

snowflake

March 18, 2001 2:33 PM

TO: Marty Hoffmann

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Pat O'Brien

Here is a terrific guy, Pat O'Brien, who indicated he would be willing to do something on a pro bono basis. You might want to keep that in mind.

He is a good lawyer and a good friend.

Attach.

DHR:dh
031X01-9

U05664 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/1

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT

190 SOUTH LA SALLE STREET
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60603-3441

PATRICK W. O'BRIEN
DIRECT DIAL (312) 701-7072
DIRECT FAX (312) 700-8665
pobrien@mayerbrown.com

MAIN TELEPHONE
312-782-0600
MAIN FAX
312-701-7711

March 14, 2001

Mr. and Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Dear Don and Joyce:

Thank you very much for sending me your new Washington address. I have been intending to drop you a congratulatory note but I wasn't sure that such a note would make its way through the Pentagon ladder of command.

Now to the congratulations – to both of you for agreeing to help keep the Republic ticking and safe. I include both of you in the congratulations because – in ways Hilly and Bill don't even begin to consider – a major office holder cannot really function without the support of the proper type of spouse.

I note, Don, that your current pictures reveal a Don Rumsfeld remarkably similar to the Navy photo used in your first run for political office which inspired the Evanston Republican Old Guard to dub you Captain Midnight.

As you can see from the letterhead, I am still with the law firm I have been with since September of '53. My job title is "Senior Counsel". This means I have an office to come to and office support, including the young lady who typed this letter, but I don't have to do anything. What I do do is teach trial lawyering, judge moot court trials, try an occasional pro bono case and give senior counseling to those who need it regardless of whether they have asked for it.

If it should ever occur to you that there is something pro bono and short lived that someone like me might be able to help you with, don't hesitate to call. I was in Air Force JAG for two years (1951-1953) and was "Chief, Military Justice, Headquarters Northeast Air Command which consisted of Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland and certain secret North Pole ice islands. I was surrounded by people preparing for World War III. Since then I have been dealing with disputes of all kinds in all kinds of courts.

CHICAGO CHARLOTTE COLOGNE HOUSTON LONDON LOS ANGELES NEW YORK PARIS WASHINGTON
INDEPENDENT MEXICO CITY CORRESPONDENT: JAUREGUI, NAVARRETE, NADER Y ROJAS
8879751 | 31401 1129C 42007336

11-L-0559/OSD/2

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT

Mr. and Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld
March 14, 2001
Page 2

On the personal side, (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Sincerely,



Patrick W. O'Brien

PO'B/pat

snowflake

*Personal file
10/16/01*

October 15, 2001 11:08 AM

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Your Suggestion

Thanks for your note of 9/25. It is a good idea. I am not dictating, but I am making some notes. I'll think about trying to convert.

DHR:dh
101501-25

020512

15 5/1/01

U12902 /02

DR

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 15 2001

Some years ago, someone (maybe Muggy Hoffmann?) suggested you keep a diary. You did for awhile, and I have it in the safe.

This is an outrageous thing to suggest, but since I spend time archiving now, it came to me that this would also be a good time for you to dictate maybe two minutes each night your personal impressions and feelings of the day.

You could keep a Dictaphone on your night table and record your thoughts at day's end. When the tape is full, you could send it to me for transcription, and I could keep your notes in the safe.

It would also help when you write your (someday) book.

Just a thought.

NP

9/25/01

P.S. Thanks for your note. It meant the world.

TIM TAM

snowflake

TO: Steve **Cambone**
Paul Gebhard

Paul

CC: Dov Zakheim

FAXED

to Dr Zakheim 3/21

FROM: Donald **Rumsfeld** *DR*

DATE: March 20, 2001

SUBJECT: Defense Budget

Do we have a group working on the number of things we would like to try to move out of the defense budget, such as research on things that don't have anything to do with the Pentagon, and the maritime item that was passed over to DOD by OMB?

DHR/azn
03200 1.07

To Dov - Let's do this - DR

snowflake



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 5, 2001 6:38 PM

TO: Bill Schneider, Dov Zakheim, Paul Wolfowitz and Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *R*

SUBJECT: Budget

Attached are the remarks that were made by Vice President Cheney and President Bush at a veteran's event on January 19th. I think you ought to read them, and I think they could be helpful in thinking through our budget issues.

Attachment

DR:dh
02050 1-25

350.001 WH

5 Feb 0

U02345B/01

*President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney
at the Salute to Heroes
Reception, Banquet and Ball
Capital Hilton
Jan. 20, 2001*

American Forces Press Service Transcript

VP CHENEY:

Lynne and I are delighted to be here tonight. By tradition, this is always the **first** event the president and vice president visit before we begin the round of inaugural balls and that's for a **very** good reason. That's because of the enormous obligation and debt that we have to all of you who served in the U.S. military, veterans as well as the Medal of Honor winners (recipients) that are here tonight. On behalf of Lynne and myself, let me thank you for what **you've** done for all of us.

And now it's my great privilege to **introduce** to all of you the 43rd President of the United States, **George W. Bush**.

PRESIDENT BUSH:

Mr. Vice President, thank you for the introduction. I'm told that it is a tradition that before the president and vice president goes on to the inaugural balls, **they** stopped at the veterans dinner and it's right that it be that way.

The inaugural balls are a reflection of the **wonderful** freedoms we have in America. The free transfer of power that took place today. This is a free land, however, it would not have been free necessarily without the sacrifice of the men and women who have worn our uniform.

It makes good sense to start here. **I'm** honored to be with the soon-to-be head of the Veterans Affairs **Department**, Tony Frincipi. He understands that a promise made will be a promise kept to the men and women who wear the uniform, I wanted to be here with the leaders of our military **branches** -- **fine** men who lead some of the finest citizens anywhere in the world.

Their mission and **our** mission is to keep the peace and the way to do so is to make sure our military is highly trained and well paid. **And to make** sure that **the** mission of the military is focused and it's focused on this, **that** our job, those of us in the chain of command, will make sure that **our** soldiers are fully prepared to fight and win war, and therefore, prevent war from happening in the first place,

And so today as the president and therefore as the **commander in chief**, what an honor and what a duty. I look forward to that honor and duty with pride. It's an honor to be here. God Bless what you all have done for America and God Bless America.

**President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney
at the Vice President's Salute to Veterans
at the George Washington University Smith Center
Jan. 19, 2001**

American Forces Press Service Transcript

VP CHENEY:

Let me say what a pleasure it is to be here today, to note the presence of so many distinguished Americans. I see my old friend Gen. Colin Powell, Mr. Secretary. My former boss, Den Rumsfeld, Mr. Secretary. I think in those two men America's going to have a great national security team,

I also note the presence of my two former colleagues John McCain -- John it's great to have you here today -- and also Bill Cohen, current secretary of Defense, Bill, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Shelton, Good to see you general.

Lynne and I appreciate very much the tremendous turnout this afternoon. By tradition, the events of this week are to include a salute to the incoming vice president. Far better, I thought, for the incoming vice president to offer a salute of his own.

So we're here today to express our gratitude to our veterans, to show our pride in our armed forces and to celebrate the event we've all been waiting for, the inauguration of a new commander in chief. I also want to note the presence of some distinguished guests that others have mentioned before me.

The presidency and the vice presidency may be the highest offices in the land, but there is an even greater distinction that our country bestows -- the Medal of Honor. It is the highest award for valor in action against an enemy force. Only 150 living Americans wear the Medal of Honor. When you meet one of them, remember the moment. For you have just met one of the bravest men in our nation's history.

One hundred and one of these gentlemen are here with us this very afternoon. Let's give them a fitting welcome.

It was 12 years ago, serving as a member of Congress that I received a call from the new president asking me to serve as secretary of defense. Taking the job meant assuming responsibility for the well being of millions of men and women in the military. I accepted without hesitation and thus began the most rewarding years of my **public** life.

As secretary of defense you hold a civilian post, but your daily life is bound up with those who wear the uniform. The caliber of these men and women, the sacrifices they **make**, the duties they carry, and the code they live by -- every day you're reminded of these. Every day **you're** reminded of what they give to us and of **how** much we owe them in return.

We've heard today some of the ways that American service men have touched **peoples'** lives around the world, These stories capture a great truth. For all its size and discipline and immense power, our military's real strength has always been, and will always be, in the character of **those** who serve."

Stephen **Ambrose** has written about the world of a little more than a **half century** ago, the world that Bob Dole spoke of. In that time, in many **parts** of Europe: and Asia during world War II, the sight of a group of soldiers would strike terror into the heart of a civilian. Armed troops almost always meant destruction or terror or death.

But if they were American troops, the civilian had nothing to fear, As **Ambrose** explains, those **G.I.s meant candy**, and cigarettes, and C-rations and freedom. We had sent **our best** young men halfway **around** the **world**, not to conquer, not to terrorize but to liberate. So it has always been for the American military,

We are a peaceful **nation**. Our people are reluctant **warriors**. We take up **arms** only to protect **our** country, to throw back tyranny and to defend the **cause** of freedom. At times the price has run high and never higher than in the last century with so many **conflicts**, world wars, Asian wars, the Cold War, the **Gulf War**.

Veterans from all these periods are with us today, Some served for a few years, others for long careers. Some were called to the front lines of battle. Others had duties closer to home:. But all had these things in common.

In our country's hour of need, they answered. They gave America the best years of their lives and they stood ready to give life itself.

It is sometime said that heroes are hard to find, But I never heard that said around the Pentagon. Those who would understand the meaning of duty, and honor and country, need look no further than the nearest veteran of America's armed forces.

Today, we also remember those who are not so near, those who never came home, those whose fate is still undetermined. We honor the memory of the fallen soldier. We have not forgotten the missing soldier and we pledge to their families our best efforts at the fullest possible accounting.

On this day in 1981, the, city of Washington was preparing to welcome a man who is in the thoughts of all of us today, President Ronald Reagan. His inauguration marked a new era of purpose and pride for the United States and for the armed forces.

President-elect Bush and I hope the *same* might be said of our administration and the era that begins tomorrow at noon. Of the many duties he and I are about to assume, none is greater than preparing our military for the challenges and the dangers to come.

We will give them training that is thorough and missions that are clear. We will give them the kind of military where men and women are proud to serve and proud to stay. We will give them the respect they have earned and the support they deserve,

All of this begins in less than 24 hours, when the chief justice administers the oath of office to the man I now present, the 43rd president of the United States, George W. Bush."

PRESIDENT BUSH:

I'm certainly glad the vice president-to-be invited me. It does not surprise me, however, that he turned his tribute, or a tribute that was supposed to be to him, to honor somebody else. That's why I picked him to be the vice president, He is a decent, honorable man.

I am so pleased to see Secretary of Defense Cohen. Thank you so much for coming. I'm honored you're here. Secretary welcomed Dick and myself and a couple other notables over to the defense department the other day and he did so with grace. For that we're very grateful, sir.

I'm so glad to see Bob Dole. What a good man. Of all the notables here, I don't know why I picked you out except you always make me smile when I think about you. What a great man. And thank you for your service in building a memorial to the World War II vets.

It's good to see members of the United States Senate here - - Senator Inouye, and of course, my friend Senator McCain. Senator McCain is a pretty tough competitor. He brings the best out in people, if you know what I mean.

But I look forward to working with both members of the Senate and the members of the United States Congress who are here as well. Thank you for coming.

It's something to be in the midst of heroes, But it's important that a president-to-be and vice president-to-be do so because it reminds us of the greatness of our country. It reminds us of the fact that there are thousands of Americans who when called are willing to serve a cause greater than self. What an honor to be here."

It's a particular honor to be here with recipients of the Medal of Honor. Great heroes of the American scene. Americans who define the character of America, remind us that we must never forget our history,

Soon, a new administration will be taking office in Washington and we'll have the responsibility for keeping the peace, for making the world more peaceful. It begins by first having a national security team, I believe, in all due respect to other presidents -- one whom I happen to know quite well -- that I believe the national security team I put together is the best in our nation's history, led by Colin Powell and Don Rumsfeld.

I look forward to hearing their opinions. I look forward to their advice, I look forward to doing what is right to make the world more peaceful. This is an administration which

understands though, that in order to keep **the** peace our military must be strong, morale must be high.

We will make sure our soldiers are well paid and well housed. We will make sure our soldiers are well trained. I'm so glad to see general officers here of our military, because I want to say this loud and clear as I can. The mission of the United States military will be to have a military prepared and trained and ready to fight and win war, and therefore prevent war from happening in the first place.

In order to make sure that morale is high with those who wear the uniform today we must keep our commitment to those who wore the uniform in the past. I have picked a really good man to head the veterans' department in Tony Principi. We will make sure promises made to our veterans will be promises kept.

In less than 24 hours I have the highest honor and that's to become the commander in chief of the greatest nation in the world. I accept **that** honor with pride, I accept that honor with purpose. Thank you for having me. God bless America.

##END##



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 5, 2001 6:37 PM

TO: Frank Kramer, Admiral Quigley, Bill Schneider, Col. Byrd

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Thank You Notes for Wehrkunde

Please draft up any thank you notes that I ought to send to people in connection with the **Wehrkunde** trip. Thank you.

DR:dh
020501-39

333 SD

5 FEB 01

U02332 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 20 2001

33524

The Honorable Rudolf **Scharping**
Federal Minister of Defense
Federal Ministry of Defense
D-1 1055 Berlin
Germany

Dear Mr. Minister:

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the recent Munich Conference on Security Policy. I appreciated both your hospitality and the opportunity to exchange initial views on security issues.

I look forward to our cooperation as we address the important issues ahead.

Sincerely,

U03396 /01

207601



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 20 2001

His Excellency **Gerhard Schroeder**
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bundeskanzleramt
Schlossplatz 1
D-10178 Berlin
Germany

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the recent Munich Conference on Security Policy. I appreciated both your hospitality and the opportunity to exchange views on security issues of mutual interest.

NATO remains the heart of European security. The U.S. government values the close cooperation among the Allies. We will fully consult our Allies and friends on important issues as we go forward.

I look forward to our continued cooperation,

Sincerely,

U03396 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 20 2001

Mr. Robert Boehme
U.S., Consulate General
Koenigstrasse 5
D-80539 Munich
Germany

Dear CG Boehme:

It was a pleasure to meet you at the recent Munich Conference on Security Policy. The work of your staff on the ground in Munich was excellent.

I would like to extend my thanks to you, as well as your political officer, Mr. Ted **Tanoue**, and administrative officer, Mr. Jeff Cellars.

Thanks so much.

Sincerely,

U03396 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 20 2001

Dr. h.c. Horst Teltschik
Chairman, Board of Directors
Herbert Quandt Foundation
Hanuer Strasse 46
D-80788 Munich
Germany

Dear Dr. Teltschik:

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the 37th Munich Conference on Security Policy and for assembling another outstanding conference. I found it important to take part in this event, even under the extraordinary time constraints of the first days of the new Administration.

Thank you again, and best wishes for continued success.

Sincerely,

U03396 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 20 2001

The Right Honourable Geoffrey Hoon
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence, Whitehall
London SW1A2H
United Kingdom

Dear Secretary of State Hoon:

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the recent Munich Conference on Security Policy. I appreciated the opportunity to develop our working relationship, which began with your warm wishes upon my nomination in December 2000.

It remains true that no European country has been a greater friend to the United States than the UK. Your support for reviewing current force levels in the Balkans is appreciated.

I look forward to continuing our discussion on these and other issues when you visit Washington next month.

Sincerely,

U03396 /01



**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON**

FEB 2 2011

**The Honorable Sergio Mattarella
Minister of Defense
Republic of Italy
Rome, Italy**

Dear Mr. Minister:

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the recent Munich Conference on Security Policy. I was struck by the similarity in our approaches to European security.

We clearly have strong mutual interests in enhancing Europe's defense capabilities and preserving the integrity of NATO as the primary instrument of transatlantic security. I welcomed your statements on the importance of maintaining NATO's centrality, avoiding unnecessary duplication, and creating an inclusive relationship between NATO and the European Union. Your support of the U.S. proposal for a joint NATO-EU defense planning process is particularly appreciated.

Italy is an important and valued ally. I look forward to our continued cooperation.

Sincerely,

U03396 /01

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 20 2001


Honorable **Alain** Richard
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
14 Rue St. Dominique
00450 Armees
Paris, France

Dear Mr. Minister:

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the recent Munich Conference on Security Policy. I appreciated the opportunity to continue the dialogue we began earlier in the week on the telephone.

I look forward to our continued cooperation, as we address these and other European security issues in the future.

Sincerely,



U03396 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 20 2001

The Right Honourable the Lord
Robertson of Port Ellen, PC
Secretary General
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Boulevard Leopold III
1110 Brussels
Belgium

Dear Lord Robertson:

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the recent Munich Conference on Security Policy. I appreciated the opportunity to exchange views on European security.

We have strong mutual interests in enhancing NATO's defense capabilities and preserving the integrity of NATO as the primary instrument of transatlantic security.

I look forward to our continued cooperation, as we address these and other issues in the future.

Sincerely,

U03396 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 20 2001

Mr. Javier Solana
Secretary General, Council of the European Union
Justus Lipsius Building
Rue de la Loi 175
1048 Brussels
Belgium

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the recent
Munich Conference on Security Policy.

I appreciated our visit. I, too, am a strong
supporter of NATO.

I look forward to meeting with you in the future
to continue our dialogue on European security.

Sincerely,

U03396 /01

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 20 2001

His Excellency Tony Tan
Deputy Prime Minister
Ministry of Defense
Republic of Singapore

Dear Mr. Minister:

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the recent Munich Conference on Security Policy. I appreciated the opportunity to establish our working relationship, which began with your warm wishes upon my confirmation as Secretary of Defense in January.

We clearly have mutual interests in maintaining strong bilateral ties. We consider the building of the carrier-capable **Changi** Pier a clear indication of this support. We especially appreciate your support of the U.S. forces permanently stationed in Singapore.

I look forward to our continued cooperation, as we discuss these and other topics in the future.

Sincerely,



U03396 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 2 12 00 11

His Excellency
Brajesh Mishra
Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister
Government of India
New Delhi 110 021

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the recent Munich Conference on Security Policy. I appreciated the opportunity to establish our working relationship.

India and the U.S. have major interests in common. I look forward to working with you in support of these interests. While I understand you have some concerns about our plans for missile defense, we welcome discussions toward a shared U.S.-Indian understanding of this issue.

I look forward to our continued cooperation, as we discuss these and other topics in the future.

Sincerely,

U03396 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 20 2007

General Gregory S. Martin, USAF
Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe
Unit 3050, Box 1
APO AE 09094-0501

Dear General Martin:

Let me again express my disappointment at not being able to meet the men and women of the 52nd Fighter Wing at **Spangdahlem**. These visits are important to me as they provide an opportunity to personally thank the service members for their dedication to our country.

Please extend my appreciation to the individuals who worked so diligently to prepare the visit. I regret the inconvenience my cancellation caused and look forward to an opportunity to visit in the future.

Sincerely,

U03396 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 20 2001

Brigadier General Donald J. Hoffman, USAF
Commander, 52nd Fighter Wing
Unit 3680, Box 190
APO AE 09126-0190

Dear General Hoffman:

Let me again express my disappointment at not being able to meet the men and women of the 52nd Fighter Wing at **Spangdahlem**. These visits are important to me as they provide an opportunity to personally thank the service members for their dedication to our country.

Please extend my appreciation to Colonels Mike Beard and John Watkins, Captains Dan Beard and Glen Roberts, and the rest of your staff who worked so diligently to prepare the visit.

I regret the inconvenience my cancellation caused and look forward to an opportunity to visit 'Team Eifel' in the future.

Sincerely,

U03396 /01



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 6, 2001 11:38 AM

032

snowflake

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld³⁾

SUBJECT: Senator "Reed"

You mentioned to me that you had talked to Senator Reed. There are two Senators named Reed/Reid. Which one did you talk you?

DR:dh
020601-6

6 Feb 01

U02328 /01



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 12, 2001 2:33 PM

TO: Marty Hoffman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: DACOWITS

334 DACOWITS

I would like to consider Marcia Littlejohn for the DACOWITS board.

DR:dh
021201-13

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

12 FEB 01

U02861 /01

snowflake



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 12, 2001 2:42 PM

TO: Marty Hoffman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Personnel

230.02

I think it is important that I start seeing clusters of candidates. I am seeing so many people on so many different things that if we go a week or two or three between me seeing various candidates for one specific job, there's no way I can compare them. I need to see them in the same day or the same two days. Thanks.

DR:dh
021201-15

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

12 FEB 01

U02844 /01



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 12, 2001 5:14 PM

TO: Marty Hoffman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Names sent by Secretary Martinez

230.02

Those names from Mel Martinez were sent over because I called him and personally requested that he give us some Hispanic names. They look like some good ones to me. Let's make sure we look hard at them. Thanks.

DR:dh
021201-42

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

12 Feb 01

U02868 /01



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 13, 2001 7:34 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Prison-made Materials

M/ana MLK 2/13/01

Action:

[Signature]
SMA

2/14

Have someone find out something about prison-made materials. One of the congressman on the trip raised the issue with me, and it is called something like "mandated source," things made by prisoners, Congressman McCullough (sp.?) was very much for it, and this congressman was against it.

*Adm Review:
You might ask Mr. Col. Cribbs.
SC*

DR:dh
021301-8

DATE/TIME: 2

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF- DEFENSE:

snowflake



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 19, 2001 8:01 AM

TO: Marty Hoffmann

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Phil Major

020 PAE

We've got to take a quick look at Phil Major, who is an executive VP of IDA. We need to check with Larry Welch with the thought that he could do PA&E.

DHR:dh
021901-1

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

19 FEB 01

U03287 /01



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 19, 2001 8:06 AM

TO: Marty Hoffmann
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: John Levy's Recommendation

230.02

John Levy, Ed Levy's son, recommended someone for the Pentagon. Do you remember who that is?

DHR:dh
021901-2

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

19 FEB 01

1103286 /01



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 19, 2001 10:43 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Author

335 SD

I would like to meet the fellow you said who wrote that paper. I think his name was Lane? Thanks.

DHR:dh
021901-11

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

3

U03285 /01

snowflake



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 19, 2001 10:43 AM

TO: Rich Haver
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Interview w/Hayden

020 NSM

Take a look at this interview with Mike Hayden and tell me what you think about this,

Attachment .

DHR:dh
021901-12

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

19 FEB 01

U03284 /01

there are such close quarters in that area that when anyone needs to walk by you, you have to, you know, move aside. It contains a lot of equipment. It's the hub of the control of the ship.

GJELTEN: Navy officials are not releasing the names of the civilians who were aboard the **Greenville** last Friday, citing privacy concerns. They insist there's no reason to conclude the visitors contributed to the accident. Controlling the helm is a relatively simple task on a submarine, often assigned to an inexperienced crew member. Captain Tom Kyle (sp), Deputy chief of staff of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, last night emphasized that visitors sitting at the controls of the **Greenville** would hardly have been responsible for the ship's actions.

CAPT. TOM KYLE [U.S. Pacific Fleet]: If there were civilians on watch or standing at any of these stations on the ship, they were under the direct control of a qualified military submarine person. So that that person, that military person could take control of any action that was initiated by a civilian.

GJELTEN: Still, neither the Navy, nor the NTSB investigators have come up with an explanation for why the **Greenville** collided with the Japanese vessel. Today, a Pentagon official said the Navy's own investigation could possibly lead to criminal charges being filed against the commander or other crew members if there is evidence of negligence.

Tom Gjelten, NPR News, Washington.

How

60 MINUTES II CBS TV

9:00 PM FEBRUARY 13, 2001

Interview with NSA Director Gen. Mike Hayden

SCOTT PELLE, co-host: How strong is America's national security? We have a sobering answer tonight from a man who knows. The head of the National security Agency admits that we're at risk and terrorists like **Osama** bin Laden may have some advantages. That sort of candor is unprecedented and so is what you're about to see--the inner workings of the most secretive spy agency in the world, a place where news cameras have never been permitted until our national security correspondent David Martin got inside.

DAVID MARTIN reporting: If you think the CIA is this country's biggest, most powerful spy agency, think again. The biggest by far, twice as big as the CIA, is the National Security Agency, which eavesdrops on communications all over the world. A phone call intercepted by **NSA** is often the first warning a terrorist like **Osama** bin Laden is planning an attack against Americans. To find that one threatening phone call or fax or e-mail or radio transmission, among the billions being made each day, **NSA** relies on rooms full of supercomputers. But the **NSA** has fallen on hard times and in many ways is facing a national security nightmare. One example, the night General Mike Hayden, the director of **NSA**, got a call from the agency's watch officer with the word that every single one of those computers had crashed.

Mr. MIKE HAYDEN: I went through a series of questions in kind of disbelief and think, 'How many computers are down?' And the answer was, 'All of them.'

(Footage of traffic; snowstorm; Hayden; woman)

MARTIN: **(Voiceover)** It was January of 2000, and while much of the East Coast dug out from a surprise snowstorm, Hayden went on closed circuit television to warn his work force what was at stake.

Gen. HAYDEN: I said, 'This is secret,' OK? This cannot be the second half of a sentence that begins, 'Honey, you won't believe what happened to me at work today,' because the knowledge that we **were** down would increase the risk significantly to Americans around the world.

MARTIN: The **NSA** was essentially brain dead.

Gen. HAYDEN: **NSA** headquarters was brain dead. We had some residual ability at our locations around the world, but I don't want to trivialize this. This was really bad.

(Footage of computers; Hayden; woman; **NSA**; aerial view of **NSA**; barbed wire; guard dog; man; Director's Suite)

MARTIN: **(Voiceover)** The computers were back up in three and a half days, but there was no denying the enormity of what had happened or other problems Hayden had discovered when he took over **NSA**. But before you can understand just much trouble **NSA** is in, you have to understand what it does. For five decades that was next to impossible, because outsiders were almost never allowed inside this compound surrounded by barbed wire and guard dogs. Too much secrecy was part of **NSA's** problem, Hayden decided, so going public is part of his solution.

Gen. HAYDEN: You're sitting in the headquarters, David, of a very powerful and a traditionally very secret organization.

(Footage of listening post; map)

MARTIN: **(Voiceover)** An organization which operates listening posts all over the world. Simply put: You eavesdrop on people's communications.

Gen. HAYDEN: That would be simply put. It's not the way--it--it's not the phrase that we use. But again, we're involved in signals intelligence.

(Footage of signals intelligence; listening post; satellites; antennas)

MARTIN: **(Voiceover)** Here's what signals intelligence looks like. The exact location of this listening post is secret, but it is one of many intercepting radio transmissions, phone calls, e-mails and faxes. **NSA** eavesdrops on the communications of both enemies and friends of the US, but Hayden will never tell you exactly who all these antennas are listening to.

Gen. HAYDEN: If the target didn't think he or she was communicating privately, they wouldn't communicate. And so the key to this business is actually doing what your adversary believes to be impossible.

(Footage of **NSA's** epicenter; flashing light; workers; **Beraradino**)

MARTIN: **(Voiceover)** This is the epicenter of **NSA**, a room so secret we were ordered to turn off our microphones, And those lights are flashing to warn everyone we are in this inner sanctum. Intercepted communications are funneled through this operations center 24 hours a day, seven days a week, under the

direction of Richard **Beraradino**.

Mr. RICHARD **BERARADINO**: It's quite frankly intelligence that's flowing from the horse's mouth, so to speak.

MARTIN: The horse's mouth being the adversary.

Mr. **BERARADINO**: Correct.

MARTIN: So you're hearing, real time, what some of our adversaries are saying?

Mr. **BERARADINO**: Correct.

(Footage of man; text on screen; **NSA** workers at computer stations)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) For example, the actual conversations of Iraqi air defense gunners getting ready to take a shot at an American plane are monitored and warnings are sent out via a top-secret chat room. This is as close as you'll ever get to what **NSA** really does.

Computerized Voice #1: Attention! Attention!

(Footage of man walking down hallway; entering a room)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) **NSA** has a gauntlet of security devices to keep outsiders out.

Unidentified Man #1: It's a fingerprint identification system.

MARTIN: So instead of typing in your password...

Unidentified Man #1: Simply present your finger to gain access.

(Footage of scanner; man; picture of eyeball)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) There are scanners that recognize the eyeballs of those who work here...

Computerized Voice #2: Identity confirmed. Access granted.

(Footage of Martin at security scanner)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) ...**and** screen out those who don't.

Computerized Voice #3: Please move forward a little. Please move forward a little. We are sorry. You are not identified.

(Footage of woman at keypad; woman **cyberscanned**)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) Office keys are never taken home; they're issued by machine each morning.

Unidentified Man #2: OK. Stand still.

MARTIN: (**Voiceover**) Some of what goes on here is straight out of a James Bond movie, This is called a **cyberscan**.

(Footage of **3-D** image)

Mr. DAVE **MURLEY**: (**Voiceover**) That actually generates a three-dimensional capture of her face.

(Footage of **Q; Murley; Martin**)

MARTIN: (**Voiceover**) There is even a real life Q named Dave **Murley**, who is searching for a foolproof way of preventing **imposters** from logging on to **NSA's** computers.

Mr. **MURLEY**: Right now the system is locked so you can't type anything on it. But as soon as I change to a position where I would be using the system...

(Footage of circles around **Murley's** face on screen; Martin)

Mr. **MURLEY**: ...**you'll** see the red circle came around my face. That indicated it found a face. Now there's a green one there. That indicates that it recognized my face.

MARTIN: And now you can type on the computer.

Mr. **MURLEY**: Now the computer is mine to do with what I wish.

(Footage of Martin at computer)

MARTIN: Right.

Mr. **MURLEY**: Now you can try to be me, and when you come into the...

MARTIN: Where am I?

Mr. **MURLEY**: Just step in front of it. It has recognized that there is a face present, but it's not my face and you're not allowed to use the computer.

MARTIN: Wrong face.

Mr. **MURLEY**: Wrong face.

(Footage of fake Dave)

MARTIN: (**Voiceover**) But what about a more clever **imposter**?

Mr. **MURLEY**: This was done by one of those companies that does masks for Hollywood. A number of special techniques have been used to match the coloring and to produce material that looks a lot like flesh. Now we'll use the fake Dave to come in and try and enter the system.

(Footage of fake Dave on screen)

Mr. **MURLEY**: And there you can see the fake Dave has been recognized as a face. It's thrown the red

circle around it, but the circle does not go green. And it does not recognize the fake Dave as the real Dave.

(Altered footage of government trash; man; recycled pulp; **Vern Shifflett**)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) At **NSA**, even the trash is a government secret. We had to alter these **pictures** to prevent secret codes and frequencies from seeing the light of day. **NSA** has to get rid of **40,000** pounds of classified documents each day, recycling them into pulp that is shipped off to become tissue paper.

Mr. **VERN SHIFFLETT**: We clean this out.

(Footage of Martin and **Shifflett**)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) **Vern Shifflett** makes sure no secret gets out of here alive.

Mr. **SHIFFLETT**: We call this non-qualified pulp.

MARTIN: I'd call it the dregs.

Mr. **SHIFFLETT**: Well, in our minds, it's still classified material.

MARTIN: You're kidding me now. This stuff is still classified?

Mr. **SHIFFLETT**: Right. It could just be one small portion in there.

(Footage of **NSA** employees)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) Until recently, **NSA** employees were forbidden to tell their neighbors, even their families, what they did for a living. That kind of fanatical secrecy is one of the reasons the public almost never finds out what **NSA** is up to.

NSA officials say that on any given day, the majority of intelligence that shows up in the president's morning briefing comes **from** here. If **NSA** is that important to what the president knows about the rest of the world, then it might alarm you to learn that according to one classified report **NSA** is quite literally going deaf. Hayden insists it's not that bad, but he concedes his agency has a very big problem.

Gen. HAYDEN: We're behind the curve in keeping up with the global telecommunications revolution. Yes, we are.

(Footage of Hayden; Martin)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) **NSA** is now playing catch-up to Silicon Valley and all the cell phones and computers that have proliferated around the world.

Gen. HAYDEN: In a previous world order, our primary adversary was the Soviet Union, an oligarchic, slow-moving nation-state. Our adversary communications are now based upon the developmental cycle of a global industry that is literally moving at the speed of light. Cell phones, encryption, fiber optic communications, digital communications, it--it goes on and on. Just--just think of all the ways that you and--and your viewers communicate, OK? Those are all available to people who would do harm to the United States of America.

(Footage of bombed embassy; rescuers; **Osama bin Laden**; burning vehicle)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) Documents introduced at the trial of the four men accused of blowing up two American embassies in Africa indicate **NSA** was monitoring **Osama bin Laden's** satellite phone as he allegedly directed preparations for the attack from his hiding place in Afghanistan. Even so, **NSA** was unable to collect enough intelligence to stop it.

I think people have a hard time understanding why, if during the Cold War, you could stay either even or a step ahead of the big, bad Soviet Union with all of its might why you can't stay a step ahead of **Osama bin Laden**?

Gen. HAYDEN: The Soviet Union, for its telecommunications, had to rely on those things the Soviet Union built. **Osama bin Laden** has at his disposal the wealth of a **\$3-trillion-a-year** telecommunications industry that he can rely on.

MARTIN: He has better technology?

Gen. HAYDEN: That's one. He has better technology available to him. I can't get into operational details about what it is we know or don't know about him.

(Photo of **Osama bin Laden**; encrypted message; **Zimmermann**)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) It is **NSA's** nightmare--terrorists like **Osama bin Laden** using technology developed right here in the United States to hide their plans to attack Americans. And here's one way they could do it: software developed by computer maverick Phil **Zimmermann** that uses encryption to make messages unreadable.

Mr. PHIL **ZIMMERMANN**: This is some document, a technical document, that we want to encrypt before we send it out on the Internet, and this is what it looks like encrypted.

(Footage of encrypted message; **Zimmermann**)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) **Zimmermann** calls his program Pretty Good Privacy. He distributes it for **free** on the Internet so average citizens can protect themselves from surveillance of organizations like **NSA**. Anyone can download it.

MARTIN: Good guys and bad guys.

Mr. **ZIMMERMANN**: That's true. But I can't think of a way of making it available to the good guys without also making it available to the bad guys.

MARTIN: So a person who wants to protect their credit card number has the same access to Pretty Good Privacy as a terrorist who's plotting to kill Americans?

Mr. **ZIMMERMANN**: That's true.

MARTIN: Does that bother you?

Mr. **ZIMMERMANN**: It bothers me a great deal, but I don't know how to solve that problem.

(Footage of fence; satellite; inside **NSA**; **supercomputers**)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) And neither does **NSA**. No organization has spent more time and money on breaking codes. After all, if you can't break the code, there's no point in intercepting the message, which is why **NSA** is armed with an arsenal of supercomputers, some of them capable of performing more than one trillion operations per second to help decipher unreadable jumbles of letters and numbers,

NSA has always had state-of-the-art computers, but they were increasingly hard pressed to keep up with the sheer volume of traffic. As the demands grew, the system was stretched thinner and thinner...

(Footage of supercomputers)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) ...**until** finally, on that night in January of **2000**, it crashed.

Gen. HAYDEN: We actually were down. We were dark. Our ability to process information was gone.

MARTIN: Was this the ultimate wake-up call?

Gen. HAYDEN: Of course. Of course.

(Footage of Hayden in his office)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) It wasn't Hayden's first wake-up call. When he became director two years ago, he **commissioned** two studies of **NSA** and got back a scathing indictment of a stagnant and unwieldy government bureaucracy. There is "confusion and paralysis," the reports said. "We have run out of time."

Some of these descriptions are descriptions of a dysfunctional agency. 'Civilian personnel wrote their own promotion reports and supervisors endorsed the reports, even if they did not agree.' Now that's crazy.

Gen. HAYDEN: Yeah, I would agree with that.

(Footage of Hayden)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) Instead of hiding those problems--easy to do in a top-secret agency--Hayden made sure those damning reports were posted on the Internet for all to see.

Gen. HAYDEN: I had these reports and they were almost like a license.

MARTIN: A license to break some china?

Gen. HAYDEN: Exactly. And--and I--I--David, I actually told the work force that, 'We're going to move.' People had to understand that standing still was not going to be an option.

(Footage of building; vehicles traveling down street; workers; Hayden)

MARTIN: (Voiceover) The high walls that kept **NSA's** secrets safe for half a century also kept out the innovative spirit of the information revolution, Now Mike **Hayden** is trying to stir up a revolution of his own inside the least known, most powerful institution in America, and he has only one year left before his tour of duty ends.

Gen. HAYDEN: This isn't about people doing bad things. This is about an agency that's grown up in one world, learned a way to succeed within that world and now **finds** itself in another world and it's got to change if it hopes to succeed in that second universe,

(Footage of **60 MINUTES** II clock)

Announcer: (Voiceover) For the history of codes and code breaking from **Mata Hari** to the Cold War, log on to **cbs.com**.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

To Lisa Blomson
D.K.

[Handwritten signature]

February 19, 2001 6:34 PM

TO: ~~Steve Cambone~~
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Paper by Iain Duncan Smith

[Handwritten signature]

Europe

Here's a paper by Duncan Smith, MP. Why don't we see if someone could check the accuracy of the facts, If it is reasonably accurate, I want to circulate it to some of the people on our team and then to Colin Powell and Condi Rice.

Attachment

DHR:dh
021901-21

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

19 Feb 01

U06613 /01

IAIN DUNCAN SMITH MP

**SHADOW SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DEFENCE**

**“The military threat, the EU’s political response
and a weakened NATO”**

Wednesday 14th February, 2001

**at the
Heritage Foundation, Washington DC**

From 1946 until 1989 a clear, even static threat, easily defined in both political and military terms, shaped all our thinking. The need to defend against the threat was paramount and the terms of our political debate for forty-three years were fashioned by it.

Western Europe has come a long way in the fifty-six years since the end of the Second World War. Together with the US and Canada under the umbrella of NATO we have faced down the threat from the Soviet Union and under NATO's protective shield have managed to establish democratic and stable nations, less likely to go to war with each other than at any time in history.

It is not surprising that, conditioned by this battle-free war, the West let out a collective sigh of relief when the Berlin Wall came down. Peoples, it was assumed, freed from the oppressive yoke of the Cold War would be grateful and benign. It was, many believed, no longer likely that European nations would be troubled by the spectre of war again.

In the intervening years even though this belief was challenged more and more, from the Gulf to the Balkans, politicians were reluctant to sit down and focus on the development of this post Soviet threat. They were too busy cashing in on the peace dividend and did not want to be bothered by something so unnecessary as a threat assessment.

Emerging Threats

However, history teaches us that threats to world stability are geographically diffused and can emerge far quicker than anticipated.

The proliferation of ballistic missiles, and the weapons of mass destruction with which they are armed, is the most daunting threat of modern times. Between 35 to 40 countries have some missile capability, and according to a report from Britain's Lancaster University, up to 18 have nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads with which to arm them. Recent developments confirm these previous estimates.

North Korea and Iran are among the countries currently seeking to develop long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Others have followed them. The ex-head of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, makes it clear that despite the sanctions regime Saddam Hussein has developed biological and nuclear agents. Furthermore his effort to develop missiles has progressed at a great pace as well.

Over the last year a number of countries have successfully tested missiles – Iran test-fired its first solid-liquid fuel missile. The missile, the Shahab-3D has a range of 810 miles.

Syria also successfully tested first North Korean ground-to-ground Scud D missile', with a maximum range of about 600 km. Like the earlier models, the Scud D is capable of being armed with chemical and biological warheads manufactured in Syria. Libya has taken a delivery of a consignment of North Korean ballistic missiles capable of hitting targets in Israel and NATO states in Southern Europe.

A series of recent flight-tests of the new Chinese Dong Feng 31 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, with a range of about 8,000-10,000km, has shown that the Chinese programme is being speeded up.

The grim facts of the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were soberly set-out by the Rumsfeld Commission, and most recently by the US Defense Department report, published at the beginning of January "Proliferation: Threat and Response"²

It noted:

"At least 25 countries now possess or are in the process of acquiring and developing capabilities to inflict mass casualties and destruction: nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons or the means to deliver them".

¹ Ha'aretz News, 25 Sep 00

² January 2001

These reports have clearly had a significant impact on attitudes in Washington, but surprisingly have had little impact on opinion in Europe. One and a half years ago, I spoke in Washington and called for Europe to take this threat seriously. Yet, I am sad to say, European leaders are resisting any calls for co-operation with the United States to counter the threat.

Such growing weapons capability in itself is a cause of great concern, yet when one considers to what degree that capability is linked with areas of great political instability and tension one can see how quickly these threats could develop. These weapons are weapons as much of terror as war fighting weapons. The possession of this capability could change the whole approach of the West in handling threats to their interests.

Some argue that our massive nuclear deterrence would be sufficient defence, ironically often the same people who opposed our possession of it in the 60s, 70s and 80s. Not even a Saddam Hussein, they point out, would risk such retaliation. Yet imagine that the threat is made. The country threatened, perhaps in the same region, may not be much reassured for they will realise they will have to suffer the consequences of the initial strike. They may also question whether the UK or the USA would retaliate with overwhelming force if their homeland is not targeted. Furthermore, what if the threat was a chemical or biological one, not nuclear? Are we certain that we would strike back with a massive nuclear warhead? It is that marginal judgement which makes the threat alone so destabilising to our allies and friends.

To illustrate this, try to imagine what would have happened had Milosevic possessed such a weapon. Who would have laid money on the Alliance holding together had Athens or Rome, for example, been targeted? And would we have engaged with Iraq had Saddam Hussein had this capability and threatened his neighbours? This is not too far fetched. Remember Yugoslavia had a well-developed nuclear programme and Serbia still possesses 48 kg of weapons grade uranium. Furthermore links between North Korea, Iraq and Serbia were developing very fast prior to Milosevic's departure.

History teaches us that those who are not prepared to change in response to new threats will soon find themselves overwhelmed. Although there are often dangers in overusing historical analysis I nonetheless think that it is relevant here.' During 1930s the British Government persuaded itself that 'it would have up to ten years warning of an emerging threat and thus would have enough time to build up forces. The events of 1939/40 show how such complacency almost ended in our defeat.

Given the nature of this growing threat, it is surely an ideal opportunity to remodel the NATO alliance to better counter these threats rather than create new and duplicating structures. The reshaping and rebuilding of military capability of European members of NATO is vital – the poor quality of military capability amongst nations of Europe has for far too long been unaddressed.

A start to this is for the nations of Europe to recognise the threat and then join the United States in development of the relevant

defences. In short, to create a NATO based programme. The alternative is to hope the problem will go away – sadly we know where that sort of complacency got us in the 1930s.

Yet confronted by these threats, the last few years show that Europe is not prepared to face this problem. Across the EU as a whole, military spending is down by around 20 per cent compared to the mid-nineties. For example Germany has cut its budget by f 7.5 billion since 1995 – a reduction of 30 per cent. They are not alone.

Ah! I anticipate some of you may say, isn't the European Security and Defence Policy, or as I prefer to call it the Euro Army, the way to deal with this?

Regrettably, as I intend to show, it will become part of the problem not part of the solution.

The Risks to NATO

There is a risk that competing priorities may come into play. Every European member of NATO will have only one set of forces and one defence budget, not one force and one budget for NATO and another force and military budget for the EU.

If European nations, through the EU, are seen as having autonomous and competing institutions, rather than integrated, transparent and complementary ones, then NATO's collective security is likely to suffer. This will leave both North America and

Europe relying on uncoordinated, inefficient and ad hoc responses to destabilizing threats.

There is also the risk that dual planning institutions will in turn create new bureaucracies. We are already seeing this happen. And indeed Sir John Weston, Britain's former ambassador to NATO, has described the new ESDP structures as being "excruciatingly bureaucratic" (*Daily Telegraph* 11 January 2001).

Nor is this an inclusive process. Non-EU members of NATO – such as Turkey, Norway, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and even Denmark (opted out) – are being discriminated against and excluded from consideration. This is already risking division and could lead to fragmentation and a loss of cohesion in the Alliance. The Turkish Government has been so concerned by such developments that they have refused to agree that the EU should have guaranteed access to NATO military planners when conducting operations.

But above all, the new European force does not extend Western Europe's collective defence capability. It does not provide for a single new soldier or a single new bullet. All it does is to transfer the chain of command from the national capitals to the EU and armed forces from NATO to EU.

When the UK Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Charles Guthrie, was recently asked whether he thought an EU Rapid Reaction Force could ever be an effective fighting force, he

replied: "Not within my lifetime, quite honestly." (The Daily Telegraph, 12 Feb. 2001)

Although some politicians insist that this force will be anchored to NATO and that it would enhance NATO, the problem is that the Nice summit formalised a significant shift away from NATO.

The Nice Summit

It is no good EU politicians now trying to deny that this EU defence force is not separate from NATO, and is simply there to enhance the Alliance. The Nice summit produced concrete evidence of what I consider to be a significant shift away from NATO.

The facts (from the Nice agreement) are these:

- The EU military forces are independent and autonomous from NATO
- The planning for many operations can and will be done outside of NATO
- It is the EU that will make the decision whether to conduct an operation and only then might consult NATO (they are not obliged to do so)
- The EU will retain full political and strategic control throughout any operation (whether NATO is involved or not)

It is worth quoting Annex 7, par. 3., of the Nice summit's Standing Arrangements for Consultations and Cooperation between the EU and NATO:

"Should the EU consider an in-depth study of a strategic option, which calls for NATO... after the EU council has adopted a strategic option...the entire chain of command must remain under the political control and strategic direction of the EU throughout the operation matter consultation between the two organizations.. . NATO will be informed of the developments..." (p. 60)

I have seen in the newspapers that EU politicians insist that these separate arrangements are only wanted by few, not by all, and that they are even now being resisted. Yet, the Nice Treaty and the military annexes were agreed by all without any dissenting voices.

Britain, for example, has announced its commitment to allocate at least 12,500 men, 18 warships and 72 combat aircraft to this organisation. Yet, this itself seems at odds with the constantly stated point the ESDP is for low-level humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping tasks. If that is the case then I am not quite sure what these men, ships and aircraft are for.

But anyway the real question is where are all these to come from. These are no extra soldiers, ships or aircraft. They are all allocated for national and NATO deployments and as such they are already desperately overstretched. It is also apparent that this is the same for every other nation that has signed up to this at Nice.

Politics

So if it is not about seriously enhancing military capability it can only be, yet again, about politics.

President Chirac says that the force is needed because “the European Union cannot fully exist until it possesses an autonomous defence capacity” [AFP, 29 May 1999]. His Minister for Europe, Pierre Moscovici, sees the European defence initiative as “the completion of the European project” adding, with admirable frankness, that it will “bear France’s imprint”. [L’Express, 20 Jan 2000]. Germany’s Defence Minister, Rudolph Scharping, has described it as “an important step in a new field of European integration.”

The importance of the Euro Army project for the political leaders of the EU cannot be underestimated. The latest comments by Mr Solana, the EU Foreign and Security Policy High Representative, illustrate this.

As recently as last month he warned that an NMD system ‘threatens the stability and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance’ and ‘the climate in the world will become rougher’ (were NMD to be deployed), while the ‘arms control agreed under the ABM Treaty is crucial to global security’. (Sueddeutsche Zeitung 15 Jan 01)

Last week, however, Mr Solana arrived to Washington stating! 'The United States has right to deploy' (missile defence)... and that ABM Treaty 'is not a Bible' and could therefore be changed.

Whatever happened to all those European concerns over the US deployment of NMD? Are they now converts or is there something else?

A simple answer lies in what has already been floated in Europe as a potential and dangerous trade off. This 'grand strategy' where the Europeans would agree to no longer complain about the US plans for a NMD system, but in return the United States should no longer raise concerns over a European Army.

This sort of trade off is both cynical and destructive. For if one analyses what is proposed, one quickly realises that it is the worst of all solutions. We would be left with a Euro defence project, separate from NATO, dividing the alliance and weakening its political as well as military resolve. At the same time the USA would go ahead and deploy a defence system solely for itself without any involvement from its NATO allies, rendering them vulnerable.

To cover this vulnerability in Europe different policy objectives would rapidly emerge, separate to and divergent from the USA. The strand of this can already be detected by some of the rhetoric being used. For example the French Foreign Minister's comment that the USA is a 'hyperpower' that needs to be counterbalanced. The German Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping, said as much

when he noted: 'As the European Union develops its security and defense policy and becomes an independent actor, we must determine our security policy with Russia, our biggest neighbour'. (IHT, 12 Feb. 2001)

Progressively, European Union members of NATO will be under pressure from the EU to arrive at a common position prior to NATO meetings, a form of caucusing. This would develop into a dangerous America vs. Europe confrontation, rendering NATO impotent.

NATO and the EU's response

There is another way, and it is still not too late to pursue it. The test for NATO in the 21st century is the way in which the Alliance responds to the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.

This issue has the ability to either unite NATO or divide it.

The first requirement is that the growing threat from rogue nations armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) needs to be recognised. Here, in the United States you have already made a decision to develop and deploy some form of Ballistic Missile Defence to deal with this threat. With the evidence now available to us all, it seems implausible that similar conclusions cannot be reached in the capitals of Europe as well. It would be dishonest, even reckless, for the political leaders in Europe to do otherwise. In UK criminal law recklessness implies consciously knowing of

risk and ignoring that risk. Yet, such recklessness at present appears to be the chosen course.

Traditionally the United Kingdom would have acted to bridge the current gap in opinions on each side of the Alliance, as we did with the deployment of Cruise and Pershing in the 1980s. But the UK's support for the Euro Army, and its own equivocal stance on missile defence, has seen the UK abrogate this role.

In short the EU members have not just embarked on a defence policy which will undermine the Atlantic Alliance, but are failing to work with our American allies as they endeavour to respond to the very real and growing threats.

Conclusion

Faced by this developing threat, it should be in the interest of European nations to work with the USA to create a NATO base@ defence. The basis of such a programme would be to accept that the imbalance in capability cannot be allowed to continue if NATO is to remain viable.

It is ironic that when we look at this new Euro Army project we find a plan for a force, separated from NATO, whose prime objective seems to be the establishment of a European identity in defence and uses the vehicle of the European Union to achieve it.

Any student of history would assume that this Euro defence project was driven by an analysis of the threat. Yet when I read all the

treaties signed from St Malo through to Nice, I cannot help asking myself – if this is the answer, then what was the question.

Some obsessed by European political structures have spoken of their ambitions for Europe as a superpower, others as a superstate. However, future generations will have harsh words for those whose 'grand design' of European integration became a substitute for the defence of their peoples. They would of course have a good reason – but by then it may be too late.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 20, 2001 7:11 AM

TO: Marty Hoffman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Additions to Policy List

Let's add to the policy list Paula Dobriansky, Doug Paal and Carl Ford. They were suggested by Rich Armitage.

DHR:dh
022001-2

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

022001-2

20 Feb 01

U03345 /01



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 20, 2001 7:21 AM

TO: Marty Hoffmann/RADM Quinn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Low-Intensity Conflict Post

020 50 L

If I am not mistaken there is a low-intensity conflict post here at the Pentagon I would like to know who is in it now. Someone ought to take a look at Brian Jenkins and see if he is somebody we ought to think about bringing into the government.

DHR:dh
022001-3

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

20 FEB 01

U03308 /01

snowflake



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 21, 2001 6:14 AM

248

TO: Marty Hoffmann

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Pension

See me about my government pension. I am told it stopped. Is that what is supposed to happen?

DHR:dh
022101-2

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

21 Feb 01

U03423 /01



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 21, 2001 9:10 AM

TO: Dr. Wolfowitz
Dr. Zakheim
Honorable Pete Aldridge
Dr. Cambone
Dr. Schneider

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Sean O'Keefe Memo

310.1

Attached is a memo that was given to me by Sean O'Keefe last month. He has some interesting ideas. Why don't you take a look at it, and then we can talk about it. Thanks.

Attachment

DHR:dh
022101-10

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

21 Feb 01

U03430 /01

(C) 714

Transition Agenda Thoughts
January 4, 2001

Working Assumptions:

Leadership is sorely needed: Pursuit of the current national security agenda and strategy is either vacuous or bankrupt. There is no way to maintain the current agenda short of adding \$50 billion each year for the foreseeable future which would still result in doing less with substantially more resources – nor would this be prudent. The current strategy is not in concert with the present national security challenges. Thus, even “fully funding” the current strategy will yield a force and program structure which is expensive, but unresponsive to the present global challenges.))

Strategy review in 2001: It will take time to properly define the alternative strategy. The Bush-Cheney approach is to spend a good portion of 2001 conducting a strategy and budget review which will be driven “top-down.” Reconciling imbalances between defense and foreign assistance resources will be only one of the elements of the review. Within defense, the challenge will be to yield an approach which re-balances the procurement, R&D, and operations budgets across services and agencies. To be successful, it has to be led by the Secretary of Defense, but conducted by a limited cohort of OSD loyalists to assure that it’s focused and timely. The earliest completion of this review will contribute to its success – mid-summer 2001 if at all possible.

Planned QDR is a “non-starter”: The current plans for the Quadrennial Defense Review are internally driven. At best, the QDR will incorporate a “service-centric” focus which will yield incremental, known solutions to pending issues. At worst, it will provide grist to litigate every decision made by the Clinton-Gore team that the institution doesn’t like. It is unlikely to yield creative strategy alternatives, and may not even prove to be an appropriate vehicle for a point of departure for the Bush-Cheney strategy review.

Amendment will be forwarded by late spring 2001: In order to slake out an agenda early in the Bush-Cheney Administration before the comprehensive strategy and budget review is complete, a budget amendment for defense will be required. Throughout the campaign the Bush-Cheney team announced its intent to use this vehicle to incorporate several key distinguishing features. The institution (the military services, et al) intend to lobby for all its priorities to be included in such an amendment. Short of well considered guidance, this amendment could yield a disparate collection of service priorities.

