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## THE GATES HEARINGS; Excerpts From Senate Hearing on Nomination of C.I.A. Chief

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Following are excerpts from hearings by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence, as transcribed by the Federal Information Systems Corporation, a private service, including a statement by Senator Frank H. Murkowski, Republican of Alaska, vice-chairman of the committee, and testimony by Melvin A. Goodman, a former division chief in Soviet affairs at the Central Intelligence Agency; Graham E. Fuller, a senior analyst at the Rand Corporation and a former intelligence officer, and Harold Ford, a C.I.A. contract employee:

**Murkowski Statement**

The allegation that intelligence analysis has been slanted or suppressed, . . . goes to the integrity and it goes to the very heart of the intelligence process. The taxpayers have paid many, many millions of dollars to build an exotic collection and communications system and to maintain a massive intelligence bureaucracy. But what is that investment worth if the analysis that actually goes to the policy makers at the end of the day is tainted?

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But the specific issue before us today is whether Robert Gates, as the senior manager of the C.I.A. in community analysis, was responsible for slanting or suppressing intelligence to please policy makers. I think the record should note that we have heard from three of the most experienced and respected figures in American intelligence -- John McMahon, Admiral Inman and the current D.D.I., Richard Kerr -- testify that they believed Robert Gates did not do so. Mr. Gates himself has given this committee strong assurances that he regards the integrity of intelligence analysis as vital. In my view, therefore, those who assert the contrary have a very heavy burden of proof.

Testimony by Mr. Goodman

. . . I want to thank the Committee for the opportunity to discuss these issues in public. For too long, the C.I.A. has hidden behind a veil of secrecy not to protect legitimate assets or legitimate secrets, but to protect its reputation. I feel this has complicated our efforts, the C.I.A.'s efforts, to recruit the best brains in the country, and I also feel that it has created a public perception of the C.I.A.'s disregard for law, morality and public disclosure.

I must say that there has been some confusion with regard to the circumstances of my departure from the C.I.A. and I am going to take a few minutes to develop that.

In 1985 I was told privately by the director of my office, that Bob Gates had ordered my removal from my managerial position in SOVA. I was not the only one to be removed, there were three of us.

Why did I leave the C.I.A.? I left because of politicization. And I must state at the outset that I agree with John McMahon, that the integrity and the objectivity of intelligence is central to the mission of the C.I.A.

Moreover, I strongly believe that any effort to subvert the process of independent analysis, that is, politicization, can lead to the loss of life, as in Vietnam; to national embarrassment, as in the Bay of Pigs; and to national tragedy, as in Iran-contra.

Now, I can understand the country's desire to put Iran-contra in the background. And I can certainly understand the Congress desire to put Iran-contra in the background. But it should never be forgotten that the actions and the policies of very few people in government, including the C.I.A., led to the sale of arms to the same Iranians who held U.S. diplomats hostage for more than a year, and were linked -- and we know this from intelligence sources -- were linked to the murder of more than 200 Marines in Lebanon, the savage bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, and the death of a good friend, Bob Ames.

There were two primary targets for politicization. First, nearly all intelligence issues connected to covert action. That is, the operational commitments that Casey had made regarding Iran, Nicaragua and Afghanistan. All those issues were politicalized. The second area concerned Casey's other major concern, his world view of the Soviet Union. That is, the Soviet Union as the source of all U.S. problems in the international arena. Casey seized on every opportunity to exaggerate the Soviet threat. This included the case for Soviet involvement in the papal plot, international terrorism and Soviet-third world relations, my own area of specialization. All of those issues were politicalized.

Gates's role in this activity was to corrupt the process and the ethics of intelligence on all of these issues. He was Casey's filter in the Directorate of Intelligence. He protected Casey's equity in these issues. And as the memo calling for the bombing of Nicaragua showed, he pandered to Casey's agenda. There were other memos of this type that maybe you have not seen. I remember one calling for the bombing of Libya to, quote, change the map of the region, unquote.

Gates's other contribution was to ignore and suppress signs of the Soviet strategic retreat, including the collapse of the Soviet empire, even the Soviet

Union itself. . . .

I'm going to start with my first charge, the use of the Directorate of Operations to slant Directorate of Intelligence analysis. I will be making a very important charge, and I know it's a very serious charge. I believe that the C.I.A. was responsible for providing the N.S.C. and even the President with misleading and false information on a sensitive issue.

As you well know, George Cave, from the Directorate of Operations, joined Robert McFarlane on the trip to Iran in 1986. Upon return, he was allowed or encouraged to do several things.

