Agency. I

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had a definition of this hall which I had intended to give you but I noticed that some of the fairer sex are here and I was constrained to temper my remarks, mildly, but there is a Philippine dialect called Tagalog and some of you may know it and if you do know it, I urge you to look up a phrase that sounds something like "sudona dalag" and this means maiden's breast. And every time I look out of my window from the seventh floor and see this beautiful dome I not only wish that we had windows that could be removed, but I wonder where the other one is. 25X1

But, as long as the acoustics are good, I suppose we can get along without the gentler touch. I asked [ ] what I might appropriately say to you. He didn't have any better idea than the staff and he just said, "Get up there and make an ass of yourself and let them at least know what the Deputy Director looks like because you don't see too many of them." So you know what I look like. On my way down I did cut out a note from Der Spigle or Der Speigle, the newspaper which in Germany has been under some ill repute recently. This is a quote picked out by the North American Air Defense Command and I think is very appropriate to the caliber of personnel we have here in the Agency. And it says, "A generation that has looked at the polar ice from below, at Jane Mansfield sideways and at the moon from behind are not likely to be stunned by anything." I think that's appropriate. I think it fits into the caliber of personnel we have here in the Agency. Their minds run in at least three tracks. In looking at these cards that were prepared for me, I find that, "It is important to you - this apparently is the reserve program - I've skipped the first card - "It

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is important to you because it permits you to retain your military reserve status and the benefits which accompany it." I'd like to go along with that. I have retained my military status while here in the Agency and the benefits which go along with it. "It's important to the Agency because it permits the Agency to retain your services in military or civilian status in time of national emergency instead of releasing you to the Armed Forces." That sounds like a guarantee, but knowing what little I do about the Armed Forces, I would say don't depend on it. You can at least assure yourself that you will not be subjected to the draft and this can at times, I think, be helpful. The third reason you should maintain your competency as a reserve officer in this Agency, according to this, "is that it is important to the Armed Forces because it reduces the numbers of military personnel which must be furnished to the Agency in the event of a national emergency, since many of you will be mobilized to meet the initial Agency requirement for military personnel." Well, I think that probably has some merits although I'm not just too sure what augmentation we in the Agency would get when we go on a national mobilization basis, particularly under the current operating procedures in which we have special forces and all sorts of military units which we never had before which have sprung up in the last two or three years under the guise of counterinsurgency. I presume we are talking here in the family and I presume also that there is enough degree of classification in my remarks to prevent me from having some day to explain to my military superiors what I said when I was in the Agency. I might just as well tell you, however, the days of the Central Intelligence Agency as possessing the sole competence in certain types of operations

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are becoming more and more in jeopardy. And while this has nothing to do with your reserve forces position, I urge you as individuals to give the greatest degree of effort and integrity and competence to the Agency in those fields in which there is a military sideline or a possible military capability. I don't mean that anyone is trying to put us out of business. All I'm saying is that the competition is getting bigger and bigger and it is incumbent upon us here in the Agency to be the area of competence, the area of professionalism in those fields in which we have this competence. It's incumbent upon us to hold always at the top level to this position and to be the teachers and the instructors and the guiding lights to those other agencies which, because of increasing demands, must of necessity get into certain aspects of our business. As reserve officers it seems to me you have really a dual responsibility - I've forgotten the cards now - a responsibility to promote the Agency as a highly competent, totally professional group of men, totally dedicated and totally selfless to their assigned mission to promote the Agency and the personnel in it in all of your contacts with the military as well as with civilians. I think this is terribly important. I think that we have got to have a unity of thought, a unity of public presence in which the Agency, the Agency is the entity to which our loyalty extends; not a particular component of the Agency but the Agency as the Central Intelligence Agency; the focus of professionalism in those areas which respond to our primary mission, our primary mission. And I think you can be great exponents of the Agency particularly because of your reserve status in all of our contacts with the military and to a lesser degree perhaps with the civilians. It may come as some shock to you



