OKINAWA

CALENDAR OF DOCUMENTS

(Asterisks indicate documents of special importance)

Our No.	SecDef Contr Nr	Date	Document, Subject & Content
1:	X-0850	20 Feb 69	Memo from SecDef to the President: Okinawa Bases and Forces. Responds to questions asked
			at meeting 27 January. Notes that these are JCS answers and that definitive DoD policy will be provided through an NSC study in progress. Consequently, SecDef comments are not provided.
•			Questions answered include size of forces in Okinawa, reason for being there, future needs for the bases etc.
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Attachment: Note to SecDef requesting trans- mittal from JCS to President and noting that ISA has not commented yet.
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
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5	X-2707 22 May 69	Letter from SecDef to Secretary of State
•		requests concurrence in assigning the Army
		I COME TO THE CONTRACT OF THE MAN
		the task of studying the civil and administra-
	•	tive aspects of any agreement to return ad-
		ministration of the Ryukyus to Japan.
		Attachment: ISA memo transmitting draft of above.
	•	Addeciments. The memo distinct of the city of shore.
	•	
	X-3140 11 Jun 69	Letter from SecState to SecDef concurs with
6	(X-3140 II Jun 09	
	, t ,	22 May letter, notes that State has set up
, ;	· ·	
• • •		its own study group, and suggests that an
		interagency study group be set up shortly.
7	v 3810 12 Jul 60	
7	X-3810 12 Jul 69	Memo from Chairman, JCS to SecDef: Senior
7	X-3810 12 Jul 69	
7	X-3810 12 Jul 69	Memo from Chairman, JCS to SecDef: Senior Uniformed Representation on the US Okinawa
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8 (Cor	nt'd)		for the concessions it is making. Urges that US slow down negotiations, determine concessions in military and non-military areas that it wants if it is to give up some rights on Okinawa, and postpone the meeting of the heads of state until a later time so that all issues can be resolved before their meeting. Requests meeting to discuss this subject.
9.	x-4078	28 Jul 69	Letter from SecDef to Sec State requests military representation on Okinawa negotiating team. Letter is substantially similar to
			12 July memo to SecDef from JCS. Attachment: ISA memo recommending against senior military representative at this time.
10	x-4783	6 Sep 69	Memo from SecNav to SecDef: Post-project 703 Marine Forces on Okinawa. Notes that Navy has
	·		been requested to provide new troop strengths and assignments as well as costs based on changes in Vietnam and deactivation of the 5th Marine Division. Requests that Marine Corps strength of 19,000 for Okinawa and
I.			that a Division be approved along with other assignments in the Pacific so that studies can be completed. Attachment: 5 Sep point paper on above subject.
11	x-4898	13 Sep 69	Letter from SecDef to Sec State advises that he is approving transfer of a Division headquarters and a Marine Regiment to Okinawa to bring strength to one Division there— approximately the same as pre-war levels.
12	x - 4897	13 Sep 69	Memo from SecDef to SecNav: Marines on Okinawa. Approves decisions requested in SecNav memo of 6 September subject to President's final concurrence in Vietnam redeployments. Attachment: SA memo recommending Marine plans and providing background data.
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*13	x-6126	8 Nov 69	Memo from Chairman, JCS to SecDef: Okinawa Reversion. Restates JCS and USG positions and concerns and expresses view that negotiations are not moving satisfactorily or accomplishing US objectives. Feels that agreement prior to"summit" meeting is imperative. Recommends that 1) State be informed that essential military elements of NSDM-13 have not yet been
			adequately guaranteed and firm assurances of continued rights to use Okinawa are essential and 2) that all final agreements and statements be completed in time to be reviewed by the NSC prior to the "summit" meeting.
· · ·		•	
*14	x-6257	18 Nov 69	Memo from SecDef to White House Staff (Kissinger): Okinawa Reversion. Passes along JCS recommendations outlined in 8 November JCS memo to
•		<u>A</u>	SecDef. ttachment: ISA memo providing draft for White House.
*15	x-6571	3 Dec 69	Memo from White House (Kissinger) to SecDef: Okinawa Reversion. Acknowledges 18 November memo and indicates that JCS points were given
	75,0050	70 70	"careful weight" in discussions with Prime Minister Sato.
16 * *	X-3370	18 Jun 70	Memo from Chairman, JCS to SecDef: Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibilities in the Ryukyus. Discusses several specific problems related to negotiation for the reversion of Okinawa to the Japanese. Recommends approval of the CINCPAC plan for deployment of the
			Japanese Defense Force after reversion and suggests that negotiators attempt to separate transfer of Naha port to the GOJ from lump sum payments related to reversion.
17	x-3685	7 Jul 70	Memo from SecDef to Chairman, JCS acknowledges 18 June memo and indicates it will serve as basis for additional instructions to negotiators.