A transition strategy:

To avoid the institutional forces setting the agenda, to **preserve** options for the more **extensive strategy review**, and to put a **stake** in the ground with the spring budget **amendment**, the following six factors should be incorporated into the **defense transition plan**. These six elements could form the basis of **institutional "guidance"** and **budget amendment guidelines**.

While the incoming Administration may separately develop program or policy **initiatives** which should be included in the **amendment**, the **military services** and **DOD elements** could be restricted to these six areas for issues to include in the upcoming **amendment**.

Six elements of past & future orientation:

The **six items** represent three areas of focus to signal a **clear break** with the past strategy framework and three areas which explore potential future parameters for the **larger strategy review** focus. In all cases, the results of the **institutional consideration** will provide the new **Administration team** with valuable insights into the **obstacles** in managing the **Department** toward new directions.

Three issues to demonstrate a break from the past:

- 1) *Reconfigure 20% of the R&D budget to C4ISR initiatives:* The senior civilian and military leadership have lamented the severe shortage of **C4ISR related resources**. This approach would force a prioritization of initiatives, with a **clear requirement to make choices**. There should be 3 clear priority for commercial approaches where they exist. It could be left up to the **services**, or led by the Chairman to select the **C4ISR initiatives** and to **OSD** to decide which elements of the current **R&D** program will be diverted. The latter is **preferable** and more likely to include hard choices, ✓
- 2) *Plan to Competitively Outsource 25% of the support establishment:* It's commonly held that competitive outsourcing will yield **30% savings** over current cost performance. Yet, the **Department** is unwilling to pursue these initiatives in earnest for a variety of institutional reasons – most prominent of which is a conviction that the initiative will be **endorsed** and the savings pocketed before any **outsourcing** is actually undertaken. To break that bias, the outsourcing objective should not include an expected savings target. This will signal the sincerity that the objective is outsourcing and savings will be an **attendant benefit**. Whatever resultant savings accrue can be plowed into the longer term strategy review and potentially **finance** those priorities later. ✓

- 3) *Base Closure/Infrastructure realignment:* The senior military leadership has gotten religion that base closure will be the answer to long term resource prayers. No amount of political cajoling however, will yield a new closure process. Therefore, a comprehensive list of base closure candidates should be prepared using the existing authority and procedures. It's a long, drawn out process which, in 1990, forced the Congressional leadership to the negotiating table to find a better, more efficient, less political method. Ten years later, the leverage may work again, but it has to begin with a candidate list. At minimum, this action will demonstrate a willingness to carry the standard and may well reveal the military leadership's priorities. This presents a real opportunity to continue consolidation of common support functions in logistics, communications, medical and intelligence and adoption of best business practices. ✓

Three initiatives to signal potential new direction:

- 4) *Fund the enablers to enhance extant systems:* The Bush-Cheney team has indicated an interest in "skipping a generation" to avail new technology in future systems. Along the way, current systems planned for fielding can incorporate new technology into current systems at minimal cost. A policy which requires including systems such as Link 16, for example, into current and new aircraft systems can significantly improve "battle space awareness" and improve connectivity with C4ISR assets. Specifically signaling inclusion of such systems in the amendment will immediately yield a list of significant candidates and send a strong message that these are the right kind of initiatives to pursue as an interim strategy. To be sure this will represent a significant culture and resource change. ✓
- 5) *Define mission objectives and identify different assets to accomplish the tasks:* Challenge the institution to do zero-based reviews and to come up with alternatives to accomplishing tasks without using the current assets to meet the objectives. For example, precision deep strike, rapid deployment and battle space command & control missions always yield the answers respectively that cruise missiles/long range aircraft, forward deployment, and reconnaissance aircraft are required. By challenging the institution to omit current solutions, different asset employment options may emerge to reveal the varied mission utility of B-2, mobile off shore bases, and UAVs, for example. Great care must be exerted in identifying the mission definitions, but the results could be illuminating. ✓ +
- 6) *Solicit joint basing configurations:* The assessment of infrastructure utility, encroachment, and capacity are heavily influenced by service "ownership." A commitment to advance at least two joint-s&cc base configurations will yield some creative uses of extant capacity – and might even promote operational jointness in a more meaningful way than merely by well intentioned doctrine. Including the resources in the amendment to make two joint operating bases a reality will demonstrate commitment to this concept.

There is nothing particularly magic about these six initiatives other than they are collectively a strong statement that the past strategy is about to change in some direction to be determined, and that standard current practices in the future are not likely to endure. All but issues #4 and #6 are "zero sum" propositions. Indeed, those two initiatives should consume a small fraction of the spring budget amendment increase.

Plenty of room is preserved for other specific program initiatives the new Administration may seek to highlight. This approach preserves much needed time to engage in a comprehensive strategy review. Meanwhile, this transition agenda keeps the Department and its parochial institutions engaged in meaningful directions in the meantime rather than litigating grievances about the past Administration's decisions.

.... and it's a start.....

snowflake

February 22, 2001 8:25 PM

230.02

TO: Marty Hoffmann
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Bill Boyster

Please take a good hard look at Bill Boyster (sp.?). I have gotten some good recommendations on him, and I do know him. See if you can find something that makes sense for him other than the spot he is seeking. Thanks.

DHR:dh
022201-16

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

22 Feb 0

U03669 /01

snowflake

February 22, 2001 8:32 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Principal Deputies

We ought to think about not having Principal Deputies in **OSD**. If we do keep the Principal Deputy slots, we probably ought not use them for Principal Deputies but rather parse out some of the responsibilities so the people in those jobs are not gophers and administrative assistants, but actually have substantive responsibility.

DHR:dh
022201-18

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

0220 OSD

22 Feb 01

U03693 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/70

February 22, 2001 8:48 PM

33550

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Paper by Boyd

Would you send me up the paper Boyd sent you? I would like to read it. Thanks.

DHR:dh
022201-20

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

20 Feb 01

UG3672 /01

February 22, 2001 9:21 PM

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Robin West

Is Robin West somebody we ought to get in to help?

DHR:dh
022201-28

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

230.02

22 Feb 01

snowflake

TO: Zal Khalilzad
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: February 23, 2001
SUBJECT: Use of Force Issue

[Handwritten initials]

381

Thanks for your memo on my discussions with the senators on the use of force issues.

Attached is a memo that I drafted that touches on the same subject. I wonder if you would take the memo I drafted, and then take anything that I said in the discussions with the senators that is better or that elaborates, and incorporate them into this piece that I drafted.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022301.11
Attach.

[Handwritten notes and signature]
Zal
I'd like a
style conc. to base
D.R.

23 Feb 01

U04507 /01

February 19, 2001 1:53 PM

Possible Criteria for U.S. Military Engagements

1. Whatever the U.S. sets out to do should be reasonably achievable.
2. If lives are going to be at risk, as they almost always will, it must be in the national interest.
3. If it is worth doing, the U.S., and allies if they are to be involved, must be willing to put lives at risk.
4. The resources and capabilities to achieve it need to be available and not in use elsewhere.
5. If public support does not exist at the outset, leadership must believe it will be able to earn sufficient public support to sustain the effort for the period required.
6. Leadership should be willing to act early to try to alter the behavior of others to avoid conflict, but, if that fails, be willing to use the force necessary to prevail.
7. The command structure must be something we can control-not UN control or a joint or collective command structure, where command decisions are made by others or by a committee. Neither NATO, the UN or any other coalition should be in a position to control U.S. decision-making. If the U.S. needs a coalition to achieve its goals, leadership must gain prior agreement to do whatever it is it thinks may be needed to achieve the stated goals.
8. There should be clear goals as to the US. purpose and criteria for success, so it will know when it has achieved the goals and can exit.

DR:dh
020501-9

February 23, 2001 9:22 AM

TO: Steve Herbits
CC: Steve Cambone
William Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Battlefield of the Future

381

Attached is one of the proposals from Newt on the battlefield of the future.

See me when you think you have an idea of how we might do that. Thanks.

Attachment

DHR:dh
022301-13

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

23 Feb 01

U03727 /01

Envisioning the Unified Battlefield of the Future

The combination of **nanoscale** science and technology, massive computing capability, exploding bandwidth for communications, new materials technologies, space based assets and the biological revolution will create a new scientific and technological framework for warfare. The traditional bureaucracies will resist the scale of change involved.

The Secretary of Defense should establish a panel of majors (and lieutenant commanders) from the five services (including the Coast Guard) and comparable younger intelligence and civilian experts to assess the scientific potential of the next **25** years and develop a proposed unified battlefield capability that would synergistically bring together the capabilities into a new model force.

The goal is to eliminate any consideration of current platforms and look at the elimination of time, distance, and size by the combination of space assets, computerization, and **nano**-scale miniaturization.

Majors are probably the oldest group capable of getting outside the current assumptions and being truly daring in allowing scientific advances to **define** the development of possibilities rather than having the services' vested interests define the potential,

A working group that reported directly to the Secretary and had an aggressive schedule of reaching out to civilian laboratories, universities, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists might within a two year period develop a vision of a new model unified battlefield that would create a very rich opportunity for true innovation in force structure and doctrine. The group might be collocated at **Moffett** Field with the NASA Ames laboratories that might be the best geographic site for exploring the science of the next quarter century. It would need substantial travel and consulting funds to visit the most interesting scientists and laboratories in the country and to develop simulations and systems to shape a unified battlefield of the future.

February 23, 2001 9:37 AM

TO: Admiral Jeremiah
CC: Steve Herbits
Steve Cambone
William Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Military Schools

Here is a brief paper on Military Schools. Do you think this is something we ought to take a look at?

Attachment

DHR:dh
022301-17

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

352 Dep Schools

23 Feb 01

U03732 /01

Military Dependent Schools as a Retention Opportunity

Americans value educating their children. In fact many Americans will move just to get their children into better schools. This fact could be developed into an asset for the military in retention.

The military dependents' education system could use the best available laptop computer, Internet based curriculum, and advanced learning systems to offer the best education in America. By offering an Internet based curriculum it could provide a continuity of learning for military dependent students as they moved around the world. By using its size as a potential purchaser and its position as a potential showcase the military dependent school system could get the best prices available for new technology and new systems.

The result would be a school system that would encourage retention by ensuring that the children were gaining through their parent's military career.

snowflake

February 24, 2001 8:59 AM

TO: RDML Quinn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Subject Areas

Please add intelligence and unmanned UAVs to the list of things that we are going to get people to comment on. Thanks.

DHR:dh
022401-1

DATE/TIME: 3/01/01

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Done ,

V
R

J.V.
SMAA

350.09

24 FEB 01

snowflake

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 FEB 26 PM 5: 26

February 26, 2001 9:49 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Aircraft

452

Have someone put together that piece of paper that shows each aircraft, what the individual cost is, what the total buy is, what its purpose is, and, if you have some way of calculating it, its lethality by some cost measure.

DHR:dh
022601-12

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

26 Feb 01

U03903 /01

February 26, 2001 11:32 AM

TO: Dr. Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: (b)(6)

Your friend, (b)(6) grabbed me at the White House dinner Sunday night and said she had to talk to me, which of course she always does when she sees you. I told her I would have you call her-here is her number: (b)(6). Do well.

DHR:dh
022601-21

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

335 SD

26 Feb 01

U03864 /01

February 27, 2001 2:29 PM

TO: The Honorable Rudy de Leon

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Homeland

The word "homeland" is a strange word. "Homeland" Defense sounds more German than American.

Also, it smacks of isolationism, which I am uncomfortable with.

Third, what we are really talking about, I suppose, is "population" as opposed to "homeland."

Let's visit about this.

DHR:dh
022701-21

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

381

27 Feb 01

snowflake

February 27, 2001 5:14 PM

TO: Admiral Quigley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUB JECT: Advertisements

240

I would like to see the "Army of One" advertisements so I can know precisely what is going on.

DHR:dh
022701-31

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

0

7

U04046 /01

snowflake

March 1, 2001 2:47 PM

TO: Honorable Rudy de Leon

FROM: Donald **Rumsfeld**

SUBJECT: Spectrum

Who handles spectrum in the building? Secretary Don Evans called me today and wants to put together a group to discuss it.

Let me know what you would propose.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030101-19

311

1 (Mar 01

11-L-0559/OSD/84

U04173 /01

snowflake

TO: Steve Herbits
Marty Hoffmann

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: March 2, 2001

SUBJECT:

General Tom Moorman, Four-Star USAF Ret., tells me that Lyle Bien is first rate, and that we may be looking at him for CIII.

DHR/azn
030201.26

23

2 Mar. 01

snowflake

TO: • Steve Herbits
Steve Cambone
• Bill Schneider

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*

DATE: March 2, 2001

SUBJECT: .

At lunch, **Gen. Ron Fogleman** said he really thought no one had ever addressed the personnel side of the post-cold war world and what numbers and what arrangements we ought to have.

Let's give him a call and get him involved in that subject, I can't tell which task force that would fall in. Would it be transformation or quality of life?

I think the former.

DHR/azn
030201.31

320-2

2MA

01

U04386 /01

snowflake

March 2, 2001 6:49 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita, Acting ASD (LA)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Duncan Hunter's Book

461

After you have had a chance to look at the book Duncan Hunter gave us all, let me know what you think.

DHR:dh
030201-1

2 Mar 01

U04194 /01

snowflake

March 2, 2001 7:24 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita, Acting ASD (LA)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Budget for Military Pay

270

One of the Members, I think it was the person who is involved with the Personnel Subcommittee, mentioned the need to discuss with them how the \$1.4 billion is going to be used for pay.

DHR:dh
030201-4

U04193 /01

270

snowflake

March 2, 2001 10:18 AM

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Paula Unruh

Paula Unruh information is down there. I have written a letter thanking Mr. Weldon for recommending her. I have known her over the years, and I think she is probably pretty able. Why don't you take a look at her?

DHR:dh
030201-5

250.00

2MTRU1

U04228 /01

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
Bill Schneider
Pete Aldridge
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *D*

DATE: March 8, 2001

Attached is a letter on the subject of missile defense, for your information.

DHR/azn
030801.10
Attach.

373.24

8/Mar 01

U04864 /01

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

March 7, 2001

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 MAR -8 PM 1:37

The Honorable **Donald Rumsfeld**
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you **prepare** to **deploy** a National Missile Defense system, we would urge you to **resist** any single approach that could have the effect of foreclosing the full multitude of options for a comprehensive system **architecture**.

We understand that you have **received** a letter signed by some of our **colleagues** who urge moving **forward** with **construction** of 8 radar in Alaska. While we totally agree with the **sentiment** that the United States must deploy missile defenses as soon as possible, and we understand **there** is a **case** to be made that **such** a radar is a **desirable** component of any system we deploy, we **are** concerned that the **single** act of **constructing the** radar site at **Shemya** Island could be used by opponents to argue against developing the kind of layered **defense that** we believe the United States should deploy. Many in Congress **were seriously** concerned during the previous Administration that it would use **construction of** a land-based site in Alaska as an **'easy out'** that **would** seemingly appease missile **defense** proponents while **foreclosing** other promising **options**, including sea and **space-based** systems. Because of the enormous promise sea and space-based **options** hold for the **future** of a National Missile Defense system, **such** a decision could have the **effect** of undermining the long-term defense of the United States **against** ballistic missile attack

The political ramifications of a decision to proceed with **construction** of the **Shemya** Island radar absent **simultaneous announcements** to proceed expeditiously with sea and space-based programs-for example, the project to convert **Ticonderoga-class cruisers** for the **missile** defense mission-will be exploited by **NMD opponents** to limit **national** missile defense to the single land-based **site** option. Russia might **utilize** the opportunity to agree to the single site and only the single site if public perception was that the Alaska complex **represents** the extent of our efforts. Similarly, allied nations opposed to **NMD could** be expected to **seek** to **freeze** the **U.S. program** if it appears that the **Alaska** site has priority in the **Department** of Defense.

In short, the political energy exhaust& to attain international acquiescence-if not outright support-for **NMD** would be wasted if the perception that the Alaska site takes precedence over a more extensive, **layered architecture** is permitted to take hold. This will **particularly be** true if missile defense opponents use a favorable change in the **status** of North **Korea's** missile programs to argue that the **threat** of ballistic missile attack has been **vastly diminished**. As that **threat** is not unique to North Korea, the effects of such arguments could be debilitating.

u o . 4 7 5 9 / 0 1

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Page 2

We are not competent to judge the technical merits of a radar at Shemya. We know it is necessary for a single-site land-based system, even as we remain concerned about its potential vulnerability. We further understand that the studies done by the Navy to date regarding a sea-based NMD system have been predicated on the assumption that the Shemya radar would be built. A case can also be made for an early deployment of a sea-based system utilizing different radars (including X-band) aboard different kinds of ships. As part of the National Technical Means of Verification to which Cobra Dane has been an integral part, the United States long maintained missile tracking radars at sea, the so-called Cobra Judy radar. Building upon the experience of operating that system could prove as or more important to the National Missile Defense mission as the Shemya Island program. We ask only that you make any decisions about Shemya Island within the context of a far broader program, and that, if there is a Shemya component, it be clear that it cannot be disaggregated from the other system components,

We appreciate your taking the time to consider this appeal and look forward to working with you in the years ahead on this and other issues important to national defense,

Sincerely,


Representative Curt Weldon


Senator Jon Kyl

March 9, 2001 8:00 AM

TO: SFC (b)(6)
cc: RDML Quinn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Telephones

I need a way to buzz the mess when I am sitting at the conference table in my office and at the lunch table in the lunchroom.

DHR:dh
030901-11

MAR 1 2001

SIR,
See ATTACHED Explanation
From Col Sweeney. They ARE
WORKING IT.

VR
JT
SMA

5:02 PM

March 9, 2001 5:51 PM

nowflake

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Clinton-Gore Book

Is there anything in this Clinton-Gore book that Duncan Hunter put together that could be useful to us in our dealings with OMB and the White House on the budget?

Attach.

DHR:dh
030901-23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U05001 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/94

Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense
From: Dov S. Zakheim
Subject: Clinton-Gore Book
Date: March 14, 2001

(Handwritten initials in a circle) 24/5

*To Paul W
M
F
DR*
1900
14 March

Duncan Hunter's book (ref. your note to me of 9 March) is quite good, but I believe that we have marshaled the arguments he makes. Moreover, his statistics tend to be from 1999, and some improvements were realized last year, with more anticipated for this year.

A marginal note: Hunter cites Lane Pierrot's testimony in making his case about modernization shortfalls (first tab in book). Lane worked for me years ago at DoD and I have suggested we hire her as a special assistant in the **Controller's** front office.

110.01

GRUDEF HAS BEEN
MAR 14 2001

U09866 /01

14MAY01

snowflake

March 9, 2001 6:28 PM

TO: RDML Quinn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Asymmetric Advantages

Ask Andy Marshall to give me a piece of paper that shows what our asymmetric advantages are.

DHR:dh
030901-26

SIR,

See ATTACHED →

VR
JJ

SMA

3/3/01

1:41 PM

snowflake

March 13, 2001 8:31 AM

cc: PAUL WOLFOWITZ

TO: Rudy de Leon

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^D

SUBJECT: Article. "Cut Military Gambling"

Here is an article on gambling. Does the military have a policy on gambling?

Attach

DHR:dh
031301-5

330.11

13 Mar 0

U05368 /01

Cut military gambling

SALT LAKE CITY
GEORGE W. BUSH has astonished some of his critics and doubters by taking an eminently sensible, Harvard MBA's look at the nation's military machine.

He wants a clear definition of its strategic objectives. He wants to motivate with higher pay the military men and women who will have to achieve those objectives. He wants to take a very hard look at the cost and effectiveness of the weapons they need to carry out their mission.

Good managers maintain morale by a variety of means. The welfare of our troops would be improved if the Pentagon also took a good hard look at the vice of gambling that permits and perpetuates on military bases.

About a decade ago, the US Army's Community and Family Support Center toyed with the idea of running an officially approved lottery on US military bases overseas. They gave a \$49,000 contract to Market Opinion Research of Dayton to conduct a worldwide sampling of military opinion.

I thought it was a terrible idea and wrote accordingly in this column. Many of the servicemen being polled were teenagers who may not have had much experience with gambling. There were about 518,000 US servicemen stationed overseas at the time, and if the demographic makeup had been about that of the armed services overall, some 20 percent of them would have been under 21, and another 35 percent would have been between 21 and 25. Why encourage them to participate in a Pentagon-sanctioned lottery when every known news organization from The New York Times to Time magazine was raising questions about the addiction of Americans to gambling?

In the face of inquiries from the press, the Pentagon skittered around in embarrassment and dropped the project.

But today, when the incomes of some young military families are so low that they qualify for food stamps, the armed services are operating thousands of video poker and slot machines on overseas military bases.

The problems this can cause were illustrated in an Associated Press dispatch recently on the travels of Senior Airman Lenvata Tinnelle. She was based at naval station Keflavik, Ireland, and in the darkness and cold of an Icelandic winter dumped coin after coin into slot machines on the US military base. Some nights she won, but

over a year she lost \$28,000. "It was like I was in a trance," she told the AP. "I couldn't stop."

Court-martialed for writing dozens of bad checks, she was sentenced to a month of hard labor, two months of restricted activities, and a reduction in rank. She's appealing for leniency to the Defense Department, which runs the slot machines, including video poker machines, at overseas bases and she says she feels the military let her down. She says the Air Force is eager to punish her but slow to help people who become addicted to the gambling it promotes.

According to the Pentagon, the armed forces operate about 6,000 slot machines at 94 bases and other posts overseas. Some 90 percent of the money wagered is returned to players as winnings, but the remainder, about \$120

million in 1999, is kept by the military.

According to a Defense Department survey quoted by the AP, 23 percent of military personnel have experienced at least three gambling-related problems in their lifetimes, classifying them as "probable pathological gamblers." This is higher than the national average of 1.5 percent for US adults, according to a survey by the National Gambling Impact Study Commission.


John Kindt, a University of Illinois professor and expert on the problem, is quoted as saying the slot and video poker machines that are among those offered at military bases "are known as the crack cocaine of gambling, creating new addicted gamblers."

Rep. Koscoe Bartlett (R) of Maryland has launched a campaign against the machines. He's requiring the Defense Department to come up with a report by March 31 on who uses the machines, how much they gamble, and how many of them have bounced checks or sought counseling because of their losses. "We have no right to put this type of temptation in front of our young people," says Mr. Bartlett.

The pro-Bush magazine Weekly Standard says: "It will be both conservative and compassionate for our new president to wipe out this vice on military bases for good."

It would also be part of the good management approach Mr. Bush is bringing to the military.

• John Hughes is a former editor of the Monitor, and currently editor and chief operating officer of the *Deseret News* in Salt Lake City.



1 tie Pentagon operates slot machines on over sea: bases. Bush should stop it.

snowflake

March 13, 2001 8:39 AM

TO: RDML Quinn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: MOU

I think we ought to have the legal office type up an understanding between Wolfowitz and me that we will not be out of the city of Washington, DC at the same time. One of us will always be in the city.

Our offices will have to coordinate calendars to see that is accomplished.

DHR:dh
031301-5

ORC SD

13 Mar 01

11-L-0559/OSD/99

405709/01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MEMORANDUM FOR IMMEDIATE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM

DONALD H. RUMSFELD
PAUL WOLFOWITZ

Handwritten signatures of Donald H. Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz.

SUBJECT: Dual Absence of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

We have agreed that both of us will not be out of the City of Washington, D.C., and its immediate environs at the same time. The Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense will be responsible for implementing this policy. Exceptions will be made only in extraordinary circumstances and will require the Secretary's personal approval.

Handwritten signature of Paul Wolfowitz.

U05709 /01

OFFICE of DoD GENERAL COUNSEL
The Pentagon, Room 33980
Washington, D.C. 20301-1600

March 14, 2001

NOTE FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

SUBJECT: MOU

- Attached is a memo for your and Dr. Wofowitz's signatures

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. J. Dell'Orto". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

Daniel J. Dell'Orto
Acting General Counsel

March 14, 2001 8:18 AM

TO: Dave Jeremiah
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Education

Attached is a letter I received from Checker Finn. He was Assistant Secretary of Education some years back and is a very thoughtful, talented person.

I don't know what you are thinking about with respect to education, but this is somebody who can sure help.

Attach.

DHR:dh
031401-4

230.02

14 Mar 01

U05367A / 01

March 14, 2001 8:21 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Checker Finn

When you get in the saddle, please get Checker Finn in for a visit. He is first-rate.
I would like him to help us.

Attach.

DHR:dh
031401-5

230.02


14Mar-01

U05367 / 01

Chester E. Finn, Jr.
President

David H. Ponitz
Vice President

Thomas A. Holton
Secretary / Treasurer



Trustees
Chester E. Finn
Chester E. Finn, Jr.
Thomas A. Holton
Bruce Kovner
Bruno V. Manno
David H. Ponitz
Diane S. Ravitch

March 12, 2001

Honorable and Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Dear Don and Joyce,


Welcome back to Washington and thanks for your new address information. (b)(6) and I hope that you're happily settled and that we get to see you sometime. If there's anything at all that I or this little foundation can- do to be useful to either of you, please sing out.

I also have two informal offers for the Secretary of Defense! First, if at some point you would like to take a hard look at the D.O.D. overseas schools, I'd be delighted to lend a hand. I think they could be a lot better than they are.

Second, (b)(6) is actually your employee, chief of cardio-vascular pathology at a unit that may not yet have appeared on your radar screen, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (A.F.I.P.). It's located at Walter Reed but a separate entity. Her professional name is (b)(6). (She's also a world authority on stents, such as the one that has been giving the Vice President a little trouble.) She and her colleagues would welcome an opportunity to tell (or show) you what they're up to. I suspect you'd find it interesting—and rather different from most of the Pentagon's other concerns.

Standing by! Meanwhile, best wishes in the new/old position and to both of you in your new home.

Cordially,



Chester E. Finn, Jr.
President

snowflake

March 14, 2001 3:00 PM

mic
3/15/01
TO: ExecSec (C&D)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: "Pearl Harbor" Foreword

Give me a copy of the Schelling "Pearl Harbor" foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book. Please send it to the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the attached note from me.

Attach.


DHR:dh
03 140 1-20

4/6/1

14 March 01

U05419 /01

March 15, 2001 10:18 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Delegation of Acquisition and Corporate Decision-making

Until I complete the divestitures I have agreed to under my ethics agreement, I will continue to delegate responsibility for acquisition matters. Now that you are onboard, that delegation will be to you and/or to other authorities, as appropriate,

Attach.

DHR:dh
031501-4

020 DSD

15 Mar 01

U05440 /01

2001 MAR 12 AM 10: 51

OFFICE of DoD GENERAL COUNSEL
The Pentagon, Room 33980
Washington, D.C. 20301-1600

March 12, 2001

NOTE FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

SUBJECT: Delegation of Acquisition and Corporate decision-making

In response to your March 7, 2001 note, I agree that, until your divestitures are completed, your delegation of Acquisition and Corporate decision-making matters to Dr. Wolfowitz is appropriate.



Daniel J. Dell'Orto
Acting General Counsel

U05027 /01

March 18, 2001 3:49 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **7**
SUBJECT: Army

There are two other issues with respect to the Army.

One is that someone in the Army told me that a test was being prepared to be given to everyone before they could wear a beret. I would be careful about that.

The second is the "Army of One" advertisements that are connected to the beret. You might want to get a hold of the ads and look at them, see what you think. Then let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh
031801-19

U/20

18 Mar 01

U05665 /01

European Stars and Stripes
March 15, 2001
Pg. 3

NO TEL -
WASH AD

'An Army Of One' Attracting The Interest Of Thousands

By Lisa Burgess, Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The advertisement is stark, iconic.

A close-up of the one item universal to all soldiers: a pair of dog tags, the required Army values card just peaking out from behind the scratched aluminum, a nonregulation locker key adding a touch of realism. To the right, in bold Army gold, is the service's new slogan:

"I am an Army of one."

"An Army of one," the core around which the Army has built its new, \$150 million a year advertising campaign, is the result of thousands of hours of public and private research into the minds of the Army's target audience, youths between 16 and 20 years old.

But the concept is causing howls of protest from some quarters, primarily serving Army members and Army retirees.

"There has ALWAYS been the one quote that holds true, 'There is no "I" in team,' " Dennis J. Schley, an 11-year veteran of the Army and National Guard, who currently coaches varsity hockey in Brookings, S.D., wrote in a letter to the editor in Stars and Stripes.

"The military, which is made up of over approximately 1 million soldiers, is one of the largest teams in the world. Why would they introduce a slogan that promotes 'only me'? . . . This slogan is useless!" Schley concluded.

Not to the target audience, Army officials counter.

In fact, the slogan is carefully tailored to appeal to today's teenagers — a very different group of individuals than their predecessors, the baby boomers and Generation X, according to Pat Lafferty, account director for Leo Burnett in Chicago, the Army's new advertising agency and the creators of "An Army of One."

"Today's youths want to be part of a team, to be part of something larger than themselves," Lafferty said. "What they don't want to be are faceless robots, lost in a mass.

"'Army of One' concisely states what the Army uniquely offers: empowerment that comes from being challenged mentally, physically, and emotionally, from day one, into doing things that you didn't think you could do," Lafferty said.

As important as the words are the images the campaign features, Lafferty said — real soldiers, talking about their jobs in their own words.

What the new campaign does not mean to suggest is a group of do-it-my-way loners, said Col. Kevin

Kelley, director of advertising and public affairs for the Army's Recruiting Command at Fort Knox, Ky.

"An Army of one means one Army, one team, one mission and one set of values," Kelley said. "It's about how every person can contribute to the team."

The complaints are almost exclusively from adults beyond Army recruiting age, not the target audience, Kelley said,

"It seems as though the older people latch right in on the word 'one,'" Kelley said. "The youth read the whole message. They're getting it."

It's too early for recruitment statistics based on the new campaign to register, Kelley said. But visits to the Army's recruiting website, [BOLDFACE]www.goarmy.com[/BOLDFACE], show the new campaign is generating a buzz with its target audience.

From Jan. 1-9, before the ad campaign was unveiled, the Army site was averaging 7,300 visitors per day, Kelley said.

After the Jan. 10 launch, the number of visitors climbed to 14,000 per day for the rest of January. In February, after the "basic training" component of the ad campaign was rolled out, the number of visitors to the Army site now stands at 28,000 per day, Kelley said.

The "Army of One" campaign replaces "Be all you can be," a campaign that the Army had faithfully stuck with since its launch in 1981.

In 2000, with recruitment lagging, Army Secretary Louis Caldera decided to see whether the Army's ad campaign was still getting its message across. He commissioned an internal study from the Rand 'Corp., which included interviews of more than 10,000 young people discussing their view of the Army,

The Rand study revealed discouraging news.

The subjects said that they "kind of respect the military, they think it's a good thing to have, but they don't think it's for them," Kelley said.

Furthermore, the study showed that the very people the Army hoped to count on as its future leaders perceived Army life as an endless, dreary round of "sleeping in tents in the field, crawling around in the mud, and mindlessly taking orders," Lafferty said.

As for "Be all you can be," the Rand study showed that campaign "was tired in the eyes of our target," Kelley said. "There was good recall [of the slogan], but it didn't motivate the target to take action."

After winning the Army's recruiting advertising contract in the summer of 2000, Leo Burnett conducted its own preliminary research, based on more than 100 interviews of target-age youth.

Next, Lafferty, a former Army officer with seven years' experience in the military police, sent 50 of the agency's Army account team members to 10 different Army installations to get a first-hand look at Army life.

The "Army of One" campaign was the result of a whittling-down process in which Leo Burnett would propose a concept, consult with the Army, test the idea on a target audience for reaction, then go back to

the drawing board to refine the idea based on that feedback, Lafferty said.

No matter what the actual words, it was rapidly apparent that the Army needed to focus on one core thought: "These youth have a strong desire to be a part of something bigger than themselves and doing something that makes a difference," Kelley said.

March 18, 2001 3:52 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **7**
SUBJECT: Taiwan

Take a look at this *WSJ* editorial on Taiwan and let's visit about it.

Attach.

DHR:dh
031801-20

China (Rumsfeld)

18 Mar 01

U05666 /01

3/16/01
WSJ

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Protecting Taiwan

President Bush's unabashed commitment to missile defense is already paying big dividends. In a turn of events that seemed highly improbable just a few months ago, much of Europe, Russia and now China have toned down their protests and agreed to discuss the issue. Indeed, Mr. Bush's missile defense initiative is sure to be high on the list of talking points next week when China's senior foreign policy officials visit Washington.

But Mr. Bush isn't the only one here who deserves credit. Beijing abruptly changed its tune on missile defense just days after the release of a Senate report recommending the sale of Aegis destroyers and other advanced weapons systems to Taiwan. Make no mistake, China's leaders still consider Mr. Bush's theater and national missile defense programs a threat. But they are more than willing to trade on an issue that ultimately they have no control over to block the immediate sale of sophisticated weaponry to Taiwan.

If the White House decides to go ahead with the sale it's sure to make relations with Beijing stormy for a spell. That in itself is no argument against the sale. Indeed, the Bush Administration would do well to set out a marker that it won't continue its predecessor's practice of placating China. The U.S. has an obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide adequate weapons so the island can defend itself. Two of the key Chinese threats are ballistic missiles and submarines. For both, the U.S. should sell more of the weapons Taiwan needs to neutralize the Chinese threat.

The Chinese military has about 250 relatively inaccurate missiles stationed along the coast opposite Taiwan, and it is adding to that number at a rate of more than 50 a year. These could be used against Taiwan's airfields as part of an all-out attack, or they could be targeted at cities as a form of psychological warfare. The U.S. has already provided some lower-tier missile defense by selling the second-generation Patriot and transferring technology for Taiwan's own Sky Bow, in return for Taiwan abandoning efforts to develop ballistic missiles. Mr. Bush should now offer Taiwan the third generation of Patriots, China's Russian-built Kilo-class submarines are patrolling the Taiwan Strait, and

the island's defenses against this threat are limited. The U.S. should not only sell Taiwan antisubmarine planes, but it should allow other countries to sell diesel subs to Taiwan. This has been ruled out in the past because subs are classed as offensive weapons, a distinction that has never made much sense.

But the best weaponry in the world won't matter without first-rate armed forces to use them. And here Taiwan could also use some help. When the U.S. and other countries switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing, military-to-military links were cut drastically. Taiwan has been isolated for so long that it missed out on many advances that would allow it to use its forces to greater effect.

The question then is whether Taiwan is ready to spend a huge proportion of its acquisitions budget in coming years on Aegis destroyers. They could play a useful role in missile defense, because they are capable of tracking and intercepting multiple missiles. But on the negative side, integrating these high-tech systems would require tremendous resources, and protecting them after they take up their role in the Taiwan Strait will pose more challenges.

One idea might be for the Bush Administration to postpone a decision on Aegis. It could tell the Chinese it will watch the buildup of missiles on the Fujian coast and predicate future sales on the state of the military balance. Aegis would be sold if it appears China wants to use missiles to overwhelm Taiwanese defenses. This would give China an incentive not to give free rein to the Chinese military hard-liners who are driving the Beijing-Taipei arms race. Of course, such an ultimatum would rely on U.S. credibility, which has been run down by the Clinton Administration. But this would offer a chance for President Bush to rebuild that credibility in the face of Chinese bluster.

The U.S. cannot afford to let a newly democratic Taiwan be bullied into any settlement with China that its people do not accept. Preserving Taiwan's political options means bolstering its defenses as long as China refuses to renounce the use of force. Hardware is important to that task, but software is just as critical. President Chen Shui-bian has shown himself to be a moderate and responsible partner for the U.S. in this effort. Only by opening new ties between the two militaries can Taiwan be prepared for the high-tech weaponry that it may need to acquire in the years ahead.



Chen Shui-bian
A trusted partner

O'Neill Makes A Not-So-Hot Impression

Japan's miss, the Nasdaq looks in London after the blitz and his boss's t cut hangs in the balance. So what did Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill do on Feb. 2

He personally wrote a three-page memo urging President Bush to do it quickly: on "global climate change. Among other things, Mr. O'Neill you said that, "As you know, I think this could be a very big problem." The memo recommended that Bush establish a panel "experts" on the issue, mentioning them by name had been just as comfortable in an Al Gore White House. Does anyone think this is why he O'Neill was named America's finance chief?

Mr. Bush's decision this week not to regulate carbon dioxide is rightly seen as a rebuke to environment chief Christy Todd Whitman. But it's also a quiet rebuke to Mr. O'Neill, who's off to a rough start a job that's become a very hot seat for reasons other than greenhouse gas.

Mr. O'Neill says he opposed classifying CO2 immediately as a pollutant. My other sources say that's true, but they add that Treasury favored a middle-ground option that would have kept such regulation on the table for the future.

"We viewed that as the worst! option because it meant regulation was a ce

Potomac Watch

By Paul A. Gig

tainty* sooner! or later, says one insider. Opponents argued that the inevitable barriers to fossil-fuel production would mean the end of any Bush energy policy. So he Bush rejected the Treasury option too, siding with White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey, Energy Secretary Spence Abraham and Vice President Dick Cheney.

In any event, Mr. O'Neill's memo to the president reveals some of the traits that have made him an early administrative weak spot. One is a political tin ear.

The Treasury chief created his first buzz by telling the Senate that Mr. Bush's tax cut wasn't designed for short-term economic stimulus. He was right, but he didn't win him any White House kudos. Then Mr. O'Neill swiped at the memory of Reaganomics. His words were later used by Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle to flay Mr. Bush's tax cuts on national TV.

Next the former CEO invited (and received) a volley of liberal criticism by hailing onto \$100 million worth of Alcoa stock and options. Mr. O'Neill has promised to recuse himself from matters that could affect Alcoa, and no doubt he will.

But the decision shows Mr. O'Neill doesn't understand why his boss won the election. Mr. Bush promised to set a different ethical tone, and his Alcoa holdings gives Democrats a chance to say "nothing's changed."

AS for Mr. O'Neill's memo to Bush, what leaps off the page is the Tre



Successions and Science

The president of the Memorial that Nancy Thurmond had sent a letter

snowflake

March 22, 2001 9:38 AM

TO: Steve Herbits
cc: Rudy de Leon
FROM: PAUL WOLFOWITZ
Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Foot and Mouth

Ann Veneman called and said the foot and mouth disease problem is getting worse. They now think they have found it in Ireland and the Netherlands.

She is sending us a letter expressing concern about the risk of military equipment coming back into the United States, particularly tractors, and the need for cleaning these vehicles.

Why don't you have Rudy look into it and get back to us.

DHR:dh
032201-9

110

22 Mar 01

U05908 /01

snowflake

TO: Rudy de Leon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld (H)
DATE: March 26, 2001
SUBJECT: Andy Marshall Paper

When you read Andy's paper, under the section on training, he suggests consideration of a joint national training center.

Take a look at that and tell me what you think.

Also, in the section on unmanned systems, tell me what you think.

DHR/azn
032601.08

352

11-L-0559/OSD/115

TO: Chris Williams
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
General Shelton
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 26, 2001
SUBJECT: **Honduras**

I understand we still have some 576 personnel and 19 helicopters in Honduras. It has been 14 or 15 years.

Why don't we wind it down to a small minimum group to maintain access to the base and get the rest of the folks out of there.

DHR/azn
032601.2 1

Honduras

26MAR01

1106207 /01

snowflake

TO: Bill Schneider
Steve Cambone
Chris Williams
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 26, 2001

SUE JECT:

Take a look at this memo that you have all heard and make any edits you think would improve it, or make it more accurate.

Thanks -

DHR/azn
032601.52

SIC.1

DIOMAR01

DRAFT-2

March 20, 2001

SUBJECT: The Challenge-the Importance of Succeeding

After two months on the job, it is clear that the Defense establishment is tangled in its anchor chain. In short, it will be possible to transform the Armed Forces for the 21st century only if we transform the Department-how it operates and how it interacts with the Congress.

We have the finest military in the world; but GAO opines that DoD can't account for some 2.6 trillion dollars.

We have been fortunate in attracting and retaining outstanding men and women who voluntarily put their lives at risk to perform the noble work of defending our country, but we are providing them with training, equipment and exercises that are more appropriate for the Cold War than they will be for the coming decades.

DoD is one of the largest enterprises on earth, but its leadership has precious little control left over the dollars. Managers at all levels have no incentive to save dollars and, in large part, lack the ability to hire, fire, or reward those who bring the critically needed skills.

DoD is charged with the vital task of defending our nation, but spends its time:

- Preparing some 250-plus (?) reports to Congress each year, many of which are of marginal value and probably are not read.
- Responding to dozens of inquiries of concern or complaint from Congressional offices and answering dozens of letters from Members per day.
- Seeking Congressional approval to build even a \$500,000 building and, at great expense and waste, maintaining probably some 20-25% more facilities than are required to support current force levels

The Department is monitored closely by the General Accounting Office, several Inspectors General and a testing organization, all of which report to Congress, with the result that the Department has so many auditors and inspectors, roughly 24,000 on any given day, that they begin to approximate the number of U.S. Army "trigger pullers" deployed at any one time.

DRAFT-2

The single most important responsibility of the federal government is to preserve freedom, but as DoD strives to contribute to that important goal, it has:

- Leftover personnel policies, many of which were designed to manage a conscript force of single men but now manage a volunteer force with families.
- Several personnel systems that enlist its workforces for four-year tours as opposed to bringing them **onboard** for a career.
- Policies that uproot personnel and families every few years to move to new assignments, and then shove most out of the service while still in their 40's, after extensive training and having benefited from their **fine** services for only one-half of their careers.
- Policies that commission officers, train them, and then bounce them **and** their families from assignment to assignment every 20 to 25 months or so, to the point that successful officers skip across the tops of the **waves** so fast that even they can't learn from their own mistakes, because they are never in an assignment long enough to see what their mistakes were; and then they push them out to retirement between the ages of 45 and 55, while still in their prime.
- Benefit and assistance programs for military personnel that some say emulate the failed Soviet model of centralized government systems for housing, commissaries, healthcare and education, rather than favoring the private sector competitive models that are the envy of the world.
- Three separate Post Exchange systems, with a law that prohibits the Department from consolidating them without the explicit approval of the Congress.
- Three or four different health systems and three or four surgeons general, rather than a single, privately operated service that any efficient, large-scale enterprise would employ.
- Grade and rank systems that are more than 100 years old and were rejected years ago by the for-profit sector in favor of flatter, more **nuanced** organizations and cooperative arrangements.
- Financial management and information systems designed to report to Congress and comply with the maze of laws, amendments and requirements that have grown geometrically and accumulated over decades, rather than a system designed to provide the financial information managers must have to manage.

DRAFT-2

- Rules, regulations and approval requirements calculated to guarantee that the Defense establishment infrastructure remains decades behind in recapitalization, rather than the more efficient models most companies, and even the Postal Service, use that include private outsourcing and sale/lease back arrangements.
- Organizations and practices that rigorously perpetuate separateness, as the Department talks “jointness.”
- A DOD-fashioned acquisition system that, in close cooperation with Congress and the defense contractor community, has been successful in doubling the time it takes to produce a weapon system from 5 to 10 years, while the pace for new generations of technology has shortened from years to 18 months, guaranteeing that DOD’s newest weapons will be one or more technology generations old the day they are fielded. (Today’s leading edge fighter has software a decade old.)
- A pattern of talking of a warrior culture, while sliding from what some estimate as a 60/40 teeth-to-tail ratio to a 40/60 ratio (the perception depends on what is classified as teeth).
- Metrics more focused on inputs, efforts and intentions than on outputs and results.

It is notable that in 1975 the Defense Authorization Act totaled 75 pages; today, packed with requirements, prohibitions, stipulations and mandated organizations, it has blossomed to 998 pages, during a period when the number of men and women in the armed forces has dropped from 2.1 million to 1.4 million.

Only a fraction of the Department’s resources are under the discretion of management. This untenable situation has undoubtedly evolved as a result of a series of instances of distrust between the Congress and the Department. The result is not better oversight. Instead, each new layer of control and micromanagement compounds the problem of accountability. From a practical standpoint, the DoD no longer has the authority to conduct the business of the Department, and its performance is steadily deteriorating.

The maze of constraints on the Department forces it to operate in a manner so slow, so ponderous and so inefficient that whatever it ultimately does will inevitably be a decade or so late, wasteful of taxpayer dollars, and most certainly lead to still more letters and calls from Congress, critical hearings and reports, followed by a still greater number of amendments, restrictions and requirements.

Transforming the US. Armed Forces is a critically important task. However, transforming how the Department of Defense functions and its

DRAFT-2

relationship with Congress is even more important. Without transforming the Department, the transformation of the armed forces is not possible. What may be needed is an omnibus BRAC-like process to reform this critical relationship and then a compact so any new controls, requirements, reports and regulations will have a sunset provision.

Notwithstanding the fact that we have outstanding people who care about, our country in the Congress and working throughout the Defense Department, doing what they believe to be their best and none of whom would knowingly damage national interest, that is our circumstance.

But when the national interest is obscured, when there **have** been too many instances which led to distrust, when all see increased special pleading and pork' by others, and when there have been too many instances where the will of the Congress was frustrated, the system loses discipline.

To change, we need to seize the high ground, honestly expose the situation and the state of the relationship, document the inability of the Department to function and, by so doing, marshal support and inspire key decision makers **with** the importance of the task and the urgent need for change.

It has taken decades of small, then logical or at least understandable, individual acts to create a situation where in the aggregate the acts prevent the Department from serving the national interest.

Large institutions can't turn on a dime, And no large institution willingly reforms itself. Resistance to change will be great. To accomplish the task will take the best efforts of the President, the military and civilian leadership in the Department, and, importantly, the leaders and Members of the House and Senate.

Each President has available during his term only the capabilities left by his predecessor. So, too, what he does and the capabilities he tasks will be available not just to him, but to his successors.

It is our challenge and responsibility to get about the enormous task of transforming this great national asset that is needed to preserve peace and stability in our still dangerous, untidy and dynamic world.

The country and the men and the women of the Armed Forces who put **their** lives at risk deserve no less. It is our collective responsibility to see that it happens.

DHR:dh
031801-23.2

TO: Steve Cambone
Paul Gebhard

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 26, 2001

SUBJECT: **Manpower**

Attached is a memo I received on the subject of manpower. Take a look at it and tell me if you think one of our task forces is looking at that, and then return it to me.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
032601.67
Attach.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

5/14/01

To: CTO

PLEASE control + distribute
today.

Thanks - MIC

- 1) Central Support Mgt
- 2) STREAM LINDING JOINT STAFF
- 3) Charts for Testimony
- 4) Meeting w/ MARK THISSER
- 5) FILE SIZE
- 6) SUPPLEMENTAL
- 7) TESTIMONY INPUT
- 8) 9 JUNE HESINIA

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

10) MAKE CORB INPUT

snowflake

TO: Commandant of the Marine Corps
James L. Jones

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: March 26, 2001

SUBJECT:

Thank **you** for the information **on** your safety campaign plan. I'll be back in touch with **you** on some additional thoughts.

DHR/azn
032601.10

210MAR01

729

U06210 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/124

March 27, 2001 6:29 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: BAH

I am told we can only change BAH once a year, and with the California energy crisis, it is a problem. That might be a law we want to adjust. I got that from the senior enlisted folks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032701-10

032701-10

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

April 26, 2001

From:

(b)(6)

MEMO FOR

TO: C&D

THRU: ~~ExecSec~~


*MIC
4/27/01*

*27 APR 1 810
JCA*

1. Please forward these memos from SecDef to the addressees, along with their associated attachments.
2. NOTE: Some attachments are comprised of previous SecDef memos-please take care that these memos do not get separated out and then sent again. They are part of the attachments.
3. Please control a file copy.

No further action or coordination is required at this time.

Thanks,
DH



March 27, 2001 6:46 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Rudy de Leon
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Endangered Wildlife

When we start racking up the DoD, we ought to include the fact that we spend \$900 million a year to protect, nurture and enhance endangered wildlife, because military bases are one of the few places where wildlife can still go, and that is not a DoD function.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032701-17

618.2

27MAR201

U07226 /01

snowflake

March 29, 2001 7:15 AM

TO: ~~ExecSec~~ *MIC 3/29/01*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Shimon Peres

MIC 3/29/01

Have I written Shimon Peres on his new post as Foreign Minister?
Thanks.

DHR:dh
032901-I

MIC 3/29/01

Peres

MR SECRETARY
Proposed LETTER IS Attached
Respect fully
Mmi

snowflake

March 29, 2001 6:31 PM

TO: <sup>MLC
3/30/01</sup> ExecSec
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Revised Text for DCI Letter

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and Undersecretary of the Air Force

You requested a summary of the duties and responsibilities for the Director, NRO position. I have attached such a summary.

I have also included some attributes of a candidate that seem to make sense to us.

As you know, this is critically important to our efforts here at DoD.

Our folks here have been visiting with Mr. Al Smith for the position of Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director, NRO. I have attached his background sheet. I am sure many of your colleagues know him.

I would appreciate your getting back to me with your thoughts as to the duties and qualifications for the Director, NRO and also any observations you may have with respect to Mr. Smith. We have not formally put him forward at the White House as yet and will await hearing from you.

Thanks.

Attachment:
As stated

DHR:dh
032901-26



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

Attached is a Duties and Qualifications summary for the Director, NRO position.

As you know, space and intelligence operations are at ~~the center of our building for~~ *vital to our effort here at DoD.* the future. We are fortunate that Al Smith has ~~accepted~~ *accepted* the position of Undersecretary of the Air Force, including the responsibilities of Director, NRO. I've attached ~~Al's~~ *his* bio, but I am sure many of your colleagues know him.

any doubt you may have. If you agree he
I would appreciate your support for this position so that I may forward it to the White House. Please let me know.

Attachment:
As stated

indicated that he would accept

it heard,





**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000**



MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Coordination on Recommendation to the President for position of
Director, NRO

Attached is a Duties and Qualifications summary for the Director, NRO position.

As you well know, our space and intelligence operations are at the center of our building for the future. We have been fortunate to attract Al Smith to accept the position of Undersecretary of the Air Force, including the responsibilities of Director NRO. His bio is also attached, but I am sure many of your colleagues know Al.

I would appreciate your support for this position so that I may forward it to the White House. Please let me know,

Attachment:
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/131

March 30, 2001 11:36 AM

TO: Bruce Dauer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Allocation for Breast Cancer

I have been over the paper on nontraditional defense programs. Thanks so much.

I was surprised to find that there was no \$300 million allocation for breast cancer, which I had been told was the case. Why not?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
033001-18

720

30 Mar 01

U06616 / 01

snowflake

March 30, 2001 12:59 PM

TO: ~~ExecSec~~ ^{MIC} 3/30/01
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Memos to the President

Please get me copies of all the memos I have sent to the President since I came into this job.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
03300 1-29

3/2

30MAR01

U06792 /01

TO: Andy Marshall
Gen. Shelton
Bill Schneider
Steve Cambone
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 2, 2001

SUBJECT: **Military Manpower**

I received the attached letter from a friend who is a retired four-star.
I would be interested in your thoughts on it.

Thanks so much.

DHR/azn
040201.04
Attach.

320.2

2 Apr 02

U12580 /02

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you indicated in your luncheon remarks the total costs associated with **manpower** (recruiting, pay, benefits, **health** care, quality of life and retirement) are **consuming** an ever-larger part of the defense budget. This is **happcning** at a time **when** we need to re-capitalize the forces **with** more modern and **capable** equipment,

In **my** view **WC** have lost our way because we have forgotten the fundamental principles upon which this nation founded its military **establishment**. Our forefathers, **based** on **their** view of the dangers and costs of such a force, **deliberately decided** to eschew a **large** standing military **establishment**. Throughout most of our history we have followed the militia model. Under this model we maintained a **cadre** of a professional military around which we **mobilized** our militia in times of crises. This model served the nation imperfectly, **but well**, up through the first half of the 20th Century.

With the advent of the Cold War the militia model was discarded, primarily as a result of the tyranny of timelines imposed by a large standing threat to the peace of **Europc**, the Soviet led Warsaw Pact, and the **spccter** of global Communism. Those of us who served during **that** period remember the requirement to be able to deploy 10 divisions to **Europc** in 10 days to augment the large forward deployed force in blunting an **anticipated** attack by the Warsaw Pact. This requirement dictated the size and composition of the active force and resulted in a large standing military **establishment with** heavy land forces comprising much the force. When the Cold War ended and the Warsaw Pact **disintegrated**, as a nation we missed the opportunity to review our **truc** **dcfense** needs at the grand strategy level. The **previous** Bush administration was starting that process when Saddam triggered the gulf War. Coming out of the Gulf War we had **another** opportunity to do a top to **bottom** review of national **security** needs. However, the change in administration, to one led by a **President** and civilian defense team **taintcd** by a lack of military **expcrience**, resulted in a missed opportunity over the next eight years.

The Clinton **dcfense** team chose not to challenge **the** **uniformcd** leadership throughout a series of reviews (Bottom Up Review, Roles and Missions Review, QDR). For a **variety** of reasons, (natural conservatism, service parochialism, fear of the unknown) the senior military leadership insisted on perpetuating the planning assumptions and **timelincs** of the Cold War force. This was done by having the civilian leadership accept the concept of **dctcrmining** the size and readiness of the **forcc** on the need to be **prcpared** to fight two major conflicts quickly and **nearly** simultaneously. Two major **thcater** wars (**TMWs**) became the unshakable Underpinning for perpetuating a large standing military **forcc**. The result **was** a salami **slicing** approach to force **structure** reduction but no **real** **effort** to take advantage of the lack of a real threat **and** capabilities coming out of the revolution in **military** **affairs** (**RMA**). At the same time the administration decided that if a sizable

military force existed it would be used to police the world. The senior uniformed leadership became willing accomplices in these misadventures.