but I served three years in the State Department. The shock being that I can still have a lot of crudity about me without having all the edges worn off. I did serve three years in the State Department. And for those of you who have heard this unhappy story, you'll still have to stay in order to get your point credit. But as an indication of how you can get into deep trouble without even trying, I visited the Embassy in Brazil where we had one of the old Foreign Service - old, old, old Foreign Service type Ambassadors. He was showing me through the Embassy - I had newly reported to the State Department - and as we were going up this spiral staircase into the ballroom the Ambassador turned to me and said, "How long, General, have you been in the diplomatic service?" I was just about to respond when I saw two pictures at the end of the hall of a couple of old jokers, obviously nineteenth century with beards and sideburns, and I turned to the Ambassador and said, "Who are those two jokers?" "Oh," he said, "those are my grandparents and I withdraw my previous question." This was my introduction to the State Department and I must say the story must have gotten around pretty well because I was in deep trouble those entire three years. I point this out to say I am not a member of the diplomatic corps nor am I a diplomat. In fact, not too long ago I was at one of our outlying stations and I had just filled out a form for the Agency, one of hundreds that I have filled out since I joined, and I had done various other relatively undignified procedures in the Agency - you know things strapped and all sorts of things - and I had filled out this form which indicated that my wife was witting. I first found out what this meant. I had never run into it before but in visiting this outlying station I saw this lovely girl

over in the corner and I had had my two martinis and I went over to join her and struck up a conversation. This was an Agency installation entirely. And I didn't notice this gentleman come join us and I turned to this lovely girl and I meant to say, "Are you witting" but my tongue slipped and I said, "Are you willing." I corrected myself very quickly and I said, "I mean witting." And this fellow standing next to her said, "She sure to Hell is, we have six kids." I didn't stick around to ask him which or what we were talking about. Finally, they allotted me fifteen minutes to keep you amused until you get on with your training and I have several other stories. The most noteworthy of which I think I will save until the end, that will be three or four minutes. It says here that "If you wish to retain your reserve status you should be prepared to participate fully in the reserve program and meet its requirements for your continued status in it." These requirements may have to be changed after this evening's entertainment. In any event you are here now so up to now you are current. And "Unless you are prepared to contribute to the program, you will neither benefit from it nor will the Agency meet its obligations in supporting it." I think this is probably true about anything. I think the major effort I can put into being while I am here is to see if we can't get the Navy to join this outfit. It has never been done anywhere else. I think we at least should give it a try now that we have the opportunity here. It is helpful that you are a joint command and it also says here "This is important since more often than not the major CIA headquarters will always be adjacent to the joint military command and the fact that you have organized on

a regional basis on the major geographical areas of the world gives focus to the subjects with which you are concerned but will make your mobilization assignment easier to resolve." That's pretty heady stuff. You know that it may well be that my next assignment is in charge of the reserve forces and somebody knows it ahead of me. In any event all joking aside, the reserve program is important. It is important to the Agency. I have a personal interest in it. That is why I am here. I will continue to beat the drum for it and I will attempt to get the Navy in it. It should be important to all of you, not only from your own personal situation in the future and some of it happens to you this year I presume from your 20 year basis, but also it's important to the Agency. But namely it's important because of the stature, the stature that you as an operating, professionally-competent Agency representative maintains as a reserve officer. And I would leave no stone unturned at every opportunity when you are meeting with your counterparts, particularly military ones, to reminisce about what happened at Anzio or if you were in <sup>OSS</sup> ~~SS~~ Europe what happened in some of the bistros in Paris. At least drag up something to reminisce about if you really get into a pinch and somebody starts giving you a hard time because of your perhaps lack of knowledge of military requirements. You can continue to count on my all out support for the program. Finally, in order to get off this podium but to assure you that I will attempt to answer any questions that you might have, not about the reserve program, believe me, but about the Agency in general and even specifically if it is of general interest for the next few minutes in order to take care of the instructors for your second period who have not yet prepared their instruction sheets. They're in almost as bad shape as I was, probably worse, before I came

down here. I'm reminded of the dinner that I attended at the Norwegian Ambassador's house in Paris in 1948 when I was accompanying General Marshall, he being Secretary of State, and the foreign ministers of France and England were also there. And after the dinner, they got up and left. They had a private session and the Indians, of which I was one - there were about 10 of us I guess, stayed around after dinner for an appropriate amount of coffee, cigarettes and liquors. And after about an hour of this, I looked around and while I might not have been the oldest I was certainly the most bored and the baldest, so it seemed time for someone to make an excuse and I went over to the hostess and in my best State Department language I said, "Thank you very much your Excellency or Madame, I've had a lovely evening." And she looked up at me - she was a beautiful blonde with great big blue eyes - and said, "Oh, must you leave now?" Well, I hadn't read a Hell of a lot farther in the book and I didn't know what the next ploy was so I said, "Well," reverting to the simple soldiery, I said, "Well, I can't stay all night." Being an Ambassador's wife, she replied, "I had not hoped for such a favor at this our first meeting." That was along toward the end of my State Department career. I retired without answering any questions from the Ambassador's wife. But, if there are any questions now, I would be prepared to tackle them. Thank you again for certainly your sufferance in letting me come up here. I have given you a brief of what I was told to give you and you have seen the Deputy Director. I am certain it is no consolation but it may help to relieve some of the consternation at some later date when you get a paper I may have signed off on or directed the assignment of. Thanks again. Are there any