One, he sent a typescript memo to the White House regarding Iranian politics. This memo was never coordinated in the Directorate of Intelligence. The memo argued for the fact that there was a moderate faction in Iran that wanted to establish contacts with the United States.

Two, he sent Director of Operations reporting along with the P.D.B., that is the President's daily brief, to the President. These reports, in terms of their message, were at variance with the views of the Directorate of Intelligence and the senior analyst on Iran with regard to whether or not there was a moderate faction in Iran.

Three, he was allowed to brief the N.S.C. on the basis of these reports. He was given a special channel to the White House and the N.S.C. Also, I might add that the N.I.O. for Counterterrorism, Charlie Allen, sent a memo to the N.S.C. that said that moderates were eager for improved relations with the United States and that they were in sufficient charge to carry this policy out.

Five, the N.I.O. for Counterterrorism briefed the NSC on Iranian attitudes toward the United States. Again, the analysts of the Directorate of Intelligence were not consulted.

Now all the activity I've cited thus far was not coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence. It was at variance with the views of the Directorate of Intelligence and with the entire intelligence community, especially with regard to the existence of moderate factions in Iran wanting contacts with the United States.

I believe, this is my opinion, that this was a conscious attempt to provide uncoordinated information to the N.S.C. and even the President in support of operational activities and that this effort had devastating consequences. This activity also violated the ethics of the intelligence community. And it may mean that when President Reagan said he thought he was dealing with a moderate Iranian faction with interest in dealing with the United States, he was acting on the basis of false C.I.A. analysis.

So a question remains. Was the President himself a victim of C.I.A. misinformation or even disinformation?

Now, I want to deal with my third charge: Regarding intelligence on Iran, which I believed involved every instrument of politicization.

Let me introduce this subject by providing some context. From 1981 to 1985, the Directorate of Intelligence -- that is, the analysts in the Office of Soviet Affairs and the analysts in the Near Eastern Office -- developed rather strong

analytical positions on several key issues: Iran support for terrorism was significant; Iran's political scene did not include a moderate faction; seeking ties with the United States; that the Soviet position in Iran was in decline; and that Soviet arms sales were declining significantly. I might add that in 1986 there were no Soviet arms deliveries to Iran. The important point about all of this is that all of this analysis was based on very strong evidence.

Now, one thing is certain and can be documented: The C.I.A. changed its analytical position on all of these views during a very important period. We're talking about mid-May 1985, before the delivery of Hawk missiles to Iran.

I think it's also important that the views were changed without a strong evidentiary base, and over the protests of the senior analysts, particularly in SOVA. I find it's also interesting that in 1986, after the disclosure of many of these events associated with Iran-contra, the C.I.A. then reverted to the old line it had consistently established from 1981 to 1985.

Now, Gates has told this committee that he was unaware of dissent . . . In fact, Gates suppressed dissent, and he even strongly pressured one agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, not to take a footnote. I think he also strong-armed his own Directorate of Intelligence.

Now, just to sum up this point, I think that this swerve in analysis in the estimate on Iran and the intelligence on terrorism and the view with regard to the moderate faction were all cases of politicization. That is my opinion.

Now I would like to deal with the suppression of intelligence. In some ways I consider this just as important as my previous examples, because it deals with all the things, all the analysis we were never permitted to say. We're talking about the intelligence that policymakers never got, trends that were never reported, data that was suppressed, particularly with regard to Soviet retrenchment and retreat.

This was true also with regard to Soviet problems in Africa, and I'll give you a personal example from 1981. This was before Gates joined Bill Casey's staff. He was still the N.I.O. for the Soviet Union. At that time he commissioned an assessment on Soviet policy in Africa. I didn't believe the assessment was a good one. I had to go to the meetings for coordination because I was the DI representative to the coordination process, and I thought it was only fair to go to the drafter to give him some advance warning that I was going to have some problems at the meeting. I thought the paper had ignored evidence that the Soviets were having their own problems in Africa. The analyst who drafted the paper said, "Your problem isn't with me. I was just, quote, 'a hired gun' on this paper." I said, "Who hired you?" He said, "Bob Gates."

I took my problems to Bob Gates. This was the first encounter I ever had with Bob Gates, someone who I have known since 1968 -- the first encounter with Gates on integrity and the intelligence process. There was an angry exchange. It is not necessary to go into that. The important point I want to make is that when we got to the coordination meeting, even though some changes were made in the coordination process, at one point in these deliberations Bob Gates says this is the paper that Casey wants, and this is the paper that Casey is going to get.