If the new Bush Administration is to break out of the pattern of the last eight years it must start by articulating a new national security strategy based on different timelines and force requirements. The centerpiece of such a strategy would be the idea that we can have a smaller active force, particularly land forces, if we return to our militia roots. Such a strategy would allow reductions in all the services. The money saved can re-capitalize the force and support a robust ability to project force from the CONUS, a few forward bases and from the sea. The tools emerging from the RMA that allowed us to prevail in Serbia and Kosovo and keep Saddam in the box in the Middle East, along with a combined, robust space based and air breathing reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence capability will allow us to detect and deter trouble before it becomes conflict. If deterrence fails the response will be long-range strike assets followed by mobilization. Inherent in such a strategy is the idea that if the threat cannot be defeated by the initial responses it will be contained until land forces can be mobilized and fall in on equipment. The necessary mobility assets (tankers and sea and air transports) will receive priority in the modernization program. Timelines might be more on the WWII model, but with far more capable and credible early responders and modern equipment available for the forces being mobilized.

Concurrent with new national security strategy it would be helpful if the administration adopted new policies to neutralize the underpinnings of the two MTW strategy. Clearly the current Iraqi policy sanctions and continual force deployments to police the no fly zones are failing. A policy shift that modifies the approach to sanctions and withdraws US forces from parts of the region would send a strong signal to the countries of the region. In essence we would make Saddam an Arab problem not an American problem. Before withdrawing our forces from the region we should make it clear to his neighbors that they must deal with him and if they can not or do not wish to take him on when challenged then they must be willing to admit the first responders from the U.S.

In the case of North Korea it appears that the way to neutralize that threat is to support South Korea's efforts to bring the North out of its isolation. Any U.S. hard-line policy helps perpetuate the regime in the North and generates a threat, which justifies keeping U.S. active force structure for that single scenario. A policy of active US engagement combined with South Korea's "Sunshine Policy" allows us to monitor the situation and determine capabilities and intent. That in turn will allow us to properly size our forces.

A business as usual approach that depends on savings from BRAC, process changes and more minor force structure adjustments will be inadequate generate the resources needed to modernize and shape the forces for now and the future. Significant savings can only come from manpower reductions that make sense within a new National Security Strategy. Putting on my old programmer hat I can see BRAC potentially generating savings of \$1 - \$3 billion dollars per year, undefined process changes perhaps \$5 billion and another salami slice of force structure \$2- \$5 billion. On the other hand, a reduction

of 350,000 **soldiers**, sailors, marines and airman, assuming a 1 to 4 **officer** to enlisted ratio, would generate approximately \$22 billion/yr. and provide the opportunity to gain additional **BRAC** and force structure savings.

I recognize this is an over simplification of the challenges faced by the administration in **general** and the **Defense** Department in particular. However, until **the civilian leadership** takes the lead in articulating a bold new National Security Strategy that breaks **the tyranny** of outdated response **timelines** **the** uniformed leadership and their political allies will resist any meaningful transformation efforts. A strategy that is based on one of **the** fundamental founding **principles** of the United States, **the militia concept**, should appeal to a wide **range** of constituents.

snowflake

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 MAY -9 AM 8:04

TO: Rudy de Leon

CC: General Shelton ✓

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld JA

DATE: April 2, 2001

SUBJECT: Quality of Life

I keep hearing that we could save money and do a better job for dependent **schools**,
healthcare, recreational facilities and quality of **life** if we consolidated some army and air
force bases in Europe.

Has there been a study on that recently? Please let me know your thoughts.

Thanks,

DHR/azn
040201.06

292

2 Apr 01

2001 MAY -9 AM 8:04

U08911 /01

snowflake

TO: General Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld (3)
DATE: April 5, 2001
SUBJECT: King Abdullah

Would you please see that I am advised on the matters that King Abdullah wanted me to be informed on?

Thank you.

DHR/azn
040501.21

Jordan

3 APR 01


U07045 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/139

snowflake

April 6, 2001 8:10 AM

TO: General Tom Schwartz
HQ, U.S. Forces, Korea

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Strategy Review

Thanks so much for the feedback you provided on the defense strategy **review** paper.

I do appreciate it and will see that Andy Marshall has a copy and focuses on your **fine** suggestions.

DHR:dh
040601-I

381

U07154

U07154 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/140

snowflake

April 7, 2001 4:29 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge

TO FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Commission on Outsourcing

Walker from GAO says there is a statutory commission on outsourcing, and he is anxious to have you serve on it for the Department.

It is your call.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040701-1

*Don
This is important.
I'll do it.
Pete*

TOTAL P.02

11-L-0559/OSD/141



THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION

TELEFAX COVER SHEET

E. C. Aldridge, Jr.
Chief Executive Officer

Date: **4/9/01**

TO: **The Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld**
Secretary Of Defense
U.S. Department Of Defense
Fax: (703) 697-8339
Phone: (703) 692-7100

FROM: **Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr.**
Chief Executive Officer
The Aerospace Corporation
Fax: (703) 812-9332
Phone: (703) 812-0606

CC:

No. of Pages: 2 each (including Cover Sheet)

Corporate Offices: 2350 East El Segundo Blvd., El Segundo, CA 90245-4691 / Mail: P.O. Box 92957, Los Angeles, CA 90009-2957 / Phone: (310) 336-6872 / Fax: (310) 336-5703 Washington Corporate Office: 1000 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 2600, Arlington, VA 22209
Phone: (703) 812-0606 / Fax: (703) 812-9332

snowflake

April 9, 2001 10:16 AM

TO: General Tom Schwartz
HQ, U.S. Forces, Korea

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategy Review

As I have indicated, the materials you sent in were exceedingly helpful. I thought your suggestions on the paper were first rate.

Your memo on how to rebuild trust is an excellent outline, and I can assure you I will see that those thoughts are communicated to the folks here. We will try to get to work on them,

I also appreciate your paper on incentives and will see that gets moved to the right people.

Thanks so much for your very thoughtful work.

DHR:dh
040901-12

38

YHP 01

U07333 / 01

snowflake

April 9, 2001 11:13 AM

TO: General Franks
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Comments on Strategy Review

Thanks so much for your very thoughtful comments on April 1 with respect to the paper you read.

Your suggestions will be fed into the process, I certainly appreciate them and value the source as well as the quality of the suggestions.

DHR:dh
040901-14

381

9 APR 0

U07334 /01

snowflake

TO: Paul Gebhard
Steve Herbits
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 9, 2001

SUBJECT: **Authorization Bill**

Here's a chart that shows the pages in the Authorization Bill since I was here last in 1975. We need to consider possibly a chart when I do my presentation to the Congress. We should have some charts that show that.


DHR/azn
040901.15
Attach.

110.01

9 Apr 01

U07350 /01

Pages in Defense Bills vs Strength



1945:

- Military ES exceeded 12 million
- War Department Civil Appropriations - 7 pages
- Naval Appropriations - 32 pages
- Military Appropriations - 24 pages
- Appropriations for War Agencies - 15 pages
- Excludes miscellaneous Defense appropriations

1947: National Security Act established Department of Defense

1950: First DoD Appropriation Bill - 42 pages

- Authorization committees debated policy, passed no bill

1962: First Defense Authorization Bill - 1 page

1975:

- Defense Authorization bill - 10 pages
- Defense Appropriation bill - 21 pages

2000: 1.3 million end strength down 88 % from 1945

- Defense Authorization bill - 464 pages
- Defense Appropriation bill - 72 pages

1945 78

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Military Assistant

3/20/61

MR. SECRETARY

ATTACHED, THE METRICS YOU
ASKED FOR CONCERNING
THE PAGES OF DEFENSE BILLS
OVER TIME. THIS WAS SUBMITTED
BY MR. SOULE.

OF NOTE, ALTHOUGH THE
DATA GOES BACK TO 1945, DOD
WAS NOT ESTABLISHED UNTIL
1947. THE FIRST DOD APPROPRIATION
BILL WAS SUBMITTED IN 1950

RESPECTFULLY

Roy

Roy R. Byrd, Colonel, USMC
Mil. Assistant to the SecDef

April 9, 2001 12:50 PM

TO: General Hugh Shelton

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**

SUBJECT: March 30 Memo

APR 10 PM 5:24

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I was looking over your March 30 memo commenting on Andy Marshall's work.

Could you please have your staff try to address the areas that you think need additional emphasis? For example, under "b" at the bottom of your first page, it says that the strategic objectives, the ends, are not sufficiently defined to allow us to derive ways and means. Could you come up with some specific examples of that and your own suggestions?

The same thing with respect to item "c."

With respect to "e," I think it would be helpful if you listed some examples.

With respect to "f," I quite agree with you that the likelihood of surprise is understated.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh
04090 1-20

~~SECRET~~

(Unclassified when separated from enclosure.)

X00412 /01

SECDEF CONTROL

snowflake

April 9, 2001 1:59 PM

TO: Paul Gebhard
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve **Herbits**
Steve **Cambone**
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**
SUBJECT: New Categories

Attached is a memo that suggests some new categories. Who should get this?
Any thoughts?

Attach.

DHR:dh
040901-33

381

9 Apr 01

U073097/01

A STAB AT NEW CATEGORIES

OLD

NEW

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| 1. LAND | 1. Homeland Defense (forces that are “here”)
strategy/NMD/anti-CBW/anti-terrorist |
| 2. SEA | 2. Regional Forces (forces that are “there”)
presence forces (land/sea/air), TMD, SOF etc |
| 3. SOF | 3. Long Range Forces (forces from “here to there”)
bombers/subs/mobility |
| 4. TACAIR | 4. Space and Support (intel, recce etc) |

snowflake

April 9, 2001 4:10 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Inspectors General

Do we really need all these inspectors general? Why don't we have one for the Department of Defense and one for each of the services and let them handle the rest of these activities?

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.
4/3 Memo **from** Mr. de Leon

DHR:dh
040901-48

U07297

9 Apr 01

U07297w/01

snowflake

April 10, 2001 7:34 AM

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *R*
SUBJECT: Collins' Memo

What do you think I should do with this Collins' memo? I look at it, and I don't know what to do with it.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/2/01 Collins' Memo: "Key Points on CSIS Military Culture Study"

DHR:dh
041001-20

381

1 Apr 01

U12598 /02

Joseph J. Collins

March 2, 2001

Memorandum for Secretary of Defense

Subject: Key Points on CSIS Military Culture Study

Here are a few points on "American Military Culture in 21st Century" that **DEPSECDEF mentioned to you yesterday:**

- For 24 months ending January 2000, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington think-tank, has conducted a study on American Military Culture in the 21st Century. LTG ret **Walt Ulmer**, Dr. **Owen Jacobs**, and Dr. **Joseph Collins** of CSIS, (now OSD) led the effort that was chaired by LTG ret Howard Graves and Dr. Ed **Dorn**. Selected bios are at page 3 of this document.
- Study is a first of its kind look at military culture and provides **a great window on what is happening on the human level, inside of the Armed Forces.**
- Part of that study has been a **99-question** survey on military culture and organizational climate for units throughout the Armed Forces.
- By study end, we **surveyed 12,500 military personnel** from the Regular Army, the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Coast Guard, and the Marine Corps **in CONUS, Korea, Germany, and Hawaii.**
 - Also, have surveyed Pacific Command joint headquarters, as well as their Navy component, Pacific Fleet headquarters. Also, surveyed Atlantic Command in **Sep 1999**, and **USAREUR** units and headquarters.
- CSIS surveys were followed up by **125 on-scene focus group discussions** with officers or Non-commissioned officers. Approximately **700** service members participated in these focus groups. The Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines also gave us access to unpublished surveys of their own.
- We have briefed our study results to **CSA**, selected legislators (**Sen. Warner**, Rep. **Murtha**, **Sen. Reed**), widely within the Pentagon, to the Defense Science Board, RAND, and at the War Colleges. We have also briefed selected expert groups at **CFR** in New York and **D.C.**, as well as numerous veteran organizations.
 - Undersigned addressed the entire student body of the National Defense University in late Feb. **2000.**
- Study was the subject of over **150** newspaper articles and widely publicized.

Key Findings of *American Military Culture in the 21st Century*:

- **Values** in the force are strong across all ranks and services, but
- **Force reductions, high operations tempo, and resource constraints in units have exacted a toll** on the people in our mostly married force. While not as damaged as it was in the post-Vietnam era, today's **military is far less ready and less satisfied than it was a decade ago.**
- Overall, the **biggest problems noted by military personnel** in the CSIS survey are pay/quality of life, excessive operations tempo and work-family imbalance, a shortage of material and human resources in units, and the quality and training of new personnel just graduating from basic training.
- **Morale** in the force is not high. Only a fourth of the force considered morale high. Reasonable expectations for quality of life for Service members are not being met.
- We found **race relations** to generally be on a good footing, but with no cause for complacency.
- Survey and focus groups also noted some job performance-related problems with **gender integration** in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, well-documented in respective surveys. For example, men on CSIS survey said women would not pull their share of the load in combat; many women agreed.
- In focus groups, we often heard complaints of **various leadership problems**: micro-management, a "zero defects" mentality, and continually having to do more with less.
- There are **problems of trust between seniors and subordinates, both in the field and between the field and Washington.** This field-Washington perceptions gap ---documented by survey and focus group comments --- often stems from value conflicts for senior officers in DC. This problem has been magnified by global media and access to the **internet** for people in the field.
- The **quality of officer leadership** in units is not uniformly good and can be improved, especially if promotion or command boards are given access to peer ratings or other information beyond senior-subordinate ratings.


Joseph J. Collins, Ph.D.
Colonel, US Army ret.

Senior Fellow and Project Director

703 692 4076 work /// (b)(6) home /// joe.collins@osd.mil

Biography of Selected Key Personnel

LTG ret. Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. retired from the Army in 1985 after 33 years of service. His major assignments included command of the 3d Armored Division in Germany and III Corps at Fort Hood Texas. For nearly a decade after he retired, **LTG Ulmer** was the President of the Center for Creative Leadership in Greensboro, North Carolina. Today, he is an active consultant on military issues and leadership. He served as the Chairman of the Study Working Group for the American Military Culture project, and together with Joseph Collins and Owen Jacobs was the author of the recently published report.

Dr. Joseph J. Collins, now working for OSD, retired from the Army in 1998 as a Colonel with nearly 28 years of service. His career was equally divided between assignments as an infantry officer, a professor of International Relations at West Point, and a strategic analyst in the Pentagon. In the latter capacity, he was a special assistant the Chief of Staff of the Army (1987-89), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (1989-91), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1996-98). He was the project director for and co-author of *the American Military Culture in the 21st Century*. His doctorate is from Columbia University.

Dr. T. Owen Jacobs is a visiting professor at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces of the National Defense University. He has been for four decades one of the nation's leading experts on military leadership and related issues.

snowflake

April 10, 2001 8:12 A.M

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memos

Here is your "Top Down Review" memo. Why don't you draft memos for me to send to whoever you think I should send them to in order to achieve the goals you still think need to be addressed.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/1 7/0 1 Zakheim Memo: "Top Down Review"

DHR:dh
041001-27

7
TOP DOWN REVIEW

Candidate **Bush** committed himself to ordering a **Top Down Review**, something we haven't had in 12 years. The NSC may be given the lead on this, but even if it is, DoD will be a major contributor. DoD already is in the midst of the **Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review**, but this is **proving** to be a **routinized, highly conservative** document.

Following **are some of the issues that will** have to be addressed quickly—in the **QDR, the Top Dow Review—or both**

- **Getting out of the Balkans**
 - **What forces are pulled out? What forces stay behind? Does DoD contribute constabulary forces? (I would suggest that it not do so)**
- **Military Relations with Asia**
 - Expanding military **contacts** with China? (**yes**, but on a **reciprocal** basis)
 - **How quickly to move to agreement with North Korea? (not too quickly)**
 - Defining **relations** with **Taiwan** (need to **train** with **ROC** forces, **at least CPX's**)
 - Expanding **operations/training/with** Japan? (**yes**)
 - Re-engaging **the Indonesian military**? (definitely)
- **Overseas Basing**
 - **How much to exploit Guam** (now being proposed as **base** for **reconfigured Trident subs—SSGN's**)
 - How to restructure **OUT basing posture** in **Japan and Korea**
 - Do we **intensify** our **starch for facilities** elsewhere in Asia? **Re-engage** the Philippines? **Expand** Singapore **and/or** Australia? **What about** Indonesia and Malaysia? (**yes**)
 - Re-visit **our basing policy** in the Gulf? (**yes**)
- **Deployments (a review mandated by Candidate Bush)**
 - **Where can we cut back other than the Balkans? Do we dare do so in Asia?**
- **Nuclear policy (also see below)**
 - **warhead reductions**
 - **“reducing the hair trigger”**

snowflake

April 10, 2001 8:31 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **7**
SUBJECT: Pentagon Bureaucracy

What do we do about the Pentagon bureaucracy? Please take a look at this memo from Marty Hoffmann and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.

1 /1/01 Hoffmann Memo: "Pentagon Bureaucracy"

DHR:dh
041001-31

11-L-0559/OSD/158

Dis-

1 Jan01

Memo To : The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Defense Secretary Designate

Subject : Transition Opportunity/Issue : Pentagon Bureaucracy

From : M. R. **Hoffmann**

In a change of Administration, particularly when the whole National Security establishment needs such a major reorientation (weak word), the question of the copious overstaffing of the Pentagon needs quick attention. ✓

There are a number of devices to do this, such as consolidation of the functions of two offices, the retention of an incumbent individual in a job which is then abolished; leaving jobs unfilled and then abolishing, etc. Distinction must be made between statutory positions (required by Congress) and those over which the Executive Branch has control for this purpose.

The problem will be sorting out the really key positions (as opposed to those positions in which the incumbent was not up to the job). People like Hamre, Perry etc from the recent Administration may be helpful, as well as recently retired Military and Civilians among the various self-styled experts in Washington in whom you have particular confidence (CSIS and others may have material already "in the can" which could be helpful). Proposing Legislation abolishing certain jobs gives the opportunity to leave them unfilled until the resulting legislative issue is resolved .

snowflake

April 16, 2001 9:22 AM

TO: RADM Quigley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: WSJ Article

When you knock down that "Washington Wire" story from *The Wall Street Journal* by Jackie Calmes, let me know what they say. It seems to me we ought to **find** a way to knock that down.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/13/01 *Wall Street Journal*, "Washington Wire"

DHR:dh
041601-6

→ Talk to Larry R. Rosen -
He knows how it happened.

DR

032

16 Apr-01

U07615-01

... sound and from
... pole.
... decision will depend
... temperature, the amount of
... light and cloud cover, and the
... pilot's ability to see the horizon,
Bullock said. Recent temperatures
have ranged from minus 94 degrees
to minus 50 degrees Fahrenheit.
Below about minus 67 degrees, fuel
and hydraulic fluids in the LC-130s
would get too cold to flow, he added.

At this time of year, Antarctica
is in twilight and temperatures
fluctuate as winter comes on,
Bullock said. Soon, it will be so
cold that landing will be impossible.
"It's like those summer days when
the sun is below the horizon but
you still have just a little bit of
orange on the horizon," he said.

Shemenski signed on last fall
with Raytheon Polar Services Co.,
the Englewood company that provides
logistics support to the U.S. science
facilities in Antarctica. A family
practitioner, he gave up his private
practice in Ohio for a life of short-
term medical assignments in remote
places.

"He was looking forward" to
spending the winter at the South
Pole, said his cousin Richard
Shemenski of Powell, Ohio. "He
just thought it would be an
adventure."

Ronald Shemenski works with
a physician's assistant to care for
the medical needs of approximately
50 people at the South Pole station.
He arrived there Oct. 29.

Katz said Shemenski developed
severe abdominal pain around
April 1 and noticed his urine was
dark, a common occurrence when
a gallstone blocks the duct that
drains bile from the gallbladder.
He had blood tests and was treated
with painkillers and intravenous
antibiotics and fluid.

Katz said that an ultrasound
test showed at least one gallstone
and that blood tests indicated
Shemenski's pancreas had become
inflamed, a complication that
sometimes occurs when a gallstone
blocks a duct. Inflammation of
the pancreas, an organ that makes
digestive enzymes, causes severe
pain and fever and sometimes
progresses to peritonitis, a life-
threatening infection

Over the ensuing days, the
obstructing gallstone apparently
passed through the duct and the
pain abated. Doctors' concern
is that if the duct becomes
obstructed again, Shemenski
could become much sicker.

Once a patient has one such
episode, the chance of recurrence
within a year is 33 to 50 percent,
Katz said.

When the NSF evacuated
physician Jerri Nielsen from
the South Pole to treat her
breast cancer in October 1999,
it was early spring in Antarctica
and conditions were milder.
This time, winter is ahead.

"The last e-mail I had from
Ron," his cousin Richard recalled,
"he said, 'It's getting darker.'"

Wall Street Journal
April 13, 2001
Pg. 1

23. Washington Wire

The Brass
THE BRASS bristles at
Pentagon Chief Rumsfeld's
latest rule.

The defense secretary orders
generals and admirals to notify
his office a week in advance
of all meetings with lawmakers,
say congressional staff and
military officials. He wants to
stop the services' freelance
lobbying, after nixing their
earlier efforts to get Congress
to increase the current defense
budget by \$8 billion.

The officers grouse that
Rumsfeld's command is unrealistic:
If senators seek a briefing on
weapons systems, the services
can't tell them to wait a week
until the Pentagon civilians
clear it, they say. In response,
officials submit lists of proposed
meetings, many of which never
come off.

China Fallout

Senate Leader Lott predicts
Bush won't sell Taiwan the
Aegis-equipped destroyers it
wants -- and China fears --
despite increased pressure for
the sale from GOP lawmakers.
But tech-industry lobbyists
suggest delaying a Senate vote
on legislation relaxing limits
on exports of high-performance
computers, fearing anti-china
sentiment now could derail it.

--Jackie Calmes

Washington Times
April 13, 2001

24. Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan
Scarborough

Chinese feared raid

Pentagon intelligence officials
said China's military was ready
to repulse a covert U.S. military
attack on Hainan Island to
capture the detained American
crew and its damaged EP-3E
Aries II intelligence-gathering
plane. Chinese military
commanders ordered a special
command post set up on
Hainan Island, the South
China Sea island where the
crew made an emergency landing
April 1.

Every night — the best
time for such raids — the
Chinese are placing concrete
barriers at either end of the
damaged EP-3E aircraft just in
case U.S. commandos attack
and try to get the intelligence-
gathering plane out of the
country.

Officials told us unspecified
military options were discussed
among top Bush administration
national security officials
during the standoff, but only
in the remote chance the 24
hostages were being mistreated,
tortured or killed. Special
forces commando units in
Japan were readied just in
case.

Lt. Osborn's decision

An internal Navy memo says
Lt. Shane Osborn, pilot of the
EP-3E surveillance plane
detained by China, made the
correct decision to land the
crippled turboprop in China
rather than risk ditching in
the South China Sea.

"The EP-3E aircraft commander
and crew, presented with
compound emergencies, complex
tactical considerations and
complex diplomatic considerations,
succeeded in keeping his crew
safe and intact," says the
memo from an Navy aviation
official.

The memo says damage to
two propellers, the nose cone
and a wing after colliding with
a Chinese F-8 fighter greatly
reduced the chance of a
successful ditching. In other
words, a sea landing would

likely have killed the 24-
member crew.

"The squadron emergency
action plan states: 'While every
effort shall be made to prevent
classified material from falling
into the hands of hostile
personnel, emergency destruction
is secondary to aircrew safety,'
" the memo states.

"Landing the aircraft in the
PRC represented the best option
for maintaining the safety of
the aircrew. The aircraft
commander exercised sound
judgment in electing to land
the stricken aircraft [instead of
attempting to bailout or ditch].

The aircrew should be
commended for their professional
handling of this emergency."

EP-3E upgrade

One reason the Pentagon is
so intent on getting back the
EP-3E now parked on the runway
at Hainan's Lingshui airfield
is that the intelligence-gathering
equipment on board was some
of the U.S. intelligence community's
most advanced gear. The EP-3E
was one of several of the 11
signals-intelligence planes to
receive a recent upgrade package.
"It recently got some new
equipment," one official told us.

Initial debriefings of the
released crew indicate the 22
sailors, one airman and one
Marine managed to do a good
job of destroying the equipment
before landing April 1.

Intelligence officials said
the Chinese military sent about
100 technicians to pore over
the aircraft after its arrival.

What was on board? Rear
Adm. John Nathman, the
Navy's director of air warfare,
stated in an article in June that
one upgrade being added to the
EP-3E squadron is known as
the Sensor System Improvement
Program (SSIP). "SSIP
incorporates new tactical
communications, electronic
support measures and special
signal processing and exploitation
systems," Adm. Nathman
said in the publication Naval
Aviation News.

A second major EP-3E
improvement was on board
the downed plane is the Joint
Signals Intelligence Avionics
Family Bloc Modernization
Program (JM D). The EP-3E
JM D consists in three
"blocks," or versions. Accord-

page 23 of 37

ing to Adm. **Nathman**, the first one improves **onboard** handling and processing of signals, and a second version adds a low-band subsystem and improves data fusion through what is known as Common Data Link, "which provides crucial connectivity for network centric warfare," Adm. **Nathman** said. The third version "adds a precision targeting system," he said.

The exact version of the JMOD upgrade on the EP-3E held by the Chinese could not be learned, but officials said it was at least one of the three.

Truth offensive

Now that 24 Americans have been released from captivity from China, the Bush administration is planning a public relations campaign to explain why the Chinese government and military version of events near Hainan Island is completely wrong.

The facts, according to Pentagon sources, when released by the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence community, will show that Chinese pilot Wang **Wei** acted recklessly in intercepting the EP-3E surveillance aircraft and caused the chain of events that led to the captivity.

The intelligence includes videotape of previous Chinese intercepts as close as 20 feet from U.S. aircraft and **cockpit voice communications** from the EP-3E that made the emergency landing on Hainan Island.

Pro-China officials in the government are opposing the planned truth offensive. They argue that explaining in detail what happened will further inflame already tense relations with china.

Other **officials** say the only question remaining is who will get the call to lay out the facts. Deputy **Secretary** of State Richard Armitage is State's choice, while Pentagon officials would like to see Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld come out swinging **with** the offensive.

EP-3E diplomacy

Rep. Donald **Manzullo**, Illinois Republican, decided to try a little congressional diplomacy during the **EP-3E** standoff when he encountered Yang Jiechi, new Chinese ambassador to the United States,

at a Washington dinner April 3.

The occasion was a **celebration** of United Parcel Service gaining access to a new China route. Mr. **Manzullo's** northern Illinois district includes a UPS airport hub. His district also is home to 20-year-old Seaman Jeremy **Crandall**, one of the 24 **EP-3E** crew members detained 11 days by the Chinese.

During the dinner, Mr. **Manzullo** took the opportunity to hand Mr. Yang — an old friend of former President George Bush — a letter **politely** urging the Americans' release.

Mr. **Manzullo** wrote, in part, "As chairman of the Interparliamentary Exchange Group between the U.S. and China, I have a keen interest in promoting stable relations between our two countries. Quickly releasing the crewmen to allow them to return home would send a positive **humanitarian** gesture that I know would be appreciated by parents across this country like Tom and Shirley Crandall [Seaman Crandall's] parents."

Pentagon 'upheaval

One defense industry **official** is predicting "earth-shattering" changes in the way the Navy buys ships. The **official, who asked not to be named**, has been talking to Pentagon officials about options in Defense Secretary Donald H. **Rumsfeld's** ongoing top-to-bottom review. The Pentagon is expected to announce initial results in May time for inclusion in the fiscal 2002 defense budget. But major decisions will await the fiscal 2003 budget.

This **official** told us he expects an "upheaval" in the shipbuilding industry, with perhaps a **shrinking** from two U.S. submarine builders to one and **commitment** to smaller aircraft carriers. The source also said he would not be surprised to see the review recommend cancellation of not only the **Joint Strike** Fighter but also the Air Force's F-22 Stealth fighter.

America first

Three Republican senators are calling on President Bush to block a Dutch company's acquisition of the Silicon Valley Group Inc. (SVG). The

company has made state-of-the-art satellite optics and is a leading manufacturer of tools used to **make** computer chips.

The three are Sens. James M. Inhofe of Oklahoma; Tim Hutchinson of Arkansas; and Robert C. Smith of New Hampshire.

The senators said in an April 10 letter to President Bush that the proposed acquisition by the Dutch firm ASML Lithography raises the risk that the U.S. company's cutting-edge know-how will find its way to potential adversaries,

An interagency panel, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), is now reviewing the proposed acquisition before making a recommendation to Mr. Bush.

"We believe the proposed takeover of SVG by the Dutch firm ASML is a threat to national security," the three wrote. "We urge you to use your authority under law to block this proposed transaction."

Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough are Pentagon reporters.

Aerospace Daily
April 13, 2001

25. Clark Urges Budget Increase, Acquisition Reform

For nearly 10 years, the United States has watched the military strategy, forces and **budget mismatch** grow and grow, to the point where the services are now short of resources, said Chief of Naval Operations ADM Vern Clark.

Meanwhile, the Navy must recruit, retain, train, maintain and be ready to handle future commitments, Clark said yesterday at an address to the Navy League in Washington.

So, to deal with the imbalance, Clark suggested raising the service's top-line; modifying the acquisition process to deliver products in a more efficient and cost-effective manner; accepting the operational and strategic implications of having a smaller Navy; or some combination of those.

All of the services are "dealing with an imbalance in

strategy and forces that will grow at an alarming rate if it's not addressed," Clark said. In terms of budget, he added, "Things really are getting to the point where business as usual and marginal changes aren't going to get the job done." Acquisition reform

The rate of change in today's world as outpaced the current acquisition process, according to Clark. "And we need to do something about it," he said.

"The whole process of thought and concept development and simulation and experimentation and production takes far too long today," Clark explained. "The linear approach in an exponential era just isn't getting it done. We need a quicker, more agile, and simpler way to move forward in the future." He called on industry to help.

Smaller Navy?

Expectedly, Clark found fault by addressing the resource/strategy imbalance with a smaller Navy. "The nation must understand that a smaller and/or less capable Navy will lead to greater risk in the form of less security for seaborne trade, less flexibility and response, lengthened response time due to proximity and availability and more difficult access," he said.

Access is becoming an increasing problem, Clark explained, noting naval forces gain access through their freedom of maneuver. By being forward-deployed, naval forces are available for rapid and timely response, he said. "The time/distance problem is incapable to any commander who has to deal with a real-world problem," Clark added, "and it certainly is better to be there than to take lots of time trying to get there."

The CNO defended the role and requirement of the service he commands, even those capabilities redundant with other forces. It is this redundancy that "gives flexibility to the National Command Authority, and depth and power to joint operations," he said. The U.S. needs sea control, power projection, and seaborne supply to fight and win the nation's wars, he said.

snowflake

April 16, 2001 2:31 PM

TO: RDML Quinn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: LT Osborne

Please find out why the EP-3 pilot thanked Ross Perot at the Whidbey Island welcome ceremony.

I would like to know what his involvement in this thing was.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041601-29

CHINA

16 Apr 01

snowflake

April 16, 2001 3:59 PM

TO: Paul Gebhard
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Archie Clemins

Please take this letter from Archie Clemins, break it into three separate memos and craft memos from me to the appropriate people on each of these points.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/12/01 Clemins ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
041601-56

381

16 Apr 01

U07649 /01



4/12

Mr. Secretary,

Adm (ret.) Archie Clemins
was part of your discussion
with former CINCs & chiefs
last Friday.

His comments to you are
attached.

v/r.
Paul Gebhard.

April 12, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Dear Secretary **Rumsfeld**;

I am taking you up on your offer regarding comments on the various areas being reviewed by the 'U.S. Defense Strategy Review and Supporting Studies.' I don't have expertise in several areas that are being reviewed, and have therefore limited my comments and suggestions to those few areas where I think there are great **opportunities** that have not been pursued. But, before I start, let me say up front that that these comments are submitted after working these issues for three years as Commander in Chief, US. Pacific Fleet-trying to execute budgets, and since retirement working in the commercial technology sector trying to grow a small business.

- **FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT:** There are two major areas in this arena that have the opportunities to yield significant returns.

POM PROCESS

The first one is the POM process. Everybody complains but no one seems to have a serious recommendation for improvement. What exists now is a process that when compared to baseball has 'eight months of spring training with a one month season.' What I mean by this is the Defense Guidance comes out early in the Process, then all the services figure out how they are going to budget their money to comply with the Guidance, then in the final throes of the Process the Defense Resources Board (DRB) meets to make all the trade-offs, destroying balanced programs without fully understanding the ramifications of the actions. Now obviously this is an exaggeration, but not much!

The Process needs to be changed such that the DRB takes place up front with the decisions made as to what is going to be procured, what readiness is to be budgeted for what is going to be the quality of life standard, etc. Then the services need to work the next eight months on figuring out how they are going to do this with the allotted **money**. Contrary to today's process, this proposed process would cause the services to figure out how they were really going to do this, and would force them to operate more like a corporation, which has to make the same type of decisions.

WORKING CAPITAL FUNDS

The second one is the Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF). Each service has its own version of DBOF called the 'Working Capital Fund.' These funds, which in reality are accounting systems, were established during a period of Defense Growth in the Reagan Era, when there was significant competition. This is not the case today, even though the Working Capital Funds have changed little. For the most part they, in fact, do not work in a downsized military environment and stifle innovation while wasting money.

Today with the consolidation of the defense contractors and the reduction in quantities being purchased Working Capital Funds cause many wrong decisions to be made just to support the accounting. For example, if a government shipyard or aviation depot is under Working Capital Fund Accounting, there is little incentive to become efficient, since the customer has to pay the established man-day rate regardless. On the other hand, a mission funded activity where the customer is both the owner of the activity and, at the same time, the customer, has the incentive to drive down cost to get all the work done so that more is not paid than is required. In other words, you may manage a Mission Funded Activity in away to pay the operating cost of \$400M dollars up front, and then manage it to get \$600M of maintenance for the \$400M. In a Working Capital Environment there is minimal incentive to do this.

The Business Operating Funds needs to be reviewed, and anything that doesn't need to be in them should be considered for removal. At the same time, the initial reaction of the financial community will be that they have to buy their way out. This should not be the case. During the rapid draw down of the 90's it was impossible to draw down as fast as desired (even if we wanted to) due to government regulations. Therefore, in shifting entities to Mission Funded from Business Operating Funded, they should not have to buy their way out.

- **MORALE AND QUALITY OF LIFE.** I will only address one area in this area-Housing.

HOUSING

All of the services' housing is managed from a standpoint of 'ungraceful degradation.' This is not because people want it to be this way, but rather that is what the system fosters. An upfront DRB would hopefully affect the housing standards trying to be achieved. Today, you will not see housing degradation as being a big quality of life enhancer. At the same time I predict that substantial housing improvements would be a great retention incentive. While initially I wasn't sure if Public Private Venture Housing was the way to go, I am now convinced that it is. But, the devil is in the details. Because when you get involved you quickly realize you are building housing for your grandchildren and the business plan must address this. There have been several mistakes made with Public Private Venture Housing but the model that is now being used to build the new San Diego Navy/Marine Corps Housing is the best I have seen.

- **COST SAVINGS** Networks and Process Change is absolutely essential.

With the right leadership, I have always felt that people performed as well as the system allowed them to perform. If the people perform badly, then you should look at the processes. The comments on the previous pages in general are about processes and the 'supply chain,' which historically has not been considered a very glamorous place to work. Yet, when you look at the commercial sector and look at how much they are spending on supply chain management, supply chain event management, and driving down inventory, as well as the investments in customer relations management, DOD (and is the rest of government) is significantly behind in these areas. By being behind they are missing opportunities to save significant amounts of money. As I mentioned last Friday Networks that give Broadband capability to the desktop is absolutely essential to drive down costs **and** manpower (both military and civilian). But then using the Broadband capability and changing our processes is where the real payback will come from, **because** almost all of our processes were developed when people were cheap. The same is true for industry, except they are moving out to drive down costs; government has to move faster. When **you** look at DOD processes-whether it is recruiting, manpower, supply inventory, maintenance, budgets, travel, accounting, etc.--they are all what would be categorized as supply change. Starting down this 'continuous change road' is absolutely essential to achieving savings.

Sincerely,

Archie Clemins

Copy to: DEPSECDEF

snowflake

April 16, 2001 4:48 PM

TO: Rich Haver
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Beverly Shaver

Here is a letter I received from Beverly Shaver. What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.

04/12/01 Shaver ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
041601-61

China

16 Apr 01

U07609 /01

(b)(6)

April 12, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 c/o Nancy Pardo

Dear Rummy:

Although there are few, outside the immediate families, who have rejoiced in the return of the EP-3E crew more than I, nevertheless the poignancy of knowing there is at least one other member of VQ-1 for whom the Chinese have never accounted, has been especially acute for me.


I know it is scarcely necessary to remind you that this may be either one of the **bat (or one of the worse?)** times to raise the question of Jim Deane's fate/return, but surely it should not be omitted in the an-going dialogue on this matter with the PRC. Ambassador Prucher's and the DPMO's past efforts to obtain information have apparently not produced a PRC response as yet, but perhaps the bilateral dialogue in progress over the EP-3E could shake loose some additional cooperation.

The united States government has simply got to do more for those who have waited, not 11 days, but rather more than 40 years for closure. If I, as a private citizen, can go to China and blunder into a first-time confirmation that the PRC imprisoned two of the P4M's crewmen, then surely all the U.S. intelligence resources, including the CIA, can determine the circumstances of Jim's death or his whereabouts today.

This particular time has got to be a real window of opportunity to bring some sort of resolution to Jim's case. Although I have contacted neither of them on this matter, I should tell you that Elaine Chao is my daughter-in-law's sister, and Condoleezza Rice is my daughter Lili's mentor from Stanford (though Lili is not sure she would be remembered from 1988). But most importantly your position at Defense enables you to get the attention and respect of all the PRC leadership. They do not seem to understand humanitarian appeals from a flyer's widow, they do understand titles and influence.

You have been so enormously helpful to me. What can I say, except thank you thank you again...and again.

Regards,



Beverly Deane Shaver, MD

(b)(6)

snowflake

April 16, 2001 6:19 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **9**
SUBJECT: Notes on Courtesy Calls

Attached is Tom Korologos's memo of all the notes that came up during my confirmation courtesy calls.

Attach.
Notes on Courtesy Calls

DHR:dh
041601-76

02 SD

6 Apr 01

U07633M/01

snowflake

TO: Rudy de Leon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
DATE: April 17, 2001
SUBJECT: **Blechman Letter**

Take a look at this from my friend Barry Blechman and tell me what you think.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041701.13
Attach.

381

17 Apr 01

U07714A/01

DFI INTERNATIONAL

April 16, 2001

Handwritten: *2*
H E R

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary
U.S. **Department** of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Room **3E880**
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

When we last met, you asked for "good ideas." I have one, I think, which will **become** particularly relevant as you move from the current "strategic review" to implementing **changes** in the Department's plans, programs, and forces.

Judging **from** information available in the press, it seems likely that there will be insufficient resources to achieve all the goals that might emerge from the strategy reviews. Operational short-falls, "quality-of-life" needs, and congressionally-mandated health care expenses seem destined to consume most of whatever incremental funds might be made available to **DoD** this year and next. And I doubt that you will be able to gain enough potential savings from force structure reductions or cuts in legacy modernization programs to fund all the **desirable** increases in expenditures for space systems and other transformative capabilities.

Over the mid-term, the only way to free up sufficient resources is to reduce the **unit cost** of defense – the amount it takes to field and maintain the defense establishment. One way to reduce unit costs is to consolidate the infrastructure, as you are already planning to do. Even greater resources could be saved, however, by making the Department's use of civilian and uniformed manpower more efficient.

As you know, one reason US corporations have become more productive over the **past** fifteen years is that they have taken advantage of technology to reduce their payrolls. To cite a trivial example: my **80-person** company now has only two executive assistants. Before the advent of networked personal computers, modern communications systems, etc., we would **have** had 30 or more.

Barry M. Blechman
CEO and President

1717 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Suite **1300**
Washington, DC **20006**
202 • 452 • 6900
fax: 202 • 452 • 6910
email: bblechman@dfi-intl.com



Handwritten: *U07714-01*

My impression is that the armed forces have not made this transition. They've bought the technology, but continue to use people in old-fashioned ways. Although comparisons with private corporations are not strictly fair, as the military needs to maintain a rotation base for overseas and combat duty, I don't believe that the armed services have taken a hard look at their manpower needs for many years – despite the sharp reductions in combat force levels in the 1990s. As a result, I would guess, the ratio between manpower in combat roles and manpower in supporting roles is probably worse now than it was when you last served in the Pentagon.

Identifying potential cuts in support manpower is not easy. It requires detailed examination of individual staffs and functions at each unit and facility to identify unnecessary duplications and overlaps. It also needs hard-headed looks at trade-offs for individual functions between in-house staffs and contracted services. It takes re-assessments of the number of man-hours required to perform various tasks, e.g. maintaining a particular aircraft engine after a fight, to determine the necessary size of those units and staffs which are retained. And it needs objective assessments of the possibility that an individual Service might be able to perform certain tasks (e.g., basic pilot training) as an executive agent for all the Services, making possible elimination of the other Services' comparable staffs.

I doubt that the OSD Manpower Undersecretariat could really accomplish this analysis, much less make any proposed reductions stick. Only the Services have the detailed information to identify possible cuts, as well as the institutional power to implement such proposed manpower reductions effectively. But why should the Services cooperate in such an enterprise? Fewer personnel eventually mean fewer promotions, less political clout, etc. One way around this dilemma is to provide an incentive package like that discussed by Secretary James Schlesinger in the 1970s. As I recall, Schlesinger offered the Service Chiefs trade-offs between combat and supporting personnel. I don't recall the initiative exactly, but I have a vague memory that he offered the Navy and Air Force one person above authorized combat manning levels for every two people cut from supporting roles. If sufficient savings in support personnel were achieved, the Service could justify additional combat units, as well as the resources necessary to equip them.

It may seem wrong, somehow, to have to offer such a deal to the Services, but the reality is that major manpower reductions can probably not be achieved without Service cooperation. A trade-off between deeper cuts in support personnel in exchange for increases in combat capabilities makes sense on many levels.

Needless to say, I would be delighted to help you flesh out this idea, Please let me know if I can be helpful.

Yours truly,



Cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
Ray Dubois

April 19, 2001 9:53 AM

TO: Chris Williams
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Press Coverage

This *International Herald Tribune* article says that the U.S. is not telling all we know about the spy plane as to its precise location. I thought we had done that.

It also says we did not release recordings of conversations between the pilots and the ground controllers. Do we have those?

Thanks.

Attach.

4/19/01 *International Herald Tribune* article, "Neither China nor U.S. Is Telling All About Spy Plane"

DHR:dh
041901-11

China

19 April 01

U08025 /01

CURRENT NEWS

EARLY BIRD

April 19, 2001

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Story numbers indicate order of appearance only.

TOP STORIES

- **1. Rumsfeld Seeks To Withdraw American Troops From Sinai**
(New York Times)....Jane Perlez
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld surprised Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel during his visit here last month by telling him that the Bush administration wanted to withdraw the American soldiers serving as peacekeepers in Sinai, a move proposed as part of the Pentagon's drive to reduce troop commitments abroad, administration officials said.
- **2. Verdict On Osprey Is Mixed**
(Washington Post)....Mary Pat Flaherty
A Pentagon-appointed review panel delivered a split decision for the troubled V-22 Osprey program yesterday, saying it should continue in limited production but calling for major changes before the aircraft returns to regular use.
- **-3. Sub Captain To Lose Job, Not Freedom**
(Los Angeles Times)....Tony Perry
A top Navy admiral has decided against courts-martial in the Greenville submarine disaster but will order the sub's captain to an administrative hearing that will force his departure from the service, Navy sources said Wednesday.
- **4. U.S. Mav Quit Talks With China Over Plane**
(Washington Post)....Clay Chandler
Chinese and U.S. officials stuck to sharply clashing positions today in their first joint review of the collision April 1 between a U.S. surveillance plane and a Chinese interceptor, prompting an immediate U.S. threat to break off the talks.
- **5. Bush Advised To Withhold Top Destroyers From Taiwan**
(Washington Times)....Rowan Scarborough
President Bush's national security aides are tentatively recommending that the United States not sell advanced destroyers to Taiwan at this time, but provide less-capable warships and other conventional arms, administration and congressional officials said yesterday.

CHINA/U.S.

- **6. After Rancorous Start, U.S. And China Resume Talks**
(New York Times)....Elisabeth Rosenthal with David E. Sanger
U.S. negotiators here said this morning they had decided to continue talks with the Chinese government concerning the collision of an American spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet on April 1.
- **7. China Flights May Get Escorts**
(Washington Post)....Thomas E. Ricks
The Pentagon has prepared detailed plans that call for fighter jets to escort military reconnaissance aircraft through international airspace, plans likely to be implemented if talks between the United States and China continue to go badly, a senior Pentagon official said last night.
- **8. Neither China Nor U.S. Is Telling All About Spy Plane**
(International Herald Tribune)....Thomas Crampton
...Avoiding what is standard procedure for similar incidents involving civilian aircraft, both sides have not released recordings of conversations between their pilots and ground controllers or data proving the precise positions and headings of all aircraft.

~~F #~~

April 25, 2001 8:34 AM

SUBJECT: Outsourcing

The Marines are now outsourcing 100% of their mess halls.

Why don't the Army, Navy and Air Force do that?

I want to talk to the Service Secretaries about this.

DHR:dh
042501-2

→ RECORD -

7/18

Air Force Secretary
Response attached. I
am following up with Army/NAVY
to get you further info.
D. Rich

1/19
0925

J/26

April 25, 2001 2:51 PM

TO: Chris Williams
CC: Paul Wolfowiti
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mark Stokes

I definitely will not detail Mark Stokes out of OSD. I want him here-he is excellent.

←
←

DHR:dh
042501-15

MIC 4/20/01

Gen Maria Cribbs —

For appropriate action. I had understood that Maj Stokes was set to be detailed beginning this coming Monday, April 30th.

*Chris Wolfowiti
4/27*

040 STARE

25 Apr 01

U08386 /01

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

4/30/01

To: Chris William

REF: MARK STOKES ASSIGNMENT
TO STATE

SIL

General BATISTE ADVISES THAT
THE Deputy will call Secretary
ARRIVING EARLY THIS WEEK
AND CANCEL THE MARK STOKES
ASSIGNMENT TO STATE.

Respect fully
Maia

snowflake

April 30, 2001 8:54 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: **STEVE HERBERTS**
Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Don Rice Letter

Please take a look at this letter from Don Rice and let me know what you think.
Thanks.

Attach.
4/16/01 Rice ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
043001-16

45220

5047101

DONALD B. RICE

(b)(6)

April 16, 2001

4/17
① D TLY
2 Kern

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Rm 3E-880
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

If the media has it even close to right, you have your hands full as you bring this national security review and study process toward decision making. You and I discussed some topics a few weeks ago and I want to share some additional thoughts.

I've been encouraged by recent dialogue suggesting a new strategy which recognizes the challenges our nation will face: a strategy that increases focus on Asia and the Pacific in addition to the Gulf region, and prepares us to deal effectively with crises that spin up rapidly in places where we have few bases or where we face adversaries with capability to deny or degrade our ability to build up forces.

Now you're wrestling with a force structure to support the strategy. The kind of force that served us well in the Cold War-short-range aircraft and heavy armor-seems ill-suited for a world in which long distances must be transited and in which adversary weaponry could make concentrating forces problematic. Reports suggest such factors have led you to put a premium on range, stealth, precision, and rapid response. This is what I was arguing for 8 years ago and what our bipartisan National Commission has recommended.

That means survivable long-range aircraft take on added value. Survivable long-range **aircraft** put added credibility behind conventional deterrence with their capability to deliver devastating mass precision to halt aggression. They can go anywhere, anytime on a few hours notice. These aircraft can destroy enemy anti-access capabilities and greatly improve conditions for follow-on forces to deploy. Just as important, because they can provide loiter time and endurance, they can maintain dominant presence over broad areas of the battlespace to rapidly strike fixed and mobile targets throughout the campaign.

The Air Force is a great organization, with great people. But it's too wedded to the fighter force mentality of deploy and fight. Important as the fighter force is-and will remain-it does not meet the full range of challenges you are defining. I thought the case was overwhelming even before your new strategy that only a modern long-range bomber force, equipped with a flexible mix of precision weapons, can. With sufficient long-range bombers, no enemy could

expect to mount a large scale surprise attack to seize friendly territory-the bombers could prevent him from massing to carry out aggression. And no **Dad** actor could keep his strategic vitals safe from a devastating response. If you needed the extreme option of preemption, this bomber force would be first choice. So, in my mind, unless the long-range bomber force is seen as getting top priority, our strategy strains for credibility. ✓

The B-2 has its opponents+ften, I suspect from entrenched interests that sense competition with their favorite programs. Some may claim the B-2 is aging technology. To suggest that ignores how far the original B-2 was on the leading edge-as well as the proposed plan, at moderate cost, to insert modern avionics and processors to bring it up to state of the art. Others may suggest that it's not stealthy enough for the 2015 threat, which assumes lots of **SAMs** with **SA-10C** level capabilities. First, my involvement in studies suggests the B-2 does **fine** in most scenarios. Second, the B-2C can get better. Third, even when we face the toughest scenario, B-2s would be the best option (because B-2s can combine stealth with weapons mixes that also suppress defenses). Beyond that, since there's not much signature improvement available from modifying the mold line even in new aircraft designs, the next level response is to add jamming or decoying. Even moderate jamming **significantly** leverages the inherent stealth and could be provided from elements of the bomber force. Speaking of that, a long-range, long dwell capability for electronic combat-manned or unmanned-would be valuable in many circumstances.]

Some will suggest half-measure alternatives to the B-2: perhaps cruise missiles or a longer-range JSF or a regional bomber-a stealthy F-117 class aircraft. But the more I think about it, the more I come down on the side of the B-2.

Cruise missiles are very expensive to procure in sufficient quantities-that's why we've never bought enough. And they will only do a piece of the job. Some number of cruise missiles provide a useful augmentation to a robust force of **B-2s**, but no substitute for it. As the last Administration **unfortunately** discovered, heaving a **few** cruise missiles at an adversary is not an effective response to anything.

And as for a longer-ranged JSF or a stealthy F-117, I don't think either have the sort of "legs" we're going to need, F-117s bring to mind the 1986 Libya raid. As I recall, it took an armada of tankers (almost 30) to get 18 strikers to and from the targets. That's a lot of airplanes for a small mission. A few B-2s could do that mission from **CONUS** with a handful of tankers-no tankers if they do it from the theater. And with the increased distances of the Pacific to worry about, and likely erosion of our forward basing posture, range will only become more important.

7.

With both JSF and an F-111-class airplane, there's an enormous near-term opportunity cost—all those scarce dollars going into R&D and EMD when they could be going into combat capability. The RDT&E plus EMD for an F-111-class aircraft would be \$20 billion (if you're lucky). Yet there'd be no significant breakthrough in capability. If the unit price is in the \$200 million range, buying two wings—say 200 aircraft—would cost \$40 billion for a total investment of \$60 billion, not counting bed-down costs. Even being pessimistic in B-2C costs, that would buy at least 60 B-2Cs—likely more. And the deterrent effect, range, weapons carrying ability, flexibility, and operational capability of such a B-2 fleet would dwarf the F-111 force. By my back of the envelope calculations, assuming for the example 60 more B-2s, the B-2 force would provide well more than double the payload-range for the same money. (By the way, payload-range per dollar is a favorite metric of mine that doesn't get the attention it should.) JSF suffers even more from this kind of cost-effectiveness comparison. You should check this with the Air Force, but my understanding is that a JSF can only carry two JDAMs internally. That's no more than a dual-role F-22 (though F-22 is more restricted in JDAM versions). Based on that alone, it's time to consider strangling JSF—before its cost strangles you.

Payload matters. While an F-111-class airplane would improve on JSF, the improvement will be relatively marginal. The B-2 will carry 16-80 JDAMs, depending on size and type. It would take a much larger number of either one to approximate that much firepower, and lots of bases and supporting assets that may well not be available within the theater. Even if the technology for a small diameter bomb proves out, the B-2's proportional advantages over fighters remain. And the difference in capability is more than just tonnage. The B-2's mammoth payload allows it to be flexibly loaded with a mix of precision weapons—flexibility that will enable it to employ optimum weapons against fleeting targets in a dynamic battle. That's a capability some would just as soon not have you consider—because it's a mission they'd rather reserve for other elements of the force structure they're trying to protect. But my review suggests the B-2 would be very valuable in that role.

And what if we need capability sooner rather than later? I doubt if JSF—particularly a longer-range JSF—will come on line in meaningful numbers until, at best, 2015, and probably later. A new F-111 would be after 2020. The marketing pitches may say sooner... but you and I know with all the design complexities and testing requirements, that'll slip. Hard to understand why we'd want to spend more money... to get less capability... later! Rather than either JSF or a new, stealthy F-111, start a technologically serious and fiscally prudent R&D program on a future unmanned long-range, stealthy attack aircraft you can pursue for the more distant future alongside a program to get more B-2s on the ramp in a meaningful timeframe,

An additional thought—why not sell the British a dozen or so B-2Cs. Better for them and us than a bunch of short-legged jets they need mini-carriers to utilize.

