



(U//FOUO) 2009 Fourth of July Security Awareness

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(U) Prepared by the DHS/Critical Infrastructure Threat Analysis Division and the FBI/Counterterrorism Analysis Section. The Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group reviewed this product from the perspective of our nonfederal partners.

(U) Scope

(U//FOUO) DHS and the FBI are releasing this Joint Homeland Security Note to raise security awareness during 2009 Fourth of July celebrations. This product is intended to provide perspective and understanding of the nature and scope of the threat posed to the holiday celebrations and to assist federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities to develop priorities for protective and support measures relating to an existing or emerging threat to homeland security.

(U) The International Terrorist Threat

(U//FOUO) DHS and the FBI currently have no specific credible information that international terrorist organizations are planning attacks against the United States during the Fourth of July celebrations this year.

- (U//FOUO) Most international terrorist attacks against targets in the West have not been timed to coincide with major dates or high-profile events. Terrorists could find an attack on symbolic targets during Fourth of July celebrations attractive due to large gatherings across the country and the potential psychological impact of an attack during a high-profile holiday.

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(U) The Domestic Terrorism Threat

(U//FOUO) DHS and the FBI have no information indicating a threat to the Fourth of July celebrations this year from U.S. domestic terrorists or violent extremists.

(U) The Lone Offender Threat

(U//FOUO) The recent attacks against a reproductive health care provider in Wichita, Kansas, and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., illustrate the need for maintaining vigilance and awareness of the possibility of individuals committing criminal acts in pursuit of ideological objectives. Preliminary investigations indicate that the perpetrators may have been lone offenders.

(U//FOUO) The high degree of operational security lone offenders generally observe makes it extremely difficult for law enforcement and homeland security authorities to detect a lone offender's plans, targeting, and methods well enough in advance to deter an attack. Indicators exhibited by many potential lone offenders include:

- (U//FOUO) Predisposition toward violence and advocating violent action;
- (U//FOUO) Obtaining or expressing interest in obtaining and using weapons, explosives, and bomb-making manuals and materials for use in violent actions;
- (U//FOUO) Expressing desire to attack a specific target and taking action to collect information on it;
- (U//FOUO) Rejection by or voluntary departure from a group for advocating violence that the group does not support; and
- (U//FOUO) Expressing solidarity with, or admiration for, other violent lone offender extremists or terrorists.

(U) Indicators of Preoperational Surveillance and Planning

(U//FOUO) Law enforcement officers and security personnel should remain alert and immediately report potential indicators of preoperational surveillance and planning activities at any commercial retail establishment, transportation venue, national monuments and icons,^{*} or other public gathering place. These indicators include the following:

- (U//FOUO) Unusual or prolonged interest in or attempts to gain sensitive information about security measures of personnel, entry points, peak days and hours of operation, and access controls such as alarms or locks.

^{*} (U) For more information on National Monuments and Icons, see the "National Monuments and Icons: Sector Specific Plan," <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-national-monuments-icons.pdf>.

- (U//FOUO) Observation of security reaction drills or procedures.
- (U//FOUO) Discreet use of cameras, note taking, or video recorders.
- (U//FOUO) Interest in speaking with building maintenance personnel.
- (U//FOUO) Observation of or questions about facility security cameras.
- (U//FOUO) Observations of or questions about facility air conditioning, heating, and ventilation systems.

(U) Suggested Protective Measures

(U//FOUO) Event or building management personnel may want to consider the following enhanced protective measures:

- (U//FOUO) Institute increased foot, roving, and vehicle security patrols that vary in routes, size, and timing.
- (U//FOUO) Promptly approach all illegally parked vehicles in and around facilities; question drivers and direct them to move immediately; immediately tow unattended vehicles in unauthorized areas.
- (U//FOUO) Implement random security checks of backpacks and bags.
- (U//FOUO) Increase awareness of security personnel regarding improvised explosive devices.
- (U//FOUO) Implement random searches by explosives detection canine teams.
- (U//FOUO) Ensure that area businesses, facilities, and utilities are familiar with procedures for alert notification, crisis management, evacuation, and threat reporting.
- (U//FOUO) Be alert to the presence of unattended bags, backpacks, briefcases, and suitcases.
- (U//FOUO) Review security camera footage daily to detect possible indicators of preoperational surveillance.
- (U//FOUO) Review and exercise emergency response and consequence management procedures with law enforcement, medical emergency services, and security to mitigate the effects of an attack.

(U) Outlook

(U//FOUO) DHS and the FBI have received no credible or specific threats to the Fourth of July celebrations this year from terrorist groups or violent lone offenders. Because of the symbolic importance of the holiday, however, federal, state, and local law enforcement entities and security personnel should remain vigilant to preoperational planning, such as suspicious surveillance activities around special event sites. DHS and the FBI will continue to monitor intelligence for signs of terrorist plotting or any related activity.

(U) Reporting Notice:

(U) DHS and the FBI encourage recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to DHS and the FBI. The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9685 or by e-mail at NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov. For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC. The NICC can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9201 or by e-mail at NICC@dhs.gov. The FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at <http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm>. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.

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