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18	X - 3856	9 Jul	70	Letter from Sec Treasury to SecDef points out need to identify \$200 million of con-
	•			struction projects on Okinawa in the next
	1			7 years to use up Japanese lump sum payment
•				without getting into disagreement about
,			1	agreement language.
19	X-None	23 Jul	. 70	Letter from SecDef responds to Chairman,
		*		House Armed Services Cmte letter asking about
•	•	•		statements made in Japan that USG planned
	ŧ.,			large construction expenditures in Okinawa.
ŕ				SecDef acknowledges that some statements were
				made inadvisedly, states that the statements
•	•			were badly misconstrued, and indicates that the
	•			only construction underway or being approved
				is minor and necessary and that all other
				items are currently being held up as requested
r.			•	by the committee.
				Attachments: Chairman Rivers' letter dated 7 July.
*				ISA memo transmitting SecDef reply (16 July)
	•			New York Times article
	٠.		• -	LA letter acknowledging Rivers' letter
20	X-6179	12 Nov	70	Memo from Chairman, JCS to SecDef: Japanese
		•		Assumption of Defense Responsibilities in
	•			the Ryukyus. Recommends that plan submitted
•	1		•	in 18 June memo be given to Japanese for
	* .			inclusion in the budget plans, that US services
.:. ::		• •		occupy facilities to be vacated until reversion
)·4				or relief, and that US negotiators need to
*	:			work out arrangements with GOJ for funding
		•		costs during transition period and for facilities
\$- \$-				to be shared by both US and GOJ forces.
21	x-0263	21 Jan	71	Letter from SecDef to Sec Treasury comments
	, 0200	<u></u>	1,	on the lack of progress in working out arrange-
·				ments for the US to realize \$200 million in
	•			savings as a result of Japanese payments.
- ,				Suggests discussions with Japanese Vice Minister
		•	*	at meeting here next week.
				The state of the s
22	X-0325	23 Jan	71	Letter from Sec Treasury to SecDef acknowledges
	- · · · y - y		•	21 January letter, regrets inability to meet
		خ. د		to discuss the issues, and agrees to try to make
				progress in meeting with the Vice Minister.



*23	X - 0508	3 Feb 71	Letter from Sec Treasury to SecDef reports on conversations with the Vice Minister and
: :::-			notes items requiring further action by DoD, State, or Treasury. Items noted include
•			1) studying the feasibility of including a treaty clause calling for a \$100 million cash payment if Japanese can get legal authority for it and 2) desire of the Japanese to spend some of the money for moving US housing
•		,	being being of the mercy for meving ob nousing
			Notes that an additional meeting is scheduled in Tokyo 17 February.
*24 :	x - 0690	16 Feb 71	Letter from SecDef to Sec Treasury indicates that the proposed cash settlement is acceptable to DoD, that
· · .			not provide net benefit to DoD, that DoD would consider reimbursement of labor and severance costs or, failing that, of O&M costs under certain conditions, and that the balance of the \$200 million is assumed to come from re-
r r r		<u>A</u> 1	imbursement of facilities maintenance costs and Japanese assumption of Master Labor contract administration providing certain assumptions are correct. ttachment: ISA transmittal memo for above.
25	X - 0819	19 Feb 71	Memo from ASD(ISA) to SecDef: Memorandum for the President on Okinawa Reversion. Attaches
		Δt	draft memo to President from SecState suggesting Okinawa reversion be considered a treaty and submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. Suggests SecDef concur (he did). tachment: State Department coordination memo.
* 26	X –1 580	7 Apr 71	Memo from SecDef to Service Secs and Chmn, JCS:
			Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibility for Okinawa. Approves plans submitted 12 November outlining facilities to be turned over to Japan and details certain exceptions, negotiating positions, etc. States that payments by Japan are to provide net benefit to DoD and that any construction or relocation projects, whether or not
		· .	related to reversion must be processed through