The Honorable Donald H. Rurnsfeld
April 16, 2001
Page 4

I fought hard for the B-2 program because of my belief in its revolutionary capability to project conventional power. Everything that has happened since has only strengthened my belief. I urge you to take up the fight-the country will be the better for it and you'll have a distinctive contribution to the new strategy that nothing else can offer.

Call me if you'd like to discuss any of this further.

Warm Regards,



P.S. To remind you of how stark are the comparisons of B-2 capabilities to fighter or cruise missiles, I've enclosed my two Value of Stealth charts. The first compares an actual unsuccessful F-16 raid in the Gulf War (standard package) to what it would have been if they'd had precision weapons, to the actual F-17 raid that followed to kill the targets, to how we'd have done it with B-2s. The second chart compares B-2 payload to cruise missiles (ignoring that cruise missiles aren't effective against many critical fixed military targets or any relocatable targets) and shows that large operational dollar savings accrue to use of B-2s.


cc: Honorable Paul Wolfowitz



The Value of Stealth

	Standard Package	Precision Weapons	Precision Weapons and Stealth	B-2
Bomb Droppers	4 4	4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	 
Air Escort	4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses	   4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	
Tankers	       	       	       	 

The Value of Stealth II: Stealthy Bombers vs. Standoff Weapons



versus



Cost Saving Using B-2s: \$627 M

**Every Time The B-2 Fleet Flies In Combat,
It Pays For A New B-2**



B-2 Precision Bomb: 2,000 lbs
Cruise Missile Warhead: 1,000 lbs

April 30, 2001 3:21 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
Steve Herbits

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper for comment

What should we do with this paper?

Attach.
Undated paper, "Organizing for National Security"

DHR:dh
043001-33

381

30 Apr 01

U08405 /01

ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

The Bush-Cheney Administration has a unique opportunity to **do well by doing good**: As it prepares to govern and, inevitably, begins laying the groundwork for successful mid-term and presidential elections over the next few years, arguably the single most important step it can take is to implement its campaign promises to rebuild, reequip and reinvigorate the U.S. military.

This step would put the United States in a far better position to confront the global challenges sure to be among the most dangerous of the legacies of the Clinton-Gore years. It can also serve to galvanize a community that has, in the past, proven to be a reliable and formidable base of political support for Republicans.

Importantly, this community can be comprised not only of the roughly 20 million Americans who are either past or present members of the U.S. armed forces, their dependents and those associated with companies doing business with the military. It also can be extended to include many millions more who, by virtue of their ethnic background and/or religious ties to foreign lands have a potentially decisive interest in U.S. foreign policy -- at least with respect to the nations in question. Finally, the base can draw heavily upon what used to be known as Reagan Democrats, individuals whose native common sense and instincts are appealed to by policies of "peace through strength,"

If the Bush-Cheney Administration and its allies on Capitol Hill are to actualize the political potential of this potentially decisive community in time for what are expected to be very close, if not actually disastrous, mid-term elections, they must take a number of steps at once. These include the following:

Personnel: Build on the superb choice of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense by putting into place a Pentagon team that restores confidence in the building's civilian and military leadership. In particular, **Joint Chiefs Chairman Hugh Shelton should be replaced immediately** by an individual who, by dint of his personal integrity, vision and demonstrated willingness to "speak truth to power" commands the respect of the armed forces and will be instrumental to rebuilding esprit de corps, retention and the Nation's combat power.

This step should be complemented by an urgent Administration initiative to **overhaul Goldwater-Nicholls**, legislation that has effectively rendered the service chiefs little more than damage-control officers for their respective budget crises.

Policy/Programmatic Initiatives: While there is much to be done -- and undone, the new President and his team can immediately enlist and invigorate the wider defense community by taking tangible action on the following items:

The President should announce on Day One of his presidency that, starting **on July 20, 2001, the United States will begin the process of deploying anti-missile defenses** for our forces and allies overseas and the American people here at home. To do so, he should order the United States Navy and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to take steps to modify one or more AEGIS fleet air defense ships so as to prepare them to serve as anti-ballistic missile platforms. Initially, this will, of necessity, involve little more than the

deployment of components and test articles -- much as was done by President Bush *in 1990* with the emergency fielding of Patriot test missiles at the time of Operation Desert Shield. Gov. Bush spoke favorably of this idea in the campaign and successive Pentagon analyses confirm its inherent feasibility, affordability and strategic utility.

Send Congress legislation to **fix the military voting problem**, once and for all. A clear commitment to end the disenfranchisement of our men and women in uniform would send a potent signal to them and all who appreciate their service to our country. A centerpiece of such an initiative should be an experimental use of electronic voting, perhaps initially utilizing secure military communication capabilities, in time for this year's gubernatorial elections in Virginia and New Jersey.

Establish as a matter of presidential policy that the national security (including foreign policy-related expenditures) demands a minimum commitment of resources equal to at *least* four cents on the national economic dollar. This compares to slightly less than three percent of Gross Domestic Product we are currently allocating for these purposes -- the lowest level since before Pearl Harbor.

By making the **"Four Percent Solution"** -- one additional cent for national security -- a foundation for his military rebuilding program, the new President can end speculation that he will follow the Clinton-Gore stratagem of using budgetary smoke-and-mirrors to conceal the reality that "reform" *alone* cannot fix what massive infusions of additional funding recapitalization will be required to correct.

"Unsign" the International Criminal Court Treaty. By rescinding President Clinton's last-minute overruling of the military's strong opposition to the ICC, his successor will send an incalculably important message to his troops that help is no longer "on the way," as Vice President-elect Cheney put it in the course of the campaign -- *it has arrived*. No less importantly, the Bush-Cheney team will be serving notice on the international community: The incoming team is determined to be an American administration, not one that subscribes, as its predecessor did, to the "Post-American" philosophy that has systematically subordinated national interests and sovereignty to "aggressive multilateralism" and world governance.

A "second opinion" on China. Secretary of State-designate Colin Powell has publicly expressed the view that "conservatives" need to be educated on China. In fact, there is reason to believe that he -- and indeed the government as a whole -- would benefit greatly from a fresh *and independent* look (i.e., of the kind Secretary Rumsfeld has twice led, a "Team B" drawing upon outside experts who are not closely associated with the "conventional wisdom") to examine the premises and policy implications of official U.S. views of China's goals, conduct and military programs.

Defense Industrial Base: The rebuilding our Armed Forces cannot take place without the presence in the United States of a healthy defense industrial base, with vibrant R&D and manufacturing capabilities, upon which our national defense and our freedom of action in the world ultimately rest. Today many American defense subcontractors with critical technologies are being bought by foreign conglomerates. Others are simply being replaced

by Chinese and other third world suppliers. Allies require "offsets" as a prerequisite for the purchase of superior American weapons systems, a practice at odds with free trade principles. The entire state of the defense industrial base needs immediate review – and part of the political calculation should be the fact that much of the base is unionized labor.

Congress: Congressional allies should be tasked immediately to help establish a record concerning the world being bequeathed to the Bush-Cheney team. It can be easily demonstrated that it is far less conducive to U.S. security and vital interests than was that of 1993. Absent a concerted effort to hold the outgoing Administration accountable for the trouble now brewing literally all over the globe, it will be difficult to make the case for corrective action. On the other hand, such an accounting can significantly reduce the danger that the new administration will be blamed for its predecessor's misdeeds (just as the Democrats will try to do if the economy continues to tank).

Among the areas the congressional oversight committees should be asked to address with outside witnesses include: China's increasing belligerence; troubling developments in Russia, including its strategic partnership with the PRC; what to do next about the crises emerging in the Middle East and Persian Gulf; the emerging missile threat and what we can begin to do about it immediately; the need for U.S. space power; problems afflicting the intelligence community; reforming Goldwater-Nicholls so as to restore authority to the service Chiefs of Staff; Pentagon budgetary and programmatic fixes made necessary by the past decade's malign neglect; increasingly urgent energy security issues; potential adversaries' efforts to secure undisciplined, non-transparent funding for their malevolent activities on U.S. capital markets; etc.

Rebuilding the Defense Coalition: The new Administration needs to encourage and support the reconstituting of the sort of coalition that led to and supported the Reagan defense build-up and program so well in the late 1970s and 80s. At an elite level, this might involve a new initiative modeled after the Committee on the Present Danger, which would be legitimated by and given access to and succor from the relevant national security officials and departments.

At the grass-roots level, an outreach effort should be made akin to that mounted so successfully by Grover Norquist and dubbed the "Leave Us Alone" Coalition. Much spadework has already been performed to reawaken in many of the participating conservative organizations a concern about national security, but a far more serious and officially sanctioned initiative is needed to enlist not only their members but those of the veterans organizations, ethnic groups, defense and related labor unions, etc.

Media: A concerted and sustained effort needs to be made by the new defense team working with those inside the Administration and out who are savvy about the press to expose the media, and through them, the American people to the national security problems we are inheriting, and the serious shortfalls in our ability to address them. Focuses of such an effort should include: an unvarnished look at serious readiness inadequacies; military quality of life problems and their impact on recruiting and retention; obsolescing equipment and why we should not consider equipping our troops with anything less than weapon systems that are the best in the world; the threats we must contend with in the future -- including the asymmetric ones -- that will require nothing less; and otherwise promote the image of the men and women serving their country as once again valued members of our society and exemplars of its ideals.

Obviously, there would be enormous synergy if these steps are pursued in parallel. Should each be pursued aggressively and on an ongoing basis, they could prove instrumental to the maintaining -- and perhaps expanding -- the Republican majority in Congress in 2002, to supporting President Bush's reelection efforts and, most importantly of course, to assuring the national security.

April 30, 2001 5:43 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Herbits

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ~~Strategic Priorities~~
JOINT STAFF

Please take a look at this memo on how the Joint Staff works and what the role of the SecDef is. Steve Herbits, then please set a meeting for the three of us to discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Section 155 "Joint Staff"

DHR:dh
043001-48

U08395 /01

020JCS

30 APR 01

1992 - **Subsec. (c)**. Pub. L. 102-484, Sec. **911(b) (1) (A)**, substituted **'the** duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such **other'** for **'such'**.

②
PW

Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 102-484, Sec. **911(b) (1) (B), (C)**, redesignated subsec. (g) as **(f)** and struck out former **subsec. (f)** which read as follows: "Participation in JCS Meetings. - The Vice Chairman may **participate** in all meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but may not vote on a matter before the Joint Chiefs of Staff except when acting as Chairman."

1988 - **Subsec. (b) (1) (B)**. Pub. L. **100-456** substituted **'completed** a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment (as defined in section 664(f) of this title) **'** for **'served** in at least one joint duty assignment (as defined under section 668(b) of this title) **'**.

EXTENSION OF TERM OF OFFICE OF VICE CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Pub. L. 100-526, title I, Sec. 107, Oct. 24, 1988, 102 Stat. 2625, authorized President to extend until June 1, 1989, term of office of officer serving as Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for term which began on Feb. 6, 1987.

WAIVER OF QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT AS VICE CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Section **204(c)** of Pub. L. 99-433 authorized President, until Oct. 1, 1990, to waive certain requirements otherwise applicable for appointment of an officer as Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff.

-CITE-

10 USC Sec. 155

01/23/00

-EXPCITE-

TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES
subtitle A - General Military Law
PART I - ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
CHAPTER 5 - JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

-HEAD-

Sec. 155. Joint Staff

-STATUTE-

(a) Appointment of Officers to Joint Staff. - (1) There is a Joint Staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities.

(2) Officers of the armed forces (other than the Coast Guard) assigned to serve on the Joint Staff shall be selected by the Chairman in approximately equal numbers from -

- (A) the Army;
- (B) the Navy and the Marine Corps; and
- (C) the Air Force.

(3) Selection of officers of an armed force to serve on the Joint Staff shall be made by the Chairman from a list of officers submitted by the Secretary of the military department having jurisdiction over that armed force. Each officer whose name is submitted shall be among those officers considered to be the most outstanding officers of that armed force. The Chairman may specify the number of officers to be included on any such list.



①
X

10

Amend. of Sec Def -

(b) Director. - The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, may select an officer to serve as Director of the Joint Staff. (2)

(c) Management of Joint Staff. - The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages the Joint Staff and the Director of the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff shall perform such duties as the Chairman prescribes and shall perform such duties under such procedures as the Chairman prescribes. ←

(d) Operation of Joint Staff - The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Joint Staff is independently organized and operated so that the Joint Staff supports the Chairman Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in meeting the congressional purpose set forth in the last clause of section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) to provide - Get

- (1) for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces;
- (2) for their operation under unified command; and
- (3) for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

(e) Prohibition of Function as Armed Forces General Staff. - The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority. The Joint Staff may be organized and may operate along conventional staff lines.

(f) Tour of Duty of Joint Staff Officers. - (1) An officer who is assigned or detailed to permanent duty on the Joint Staff may not serve for a tour of duty of more than four years. However, such a tour of duty may be extended with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. NO

(2) In accordance with procedures established by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may suspend from duty and recommend the reassignment of any officer assigned to the Joint Staff. Upon receipt of such a recommendation, the Secretary concerned shall promptly reassign the officer.

(3) An officer completing a tour of duty with the Joint Staff may not be assigned or detailed to permanent duty on the Joint Staff within two years after relief from that duty except with the approval of the Secretary.

- (4) Paragraphs (1) and (3) do not apply -
 - (A) in time of war; or
 - (B) during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.

(g) Composition of Joint Staff. - (1) The Joint Staff is composed of all members of the armed forces and civilian employees assigned or detailed to permanent duty in the executive part of the Department of Defense to perform the functions and duties prescribed under subsections (a) and (c).

(2) The Joint Staff does not include members of the armed forces or civilian employees assigned or detailed to permanent duty in a military department.

-SOURCE-

(Added Pub. L. 99-433, title II, Sec. ,201, Oct. 1, 1986, 100 Stat. 1009; amended Pub. L. 100-180, div. A, title XIII, Sec. 1314(b) (2), Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat. 1175; Pub. L. 101-510, div. A, title IX, Sec. 902, Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1620; Pub. L. 102-484,

//



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE MILITARY ASSISTANT

April 252001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECDEF

SUBJECT: LEGAL LANGUAGE GOVERNING THE
FORMATION AND AUTHORITY OVER
THE JOINT STAFF

Mr. Secretary,

You asked for legal language defining the role of the Joint Staff, who they work for and related directives. The legal language is contained in 10 USC Sec. 155, copy attached with pertinent sections highlighted. By law the Joint Staff works for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The law also requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure its independence in supporting the Chairman.

A search of Department of Defense Directives relating to the Joint Staff provided negative results.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Roy R. Byrd".

Roy R. Byrd
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

April 23, 2001 7:20 PM

TO: RDML Quinn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld?A
SUBJECT: Joint Staff

Please get me the legal language as to who the Joint Staff works for and any directives relating to it.

Thanks.

SIR I

DHR:dh
042301-27

Legal LANGUAGE IS ATTACHED

VR

J/SMA 4/25

4-25
11:40 am
DHR

snowflake

April 30, 2001 6:02 PM

TO: William Schneider, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUB SECT: Cyberwar

Please take a look at this article, "The US Is Not Safe in a Cyberwar" and tell me what you think I ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/12/00 Staniford, Saydjari, Williams paper, "The US Is Not Safe in a Cyberwar"

DHR:dh
043001-52

110101

5071101

Abstract

The United States is becoming vulnerable to suffering very serious harm in a cyberwar fought with a moderately funded enemy. In this paper, we lay out what we believe would be the enemy's most certain and effective strategy to inflict damage. We think that is to use a series of well engineered worms to gain control of several million Internet connected computers within the United States, and then use those to launch distributed denial of service attacks of various kinds against Internet sites critical to the economy, or to US ability to analyze and contain the problem. Recent events show that the nation does not understand how to respond effectively to this kind of threat

We believe that a determined and competent enemy could cause significant harm to the US economy now, and that the problem is likely to become rapidly more critical over the next several years. An attack could be carried out in a way that would make it extremely difficult to identify which enemy was responsible. A number of ongoing policy and market trends are making this problem worse. In essence, our society is becoming too dependent on the Internet without an adequate understanding of the national security implications. This is becoming the worst threat the United States faces.

The authors of this paper are concerned that US leadership, and other decisionmakers about Internet use, do not fully appreciate the potential consequences of the current situation. Although we believe that the scenarios we describe could be inferred from the history of events that have already taken place, we feel it is necessary to make these inferences explicit. We do so in an attempt to influence policy-makers toward a safer posture.

We also lay out our best thinking on approaches to make the situation safer. We do this on several time-scales. We discuss what could be done in the very near term to help manage an emergency response to a serious cyberwar attack on the US. We then discuss policy measures that we think could significantly reduce national vulnerability over a period of several years. Finally, we discuss technical research and engineering areas that should be explored further.

1 Introduction

War seems to be as old as humanity, and to be an inescapable part of the human condition. Hunter gatherer tribes often fight with neighboring tribes, the Old Testament details many wars the Israelites fought, and history is punctuated at regular intervals with wars great and small.

The psychological dynamic of war is that of two peoples whose desires and view of the world are very different. They are unwilling or unable to imagine the other's condition and to see the world from the other's perspective. When empathy is absent, congeniality dies, and fear and dislike set in. An escalating cycle of increasing hostility takes place, until anger and hatred of the other is all-consuming. Thus war should be conceptualized first as a matter of the passions, not as rational actors pursuing reasonable but differing goals.

These dynamics do not heal quickly. The Balkans are still mired in anger and mutual hatred from centuries past. The ongoing troubles between England and Ireland have their roots in the invasion of Ireland by King John in the early 1200s. Pathologies in the individuals who lead the respective societies can greatly increase the potential for hostility. New communication or transport technologies do not prevent the basic psychological dynamic of war. Thus they do not end it, they only change the way it is fought. For example, the development of ocean going ships allowed for increased trade and increasing understanding of foreign countries. But that did not prevent wars; instead it meant that there were naval wars as well as land wars. Similarly, the invention of the airplane has allowed unprecedented opportunities for ordinary people to visit other lands and appreciate their experience. But its implication for warfare was strategic bombing and dogfights, not an end to the battles.

Similarly, the invention of the written word, the printing press, the telephone, the television, have all changed the way the world thinks about and carries on wars, but have not changed the fact that it fights them.

So we think it is extremely unlikely that the Internet will end war. But, of course, it will change it. Internet technology will be used to co-ordinate warfighting, and cyberwars will be fought over the Internet. The purpose of this paper is to suggest how that might happen; and also to suggest that the United States is placing itself in an extremely vulnerable position with respect to its enemies in a cyberwar. The US must change course; and soon; or face grave risk of serious domestic hurt in a conflict.

The Internet is very new, and has caused enormous societal change very quickly. In the 1970s it was under early development, and was mainly a platform for the researchers who were creating it to explore design possibilities. During the 1980s and early 1990s, it became a means for most kinds of scientists and engineers to exchange information. Starting in the mid 1990s, serious commercial use of the Internet, became apparent. By this writing, in 2000, the US is engaged in full scale attempts to convert as many societal functions as possible to using the Internet, and it is doing so in a frenzy, with little or no reflection on the risks.

History shows that, by and large, democracies do not fight wars with each other. Wars usually involve at least, one autocratic society. So in the early period of Internet development, when its use was largely confined to democratic countries, cyberwar was unlikely. Now, however, use of the Internet is becoming common in countries which are not democratic. And some of those countries are enemies of the US, or could easily become so. Some countries: also harbor semi-independent subgroups hostile to the US. Inevitably: their thoughts will turn over time to how to use the Internet to harm Americans. We should have given thought to how to protect ourselves before they do.

Throughout this paper, we talk about US vulnerability, and protecting the US, because that is the case we are most familiar with, and whose vulnerability is most personally threatening to us. However, it should be clear that, the general ideas apply to any country that is rapidly becoming dependent on the Internet.

We cannot stress enough that wars are not nice, and assumptions about how people will behave during peacetime cannot be applied in a war. It should be assumed that the enemy in a war would be glad to see American citizens starving in the streets after a failure of the US economy. We cannot, assume that an enemy lacks motivation to harm us; we must ensure that they do not have opportunity.

2 Cyberwar Strategy

Since the world has no experience with large scale cyberwar, we do not yet know for certain how it will look. Military doctrine has not been solidified, strategy ideas are uncertain, everything is in flux.

We are in a position similar to that of thinkers in 1912 interested in what

an air war would be like. The airplane had been invented, but not yet used in war. Some thinkers imagined correctly (eg the British Navy under Churchill's leadership was practicing bombing with aircraft) but many did not. At the start of the First World War, airplanes were used by the British and German armies solely for reconnaissance because it was not really understood how they might be applied in war. At the outset, pilots of planes on opposing sides would wave to each other if they happened to pass. By the end of that war, the basics of airborne warfare: bombing, fighters escorting bombers and dogfighting with each other, etc., were established.

Despite the lack of real experience: the authors believe that it's fairly straightforward to see what several good ways to fight a cyberwar against the United States would be, and the implications are already alarming. We start just by asking what have been the most destructive kinds of Internet security incidents to date? The answers are

- worms¹
- distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks²

So the simple thing to do is suppose that the enemy just uses those ideas. But, we assume that the enemy will put a serious engineering effort into building the tools they use, and will have researched the best ways to apply them to cause maximum damage. We assume that they have made careful and secret preparations before they launch their attack, but then that they will improvise and revise their plan during operations.

We also suggest some slight extensions of the techniques that have been seen before, that would make the attacks more damaging. In particular, we consider application level DDOS attacks, in which the attack is not just seeking to block the network in front of a site, but to overwhelm the

¹A worm is a computer program that knows how to propagate itself across the Internet to other computers: from them to still others, and so on. Worms typically spread to infect exponential numbers of computers until the worm can be understood, information about it propagated to all affected computer users, and the computers in question cleaned up by anti-virus software! or by re-installation of all clean software on the computer.

²A distributed denial of service attack is where an attacker gains control of a very large number of computers (zombies) and uses them to send harmful data of some kind to targets. The attacker seeks to overwhelm the target in some way. He uses an automated method to co-ordinate all the zombies.

transaction processing machinery of the site with bogus transactions. We think that in certain cases these will be much harder to recover from.

We do not claim that these are the **only cyberwar strategies**. However, as we will **outline**, they are enough to do enormous **damage**, and they are very hard to **combat**. They are **particularly attractive** to an enemy for the following **reason**. The enemy will want to use strategies such that the outcome is largely under his control. **He will try to** depend only on things that are true **with** a high probability, or that he directly controls (**such as the design** of his own tools). Thus plans which require the enemy breaking into **any** particular site are less **attractive to him**, since that particular site may be **too well secured to break into**, or **may have alert administrators** who notice in a timely way **and** reveal the enemy operation too soon. Instead, we work **out** scenarios in **which** the enemy only depends on **facts** such **as** that there are many **vulnerable** computers on high speed links in the United States (**something** that is essentially certain to be **true**), and the correctness of his own planning and **designing**. This leads to an emphasis on **large scale automated** attacks such as worms and DDOS.

First we **review** some recent **instances** of worm and DDOS events. The first, worm to attract large scale notice was the **Internet Worm** of 1988. **It** was written largely by a single individual, Robert Morris Jr, as a prank. The author was a talented **and** knowledgeable **practitioner** of computer security, but the worm code was hastily put **together** and **contained** several errors. The worm **spread across** much of the Internet: and largely paralyzed it for several days. The worm **was capable** of several different methods of **spreading, including using** some **previously** unknown vulnerabilities in common computer systems of the **day**, together with **passwordcracking**.³ The worm also encrypted parts of itself.

More recently, a series of simpler **email** worms have caused havoc on the Internet for a day or **two each**. *Melissa* and *I Love You* were the two most prominent examples. **Each** of these involved a malicious **attachment to an email** message. The message was crafted to come from someone the recipient **knew**, and to fool and encourage the recipient into opening the attachment. Once they did **so**, the **attachment** executed computer code which performed

³**Password** cracking is the process of finding a password by using automated brute force to run many possible passwords through the **password comparison algorithm** on the computer to see if any work.

malicious actions on the computer system of the affected individual, and mailed the worm to all the persons it could find in the recipients email address book. Both of these worms were written by individuals with just a month or two's effort. These latter worms were considered extremely simplistic by computer security practitioners, but even the Morris worm could have been much stealthier than it was.

Various ways of tricking many computers into all connecting to a single site have been known for some time. However, the recent history of distributed denial of service attacks begins in mid 1999 with an incident where the University of Minnesota was effectively removed from the Internet for several days. This turned out to be caused by a distributed denial of service attack, which was orchestrated with a then unknown hacker tool called Trinoo. Trinoo, and the several similar tools which have appeared since, work as follows. Hackers first compromise a large number of hosts. Typically they do this by large scale scanning⁴ of the Internet looking for vulnerable computers at random: compromising them: and then installing their software on the hosts in question. This is done via automated tools which perform the scanning, exploitation, and software installation on a large scale completely automatically. The software on these hosts is typically known as "zombie" software. In the University of Minnesota incident: several thousand machines were involved as zombies.

The attackers then use one or several master computers to send commands to all the zombies to flood continuous Internet traffic to the target sites. The target sites are overwhelmed with enormous amounts of spurious information which effectively prevents them from conducting their normal business.

In February of 2000, a series of more serious incidents managed to take several very high profile sites off the Internet for several hours each, including Yahoo, and Amazon.com. This necessitated a public appearance by the President to discuss the situation.

The DDOS incidents publically analyzed to date appear to be due to individual hackers, or small groups of hackers. All the tools to date show

⁴Scanning is the process of sending packets to a computer or a number of computers to characterize the possible vulnerabilities of the computer. It is the Internet analogue of walking down the street trying the door handles of autos. However, on the Internet it is automated, and millions of computers can be systematically scanned. Most full-time Internet connected computers that are not behind a firewall are scanned by hackers in some way daily.

a. low quality of software engineering. Nonetheless, they have been very effective in causing damage and disruption.

Before turning 1.0 how an enemy willing to expend a more serious engineering effort on their tools might operate, we consider how the information security community responds to incidents like those described above. We'll use the Minnesota incident as a prototype, but essentially similar steps occur in other incidents also.

In the Minnesota incident, Susan Levy Haskell was the incident co-ordinator responsible for understanding and responding to the situation. When she initially noticed that the University of Minnesota was losing Internet connectivity, she began to try to analyze the problem using tools and data supplied by the Cisco routers that connected the University to the rest of the Internet. Since the problem was a new one that had never been seen before, it took her several days of trying different hypotheses and misunderstanding the situation as variants on previously known problems, before she realized the basic idea; that many computers all over the Internet had been compromised and were all being co-ordinated to send excessive loads of traffic to her university.

The realization finally came during a phone conversation with personnel at the University of Washington. Levy Haskell had identified that 27 of the thousands of computers apparently attacking her site were located there. She had a preexisting relationship with system administrators at UW, so she called them, and they confirmed that those 27 systems all appeared to be compromised. Levy Haskell was then able to write a computer program which looked up contact information for site administrators for all of the computers that were attacking her in the databases of internet addresses kept by the organizations that assign addresses (ARIN, RIPE, etc), and send email to all of those sites. Within hours, the DDOS volume dropped to proportions that were manageable as the site administrators for all the compromised computers began to discover and clean up the problems, thereby taking the trinoo zombies off the Internet.

Dave Dittrich at the University of Washington located and analyzed the Trinoo software that was found on the compromised systems. He published that analysis on the web. The incidents were widely discussed on Internet security email lists, so that within a matter of days, much of the operational computer security community knew about Trinoo and knew what to look for on a compromised computer for that particular tool. Dittrich and colleagues have since gone on to analyze several other DDOS tools that have appeared

on the Internet.

A number of features of this incident are very general to all large scale incidents on the Internet to date, and should be drawn out, as they will be of significance later in the discussion.

- When the problem initially appears, no-one understands it, or knows what to do. People naturally assume that it is similar to previous problems, and understanding will come quicker or slower to the extent that proves to be true.
- Individual professionals with the necessary talent and skills, and who are directly affected by the problem, immediately turn to analyzing it, and attempting to understand what is happening.
- Informal networking between individual technical staff at different organizations is usually critical to solving the problem.
- Ms Levy Haskell used the phone to conduct her networking because she was cut off from the Internet by the DDOS attacks.
- Several internet databases are critical to an effective response, because without them, there is no way to translate the internet address of an attacking computer into an email address or phone number of a security administrator at the site with responsibility for that computer.
- Once the problem is understood by someone, somewhere, information about it may be very rapidly disseminated to the entire information security community using the Internet. If that happens, the problem comes under control fairly quickly.

Basically similar points could be made about the response to the worms. In recent years, anti-virus companies have become key centers in analyzing and disseminating information about those incidents.

We believe that DDOS attacks are a good weapon for cyberwar.

- A big DDOS attack has the power to take even the largest Internet web sites off the air until it is brought under control. While it is impossible to be certain at present, we think that a well prepared cyberwar DDOS could be orders of magnitude bigger than the largest hacker DDOS to

date. and therefore could keep several hundred web sites off the air simultaneously. Many of these can be chosen to be web sites critical to economic functioning. We believe there are a growing number of such sites.

- There is nothing an individual site can do to protect itself in advance. No matter how secure a site is, if it accepts traffic from the public internet at all, it can be flooded from other less secure sites. The flood can use traffic that is almost identical to legitimate traffic, so that there is no straightforward way to filter it out.
- DDOS attacks can be targeted. The enemy can choose to target particular web sites that it thinks are the most damaging ones to us. Collateral damage to other countries can be minimized.
- DDOS attacks are very difficult to respond to at best. If the enemy directly targets the sites likely to be necessary for response, they will be much harder still.
- All the experts who have analyzed the problem to date have concluded that it is extremely difficult to solve the problem under present circumstances. No-one seems to have any magic bullet ideas that do not involve fundamental change in the way the Internet and/or the computer industry operate.

Worms are also very useful in a cyberwar. A worm could certainly be used for general destructiveness across the whole globe. Computer security practitioners believe that worms could be much more stealthy and hard to eradicate than the ones in recent incidents. By mutating itself, encrypting itself, modifying the host operating system to make itself invisible, disabling countermeasures such as anti-virus software, a worm could become extremely hard to detect. Most recent worms have spread by email, but that it by no means the only possibility, and is now probably one of the less effective ones for a cyberwar attack because organizations have a lot of practice at dealing with email worms. Also: the mail servers tend to form a bottleneck for worm propagation.

A worm by itself is a very blunt instrument for causing damage. An attacker cannot easily exercise fine control over where it goes (in particular

which counties are affected). So a worm could be used to cause massive global destruction of computer data, but it's relatively hard to fine tune for any specific war aim. What worms are good for, in our view, is to allow the enemy to install software on a very large number of computers very quickly. That software can then be used for distributed denial of service attacks on a scale not yet seen.

Other strategies are certainly possible. The Internet core is quite vulnerable to attacks on its routing^b, and the large routers that move long haul traffic in volume can often be brought down by a quite small number of malformed packets. These techniques can be used to cut off parts of the Internet maliciously.

Also, the root domain name servers are few (13 as of this writing) and could fairly easily be cut off from the Internet. This would prevent much of the translation of names (such as in URLs) to addresses, effectively making many resources inaccessible^c. Again, this would have a global effect and would not be readily targetable against any particular country or entity.

Additionally, the large number of computers that have modems allows for the possibility of a phone system DDOS. A worm that gained control of many computers could be used to have them all call into certain phone numbers, effectively cutting those call centers off.

The would be cyberwarrior is likely to be spoilt for choice. We like the combination of worms to distribute software used for large scale distributed denial of service which can then be used against a large number of targets to cause maximum disruption. In the next section we will take this up in more detail.

First though, we point out a very novel feature of cyberwar attacks; it is conceivable that the enemy might be anonymous. Traditionally, in warfare it was fairly straightforward to tell who the enemy was. This may not be true in cyberwar. Just as it is presently extremely difficult to trace and apprehend computer criminals, it may be extremely difficult to identify cyberwar attackers. Additionally, many groups and companies are presently engaged in developing anonymizing networks. They aim to allow use of the Internet

^bRouting is the process of directing packets of data from the computer where they start, across the Internet to their destination, and routers are the devices that do this

^cAlthough domain name servers cache names and the location of other lower level domain servers, so access to resources recently used would tend to survive, while new resources could not be located

in a way which makes identification of the participant not merely extremely difficult in practice, but impossible in principle. In most cases this is being done for high-minded reasons (protecting dissidents in autocratic countries; and veiling innocents from stalkers, etc). However, the exact same systems can be used to control the apparatus of a cyberwar attack anonymously.

In some cases of course, world events may make it clear who the enemy must be. In others, there may be several possible enemies and it will not be clear which is attacking us. Or we may be attacked in peacetime with no idea who is responsible.

Having outlined our general thinking on large scale cyberwar, we now sketch a particular scenario.

3 One Possible Cyberwar Attack

Every large scale cyberwar will have its own unique characteristics, and there is no way to predict what the first one will look like. However, to illustrate the scope of US vulnerability, we here develop in more detail one possible scenario. While any such scenario is an act of imagination, and there are aspects of such an attack that could not be tested in advance, the authors, after intensive debate, judge that the following scenario is basically feasible. We think that enemy commanders of similar knowledge and competence to our own could carry this out without needing to solve any hard research problems or to use any sophisticated intelligence capabilities. We will illustrate such a campaign using nothing but freely-available information and tools. This could therefore be a lower bound to the damage a well-financed adversary with sophisticated technical capabilities could inflict.

We suppose an anonymous enemy who attacks without warning, in peacetime, for the purpose of revenge against the US (we think the reader will find it credible that there are nation states and large terrorist groupings with that motive). The enemy's war aim is to cause maximum economic disruption in the US without being identified (thereby leading to US kinetic retaliation). The goal of not being identified leads him to a cyberwar-only strategy. We assume that the enemy has a campaign staff of several dozen knowledgeable and disciplined individuals with the right mix of skills and knowledge, and that the operation is led with vision, determination, and talent. We assume six months to a year of preparation (software development, target research:

etc.

The example campaign consists of five stages: Tool building, intelligence collection and preparation, softening up, increased tempo, and main attack.

3.1 Tool building

We assume that the enemy builds a series of DDOS worms, using the same general principles for each one, but differing in the details of how they spread, hide themselves, and are controlled. (He builds several so that he can release new ones as we manage to gain control over the last one, and so that he can have a number of capabilities without making the worm code too large). We assume he has available several vulnerabilities that are either brand new, or widely unpatched (a very weak assumption since many new vulnerabilities in popular software are discovered every week). We now described one such DDOS worm.

We assume the worm infects computers running Microsoft Windows since the owners and operators of those computers often lack much computer knowledge: ensuring that they will find it difficult to analyze and understand what is happening on their computer, even when given instructions. The worm would be obscured in transit to hinder analysis, and would unobscure itself on installation. It would insert itself into the operating system kernel, and would not show up in any system utilities or anti-virus products. It would disable auto-update of any AV product+ on the system and silently disable the appropriate parts of any personal firewall or IDS software, but otherwise would not affect computer functionality. So it would be very difficult to tell that it's there.

No data is available on what proportion of computers have been infected in recent worm incidents. However, we think that injecting in the region of 1% to 10% of Internet connected computers is a plausible estimate. Cleaning up all these computers is likely to seriously overwhelm the capabilities of technically capable people (system administrators, computer consultants! etc).

Communication to the worm would occur down the injection tree, except it would also pass addresses several steps up and down that tree to create a directed acyclic graph with a lot of extra fallback communication links. The top of the control tree would disappear into an anonymizing network before going to the enemy. The worm-worm control protocol would use a

common port.. but, the modified kernel would pick up the control protocol packets without showing an open port. to port-scanners. The protocol would be encrypted with random session keys.

The main thing communicated down the tree would be changes to the DDOS target list. Each instance of the worm would create a fairly modest amount of traffic to random targets from the list. DDOS packets would be plausible looking transactions on common protocols (probably web http transactions). The host site would not be crippled, since any given computer wouldn't produce that much traffic. Each worm instance would know a large proportion of the large target list.. Thus any given target is brought to it's knees by a fairly few packets from each of an extremely large number of zombies (making response very difficult). In some cases, the targets would be overwhelmed by sheer volume of packets, but in other cases the worm would actually be attempting transactions against the site to overwhelm the back office processing.

As soon as the code starts to be installed somewhere, the enemy is vulnerable to having it analyzed and the analysis disseminated amongst respondents, Therefore, the enemy must install and get his DDOS network into operation as quickly as possible so that he is in a position to cripple effective response before it occurs. However, this worm would almost certainly get analyzed successfully within a, few days, even given that the enemy could hinder the operation of anti-virus companies a lot. However, identifying and cleaning up the infected computers would take a lot longer. Determining who controlled it would be impossible.

We judge that the tool building could be done in three to six months.

3.2 Intelligence collection and preparation

Enemy intent in the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) phase is to determine key targets and means that would help achieve his goals. Unfortunately, our open society and the rush to make information available on the Internet makes passive -reconnaissance frighteningly easy. The authors augmented common knowledge about the way the US does business, open Internet sources, and a limited number of e-commerce and investing magazines, with less than one week of Web searching to identify potential targets, determine the probable feasibility of the campaign described below, and develop this simple campaign plan. Active discovery would involve some

hacking to determine which target web sites can be penetrated for more malicious activity, and which ones are restricted to pure DDOS. This stage could consume several months, but can be done concurrently with tool building to some degree. In the IPB stage, the enemy would include activities like

- **Stealing** credit/debit card numbers (or getting a large number of stolen numbers from readily available hacker/ cracker sources).
- **Determining** the algorithms for validating credit card (CC) numbers, and **reverse-engineering** to generate card numbers for non-existent accounts.
- **Finding** e-commerce sites that merely use the number validation algorithm instead of the Address Validation System (AVS), or more secure validation means.
- **Determining** major on-line banks or non-bank processors of EFT and CC transactions,
- Determining transaction formats,
- Algorithm development!
- **Campaign** planning,
- Feasibility testing

3 . 3 Softening Up

The softening up stage would consist of a series of **psychological** operations (**Military** term: **PsyOps**) intended to reduce the populace's confidence in the US economic system; and to undermine confidence in the news media as a channel of **communication** about what was happening. Rather than simple "look how smart I am" web **page defacements**, the enemy **will** use any **hackable** news web sites and gossip columns to plant **spurious** articles of the type:

- Fed may raise **interest** rates

- Analyst downgrades **XXX** (any Dow or Nasdaq 100 component - do many of them) from buy to hold (or hold to sell)
- Major production cuts expected from OPEC; nation:
- Social Security funds misreported - crisis in two years instead of twenty
- Defense Finance Service (or Social Security administration) reports major computer problems - retirement checks to be delayed more than sixty days (plus something similar for Union retirements/payrolls. Electronic Benefits Transfers. . .)
- Hacker publishes two million stolen credit card numbers in blackmail scheme
- and numerous others. of increasing severity over the duration of the campaign.

Later articles will refer to events from the campaign itself. Spurious and misleading information about what was happening, together with counter-productive advice would be inserted into the stream of news.

A powerful strategy would be to post this type of disinformation on news sites that do not check sources, such as many of the dot-com sites not associated with major networks and newspapers: and on Usenet news group? that we scanned and catalogued by search engine bots. It is not unreasonable to expect that major outlets would be forced to pick up some of these Web and Usenet postings, and report them if only to refute them. The goal of this stage is to confuse the populace, and make them uncertain that any source can be believed or trusted. With careful additional disinformation, and a rotating series of targets as the initial set either shuts down or learns to secure themselves, the enemy should be able to make people doubt official communications too.

3.4 Increased Tempo

The severity and tempo of PsyOps would be augmented after a few days by a parallel series of DDOS attacks on economic nexii, including the key communications nodes mentioned above, that are accessible via the Internet. Here are some other examples:

- **Electronic on-line and day trading**
- **Brokers.** We found web addresses and rankings for over 100 discount brokers who provide Internet access to Level II trading. The financial pages of any major newspaper or investment-related magazine will provide names (and web addresses) for more conventional Level I electronic trading brokers. DDOS attacks would force large numbers of traders back to telephone (automated touch-tone trading and normal voice) or fax - with the associated delays - in what the enemy expects to be a plunging market.
- **SOES, ECNs and Market Makers.** These are the backbone of day trading. The Nasdaq Small Order Entry System and the Electronic Computing Networks are systems that internet day traders use to enter Level II bids and offers just like the major Nasdaq Market Makers. Individual day traders access SOES or an ECN through their on-line broker, above. Instinet, Archipelago, Selectnet, and Island are four ECNs that provide an Internet from-end to brokers. The market makers are very large brokerage firms with easily recognized names among even the least sophisticated readers of the business pages - Goldman, Sachs; Schwab; Merrill-lynch; A. G. Edward; and about 100 others. DDOS of the on-line Level II brokers and the ECNs would starve access to this day trading backbone - further research is required to determine whether the market makers use Internet, private dial-up, or leased lines to interoperate with the ECNs. However, the enemy has another way to choke the market makers that we will discuss below.
- **Data services.** Links to Internet quote services, news, and trading brokers are at <http://www.daytraderpicks.com/links.htm> - one-stop shopping for intelligence collection. The reader may have heard of quote.com, PCQuote.com, Datek.com and some others through the magic of television (CNN, MSNBC, CNN in advertisements). These are eminent DDOS targets for the ramp-up stage.
- **Exchanges.** The NYSE, Nasdaq, PSE, CBOE, Commodity and Futures exchanges could be targets, depending on the level of web-enabling each has accomplished. We judge it unlikely that one could launch a DDOS attack via the Internet against most of the exchanges today, because

most have some sort of private mainframe system that is not accessible, or could be disconnected at the first sign of trouble. However, most are aggressively planning more Internet integration. For example, the Chicago Board of Trade already has 10-15% of transactions initiated via the Internet, and plans to go to an all electronic model.

- **Bond, Options, and Commodities markets.** Essentially the same sort of attacks as above are feasible with different specifics about targets, information sources, and bottleneck.
- **Food distribution.** In an hour of searching on the web, the authors were straightforwardly able to identify a number of web sites for food distributors and wholesalers who accept online orders. While the proportion of food orders being handled this way is small today, we assume it is growing rapidly. In peacetime, this is completely understandable. It lowers costs both for distributors and retail stores to be able to use the web to manage orders.
- **Media.** Those media sites not being used as disinformation sources, and especially those who might be issuing counter-disinformation, become DDOS targets. This may not be as effective a use of DDOS zombies as other targets, because media outlets have other channels besides Internet. Major Internet portals (Excite, Netscape, AOL, . . .) have become media sources in their own right, and will be targeted for disinformation and DDOS as necessary.
- **Infrastructure.** At best (from the US perspective), a cyber campaign would do no worse than force infrastructure Command and Control back to manual, telephone, fax, -and non-Web operations. DDOS attacks against power distribution and management, transportation management and status reporting (especially at intermodal transfer points), weather, B2B, and voice/data-over-IP might do much more than inconvenience the citizens. Expectations of technology are so high, though, that mere inconvenience can help generate chaos: especially in the light of "road rage", "air rage", and the current furor over small increases in gasoline prices.
- **On-line banking.** The proportion of the population using on-line banking is growing at an ever-increasing rate. Financial institutions like

brick-and-mortar banks and credit unions are rushing to the Internet to compete with the emerging plethora of Internet-only banks. The adversary will target the major on-line institutions in this stage for DDOS attacks.

- **Local, State, and Federal government.** These organizations are rushing to provide services to their citizenry. Although most of their critical databases are on private systems, there is a push to make it possible for constituents to pay water bills, pay property taxes, order automobile decals, renew driver's licenses, and carry out other governmental necessities. The federal government's version of this is Pay.gov, a new web site which is expected to handle \$125 billion per year in transactions. DDOS against these systems would have a very strong demoralizing effect on the government and on citizenry.
- **Information Security Community.** We also expect the enemy to target web sites about information security, anti-virus companies, and mailing lists for the internet security community. This will hamper an effective US response to the attack. We take this up in more detail in the section on response.

All of these potential DDOS targets are targets for more in-depth disinformation in this stage. There are enough targets for a rolling series of attacks, such that the populace and the people trying to fix the problems would be nearly punch drunk. Any of the above targets could be used as a feint to draw attention away from the main target.

3.5 Main Attack

After several days of fanning the fires, the adversary would launch a main attack on the financial crown jewels - the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve is not currently vulnerable to direct DDOS attack, because all the Federal Reserve Banks (FRB), and the Automated Clearing House (ACH) members of the National ACH Association (NACHA), use large mainframe computers with leased-line or secure dial-up access. The NACHA includes the Federal Reserve. These clearinghouses perform all the overnight debit/credit processing in the country - approaching 10 billion transactions a year. We judge that a sophisticated adversary can mount an indirect DOS attack on

the ACH networks that would **create** the **ultimate havoc**, requiring the **ACHs** to shut down or go manual, and costing more man-years to straighten out than the **Y2K** fiasco. Here is one possible scenario:

- Use application level DDOS zombies to run credit card purchase scripts through a large number of e-commerce **sites**. Credit card numbers could be stolen from the computers **in** question in many cases, or use a list stolen in **advance**. These can go through any e-commerce **site**: but concentrate on a relatively small number of banks **that** process credit cards. Continue for several days or until detected. **The current** procedure requires the banks to absorb losses, or to pass them along to the e-commerce site as "chargebacks" - **this** will create a significant backlog **as** the customers, **banks**, and sites attempt to clear things up manually. Cascade through sites and banks. Note that the **transactions** have been batched and processed through the ACH **system**, so **actual** money has changed hands, to require error-processing.
- Meanwhile (or during the preparatory stage), generate several **million** totally bogus credit card numbers with the reverse-engineered validation algorithms. When the **above** attacks are recognized **and cleanup** activity **3s** in progress, run several thousand small-value purchases using each of the generated numbers through sites that do not use **AVS**, authentication, or expert-system methods to ensure that the cardholder is really the purchaser. The aim is to generate several hundred million bogus, unauthenticated transactions a day that will slip through the e-commerce sites, and their banks, all the way to the ACH. Since the **FRB** are an integral part of the ACH system, the enemy is forcing them both to process a significant fraction of **their** annual volume every night - potentially enough to choke them in an indirect DOS attack.
- If the ACH attack can be made to persist for a few days: one could envision the entire ACH system having to inflict **its own** DOS **attack**, **shutting** down until it gets the mess straightened out, reverting to **manual** processing, and developing new procedures for the Internet **commerce community to adopt**,
- The enemy can also use the zombies to **launch large** numbers of **spurious** transactions into the ECN and Market Maker networks, causing similar

effects, and exacerbating the credit card attacks, since monies involved in **trading** are also cleared and moved through the **ACHs**.

To make matters worse, the Fed is actively pursuing on-line ACH business: and is in the process of instituting **FedWeb** - a web-based clearinghouse **capability**. The authors did not have the time to research the other **ACHs** to discover whether any of them **have implemented** web access, or are in the process of doing so. One hopes **that** this **access** will only be accessible to subscribing banks, and locked down with strong authentication, encryption, and the best safeguards known to man. They may still be vulnerable to the weak links at the originating end of the chain - **bad** transactions being fed to the Fed using the finest protection and authentication.

The consequences of an ACH failure or shutdown are unimaginable. The combined effect of the overall campaign could be to cause a worldwide depression, or worse. It is almost certain that the stock and bond markets would crash. In fact, one other part of the preparation **stage** of the enemy campaign could be to buy large numbers of puts and sell index futures, in effect financing the whole campaign.

4 Likely response at present

In this section, we outline our best guesses as to how the US would respond if this were to happen tomorrow. We cannot know; we are simply extrapolating from knowledge of how past **information** security incidents got handled, and of the kinds of emotional stages that people and societies pass through when faced with a great loss.

4.1 Denial

At first, at all hierarchical levels of perception of the attack there is a tendency to find some other explanation for what is going on. At the local level, starting with the user who needs to access some unavailable service, the first thing a user will conclude is that the computer has done something wrong again, or the network is down. This is natural as most people are conditioned to expect computer infrastructure to be fairly unreliable. Less experienced system administrators may have the same reaction; some will progress beyond

this point **based** on their intuition about how the system should or should not behave.

Some talented system **administrators and** other computer professionals at affected sites will not be in denial, but will immediately realize that there is an unusual problem without understanding the wider context. They will quickly turn to analyzing what is happening. These will be the people with debuggers and disassemblers attempting to unravel the enemy code. If the enemy has done a good job, it will **take** some time. However, we think it extremely unlikely that the code from any given enemy tool will not be fairly well understood by someone within a few days to a week of its first use in the campaign.

However: as systems professionals begin to understand how the enemy is operating at a low level, they are **going** to find their ability to share that understanding or respond effectively badly hampered by the enemy. The enemy can keep key **mailing** lists and web sites for information security professionals off the air. They cannot prevent all communication, but they can force it to happen slowly and ineffectually via non-standard channels. They can also take out the key databases required to co-ordinate responses to security **incidents** (ARIN etc). That will make any kind of targeted response by a victim site impossible.

At the higher level: there is going to be initial confusion, as the government and other large bodies realize that they have no effective organizations or doctrine in place for handling cyberwar attacks. There will be much conversation and discussion, but much of **it** will be directed to getting up to speed on the most basic aspects.

4 . 2 **Anger**

Once people realize an attack is underway, they tend to get very angry at the attacker and at their system for being attacked. They want to take action to get it over with **as** soon as possible. This **leads** some system administrators to take precipitous and sometimes rash action - like taking their system off of the network. Sometimes these are precisely the actions that an attacker is trying to induce. Users may stop trusting their systems and go back to some **fallback** mode of operation...again, this may be exactly what the attacker wants. Some minority of system administrators and operators will remain calm and continue systematic investigation of what is happening.

The extent to which **fallback** on older modes of communication is successful is going to depend almost entirely on how far Internet integration has gone. An organization that is handling 10% of its business over the Internet and 90% by phone can stand to lose its Internet operation. It will have in place the necessary call centers; staff, phone lines, and systems to handle the increased volume of phone calls. Delays may increase, but nothing worse than that.

An organization that handles 90% of transactions online is out of business if it loses its Internet operation for a significant length of time. There is no way it will have the resources necessary to handle transactions in a non-automated way. **It** will not be able to acquire those resources quickly enough.

At the highest level, there will be **desperation** to gain a better operational picture of what is happening. The extent to which we have no idea **what is** happening on the Internet will become clear. There will be a strong desire to find someone to blame.

Some folks in the upper echelons will want to strike back at the attackers, even to the extent of physical violence. The desire for targetting information will grow frantic and the lack of technology and tools to get such information as to who and where the attackers are will increase the frustration levels.

4.3 Panic and Depression

If defenders are able to broadly keep control of the situation, things will start to stabilize at this time. If the attack is successful enough however, defenders of systems will begin to get quite depressed with the ability of the attackers to do what they want, when they want it and the defenders inability to see it let alone act against it. Some may just give up at this point. A hardy few will continue the diagnosis and solution process.

At the population level, panic will start to set in. Depending on the extent of the economic damage, people may begin to look for alternative ways to survive.

We should point out that this progression, or some variant of it will repeat itself as layers of the attack are revealed. Also, we will see it repeat itself up the hierarchy of an organization. So, using the **DoD** as an example, one might expect first line defenders (system **administrators**, for example) to go through this first at a very **tractical** level and then much later on, as evidence comes in from a great number of sites, one might expect to see

this same sort of progression (and its **iterations**) happen at the national level within a crisis management team such as might be assembled at the National Security Council level. By the time the **situation** reaches the highest echelons, the **lack** of doctrine and procedures will **have** resulted in a number of tactical responses that could severely limit strategic courses of action.

Law enforcement will note **that** it **too** does not have many tools that, it can bring to bear on the problem: but will attempt to respond to the situation. An argument over who is in **charge** will ensue that will waste a great deal of precious time. Law enforcement **naturally** wants to leave the "crime" scenes untouched so they can watch what is happening and gather evidence to prosecute later. The **operationals**, including **DoD** element, will naturally want to stop the pain immediately **becuase** they have a mission to accomplish. There will be conflict over how much information to share with the public. Government will have a strong tendency to share very little **information** (as happened in February of this year), and yet the great bulk of society will need to respond and won't be able to without good guidance and detailed information.

Strategic decision making will be nearly impossible because of the inability (through technology) to determine who is **attacking**. The normal means of diplomatic or military action depends on knowing who **is** causing the problem, Top level decision makers will be limited to decisions like whether to tell the public and perhaps broadcasting messages about the situation that might tempt the attacker into believing things that might be to our strategic advantage (like that we are getting close to knowing the identity and that we are preparing to bomb the attackers site). Response actions considered at this level will get **quagmired** in legal and ethical debates because of a lack of forthought on these issues and so inaction will be the norm.

5 Short term preparations

In the remaining sections of the **paper**, we discuss what might help. We do not have all the answers, and we do not claim that all the following suggestions are fully worked out or perfect, However, we are strongly of the opinion that the situation is so serious that it requires concerted and decisive action quickly, and that policy options previously inconceivable should be on the table. These are our best ideas at present.

In this section, we discuss ways that the United States could mitigate the **dangers** discussed in this paper on a timescale of months. **If** we knew this was going to happen in three months time, but didn't know any details, what would we do to prepare?

Firstly, and most importantly, the US should have a clear contingency plan for fighting a cyberwar against a determined and well prepared enemy. Who is in charge: and what resources are available to them, should be determined in **advance**. Even a moderate amount of planning and preparation could make a big difference.