I want to just point out one other issue. We lost a lot of good senior people in the directorate of Intelligence because of this activity. I think we lost our best people. Some of our best people are working now for other intelligence agencies.

Let me tell you about one anecdote of someone who has stayed behind, who is still there. One day he wrote a piece that apparently attracted a great deal of anger of the management of the Office of Soviet Analysis -- this was recent, this was in the last year. He was called in by his supervisor, and I quote, You know, this isn't a democracy we're running here. Your job is to know the message the office wants and make sure the analysts get it right, unquote.

Frankly, I find this history distasteful. I find my own recollections distasteful. I don't want anyone on this committee to think that I get any satisfaction whatsoever out of bringing any of this to you. I might add that I did not come to the committee; the committee came to me.

Frankly, I worry about the signal that would be sent in returning Gates to the environment he created. I worry about the effect this would have on the standards of others back at the Central Intelligence Agency to be led by someone so lacking in vision, integrity and courage. Testimony by Fuller

Mr. Chairman, as I read the testimony of others in the past week, I find myself disquieted. Serious charges have been raised against Bob Gates, especially those of Mel Goodman. While I know and respect Mel Goodman as a very knowledgeable and experienced Soviet analyst, in all frankness, I do not readily recognize the Bob Gates described in his testimony. I am indeed disturbed at hearing the specific and worrisome accusations that he levels against Gates. But I find that when he talks on those incidents of which I am personally familiar, his account, in my opinion, contain serious distortions in content and in the manner of telling.

In brief, I do not believe that during my five-year's tenure at the National Intelligence Council I witnessed anything that I would call improprieties in the conduct of estimative work by Bob Gates. I have no direct knowledge of his leadership of the DI, which has figured in so much of the testimony. But I do know that within the confines of the NIC and the National Intelligence Estimates, I have not seen Gates engage in anything that can be loosely called politicization of intelligence.

It is very important to distinguish between sharp differences of opinion and sharp disagreements about the implications of those differences on the one hand and deliberate distortion of facts on the other.

During my entire time at the N.I.C., I felt there was a scrupulous regard and concern for the integrity of the estimative process and a singularly high proportion of time spent in talking about what the integrity of that process implies in concrete terms.

'Taken Flack for Casey'

To be specific, at no time was I ever told what either the administration or Gates or Casey wanted to come out of an estimate or what it should say or what conclusions it should reach. Not only was I never told what to say, but I would have regarded it as outrageously improper to even hear the suggestion and I

would have rejected it forthright.

I have taken flack for Casey for what we ended saying on occasion. He did not always like the product that I delivered to him. But I have never been told what to say, even indirectly. There was never a hint that there was an unspoken line somehow to follow and that I was to respond to.

Mr. Chairman, I may have many failings and I have indeed made errors in calling the political shots correctly on a number of issues over my many years in this very risky business of prediction. But nobody who knows me would ever call me a toady or patsy to upper management.

Casey had a broad sense of global politics and the interrelationships of things. He could usually think of 10 more implications of any international event than the average analyst could. He read widely, and his N.I.O.'s had to run to keep up with his restless mind and flow of various hypotheses. He was an unabashed cold warrior and tended to view all events in terms of their impact on the struggle with the Soviet Union apart from other regional implications.

Mr. Goodman, I think, has suggested what I think is a slight parody of Casey's views on these things.

Now Bob Gates may be a skillful staffer who has served a number of differing bosses well. But he, too, is not a faceless bureaucrat. He is immensely intelligent, has a superb grasp of substance. He is a quick study, and he fully understands the relationship between policy and intelligence. He was indeed able to keep pace with Casey's own geopolitical instincts, but he was also able to tone down some of Casey's more far-fetched hypotheses, in discussions which were held in which I have been personally present.

Where Casey did not always hide what he hoped intelligence might indicate, Gates was always fully aware of the requirements of analytic procedure and the validity of independent analysis from everything I saw within the NIC. I cannot speak to charges leveled about Gates' handling of research within the D.I. . . .

Gates did share a hardline view, but a very well-informed view of the Soviet Union, independent of Casey. The international situation at that time, I would argue, perhaps justified a fairly hard line view in any case. The world was very different in 1980 to 1985, prior to Gorbachev, than it has been in these stunning years that we have witnessed following the Gorbachev tenure.

I felt [ there ] was the development of an adversary culture within CIA -- within at least the Third World branch of SOVA, given Mr. Casey's own strong views, Bob Gates' partial adherence to some of those views, and the very strongly felt discontent within the SOVA-Third World group that saw things quite differently . . .