8-10-77

questions? Is there anyone who wants to get up and make a speech or ask me anything about the Agency that I can't pass to John Warner or send up to the Hill? Apparently not, you're so anxious to get to your next assignment. Thanks again for coming and you have now earned about .33 of a point. Thank you.

# Topics

OFFICE OF INFORMATION  
HQ NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

VOL. VII, No. 2

15 January 1963

"A generation that has looked at the polar ice from below, at Jayne Mansfield sideways and at the moon from behind is not likely to be stunned by anything." -- Der Spiegel.

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1. FOR THE PAST 13 YEARS THE AGENCY HAS ENCOURAGED ITS RESERVE OFFICERS TO MAINTAIN THEIR MILITARY RESERVE STATUS. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THIS POLICY AND IT WILL BE CONTINUED.
2. IN ADDITION TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT THE AGENCY PROVIDES, THE ARMED FORCES CONTRIBUTE ROUGHLY A QUARTER OF A MILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY TO MEET THE COSTS OF YOUR ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING.
3. THE AGENCY RESERVE PROGRAM IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, THE AGENCY, AND YOUR MILITARY SERVICE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

- a. IT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU BECAUSE IT PERMITS YOU TO RETAIN YOUR MILITARY RESERVE STATUS AND THE BENEFITS WHICH ACCOMPANY IT.
- b. IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE AGENCY BECAUSE IT PERMITS THE AGENCY TO RETAIN YOUR SERVICES IN MILITARY OR CIVILIAN STATUS IN TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY INSTEAD OF RELEASING YOU TO THE ARMED FORCES.
- c. IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE ARMED FORCES BECAUSE IT REDUCES THE NUMBERS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WHICH MUST BE FURNISHED TO THE AGENCY IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY, SINCE MANY OF YOU WILL BE MOBILIZED TO MEET THE INITIAL AGENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL.



4. YOU RESERVISTS REPRESENT THE INITIAL FORCE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL THE AGENCY WILL NEED IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL MOBILIZATION. BY VIRTUE OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF AGENCY TASKS, AND YOUR PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS YOU WILL BE MORE VALUABLE TO THE AGENCY IN AN EMERGENCY THAN AN EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF PERSONNEL WHO MIGHT BE DETAILED TO US FROM THE ARMED FORCES. YOU ARE THE AGENCY'S PREFERRED SOURCE OF MILITARY MANPOWER IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION AND VITAL TO OUR INITIAL EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

5. RETENTION, BY EACH OF YOU, OF YOUR MILITARY STATUS, ENHANCES YOUR USEFULNESS TO THE AGENCY IN PEACETIME. SOME OF YOU HAVE FILLED DUTY ASSIGNMENTS IN MILITARY STATUS OVERSEAS. EACH OF YOU HAS PERFORMED ACTIVE DUTY ASSIGNMENTS WITH YOUR RESPECTIVE SERVICES. THESE EXPERIENCES ARE IMPORTANT IN PRESENTING TO THE ARMED FORCES AN IMPRESSION OF THE AGENCY ON THE ONE HAND, AND HAVE GIVEN YOU, ON THE OTHER, AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE MILITARY VIEWPOINT AND OF INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS.

6. ON THE PRACTICAL SIDE, EACH OF YOU STANDS TO BENEFIT MATERIALLY BY RETAINING YOUR RESERVE STATUS. YOU BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR CERTAIN RETIREMENT BENEFITS AFTER YOU HAVE PUT IN YOUR 20 YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE. FOR MANY OF YOU, 1963 IS THE CRITICAL YEAR.