It is our view that cyberwar is different enough from other kinds of warfare that it probably needs its own military service (as with ships and airplanes, new technologies call for new services). A law enforcement perspective is not appropriate for fighting a war. The nucleus of that service should be identified and developed now. That service should think of its mission **as** the strategic **cyber** defense of the United States. It will require visionary and talented **leadership**, and technical depth. Pay scales must be competitive with private computer industry jobs **in** order to attract the necessary talent.

Cyberwar defense requires strong **relationships** between government and commerce. Those **relationships** need to be built as rapidly **as** possible. In particular, channels of communication with major **ISPs** are essential response. However, in order to take this role, government must be competent. If the government does not have credible technically savvy staff who understand the Internet culture, it cannot take a useful role.

The President must have appropriate emergency powers to compel necessary assistance from **ISPs**, phone companies, etc in extremis.

US computer security companies, anti-virus companies, computer emergency response team at universities etc should **all** be aware of who is the government entity in charge in a crisis, and know the phone numbers, **email** addresses, etc.

Emergency **broadcast** system should be available for use in co-ordinating a response: and likely responders should be **aware** **this** method would be used to co-ordinate.

A **law** enforcement perspective **must not** be allowed to control in an emergency. It is essential to communicate rapidly and fully with business and **academia** to co-ordinate an effective response. **Cyberwars** will be won by the combatant that is able to share information amongst itself quickest and best. Military security, classification schemes etc also have potential to severely

hamper an effective defense.

6 Medium term policy changes

In this section, we consider legal and policy changes that the US might make. We propose a set of measures that we believe would largely eliminate this danger. Most of these are fairly difficult, painful changes, and we have not worked out all the details of them. It would be appropriate to explore possible remedies at much greater length in hearings and in public debate. However, we cannot think of any easy solutions to the present parlous state of security on the Internet: and the consequence? of not acting to make ourselves secure are likely to be very severe. We believe that currently proposed policy measures are not nearly adequate to the situation. We believe the ideas that follow are a lot closer to what is necessary: even if not perfect yet.

It's important to understand the key points about the scenario described above, so we reiterate them here. There is nothing a critical Internet site can do to protect itself from a well-engineered DDOS attack. No matter how many security measures the site itself takes, it cannot prevent itself from being overwhelmed with floods of apparently legitimate requests from elsewhere. Similarly, there is nothing that backbone Internet backbone providers can do to cut off a DDOS attack that comes from a very large and diverse set of their customers. Too many customers would have to be cut off to solve the problem, making the cure worse than the disease.

Thus the Internet creates a historically unique situation. Every site is dependent for its functioning on the security of all the other sites (especially those with high bandwidth connections). Only when most Internet connected computers are secure will critical Internet sites be reliably available in wartime. This is very far from the case today.

There are a number of new computer security vulnerabilities published every week. What happens at present is that individual security researchers and practitioners discover these vulnerabilities. They either disclose them to the vendor, or publish them (or both). By and large, this process is done by people acting in the public interest, or in pursuit of peer recognition. There is little economic advantage to finding a vulnerability (particularly compared to the potential harm that can be done with a new, previously unknown vulnerability). Security experts assume that there are many vulnerabilities

that never get discovered.

Even of those that do get discovered, many are never fixed by the vendor that supplied the software. When the vendor does supply a patch to the product: most customers never install the patch to make their computer secure. Thus most computer security experts regard a present day computer as a hopelessly insecure mess, riddled with tens of known vulnerabilities, and probably hundreds of unknown ones. In order for the Internet to be usable for critical societal applications, this has to change 1.0 a. situation in which vulnerabilities are rare and fixed quickly.

It seems overwhelmingly likely that this is possible in principle. There is a discipline of software engineering for critical systems that has intensively studied how to create secure well-written programs. Even more informal efforts can often produce very good results. For example: the OpenBSD operating system is created by a team of volunteers who are strongly concerned about security. Although lacking as many applications as systems such as Microsoft Windows and Linux, it is a complex modern operating system: and it has had no vulnerabilities in the default install for the last two years. This despite the fact that the team is much smaller than that creating other operating systems and is unpaid. Where there is a will, there is a way.

So the problem is not that it is impossible to create secure programs, it is that the economic incentives in the software industry do not reward doing so. Software vendors perceive that it is essential for them to get the most feature laden product possible to market as quickly as possible. Hence their modus operandi is to make the product extremely complex: and ship it as quickly as they dare. It is inevitable that the result contains many many errors: and some of these will be security relevant. The economic consequences of a security bug to a vendor are modest. A small amount of engineering time must go into creating the patch, and there is some negative consequence to the vendor's reputation. However: the public seems to be accustomed to such reports: and a constant stream of them does not seem to have changed anything. Self regulation is extremely unlikely to be effective in the face of persistent economic incentives to ship ever more complex software in a hurry.

Similarly, for the customer, installing a patch is a time-consuming and annoying task that does not increase the functionality of the computer for the customer. It is low down on the todo list for whoever should be doing it. In many cases, customers may not even be aware of the need to install patches: or know how. So it is usually not done.

In peacetime, the costs of these problems are **manageable**. In wartime, they will not be. There are a **variety** of possible **ways** to change the **system** to make it **function better**. Our view is that the best approach is 1.0 **make minimal changes** in the **system**, except to introduce new economic incentives. We also think it **best** to minimize the size of new government bureaucracies **that** must be created. **Large administrative bureaucracies** tend not to be very effective: and the US has a long history of very expensive failure in trying to secure operating systems by creating complex regulations and **bureaucratic** reviews carried out by government agencies **and** contractors.

Our solution is as follows. (This is an outline with notional numbers, **It** will be **necessary** to work out the **details** with more care than we have **taken** here). Any vendor who ships **software** which might get **installed** on Internet connected computers must register with a new "Software Quality Bureau" (SQB). Since a **vulnerable application** on Internet connected computers is a national security risk, this is a **reasonable** requirement. The purpose of registration is **simply** so the SQB can keep track of vendors. Vendors who did not register would be **criminalized**. **Registration** should be kept minimal in cost and complexity; even a very **small** company or an individual should be **able** to **navigate** the process without undue hardship.

Next, independent researchers who discover vulnerabilities can report them to the SQB in confidence, together with enough information to reproduce the problem. The SQB must acknowledge receipt of the notice within a couple of working **days**. The **SQB** then verifies the existence of the **vulnerability**. Within a couple of weeks, it must contact the vendor of the software in question, who is fined **1%** of annual sales for the product and has to produce a patch or **face an additional** fine. Of that fine money, **25%** goes back to the independent researcher. The rest is revenue for the government.

This will **allow vulnerability** researchers to become extremely wealthy and famous. This will **create** very strong incentives to develop a much larger **population** of such researchers who will be **motivated** to **exhaustively** analyze any software product of any consequential market. Most vulnerabilities in existing products will be found.

Meanwhile, vendors who ship insecure software will face financial consequences that are serious enough that they will **have** to change how they operate. Vendors who cannot evolve to ship a secure product will go out of business. However: human ingenuity being what it is, most vendors will evolve.

Note **that** it is not necessary for the government to tell vendors how to **create** secure products (something the government is very unlikely to do well). or to find problems itself (something it is unlikely to do **systematically** enough). It is **much** better for the government **to give** others the **right** economic incentives; **and** let them figure out how to maximize their income in the resulting system.

A few wrinkles **that** might be useful. It will **probably** be necessary to phase in **this** scheme over a year or **two**, **to** give vendors time to **adjust**. There should be incentives for the SQB to work **efficiently**. For example, if the SQB cannot fulfill its obligations within a couple of weeks, then the researcher **might** get a larger share of the **take**. There should be a technical court of appeals to which the vendor **can complain** if it doesn't **agree** with the SQB verdict.

We note **that this** will increase the cost of software to some degree: and slow the **time to market**. That is a necessary **price** to pay for a secure society. All vendors **will face** the same environment, so it should not create unfairness. However, **it is** likely that software vendors will oppose this scheme very strongly out of inertia.

Having **persuaded** the vendors to produce a more secure product, and to **reliably create patches** for those problems that are found, society still faces the problem of end users and computer **administrators** who do not **have adequate** incentive to install **those** patches. They too must be **given** a reason to do the right thing.

Someone who places an unpatched or **misconfigured** system on the **Internet** puts **all** of us **at risk** to some degree. It is **akin** to driving around on the highway with bad **brakes**. **In** the highway domain, when the police notice a car with a mechanical problem, they **issue** a **fix-it** ticket to the driver. A similar mechanism could be used in the **Internet** case. Law enforcement (perhaps **the National** Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)) could routinely scan the computers and **email addresses** in the United States parts of the Internet to ensure **that** all are patched up to **date**. This can be done from the Internet in an **automated** fashion. Any **vulnerable** computers are issued a fix-it ticket. **If** the owners do not fix the system after a few weeks, they are fined.

A difficulty **is** that it **is** presently somewhat **difficult** to decide what **addresses** are **within** the **US**, and what are not. Additional registration is going to be necessary. **Probably** the best approach is to do this via Internet **Ser-**

vice Providers. At sign-up with a US ISP, a customer and the ISP must provide enough information about IP addresses and email addresses that the computer can be remotely tested for vulnerabilities.

An alternative is to place the requirement of vulnerability testing on the ISPs. This considerably mitigates the privacy impacts of having law enforcement perform the task. It will increase the cost and complexity of being an ISP; however, and place ISPs in an enforcement position. This will increase the cost to end users of Internet use. Again, the problem is that we have not been paying the true cost of having an Internet which is actually safe for societal purposes.

Another useful measure would be mandatory egress filtering. At present, it is quite common for routers to be configured such that packets can emerge from a network with forged source addresses. This greatly hampers the target of an attack in locating the source. This should be illegal.

We also advocate mandatory reporting of computer security incidents. System administrators, security consultants, monitoring companies, etc, should be mandatory reporters of incidents where there is evidence of a crime (just as teachers etc are mandatory reporters of child abuse). Law enforcement should collect incident reports, and looks for patterns. Any evidence of new vulnerabilities being used should be immediately flagged and escalated. Owners of chunks of IP space are responsible for the security of computers in that space. NIPC will fine the IP that sourced the incident. For incidents originating overseas, NIPC will handle the liason with it's foreign equivalent.

We believe the measures outlined above would help the situation in the US -greatly. However, a considerable amount of bandwidth in connections is available between the US and foreign countries. Since the US cannot do much about the internet security situation overseas: all that bandwidth should be considered available to an enemy in a war. At the moment: there is no way to know how much bandwidth is available of this kind, or even who controls it. It is important that this problem be studied. We also believe that the US should have the ability to disconnect itself from the rest of the world in an emergency, or to disconnect itself from specific links that become problematic, This means establishing clear procedures and appropriate regulatory authority so that these links can be dropped at the order of the President in a serious emergency. It should be emphasized that this measure is likely to cause grave economic distress itself, as much international trade and operations of international companies depends on the Internet. It should not be done

lightly. **However**, it might be better than **continuing** to **suffer severe** domestic disruption.

Next, we discuss a variety of ongoing trends and policy measures that we consider dangerous in light of the **above analysis**. We **urge** caution on these trends until the situation is improved.

The Internet is not safe enough to use for critical societal applications. **No critical infrastructure** should depend on the **availability** of the Internet to continue working. This includes electricity: financial and stock trading, gas and oil, phones: rail transport: trucking: **food** distribution- military logistics and **operations**, just-in-time inventor!; **sites** for critical products, and so on. Owners of such **facilities** must **understand** the need to **delay** any plans to use the Internet to co-ordinate their **operations**. **In** general, the move to large scale e-commerce is dangerous. We realize **that** this will be an **incredibly** unpopular opinion. But as a society, we **have not** even begun to think through the **national security implications** of doing all our commerce over a network that has no **national** boundaries. After it is an accomplished fact is not the right time to be thinking about it.

In particular: routing voice calls over the Internet is not appropriate for any critical infrastructures. An **organization** that does this risks that its phone connectivity will disappear **at** the same time as its Internet connectivity. **Information** security practitioners should not depend on voice-over-IF.

Similarly, the operation of **broadcast** media such as **radio** or TV etc should not depend on **IP** connectivity to work. To the extent the Internet is used to **propagate** signals for these services, they **are** vulnerable to attack. We cannot **afford** to lose the use of these services in wartime.

7 Long Term Research Agenda

The **nation is** approximately blind and powerless against sophisticated **cyber** attack. To counter this problem, we recommend a vigorous focused research investment. Given the magnitude **of** the **threat**, we believe that we should examine Herculean efforts such as the creation of the **DEWLINE** (against the over-the-pole nuclear bomber threat) and the **Manhattan** project (against the nuclear threat) for inspiration on how 1.0 construct an appropriate program in defense of the cyberwar threat.

It must also be recognized that there are genuine research problems to be

solved, and thus solutions cannot be ordered on demand, nor can a top down program to build large systems guarantee results. We need to inspire the best minds of our generation to work on this problem, and we need them to understand it and contribute their ideas as rapidly as possible. Good minds need some freedom and autonomy to do their greatest work. Government research managers need to allow a variety of competing approaches to develop and then rapidly direct funding to those which show the most promise. It is important that the government itself recruit the smartest talent it can attract to manage research in this area.

We suggest that the following principals guide research efforts:

- Cyberwar defense research should draw from multiple disciplines. Besides the obvious relevance of computer science and network engineering, other fields are relevant at least for inspiration and metaphor, and often for practical techniques. Artificial intelligence, complexity and scaling theory, statistical physics, biology, and mathematics all have something to offer. Sociology, criminology, military history, and systems theory are extremely relevant. Analogies and techniques from conventional kinetic warfare can be very useful.
- This is an applied problem of critical national importance. It is essential that researchers gain exposure to operational information security environments. Solving abstract versions of the problem is only helpful if the abstractions capture the important features. The ivory tower must be directly wired to the network to produce useful results.
- Information Assurance is in a trade-off with other critical properties such as system functionality and performance. We need to be able to intelligently adjust this trade-off during system operation to offer up the best defense. Static systems will become ineffective.
- On the Internet, policy and technology are tightly coupled. Technologists have created systems with profound policy implications that were not thought through at all. Policymakers often fail completely to understand the technological options. Policy and technology must interact.
- It is vital that the community have a thorough understanding of the potential adversaries, their capabilities, and tactics.

- Any successful solution must be scalable 1.0 **address** the strategic **per-vasive nature** of the nation's modern critical infrastructures. We must learn how to **defend** in depth as well as in breadth.
- We must think about **attack strategy** and defensive counter-strategies as **an** evolution in time **and** project **forward several** moves ahead, as in chess playing: to find the most **effective** next move. whether that move be in system design: **operation**, or even research **itself**.

We now turn to specific research problems. We organize them according to the following decomposition.

- Seeing - **Decision-makers** need the ability to comprehend what is happening to their systems: **especially** when they are global.
- Acting- Timely, **appropriate**, and **coordinated actions** are required to mitigate threats to critical systems.
- Building - Designers need the tools to develop inherently survivable **information** systems, especially when they are large **and** complex.
- Sharing - Operators need the **ability to share information** as needed among appropriate parties without putting that information at **risk**.

7.1 Seeing

To act, you have to first be **able** to see the **adversary**. The following problems are unsolved or inadequately solved.

- Today, computer intrusion detection **systems** can detect **local** known exploits, but unreliably and **with** many false positives. They cannot be deployed on fast networks for performance reasons. More research is needed to make them work better and faster: and **to** be able to handle unknown **attacks** and variations on attacks intended to confuse them.
- In the future, we need to detect **sophisticated** novel **attacks** on a national scale. This field is in its infancy, and much more work is needed on techniques to fuse and visualize information from the local scale into a **broad** picture. We need new methods of comprehending what is happening on large networks, and in large **applications**.

- We need more **research** on **anomaly** detection. so that network **traffic** that is simply weird can be brought to human attention for further **analysis**.
- Techniques 1.0 **incorporate** real world **information** (such as news stories) into the picture would be tremendously helpful to make **sense** out of the implications of the unfolding situation.
- We need **research** in **organizational modeling** to **understand** how an **organizational mission** depends on the computing infrastructure services so the **effect** of attacks can be **assessed** with respect to the more meaningful mission function. We also need, under **this heading**, to **create** an **Indications** and Warning capability based on the **creation** of implicit **attack** models that are tracked with respect to ongoing events. We could then use these models to help **design** and drive a sophisticated sensor **grid** including a. capability to tune and task those sensors for the most relevant cyber events.
- We need research into how to **create** more accountability on the Internet. It would be **devastating** to face a. serious cyberwar attack with no **idea** who was responsible.

7.2 Acting

Today, to respond to **attack**, operators must **make** on-the-fly judgements about the best **action** with little context. They have to implement their decisions **manually** by reconfiguring each individual relevant component (like: for example, blocking specific ports on **firewalls**, or changing session **cryptographic** keys on an Secure Sockets **Layer** (SSL) connection). In the future, we must seek to **create** a. decision support, system to help quickly develop and **evaluate potential** courses of **actions**, a. **command** execution system that allows **automated orchestrated** response, and a. control subsystem that determines if the commands applied **had** the desired effect. We must create this sort of capability at both the **tactical and** strategic level. The tactical system **capability** could be based in the **application** of control theory to cyber defense. **Critical** elements could include **goal-state** specification, the creation of "linear" impulse functions, system **state** projection (requiring a **sensor** grid **within** the defended network): and some form of comparison function

between the **state projection** and the **goal state** which decides on the **appropriate impulse function**. The **strategic capability** probably ought to be based more in **command and control planning techniques using artificial intelligence technology**. Under this activity, we should hold waa-games between red (**attacker**) and blue (**defender**) forces to develop general-purpose **strategy and tactics suited to situations with particular characteristics**. The results ought to be **what** we call the **high-value cyber defense play-book**.

7.3 Building

Today, **trustworthy system design** is a **black art** that is done through **exhaustion**; one tries to counter as many **vulnerabilities** as possible until **available resources are exhausted** (similar to **bug testing**). In the future, we need to **enable** the design of systems with engineered assurance properties using tools analogous to **Computer Automated Design (CAD)** tools used by hardware engineers today. To create an effective Security Engineer's CAD **system**, we must **initiate** two **critical and deeply related** thrusts: **analysis** and design. In the **analysis** thrust, we expect, to **create** better analysis tools and techniques, including better and more effective red teams (qua metric). To create a security co-designer workbench in support of the "design" thrust: we must quickly **initiate** work on **vulnerability** modeling and counter-measure effectiveness modeling. Such models **will allow** designers to **understand** the comprehensive **set of attacks** against a **putative** system and guide them toward the countermeasures **that are most effective against** the most significant attacks.

Some aspects of the Internet infrastructure are **also** quite obviously **not** robust enough. **Key databases** such as the **DNS** and the **IP address** to contact **information** at **ARIN**, **APNIC**, etc need to be **highly** available even in the presence of large scale **attack**. Work is needed on protocols and algorithms to construct fault tolerant secure **databases which are** close to invulnerable to **denial** of service **attacks**. These need to be engineered to be practical on the Internet.

For **critical infrastructure transaction** processing to be safe on the **Internet**, it must be done **in a** distributed **fault tolerant** way that resists **DDOS**. Content distribution networks are a good **start** towards **this**, but much more is needed. Critical transaction processing sites need to be designed with large scale **cyberwar attacks** in mind; they **are** on the **front line**.

Further work is needed by **economists, organizational psychologists,** and **business professors** to understand the reasons why **software** produced by real world **organizations** is so insecure and unreliable. Policy proposals to **address** this need to be refined.

Also, a number of issues **about** how **large scale attacks** would work on the **Internet** are very poorly understood. There is **great** scope for **simulation** and analysis work to try to **understand** how **large** a **DDOS attack** could **be**, **how** worms **propagate**, and **what** the bottlenecks would be. We **have** very little understanding in detail even of the incidents **that have** already occurred. We know **what** the **tools** were **like**, but **have** very **limited** understanding of the history of the tools **propagation** and effects during the incident.

7.4 Sharing

Today, there is tremendous pressure to share **information** between inter-company systems for the sake of speed and **efficiency**. Still, **because** of a lack of trust in technology, the amount of such sharing is **limited** to well below **what** it would be **if** we could share **with** higher confidence. Today, we **have** all-or-nothing sharing. There is **no good** way to specify the domains of **sharing** and keep the **transactions** to those domains. In the future, we need to **create** tailored on-the-fly **private collaborative cyberspaces**. To do this we **must create** powerful **specification** languages for policies, a means to **negotiate** sharing **policies on-the-fly**, and a means to **verifiably** (to all connected parties) demonstrate that the constraints of all **parties** involved in the sharing are **satisfied**.

8 Conclusion

How did the United States get into **this** mess?

- We **have** built a network which has no concept **whatsoever** of **national** boundaries; **in** a war, every **Internet site** is directly on the front line.
- We have **attached** a large number of general purpose computers to that network.

- We have developed a **software industry** in which the **economic incentives reward** delivering complex feature-laden products quickly, with **inadequate attention** to **reliability** or **security**.
- We are **automating critical functions** of our economy using the resulting combined system.
- We have given very little thought to **national security** in the process.

If we do not change course soon: we will pay a very high price for our lack of foresight.

9 Acknowledgements

The authors thank the following for very helpful **discussions** during the preparation of this paper.

- **Vern Paxson** of ACIRJ for a **vigorous and helpful critique** of our early ideas. The debate **with Vern** improved the paper **considerably**.
- **Susan Levy Haskell** of the **University** of Minnesota. for a **fascinating account** of discovering and responding to the **first large scale DDOS attack**, together with several **valuable** suggestions for this work.
- **Roelof Jonkman** of the **University** of **Kansas** for a **good** deal of helpful **information** on network **infrastructure** and possible **attacks** against it, together with helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.
- **Ray Parks** of **Sandia National Labs**, for helpful suggestions and comments on this paper.
- **Maria Levy** of **Silicon Defense** for very **valuable assistance** with targeting research.
- Finally, this was a large project, **that required** extensive debate and discussion and **it** was finished on a **very** tight deadline. **That** has prevented us **from** doing a remotely **adequate** job at **acknowledging** our many intellectual debts to the colleagues who **have** influenced our thinking over the years. A number of thinkers in the intrusion detection and **infowar**

communities have had a growing sense of doom for over a decade and have said so in a variety of ways and forums. If anyone feels slighted by our lack of attribution, we apologize.

- Notwithstanding the acknowledgements above, this paper represents the views of the authors alone, which may or may not be subscribed to by acknowledgees.

10 Author Biographies

10.1 Stuart Staniford

Stuart was educated at the University of Oxford; the University of Sussex; and the University of California, at Davis. He obtained a PhD in theoretical particle physics from UC Davis in 1993, and a MS in Computer Science there in 1995. He was a computer security researcher at UC Davis until starting his own company, Silicon Defense, in 1998. Stuart is president of the company, which does research in computer security and provides outsourced computer intrusion detection monitoring for other businesses.

Stuart has done research in network intrusion detection, in detecting distributed attacks such as worms and scans, in locating attackers over the Internet, and in intrusion detection interoperability. He co-chairs the IETF's intrusion detection exchange format working group (IDWG), and is a member of several program committees and editorial boards in the areas of intrusion detection and computer vulnerabilities. He is a UK citizen.

10.2 O. Sami Saydjari

Sami has been an information assurance researcher since 1984. He has held research positions at the National Security Agency, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and is the creator and leader of the newly formed Cyber Defense Research Center at SRI.

10.3 Ken Williams

Ken received his BS from Wofford College. He attended the US Naval Postgraduate School, and obtained a PhD in theoretical quantum chemistry from

the University of Southern California in 1966. He is a retired Naval Officer who has worked for several system integration and technology firms, and currently is Chief Technology Officer of Zel Technologies, LLC. With over 35 years experience in information technology and applications, he has been a developer, architect, and integrator of military Command: Control: Communications, and Intelligence systems for kinetic warfare.

lien is Principal Investigator on a DARPA Information Assurance and Survivability project to adapt kinetic warfare Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace methods to cyberspace. He used Intelligence Preparation of the Information Battlespace techniques to assist in the target development portion of this paper.

snowflake

May 3, 2001 4:32 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Joint Bases

We have to look at joint bases, where Services share a base rather than own them completely.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
050301-26

11-L-0559/OSD/237

01may021

TO: Bill Schneider

CC: David Chu
Dov Zakheim - *usc*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

DATE: May 9, 2001

SUBJECT: **Tricare**

Thanks for your memo on Tricare. Would you please talk to Dov Zakheim and David Chu about that and see if we can get something going?

I have attached a copy of your memo to their copies of this memo to you,

Thanks.

70

DHR/azn
05090 1.03.2
Attach.

9 May 01

U09094 / 01

01 May 01

MAY-17-2001 12:31

USD(C)

11-L-0559/OSD/238

703 614 2378 P.02/04

William Schneider, Jr.

MEMORANDUM

May 9, 2001

TO: Hon. Don Rumsfeld
cc: Hon. Dov Zakheim

FROM: William Schneider, Jr.

SUBJECT: Expectations of military personnel on "Tricare for Life"
may still be unsettled.

The attached newspaper report ("Tricare for Life Details in Flux") from a local newspaper in a community (Colorado Springs) with a high density of military retirees. The article suggests that there may still be a "window of opportunity" before Tricare goes into effect on October 1st to adjust the details of the program to render its cost acceptable and predictable. To the extent administrative changes are insufficient, statutory relief could be sought through the FY 01 supplemental appropriation act, though obtaining an authorization change would require a procedural waiver.

19
0905

'Tricare For Life' Details In Flux

By John Diedrich, The Gazette

Military retirees who are expecting to qualify for the new "Tricare for Life" plan should not change any of their insurance until the new program is final, said an official with the program.

The plan, which was passed by Congress and signed by then-President Bill Clinton last year, is intended to improve health care for military retirees age 65 and older. Tricare, the military's HMO-style health plan, has not been guaranteed for retirees. Many have supplemented Medicare with private insurance.

Tricare for Life begins Oct. 1 and is expected to act as a supplement to Medicare. But Linda Hood, marketing service representative for TriWest, the regional contractor for Tricare, said details are still being worked out. She is advising retirees not to drop other insurance they may have yet.

She is one of the speakers at the second annual Veterans' Forum today at The Penrose House.

The event, which required reservations, is full.

Hood also is advising retirees to make sure they are in the Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System and are signed up for Medicare parts A and B.

Congress also passed a new pharmacy benefit for retirees that took effect April 1. It allows them to get prescription drugs at civilian pharmacies.

Before, retirees were covered only at base pharmacies, which often didn't carry medication needed by elderly people.

snowflake

May 10, 2001 7:40 AM

TO: General Jones
Admiral Clark

cc: GWS SHELTON
LARRY DIRITA
RADM QUIGLEY

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Okinawa

Attached is an article written by Jim Webb on whether we should leave Okinawa. I was interested in the last paragraph that said the U.S. has tended to leave the Japanese to deal with the issue as to why it is important for American troops to be in Okinawa and the statement that it is possible the U.S. ought to be the one explaining it. — — —

You might want to give some thought to that.

Attach.

3/11/01 *Parade* article by James Webb, "Should We Leave Okinawa?"

DHR:dh
051001-1

Japan

10 May 01

U09051 /01

AMIA CAUSION American troops **Wagonome**, a decorated Marine and ex-Navy Secretary examines whether we can afford to give up our most important military outpost in the Pacific.

Should We Leave Okinawa?

Contributing Editor James Webb was Secretary of the Navy under President Reagan. Earlier, he received the Navy Cross and the Silver Star for his service as a Marine in Vietnam. In January, Webb made his latest of many visits to Okinawa for PARADE. His mission: to explore the implications of removing U.S. forces from the island known to generations of GIs as "The Rock."

THE FIRST TIME I EVER saw Okinawa, in 1969, I arrived at Kadena Air Force Base on a military charter from California, by way of Hawaii and Wake Island. Military buses shut-

tled us past fields of sugarcane and small, windswept towns rebuilt in the quarter-century since the island had been flattened in World War II's costliest Pacific battle. Like most of the 400,000 Marines who went to Vietnam, I was "processed" at Camp Hansen. Back then, the camp was an ocean of adrenaline. Racial tensions among Americans were high. Kin, a village just outside the camp, was filled with bars and strip joints. The air was charged with the presence of violence from Marines on the way into or out of a war that would claim 100,000 casualties for their Corps.

Today, Okinawa is far more staid. Many of the 19,000 Marines stationed there—and most of the 10,000 Air Force, Navy and Army forces—are on three-year tours with their families. The raucous barracks of the past have largely been replaced by apartment towers. Much of the training takes place "off-island." Sensitivity to Okinawan civilians is extreme. (Just last month, for example, the chief of U.S. forces on the island publicly apologized for a leaked e-mail in which he called Okinawan officials "wimps.") Bars and clubs still exist, but the tone is subdued. America, once an occupier, has become a tolerated guest.



Above: Okinawa lies within striking distance of potential crises throughout East Asia. Left: A helicopter unit, part of the 19,000-strong Marine force on Okinawa, arrives at Futenma Marine Corps Air Station. Right: An Okinawan protests against U.S. bases during an economic summit last year.



If war were to break out anywhere in East Asia, U.S. troops on Okinawa would be among the first to fight.

Still, tensions between Okinawans and Americans can erupt. When a Japanese court found that three GIs were involved in the rape of an Okinawan girl in 1995, the island's then-governor, Masahide Ota, led protests demanding an American withdrawal. (Cooler heads prevailed, and

Ota, who ran on this issue in 1998, was not reelected.) But even without such tensions, there have been serious calls in both America and Japan in recent years for the bases to be removed. Some claim U.S. forces there have outlived their strategic relevance. Others say that the island,

whose population has tripled to 1.1 million since World War II, has outgrown the bases and needs to modernize its economy and reclaim its heritage.

I have been to Okinawa many times since my first stop there on the way to war. On my most recent visit, in January,

B Y J A M E S W E B B

And
If Chilean
sea bass is
on the skin
For the 64
4 large oil
thinly of
1/4 cup of
1/2 teaspoon
Salt and
pepper
3 tablespoons
6 tablespoons
1/2 teaspoon
2 fillets of
(about 1
4 tablespoons
5 tablespoons
Salt and 1/2
pepper
2 large chick
pressed
1 ripe avocado
3/4 cup of
cilantro

1. Prepare garlic and the cumin. In a small, heat. Add 1/2 cup of oil, stirring, for 1/2 cent. Add then simmer for 5 minutes.
2. Halve (into 8 pieces) the avocado. In a small, heat. Add 1/2 cup of oil, stirring, for 1/2 cent.

The Pacific's Deadliest Battle

Okinawa is forever burned into American memory as the site of the bloodiest Pacific battle of World War II. Viewed by U.S. planners as an ideal location for staging an invasion of Japan, the island was assaulted by 180,000 American troops on April 1, 1945. At first, they met little resistance, because the Japanese defenders had pulled back to the heavily fortified southern tip of the island—taking most of Okinawa's 450,000 civilians with them.

It took U.S. forces less than three weeks to capture northern Okinawa. Violent fighting for the south, however, continued until June 21. Altogether, about 12,500 Americans were killed and 36,000 wounded



The Japanese death toll was staggering: about 93,000 troops and about 94,000 civilians—many of whom killed themselves. The Japanese suicide pilots known as kamikazes sank 30 U.S. vessels.

A GI guards a beachhead on Okinawa during fighting in 1945.

Twenty with one important question: What are the true implications of a U.S. pullout, not only for American interests in East Asia but also for the Okinawans themselves?

nawa to train in other countries and re-locating them permanently. The volatile Pacific of today demands that U.S. forces be consolidated. Yet most diversification scenarios would put more of our forces at risk by scattering them among countries where the governments are not as stable. "The only locations without such political risks are Australia and Hawaii," notes Dr. Mackubin T. Owens, a professor of strategy at the Naval War College.

And there is another consideration: It is far from clear that the Okinawans really want us to leave.

Perhaps the greatest change of the past 55 years has been the subtle merging of two cultures. Despite periodic friction, "Okinawans have come to understand the Americans and the presence of the bases," says the noted Okinawan historian Kurayoshi Takara.

Yasumitsu Tsuha, a community leader and participant in negotiations to relocate an air facility near his town of Ginowan, affirms Takara's observation: "The period before reversion to Japan allowed us to reconsider our own historical uniqueness as Okinawans. At the same time, we came to know the Americans and to admire their culture. Many Okinawans term their willingness to adapt to outside influences as *champurabunko*—"stir-fried culture."

continues

returned with one important question: What are the true implications of a U.S. pullout, not only for American interests in East Asia but also for Okinawa?

Unlike the rest of Japan, Okinawa has mingled with foreigners for centuries. Okinawans are not considered "ethnic" Japanese, either in Japan or among themselves. The Ryukyu Islands, to which Okinawa belongs, were annexed by Japan in 1879; before then, Okinawans paid tribute to both Chinese and Japanese warlords. From 1945 until 1972, the island was a U.S. protectorate, and even today it hosts the majority of all GIs in Japan.

Among those who believe the U.S. should remain strong in the Pacific, there is little argument that Okinawa—350 miles from Taipei, 700 from Seoul, 800 from Manila and about 1500 from Singapore—is ideally situated not only for the defense of Japan but also for rapid deployment to a wide array of potential crises. Annually, Marines from Okinawa participate in about 70 training exercises throughout the Pacific Rim, plus humanitarian missions to locations such as Bangladesh and East Timor. If war were to break out anywhere in that vast region, they would be among the first to go.

Ironically, some U.S. defense planners believe that the limits American forces have placed on themselves in order to satisfy the Okinawan people are too restrictive, leading them to recommend a substantial withdrawal from the island.

Last October, a much-publicized study sponsored by the National Defense University recommended a "diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region" of U.S. forces on Okinawa. And former Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, now minister for Okinawan affairs, speaks often of "the suffering of the Okinawan people" as a result of the American bases, implicitly supporting their removal.

Supporters of withdrawal are vague about where these "diversified" forces would be based. Some invoke the politically volatile Philippines, where U.S. bases existed until 1992. Others hint at already crowded Guam or the sparsely populated Northern Marianas. Some say Singapore or even Vietnam. But, in my view, it's important to make a distinction between sending units based on Okinawa

There is little argument that Okinawa is ideally situated not only for the defense of Japan but also for rapid deployment to a wide array of potential crises.

East Meets West: A Tale of Two Cultures

Masako Adaniya's family disowned her when she married Marine Maj. Harold Cottrell on Okinawa in 1970. When her son, Shogo, was born a year later, Masako's mother refused to visit, even though she worked in the U.S. Army hospital where her grandson was born. "I did not exist to her," recalls Masako, who later moved to the U.S.

Fortunately, relations eventually warmed. Shogo, now 29, and his sister Mini, 28, both U.S. Naval Academy graduates, visited estranged relatives while serving on Okinawa as Marines. Their sister, Erika, 24, visited while a cadet at the Air Force Academy. "I'm proud of both the American and Okinawan cultures," says Shogo, a Marine captain.

The Cottrell family's impressive journey within just one generation has been repeated by thousands of Americans of Okinawan ancestry: During the 1990s alone, more than 2000 Okinawan women were married to American servicemen.



Left: The late Maj. Harold Cottrell and wife, Masako, at their marriage in 1970. Below: Masako in 1998 with her children—Mini, Erika and Shogo (l-r)—in uniform.



Okinawans who oppose U.S. bases do so for varying reasons. Some are concerned about militarism. Others know controversy tends to increase the generous payments made to those who lease the land on which the bases are set. Finally, there's an activist coalition of Japanese trade unionists, Communists and Social Democrats dedicated to removing both the bases and American influence from Okinawa. This faction backed former governor Ota, whose often-expressed goal was "a peaceful, military-free Okinawa."

Retired Marine Col. Gary Anderson spent seven years on Okinawa and commanded Camp Hansen for two. Recalling the 1995 rape, he told me: "Ota is deft at manipulating public opinion, and he cynically turned the incident into a national crisis." Condemning the incidents, Anderson nonetheless argues for a sense of proportion: "Virtually every community in the U.S. would welcome a crime rate as low as that for our servicemen on Okinawa."



If bases were removed, China would attempt to extend its influence over Okinawa.

Former Governor Masahide Ota (l) and Japanese minister for Okinawan affairs Ryutaro Hashimoto: Both want Americans to leave the island.

Indeed, serious crime by Americans has dropped 78% in the last 10 years, and a recent poll indicated that 74% of Okinawans have a favorable opinion of the U.S. While most would prefer reductions in the bases, only 16% believe all Americans should leave. Okinawans also understand the economic benefit Americans bring to their island, poorest of Japan's 47 prefectures: about \$1.2 billion a year, or roughly \$1000 for every Okinawan. "Because of the [Second World] War, Okinawans are extremely uncomfortable with militarism," says the historian Takara. "But this is not necessarily directed at America itself."

The removal of U.S. bases also would have implications for a resurgent China. Okinawa's relations with that country go back more than 500 years, and many Okinawans are proud of such ties. In recent decades, the Chinese have played upon Okinawan goodwill, and there is little doubt that if U.S. bases were removed, China would attempt to extend its influence over Okinawa, which is nearer to Taipei than Tokyo. Lately, China has shown an insistent tendency to confront Japan. Chinese military vessels made at least 17 incursions into Japanese waters last year. In addition, China still claims Japan's Senkaku Islands, lying between Taiwan and Okinawa. And China has never accepted Okinawa's 1972 reversion to Japan.

Military bases bring liabilities as well as benefits—whether in Hawaii, home to more than 41,000 troops, or on Okinawa. But few can dispute the important contribution made to regional stability by cooperation between the U.S. military and the Okinawan people. Now is not the time to trade the known—Okinawa—for new difficulties in other countries, or for the U.S. to reduce its presence in Asia in the face of an invigorated Chinese military. A wiser course, I believe, would be to continue recent efforts to restructure the bases on Okinawa in a way that is compatible with the island's future. Fundamental to that is a better articulation of our reasons for staying on.

"Okinawans accept the bases," notes Kuryoshi Takara, "but it is still hard for many to understand their importance. The U.S. always allowed the Japanese to explain the importance of American troops, but the Japanese usually deal with the issue through avoidance. The U.S. needs to explain."

Indeed it does—both in Japan and here at home. ■

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
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May 10, 2001 2:25 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Promotions

I am told it takes months for commanders, captains, rear admirals, and admirals to get through the confirmation process. The Services spend a long time going through it, checking everything, then it comes up to OSD and it goes through a process, then it goes to the White House and it goes through a process, then it goes to the Hill and goes through a process.

What do you think about having a reform where the Service is the checker, and we approve it swiftly and by exception the White House does the same thing and the real responsibility is left with the Senate. If they want to hire a lot of people and do all that, why not let them?

DHR:dh
051001-19

210

10 May 01

U12604 /02

snowflake

TO:

MAY 12 2001

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 12, 2001

SUBJECT: **Laser Surgery**

Why don't you folks think about whether or not we ought to have a common policy for pilots with respect to laser surgery for their eyes.

I don't know a lot about it, but my understanding is that people all over the world are doing it these-days, and that it is just terrific. Vision is dramatically improved.

Since we are having trouble keeping our pilots, why would we want to have an antiquated rule that was established before laser surgery contribute to our getting rid of pilots who could fly perfectly well? Also, why should the services have different rules?

Any thoughts?

Thank you.

DHR/azn
051201.02

cc: David Chu
Paul Wolfowitz

U09274 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/246

701

B2 May 01

TO: David Chu
cc: Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: May 14, 2001
SUBJECT: **Costs**

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2001 MAY 15 PM 5: 21

Why don't we get a way to calculate fully burdened costs for all people that we detail out that goes up to and includes lifetime health care.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
051401.07

70

14 May 01

U09273 /01

snowflake

May 19, 2001 11:15 AM

TO: ~~ExecSec~~ *MIC 2/1/01*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: *Fortune* Article

000.1

Please send Condi Rice a copy of that *Fortune* magazine article from 25 years ago.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051901-12

To: CTD / CABLES

SEND DIRECTLY TO DR RICE'S OFFICE WITH A NOTE THAT SECRETARY RUMSFELD WANTS HER TO HAVE THIS ARTICLE.

*THANKS
MIC*

*2/1/01
1/00*


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U09564 /01

FORTUNE

September 10, 1979



A POLITICIAN IN THE CORPORATE WORLD

by Donald Rumsfeld

**The Telephone Companies'
California Nightmare**

**Du Pont and Dow: Rival
Strategies for the 1980's**

**A North American
Common Market?**

11 S EDWARD ST
MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN 53233
RESPECT IL 60056



A Politician-Turned-Executive

The culture shock of a businessman attempting to apply his executive skills to the high echelons of government was described in detail by W. Michael Blumenthal in the January 29, 1979, issue of FORTUNE. The former Bendix chairman, who was then Secretary of the Treasury, provided candid insight into the difficulties of adjusting to the federal bureaucracy, and specifically to the Carter style of government difficulties that hastened his departure from the Cabinet two months ago.

Donald Rumsfeld for the past two years president and chief executive of G.D. Searle & Co., also qualifies as being in a rare position to compare the widely different worlds of business and government, but from the opposite vantage point. The first phase of his political career spanned four years in Congress representing the Republican Thirteenth District of Illinois. He resigned his seat in 1969 to take on a succession of powerful posts in the Nixon and Ford Administrations: director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, director of the Cost of Living Council (wage-price controls), ambassador to NATO, White House chief of staff, and Secretary of Defense.

Even if President Ford had not been defeated in 1976, it was Rumsfeld's intention to leave government at an early time and seek a new career in the private sector. "I felt it would create an imbalance, if I spent my entire career in government," he now says, although he also makes it clear that at forty-seven his political yearnings are far from fulfilled.

Rumsfeld freely admits his lack of previous business experience. Nevertheless, he believes that the critical tasks he performed in the executive branch of the government trained him in the art of crisis management. Precisely these double-shooting skills were required at Searle—a faltering, family-run pharmaceutical firm, which was being dragged down by unprofitable acquisitions, inadequate research, and run-ins with the Food and Drug Administration. In recent, extended conversations with Roy Rowan, a member of FORTUNE'S board of editors, Rumsfeld explains why he took the job at Searle, and compares his new business surroundings with the world of government, where he spent fifteen years.

After the 1976 election, having been in government for many years, I didn't want to make a decision right away. While sorting out what I would do next, I lectured at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and Northwestern's Graduate School of Management. It wasn't too long before I pretty well figured out that I wanted to be in business. I've never had an opportunity to develop any great appetite for having money. I finished government with very modest savings, but I was happy. AU of the business opportunities presented to me were so much better paid than I was accustomed to in government that salary certainly wasn't the deciding factor. My desire was to be fully engaged, not just peripherally involved. I didn't want to be associated with a company in a non-central position.

In any event, the Searle family, having decided to bring in outside management, offered me this job. In April, 1977, I decided to do it, starting in June. I spent the intervening period talking to people, accumulating different perspectives on what was working well and what might need attention. I established task forces with a mix of directors, employees, and outsiders on each, concentrating on five areas: financing, government compliance, scientific research, corporate costs, and an examination of Searle's various businesses throughout the world.

We weren't trying to reinvent the wheel. Searle was and is a good company, but it was a small pharmaceutical house which had grown into one that diversified and expanded throughout the world. With the help of the task forces, we came to some conclusions about what needed to be done. We decided to divest twenty of our marginal businesses. We also agreed that it would be helpful to have an outside board of directors. We reviewed our Puerto Rican portfolio and repatriated a considerable sum of money. We decided to move to a less centralized organization and reduced the corporate headquarters staff from 850 to under 350.

It also became clear that Searle's research had been fairly dry for a number of years. The product line was aging. So we decided to bring in a new senior vice president for research and development: Dr. Daniel Azamoff, a highly respected medical doctor and scientist. At the same time, we began to develop a licensing and acquisition activity focused on supplementing our remaining businesses.


What we did, essentially, was to tidy up some of the pieces that didn't seem to be suitable platforms for growth. I enjoy working with talented people, learning from them, and

urveys Both Worlds

by DONALD RUMSFELD



Donald Rumsfeld took over as c.e.o. of G.D. Searle & Co. in June, 1977; he was photographed (at left) in one of the Searle laboratories. In Washington a year earlier (above), he served as Secretary of Defense, after having been head of President Gerald Ford's White House staff.



In a festive mood in 1969, while President Nixon held up their son, Donald Rumsfeld and his wife celebrated (right) his swearing in as head of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Below, he was serving as an Illinois Congressman during the Johnson presidency.



by results. I don't think the American people judge government officials this way. However, they do expect their President to plant some standards out there and to at least get started in the right direction- In business, you don't get a lot of points for just starting in the right direction.

One of the most incisive observations I think Mr. Blumenthal made in his interview with **FORTUNE** was the difference between appearance and reality. He felt that in government appearance was everything, whereas in business, reality was everything. One of the tasks of a manager in either arena, it seems to me, is to try to see that the **perception** is as close to the reality as possible. But this is much more difficult in government.

There, the managers may not know what the **right course** is, even after many years. So they tend to look only to effort. In government, too often you're **measured** by how much you seem to care, how hard you seem to try-things that do not necessarily improve the human condition. But if you begin with the assumption that the **government** is there to serve the American people in specific ways, then the measurement realistically should be: How does all this affect the people for good or ill?

Look at the problem President Carter is facing right now -the disbelief, the cynicism about government, the feeling that promises have not been kept, that many high hopes have not been fulfilled. This isn't just a problem of Mr. Carter's. It seems to me that it's a problem of government. The fact is, it's a lot easier for a President to get into something and end up with a few days of good public reaction than it is to follow through, to pursue policies to a point where they have a beneficial effect on human lives,

Business is also more forgiving of mistakes. In **government**, you are operating in a goldfish bowl. You change your mind or **make** a blunder, as human beings do, and it's on the front page of every newspaper. It seems to make **people** in government **less** willing to correct their mistakes. This is in contrast to the way things happen in a boardroom. There it is expected that one will alter direction as new **information** becomes available.

Handwritten note: more effective

...ing them in a way that they can be more productive... wasn't a pat situation that one could just preside over... was a company that was going down for eight quarters... a row. We now have five consecutive quarters going up, and there is no doubt that things are improving.

There are always risks, but I am used to risks. **I ran for Congress** right here in the Thirteenth District of Illinois when I was twenty-nine years old and **there weren't many people** around who thought I had much of a chance to win. It seems like an incredible decision now. But it proved right,

Rumsfeld regards his government experience as useful training for his present C.E.O.'s job, but he cites many differences in the way politicians and business executives function.

My observation has been that many public officials are constantly trying to create the impression that they are omniscient and omnipresent-they know everything and do everything. In business, it's clearly possible to say: "I delegate" -and then not even try to answer every letter yourself or **meet** with every person. In business, you get a chance to think **more**, to read more, to be more reflective, to plan more. My whole being says there's an awful lot I don't know, and therefore I rely on the knowledge and experience of **others**. **This has** been true in each post I've held. But **politicians** do not tend to get up in the morning and announce to the world that there's an awful lot they don't know. Therefore, the **time** demands on a government leader are usually much greater than on a business leader. It's part of the charade of **pretending** to be doing everything yourself.

In business, on the other hand, you're pretty much judged



As White House chief of staff, Rumsfeld worked closely with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. As Secretary of Defense, he was photographed (below) at a 1976 meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in conversation with the Staff chairman, General George Brown.



Another big difference: the **star** quality that gives to many politicians a mystique. **YOU** tend to **have—or seek** this mystique in government. But my impression is that in **business** you don't need to wear a grenade on your belt, or a black patch over one **eye**, so much as you need to be right and achieve results.

There's another important **distinction**. The goal in **government** is generally accepted as a worthy one—a **legitimate** human endeavor. That's not to say all **people engaged** in government are viewed as legitimate. But the purpose of government is. On the other hand, there are many **people** in the world who simply don't consider business a **worthy** activity. They characterize profits as evil and business as an essentially selfish activity. They don't appreciate that society is damaged when enterprise is stifled.

Rumsfeld also sees many similarities between the requirements of a good executive in government and business.

Many of the similarities stem from size, and there are **certain** things unique to big organizations. They require a variety of competencies, along with intricate planning and budgeting. However, planning in business is more analytical and thoughtful than in government. You are in a less reactive mode. For example, if it evolves in the Pentagon that a weapons system doesn't work, it may have international implications, it becomes a congressional problem, an **OMB** problem, as well as one having national-security implications. Suddenly, **you have** a multiplicity of public pressures that wouldn't **show** up in a boardroom. In business the **first** task would be to work out the problem. In government, a great deal of time is taken up dealing with these pressures.

When I came to **Searle**, the company was suffering from the digestive problems of a small company that had rapidly become a large multinational corporation operating in a **difficult** competitive and regulatory environment. The organization's skills, systems, and procedures had not evolved at the same pace at which its business had grown. There also were difficulties with the Food and Drug Administration, particularly about two of our prescription drugs: Aldactone

and Aldactazide, which are used to treat hypertension I was told that Searle wanted a president who had experience with large complex international organizations and was accustomed to operating under difficult conditions.

In any large organization, there is always the need to reach down and **know** how things are really functioning. You need to **know** you're getting the truth, hearing the bad news as well as the good. In government there is such intense press coverage that things tend to get aired **more extensively** and earlier. As a matter of fact, in the kind of government positions I was in at the White House and Defense Department there was such a flood of information it was like drinking out of a fire hose. That is not true in business. Even so, it's possible to get the **necessary** information in a business setting. I make it a point periodically to have lunch with salesmen, lab technicians, and others on the **lower** levels at Searle.

Another similarity between government and business is the need to establish priorities—to **make** sure you're spending your time on what's important. It is useful to ask whether you are working off your "in" basket or **whether** the organization is working off your "out" basket. If it's the former, you may be reacting rather than leading the organization toward agreed-upon priorities. I've always been an avid memo writer. At NATO they called them "yellow **perils**" (written on yellow paper), in the Pentagon, "**Rumsfeld's snowflakes**" (white paper).

We know that in government even a President can't will something to happen. He governs by consent. In business, although it is more responsive than government, things

The veteran of government finds in the private sector that he misses the press as a major means of communication

don't just happen by command, either. It is helpful if employees understand what the direction is and why. To great extent success will depend on their execution.

In business, however, there's a communication tool that's missing—the press. Take, the Pentagon: roughly two million men and women in uniform, at least another million each in civilian employment, the Reserves, and contract work. You can communicate with five million people a lot easier through the media than you can through an internal information system. Call a press conference and you can reach most everybody instantaneously. That tool is not available in business.

Rumsfeld believes that it was a much more difficult transition going from Congress to the executive branch than it was going from the Pentagon to Searle.

As a Congressman, your power is very limited, in the sense that you're one of 435—although certainly some are more influential than others in achieving legislative goals. In the legislative branch it is frequently possible to inhibit delay, or stop something from happening. But a legislator has very little ability to make something happen. Unlike the way it was in the days of Sam Rayburn, the House of Representatives has a horizontal leadership structure. Business organizations are built like a pyramid.

In the case of the executive branch, there is a tendency to attribute great power to the White House staff, I think that's somewhat of a myth; The truth of the matter is, it's the President's power and policies that are being implemented, for good or ill. If it's the President's desire to be isolated, he will be. No one in the executive branch wants to crack the President.

When President Carter came to the White House, he established an organization that seemed to be a reaction to the Nixon Administration rather than establishing a structure that would work. In effect, he said he wanted strong Cabinet government. He did not want a White House chief of staff, he wanted openness, he wanted people to say what they thought. NOW he has a record that is not meeting with very much approval. Apparently he has now concluded that his management approach was wrong. However, instead of simply changing his approach, he has seemed to be punishing the people who had followed his instructions. Well, if it doesn't work out, don't blame Hamilton Jordan. Blame the President. If it does work out, don't credit Hamilton Jordan. Credit the President.

There's no way the President can micro-manage the federal government. Walking away, that's the key job in busi-

ness, too. In a diversified, worldwide corporation, which has a multiplicity of interactions with customers, competitors, and governments, the single most important task of the chief executive is to select the right people. I've seen terrible organization charts in both government and business that were made to work well by good people. I've seen beautifully charted organizations that didn't work very well because they had the wrong people.

The decision-making process in government has long been reputed to be far more cumbersome than in business. Rumsfeld defines some of the problem-solving differences.

It has become almost a cliché for people to say: "Oh, government, it's so frustrating." There's no question that the President has the power. The Cabinet officer doesn't. The White House staff doesn't. If someone finds that frustrating, then he shouldn't do it.

Presidents themselves are often frustrated. A President gets into the Oval Office and starts reaching around for the levers of economic power, and he finds he doesn't have them all. Congress has some. So has the Federal Reserve Board. So have business, labor, consumers. There's no one lever with which he can make the economy zig or zag at his whim.

Did I find it frustrating as the White House chief of staff? The roughest job I ever had, but . . . If you find it unpleasant to cope with a complex problem that is simultaneously the business of four or five Cabinet departments, several public-interest groups, and the Congress, and one that the President will finally decide, then it's frustrating. On the other hand, if you find that kind of situation a challenge, then it's stimulating, particularly when you see progress made, I found it tough, challenging, exhausting, but not frustrating.

In the decision-making process for G.D. Searle, my natural instinct is to consult the key managers and others whose advice is needed and who will help execute the decisions. As a Cabinet officer, naturally, you have many consulting layers. You learn to think what's best from the President's standpoint, taking into account not only your own department, but three or four other departments, the public, and Congress. You learn to think three-dimensionally. When you finally put to the President a set of options, you try to show how your recommendation fits or fails to fit with the other perspectives, how it impinges on other decisions, and then you argue your case. Now, I don't find that unduly burdensome or frustrating. It's just more complex and much more time consuming.