My own sense of [ the Soviet-third world group ] was not that they were wrong in their understanding of what the Soviets' stated positions were and what Soviet writings and analysis were in these things, but that sometimes they reflected less of an understanding of the countries whose Soviet relationships they were examining. As someone who had served overseas for many years, I had a slightly different sense of reality about the Soviets on the ground...

It was not part of the SOVA culture to believe that, quote, That was the way the Soviets would do business, unquote. No SOVA analysts would have been likely

to tell you, until the troops were lined up and ready to go, that the U.S.S.R. would ever send the Red Army into Afghanistan, because the Soviet Union had no history and no background of doing that.

When Mr. Goodman suggests, for example, that in the year that we were doing the analysis on Iran that the Soviets were losing a position in Iran and were systematically finding their position weakened, I would only like to point out that the same was true in Afghanistan in the year that preceded the Soviet coup there. . . .

Now I do not want to oversimplify what were complex views of both sides of these debates. But I for one independently grew unhappy with the product that I received from many SOVA Third World analysts. There was a liberal versus conservative struggle, and this was not a healthy situation within the Agency to have exist.

Iran was ultimately the key power in the Gulf and already a major ideological threat to the region and to Western interests there through its zealous Islamic fundamentalism.

But American policies towards Iran in that period were based solely on two factors and had only two goals: one was to strike back at Iranian terrorism and the other was to staunch all flow of any weapons from the West to Iran. Now these goals were certainly understandable. . . . These two factors hardly constituted a serious policy designed to get the United States back into some position in Iran. We were engaged in a basic struggle with Moscow for influence in Iran, the most important country on the entire southern Soviet border.

I was likewise concerned with our excessive tilt towards Saddam Hussein, who -- and I am on record on this -- I felt had never moderated during the Gulf War. Now DIA analysts -- excuse me, DI analysts within the Agency's analytic section had already produced analyses earlier that year indicating concern for instability, future instability in Iran, with which I agreed. Any careful look at the situation raised potentially alarming prospects. The clerical regime was perhaps foundering. Khomeini was aging and losing grip daily on the situation, opening the way potentially to radical leftist forces within the country.

I was concerned that a very serious geopolitical imbalance could be emerging in Iran of major import to U.S. policies. If Western arms -- if the Western arms embargo was a total success, it was logical that Moscow would be the most natural next source of arms and could quickly come to gain a monopoly over arms to Iran if it wished. A direct arms relationship with Moscow would have provided a major strategic advance for Moscow in Iran . . . . A weakening clerical regime could certainly strike a bargain with the devil to survive. I believe that Moscow would not turn down that opportunity if it were presented, especially as the clerical regime seemed to move towards possible collapse in that year, as was feared by the CIA's own estimative Middle East people.

A pro-Soviet group conceivably could have come to power in Iran under such circumstances, a far worse disaster for the West than Afghanistan had been so far. I had communicated my concerns to Casey on this quite unsolicited at about this time.

When the SOVA analyst brought me his draft portion of the estimate, Mr. Chairman, on Soviet policy towards Iran, I was immediately unhappy. It dismissed the possibility that the USSR would even seek to take advantage of the desperate arms need in Iran and it comfortably dismissed any serious Soviet design or intention to gain dominant influence in Iran in the foreseeable future. Such a view ignored several hundred years of Russian expansionism inexorably southward . . . .

It ignored a Soviet effort to ditch Iraq in favor of Iran as soon as Khomeini had come to power. . . . Even if the possibility were only slight, the impact of such a logical move by Moscow to support left wing forces in Iran, to exploit chaos, or to become a sole arms source to Iran would have been a major political coup for Moscow and a major loss for the U.S.

I felt that a formal warning of this eventuality -- potential eventuality was of critical importance to US interests. And estimates are partly designed to play a warning function as well.

I do believe that it can only be through the relentless examination of various new hypotheses and counterhypotheses that the intelligence community will ever have a chance to get at the elusive truths of forecasting the unknowable.

Because of this legitimate disagreement, SOVA analysts -- some of them -- have chosen to cast this issue in terms of right and wrong, truth versus politicization. Their own internal frustrations seem to have caused them to reject out of hand this line of analysis that was not stated as a certitude on my part but only as a distinct and serious strategic possibility that the U.S. Government must be watchful for.