7. IF YOU WISH TO RETAIN YOUR RESERVE STATUS YOU SHOULD BE  
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PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE RESERVE PROGRAM AND MEET ITS  
REQUIREMENTS FOR YOUR CONTINUED STATUS IN IT. UNLESS YOU ARE  
PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROGRAM YOU WILL NEITHER BENEFIT  
FROM IT, NOR WILL THE AGENCY MEET ITS OBJECTIVES IN SUPPORTING IT.

8. THERE ARE CERTAIN FACTORS INHERENT IN THE CURRENT RESERVE  
ORGANIZATIONS AND ITS TRAINING CONCEPT THAT ARE PARTICULARLY  
SIGNIFICANT TO AGENCY INTERESTS; FIRST, THAT YOU -- EXCEPT FOR THE  
NAVY -- ARE NOW A JOINT COMMAND AND THIS IS IMPORTANT SINCE MORE  
OFTEN THAN NOT, THE MAJOR CIA HEADQUARTERS WILL ALWAYS BE ADJACENT  
TO A JOINT MILITARY COMMAND; AND SECOND, THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE  
ORGANIZED ON A REGIONAL BASIS CAN PLACE THE KIND OF EMPHASIS ON THE  
MAJOR GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS OF THE WORLD WHICH NOT ONLY GIVES FOCUS  
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TO THE SUBJECTS YOU ARE CONCERNED WITH, BUT WILL MAKE YOUR  
MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT EASIER TO RESOLVE. THIRD, THE AGENCY  
HAS BENEFITED IN THE PAST FROM EFFORTS OF YOUR RESERVE ORGANIZATION  
IN DEVELOPING IDEAS AND CONCEPTS OF AGENCY PARTICIPATION WITH THE  
MILITARY UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF NUCLEAR AND LIMITED WAR AND  
CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS. EVEN THOUGH YOU MAY NEVER BE MOBILIZED IN  
MILITARY STATUS, YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROGRAM WILL UNDOUBTEDLY  
ENHANCE YOUR USEFULNESS TO THE AGENCY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR  
DAILY TASKS. I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT YOUR CURRENT ORGANIZATION  
AND CONCEPT OF TRAINING HAS RECEIVED OFFICIAL APPROVAL OF THE  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. IT WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE  
AGENCY.

CONFIDENTIAL

Hold  
A 30  
3 Dec 62

19 October 1962

SUBJECT: Proposed Points To Be Covered by General Carter in Addressing the  
Joint Military Reserve Command (Provincial) on ~~22 October~~ at  
1745 Hours  
21-53

1. For the past 13 years the Agency has encouraged its reserve officers to maintain their military reserve status. There is no change in this policy and it will be continued.
2. In addition to the administrative and logistical support the Agency provides, the Armed Forces contribute roughly a quarter of a million dollars annually to meet the costs of your active duty training.
3. It is commendable that Agency reservists have retained their interest and military status over the years in view of the fact that they receive no compensation for their inactive duty training as do members of the Ready Reserve elsewhere.
4. The Agency Reserve Program is important to you, the Agency and your military service for the following reasons:
  - a. It is important to you because it permits you to retain your military reserve status and the benefits which accompany it.
  - b. It is important to the Agency because it permits the Agency to retain your services in military or civilian status in time of national emergency instead of releasing you to the Armed Forces.
  - c. It is important to the Armed Forces because it reduces the numbers of military personnel which must be furnished to the Agency in the event of a national emergency, since many of you will be mobilized to meet the initial Agency requirements for military personnel.
5. You reservists represent the initial force of military personnel the Agency will need in the event of general mobilization. By virtue of your knowledge and understanding of Agency tasks, and your professional qualifications you will be more valuable to the Agency in an emergency than an equivalent number of personnel who might be detailed to us from the Armed Forces. As a matter of fact, the Armed Forces will probably send us mobilized reservists, in such an event, rather than members of the regular establishment. In this sense, you are the Agency's preferred source of military manpower in an emergency situation and vital to our initial efforts in support of military operations.

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6. In another sense, retention, by each of you, of your military status, enhances your usefulness to the Agency in peacetime. Some of you have filled duty assignments in military status overseas. Each of you has performed active duty assignments with your respective services. These experiences are important in presenting to the Armed Forces an impression of the Agency on the one hand, and have given you, on the other, an understanding of the military viewpoint and of interagency relationships. Such associations can be mutually beneficial in all cases where we contribute to a better understanding of our separate ways of reaching common goals.