You might ask, do you get so bureaucratized that you forget how to operate any other way? No. It's a lot easier to de-

continued

This chief executive worries less about all business competition than about the burden of government intrusion.

compress and not have to deal with a layer or two than it is to add one or two. But it's not clear to me that skills are readily transferrable between business and government. I've heard executives who have been successful in the private sector say: "I want to get into government." But there's no particular reason why a successful businessman should be successful in government-or the reverse,

In private industry, Rumsfeld sees firsthand the pervasive nature of government involvement in business,

When I get up in the morning as a businessman, I think a lot more about government than I do about our competition, because government is that much involved—whether it's HEW, IRS, SEC, FTC, FDA. I always understood the problem intellectually, but the specific inefficiencies that result from the government injecting itself into practically every aspect of our business—this is something one can feel only by being here.

Some years back, the thought was that government act like an umpire, calling the balls and strikes. Today, it's a participant in practically everything we do—and at a cost far greater than the benefit. It's no accident that U.S. productivity growth ranks SO low, that our balance of trade is suffering, that the number of patents issued to Americans is decreasing. It's because of the weight of government—the layering upon layering of regulation and intervention. There has to be a reversal of this. If I were back in government I would pursue deregulation much more persuasively now than I've been the head of a large corporation.

Businessmen are -often credited with being much more innovative and freewheeling than government officials. Rumsfeld describes the dangers he sees in being either excessively innovative or excessively zealous in maintaining the status quo and strict management control-

When I took over at Searle, I was asked to be chief executive officer and to run the company in a manner that would be profitable, professional, and consistent with the long-term interests of the shareholders, employees, customers, and the society in which we function, I was not asked to be either innovative or not innovative. I was asked to get results.

In Washington I saw people come tripping over their shoelaces into the President's office and say: "Look here, I have a brand-new idea—it is bold, new, and innovative," though that was automatically good. An idea that is bold, new, and innovative can also be wasteful, harmful, and unwise. Innovation became a way of life in the Sixties during

the Great Society. If someone came up with an idea that had never been tried before, it was—by definition—good. If it was also big and expensive, it was, by definition, ever better. Utter nonsense. Things can be small and good. Things can be tried and tested and at the same time be constructive, powerful, effective, and helpful to society.

Of course, a stream of competitive ideas and views keep converging on a manager, whether he's in government or business. As a result, a manager can get too fully engaged. It's important for him to stay loose enough, separated enough from the flow of details, so he can see trends and modify and improve the situation. That's terribly important.

I was a flight instructor in the Navy. The first thing a fledgling pilot usually does, when he climbs into a plane, is to grab hold of the stick and squeeze it so hard that he gets a sore arm. With a grip that tight, every movement is jerky. When government officials get into a tight situation, they have a tendency to do the same thing. They get jerky, over-control, micro-manage. A White House chief of staff who tells a Cabinet officer which secretary to hire is over-controlling.

There has been speculation that Rumsfeld will soon re-immers himself in politics, perhaps running in 1980 for the Illinois Senate seat to be vacated by Adlai Stevenson. While he dismisses this possibility, he is open-minded about the possibility of his eventual return to government.

The quick answer to that question is yes. I expect that at some point the odds favor my being involved in government again. One, I enjoyed it. Two, I think I did a good job. Three, I'm interested in our country and the world. Now does that mean I'm thinking about it? No. Does that mean I have an idea of how it might occur? No, not any. Does that mean I have the remotest idea when? No, I don't.

It is inevitable that the press continue to speculate about my running for some public office. That's one of the reasons why I signed a five-year contract with Searle in 1977. I didn't feel that I needed a contract. I wanted the contract to signify the degree of commitment on my part.

You know, it took my wife and me five years to pay off the money I borrowed to run for Congress in 1962. Living on a government salary was a strain. But the fact that I was making a fraction of what I could have been making in the private sector has never burdened our family. Finding out that life isn't easy is not a bad thing for children growing up. But at forty-seven, as I am now, I would rather have movers move me than do the U-Haul. bit. I did the U-Haul bit every time before I came to Searle.

E I

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(17 MAY 0)

snowflake

TO: Steve **Cambone**
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Mark Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 21, 2001
SUBJECT: **Deterrence**

We ought to think about including these kinds of thoughts in my remarks and in our planning.

DHR/azn
052101.15
Attach.

381

2
May 01

U09918 /01

MEMORANDUM

Deterrence

5/21/01

We don't need a deterrence strategy.

Rather, we need three.

Russia we know how to deter.

China; that's more **difficult** and it is evolving and we have thought less about it.

Other nations. A single strategy won't work. They are all different.

o Non-state entities; still more difficult issues.

DHR/azn
052101.14

snowflake

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 22, 2001

SUBJECT:

Here's an old letter to me from Sandy McDonnell talking about the problem of auditors on their premises. It is kind of interesting. I wonder if that type of information would be useful in helping us achieve a reform..

You might want to think about getting something like that updated. I wouldn't want to use his letter, however, since it is out of date and personal.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052101.75
Attach

130

U09816 /01

02/11/01

SANFORD N. McDONNELL
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS



27 May 1986

File 5/86

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
135 South La Salle Street
Suite 3910
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Dear Don:

With respect to your 14 May letter, I am pleased to pass on the following information to you.

- 1) In 1985 McDonnell Douglas had 832 full-time government employees living on our premises. On the average, we had 200 U. S. Government visitors every day -- 5 days a week, 50 weeks out of the year.
- 2) We had almost 6000 audits/reviews started during 1985, which means that on the average a new audit/review was started every 20 minutes of every hour -- 8 hours a day, 5 days a week, 50 weeks out-of the year. In many cases 2, 3 or 4 different parts of the Government were auditing us on the same subject and refused to take each other's audit.
- 3) The so-called \$435 hammer really cost the Government only \$22; but the other \$413, which was for engineering services, was on the same invoice. The Congressman who put out that information did not see fit to pass on that detail. The alleged \$7000 "coffeepot" wasn't a coffeepot at all. It was a coffee maker, a very sophisticated piece of equipment which Lockheed charged the U. S. Air Force \$100 per unit less than it charged its commercial airliner customers who used it on their L-lolls. Most of the so-called horror cases of spares were not horror cases at all when a person took time to dig into the details; and even if they were all horror cases, they were a very small percentage of the total cost of defense.
- 4) The defense contractors on the whole have done an incredible job of performing on cost, on schedule and on performance within the system. But the system is flawed -- it is grossly overmanaged. Congress overmanages DoD, and DoD overmanages the contractors. A tremendous savings can be realized by changing and streamlining the defense acquisition system.

On another subject, I had a very fine telephone conversation with Joyce the other day concerning her work on character education in the Chicago public

snowflake

May 21, 2001 7:45 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meetings

We ought to have a meeting with you and Ed and me to discuss the meetings we need to hold on a regular daily and weekly basis to track all of the major big things we are going to have to get working on, like legislative, military and press.

There probably ought to be a meeting with the Service Secretaries a number of times a week.

We ought to figure out how we keep track of what we are doing with Andy Card, Condi, Karl Rove, Mitch Daniels and that group, and then a separate category would be for the President and the Vice President. We ought to have a file for each, track what we are doing, then keep tracking out ahead and end up with a list of assignments for each.

I like Newt's idea of always giving people an assignment.

DHR:dh
052101-1

337

21 May 01

U12612 /02

CTR

To
Doug FEITH

K
Pass to SGT.

May 21, 2001 2:51 PM

TO:
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Nunn-Lugar . . .

T *6/11/5*

I think we ought to get somebody to get me a piece of paper that explains what we think about Nunn-Lugar.

Is it really working today? Has it worked in the past? Is it worth the money? Should it receive more money? Should it receive less money?

I get asked the question, and I am not current enough.

Why

DHR:dh
052101-45

*Susan
FEITH
George has for action
✓/r
Pete*

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: May 22, 2001

SUBJECT:

Here is a note on the Controller and CIO job. Is there someone proposing that we move them together? My instinct would be to keep them apart.

Thanks.

DHR/azn

052101.71

Attach. (Article - *Federal Computer Week* S/14/01)

02
COM

U09702 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/263

fers the latest in a growing dow of opportunity" for a mis- lowest possible cost and lowest same mistake with Kim. Dae- body of evidence to suggest sile deal and that President risk. This has so far succeeded jung that he made with Mr. that Mr. Kim is at once a tacti- Bush must immediately start in "muddling through," for his Clinton. His mistake with the cal genius and a strategic fool, where President Clinton left regime, but the price has been United States has meant Py- qualities that may be a major off. Not true. Pyongyang has at great cost hundreds of thou- ongyang now has to deal with obstacle to progress in both nowhere else to go. sands starving to a much tougher administration

South Korean and U.S. rela- In fact, the "time out" for death, widespread deprivation, in Washington. tions with North Korea. In an North Korea called by the and 22 million Koreans with Kim Dae-jung has pro- effort aimed at regaining the Bush administration has al- little hope for a decent life. vided Pyongyang every rea- spotlight, putting pressure on ready yielded some important. What is Kim Jong-il's sonable opportunity to move the Bush administration, and benefits. Instead of the U.S. strategy beyond immediate forward on genuine North-

reassuring Kim Dae-jung on and South Korean constantly survival by living off of global South reconciliation. But North-South, Mr. Kim met begging Pyongyang to come to handouts? His choices range unless there is rapid progress with a senior EU delegation. the table, it is Kim Jong-il who from bad to worse. The North during the remainder of this

All three elements of Mr. is now the one eager to resume Korean economic system has year, Kim Dae-jung will be- Kim's tactics were revealed in talks. This reverses the un- failed and tinkering with it of- come a lame duck as the South the EU discussions as was Mr. healthy diplomatic patterns fers little respite from falling Korean presidential election Kim's pleasure is placing him- created by the Clinton admini- further behind the rest of the campaign begins early next self on the world stage. Mr. stration, always begging and world. Opening up to foreign year. It is unlikely that Kim Kim pledged to continue his bribing Pyongyang just to at- investment and fo orming what Jong-il find a more patient, moratorium on missile testing tend meetings. Now Mr. Bush has been described as the generous and magnanimous until 2003 (not coincidentally, is setting the terms of diplo- world's most distorted econ- partner to deal with in Seoul the year when the two LWRs macy rather than reacting, to omy risks losing political con- than Kim Dae-Jung in the fore- under the Agreed Framework Pyongyang's games. This is an are supposed to be completed). important prerequisite for a China and Vietnam suggest re- other opportunity may be Yet at the same time, he told new policy. form can be managed to bring missed.

the EU envoys that Pyongyang Indeed, Kim Jong-il's be- economic vitality and retain would continue exporting mis- havior suggests that Mr. political control. siles and missile technology, Bush's assessment of the situa- tion and of U.S.-South Korean- Japanese leverage is correct. Kim Jong-il and some of his technocratic elite are aware of this, but still fear it would destabilize the regime. The result has been a strategy of trying to manipulate outside ac- tors to provide resources while Mr. Kim experiments at the margins with opening and re- form. But without making a fundamental choice and using his totalitarian control to redi- rect his ruling Worker's Party, the bureaucracy and its citizens to embark on a new course, it is a case of too little, too late.

Kim Jong-il's use of the EU visit as (to use a billiard term) a political "bank shot" to the U.S. was particularly im- pressive. By reinforcing the North Korean missile test moratorium while at the same time emphasizing North Korea would continue its destabilizing missile exports Mr. Kim was sending a clear "carrot and stick" message to Washington as it nears the final stages of its Korea policy review. Kim Jong-il's commitment to the missile moratorium was a sig- nal that Pyongyang remains eager to pursue missile talks with the U.S.; Mr. Kim's pro- clamations that North Korea given Mr. Kim Jong-il some- thing to lose. This suggests waiting more than 13 months to respond to the Perry visit, Pyongyang did not give Mr. Clinton enough time to negoti- ate a deal. Similarly, after the surprise agreement to hold a North-South Summit nearly one year ago, very little actual North-South progress has oc- curred, and now the entire process has been frozen. Mr. Kim appears to be making the

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Mr. Kim's performance is fascinating, and interestingly suggests that many critics of the Bush "go slow" approach to North Korea were dead as his tactics are clever. His wrong. Recall, it was argued that there was a narrow "win-

Unfortunately for the fu- ture of Korea, Kim Jong-il's sense of strategy is as flawed as his tactics are clever. His tactics, of course, are designed to ensure regime survival at the

There was a classic epi- sode in the old comic strip "Pogo," where Pogo says sagely, "We have met the en- emy and he is us." In the end, for all his tactical genius, Kim Jong-il will remain a strategic fool in charge of a decompos- ing state and society unless he makes the difficult choices needed to move toward a soft landing and peaceful coexis- tence. Even the best-conceived and executed U.S. and South Korean policies can do little to fix such a "Pogo problem."

Robert A. Manning is senior fellow and director of Asian studies at the Council on For- eign Relations.

Federal Computer Week
May 14, 2001

27. Keep CIO, Comptroller Apart

By Paul Brubaker
The Defense Department is considering a much-needed reorganization of the chief in- formation officer duties. The leading scenario, and the source of much recent specula- tion, involves placing the CIO within the comptroller's office. That would be a colossal mis- take. The CIO organization must work with the comptrol- ler's office, not under it. The legislative intent in creating a CIO was for that person to be independent of any other or- ganization within a department

or agency so that information resources management could be the CIO's primary duty. It was also envisioned that the CIO would have a seat at the management table alongside the chief financial officer (i.e., the comptroller) and the chief operating officer.

The CIO is also tasked under the Clinger-Cohen Act with leading process change. Under the comptroller's wing, the CIO would lose the independence to perform that function — a serious problem, because process change is something the comptroller's office desperately needs but has failed to achieve.

Controlling the purse strings gives the comptroller's office great Power and authority. For example, an attempt by Congress and the DOD CIO office to stop an accounting system that was high-risk, an over-budget and behind schedule was overturned because "that's what the comptroller wanted." Clearly, any CIO under the comptroller could not effectively oversee any financial systems, let alone successfully advocate reforming DOD's antiquated financial systems.

A third reason to keep the CIO independent is that the comptroller's civilian leadership is loath to reform. Two anecdotes support that contention. Several months ago, while serving as the deputy CIO within DOD, I had just completed a high-level briefing on the need for transforming the existing major management processes at the Pentagon. The highest-ranking civilian in the comptroller's shop stopped me and said, "That [transformation] stuff may work in the private sector, but that's not how we do business in the Pentagon."

Just a few weeks later, another senior official in the office said, "The current budget planning system has served the department well for the last 40 years." The comptroller has also constantly rejected budget requests required to implement Clinger-Cohen at DOD.

The comptroller's shop has a history of hostility toward innovation. Had the CJO shop been housed inside the comptroller's shop during con-

sideration of the Navy Marine Corps Intranet project, neither would have occurred

One of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's major priorities is to change the anti-quoted processes at the department. So it is possible that new leadership may be able to overcome the resisters of change throughout the organization. But this will take a dogged tenacity and commitment from the top.

Most importantly, it will take an independent CIO organization working with the comptroller rather than under it.

Brubaker is president of e-government solutions at Commerce One Inc., a former deputy chief information officer at the Defense Department and architect of the Clinger-Cohen Act.

San Antonio Express-News
May 15, 2001

28. Defense Picks Worri-

some
Once again, **Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz.,** is standing up against business as usual in Washington and pointing out obvious conflicts of interest.

And once again, **McCain's** position pits him against his former presidential primary foe, **George W. Bush.**

The issue: **Bush's** appointment of defense industry honchos to key Pentagon posts.

Bush chose **Gordon Egs-** land of General Dynamics to be secretary of the Navy and **me James G. Roche,** corporate vice president of Northrop **Grumman Corp.,** to be Air Force secretary.

General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman are major defense contractors.

McCain raised the issue of conflicts of interest in a Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing last week.

The nominees told senators they would recuse themselves from decisions involving their corporate connections, the Associated Press reported.

But it is discomfoting to have former high-ranking defense industry executives in-

olved in or close to decisions impacting their previous employers.

Plenty of potential nominees who do not have ties to the defense industry are available, and Bush is showing a lack of sensitivity to conflicts with these choices.

Boston Globe

May 14, 2001

Pg. 10

29. Spacey Rumsfeld

If the prospect of militarizing space were not such a serious matter, there would be something as zany as Stanley Kubrick's "Dr. Strangelove" in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's announcement Tuesday that he is shuffling the Pentagon's organizational chart in order to have a four-star Air Force general in charge of an Air Force Space Command.

Although Rumsfeld denied that his rearranging of chairs in the Pentagon has anything to do with the development of weapons for space, this new bureaucratic alignment - viewed alongside a

commission on space he chaired five years ago and the clamor from some Republicans for space weapons - looks like part of a deliberate campaign to increase funding for the development of antisatellite and anti-missile space weapons.

What is truly zany about the move to militarize space is designed boomerang that will come whistling back at the country that launched it.

"We are the only serious military presence in space at present," says Joseph Quinonez, director of the Carnegie Endowment's Non-

Proliferation Project. "The Soviet Union was also there, but now Russian satellites are falling out of the sky. Today no-

body else is even close to us, and it is very much in our interest to keep it that way. We should be trying to keep other countries out of space."

If the Bush administration pursues the development of space weapons, it will not merely be diverting and wasting finite resources. It will also be making a strategic error.

In large part, the United States owes its military domi-

nance to a virtual monopoly on space satellites. Two years ago, when NATO planes were bombing Serb targets in the Kosovo war, satellites were used to target bridges and to guide bombs to their targets.

"Kosovo was a space war," says John Pike, a prominent specialist on space weapons who is director of Global Security.org. To deter other countries from seeking to knock out American satellites, pike says, the United States can rely on the overwhelming it already possesses.

The most effective way of pre-serving the American advantage in space is to codify and enforce a norm that defines any attack on a space satellite as justifying what Pike calls "grievous retaliation."

Without wasting enormous sums on the pursuit of laser weapons in space. American satellites can be better protected by launching more of them, placing them in higher orbits, having aircraft capable of providing backup, and making their ground stations much less vulnerable than they are today.

If Rumsfeld is permitted to pursue a space weapons boondoggle, the result will be to endanger America's unrivaled advantage in space satellites, squander money that should be spent on real needs, and validate the complaints of allies and possible rivals who fear an American lust for global domination

Chicago Tribune

May 14, 2001

30. Beyond The Two-War Scenario

Since the Cold War ended a decade ago, the Pentagon has built its force structure around the notion that the U.S. must be able to fight and win two major regional wars almost simultaneously to meet its global national security obligations.

The double-header of dangers most often depicted in war with Iraq and North Korea.

Now the Bush administration is nearing the end of a

Pentagon review amid reports that Defense Secretary Donald

To:
Doug Feith

May 23, 2001 4:29 PM

TO:

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: International Criminal Court

I need to pull all the information on the international criminal court together fast and get a single paper that shows where we are, what the problems with it are, what the options to go from here are, and why I think what I think.

Let's do it fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052301-17

snowflake

TO: **Stacer Holcomb**

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: May 25, 2001

SUBJECT: **General Sheehan**

Give me Sheehan's markups on those papers he did. I would like to see what they look like.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052501.01

335 SD

25 May

U09933 /01

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

This should be brought up in the meetings this week as part of the assignment to consider. Trained forces ought to be a critical part of the discussion, if not the QDR.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.07
Attach.

381

29 May 01

U10138 / 01

Creating Doctrine from a Theater and National Asset Perspective

Despite the efforts of Goldwater-Nichols and the talk of jointness, doctrine today is developed by the individual services and then brought together in a clumsy amalgamation of capabilities designed to keep each service comfortable. The result is a system that lacks coherence in its use of national and theater assets. Consequently it provides the theater commander and the National Command Authority with fewer assets and more limited choices than it should have.

The Joint Forces Command at Norfolk currently has the responsibility for developing joint doctrine but in fact contracts the doctrine out to "lead" services who then dominate the development on their particular component within the doctrine, equipment and system they are comfortable with.

The Joint Forces Command should be assigned the task of developing a truly joint doctrine by starting with national and theater assets and then integrating into those assets the various delivery systems to create an integrated unified combat capability.

The services and the Joint Commands would be asked to comment on doctrine after the initial draft had been developed at the Joint Forces Command.

The goal would be to ensure that systems' capabilities were available and useful across the board to the theater commander. This approach would force the services to rationalize their systems and their doctrines into an integrated whole and should result in a substantial increase in integrated capability for the theater commander.

The new joint doctrine should then be tested in joint force exercises that compel the integration of all four services into single war games and single tests as compared with the service-by-service system that dominates today.

DHR/azn
052901.08

snowflake

TO: Mark Thiessen
Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 29, 2001

SUBJECT: Dr. Kenneth Adelman

Ken Adelman is available to help on lots of things. Anytime that you have something that needs to be written, or you are looking for concepts, he is very good and he has told me he would be happy to help out.

Feel free to use him. He works the fax, **email**, or he can come in. He lives nearby.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.16

U10041 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/270

230.02

29 May 01

snowflake

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT: **Ken Adelman**

Ken Adelman has an **email** for a lot of people in the National Security process that we could use.

You might want to talk to him about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.19

23002

07/11/01

U10039 /01

snowflake

TO: Mark Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

You might want to look at this article *Democracy and Foreign Policy*. I don't have time to read it, but someone said there were some good things in it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.31
Attach. (Democracy & Foreign Policy by John L. Gaddis)

U10130 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/272

Democracy and Foreign Policy"

John Lewis Gaddis
Department of History

I want to begin with some simple statistics that illustrate what may be the most significant thing historians of future centuries will remember **about** the one through which we've just lived. In 1900 the world contained no democracies, **if we can define** that term, as the human rights organization Freedom House does, to mean states in which universal suffrage produced competitive multiparty elections. Not even the United States or Great Britain qualified, since both at that time denied the vote to women and, in the **case** of the U. S., to African-Americans and other minorities as well. Half a century later in 1950, after two world wars, 22 states qualified as democratic according to the Freedom House standard, comprising some 3 1% of the world's population. But by the year 2000, after a dangerous and protracted cold war, there were **120** democracies, which meant that 63% of the earth's people now lived under democratic rule.'

The history of states goes back about 500 years, and the history of empires goes back about ten times further. Democracies in the modern sense, then, have therefore existed only for something like one fiftieth **of the** history of human governance – and for only about a third even of Yale's history. For democracy to have spread so far and so fast is, by any standard of historical judgment, a remarkable development. It's all the more remarkable that it did so in a century filled with so much violence, for at no other time had people perfected the techniques of killing one another with so much efficiency, and on such a scale.

How was it, then, that the predominantly democratic world that exists today arose from such unpromising circumstances? What has been the role of the United States, if any, in bringing all of this about? These are themes I want to try to address in this lecture. **I'll** have something to say **at** the end of it about where we may **be** going from here.

I.

The traditional American explanation for the spread of democracy goes something like this. The Founding Fathers, drawing upon their admiration for ancient Greek precedents while fearing **the** loss of their liberties within **an** all too contemporary British Empire, imported long-dormant seeds of democracy into a new world, where they immediately took root and flourished. The resulting democratic ideology then exported itself back to Europe, where it quickly undermined the most powerful continental empire – that of France – and set in motion a more gradual but no less significant political evolution within Great Britain itself. So when **Woodrow**

*Prepared for the William Clyde DeVane Lecture Series, *Democratic Virtues*, as delivered April 17, 2001. Freedom House, *Democracy's Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century* (New York: Freedom House, 1999), available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html>. I have used revised statistics from the website, which show 120 democracies in the year 2000, rather than the 199 cited in the original published report.

Wilson brought the United States into World War I in 1917 with his call to “make the world safe for democracy,” he was only continuing on a wider scale the process of democratic transplantation that Thomas Jefferson began in 1776 when he had proclaimed that “all men are created equal.” The American Revolution was, thus, was the most potent of all revolutions, which explains why so much of the world today follows its example.

There are, however, several problems with this explanation. First, the Founding Fathers were far more republican than democratic in their thinking: to the extent that ancient precedents shaped it, they came more from Rome than Greece. Second, the idea of a competitive multi-party system badly frightened these leaders, and the prospect of universal suffrage would have astounded them. Third, the history of the United States during its first century would hardly have inspired democratization elsewhere. One of its central features, after all, was the persistence of slavery long past the time it had ceased to exist in most other advanced societies, together with the fact that one of the bloodiest wars of the 19th century had been required to eradicate it. For decades afterwards, the American practice of democracy retained glaring inconsistencies: Wilson himself, who spoke so grandly of extending democracy throughout the world, had not the slightest intention of extending that same right to the Former victims of slavery at home.

So let us scrap this traditional explanation of democratic diffusion and consider another one. It falls within the category of what we might call historical tectonics: those great underlying forces in history that are set in motion by no person and no state, but that nonetheless move all persons and states, rather as the great continental plates move all of us about on the face of the earth. Two in particular might plausibly have paved the way for the expansion of democracy in the 20th century.

The first of these was the emergence, in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, of an open market system which broke down the old patterns of mercantilism by which states had sought, however ineffectually, to control the economic lives of their citizens. The free exchange of commodities, according to this argument, cannot help but promote the free exchange of ideas: politics follows economics. The second tectonic shift was the communications revolution of the late 19th century – I mean here the expansion of literacy together with the development of mass-circulation newspapers and, in the telegraph and telephone, the **first** primitive forms of instant electronic communication – all of which made it harder **than** it had been for states to conceal information, or to keep people from sharing it among themselves. “The impulse of democracy, which began in another century in other lands, has made itself fully felt in our time,” Lord **Salisbury** acknowledged in 1897, adding with evident relief that “vast changes in the **centre** of power and incidence of responsibility have been made almost imperceptibly without any disturbance or hindrance in the progress of the prosperous development of the **nation**.”²

But there’s a problem with this explanation as well, for it’s possible to argue that it was precisely these two tectonic forces – market capitalism and mass communications – that paved the way for the most appalling authoritarian excesses of

² Andrew Roberts, *Salisbury: Victorian Titan* (London: Phoenix, 1999), p. 662.

the 20th century. Karl Marx anticipated the mechanism with his claim that because capitalism distributes wealth unequally, it also encourages social alienation; and most historians would see in such alienation, as it manifested itself during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the roots of both communism and fascism. The success of these movements, in turn, owes much to the skill with which their leaders—Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and especially Hitler—exploited the new means of mass communication. The tectonic explanation gets us little further than Jeffersonian transplantation in helping us to understand the spread of democracy, therefore, since it also helps to explain the spread of authoritarianism.

It's always worth remembering, as Yogi Berra didn't say but should have, that history isn't history until after it's happened. To see the logic of this, step into your nearest available time machine, set the dial back to any point in the past you choose, and check to see how many people there were then who accurately predicted what's happening now. Drop in, for example, on the ceremonies surrounding the Yale bicentennial a hundred years ago. How likely it would have seemed on that occasion—when no one in the world had a truly democratic form of government—that two-thirds of the world's population would have such governments by the time of this occasion? Had you suggested such a thing to the dignitaries assembled on this campus in 1901, the answer would have been, I imagine, something like: "don't bet your top hat on it."

II.

Let us switch, then, to an explanation which, while it does not neglect the impact of either the American example or the underlying tectonics, does not depend upon them either: it has to do with the role of contingency in history. Because great events determine so much that happens afterwards, we tend too easily to assume that they could only have happened in the way that they did. A prime example is World War I, or the Great War as it was known until an even greater one came along. Without this catastrophe, we can safely surmise, the remaining history of the 20th century would have been very different. But because we cannot know the nature of those differences, we too often rely on the dubious doctrine of inevitability in seeking to explain the origins of the war, and its subsequent evolution.

That makes one of its most important consequences—the emergence of Woodrow Wilson as the first world leader with a global democratic vision—seem far more predetermined than it actually was. After all, no one had expected a major European war to break out in the summer of 1914. Once it had, hardly anyone anticipated that it would still be stalemated three years later, or that the United States would then enter it and help to bring about an allied victory. Certainly Wilson had not foreseen, when he entered the White House in 1913, that he would be shaping a European peace settlement in 1918-19: it would be the greatest irony, he commented shortly after taking office, if his administration should find itself involved in any significant way in European affairs.

Wilson's commitment to "make the world safe for democracy," therefore, grew more out of circumstances than destiny. He seized an unexpected opportunity to project national power onto the international scene, but he had no plan in place to

implement his lofty vision. His reasons for invoking it, indeed, were less than lofty: he was trying to win the support of a still isolationist country for a war aimed at restoring the **balance** of power in Europe. The easiest way to do that seemed to be to portray adversaries as autocrats and allies **as** democrats, despite the fact that among these allies, had he not been overthrown only a few weeks earlier, would have been the greatest autocrat of them all at the time, the Russian tsar. What Wilson was doing, in short, was enlisting idealism in the defense of realism, a technique Jefferson would fully have understood.

It took another unexpected event—the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia several months later—to transform Wilson's tactics into a highly effective grand strategy. For although Wilson had welcomed the tsar's collapse, he had been horrified when the resulting chaos allowed a tiny band of revolutionaries to seize control of that country, withdraw it from the war, and then challenge the legitimacy of the existing social order everywhere else. Wilson and other allied leaders took the Bolshevik Revolution sufficiently seriously that, during the **final** year of the fighting, they gave almost as much attention to containing its effects as to defeating Germany.

That was the context, then, in which Wilson made his Fourteen Points speech of January, 1918, arguably the most influential public pronouncement by any leader at any point in the **20th** century. For in seeking to counter the attraction of Bolshevism, Wilson pushed himself into proclaiming two great interlocking principles that would **shape** the American approach to the world for decades to come: political **self-**determination and economic integration. People should have the right, he insisted, not only to choose their own forms of government, but also to **benefit** from the open markets that would ensure their own prosperity. The world was now to **be** made safe for **both** democracy and capitalism.

In making this connection, Wilson was grounding his idealism in a more compelling realism than even those consummate realists, Marx and Lenin, were able to achieve. It's true that they, like Wilson, saw themselves **as** seeking democracy — what else would a classless society be? — but they did so by relying on dictatorships, whether in the management of politics or economics, to bring that condition about. They believed, almost as a matter of religious conviction, that coercion in the short run would produce liberation in the long run; that means disconnected from ends would not corrupt ends. It proved to be one of the costliest leaps of faith in all of history.

Wilson was far more practical. He sensed the need for **simultaneous** advance toward social and material well-being. He saw the danger of seeking one while postponing the other. He understood that economics sustains politics even as politics disciplines economics; that the relationship is symbiotic, not separate. There was, to be sure, nothing new about such thinking: it had been the basis for British liberalism throughout much of the **19th** century, and for American **progressivism** in the early **20th** century. But it was one thing to have it said by John Bright or Herbert Croly in a book or from a lecture platform. It was quite another to have it proclaimed by the most influential man in the world, as by the **final** year of the war Wilson had become. **Or** by the man of the century, a distinction future historians may well regard Wilson as having merited.

III.

But get back into your time machine for a moment, and run a **reality** check on that last proposition. Set your dial for 1920, Yale University, and the ceremonies dedicating the Woolsey Hall memorial to the dead of the Great War. Would Wilson have looked, to anyone there, like the man of the century? I very much doubt it, for not only had he failed to get the settlement he wanted at the Paris peace conference; he had not even managed to sell membership in the League of Nations – the institution critical to sustaining his global vision-to his own people. He would die broken in health and embittered in spirit four years later, with the events that would ultimately vindicate him nowhere in sight on the horizon.

Given the American withdrawal back into political isolationism in the 1920s and then into economic isolationism in the 1930s; given the demoralizing failures of both capitalism and democracy in Europe during those years; given the rise of authoritarian alternatives in the consolidation of communist rule in Russia, the emergence of fascism in Italy and Germany, and the rise of militarism in Japan: given all of these things, it was possible on the eve of World War II for many people to say and for more to believe that authoritarianism, not democracy, was the wave of the future. The organization America First, which attracted so much support on this campus after the fighting broke out in Europe in 1939, had **as** its goal insulating the United States from the rest of the world, not inspiring or leading it.

We tend to remember World War II today as a good war, in the sense that it so thoroughly crushed the challenges to democracy that the Axis states had mounted, and so decisively propelled the United States into the position of global hegemon. AS a consequence, it's easy to forget two things: that the outcome of the war, until at least half of the way through it, was by no means assured; and that victory, when it **finally** did come, guaranteed little about the future safety of either democracy or capitalism.

Recent scholarship has tended to confirm, for World War II, what the Duke of Wellington said about the Battle of Waterloo: that it was "the nearest run thing you ever **saw**."³ The reasons for this reside not just in the improbable coincidence of the democracies having leaders like Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who rose magnificently to occasions neither of them could have anticipated; nor in the amazing shortsightedness of Adolf Hitler in declaring war on **both** the Soviet Union and the United States within a six month period of time; nor in the unexpected tenacity of the British, the remarkable fortitude of the Russians, the awesome technological prowess of the Americans, and the increasingly frequent military incompetence, as the war wore on, of the Germans and the Japanese. All **of these** things had to come together to produce victory, along with the incalculable moral effect of fighting enemies that had come to be seen as truly **evil**.⁴

Even so, the end of the war was no clear triumph for democracy or capitalism. For despite the fact that Roosevelt, in the Atlantic Charter, had sought to revive Wilson's vision, victory had come only through collaboration with an ally who in no

³Elizabeth Longford, *Wellington* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992), p. 333.

⁴For an excellent recent book that stresses how easily the war could have gone the other way, see Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (London: Pimlico, 1995).

way shared it. Stalin's Soviet Union had not engaged, as had Hitler's Germany, in purposeful genocide; but its record was bad enough. During the decade from 1929 to 1939 it had managed, through the brutalities associated with the **collectivisation** of agriculture, the resulting famine, and the purges that followed, to kill something like twice the number of people who died in the Nazi Holocaust. And yet the war's outcome left this regime controlling half of Europe. The famous pictures of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin posing amicably together reflected no vanquishing of autocracy by democracy, therefore, but rather the desperation with which democracy had hung on by the skin of its teeth.

Fast forward your time machine, then, to 1950, Yale University, and the Woolsey Hall ceremony adding the World War II dead to lists of those killed in earlier wars. Ask the attendees on that occasion about the future they saw ahead of them. I suspect that, for many of them, it would not have been that of Wilson, but rather the one laid out in George Orwell's novel 1984, published only the year before. Big Brother was, of course, Stalin transparently disguised. The very indispensability of his role in defeating fascism now made communism seem close to invincible: with Mao Zedong's recent victory in China, that ideology dominated a huge stretch of territory extending from the Baltic to the Pacific. There **were**, to be sure, some 22 democracies in the world that year, but there were twice as many regimes that would have qualified, by the Freedom House standards, **as** either authoritarian or **totalitarian**.⁵ The world was hardly safe for democracy yet.

IV,

So did the Cold War make it so? That's an intriguing question, because promoting democracy is not exactly what the Cold War was noted for while it was going on. And yet the Freedom House statistics – the jump from 22 democracies in 1950 to 120 by the year 2000 – suggest some connection between the Cold War and the expansion of democratic governance: this did not all happen after that conflict ended. So did democracy spread because of the Cold War, or in spite of it? Correlations, it's worth remembering, aren't always causes.

The "in spite of" arguments will be familiar to you. They emphasize the division of most of the postwar world into Soviet and American spheres of influence; the extent to which that influence constrained the autonomy of those who fell within it; and especially the means by which Washington and Moscow chose to conduct so much of their competition – the nuclear balance of terror. This seemed the ultimate affront to democracy, because it risked the denial of life itself in the pursuit of geopolitical stability. The United States would win, one Air Force general is said to have commented, if **after** a nuclear war there were only two Americans left. "You'd better make damn sure, general," a civilian aide replied, "**that** one is a man and the other a **woman**."⁶

Critical to the "in spite of" argument is the assumption of moral equivalency: the claim that the two Cold War systems were equally repressive. It's easy to forget now what a popular position this once was. It grew out of the anti-Vietnam War and

⁵See note 1 for the source of these statistics.

⁶William Kauffman relates this story in an interview for the CNN television sties *Cold War*.

anti-nuclear weapons protests of the 1960s and 1970s. It informed much of the revisionist historiography on the origins of the Cold War that was being produced during those years. It was why Ronald Reagan felt obliged so pointedly to characterize the Soviet Union, in 1983, as an "evil empire." And as late as 1984 — Orwell's year — it was still possible for that exquisite barometer of academic self-indulgence, the Oxford Union, to debate the proposition: "Resolved, there is no moral difference between the foreign policies of the U.S. and the USSR."⁴

Such arguments began to lose their credibility, though, as people like **Andrei Sakharov**, **Vaclav Havel**, **Lech Walesa**, Pope John Paul II, and ultimately Mikhail Gorbachev himself made it clear that they saw a considerable moral difference between the democratic governments that were flourishing on one side of the Cold War divide, and the autocratic regimes that were hanging on, increasingly desperately, on the other side of it. It became far more difficult to blame the Americans and their allies for maintaining an anti-democratic system when their erstwhile adversaries were so eloquently condemning — and effectively dismantling — their own. Even before the Cold War ended, then, moral equivalency arguments had lost much of their appeal: today hardly anyone makes them.

A more serious objection to the claim that the Cold War fostered the growth of democracy has to do with the underlying tectonics I mentioned at the beginning of the lecture. If late 19th century improvements in marketization and mass communication continued throughout the 20th — as they surely did — would they not have incubated democracies quite effectively whether there had been a Cold War going on or not? Is not what happens beneath the surface of events ultimately more significant than the events themselves?

The problem here, though, is the evidence from the first half of the 20th century that marketization and mass communication could as easily incubate authoritarianism. Using them to explain democratization during the Cold War requires showing that these processes had somehow changed: that at some point they began to reward only lateral but no longer hierarchical forms of political organization. I think it's possible to make that case, but only by bringing in what my political science colleagues would call exogenous variables. Did markets themselves generate safeguards against their own excesses, or did states learn, from the painful experience of the 1930s, that they had better impose these? Did the means of communication shift all that dramatically in the 1940s, or was it the war that sensitized people to their possible abuses? Tectonic determinism is always difficult to confirm, because the tectonics tend to manifest themselves in particular contexts, the effects of which can't always easily be distinguished.

There has been one attempt to link **democratisation** to technological advance by way of the Cold War, though: it's what we might call the Teflon argument. The older people here will recall the justifications the National Aeronautics and Space Administration used to make for the space program when budgets looked likely to be cut: without it, we were told, housewives would never have had Teflon, since this better method of frying bacon had evolved from the need to avoid frying astronauts as their space capsules re-entered the atmosphere. The Teflon explanation has been

⁴John Lewis Gaddis, "On Moral Equivalency and Cold War History," *Ethics and International Affairs*, X(1996), 131-48.

expanded in various ways: without the inducements the Cold War provided to develop the necessary technology, it's often said, we would never have had such innovations as jet-powered airliners, interstate highways, 500-channel satellite receiving dishes, mobile phones, and of course the internet, which began as a supplementary command and control network for the Pentagon in the event of nuclear war. And without these things, we could never have had **globalisation**, which in turn has promoted democratization. Or so the argument runs.

I don't think much of it, though, for a couple of reasons. First, it reverses chronology: the movement toward democratization was well under way before most of these innovations were. Second, it assumes that what people have is more important than what they think. The perils of this approach became clear in 1999 when the *New York Times* columnist Tom Friedman published his "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Resolution," which noted that no state with a McDonald's franchise had ever gone to war with another one. Unfortunately the United States and its NATO allies chose just that inauspicious moment to begin bombing Belgrade, where there were an embarrassing number of golden **arches**.¹

All of these "in spite of" arguments – and, in their own way, the Teflon and Golden Arches explanations as well – disconnect democratization from the mainstream of Cold War history. They build a wall between domestic politics and geopolitics that seems unlikely to have existed in the minds of people at the time. They strike me, for that reason, as less than plausible. So what if we were to take seriously the alternative position, however unlikely it might seem, which is that the Soviet-American superpower rivalry actually promoted democratization? That the diffusion of democracy is at least in part an offspring, even if an unexpected one, of the Cold War itself?

V.

The case in favor of this argument would focus on the role of the United States, and especially on the differences in the way it handled its responsibilities in the two postwar eras. I spoke earlier of Wilson's insight that economic and political progress had to proceed simultaneously; that just as one could not expect prosperity without open markets and unconstrained politics, so one could not postpone prosperity – as Marxism, Leninism, and ultimately **Maoism** also attempted to do – and still expect to get democracy. Wilson's countrymen had not embraced this logic, though, after World War I, and as a consequence the United States made no sustained effort to implement his vision. It did after World War II. What made the difference?

Part of the answer, I'm sure, was simply guilt: despite their power the Americans had done so little to prevent the coming of the second war that they were determined after it was over not to repeat their behavior after the first war. But part of the reason also was that the world of the early 1920s had seemed relatively benign: there were no obvious threats to American security. The world of the late 1940s, in contrast, seemed anything but benign. We can of course debate the accuracy of the view that Stalin posed **as** great a threat to the European balance of power **as** Hitler

¹Friedman made this claim in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999).

had: the few Soviet documents we have are inconclusive on that point, and even if we had all the documents my fellow historians would still find ways to disagree as to what they showed. For our purposes here, though, what's important is not what Stalin's intentions really were, but what American leaders *believed* them to *be*. About that there's little doubt, and as a consequence the Truman administration had resolved, by 1947, to act very differently from the way in which its predecessors had acted a quarter century earlier.

What it did was to transform Wilson's idea of a world safe for democracy and capitalism into a strategy of containment, and then to sell it -- as Wilson had never managed to do -- to the American people. Stalin certainly helped, for although planning for the United Nations and the **Bretton** Woods system preceded the onset of the Cold War, it's not at all clear that the United States would have sustained these commitments to internationalism had there been no Soviet threat. There certainly would have been no Truman Doctrine, no Marshall Plan, and no North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And I suspect there would not have been, as well, what now looks to have *been* the single most important contribution the Americans made toward global democratization: that was a new and remarkably ambitious effort at democratic transplantation, aimed this time at two of the most persistently authoritarian cultures on the face of the earth, those of Germany and Japan.

Only Americans, I think, would have attempted something as rash as this. Only an innocence bordering on ignorance of the countries involved could have led them to consider it. Only authoritarian proconsuls like General Lucius Clay in Germany and General Douglas MacArthur in Japan would have bypassed a Washington bureaucracy more attuned to the punishment of defeated enemies than to their rehabilitation. Only the willingness to make distasteful compromises -- to cooperate with recently hated adversaries -- could have made the new policy work. And only the realization that a greater adversary was arising out of Eurasian heartland, and that the Germans and the Japanese, if not quickly integrated into the system of Western democratic states, could wind up as allies of the new enemy -- only this, I think, could have provided a basis for justifying this new policy to the American people and to those other American allies who had themselves suffered at the hands of the Germans and the Japanese.'

Each of these improbabilities had to intersect with and reinforce the other in order to produce an effect we today take for granted: that these two formerly authoritarian states are now, and have long been, safe for democracy and capitalism. It was, however, another of Wellington's "nearest run things." The course of events could easily have proceeded otherwise. To see how, reset your time machine but now in the counter-factual mode that allows you to change a single variable, re-run a subsequent sequence, and see what difference this made.

Begin with the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt in April, 1945, but change just one thing: the new president, Harry S. Truman, decides to stick with and apply to both Germany and Japan the harshly punitive occupation policies laid out by the late president's influential Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., which FDR had at

³The best discussion of the American democratization of Germany and Japan is in Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 146-76.

one point himself endorsed. The scenario then proceeds as follows. After the sacking of Generals Clay and MacArthur, the American occupation authorities in Germany and Japan dutifully follow Washington's orders. The Germans and the Japanese quickly come to resent the resulting repression, combined with starvation, and communists in both countries begin to gain support for their view that the right to eat is more important than the right to vote. The resistance they generate makes the occupation so difficult to administer that the new Republican majority in Congress resolves early in 1947 to "bring the boys home" and to "stop pouring money down foreign **ratholes.**"¹⁰

Truman and his advisers belatedly try save the situation by devising various plans which they name for themselves, but when the Soviet blockade forces the Western powers out of Berlin early in 1948, American authority crumbles throughout West Germany and the spillover effects are felt in Japan as well. Coordinated **coups** bring both countries into the communist camp that summer, just on the eve of a Democratic National Convention which feels it has no choice but to replace Truman with the only American who seems to have a chance of cutting a deal with Stalin, the former vice president Henry A. Wallace.

Having run successfully on the platform "He'll keep us out of the Cold War," President Wallace follows the example of Neville Chamberlain ten years earlier and negotiates "peace in our time" with a Soviet Union that, now that its ally Mao Zedong has triumphed in China as well, dominates the entire Eurasian continent. George Orwell's book is of course suppressed, but still it's his vision, not Wilson's, that **turns** out to have been the wave of the future. And at the end of our **counterfactual** time machine sequence, which is of course the Yale tercentennial in 2001, a group of distinguished professors are lecturing knowledgeably on the theme: "**Authoritarian Vistas.**"

Outrageous, you say? Off the wall? Well, no more so, I think, than what any American would have said at the beginning of the **1940s**, if told what the Americans would actually have accomplished by the end of the 1940s. That **scenario** would have seemed, not just counter-factual, but fantastical.

VI.

Those of you who are into chaos theory – or Tom **Stoppard's** theatrical renderings of it – will know about something about "butterfly effects": those tiny perturbations at the beginning of a process that can make an enormous difference at the end of it. The term originated in meteorology with the suggestion that a butterfly fluttering its wings over Beijing can, in theory at least, set off a hurricane over Bermuda: that's why weather forecasting is so difficult. It's since extended into the realms of physics, mathematics, paleontology, economics, and now even into politics with the very recently discovered Florida butterfly ballot.

What's implied in all of this is something historians have known all along but haven't always explained well: that under certain circumstances small events can set

¹⁰Which is what the newly-elected British Labour government did in fact decide to do with respect to India and Palestine that same year.

in motion much larger ones; that the relationship between causes and consequences isn't always proportionate; that there are great turning points in the past, and that the points upon which they turn on can be exceedingly small. The 1945-47 period **was** just such a turning point, I think, for Wilson's vision of a world safe for democracy and capitalism. Until that moment, the cards had seemed stacked against it. Even victory in World War II had not reversed a trend that seemed more likely to lead to authoritarian vistas than to democratic ones. But after 1947, the authoritarian tide — if you will pardon this profusion of metaphors — began to recede. What it left behind was a slowly emerging democratic world.

For if two of the most authoritarian states in history were on the way to becoming democracies — and if they were recovering their economic strength **as** they did so — then that was as powerful a demonstration as can be imagined of the **practicality** as well as the principled character of Wilson's vision. The Soviet Union had nothing with which to counter it: all it could offer was an ideologically based promise that seemed increasingly at odds with practicality. It would take years — indeed decades — for the contrast to become so clear that it began to shape the Cold War's outcome; but in the end it did just that. The nuclear weapons and other instruments of war the super-powers piled up during that conflict did little to determine how it actually came out. But the distinction between a **Wilsonian** vision realized on one side and denied on the other turned out to be decisive.

Would it all have happened without the Cold War? I rather doubt it, for in the classic tradition of what free enterprise is supposed to do, it was the **competition that** forced the United States, in this critical instance, to do the right thing.

VII.

What's the right thing to do today, though, in a very different world in which there's so little competition? In which democracy is no longer the exception but the norm? How can the United States **use** its influence to help ensure that the world of 2101 — the next logical stop on our time machine tour of Yale ceremonial occasions — remains at least as hospitable to democratic institutions as is the present **one**? *Several* things occur to me, which I should like to list in ascending order of their importance.

First, **admit our shortcomings**. The Cold War was a brutal time, and the **United States** committed its share of brutalities in trying to win it. Paradoxically, **the** further we got from Europe, which was always the main arena of Cold War competition, the less scrupulous we were about supporting democracy: too many people in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia suffered as a result. Even in Europe we did not always prefer the democratic alternative, as **our** record in Spain, Portugal, and Greece clearly demonstrates. Our enthusiasm for capitalism was always more consistent than our enthusiasm for democracy, despite our ideological commitment to the principle that the two went hand in hand.

The historian's equivalent of truth in advertising demands that we acknowledge this, even as we should try to understand the reasons for it. They involved chiefly a lingering pessimism about the climate for democratic transplants — a fear that these might not survive in places where the resentments generated by

poverty or injustice were too great. Some of this pessimism grew out of guilt over the extent to which the United States and its Western European allies had contributed to these conditions, whether through formal or informal imperialism. Some of it reflected a tendency to attribute to the Soviet Union and its allies a far greater capacity than they actually had to win friends and influence people in the Third World. Some of it resulted from a widespread habit within the U.S. government – understandable in a generation of leaders that had survived depression and war – of assuming the worst, even as one hoped for the best.

Three Americans, I think, should get particular credit for having reversed this long history of official pessimism about democratic prospects, although only one of them normally does. Jimmy Carter's achievement in making human rights the centerpiece of his foreign policy and mostly meaning it is justifiably well known. But I would also give credit to Henry Kissinger, who as he neared the end of his years in government, repudiated his own earlier policy of supporting white minority regimes in southern Africa; and to Ronald Reagan, who despite a dubious record in Central America had the imagination, with the Reagan Doctrine, to turn the table on the Soviets and begin demonstrating that it was they, not the Americans, who were more often the imperialists in a post-colonial world. What Carter, Kissinger, and Reagan were all moving toward – even if at different rates and under differing circumstances – was the view that the United States need not fear the choices the Third World, if freed from imperialism, would now make.

My second recommendation, after acknowledging our history, is that we *reacquire our humility*. Even Americans do not normally associate that quality with themselves, but if you go back and study carefully what everyone now acknowledges to have been our most creative period in our foreign policy – the one in which we were transplanting democracy to Germany and Japan, while seeking to revive it elsewhere in Europe – you'll find that we showed a remarkable sensitivity to interests and advice of others. There was no effort to transform the countries we occupied or supported into clients or even clones of ourselves. MacArthur presided, in Japan, over one of the few successful land redistribution projects in modern history. The Marshall Plan wound up reinforcing the European social welfare state. The movement for European economic integration, which we consistently supported, was intended to create competitors to ourselves. NATO was from the start a European initiative, and despite the disproportionate power we've always wielded within the alliance, it was the Europeans who largely shaped its evolution during the Cold War.

We exhibited this openness to the views of others, I think, for several reasons. One was that we often weren't sure what to do ourselves, and so needed all the help we could get. But there was also the sense, at least in Europe, that if we appeared too domineering, the Russians would only benefit from this. Their own arrogance and brutality in Eastern Europe, it was clear from the earliest days of the Cold War, was a liability for them. That made us all the more determined to treat our own allies with respect, to give them reasons for wanting to be within the American sphere of influence, and not to feel that they'd had it forced upon them. We allowed their interests to shape the disposition of our power. In short, we listened.

Since the Cold War ended, though, it seems to me that we've fallen into a different habit, which is that of instructing. This was one of Woodrow Wilson's less

attractive personal characteristics — perhaps growing out of his previous career as a professor -- and it seems now that in its otherwise quite justifiable rediscovery of Wilson, our foreign policy is embracing it too. The Clinton administration expected the world to be impressed by its repeated claims of American “indispensability,” even as it failed to define coherently the purposes for which we were indeed indispensable. The new Bush administration hasn’t done any better: its recent humiliation of South Korea for attempting to remove remaining remnants of the Cold War, together with its unnecessarily abrupt rejection of the Kyoto Protocol at just the moment the scientific evidence on global warming has become compelling, suggest a disregard for the opinions of others that’s quite at odds with how we waged — and won—the Cold War. These tendencies, if I may sound instructive myself, need correction.

My third suggestion would be to *acknowledge* contingency. If the history of democratisation during the 20th century suggests anything at all, it is that this was a contingent, not a determined, process: there was nothing inevitable about it. An improbable combination of circumstances allowed what in the long sweep of history will seem like a relatively small push by the Americans—the democratisation of Germany and Japan—to have very big effects. No theory of which I am aware could have predicted this sequence of events, and that ought to caution us as we assess the prospects for democratisation in the future.

It would be a great mistake, it seems to me, to assume that democracy grows automatically out of any one thing. To say that it depends solely upon *support* from the United States ignores the uniqueness of the situation in which that *support* was indeed critical during the early Cold War. To say that it results from economic integration is to ignore the fact that the world was about as integrated at the beginning of the 20th century, when there were no democracies at all, as it is now.” To say that it grows out of capitalism ignores the role capitalists have played — and not just in Nazi Germany — in supporting authoritarianism. To say that it grows out of allowing people the right to determine their own future neglects the fact that some people are determined to deny other people any future at all: does anyone really believe that democracy, if fully practiced by *all* sides in the Balkan crises of the 1990s, or by the Israelis and the Palestinians today, would fully benefit *all* sides? And to say that because democracy turned out to be the wave of the future during the 20th century doesn’t necessarily make it so for the 21st.

It’s also the case that combinations of causes can have contradictory as well as complimentary effects. We tend to assume the compliment&y of Wilson’s great principles, economic integration and political self-determination, because they mostly were during the Cold War. But has not the post-Cold War era already exposed fault lines suggesting that these two tectonic processes are not in fact moving in the same direction? The backlash against globalization that has surfaced so conspicuously over the past couple of years at places like Seattle, Washington, Prague, and Davos, only reflects a basic reality that we should long ago have anticipated: it is that people do not always vote in the way that economists think.