related to reversion must be processed through normal channels for FY 1973 and are subject to Congressional approval.

Attachment: ISA memo transmitting above for signature.



-TOP-SECRET

*27	X-2321	14 May 71		Letter from SecDef to Sec Treasury reiterates
•		•		DoD position that \$200 million payment must
			•	produce net benefit to USG and states that
		,		proposed terms as regards \$65 million to be
, .		•		spent only on relocation responding to Japanese
	•		i	political needs do not meet these criteria.
		1		Points out that US position requires these
	,			funds be allowed to be spent for facility
				maintenance, that projects Japan wants the US
				to agree to would involve substantial penalties
•				even including the \$65 million, and that we
•				have already given GOJ valuable facilities
				• =
				as a gesture of good will. Suggests that
				the time has come to hold firm to the original
	•			negotiating position.
28	x - 2260	14 May 71	_	Memo from SecDef to SecAF and Chmn, JCS:
	•			Transfer of Facilities to GOJ in conjunction
				with Okinawa reversion. Responds to memos
	* .			from addressees requesting guidance on disposal
				of personal property. Indicates guidelines
				for release are included in attachments to
1				his 7 April memo and that release of property
				is the responsibility of Service Secretaries
		•		with inter-Service coordination to be handled
				by the unified commands.
			Δ-	ttachments: ISA memo transmitting above.
		• •		26 February memo from SecAF requesting guidance.
				ro represent memo from poem reducestring germentes.
*20	X-2584	28 May 71		Memo from Chmn, JCS to SecDef: Okinawa
2.9	. A-2704	EO 1100 12		Reversion: Japanese Assumption of Defense
	•			
•	٠			Responsibilities. Concurs in proposed DoD-Japanese
ş.		,		Defense Force agreement on Okinawa specifying
*	4			Japanese responsibilities, forces and other
				commitments. Notes that there are substantial
		a.		benefits to USG from this agreement. Recommends
•	-			approval of the agreement and that a request be
				made to the Sec State that a government-to-
				government affirmation of the agreement between
				the two defense agencies be prepared.
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*30	x-3675	9 Aug 71		Letter from SecDef to Secretary of the Treasury
	7.7		•	explains that elections are scheduled to be
•		٠		held in November, 1971 for the Chief Executive
				and members of the Legislature of the Ryukyus.
,				Notes that these officials have requested that
		-	4	elections be deferred and their terms extended
	•	•	-	
		• • •		until reversion sometime in 1972. Suggests

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30 (Cont'd)	that this would have value to USG in eliminating a potentially controversial campaign, that the officials would prefer it so that they can spend more time on reversion matters, and that the Japanese are agreeable. Requests that the Secretary of the Treasury concur in the recommendation which requires amending an Executive Order.
31 X-4140 8 Sep 71	Memo from ASD(ISA) to SecDef: Transmittal of Okinawa Reversion Agreement to the Senate. Transmits copies of draft memo from Secretary of State to President to be used in submitting the agreement to the Senate. Requests that SecDef indicate concurrence in the letter and a proposed Presidential message to the Senate. (He did).
*32	
	Memo from SecDef to Service Secretaries and
	Chmn, JCS: Discontinuance of US Administration of the