// 7. The question of your actual mobilization assignment in an emergency or contingency situation will be re-<sup>solved</sup> primarily on the basis of your professional qualifications to fill a given position. The factor of cover, and the relative importance of the manpower requirements within the various components in the Agency must also be considered. Some of you may be mobilized in military status and detailed to your current position if it requires military status in an emergency, if it does not and you are needed in your current position you may not be mobilized at all. Others may be mobilized to fill military positions in components of the Agency other than that to which they are assigned at the time of emergency to the extent that they are professionally qualified for such positions, and acceptable to the head of the component concerned.

8. On the practical side, each of you stands to benefit materially by retaining your reserve status. You become eligible for certain retirement benefits after you have put in your 20 years of military service. For many of you, 196<sup>3</sup> is the critical year. Some of you may wonder if it is still important for you to participate in the reserve program. The decision is yours to make. As things now stand, no one can say with certainty that the military reserve status of any one of you in and of itself is as important as your other qualifications to serve the Agency now or for the foreseeable future, or that your reserve status is an essential factor in your value to the Agency. In fact the majority of the Agency's manpower has no current military status at all. Does this mean that continuation in the Agency reserve program is unimportant? The answer is obviously NO.

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9. If you wish to retain your reserve status you should be prepared to participate fully in the reserve program and meet its requirements for your continued status in it. Unless you are prepared to contribute to the program you will neither benefit from it, nor will the Agency meet its objectives in supporting it.

10. The fact that you do have military status, and can be mobilized gives the Agency a measure of flexibility in meeting a situation in which sudden militarization of some Agency knowledge and experience is in the best interests of the United States. The maintenance of this program within the Agency is the best means of being prepared to meet such requirements and has been useful to us in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, even though it has involved relatively small numbers of persons.

11. There are certain factors inherent in the current reserve organization and its training concept that are particularly significant to Agency interests; first, that -- except for the Navy -- you are now a joint command and this is important since more often than not, the major CIA Headquarters will always be adjacent to a joint military command; and second, the fact that you have organized on a regional basis can place the kind of emphasis on the major geographical areas of the world which not only gives focus to the subjects you are concerned with, but will make your mobilization assignment easier to resolve. Third, the Agency has benefited in the past from efforts of your reserve organization in developing ideas and concepts of Agency participation with the military under various conditions of nuclear and limited war and contingency situations. It is hoped this effort will be continued because frequently all of us in our day to day work are so busy that it is sometimes difficult for us to take these forward looks in the future and make meaningful conclusions about what we should do.

12. I have heard that some of you from DD/I and DD/S have expressed concern that you will have very little competence to contribute to the work of the DD/P in mobilized status. Let me assure you that the DD/P effort can be greatly enhanced by close working relationships with DD/I, particularly since operations will always benefit by exercise of the intelligence function, in both the planning and action phases.

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Similarly, DD/S personnel are better able to provide support to operations where their knowledge and understanding of these operations are more than superficial. In reviewing your training program, there is apparent another by-product which may have nothing to do with mobilization, but which seems to make you more aware and knowledgeable through your participation in it of the current problems the Agency faces in meeting its responsibilities for counterinsurgency operations or what are now called overseas internal defense operations. Even though you may never be mobilized in military status, your participation in this program will undoubtedly enhance your usefulness to the Agency in the performance of your daily tasks. I am pleased to note that your current organization and concept of training has received official approval of the Department of Defense. It will continue to have the support of the Agency.

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SECRET

Executive Registry

66-3992/5

DD/S 66-5023

22 SEP 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

25X1

SUBJECT : Policy Guide for Public Appearances and Publication

1. The policy governing public appearances and publication of writings by CIA employees should place more responsibility on the individual and on the line of command for making the determinations regarding preservation of cover, security of content, and public relations impact. This emerges only in the section, "Procedures and Responsibilities."

2. In the section, "The Agency Employee", I believe it was our intention that an employee under non-official cover which might normally envisage speaking or writing on unclassified subjects should be allowed, even encouraged, to do so. Similarly, employees under official cover should not be precluded from writing or speaking about matters which are not related to national security.

3. Attached is a suggested redraft.

25X1

Alan M. Warfield /  
Assistant Deputy Director  
for Support

Att.

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SECRET

SUGGESTED REDRAFT

I. GENERAL

This policy guide is intended to assist employees, their supervisors, and concerned staffs in reaching decisions on employee requests to speak publicly or to write for publication. The principles herein are also applicable to requests for CIA speakers or written material and to requests directly to an employee by a private or non-Federal Government organization or activity.