My *final* suggestion, as we consider what we might do to sustain democracy in the face of these contradictions, is to remember *Isaiah Berlin*. It was my privilege to

“For the arguments for and against this proposition, see Niall Ferguson, *The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000* (London: Allen Lane, 2001), pp. 309-12.

know the great man slightly when I was at Oxford eight years ago, and to witness at **first** hand his congeniality and conversational brilliance, his interest in everything and everybody, and his emphatic impatience with any effort to look at the world from any single point of view. He was, more than anyone else I've ever met or read **about**, a **true philosopher of democracy**. As befits a man who loved the distinction between foxes and hedgehogs, Sir Isaiah taught us many different things but also one big thing, and yet he avoided the contradiction this might seem to imply.

I have in mind his concept of the **incommensurability** of values: the idea that while we can and should pursue multiple goods, they are not all mutually compatible. Some will complement one another; some will contradict one another: we cannot, to the same extent and in all situations, have them all. The art of politics – certainly of democratic politics – is the art of balancing incommensurate goods, of making tough choices, of keeping the whole picture and not just part of it in mind, of taking an **ecological** view of our own existence.

For the word ecology, in this sense, implies the balance it takes to keep an organism healthy. We understand it well enough when it comes to our plants, our pets, **our** children, and ourselves: we know how easily there can be too much of any good thing, and how harmful the consequences can be. I'm not sure we know that yet, though, in a political world – to say nothing of an academic world – that so often encourages investments in single causes, even if in the name of democratic principles. For this is, as Berlin reminds us, fundamentally an anti-democratic procedure: "the search for perfection," he writes, "does seem to me a recipe for bloodshed, no better even if it is demanded by the sincerest of idealists, the purest of heart."¹²

This is, then, democracy's Achilles's heel: it's a disconnection of means from ends not all that different from the one at the top of the slippery **slope** that produced, at its bottom, the great anti-democratic movements of the century that has just ended. It's what ought to haunt us as we think about the century that's now beginning, and especially as we try to guess what may lie between us on this celebratory occasion for Yale University, and our descendants a hundred years from now upon the next one.

¹² "The Pursuit of the Ideal," in *Isiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays*, edited by Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), p. 16.

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: May 29, 2001

SUBJECT: Attached

Attached is a paper on Managing The Pentagon from 1989. I have no idea who wrote it, but it has some interesting thoughts, although somewhat out of date.

Thanks.

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Attach. (Managing the Pentagon 1/31/89)

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Date: January 31, 1989

Subject MANAGING THE PENTAGON

INTRODUCTION

This memorandum identifies several issues that you should resolve early because they affect the charters of OSD offices and the quality of support for your decision processes. Separate sections lay out aspects of the management problems you face, stress the importance of strategy development, describe the operation of three separate decision processes that you inherit, and raise issues for your consideration. My recommendations are included where appropriate.

Without knowing how familiar each of you is with this material, I have tried to provide minimal background. I would, of course, be pleased to discuss any **of** these matters in more depth at your convenience.

THE PROBLEM

The new Administration has staked a great deal on good management of the Pentagon. Yet the country could be shortchanged by the very focus on cutting the budget and reforming weapons procurement that many inside the Administration and out are calling for. It all depends on how it's done.

The new Pentagon management team is being called upon to deliver better value for the taxpayer and to restore confidence in the integrity of defense management. Yet even this understates the true challenge. If the President accepts level or even declining real defense spending, the cuts in currently approved forces and programs must be very large.

This acceptance would be grounded more in domestic political reality than in an admittedly uncertain assessment of the U.S. world role. Thus, diving right into budget cutbacks would be like ordering materials for a new house before the architect has drawn the plans.

A thoroughgoing reassessment of our national security needs and the means to attain them is needed to guide the force restructuring, the reformed procurements and the budget cuts. The real job of defense management is to match a **strategy**, and the military capabilities needed to carry it out, with a defense **program** made up of forces and weapons that can be provided at budget levels that Congress can be persuaded to make available.

Making this match means reassessing objectives, evaluating means, and searching out more efficient ways of doing business. It takes literally hundreds of decisions about policies, forces, weapons, personnel, organizations, operations, and **timing**. To pull it off, the Secretary must control the Pentagon agenda. The passive management style in vogue recently--setting budget limits for the Services and then reacting to their spending, proposals--can't lead to a balance of strategy, program, and budget. ✓

The task of matching strategy, program and budget is further complicated by two realities of the Pentagon. First, agreement rarely exists on specific objectives. Second, all the players will **not** always be on your **team**, including **some** appointees of the Administration and **some** senior military officers. Yet, more than usual, the national interest requires clear policy direction and civilian/military teamwork at the Pentagon.

THE PRIMACY OF STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

Why is rethinking defense strategy so important, and how should you see that it gets, done?

Stripped to its fundamentals, managing the defense program is about preparing for the use of military force. That stark realization guides everything else.

Military force is only one instrument of policy. But the credible use of force is the only constant and effective instrument of order in a fractious world. The U.S. has a special role as global keeper of order. Our capacity to play this role far outstrips that of any like-minded country. ✓

For this role to be credible, the U.S. must be willing to use force, in concert with allies and security partners when possible, unilaterally when necessary. To accord with American values and secure the support of the American people, any use of force must be thoughtful and appropriate. And that requires instruments--military forces--designed and employed with the ends and circumstances of their potential use in mind.

This is what a defense strategy means--defining U.S. interests and objectives, thinking through the circumstances that could threaten them to the point of calling upon the use of U.S. military power, devising the military capabilities needed for each case, and deciding the **mix** of forces and deployments that will best deter hostile acts against U.S. interests, or attain U.S. security objectives should deterrence fail. A defense strategy should fit coherently into an overall national security strategy, which means close coordination is needed during its development at the level of the National Security Council and some key

decisions will have to be made by the President. Nonetheless, the Secretary of Defense has the management challenge of preparing the nation's military capabilities to support the defense strategy.

While it may be obvious that no force structure, and defense budget to go with it, can be adequately justified to Congress and the American people unless it derives from a thoughtful and coherent strategy, consider your day-to-day management challenge if you were forced to operate without one. Along comes a key decision about a new major weapon system pushed hard by the Chief or Secretary of a Service. You might say to either of them, "I'm worried that your system is too costly and won't work as well as advertised." The Chief or Secretary could respond, "We know how to solve all the remaining technical problems. The system will have several impressive capabilities. The requirement for it was approved years ago. Maybe we can get the cost down some, but we can't put a price tag on our security. Besides, the costs are low for the first couple of **years.**" What happens next? Perhaps your staff can uncover a technical Achilles heel in the design, or produce independent cost estimates you'd be willing to stand on. Even so, an aura of arbitrariness will creep into decisions based primarily on cutting and fitting the defense program, with many **such** pieces, to a fixed budget. The perception of arbitrary, budget-driven decisions will undermine the credibility of defense management, which partly explains the problems Secretary Weinberger had when the budget stopped growing and his ambitious program had to be cut back.

How much better if you were able to say, "That system won't add very much to the capabilities needed to carry out our strategy. Besides, there are several other ways to skin that same cat (conduct the mission) that give us more capability for the money." This way you provoke **an** assessment carried out in terms of national needs rather than Service preferences, greatly increasing **your** ability to **shape** the Pentagon agenda and generate the kind of information needed to support your decisions.

Therein lies an important principle of defense management and a key underlying design criterion for the management systems which serve the Secretary of Defense. If you are to exercise your authority as required by law, control the Pentagon agenda, and produce a credible defense program, you will have to see to it that issues are framed for decision in terms that put you in the driver's seat. This means dealing with defense missions that often cut across Service lines in pursuit of national objectives. Then you are managing a national exercise in which each Service is a part. But the **DoD** is not organized in mission terms. If decisions get framed in Army or **Navy** or Air Force terms, the Service will clearly speak with greater authority than the Secretary in any debate about the merits. Obviously, dividing budget changes by three to give each Service its "share" of any increase or cut, though frequent practice in the Pentagon, abdicates the responsibilities entrusted to the Secretary of Defense. To discharge these responsibilities, you have

to get the bureaucracy to play on the national team, not let them call the shots.

The kind of questions that should dominate the Secretary's agenda flow from the elements of strategy and missions. For an illustrative though certainly not exhaustive list, see Enclosure 1. While all are good questions, this list offers just a few examples of the many questions that have to be formulated and answered in the process of developing a strategy with a matching set of force plans and capabilities.

Strategy development must come first because efficiency in the defense program depends in the first instance on ensuring that only those forces and weapons are budgeted which fit the strategy and provide needed capabilities. But delivering better value for the taxpayer takes more. New weapons should actually work in the field and not be "gold-plated". (This is discussed in somewhat greater depth below). Substantial efficiencies can also be found in different ways of "doing business." A few examples are listed in Enclosure 2. These "macro-efficiency" issues don't arise from strategy development and won't bubble up from the bureaucracy. You will have to create mechanisms to raise and consider such issues, either through the ongoing resource allocation decision process or by special task force. Decisions will be difficult, implementation even harder, and most of the savings will come several years in the future. Yet, attacking these kinds of issues offers the only real hope of lowering the defense budget without cutting needed military capabilities, or of getting more capability from any given budget levels.

THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS

In dealing with these questions, and the **myriad details** of systems and budgets, how do the Secretary and Deputy actually manage the Department? You get this done through three distinct decision processes that are often confused in public discussion. One gives strategic direction to the JCS and the Commands to guide the organization and employment of existing forces, often called contingency planning. It has a short-term orientation with the focus on preparing to use existing forces, if necessary. A second provides for future capabilities and is usually referred to as the budget process, or the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS). It covers up to 5 or 6 fiscal years at a time. The third, usually called the acquisition process, manages the development and procurement of new weapons systems. It often must look out 7-10 years, sometimes longer.

Both the Packard Commission's recommendations and the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols defense reform legislation speak to some aspects of each of these areas. These remove any doubt that the Secretary is charged with controlling, rationalizing, and interrelating these three areas of defense decision making. The Congress seems determined to do

more in the future to hold the **DoD** leadership accountable in all three domains.

Some aspects of this heightened attention are new. Contingency planning--defined broadly to include the assignment of missions and forces to the Commands, planning for military operations, the preparation of crisis management capabilities, and the assurance of sound procedures and mechanisms for the command and control of the military forces--is a time-honored professional military discipline. It has been largely under the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) since the Department of Defense was formed in 1947. A 1958 law moved the Secretary into the chain-of-command under the President, and took the **JCS** out. Since then, the Unified and Specified Commands (whose Commanders-in-Chief are called, **CINCs**) report to the Secretary, through the JCS (now the Chairman of the JCS since Goldwater-Nichols) only by the Secretary's assignment. But over the years, Secretaries of Defense have rarely devoted much effort and attention to contingency planning, except in the area of command and control of the nuclear forces.

What's new is the insistence that the Secretary take this on. Political guidance is a key ingredient of strategic direction for the employment of the forces. The professional military of a free society expect political guidance, even if a few do not welcome it. Guidance is needed on such topics as the role expected of other nations; what warning assumptions to use; when to plan for mobilization or make do with active forces; where it is essential to avoid casualties, POWs, or collateral damage; assumptions about base access and overflight rights in various circumstances; how much risk to run of provoking the involvement of other powers; the relative priorities of different commitments; which cases must be handled simultaneously; what geographical constraints will have to be respected. These and other elements should be covered in your operational guidance to the JCS and the **CINCs**, as a basis for their development and your review of contingency plans, command and control, and preparations for crisis management.

The PPBS was established by Secretary **McNamara** in the early **1960s**, shortly after the Secretary's power over the purse was strengthened by that same 1958 Act. The basic idea was to organize into missions terms the Secretary's decisions on the programs of the Services, so that alternatives and tradeoffs could be considered on a meaningful basis. The process was modified by Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary Packard in 1969 with the addition of strategy and fiscal guidance from the Secretary to establish direction for set limits on the Services' program proposals, at the same time shifting much of the initiative for program development back to the Services. Secretary Brown added a Defense Resources Board chaired by the Deputy Secretary. The resulting process remains today the Secretary's principal management mechanism for assessing the needs for military capabilities, evaluating the alternative means for achieving them, and deciding the content of the

defense program and the budget, The PPBS captures all decisions which affect the defense budget and, thereby, provides the only unifying context for **resource** allocation decisions. The recent reform efforts have mainly exhorted the Secretary to use the process to its full potential in making strategy, forces, and budgets "match-up."

The acquisition process received major attention from the Packard Commission and Goldwater-Nichols. The function has been reorganized at the Pentagon and more emphasis has been placed on adhering to good management practices in weapons development and procurement, streamlining the bureaucracy, and clarifying lines of authority and accountability. Two years later, many observers believe that the intended improvements are barely discernible; there is certainly no evidence yet that program outcomes are better. Coincidentally, concern about the quality of acquisition management has been heightened by disclosures of alleged illegal behavior by **some** contractors and a few Service civilian officials.

The top management process for weapons acquisition directly under the Secretary has not materially changed from that established by Deputy Secretary Packard about 1970. The overall process is intended to ensure that acquisition projects are initiated and conducted to satisfy mission needs rather than generating technical solutions in search of a problem, i.e. succumbing to "technology-push." A Defense Acquisition Board oversees each individual **system**, reviewing each one at a series of milestones tied to the stages of system development and production." At each decision point, the **system** managers are supposed to demonstrate certain standards of technical progress and management practice before being authorized to proceed into the next phase. Good management **practices** such as unambiguous objectives tied to mission needs, prototyping and hardware demonstration, competition in its various forms, independent cost **estimates**, extensive realistic testing before high-rate production, special procedures for critical subsystems (e.g. engines and complex electronics), and accountability in contracting are frequently encouraged but not always practiced,

Because the acquisition decision process is necessarily organized around individual systems, even when considering trade-offs with competing **systems**, and operates on a schedule tied to events in that particular **system** life-cycle, it does not easily maintain a broader perspective on strategy and competing demands for resources. It is the right forum for ensuring the efficiency and integrity of "**how** we buy" defense systems; it is not a good forum for deciding "**what** we buy." The PPBS fills that latter bill.

You will have to delineate more clearly within the Department the major responsibilities for "**how** we buy" and clarify their relationship to the PPBS. **At the same time**, any efforts you make to stamp out illegal behavior can't be allowed to interfere with the good management practices needed to develop and procure effective weapons at affordable

prices. And the discipline to adhere to those good practices needs to be strengthened.

Fortunately, as you undertake to manage all of this, you have lots of help available--from the Chairman, the **CINCs**, the Services, and from your own staff. Unfortunately, not all of them will be able all the time to work a given issue from your broader perspective, or even be willing to address **some** issues you will consider important--in **some** cases because of bureaucrat-ic bias, in others due to lack of knowledge or access. Most of the proposals for forces and weapon **systems** will continue to **come** from the Services. It is much harder to get a Service to adopt a program it didn't invent than it is to refuse their proposals. So you will need help in developing guidance to increase and shape the options available from the Services, in assessing options on their merits in the proper mission context, and in making the tradeoffs necessary to fit within an overall budget constraint.

One important and recently strengthened source of help is the Chairman of the JCS. The Goldwater-Nichols law made the Chairman the principal military advisor to the Secretary and the President, instead of the JCS as a committee. It also added a Vice Chairman to strengthen the cross-Service or **"joint"** perspective and chartered the Chairman to advise the Secretary on resource-constrained force plans and on strategy. The current Chairman and the new Vice Chairman have already begun to perform parts of their **new** charter. It **will** be up to you to manage this upgraded resource to exploit its full potential. This will take supervision and careful tasking to bring the Chairman fully into deliberations on resource-constrained plans and programs. Now cooperative the JCS will be in supporting Secretarial management of contingency planning remains untested. Overall, the experience of the first couple of years with JCS reform suggests that you could get more help from this source than did your predecessors.

Like your predecessors, you will have to depend **most** heavily on your own staff, and also on the Service Secretaries, for the civilian support you need. **The Service Secretaries** can **be** of great assistance in providing insights into the thinking behind Service proposals, offering independent evaluations, advancing your interests with their Service, providing political advice, and implementing your decisions. It will be your challenge to keep them on your team since pressures are strong to take on the coloration of their Service. For help that consistently adopts your perspective, you will have to count on your own staff. You can improve the quality of this support by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of certain parts of the OSD, selecting well-qualified individuals, and insisting that they build up staff competencies in selected areas.

DECIDING THE ROLES OF OSD OFFICES

The new position of Undersecretary for Acquisition (USD/A) is by law the third-ranking official in the DoD. Recommended by the Packard Commission, and enacted into law in 1986, this position has overall responsibility for the acquisition process. The Secretary will need to make clear that the USD/A has complete responsibility and authority over major systems development and procurement with respect to "how we buy", and that he is one of the key advisors to the Secretary on "what we buy." He has line responsibility for management of the basic research, advanced **technology** and management support portions of **RDT&E** funds (so called 6.1, 6.2, **6.3a**, and 6.5 monies). And the offices responsible for development testing, procurement policy, logistics, and **C³I**, as well as the Director of **Defense** Research and Engineering (**DDR&E**) and the DNA, also report directly to him. Thus, the Undersecretary should be delegated responsibility for the quality and integrity of all development and procurement projects, for the policy guidance controlling all other acquisition activities, for the defense technology base, and for the management of the **RDT&E** funds placed under his care. He should control the milestone decisions for major **systems**, subject to funding having been made available through the PPBS and appropriate prior consultation with one of you. You will need to clarify and reissue the charter of the USD/A.

One glaring gap in the **USD/A's** authority arises from the Congressional insistence on **having** the office of **operational test** and evaluation report to the Secretary and the Congress, **but not the USD/A**. The **OT&E** function is an integral part of the development process. It must be kept independent of the Services that develop the **weapons** systems, but should not be detached from an otherwise integrated acquisition authority. You should consider urging Congress to change the law so that OT&E works under the day-to-day supervision of **the USD/A**, with direct access to the Secretary, and with independent **OT&E** reports available to Congress.

✓ The Undersecretary for Policy (USD/P) is technically the fourth ranking official of the **DoD**. In reality, because his is a staff office with minimal line authority, and because his pay grade is one notch lower, his stature relative to the **USD/A** and the Service Secretaries is somewhat less. Nonetheless, the **USD/P** is the principal staff arm of the Secretary on political-military operations. This office should be assigned the role of helping you manage the contingency planning process. The **USD/P**, working closely with the **JCS** and the Commands, should develop political guidance for you to issue, and should be given authority to review on your behalf all aspects of contingency planning, command arrangements, and control of the forces. You will have to insist that the **JCS** and the **CINCs** provide the **USD/P** adequate access to their plans and data. The **USD/P** would also continue responsibilities for the **DoD** role in arms control negotiations, relations with allies and

security partners, programs of security assistance and arms sales, intelligence policy, and net assessment. You might consider renaming the office--either Under Secretary for Operations or Under Secretary for Political Military Affairs would be more properly descriptive of its function. ✓

The PPBS can be managed by two offices reporting to the Secretary, much as has been the **case at times** in the past. The office of program analysis and evaluation, with a broadened charter (and appropriately renamed), would be responsible for the planning and programming phases; the comptroller would manage the budget phase. Responsibility for planning future capabilities and analyzing program alternatives should be consolidated in PA&E, which could then be renamed Assistant Secretary for Planning & Programming or Planning & Analysis. A full resource analysis capability should be reconstituted, including responsibility for analyzing manpower and logistics requirements. This will allow the "macro-efficiency" issues to be identified and examined. The office should have an unconstrained analytical charter and you will want to ensure it has access to all needed information. This office will be the only substantive staff supporting you that can stand entirely clear of operational and line responsibilities. Since it has no axe to grind, it can adopt and sustain your point of view. If it also provides high quality analysis of the issues, and polices the analytical quality produced by others, it will be invaluable to you (as it has been in **some** earlier administrations). ✓

If you plan on a division of responsibilities under which the Secretary concentrates on policy and strategy, and the Deputy Secretary on operational management, one possible allocation would be for Secretary Tower to supervise the contingency planning process, while assigning supervision of the PPBS and the **USD/A's** management of the acquisition process to Deputy Secretary Atwood. YOU would then need to work closely together over the planning phase in PPBS so that Secretarial thinking leads strategy development and assures its coordination with **contingency planning**. This arrangement would also leave Secretary Tower more **time** for outside duties involving the Congress and the White House, and for NSC-level issues such as **arms** control. He would have to make it clear that the **USD/A** reported to Deputy Secretary Atwood.

In the final analysis, managing the Pentagon, like any other enterprise, comes down to people. No amount of organizational clarification or staff work can substitute for intellectual leadership and management discipline from the top. The best organization and process can't ensure good outcomes, but can **make it** easier for management to produce good outcomes.

Defense management will not be judged only on whether the program . can be cut and fit to a politically feasible budget level or abuses are reduced in the procurement of weapons systems. It will matter whether the defense leadership can describe the U.S. role in the world, define how military capabilities contribute to that role and to U.S. security, and explain why the forces and weapons in the budget are an effective and efficient way to provide the needed capabilities. I hope this memo makes **some** small contribution toward that broader end. ✓

ENCLOSURE 1: ILLUSTRATIVE QUESTIONS FOR STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

What should be the future role and shape of the NATO alliance, especially if the Soviet threat is reduced? Could a stronger European role be specified?

If conventional arms reductions, or NATO force enhancements, could relieve somewhat the threat of short-warning attack in Europe, what are the implications for the levels, deployment, and readiness of NATO forces?

What can be realistically done to counter a possible Soviet invasion of Iran or Turkey? What forces or systems would be employed? Given the likelihood of such an event, how much should the U.S. program for this eventuality?

What is the role of and need for forward-deployed U.S. ground forces in the Pacific? Can some reductions be made from historical levels and, if so, what compensating adjustments in U.S. or local forces would be prudent?

For what missions do we plan to use the carrier task forces of the Navy? Could some be accomplished by modern, long-range, high accuracy weapons instead? With what effect on the required size of the carrier force?

In what scenarios would the U.S. use the levels of forcible entry forces--Marines over the beach, paratroopers, special **assault units--currently** in our force structure?

What scenarios can be specified in which current or programmed forces would be inadequate to protect U.S. interests? What operational capabilities are missing? How could they be provided?

What is our base-access plan world-wide? What capabilities would hedge against base denial? What opportunities could the U.S. pursue to increase **our** ability to operate wherever we might need to in the world?

In each scenario, what role do we expect our security partners to play? How should their force planning be coordinated with our own?

Given the air-superiority forces in the Air Force and Navy, should the Marine air arm be focused on ground attack and troop transport? If good for the Marines, should the Air Force give over its close air support mission to the Army?

- In the face of future threats and changing missions, do we need a different Navy, one less tied to carriers and blue water operations, with more emphasis on submarines, and with surface ships designed to operate in circumstances more -like those of the Persian Gulf campaign?

Does the current widespread deployment of nuclear weapons on Naval ships serve U.S. long term interests? Will our Neither Confirm Nor Deny policy hold up? What alternative nuclear weapons deployment patterns should be considered, together with or separate from U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements?

- In both the conventional and nuclear realms, how can our arms control planning and force improvements be made complementary and mutually reinforcing?
- How does technological change affect strategy? Where would advanced capabilities in the hands of adversaries call elements of strategy into question? Would projected new **capabilities** make feasible elements which heretofore were considered too risky or costly, or simply impossible?
- What strategic defense capabilities are feasible in the next decade or so? Which ones add to stability and security if both sides have them?

ENCLOSURE 2: ILLUSTRATIVE MACRO-EFFICIENCY ISSUES

The taxpayer could be better served if the **DoD** bureaucracy and the defense contractors were both subjected to pressures to consolidate operations and reduce overhead similar to those that much of American business has faced since the 1982 recession. Ab...

A start has been made on closing unneeded bases, but more could be done, especially if the headquarters structures of the Services were scrutinized at the same time. ✓

Modern technology can multiply the wartime effectiveness of delivered munitions. We usually take the benefits in increased capability rather than a smaller force of costly delivery platforms to do the same military **job**.

Various ideas have been studied for reconstituting the logistics support for combat forces that would make maintenance and supply more effective in wartime, and might well **save money** in peacetime.

Compensation for enlisted personnel could be adjusted to rely somewhat less on the pay tables that apply to all and more on special pays and bonuses for scarce skills, with a likely reduction in overall budget costs.

NATO treats logistics support as a "**national**" responsibility, each member responsible for support of its own forces. Moving to the seemingly sensible concept of "**coalition** logistics" would offer greater combat capability or cost savings, but lacks the needed political support, even for developing a specific plan.

snowflake

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 22, 2001
SUBJECT: Attachment

Here's a piece on leadership through the ranks. I don't know who sent it, but there it is.
If you think someone else ought to see it, send it along to them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.36

Attach: (Leadership Through Ranks 5/3/01)

381

1/35

22 May 01

U10135 /01

5/3/01

LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE RANKS

The transformational changes necessary in the defense community in the next few years will only be possible if the millions of people in the Defense Department and its many allied and related partners from Congress to contractors provide leadership.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest a communications vehicle to allow those who have the opportunity to be leaders to get the idea that leadership is part of their job. The communications envisioned will be filled less with specific direction and infused more with the larger sense of the necessary direction of needed change.

While leadership is often properly seen as a role for a few, this paper looks for ways to assure that leadership is an activity for many, if not all, who are involved. This is not a question of substitution so much as an issue of selection. Some change can come from the execution of a commander's order. Some cannot. Sometimes leadership invokes a "Yes, Sir." Sometimes a "How about trying it this way?" is more in tune with the challenge.

The goal of this paper is to offer a new device that advances an appreciation of the need and role for leadership activities beyond command and influence. By offering this device – a project that, if successful, can have considerable impact, it is hoped that other devices implemented in other parts of the defense community will have a similar impact.

Many aspects of the imminent and urgent departmental agenda are likely to involve objectives ill suited for achievement through hierarchical order giving. If that sort of leadership worked in these areas, the job might have been long since completed.

Efficiency, innovation, insight, enthusiasm are the sorts of behaviors required by this agenda. Understanding the distinction between management and leadership is also required.

A compelling vision of the future of our defenses is neither the sole property nor the exclusive responsibility of one person – not even the President or the Secretary of Defense. Many, many people must see roads to change and follow them.

The Defense Public Affairs functions are involved in exercises of leadership by command, to be sure. But Public Affairs has an even more compelling assignment to inspire the proper climate for leadership activities of a non-hierarchical nature.

Leadership through the ranks – the column

The Secretary of Defense is the colleague of millions of Americans in uniform, in the families of those in uniform and in the civilian defense ranks.

Similarly, the Secretary must have a collegial relationship with the hundreds of thousands of men and women who provide the hardware and services to our forces as private citizens.

As we learned on Easter weekend, the Secretary and the Department are also the colleague and friend of the many citizens who live and work in proximity to our bases and installations.

Finally, and importantly, the Secretary is the colleague of the hundreds of people who are involved in the development of defense policy in the Congress.

All of these people see the Secretary as a leader. What may be needed is a way for him to return the honor.

The Secretary and his direct team, as well as other prominent leaders in the Administration, need access to this community of colleagues for purposes other than to command and report. They need to converse and confer. They need to muse and reflect. They need to worry and wonder. Occasionally, they need to complain. More often, they need to applaud.

Imagine if an 800 word essay – a column, if you will – were to be delivered every week to each of these millions, perhaps tens of millions, of colleagues? Imagine if each essay conveyed the feeling of collegiality? Imagine if each essay conveyed the importance of broad involvement in leadership activities? Imagine if each essay was seen by the entire community, putting all of the millions on the same page and – and the same level. Week after week, every individual in the worldwide American defense community would spend a few minutes thinking “in sync.”

The delivery mechanisms seem to be in place. The column would appear in every base newspaper. It might even be offered to private sector newspapers in communities with defense installations, just as surely as Congressman Rumsfeld's columns once appeared in the Winnetka Talk. The column would be similarly provided to the employees of contractors. Members of the Congress and their staffs would receive copies or encouraged to read it in the setting of a home district base paper.

This is not a column of news nor it is “The Rumsfeld Report.” The community of leaders that constitutes the defense community will come to rely on this offering as a mechanism to aid and abet their own leadership. Sometimes, the author need not be the Secretary. The President will be an excellent substitute on occasion, as will the Secretaries of State and Treasury, Housing and Health and others. The Trade Representative should weigh in occasion as well as, of course, the Chiefs and the service Secretaries.

But the Secretary will only occasionally yield the page because it is important for the conversations to have continuity and coherence. Leaders need that and every reader is a leader. Other senior leaders in the Department and the Administration may consider developing comparable venues, just as this one follows from the Presidential venue of the Saturday radio address.

Leadership through the ranks is often difficult. When leaders are made prominent, their leadership becomes an expectation. For others, there may often be a sense the permission must be granted – permission to take risks, to try something new, to challenge oneself and others. The unstated sign-off for every *Leadership through the Ranks* essay is *permission granted*.

While a newspaper column may seem a little old-fashioned, the written word is essential to the role to be played by these essays. Reading is not hierarchical in the way of watching or even listening. Reading can be done at the right time rather than the scheduled time. Reading can be reviewed without being rewound. And finally, reading prompts a universally available mechanism for response and engagement – writing.

Line extensions for this project into television, radio and Internet are logical additions to “Leadership through the ranks” venues, but they should be undertaken carefully. The electronic media seem inherently more hierarchical. Presenting the same words as the column in a television context may have a very different “feel.” Interactive media will surely play a role at some point. Both of these formats ultimately share an important trait with the written word. They can be absorbed “over the shoulder.” Many in the audience, from spouses to the neighbors to the members of Congress, may not immediately perceive themselves to be the intended audience. This is not a problem. The posture of the outsider may be just a step on the path to leadership. If the words are right, the opportunities should be clear.

The ranks of leadership will proliferate.

Bill Roesing
Revised
April 27, 2001

Spiraling to progress

American weapons systems are falling behind the technological curve. New weapons can take ten years to produce. The technology upon which those systems are based usually becomes outdated in 18 months.

This pattern must be changed. The solution will come when everyone involved in using the system has the opportunity to help lead the way to the best design. Perhaps government is neither as effective nor as efficient as the private sector when it comes to innovation. Yet, it is not logical to turn all innovation over to contractors, no matter how innovative they are – and many of them are enormously creative.

The simple fact is that when our military is the only customer, as is the case with many weapons, the risk is in leaving us out of the development process. The challenge is to add our contribution at the right time.

Making time for our input would seem to slow down the delivery of systems, but in reality it increases the likelihood of preventing costly and time-consuming errors. We will get better systems faster.

The logic of this thinking is akin to the way housing is developed in virtually every community in America. The developer will assess the market to determine how many people in an area might need what sort of house. When a customer comes to look for a house, the choices are not arrayed in the form of finished buildings. Instead the options are laid out on paper.

Often, one “model” home will be built. It will show the basic layout. Touring the model gives the buyer a sense of how well this design will serve the family’s needs. The model serves as the beginning of the decision-making process. Many, many choices are yet to be made from colors to finishes, from the uses of certain spaces to the placement of shelving. The buyer is a full-partner with the builder in making the right decisions for this particular family.

Imagine if the process were different. Imagine if every house in a new development was finished prior to the arrival of the first buyer. The process might seem to be more efficient. Everything could be done to the same specification. Yet, many of the specifications could turn out to be inappropriate. The builder would be a candidate for bankruptcy.

This sort of evolutionary system of development will now be utilized in the process of bringing new weapons on line. Our planners call the process "spiral development." Of course, guns are not homes and the Defense Department is not exactly like a family looking for a place to live. But the truth remains that just as buying a new house without contributing to the way it is finished seems silly, so it is a bad idea to complete a new weapons system without the maximum possible contribution in thinking, designing and testing by those who will use it.

With spiral development, the delivery of a bare bones, initial core capability will come first, without all of the bells or whistles. This will be followed by a sequence of improvements and add-ons based on feedback from the users – our warfighters in the field.

So, rather than going for the fully developed, but hard to change, capability straight away, spiral development will much more quickly deliver small numbers of basic capabilities to the field.

This is far more than a procedural improvement. This way the people who will be testing the new weapon to determine what works and what doesn't will be the people who are going to be using that weapon. This is an insurance policy that our experts with the weapon in question will be well positioned to make a difference. Of course, it also places responsibility for design with the right people at the right time.

Speed is as much a product of doing it right as doing it fast. By opening up the process of development, innovation will increase while mistakes will decrease.

One promising early candidate for spiral development is the unmanned aerial vehicle global hawk. We can provide basic airframes today for service as surveillance platforms while simultaneously experimenting with their potential as future combat vehicles.

One important aspect of leadership is the ability to point in the right direction. When it comes to the development of weapons systems, there are no better leaders than the men and women in our ranks who will be using them. Spiral development puts these leaders in the front-line of decision-making as weapons evolve so that we will have the best weapons possible when they are needed.

snowflake

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

I think we need to have some policy soon where we reduce the size of the OSD staff by at least 15%.

DHR/azn
052901.42

020 059

29 May 01

U10150 /01

snowflake

TO: Steve **Cambone**
cc: David Chu
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT: **Attachment**

381

Attached are some ideas from Harlan Ullman that might be of interest.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.44
Attach.

29 May 01

U10149 /01

**From The Desk Of
Harlan Ullman**

**1245 29th Street North West
Washington, D.C. 20007
202-333-3004
202-337-7337 (fax)
703-824-2194(CNA)**

Please Pass to Cdr Johnson quickly

To: Cdr Andy Johnson
Re: **Big Ideas**

March 6th, 2001

Andy---attached are a two page memo and various slides and bits. If you could let me know that they were received and passed on, I would be grateful.

Thanks,

Harlan —

SECRET/ CABLE DISTRIBUTION	
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SECRET	
EXCERPT	X
CAT	X
CC	X
CABLE/CH	
FILE	

**From The Desk Of
Harlan Ullman**

**1245 29th Street North West
Washington, D.C. 20007
202-333-3004
202-337-7337 (fax)
703-824-2194(CNA)**

To: **Don Rumsfeld**
Re: Big Ideas

March 6th, 2001

Don--- Your office called inquiring about a few "big ideas" that may **not have reached** you. Hence this correspondence. As an interested (but not necessarily well-connected) observer of **defense**, the **three** key items that were passed on to you **earlier** this year do not seem to have been addressed yet at least in 'what is leaking out of the building. That, of course, could be because these views are not shared or considered to be significant or that solutions are already being addressed. The crucial items are "**people**" and the crisis in leadership and service; the need for genuine reform in how the department conducts its business; and answers to the question "transform to what?"

First, in my view, **the** biggest problem the Department and the nation face **re** defense is about people---attracting, recruiting and retaining both uniforms and civilians who are, if not the "**best** and the brightest," pretty close. **The issue** here is "leadership and **service**" rather than simply improving the quality of life. "Juniors" (**i.e.**, O-6 or O-7 and below) are increasingly disenchanted with their seniors. In part, **this** is due to the diminution in **the** understanding of service and in convincing people why service is important and fulfilling. And, in part it is failing confidence of juniors in the ability of seniors to lead. As noted in earlier correspondence, in the Navy (to pick only one **case**), two years ago a survey of **junior** officers conducted by reserve admiral Jack Natter revealed that fewer than 10% aspired to command. This is a crisis that no one seems to worry about enough to address it and that each of the **services** faces.

Second, a **super-BRAC** is not the complete answer. Genuine reform is. And reform must be of the how the department conducts its entire business starting with the **Title X** responsibilities to recruit, **train**, equip and organize. For example, when you were first secretary, the "tooth to tail" ratio was about **40-60**. Today it is **25-75** and **possibly 20-80**. To that end, attached is a **briefing** prepared for the Navy and its so-called Revolution in Business Affairs that suggests how Such an undertaking might proceed. It was **clearly** too rich for the Navy's blood. Michael Bayer will vouch for the **process** since he **was** part of it.

Finally, in the search for the holy grail of transformation, the question is 'transform to what?' In the briefing that **CinCJFC** gave to the president in Norfolk, **he** said that the military was transforming to become more 'agile and lethal. But more agile and lethai to

do what? How, **for example**, would greater **agility and lethality have made** a difference in Desert Storm or the **78-day** war over Serbia? Freddie Franks, VII Corps Commander in Desert Storm proudly noted **that** his tanks had a 90% **kill** (i.e., not hit) rate. It would be hard to be more lethal and agile than his corps was.

As **you** recall from the work on "**Shock and Awe**," it has long been my **view** that in a world that is **as** uncertain and hectic as the one we face, the aim of policy and of military force must be to focus on how to affect, influence and, indeed, to control will, perception and attitudes. The mechanism offered to **affect**, influence and control was a regime of "shock and awe" (ranging from the sublime and therefore highly positive to complete and entire devastation and destruction). However, the point is to identify what is to be achieved through transformation, and then putting those ideas and intentions into plain English that is understandable to the private, general, member **of Congress and** informed citizen.

I am happy to discuss some or all of the above or simply to turn my transmitter off.

In the meantime, the very best wishes and best of **luck!**

Harlan —

Attach

The Big Problem


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IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY

As will be shown, from 1989 to 1993 and including the actions of the first three Base Closure and Realignment Commissions, the defense budget has been cut by nearly 30 percent in real terms, force structure by about 35 percent, and the infrastructure by less than 17 percent. Because the infrastructure still included many facilities that date back to World War II, these reductions and realignments have been modest at best even though the political pain and consequences have been quite high.

In terms of infrastructure, figures 16 and 17 depict graphically, how the DOD budget has shifted over the past four decades in terms of actual spending. Although funding for strategic forces has dramatically and understandably declined from the build-up of the early 1960s, categories that are generally representative of infrastructure have shown the opposite tendency. The future trends depicting the growing disparity between "teeth" and "tail" take into account the actual and projected savings made through the BRAC process.

Figure 16. Infrastructure drain 1982-1990




Note: All figures taken from Office of the Comptroller, the DOD, May 1993, pp. 62-63. "Teeth" included strategic and general-purpose forces, and air- and sealift. "Tail" included the other accounts.

PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW"

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Figure 17. Infrastructure drain 1980-1988



Note: All figures taken from Office of the Comptroller, the OOD, May 1988, pp. 62-63. "Teeth" included strategic and general-purpose forces, and air-and-sealift. "Tail" included the other accounts.

- "Teeth," measured by strategic and general-purpose forces, have shrunk from about half of the budget to less than two-fifths. The trends between "teeth" and "tail" are diverging rapidly in favor of infrastructure.
- Intelligence and communications funding has increased, in real terms, by more than double.
- Air and sealift funding has increased by nearly half.⁵²
- Guard and reserve funding has increased by nearly two-thirds.
- Research and development funding has increased by almost half.
- Training, medical, and administration have increased, particularly in relation to the reduction of one million active-duty service members since 1962.

⁵² Lift clearly contributes to fighting power as well as parts of other budget accounts, but it is the size of the differential that is suggestive of the trend.



Making a Revolution -- Implementing a Real RBA

01 September 1998

Draft 2-98





Summary

- **In order to implement a full and complete RBA, four basic and overriding tasks were identified:**
 - First, a process for integrating, assessing and validating all operational, readiness, training and maintenance requirements must be put in place.
 - Second, the core functions that can only be performed by Sailors and Marines such as pulling triggers, dropping bombs and capturing territory must be defined and less essential tasks assigned to appropriate government agencies or other services, contracted out, or eliminated.
 - Third, the "Teeth to Tail ratio," appropriately defined, must be shifted perhaps by as much as \$8 billion per year towards "teeth."
 - Finally, "Quality of life" initiatives must address the issue of sustaining the morale and general welfare of our most important resource – our military and civilian people.

~~For SECNAV's Eyes Only~~



A Real RBA

- **While the private sector does NOT use the term RBA, here is our definition:**
 - First, to be an RBA, there must be a highly objective assessment of the harsh realities confronting the services, and then crafting an appropriately bold response.
 - Second, it is taking the best practices of the private sector and, as each fits, applying them to how DoN is organized, managed and run.
 - Third, it is ensuring that all people concerned in making the RBA work recognize that the future of the naval services is at stake.
- **We start with the law, Title 10, and the responsibilities for “organizing, training and equipping” naval forces for “prompt, sustained operations incident to combat...”**
- **The first key question is knowing for what we are organizing, training and equipping.**



A Real RBA

- **Currently, requirements for organizing, training, equipping, and operating are rarely assessed and validated in a comprehensive way. And, Title 10 now directs CJCS to develop “doctrine for joint employment” and formulate policy for “joint training,” adding another input.**
 - For example, in the Atlantic Fleet, every 18 months a ship undergoes 314 inspections, which seems excessive.
 - And, CNO has signed out a memo to LANTFLT and PACFLT to reduce some of those requirements by 25%.
- **Hence, step one must be to collate and validate all of the operational, training, readiness and maintenance requirements, including all exercises, services and special port calls, to determine what we are organizing, training and equipping for.**

~~For SECNAV's Eyes Only~~



What Comes Next?

- **Second, and a subset of the first, we must:**
 - Identify those tasks and assignments that can only be performed by Sailors and Marines, such as pulling triggers, dropping bombs and occupying enemy territory;
 - Identify what tasks could be [better] performed by other services, other government agencies and offices;
 - Identify what tasks could be "contracted out";
 - Identify what tasks could be eliminated or reduced.
 - For example, there is an initiative under review to "MSC-ize" an FFG-7, manning it with about a quarter of the nominal crew by minimizing maintenance and watchstanding requirements, and still conduct counter-drug and other non-warfighting missions.

P 11



What Comes Next?

- **Third, there must be renewed emphasis on shifting the “Teeth to Tail” ration towards “Teeth” using an arbitrary objective of freeing up about 10% of the Navy’s annual budget toward that objective.**
 - Senator Ted Stevens recently declared he would implement a new BRAC in response to a major DoD headquarters restructuring and downsizing – why not take him up on it?
 - Industry, through reorganizing and productivity increases is routinely freeing up more than 10% of its operating income.
- **Finally, our most important resource – people – must be protected and morale and general welfare sustained through QOL initiatives.**
 - Retirement, healthcare, and other benefits are being [seriously] eroded and retention is suffering.

MAP, - 6-01 TUE 1:25 PM

~~For SECNAV's Eyes Only~~

6

11-L-0559/OSD/319

11



A Proposed Structure and Plan of Action

MAR-6-01 TUE 1:26 PM

Taking the Four Tasks:

- I. Validate operational, training, equipping, maintenance and other requirements, including joint ones.
- II. Identify core / unique / essential tasks.
- III. Shift "Teeth to Tail" ratio.
- IV. Enhance "Quality of Life."

We superimpose the necessary additional sub-steps, the ExCom initiatives, and a time horizon for completion / implementation using the near (1-3 months), medium (3-12 months) and long-term (beyond 1 year).

~~For SBCNAV's Eyes Only~~

P. 12

12



A Proposed Structure and Plan of Action

MAR-6-01 TUE 1:26 PM

I. Validate operational requirements for organizing, training, and equipping.

IA. Validate (new task)

IB. Application of technology

IC. Establish accurate, comprehensive, transparent cost accounting
system (new)

II. Define core / unique functions.

IIA. Define unique functions (new task)

IIB. Reengineer major staffs *

IIC. Exploit unused infrastructure *

IID. Recruiting, training and assignments *

IIE. Alternatives to military manning *

IIF. Re-focus R&D (new task)

* ExCom recommendation

~~For SECNAV's Eyes Only~~



A Proposed Structure and Plan of Action

III. Shift "Teeth to Tail" ratio toward "Teeth"

- IIIA. Apply results of validation and definition of tasks (I & II)
- IIIB. Application of technology *
- IIIC. Reengineer staffs *
- IIID. Incorporate commercial financial practices *
- IIIE. Reengineer personnel support *
- IIIF. Incentives for business reform *

IV. Enhance Quality of Life

- IVA. Set new OPTEMPO, deployment, training and work-up schedules (new task)
- IVB. Housing reform *
- IVC. Application of technology *
- IVD. Reengineer staffs / organizations *
- IVE. Recruiting, training, etc. *

* ExCom recommendation

~~For SECNAV's Eyes Only~~

snowflake

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

Who's the asset manager for the **DoD** that manages inventories, receivables, payables.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.53

400.23

29 May 01

U10151 /01

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

Here is some material From Bill Owens' book, *Lifting the Fog of War* on standing joint task forces which is most helpful.

How do we get these plowed in this week to the meetings?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.15
Attach.

110.01

29 May 01

U10139 /01

WINNING THE REVOLUTION

- *Transform military education and training.* To set in stage a transformation of U.S. military service culture—in particular, to root out the military service insularism and rivalry that have dominated the ranks for over a century—the secretary and his staff should organize for a comprehensive review of all of the military educational institutions, ranging from the military service academies to the National Defense University and armed forces colleges, and to the basic training for enlisted personnel. The impetus of the review should be to identify areas of curriculum and administration reform aimed at radically increasing the exposure and education of military personnel to the full spectrum of U.S. military culture and organization. (For example, the review panel might consider a partial consolidation of the four military service academies to encourage cross-training, mutual indoctrination, and expanded exchange programs.)

- *Establish Standing Joint Force Commands.* Develop a plan for the establishment of four to seven SJFs in each of the five regions under three-star officers, and reporting to the five regional commanders in chief. Disestablish the four-star service component commands that operate as "war fighters" under the CINCs today (and which enforce the single-service mentality around the world). Encourage savings and considerable improvement in military capability would ensue.

We have approached the end of the twentieth century much as historians say we began it. Nearly one hundred years ago we were also flush with military victories and torn by protracted conflicts in obscure and remote lands. We had defeated the Spanish Empire, a military force that pundits of the time proclaimed as "one of the world's most formidable," much as their progeny would describe that of Iraq nine decades later. We had fought in coalition with European nations and the Japanese to enforce "world order" over "the chaos of what is essentially tribal warfare and centuries of animosity" in the Chinese Boxer rebellion.²² We had begun a long, grinding, and largely unnoticed interdictory effort against the Moors in the southern Philippines to, among other things, "protect the civilized world from the threats of fanaticism and

LIFTING THE FOG OF WAR

The legislation would eliminate all authority for defining budget and procurement requirements from the military services, making them responsible to implement the decisions of the Joint Requirements Committee and manage their services. The chiefs of each of the military services would be specifically charged with being the "chief executive officer" of his service's infrastructure, with training and managing personnel and facilities. The secretary of defense's staff would also shift in function, losing all its existing power to set military budget requirements independently. This in turn would justify major reductions in civilian and military Pentagon staff personnel, perhaps by as much as 50 percent of the current Manning level. The Joint Requirements Committee would become the center of the Pentagon's primary responsibility to analyze and define the shape of the future U.S. force structure and to determine what military capabilities the force would require.

- *Convene a new "Summit of Key West."* The next President and his national security team immediately upon taking office should convene an "off-site" summit meeting with all of the senior four-star officers of the armed services to outline the goals for the program to implement the Revolution in Military Affairs and real defense reform and to seek guidance and input on specific subjects such as how the Unified Command Plan (which designates the responsibilities of the regional commanders in chief) should be revised.

- *Consolidate key military support functions.* The new secretary of defense should take immediate steps to order the consolidation of the four "great enablers" of combat power—intelligence, communications, logistics, and medical services. An individual military service (Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps) could be made the executive agent for each of these four joint executive functions, taking on the management responsibilities for all of the four services. In parallel with this consolidation, the defense logistics, communications, and intelligence agencies of each service and the

• *Unitary military war-fighting organizations.* Although we would still have ground, naval, and air forces with individual service identities, the forces would be organized by what tasks they perform in battle rather than by what service branch they come from. Unlike the past tradition where the four services operated and maintained their own bases and installations, the basic building block for U.S. military force would be a range of *standing joint forces* that—regardless of their service composition or origin—would be located together, train together full-time, and deploy as a single entity. They could be general-purpose forces geared to land, air, and sea or they could be tailored to specific operating missions such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; amphibious assault; long-range aerial strikes; theater missile defense; sea control or armored ground assault.¹ These Standing Joint Forces organizations would be under the leadership of a three-star general or admiral and would number 15,000 to 50,000 personnel. There could be 25 or 30 of these forces in the U.S. military, each working for one of the regional four-star commanders in chief. And they would be organized for the most efficient and effective use of resources to accomplish America's missions around the world.

• *Embedded information warfare capability.* From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the individual infantryman, sailor, airman, and Marine, the U.S. military force would define itself and its combat capabilities through superior information technology, enabling our fighting units to outmaneuver and outfight any conventional military opponent or irregular adversary. We would have an offensive capability to destroy the enemy force's intelligence and command-and-control system, and a defensive capability to protect the U.S. force from deception and attack by the enemy. All deployable combat units, whether tailored for ground, naval, or air operations, would be organized with a dedicated information warfare capability linking its commanders, weapons, sensors, and command-and-control systems.

• *From the command chain to the command network.* The industrial-age hierarchy from generals and admirals down to privates and seamen would be fastened significantly, and there would be fewer

intermediate layers of bureaucracy. In many places the chain of command would be replaced by secure and powerful networks that relay commands and critical battlespace information from the area of conflict to key decision makers, and from leaders and national intelligence agencies directly to the combatants, who will be able to respond more quickly and nimbly to directives from their commanders.

—*Lean and mean combat writs.* Capitalizing on advanced computer processing power, networked sensors and communications, and long-range precision weapons, war-fighting units would be designed for maximum mobility, speed, and agility to be deployed to crisis areas from the continental United States and overseas bases.

—*Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (C²ISR).* The wide range of early-warning, strategic intelligence, and tactical surveillance missions—the military's eyes and ears—would be supervised by a single military organization. Each combat organization would have a consolidated internal intelligence component at every key level in the chain of command, seamlessly connected to the command-level systems. Included would be tactical surveillance systems at the battlespace level whose data would be available from local units to senior leadership.

—*Consolidated global mobility.* Combat and support units would be designed and organized from the continental United States for rapid deployment worldwide with one organization being in charge of a modernized and expanded fleet of fast combat supply ships and military aircraft. Heavy equipment would continue to be prepositioned overseas at secure sites and onboard an enlarged fleet of cargo ships. Note that the United States could construct a number of large Mobile Offshore Base deep-ocean structures that would anchor our military presence in trouble spots, providing basing for large logistics storage, several thousand combat troops, and up to several hundred tactical aircraft.

—*Consolidated advanced logistics.* The "tooth to tail" ratio of fighting versus support units would be twice what it is today. This leaner ratio of support to combat units would mark a revolution-

snowflake

TO: Jackie Arends
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

I am told that Cameron Bruemmer (f/k/a Woods) has a resume in to get a job, I think in the Under Secretary for Policy and Readiness shop.

Can you dig that out for me? Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.20

U10038 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/327

02045P

27MAY01

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 29, 2001
SUBJECT:

Where in OSD do we have a policy planning staff!

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052901.43

020 OSD

29 May 01

U10152 /01

May 29, 2001 5:00 PM

snowflake

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Pat Roberts

DR

*Wayne for action
Bzz*

You might want to draft a letter for me to send to Pat Roberts on the Ellsworth paper he was involved in and worked on. He has mentioned it to me twice. It was a good piece of work.

Our people have read it, we are certainly taking it into account, and I think it would be nice to tell him that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052901-56



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 17 2001

The Honorable Pat Roberts
United States Senate
Washington, DC 205 10- 1605

Dear Senator Roberts,

We have discussed the Ellsworth Study a number of times at **DoD**. It is a very good piece of work. I do thank you for bringing it to my attention. We are certainly taking it into account.

I understand Secretary **Roche** had a good exchange with you at a recent hearing.

Sincerely,

452B

1750101

U12551 /01

snowflake

May 30, 2001 1:32 PM

VIA FACSIMILE

TO: General Charles R. Holland, U.S. Air Force
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command

CC: General Hugh Shelton

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Defense Strategy Review

Thanks for your April 25 memo on the defense strategy review paper. It was helpful and constructive.

We are bringing the CINCs together on Saturday, as you know. I hope you and your associates will be prepared to present your thoughts.

Regards,

DHR:dh
053001-8

381

30 May 01

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
cc: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 31, 2001
SUBJECT:

We are going to have to get some savings. Why don't we just do a cut at OSD of some percent, say 10% or something, and find out what the current level is and move it down somewhat.

See me.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
053101.23

110.61

31 May 01

U10309 /01

TO: Admiral Vernon Clark

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2001

SUBJECT:

Thanks so much for sending up the strategic surprise paper. It certainly gets one's brain going. I appreciate it!

Thank you.

DHR/azn
060101.02

335 SD

15 Jun 01

U10310 /01

snowflake

TO: Gen. Henry Shelton

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 9, 2001

SUBJECT:

Thanks for your report on your visits to Jordan and Egypt. It is helpful. I have passed it along to Colin and Condi.

Regards.

DHR/azn
060901.03

W
33

9
for
10

U10612 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/334

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone
Lisa Bronson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

DATE: June 9, 2001

RE:

Find out what the meeting that Ivanov mentioned that he was invited to in Naples and said he would accept. He said that during the Ministerial meeting in Brussels.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060901.11

U10610 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/335

snowflake

TO: Lisa Bronson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: June 9, 2001

Make sure you send Tom Miller anything I said about Bosnia in the various **ministerials**.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060901.16

BOSNIA

9 June 0

U10609 /01

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
cc: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 9, 2001

We want to make sure we have money in the '02 budget for military training.

DHR/azn
060901.17.3

353

9-5-01

Done as usual.

U10827 /01

snowflake

June 11, 2001 12:10 PM

Info
6/9/01
1238

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Testimony

I think we ought to mention **IMET** in my testimony everywhere we go. And when we talk to people, we ought to keep that **front** and center.

I need the details. We need to get enough money into it, and we need to get permission to go into countries we are not currently able to go into.