The argument instead has been presented now as to being -- serving either Casey or serving Gates or serving the White House. I have not even been given the courtesy of simply being called "wrong," but rather portrayed as someone else's instrument in the struggle against SOVA. Whether the application of the word "wrong" is appropriate in any case is questionable when one speaks of the warning function in intelligence. . . .

#### 'Plenty of Fires'

No, in the end the barn did not burn down, but there were plenty of fires raging in the region and people were playing with matches in the barn. Even the possibility of this major calamity for American interests seems not to have been acknowledged by SOVA analysts.

Mr. Chairman, the N.I.O. and I and Gates were also accused of politicization in an estimate we did on Soviet-Israeli relations in a year or so later. In that estimate, both myself and the Soviet N.I.O., impressed with the new vigor of Gorbachev in foreign affairs in the early days, reconsidered the old issue of Soviet-Israeli relations, and we felt, in fact, by now there were very good reasons why it would now be in the Soviet advantage to establish diplomatic relations with Israel within, as the estimate said, within possibly the next 18 months.

. . . There were no policy needs, Mr. chairman, as far as I can see. To say that the Soviets might do this I could see as playing one agenda; to say that they wouldn't do it might play to another policy agenda.



Our revisionist review, myself and the Soviet N.I.O., of this time-honored SOVA position -- that we chose to review this time-honored position was viewed with scorn by SOVA, and our estimate was acknowledged -- even though our estimate openly acknowledged a difference of opinion and explicitly stated so.

SOVA analysts now triumphantly point out that they were right; that diplomatic relations were not, in fact, restored within 18 months between the Soviet Union and Israel. But if formal relations were not restored, Mr. Chairman, in fact a whole revolution came out about in Soviet relations with the whole region, and informal ties, informal ties with Israel blossomed extraordinarily. It was a true time of revolution.

This indeed -- and this is a very important point, Mr. chairman, this is one of the dilemmas of intelligence work. It is not a good versus evil. It is a dilemma of intelligence work. Does absence of evidence mean that something is not there or it has not happened? How much should we rely on intuition, judgment and experience in appraising the likelihood of events or motives or the issue of who benefits from an event?

This dilemma can never be solved. SOVA seems to have clung to the idea that the sweeping force of, quote, no evidence, means that we don't think it happened, which is the safe and perhaps appropriate position for a junior analyst. But is a more experienced analyst or manager wrong to examine other considerations even in the absence of evidence that we may never collect?

Mr. Chairman, this is the real world of intelligence analysis that I knew and experienced. That is the Casey and the Bob Gates that I know. I am acutely aware that we have many analysts, including serious respected and knowledgeable senior analysts and junior analysts, who somehow feel pain at the way the process worked when they were there.

But in the trenches of analysis and policy over the years mistakes do get made. We have all made them. God knows I have made mistakes in my own judgments, and I will probably go on to make more in the future. Yet I have not personally experienced anything that I would call true politicalization of estimates in my personal experience, even by Casey . . . . Nor do I think that politicalization accurately or fairly describes the Gates that I worked with for five years, whatever failings, harshness, insensitivities, or analytical misjudgments he, too, may be guilty of in this period. Testimony by Mr. Ford

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have some very difficult things to say today, but I feel I must say them.

In brief, my message is that I think Robert Gates should not be confirmed as Director of Central Intelligence. This is a difficult task for me, in part because though semiretired, I am still an employee of the C.I.A. on part-time contract. This is also a very painful task for me. It is painful to be negative about someone who has been my colleague, a relationship that was cooperative throughout, and where there was no bad blood whatsoever between us. Moreover, as my supervisor, Bob Gates was good to me and awarded me increased responsibilities. Furthermore, he is extremely able and has clearly had unique experience in both the production of intelligence and its use by the country's to decisionmakers. It is also painful to have to differ with my good friend, Graham Fuller. I see things differently, I see Bob Gates differently, as I

will spell out.

Discerning what is a skewing of intelligence and what is not is a tricky business, but from my four decades of experience in and around intelligence, I think I can help the committee thread its way through the differing kinds of pressure which Bob Gates did or did not bring on intelligence analysis. It is my view that many of his pressures were justified as he sought to sharpen analysis and its usefulness to decision-makers. Secondly, that some of the pressures he brought on analysis simply reflected differing professional judgments, and that some of the allegations that he skewed intelligence doubtless have arisen from an analyst whose pride was damaged by his revisions. Thirdly, however, as I am prepared to discuss at greater length, it is my view based on documents that have been released in the last few days, on testimonies that have been given to this committee of late, and on the confidence of many C.I.A. officers whose abilities and character I respect, that other of Bob Gates pressures have gone beyond professional bounds and clearly constitute a skewing of intelligence. Not in the fields of military and strategic issues, but chiefly concerning Soviet political matters, Soviet's and the third world.