II. POLICY

A. It is the policy of the Agency to prohibit activities by employees such as public speaking and writing for publication if the cover of the individual is likely to be impaired; if there is any chance of classified intelligence information, methods, or sources being disclosed to unauthorized individuals or groups; if there is any likelihood of publicity which would involve the Agency.

B. Conversely, it is the policy of the Agency to allow public speaking and writing by employees when such activity is normal to the individual's status as a citizen and is not in conflict with any of the considerations above.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The primary responsibility for adhering to the principles herein set forth lies with the employee, who knows his cover status and his material.

B. Following the supervisory chain of command, the Office Head or Operating Official responsible for the employee shall be responsible for approving or disapproving the proposed speaking engagement or publication. In meeting this responsibility, he will assure the concurrence of the Director of Security and the Special Assistant to the Director.

C. In the event there should be a conflict or lack of agreement between the Office Head of the employee, the Office of Security, or the Special Assistant to the Director, the case will be referred to a panel, consisting of a representative from each Directorate and chaired by the Special Assistant to the Director. Those cases which are not resolved by the panel will be referred to the DDCI.

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- 2 -

#### IV. IDENTIFICATION

A. Employees will identify themselves as Agency employees only when this is normal or required and provided there is no former, present, or future cover reason not to so identify themselves.


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DRAFT

POLICY GUIDE GOVERNING  
PUBLIC APPEARANCES AND OPEN  
PUBLICATION BY CIA EMPLOYEES

Given the diversity of their cover problems, the many areas of their professional and private interests and the variety of public media in which they might appear, it is virtually impossible to set forth a simple and all-encompassing rule governing the public appearance and open publication of CIA employees. It is possible, however, to set down certain basic principles against which each case may be judged on its own merits. These principles will be considered as they apply to the employee, the subject matter, and the procedural details.

THE AGENCY EMPLOYEE

25X1



(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

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P 1.25

3. The overt Agency employee, with no history of cover, and no likelihood of cover in the future, is free to speak and write, provided his actions are not likely to reflect adversely on the Agency and provided other provisions of this policy guide are satisfied. Here it should be noted that the employee should be free to identify himself as a CIA employee. If the media in which he appears does not normally require such identification (e. g., a book review, a song), the usual procedure for the media should be followed.

#### THE SUBJECT MATTER

For those Agency employees whose cover permits them to speak or write for publication, the next considerations apply to the material they will present.

1. Security. The material must be unclassified and drawn from unclassified sources available to other researchers.

2. Policy. Publications or speeches on current intelligence or intelligence operations, current foreign policy issues or other controversial subjects, especially when such presentations could be construed as a CIA opinion rather than the author's, must be avoided.

3. Equity. The preparation of the speech or article must be accomplished on the employee's own time and must not interfere with his normal duties.

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### PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The primary responsibility for adhering to the principles herein set forth lies with the employee, who knows his cover status and his material.
2. Following the chain of command, the next authority will be the office head of the employee, who will review the proposed publication for compliance with policy.
3. The Office of Security will then conduct its own review, as currently required by regulations.
4. The Special Assistant to the Director is the final approving authority in routine cases.

In the event there should be a conflict or lack of agreement between the office head of the employee, the Office of Security or the Special Assistant to the Director, the case will be referred to a panel, consisting of a representative from each Directorate and chaired by the Special Assistant to the Director. Those cases which are not resolved by the panel will be referred to the DDCI.

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	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<b>Remarks:</b>  Attached is first draft of policy guide plus the documents you furnished yesterday.			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM		ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
SA/E&PD			9/1/66
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				SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached are responses to our request for comments on the draft policy guide governing public appearances and open publications for Agency employees. Please review them, put into a meaningful form for ExDir consideration, and prepare a revised draft policy guide as you believe appropriate.

SUSPENSE: 4 OCT

**FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER**

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
O/Executive Director		26 Sep 66

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Remarks:			
<p>Colonel White has seen your draft policy guide governing public appearances and open publications by CIA employees. The only change made was an addition to the first sentence of paragraph 3. Copies have been sent to all participants at the 4 August meeting, requesting comments by the close of business on 23 Sep.</p> <p>ER SUSPENSE 23 Sep</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
O/Executive Director			16 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000600250014-5			