With respect to the latter, I would interject, events have proved that the Soviets have for some years been definitely lessening their commitments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; thus validating the earlier judgments that SOVA made, not those that Bob Gates and his supporters did.

I would also add that the skewing of intelligence and the purging of dissident D.D.I. analysts, as we've already heard today, goes considerably beyond the four particular issues this committee happens to be focusing upon. It isn't wholly across the board, but there are many more than just four issues.

In my view, that 1985 estimate on Iran was not an estimate in the usual sense. A national intelligence estimate presents the data -- all the data on all sides -- and then draws what seem to be the most likely patterns and the most likely future. If an N.I.E. or S.N.I.E. goes on to talk about, "Well, it's possible that the Soviets might do this, the worst case that they might do this," it clearly says so. This 1985 estimate was a worst-case paper, clearly, but it did not clue the reader that it was, and therefore the readers could misjudge it, thinking this is the way things were going to be -- not this is the way things might be if the Soviets did their damndest.

More important, that 1985 estimate skewed -- had significant policy consequences. As the Congress's Iran-contra report and the Tower Report both indicate, that estimate directly fed White House interest and enthusiasm with respect to reversing the then-boycott of U.S. arms to Iran. Again, as Doug MacEachin said in his memo to Dick Kerr of January 1987, later national intelligence estimates backed off from the 1985 estimate's stress on the Soviet threat to Iran.

I differ with Graham. I think no one can read these without drawing that same conclusion. They softened that view. Why? Because it became more clear that the level of Soviet military support to Iran had been dropping precipitously for some years.

As for the pressures Bob Gates wrought within C.I.A. overall, it is clear that he leaned much more heavily on intelligence analysts in the Directorate of

Intelligence than he did with the N.I.C. This is probably because it is harder, much harder, as Graham has said, to skew a broad national intelligenc estimate than it is the narrower questions more often addressed by and in the D.D.I. Secondly, it was probably more difficult because the D.D.I.'s analysts are mostly younger, more junior officers than the N.I.C.'s tough veterans.

Now, the key question before us, why do I take the painful step of urging that Bob Gates not be confirmed?

Several reasons. First, my views on the nomination have become markedly more critical since the confirmation hearings began . . . .

Secondly, I have become more critical because of certain testimonies of Bob Gates himself. His earlier testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which I mentioned a moment ago, and his many instances of forgetfulness in his responses to this committee. I am sorry to say it, but the word that for me captures this latter testimony of his is clever. The forgetfulness of this brilliant officer gifted with a photographic memory, does not to me instill confidence.

Thirdly, to develop the finest U.S. intelligence possible, as D.C.I., Gates would have to attract and recruit the best brains in the country. I fear that he would have some difficulty doing so because many would shy away from serving a D.C.I. about whom some serious questions have been raised.

Fourthly, there should also be reservations about Bob Gates's analytical style and judgment. Over the years the best analytical results in U.S. intelligence have occurred when the D.C.I. attracted the very best analytical talent he could find, then listen to their judgments, ground in his own and then presented their collective views to the senior policymakers.

My view that Bob Gates has ignored or scorned the views of others whose assessments did not accord with his own would be okay if he were uniquely all seeing. The trouble is he has not been. Most importantly, he has been dead wrong on the central analytic target of the past few years -- the outlook for change, or not, in the fortunes of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet-European block. He was wrong in presenting the Soviet threat to Iran in 1985 as a true N.I.E., and then telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee two years later that those things still applied. I think Bob Gates was overly certain earlier that the Soviets ran or were in charge of international terrorism. He certainly was overly certain that the sky would fall if we didn't bomb Nicaragua, to say nothing of the wisdom of such a recommended course of action.

The U.S.A. deserves a D.C.I. whose analytic batting average is better than that, especially if that D.C.I. tends to force his views on C.I.A. and the intelligence community, and especially at a time when U.S. intelligence and US policy face a far more complex world than the one we have known.

I do agree with Admiral Inman's testimony that there will not necessarily be dancing in the streets in C.I.A. if Bob Gates becomes the D.C.I. I do feel, however, that Admiral Inman may have left a mistaken impression with this committee that the reason C.I.A. senior officers might not wholly welcome a D.C.I. Gates is because they are simply set in their ways and don't want to have to change.

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