It is an important program, and we need to push it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061101-15

110.01

11500

snowflake

June 13, 2001 9:46 AM

TO: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Tunisia

I am told that the Air Force uses Tunisia for a target range. Could we use that instead of Vieques?

DHR:dh
061301-23

11-L-0559/OSD/339

June 13, 2001 1:44 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Biological Sanctions

I am worried about the biological sanctions regime. Apparently is it still rattling around in our bureaucracies, It is a bad idea, We need to stop it once and for all..

Please let me know what the status is and what I can do to help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061301-S

370.64

3 Jun 0

U10871 /01

snowflake

June 15, 2001 10:12 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stealth

Do you have **anything** on this article I have circled on stealth?

Attach.
6/15/01 SIRO Press Review

DHR:dh
061501-2

cc: Susan Sitt

11-L-0559/OSD/341

FRIDAY, 15 JUNE 2001

UNCLASSIFIED

H I G H L I G H T S

1. (MIDDLE EAST) A Palestinian fired from close range at an Israeli van in the West Bank on Thursday, killing an Israeli army intelligence officer, jeopardizing a new, U.S.-mediated cease-fire agreement. The shooting, along a major thoroughfare, took place during a schedule meeting between the Palestinian and the Israeli officer, a Palestinian security official in the Gaza Strip said on condition of anonymity. A soldier in the car then shot and killed the Palestinian, the Israeli military said. A soldier was wounded in the attack. Later that day, Palestinians fired several mortar shells at the Jewish settlement of Morag in the Gaza Strip, the military said, but no one was hurt. Israel ordered its army to start easing restrictions on the Palestinians following a security meeting on 13 June in Tel Aviv. At the Netzarim junction, a major flash point in the Gaza Strip, Israeli tanks pulled back about a 100 yards on Thursday, then approached again part-way. Stone-throwing Palestinian youths pelted Israeli military jeeps. Soldiers responded with stun grenades and tear gas. No injuries were reported. Major General Giora Eiland, Israeli Chief of Military Operations, said soldiers would begin to lift restrictions by mid-afternoon Friday, and Israeli forces would redeploy. The plan calls for Israel to pull its forces and heavy weapons back to points they held before the hostilities erupted. Eiland said the timetable could be accelerated if the Palestinians work to prevent attacks. -AP, 14 JUN 01-

2. (BALKANS) Macedonia asked NATO on Thursday to be ready to help it disarm ethnic Albanian rebels, if the guerrillas eventually agree to peace terms now on offer. Macedonian authorities have also extended a four-day cease-fire. Although ruling out Western intervention, NATO Chief George Robertson told a news conference that he will be taking the request back to NATO headquarters "to see what we can do." Robertson supports Macedonian President Trajkovski's peace plan that provides for a system of disarmament and decommissioning. The guerrillas, meanwhile, outlined for the first time their demands for ending the insurgency. Wary of the Macedonian government, the guerrillas also want the western alliance to get involved, asking that NATO troops be deployed throughout the country and demanding an amnesty for their fighters and wide-ranging reforms to improve the status of Albanians. Meanwhile, Britain said on Thursday it had offered to send training teams to help the Macedonian army but according to the Ministry of Defense, the Macedonians had yet to make a direct request for help. -REUTERS, 14 JUN 01-

C A P S U L E S

1. (U.S./CHINA) A six-person team from the contractor Lockheed Martin is en route to Hainan Island to begin dismantling and shipping home the damaged EP-3 Navy spy plane, U.S. and Chinese officials said Thursday. -AP, 14 JUN 01-

2. (U.S./STEALTH) China, Russia, and several European and U.S. companies are working on a new radar system that threatens to render the stealth B-2 bomber fleet obsolete by making the radar-evading planes more detectable, ABC's World News Tonight reported on Thursday. -REUTERS, 14 JUN 01-

3. (RUSSIA/OSCE) According to Reuters, the 55-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has agreed to pay the Russian Ministry of Justice for a 25-man protection squad for its two-or-three-man monitoring team that is returning to Chechnya after withdrawing in December 1998. -REUTERS, 14 JUN 01-



STATEMENT

United States Air Force

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 1690 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1690
(703) 695-0640

June 14, 2001

USAF ANALYSIS OF PASSIVE COHERENT LOCATION SYSTEMS

The Department of Defense remains interested in any and all advanced detection techniques to support US military operations around the world. The US Air Force has analyzed the capabilities of much talked about passive coherent location systems (PCLS) to evaluate the practical limitations as well as advantages of passive systems. These air defense 'radars' use TV, radio or cell phone transmitters combined with sensitive receivers to track aircraft. Some have characterized them as "counter-stealth" systems. A recently published article in the London Daily Times as well as interviews with Lockheed Martin, the designer of the Silent Sentry passive tracking system, suggest a continuing misunderstanding of the practical applications of such an air defense asset.

The Air Force participated in testing of Lockheed Martin's Silent Sentry system at various locations on the east coast, using commercial broadcast TV and radio transmitters, to assess its ability to develop tracks on military and commercial aircraft. As part of these tests, an instrumented aircraft with highly precise differential GPS onboard was flown against the PCLS system. This aircraft position data was then compared to Silent Sentry tracks. The Air Force used this data to, validate a model of the PCLS system, which accurately matched its true performance. This model was then used to compare PCLS in an air defense role to traditional long-range early warning radars.

The testing and models show the PCLS system has significantly less detection range and comparable tracking accuracy to commercially available and widely deployed early warning radars. During testing, Silent Sentry created more false tracks than other typical air defense radars. The testing did not include jamming or other techniques that could potentially degrade detection performance during military engagements.

The US Air Force's early involvement and independent analysis of PCLS successfully demonstrated some limited performance against military and commercial air vehicles. As a result of demonstrated performance, the Air Force currently has no plans to pursue further development of the Silent Sentry system and does not consider PCLS technology "counter stealth."

-30-

snowflake

June 18, 2001 9:13 AM

TO: Under Secretaries
Service Secretaries

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Gordon Moore

Attached is an article on Gordon Moore. Gordon was a member of the Gilead board, which I chaired, and is a good friend.

It is worth considering the implications of this for our business.

Attach.

Newspaper article: "Moore's Law Sets the Pace of Progress"

DHR:dh
061801-3

413.5

185un 01

U11083 /01

Moore's law sets the pace of progress

As the rise in the complexity of integrated circuits continues, even the man who created Moore's law is being overtaken by it.

Paul Abraham

In April 1965, Moore's law was published in a short article in the publication *Electronic Design*. The article, written by Moore, then president and chief executive officer of Intel, described the trend of increasing complexity in the world's largest semiconductor manufacturer's products.

Moore writes: "The complexity of integrated circuits has increased at a rate of roughly a factor of two per year since 1965."

Moore's law states that the number of transistors packed into an integrated circuit doubles every year. Another approach to Moore's law is to state that the number of transistors per square centimeter doubles every year. Moore, who is retiring from his post as president of Intel, states that there will be no reason to doubt that Moore's law will continue to hold.

The pace of progress in the semiconductor industry has been rapid since 1965. Moore's law has become a guiding principle for many engineers and scientists. The industry has seen a steady increase in the number of transistors per square centimeter, and Moore's law has become a benchmark for the industry.

Moore's law has been a driving force behind the development of integrated circuits. The number of transistors per square centimeter has increased from about 10,000 in 1965 to over 100,000,000 today. Moore's law has also been a key factor in the development of microprocessors, which are the brains of most modern computers.

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Moore's law has been a driving force behind the development of integrated circuits. The number of transistors per square centimeter has increased from about 10,000 in 1965 to over 100,000,000 today. Moore's law has also been a key factor in the development of microprocessors, which are the brains of most modern computers.

rise in information technology-related productivity and US's economic growth in the 1930s to the validity of Moore's law.

Mr Moore, now 72, says he is happy to take the credit for all the ramifications of the "law" he raised his fingers to put many nary inverted commas around the word. But he admits he used to cringe whenever he heard the expression. "Now I have got so used to it that I can say it with a straight face," he says with a laugh.

But as Mr Moore prepares to step down from Intel, he admits that his law could eventually be broken. "If you take a silicon chip, currently half of a micron wide, one four-hundredth of the width of a human hair, and the ability to make ever smaller components will start running up against the laws of physics. The problem is that chip component sizes are getting down to atomic dimensions.

1980, he would have missed the PC. In 1990, he did not foresee the internet. In fact, Mr Moore is being modest. His 1965 article foresaw that integrated circuits would lead to mass computers, networks of linked computers, chips on other digital watches and even "personal portable communications equipment".

His law does run into trouble. Mr Moore says it will not be on his watch, but he plans to continue to look for ways to extend Moore's law. He is currently looking for ways to extend Moore's law. He is currently looking for ways to extend Moore's law. He is currently looking for ways to extend Moore's law.

snowflake

JUL-02-2001 14:40

P.02/03

June 22, 2001 6:27 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ✉
SUBJECT: Empty Bases

One of the **things** that came up today in the **budget meetings** was the **fact that we have** these empty bases and yet we **are renting** a lot of **expensive** space downtown for **headquarters**. Why don't **we** move some of **these activities out of the** expensive leases and put them into the bases **that are underutilized?**

Thanks.

DHR:db
062201-3 I

11-L-0559/OSD/347

June 22, 2001 6:00 PM

JAPAN

Via Cables

TO: Admiral Dennis Blair

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DL

SUBJECT: Cable on Japan

The cable you sent on Japan was most helpful. I used it extensively and appreciate your thoughtfulness.

DHR:dh
062201-25

22 Jun 01

U11357 /01

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: June 23, 2001
SUBJECT:

Let me know what happened in your conversation with Senator Collins.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
062301.07

032

23 Jun 01

U11343 /01

snowflake

June 25, 2001 2:30 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Steve Cambone
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Events

I would like to keep a list of the events since I came in—just with a reference and a date so I can remember them. It would be events like the EP-3, the submarine surfacing under the Japanese fishing boat, Macedonia, a Kosovo landmine blowing off a soldier's foot today, the bombing of Iraq and the like.

Please do a draft of it and let me take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062501-27

LTC Sweeney -
Please let's discuss.
I think the Notification
file is a good place to
start this listing.

Larry Di Rita
6/29

092

25 Jun 01

snowflake

June 25, 2002 7:31 AM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Modernization

I just took a look at the memo Newt **Gingrich** sent you on March 27. It sounds to me like he is on the mark.

Please know that I am anxious to have you make progress on modernization. Newt thinks you are going to have to insist on a modern contract proposal if we are going to make any real headway.

Do let Paul or me know what we can do to help and please keep us posted.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/27/02 **Gingrich** e-mail to **SecDef**

DHR:dh
062502-5

.....
Please respond by 07/02/02

701

25 Jun 01

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

(Newt Gingrich)

Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2002 4:36 PM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

CC: Herbits1@aol.com; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: for secdef depsecdef

to secdef, depsecdef

from Newt 3/26/2002

attached is a memo I just sent Winkenwerder and Quam on the work they are doing to modernize healthcare for DOD. They are making real progress but the next phase of getting the bureaucracy to write the contract proposals is really difficult and encouraging winkenwerder to really insist on a modern contract proposal could be a big step toward having better healthcare while saving up to \$22 billion over the next five years.

Winkenwerder is doing really well but I think it would help if he knew he had support from secdef and depsecdef to continue moving to modernization
newt

to Bill Winkenwerder and Lois Quam

It sounds like you are making real progress on thinking through a 21st century system of healthcare for DOD. I am a little concerned about several steps that could make it more difficult to achieve the increase in quality and savings in money:

1. the bureaucracy historically developed a very different type of contracting than the model required for high quality, advanced technology healthcare. It is really important to ensure that the actual proposal writers spend time learning the principles and metrics of this more modern system. They should not be trying to marginally improve the traditional system which is what they are familiar with but rather should start from the requirements of the new, more modern contracting system and then design it anew. That may require some training or some oversight. In its absence I will be very surprised if they do not gradually and despite themselves revert to writing large sections in the old pattern.

2. It would probably help to hire an outside consultant who is an expert in how modern health contracts are written to help the senior civil service learn the new model, to be available to brief the news media from an objective standpoint on why the new model will deliver better quality care than the old model, and to be able to meet with congressional staff and members of congress to explain the new system and the fact that it is based on the developments in the private sector which provide better services at lower cost.

Finally, I think Torie Clarke and Powell Moore need to be apprised at some point of these exciting new developments because some of the current contract holders are almost certainly going to try to fight any significant modernization which would expose them to new competitors and new requirements. It is important to design the entire process and the way it will be explained to the news media and the legislative

3/28/2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUN 24 2002

branch to ensure that the focus is always on better quality care and more modern systems for the military families and retirees.
Newt

3/28/2002

snowflake

~~June 26, 2001 7:20 AM~~

July 11, 2001

TO: ~~Steve Cambone~~ *Lois*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Space

Here is an article **from** January 19, 1977. Take a look at the **next** to the last paragraph, which is on space.

Attach.

1/19/77 *Washington Post* article, "Rumsfeld Urges Steady Rises in Arms Spending"

DHR:dh
062601-3

471.96

2650001

U12617 /02

By Larry Morris—The Washington Post
Coast Guard vessel leads ships freed from ice yesterday into Baltimore Harbor.

gins Jovially

"I've never been to anything like this before," he said, "I expect it'll really be something to talk about for a while."

Hundreds milled around the Great Hall of the Commerce Department seeking to pick up their inaugural party and parade tickets. The phone rang there incessantly. One man from Georgia said loudly that Chip Carter, the President-elect's son, had personally assured him there would be a third party ticket waiting for him there. He'd been there for two hours and no one could find it.

"If Georgians were running this operation, this wouldn't be such a mess," he sniffed.

Another group, from Rochester, N.Y., got their tickets in five minutes with no problems and were preparing for an active stay in Washington.

See DAY, A12, Col. 4

Egyptians Rebel At Higher Prices

Demonstrations and scattered violence broke out in Egypt's two largest cities yesterday as thousands of workers and students protested government-ordered price increases for food and other staples.

Price increases were ordered Monday as the debt-ridden Egyptian government reduced a 24-year-old subsidy program. The moves were made at the urging of international financial supporters of Egypt.

Story on Page A18.

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced that parliamentary elections, twice delayed, will be held in March.

Story on Page A20.

Rumsfeld Urges Steady Rises in Arms Spending

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, delivering the Pentagon's annual posture statement, made the outgoing administration's case yesterday for keeping military spending high for at least the next five years.

He warned that unless a new block-buster ICBM, strategic bombers and a fleet of warships were built, the Soviet Union would get so far ahead militarily that the United States would lose influence around the world.

President-elect Jimmy Carter and his Defense Secretary, Harold Brown, thus will be up against a Pentagon brief of 353 pages if they try to downplay the Soviet threat and make cuts in the Pentagon budget as promised during the presidential campaign.

"In contrast to the 'buying only what we need' guidance laid down in 1961 when Brown started his first tour at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld argued yesterday that 'the United States effort must be as serious, as steady and as sustained as that of the Soviet Union.'"

He projected Pentagon budgets going from \$123.1 billion in the next fiscal year, 1978, to \$166.8 billion in 1982. Although the United States and the Soviet Union have "rough equivalency" today in strategic forces, Rumsfeld said, that much money will be required in the future to maintain the balance.

The departing Defense Secretary also firmly embraced the strategy of his immediate predecessor, James R. Schlesinger, by arguing in the posture statement that the United States must prepare to fight a limited nuclear war as well as deter an all-out one.

Rumsfeld said Soviet leaders do not share the American view that nuclear war would be so mutually destructive

See DEFENSE A6, Col. 1

11-L-0559/OSD/355

above zero, compared to the grees above zero recorded M morning at National Airport.

The freezing temperatures af rich and poor, suburban and city dwellers with chilling imp ity. In Bethesda, workmen yest

See COLD, A14, Col. 2

February' Visit Eyed

Vance Plan

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

Incoming Secretary of State R. Vance plans a trip to the M East next month as the first st Carter administration efforts to about new Arab-Israeli peace ne tions, informed sources said y day.

The Vance trip to Egypt, Syri udi Arabia, Jordan and Israel is to lead to invitations for the le of those countries to visit Washi this spring, the sources said. Th stage will be set for initiatives lo toward major peace negotiation: summer.

President-elect Jimmy' Carter in an interview last month th hoped to meet Israeli and Arab ers before deciding on U.S. effor arrange Middle East peace talks fact that Vance expects to be t

Unity Under For Catholic

By Marjorie Hyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

A prestigious joint commissio Roman Catholics and Anglicans recommended that the two chur be united under the supreme au ity of the Pope.

The historic proposal to end 442-year-old split between the churches—one that is certain to voke controversy among Anglica was made by the Anglican-Rc Catholic International Commissio a document released yesterday London. The 21 scholars compri the commission have been stud since 1968 the possibilities of hea the four-century-old ecclesiastical s

The report of the commission. chaired by archbishops from t

Arms Spending Rises Urged

DEFENSE, From A1

that actually waging one would be unthinkable.

In one passage illustrative of the tough rhetoric he chose for his fare, well statement on national defense, Rumsfeld said the Russians "must be accepted for what they are, not for what we want them to be. Their actions indicate that they take nuclear war seriously. The United States must do no less."

In that context, Rumsfeld said the United States must deploy nuclear weapons so controlled and targeted

that the President would have "at least the option to respond in a deliberate and controlled fashion."

Critics have long argued that limited nuclear war is illusory because neither side would restrain itself once the first nuclear weapon was fired.

At the other end of the nuclear war spectrum, Rumsfeld said that destroying Soviet cities in retaliation for an attack on the United States might not be enough. "An important objective of the assured retaliation mission," he said, "should be to retard significantly the ability of the U.S.S.R. to recover from a nuclear exchange and regain the status of 20th century military and industrial power more rapidly than the United States."

This is "a new goal" for retaliation that should not have been set, Herbert Scoville Jr., former CIA deputy director, said at an Arms Control Association luncheon meeting called yesterday to assess the posture statement. He said the Ford administration is overreacting to the Soviet military buildup and "poor-mouthing" U.S. strength.

Id making the case for building a new family of and maintaining armed forces numbering 2.1 million people in peacetime, weapons Rumsfeld said: "Our nation simply cannot allow Soviet capabilities to continue expanding and U.S. capabilities to retrench as they have over the past decade without inviting an imbalance and; ultimately, a major crisis."

Not only must the United States advance into a new generation of super weapons for nuclear war, the secretary said, but must continue to improve the conventional forces that are the best insurance against the need to use nuclear Weapons.

Because Soviet ocean-spanning missiles are getting more accurate all the time, Rumsfeld said, U.S. land-based Minuteman ICBMs are becoming increasingly vulnerable to a surprise attack. Therefore, he argued, it is time to speed up the development of the MX "blockbuster" ICBM, which could be moved from

place to place around a missile field, making it harder to target and hit.

Deploying the MX, Rumsfeld said, "might serve as an incentive to the Soviets to slow their momentum in deploying new ICBMs and seek mutual reductions in strategic offensive force levels."

Rumsfeld is recommending to Carter that \$294 million be spent on the MX in the next fiscal year so it could be deployed in "the mid-1980s."

The B-1 bomber is also needed to maintain "strategic equivalence," Rumsfeld said, and is "the most cost-effective alternative for carrying out the bomber force mission."

Carter said during the political campaign that putting the B-1 into production would be "wasteful." Brown, when he was director of Pentagon research, started the studies that led to the B-1 after the B-70 bomber program was canceled.

In a decision that will be hotly contested in Congress, Rumsfeld said he had scrapped the plan to build a fourth Nimitz class aircraft carrier costing about \$2 billion because a new National Security Council study had concluded that the better course was building more but cheaper carriers.






Instead, the plan Carter will inherit calls for starting a new class of smaller carriers that would be used by aircraft that could take off and land on a short stretch of deck.

Rumsfeld also said outer space could become a new battleground and recommended a number of programs to protect American communications and reconnaissance satellites.

Stating "no evidence is available that the Soviet leadership intend to launch a direct military attack on the West in the immediate future," Rumsfeld said "the darker face presented by the Soviet Union" requires U.S. defense budgets of these amounts in the future:

- Fiscal 1978 \$123.1 billion
- Fiscal 1979 \$135.4 billion
- Fiscal 1980 \$145.8 billion
- Fiscal 1981 \$156.7 billion
- Fiscal 1982 \$166.8 billion

U.S., SOVIET MILITARY FORCES



Senators Nearer Ethics Code-and Pay

Associated Press
 The Senate established a special 15-member committee yesterday to draw up a code of ethics for senators.
 Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.) and Minority Leader Howard H. Baker (R-Tenn.) told reporters they both supported the resolution establishing the committee. It was adopted without opposition.
 "The public, the press and senators will know there's going to be a code of ethics enacted here," said Byrd.
 Byrd said the committee would be made up of eight Democrats and

would then be subject to change by the full Senate.
 The need for a code of ethics was cited by a presidential commission that recently recommended substantial pay increases for top-level government officials, including a raise for members of Congress to \$47,500 from \$44,800.
 President Ford said he supports the recommendations and would pass it on to Congress: It would become effective 30 days after reaching Congress if neither the House nor Senate

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 said followi

June 28, 2001 11:57 AM

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Alternative to Vieques

Is that South Texas site going to be appropriate for replacing Vieques?

DHR:dh
062801-4

I don't know (yet) this site, along with others, will be the subject of the special task force. The task force will be in operation next week.

*Sanchez
6/28*

Will keep you informed.

snowflake

July 5, 2001 10:26 AM

TO: Dr. Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT.: Newt Gingrich QDR Thoughts

You have read Newt Gingrich's e-mail to (b)(6) on QDR. I think he has some spectacular thoughts in there. How do we get it done?

DHR:cd
070501-6

310.1

55101

U12102 /01

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2001 7:15

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: Notes on QDR thinking

Arlene would you share this with the secretary and Paul, Ed, Larry, and Steve, thank you newt

Thank you for letting me read the QDR guidance.
As I reviewed it the following observations seemed appropriate:

1. the QDR should be expanded to include all intelligence capabilities. The ~~mixture~~ of weapons of mass ~~detruction~~ and terrorist organizations is going to make it increasingly difficult to distinguish the military's intelligence needs and the other requirements for human intelligence. This may require a law change and sme coordination between ~~SecDef~~ and ~~DCI~~ but in the long run we need a single overview of intelligence as part of the QDR. ✓

2. we need a briefing which could introduce a citizen, business leader, reporter or member of congress to the assumptions which led to the guidance. The guidance has a lot of assumptions behind it. You are assuming changes in reality (technology, nature of threat, patterns of conflict) which I agree with but an introduction to the 21st century world which creates the need for a 21 st century is necessary. Most people do not spend time thinking about these things and if you jump into change without context it is much harder for them to understand what is driving you. This is the briefing I would consider to be the equivelant of the Huges briefing and it is precedent to the details of the planning guidance. ✓

3. The guidance understates the centrality of the most dangerous **asymetric** threat—terrorists with wmd using container devices or other unconventional delivery systems. This is what drives both the need for much greater humint and the need for a Homeland Security Agency to minimize the damage if such an attack **ocurs** (which I believe mathematically it **almost** certainly will eventually). ✓

4. Basic science should be listed as a separate component of national security. We are entering a period of enormous change in fundamental science and we need to re-emphasize its role and reinforce our investment both at DOD and at NSF. ✓

5. Use WASTE instead of efficiency when describing certain changes. Efficiency is a positive but often undervalued achievement. Waste is an indefensible negative. You want your opponents defending waste in the Pentagon more than you want to be the advocate of efficiency. This is an important language difference. ✓

6. Page 14, you should make the importance of helping Colombia and drug-endangered **democraces** explicit as a goal we should plan for. We continue to under invest both manpower and technology in helping third world countries with low grade but potentially devastating insurgencies. With all our technology we should be more hel to Colombia (as well as the **Philippines,etc**). ✓

7. It may not be our current national strategy but I think you should mention the need to develop some capability to help Africa. Aids will turn out to have a huge security component. Places where people get chopped to death are bad for public health services. The Sudan is gradually crowding its way on to

6/28/2001

11-L-0559/OSD/359

128
1245

the agenda. We need some recognition that we need a systematic capability to help sub-Saharan Africa (I personally favor a **CINC** for the region, it is absurd to deal with it indirectly from Europe and the Central Command).

8. page 9 one of our national goals should be to avoid a weapon of mass destruction event or at worst to respond effectively and minimize loss of life and collateral damage ✓

9. one of our goals should be nonviolent suppressive tools for crowd control, if the Israelis could technologically defeat stone throwing with foam or plastic or some other device they would be in much better shape. The rising violence of the demonstrations at international meetings also calls for some kind of technological response. The goal should be to make the demonstrators helpless and ideally also make them look silly and ineffective. Since we are entering a world of very high standards for using violence we need new non violent systems of suppression and coercion, I know these have been talked about for years but they seem to avoid being developed. ✓

10. On page 19 you mention suborbital delivery systems, Bill Brunner at 697-1802 has been developing a brief on some new approaches to US based suborbital delivery at low development cost that are worth your seeing. He is a former intern in the Speaker's **Office** and a very bright Air Force **officer**. ✓

Thanks for letting me share these ideas.

Newt

6/28/2001

11-L-0559/OSD/360

July 5, 2001 10:30 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Arms Control Process Procedure

388.3

On the subject of the draft Arms Control Process procedure -- I'm comfortable with all of that except that I want Paul or me to sign off on anyone who is going to represent the Department of Defense in any one of these activities. Just being told about it is not enough.

Cc: Dr. Cambone

DHR:cd
070501-8

5 Jul 01

U12103 /01

snowflake

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 JUL -9 PM 3:17

July 5, 2001 2:05 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Travel talks

I ought to give some thought to doing some talks at military bases when I go. I don't want to do it in a way that a lot of people have to stand around a long time to hear me. But, at the end of an event if people are gathered in a hall or someplace I could say a few words of thank you to them. Let's talk about it each time before you set up anything.

DHR:cd
070501-17

333 SD

59001

U12044 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/362

snowflake

July 5, 2001 2:33 PM

TO: Dr. Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: List of Nuclear Needs

We probably ought to get a list of all the nuclear needs and weigh them against other things. We've got to look at that modernization of the nuclear force.

DHR:cd
070501-22

A-471.61

55101

U12003 /01

snowflake

July 5, 2001 2:45 PM

TO: Admiral Holcomb

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: NRO Possibility

Let's think about Tom Moorman for NRO.

DHR:cd
070501-25

020 NRO

5 Jul 01

U11996 /01

snowflake

July 5, 2001 3:00 PM

TO: Admiral Holcomb
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NIMA

You may want to talk to Eberhart about who he thinks would be good for NIMA.

DHR:cd
070501-27

020 NIMA

10/10/01

U11997 /01

snowflake

July 5, 2001 3:26 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 3^h
SUBJECT: List of Reports

Let's get that list of all those reports up to this fellow Snyder fast.

DHR:cd
070501-33

SECRET -

*We've done this.
Larry*

3/9/1

5 Jul 01

U12030 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/366

JUL. 2.2001 2:46PM

Unless you are planning to start it, it's difficult to prepare for the next war. This is especially so at a time when geopolitical alliances are shifting and military technology is changing rapidly.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is trying to reassess U.S. military needs now that the Cold War is over, and the microchip is here. He took a lot of flak for it from both Democrats and Republicans in hearings in Congress.

Some of the flak is deserved. Although it is vital that senior U.S. officials periodically and carefully rethink what it is the U.S. military can and cannot do and should or should not do, it isn't such a good idea to conduct too much of this discussion in public.

There have been many stories indicating Rumsfeld plans to recommend that the United States formally abandon its stated commitment to maintain military forces large enough and strong enough to wage two major theater wars simultaneously.

Military analysts have thought for years a Clinton-era military crippled by budget cuts and peacekeeping missions in the Balkans isn't up to the task of fighting two Gulf war-size conflicts simultaneously. Frederick Kagan, a professor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, has described our current strategy as a "win-hold-oops" strategy.

I think "win-hold-oops" is about right, and that the American people are unwilling, in peacetime, to spend the forces required to keep the two-war promise. But I'm not sure it does much good for the emperor's senior aides formally to acknowledge the emperor isn't wearing much.

If we formally abandon the two-war commitment, we're bound to make friends nervous, and to give potential adversaries ideas.

Currently, analysts think the most likely future regional wars into which we might be drawn would be a second Korean War, a second Gulf war, a war with China over Taiwan or another Arab-Israeli war.

If we formally abandon the two-war strategy, we'll

leave the South Koreans, the Saudis, the Taiwanese and the Israelis wondering who will get the short end of the stick.

And we'll give the bad guys ideas. Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong Il may be nasty, evil, mean and rotten, but they're not stupid. If trouble starts someplace else on the planet, they may think they have a free shot.

"Consider the position of a president who has at his command only a one-war force," Kagan said. "War is threatened somewhere. Does he deploy his force? If he does, he leaves every other region of the world open to aggression. If he does not, he cannot deter the aggressor."

While I think Rumsfeld would be making a serious mistake if he publicly abandons the two-war strategy, what he is doing is mostly right. He should be commended for his bold thinking, and he deserves to be supported in the hard times that are sure to come as those who have vested interests in old alliances, old ideas, old technologies and old spending patterns hammer him from all directions.

Military services are inherently conservative. Generals and admirals develop strong attachments to the combat organizations and weapon systems in which they fought and died as young men and tend to be slow to recognize obsolescence. The history of warfare has too often been a history of soldiers needlessly killed because tactics didn't keep pace with technology. All the things which led to massive, pointless slaughter in World War I were abundantly evident in the last two years of the American Civil War, but nobody -- including us -- paid attention.

Caution is justified. New technologies rarely have been implemented in the way and on the timetable the visionaries foresaw.

In the 1920s, Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell predicted future wars would be determined entirely by airplanes. But it wasn't until the Kosovo war that this actually happened. It would be imprudent to mothball too soon the

rifleman, the tank, the dumb bomb and the smart pilot.

But change does come. Cyber attacks and ballistic missiles are now a greater threat to the United States than the kinds of forces we expected to meet on the central German plain. Rumsfeld is right to reorient our military to defend against them.

Suck Kelly is national affairs writer for the Post-Gazette and The Blade of Toledo, Ohio.

International Herald Tribune July 2, 2001

29. What's The Rationale For Seeing China As Enemy? By William Pfaff, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

PARIS—Why is the new Bush administration preparing to go to war with China? The question may seem a provocation, but that is what the administration seems to be doing, and it is important that it explain itself. Since January the military estimations and foreign policy speculations of the vice president and the secretary of defense, and their principal advisers, have been consistently framed in terms of eventual conflict, if not war, with China. The supposed conclusions of the Pentagon's strategic review, as leaked to the press, demand redirection of the main military effort from Europe to Asia. Forces and weapons are to be designed or reconfigured to project power across the Pacific.

Self-fulfilling prophecy? If China is treated as an enemy, it will become one. A second consequence is to undermine the existing U.S. position in the Far East as an ally of Japan and South Korea. Neither wants a war between Washington and Beijing, into which each would risk being drawn. Neither sees any reason for such a war. Yet the course the administration is following undermines relations with both countries. It could end in a crisis in alliance relations and an eventual end to American base rights.

There are now a U.S. Army corps command, the 5th Air Force command and two large permanent naval bases in Japan, plus 20,000 Marines on

Okinawa, where they are a constant irritant to U.S.-Japanese relations. There are army and air force commands, and 36,000 troops, in South Korea.

The best realistic contribution to good U.S. relations with Japan and South Korea, as well as with China, would be negotiations to reduce and eventually withdraw those troop deployments - the exact opposite of current Bush administration policy. If the United States does not move in that direction on its own initiative, it could eventually find itself ordered out.

The administration seems convinced that there is no political solution to the Korea or Taiwan problems. Yet sooner or later there have to be political solutions. Neither North Korea nor China has the military means for any other kind of "solution."

China's threats to invade Taiwan are bluff; the attempt would fail, even if the United States did not intervene, and the consequences would devastate China economically. The American and South Korean confrontation with impoverished North Korea is an anomalous legacy of the Korean War. North Korea has cleverly managed and exploited the existing state of tension with South Korea, but it has absolutely nothing to gain from a war.

China's foreign policy today is entirely predictable. It is a reasonable policy, in terms of China's position, past and present, and its character. China has never been a global power or thought of itself as one, like the European great powers or the United States. It has always considered itself the unique "Middle Kingdom," culturally superior to everyone else, surrounded by "barbarian" neighbors, the latter expected to defer to Chinese primacy, pay tribute etc., but never considered equals or legitimate rivals.

It has no military forces capable of projection beyond its frontiers. It has a large army that one could call irresistible in defense, incapable of offense and, overall, an expensive liability, unless someone is so unwise as to invade

and effort the Pentagon spends providing Congress with information and analysis,

Known as the Freedom to Manage Act, the initiative would reduce the number of congressionally mandated reports imposed on the Pentagon each year and reduce the amount of time Rumsfeld and his staff spend on Capitol Hill.

Other changes in the relationship between lawmakers and the Pentagon are expected to emerge as the idea takes shape, Pentagon officials and congressional aides say.

Rumsfeld described the initiative during June 23 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.

"If we could fashion some way to come to an agreement with the Congress on a Freedom to Manage Act... an ability to give us a crack at trying to run the place," Rumsfeld said. This would involve "...combining things that are duplicated and closing things that need to be closed and not wasting money and privatizing some things that could be better run in the private sector, I think we could save some real money."

"This is a new concept, it is not formalized to the point of organization," said Lt. Col. Willette Carter, a spokeswoman for Rumsfeld. The initiative is expected to address the overwhelming number of congressionally mandated reports the Pentagon must produce annually, and examine how much time Rumsfeld and other defense officials spend with lawmakers on Capitol Hill, she said.

During the June 21 testimony, Rep. Vic Snyder, D-Ark., asked Rumsfeld for a list of the "905 reports that the Defense Department and the military have to make to the Congress," he said. "If you could provide that for us, maybe we could help clean up some of that."

Carter said Rumsfeld will provide the list as soon as possible.

"For a minimal starter they could assign a [Congressional Research Service] staff member, and probably a Democrat and Republican staff member each, to go through all these reporting requirements and

prohibitions and repeal stuff that everybody agrees is out of date or just crazy," one congressional aide told Defense News June 27.

While it might be feasible to cut down the amount of paperwork the Pentagon must produce, congressional aides and even one Pentagon official had little sympathy for the secretary's duties on Capitol Hill.

"The secretary's primary job is selling the department's initiatives and objectives to the Congress, where the checks are written," a Pentagon official told Defense News. "That requires a good deal of personal involvement in the relationship, because there is a balance that has to be struck."

One congressional aide bristled at the notion of changes in the way the Pentagon participates in the hearings and briefings process.

"In many dimensions, the congressional process has imposed a regime upon the Defense Department in terms of how it goes about its business, and it's debatable as to whether or not there is excess there," the aide said.

The idea of combining hearings between authorization and appropriations committees to reduce the amount of time Rumsfeld and his staff spend testifying on Capitol Hill is not popular with congressional staff.

"I could see some cases in which it would make sense, to hold a single hearing or briefing on a special topic," the aide told Defense News June 26.

"But until the Congress in its almighty wisdom decides not to have separate authorizing and appropriations committees, we will hold hearings and continue to do our job," the aide added.

"If they provide some concrete sense of what the benefit would be for the country, they might at least get a hearing out of it," said Jon Etherton, vice president of the Aerospace Industries Association, an aerospace defense trade group, here.

U.S. News & World Report July 9, 2001

6. Washington Whispers By Paul Bedard

Promises, promises Last week's U.S. mission to chaotic Macedonia to evacuate Albanian rebels was supposed to be a team effort. But France didn't make good on its promise to send help, and Italian evacuation buses were sent but never arrived. We're assured that their absence made no difference.

Get the Ritalin Attention-deficit disorder seems to be spreading in the Bush cabinet. Aides to at least two-Attorney General John Ashcroft and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld want to get their bosses on Ritalin. Ashcroft first: Associates say he's aloof. At one recent meeting, he flipped open his nail clipper. We also prefer to discuss only one topic at meetings. Rumsfeld's story: During a top-brass meeting, he whispered unrelated notes into a recorder.

Stars and Stripes Top Bush officials are questioning a plan by the Pentagon's PR department to buy out the private Stars and Stripes so people will stop getting it confused with the military's Stars & Stripes. Insiders tell us that the offer is \$1 million. "That's a lot of tax dollars we could use for something else," gripes a Bush aide.

San Diego Union-Tribune June 30, 2001

7. Army Boss Not Entirely Stepping Aside In Base Utility Contract Calls Secretly White worked for Enron

By Sharon Theimer, Associated Press

WASHINGTON - The new Army secretary, whose former employer is pursuing contracts to run base utilities, will not completely remove himself from decisions that could benefit the energy company.

Amy Secretary Thomas White will remove himself from involvement in contracts specific to Enron but not the broader policy that allows private companies -- including Enron -- to win multimillion-dollar agreements to run base utilities, an Army spokeswoman said yesterday.

White, a former executive at Enron Energy Services, will step aside from decisions on any specific contracts that would cause a conflict of interest, Capt. Amy Hannah said.

However, White "is going to execute the Army's privatization program vigorously," Hannah said.

White tent a letter yesterday on the matter to Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., and Jean Carnahan, D-MO., in response to their request that he remove himself from any involvement with the base utility issue for at least a year.

They said he should take that step to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest, even after selling his Enron stock.

Roy Temple, Carnahan's chief of staff, said the senator's office, while pleased White will remove himself from Enron-specific decisions, will seek more information about the involvement he will have in base utility issues.

"We believe the question that is not answered in the letter is how extensive a role he believes he can play in the privatization efforts with regards to utilities without creating the appearance of a conflict," Temple said.

Carnahan and McCain asked White to remove himself from the utility issue in response to a June 19 story by The Associated Press about White's connections to Enron.

Until this year, White served as vice chairman of Enron Energy Services. While at Enron, he played an active role in pushing for base utility contracts.

The AP reported that as Army secretary, White has been pressing to shift control of more military base utilities into private hands, a business Enron continues to pursue.

To save money, the Pentagon in December 1998 ordered the Army and other branches of the armed forces to hire energy companies to run the electric, natural-gas and other utilities on military bases.

White said this month that the program should be moving faster. He noted that the Army's Fort Hamilton in New York is the only Army base to

24th R
BIA

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

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1. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)

- a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED
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- c-1 c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT EXTEND SUSPENSE TO
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2. JUSTIFICATION

Reviewed by Frank Lane (Dep Dir., Analysis & Investment) and determined that General Counsel could more appropriately handle); Nicole Bayert (GC's ofc) accepted. Please transfer, accordingly.
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3. REPORTING AGENCY

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07/10/2001

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snowflake

July 6, 2001 10:30 AM

TO: Dr. Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Dr. Kissinger Article

092

Here are some thoughts for the negotiations.

DHR:cd
070601-7

6510

U12008 /01

collect information that could be useful to illegal Iraqi weapons programs.

Khidhir Hamza, a high-ranking defector from Iraq's nuclear Program, described in a recent book, "Saddam's Bombmaker," how Iraqis in the United States combed through American research centers and libraries for technical information not available in Iraq.

Washington Post
July 5, 2001
Pg. 13

24. Giving Europe's Leaders Something To Think About By Henry Kissinger

I cannot recall when a president left on a foreign trip amid such a cacophony of low expectations as that which preceded President Bush's European tour. Yet its result is likely to mark a turning point in the Allied debate on such key issues as missile defense, the environment and America's relations with Vladimir Putin's Russia.

The level of expectations for the trip was defined by a White House briefer as an effort to disabuse Europe's leaders of the image of the president as "a shallow, arrogant, gun-toting . . . Texan buffoon." Paradoxically, these alleged European perceptions enabled the new president to emphasize his distinctive qualities. Since no one expected the traditional diplomatic style, Bush was free to indulge his instinct of getting directly to the point. This, in turn, brought out the truth that, on the core disputes of the Atlantic disagreements -- missile defense and the environment -- Europe and America were divided not by the personal of the new president but by differences in political philosophy.

The new president's intellectual convictions were shaped by the conservative side of the American political spectrum, and he was elected by espousing its principles. In foreign Policy, this translated into a firm commitment to the nation's security -- of which missile defense has emerged as a central focus -- the nurturing of established links with tradi-

tional allies and a definition of the national interest that stops short of universal interventionism while utterly rejecting isolationism. This has been interpreted by some as a move toward the center; hence the internal pressures from the party's right wing, insisting on the verities of the campaigning period.

By contrast, the majority of European governments the president encountered on his European trip are center-left. As these European governments have also moved, albeit from the opposite pole, toward the center and market-oriented policies in domestic affairs, they are under pressure from their left wings to maintain familiar leftist principles, at least in foreign policy. These include opposition to any modification in the established nuclear equations (except to reduce them), suspicion of American military expenditures and purposes, the erosion of European security budgets and emphasis on the so-called "soft" issues, such as the environment.

The formative political experience of the European leaders was in the anti-Vietnam protests of the 1970s and the anti-missile demonstrations of the 1980s; that of the American administration, in the Reagan-era rejection of those attitudes. Clashing perceptions were therefore inevitable.

As it turned out, the caricature of the American president in the European media and by some European leaders facilitated a positive outcome of the presidential tip. For, with the president holding fast to his fundamental views on missile defense but inviting consultation on their application, the European leaders were obliged either to initiate a philosophical challenge -- risking the entire relationship -- or to accept the principle while retaining the option of modifying its application. President Bush faced a comparable challenge with respect to European attitudes toward the environment and made a comparable adaptation. The outcome was to preserve the option of what each side considered essential while setting the stage for con-

sultation to define its implementation.

On missile defense, European leaders face contradictory domestic pressures: to oppose it as either unworkable or as working so well as to destroy the strategic balance, and in any event as being too expensive. They now realize that the Bush administration, while prepared to consult in great detail, will not equate consultation with a veto. No president can take the responsibility, in a world of proliferating nuclear and missile technology, for leaving the American people vulnerable to attacks for which a demonstrated and growing capacity exists -- not when he has available an emerging technology that shows promise in protecting against at least the lower end of these dangers. Thus the real choice of Allied leaders was between a national American missile defense and one that includes Allied territories. Future consultation will have to focus on such issues as appropriate technology, levels compatible with stability and the form for expressing any agreement reached.

Similarly, there are no advocates in the Bush administration or in Congress for ratifying the Kyoto protocol -- even among those who thought the Bush administration's rejection of it was too peremptory and undertaken with too little regard for the sensitivities of our allies. The president's posture in Europe conveyed an American willingness to consider some joint responses to the issue of global warming. But it could not be based on the Kyoto protocol, which the U.S. Senate has indicated by a vote of 95 to nothing it would never ratify and which only one European government has ratified. The successful meeting between Putin and Bush, which made clear that Russia is receptive to a substantive dialogue, including on the subject of missile defense, has helped transform the atmosphere.

All this should turn the transatlantic debate toward concrete issues rather than preconceptions driven by domestic politics. Still, the new atmosphere leaves a range of is-

suues to be resolved. For example, against what specific danger is the proposed missile defense to be directed? In my view, the emphasis on so-called rogue states is a mistake. It confuses the issue by an abstract exercise of dividing the world between counties defined as evil and other nuclear countries, including Russia, somehow defined as irrelevant to the nuclear threat. Such an exercise would involve us in a never-never land of kaleidoscopic changes in definition. A serious defense system must seek to provide protection against attacks from any direction; the meaningful subject of the debate should be the scope of the threat against which protection is sought rather than its origin.

As for the dangers of triggering an arms race, no foreseeable missile defense can afford protection against an all-out Russian attack. Thus, of all the nuclear weapons states, Russia is the least affected by a missile defense system -- even if its capacity for lower-level blackmail will be reduced. Missile defense is unlikely to spur an arms race with Russia -- though it may alter the composition of Russia's missile forces.

The country most affected by an American missile defense program is China. Even a modest American anti-missile program will have an immediate impact on the small Chinese strike force. Though I reject the proposition that China is an inevitable strategic adversary, an increase in the Chinese strategic program is to be expected -- probably in any event. Once a dialogue with China develops, its limits might become an important subject. As for the so-called rogue states, they are already at the limit of their capabilities independent of an American or Allied missile defense.

The issue of preventing an arms race can be addressed most immediately by the significant reduction of strategic offensive arsenals. Some administration sources have spoken of a reduction to 1,000-1,500 warheads -- a cut of more than 50 percent from START II levels. A significant reduction can be undertaken

unilaterally if necessary and is largely independent of the level of missile defense, since none foreseeable could defeat an attack of such magnitude.

Once a decision has been reached on technology, the level of protection and against what scale of attack, attention must be paid to the international framework for implementation; whether as unilateral American decisions, agreements with NATO allies or agreements, bilateral or multilateral, with other nuclear powers. Unilateral American decisions should be a last resort; the most powerful nuclear country should not adopt unilateralism until the possibilities of agreement have been fully explored. And our **NATO** allies should be given every opportunity to participate in a common program.

It is clearly impossible to create the technology for the necessary missile defense under the existing ABM treaty. Whether the treaty can be amended to make it compatible with the requirements of missile defense deserves consideration, though care must be taken lest amendment talks become a means to postpone deployment into the indefinite future or create by implication a Russian veto over the ultimate deployment.

Within these limits, the building of missile defense should proceed side by side with explorations of what international agreement can embody a new global strategic design. But this should be freed to the greatest extent possible from the nit-picking detail that blighted previous arms control negotiations. The preconditions for such a dialogue were created in the Bush-Putin meeting.

A comparable pragmatism governed Bush's approach to the environment. But having made the point that the Kyoto protocol as it stands is unacceptable, room must be left for common action on global warming by the states that most contribute to dangerous emissions. The issue has become politicized, especially in Europe, where it is being used to play up to the green constituencies. Science, not emotions, should guide the appro-

priate response. Why not form two study groups with short deadlines: an American group, to relate environmental concerns to economic growth; and an Atlantic group, to decide what programs are able to achieve a genuine amelioration that can in fact be implemented?

The dialogue between presidents Bush and **Putin** has done much to remove from the Allied agenda the contention over how to deal with Russia. Until the meeting in Slovenia, too many European leaders saw their roles as mediators and facilitators of a **Russo-American** dialogue. The encounter of the two presidents has made evident that such a role is unnecessary — even if some exuberant American statements concluding the conference and afterward overshoot the mark. **Instead**, the NATO allies need to ask themselves whether to conduct **their** relationship with Russia competitively or as a common project.

This is all the more important because the fundamental challenge of **Putin's** Russia will not be missile defense but rather how to encourage the emerging Russia into the global and European system and how to discourage it from returning to the historic Russian policy of absorbing neighbors or turning them into satellites. In this process, **the** future genuine independence of such countries as Georgia, Azerbaijan and, above all, Ukraine is crucial. Russia must be brought to understand that its actions to date in these **countries** give rise to serious concern.

A good start toward a new approach to all these issues was **made** by the president's trip — especially in his seminal speech in Warsaw, which raised the challenge of the expansion of NATO including the Baltic states. The agenda is clear; giving it meaning is the next task.

The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm.

New York Times
July 5, 2001

25. Stalemate Over Iraq

Faced with intractable Russian opposition, Washington has sensibly postponed its efforts to reconfigure sanctions against Iraq till a later date and accepted an extension of existing arrangements for five more months. That gives the Bush administration time to work out a satisfactory compromise with Moscow. Iraq policy should be high on the list of subjects President Bush discusses when he meets again with President Vladimir **Putin** of Russia later this month.

For many weeks, America and Britain have sought support for a new United Nations Security Council resolution that would ease restrictions on Baghdad's imports of consumer goods while tightening enforcement of the ban on Iraqi imports of weapons and their components. Those changes are important, and not just as an answer to humanitarian complaints about unnecessary economic privations imposed on Iraqi civilians. Iraq has become increasingly successful at selling smuggled oil through Turkey and Jordan. That has allowed Saddam Hussein to evade the U.N. financial controls that are supposed to prevent **him** from using oil revenues to purchase arms.

With no U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq for the past two and a half years, there is a growing danger that Iraq is secretly rebuilding its biological, chemical and nuclear arms programs. The new Security Council resolution, proposed by London and backed by Washington, would make that harder. It would tighten border controls against illegal arms imports and, by broadening the range of goods available to Iraqi civilians, make it politically easier for neighboring countries to crack down on Iraqi oil smuggling. For those reasons, Mr. Hussein strongly opposes the new resolution. Instead he demands early steps to terminate sanctions and remove international financial controls. Russia is siding with Iraq, as it frequently has in the past.

Just a month ago Moscow cast a preliminary U.N. vote in

favor of the concepts being promoted by Washington and London. But then it fell into line with Baghdad. France and China, two other countries that have sometimes leaned toward Iraq in the Security Council, this time seemed ready to support **the** British and American approach, as did every other Council member except Russia.

Moscow has now isolated itself almost completely. It alone is responsible for delaying early relief to Iraqi civilians. That is not a very promising way for Russia to advance Mr. **Putin's** goal of rebuilding Moscow's diplomatic influence in the Arab-world and at the U.N. Mr. Hussein suffered an embarrassment of his own Tuesday when it became known that at least one senior Iraqi diplomat at the U.N. was seeking asylum in **the** United States.

As Mr. Bush and Mr. **Putin** wisely recognized when they met last month, constructive relations between Russia and America can **serve** both countries. Of **the** many issues now dividing the two, sanctions on Iraq should be one of the easier ones to resolve. Thwarting Saddam Hussein's **efforts** to build unconventional weapons would enhance the security of both the United States and Russia.

Wall Street Journal
July 5, 2001

26. Smarting Over Iraq

The Russian delegation to the U.N. Security Council this week torpedoed an **Anglo-American** plan to **replace** the current sanctions regime on Iraq with so-called smart sanctions, which target a relatively small set of **proscribed** military and "dual-use" **goods**. **Moscow's** motives are, at bottom, venal: It is doing Baghdad's bidding to collect on **Soviet-era debts**, **secure** lucrative oil contracts, and rebuild a former client state hungry for Russian weapons.

Yet this is one me for which London and Washington may **one** day have cause to be grateful. To wit, it may at last force Britain and the U.S. to stop exploring variations of an obviously failed approach and

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snowflake

July 5, 2001 2:10 PM

TO: Dr. Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Demonstration Options

Let's talk about a demonstration nuclear option, a conventional ICBM, pre-emption options, and more **nuanced** options.

DHR:cd
070501-18

A-47 6

5 Jul 0

U12009 /01

snowflake

July 6, 2001 11:10 AM

02050

TO: Admiral Holcomb
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Ellis and Handy

I think we can go ahead with Ellis and Handy.

DHR:cd
070601-14

6751 01

U11986 /01

July 9, 2001 8:52 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stevenson Speech

You might want to read this speech by Adlai Stevenson. He spoke to my senior class at Princeton.

It has some terrific language in it as well as some useful thought. I was clearly one of the better speeches I have ever heard in my life.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/22/54 Stevenson speech

✓ Meck Speech returned to TR

DHR:dh
070901-12

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Princeton Class of 1954



Address by

ADLAI E. STEVENSON, '22

at the Senior Class Banquet

Monday, March 22, 1954

Address by Adlai E. Stevenson, '22

An address by the Hon. Adlai E. Stevenson '22 to the Princeton Class of 1954, March 22, 1954, upon the occasion of the Senior Class Banquet.

I have a number of preliminary things I should like to say. In the first place, I am informed that this senior class banquet is being held at the expense of your accumulated reserves. This is a very perilous thing that you are doing by inviting me here because certainly within a few hours the Republicans will ask for equivalent time.

I was delighted to witness a moment ago your emphatic approval of my program for Princeton some thirty-two years ago—unlimited cuts, non-compulsory Chapel, and student firing of the Dean. I have always considered almost from infancy that it was wise in politics to have—shall we say—a popular program. The trouble is that when I went into politics, it appears that I changed my views.

I wonder, President Dodds, if you would like to be excused now. Leave me alone with these young gentlemen. It is really a very inhibiting circumstance to find myself sitting at the wrong side of the President of Princeton, my old and esteemed friend. I have heard him speak many times. I have always found what I have heard both enlightening and profitable. I am afraid there will be no reciprocity tonight. I've been at a loss as to what to say to you, and having just read over what I have prepared rather hastily, I have concluded that I have resolved my uncertainty by saying nothing. This will take me approximately forty minutes.

Some one asked me today when I was walking about the campus why I was here, in view of the fact that I had declined or been unable to come on numerous previous occasions when the University or groups were good enough to invite me. I explained that I had come this time only because I had wanted to come and that I need not have an excuse to come. I think it was perhaps an unwise and intemperate thing to do, and had I continued in my earlier resolve, would be better off. There are too many people hereabouts who know me too well. I was thinking on the way over here about the un wisdom of speaking sometimes and the wisdom of restraining oneself. You will perhaps recall—I am sure President Dodds does—the wonderful remark of Disraeli when a callow, young member of the House of Commons came to him—the leader of his party—and said, "Now, Mr. Prime Minister, I've just come to the House; do you think it would be well if I participated actively in debate?" And the Prime Minister looked at him appraisingly for a moment and said, "No, I think it would be better if you did not. I think it would be better if the House wondered why you didn't speak rather than why you did."

I daresay it will be under those circumstances that I shall leave here this evening. In all events, I am deeply grateful for your invitation, and for the opportunity which you have afforded me not only to come back to this place I love so well but to impose on your time and your patience. There is another one, which you will remember, Harold. President Coolidge

said, "It is sometimes better to keep still and be thought a fool than it is to speak and remove all doubt."

I feel as though I were opening the hunting season on college seniors. From now until mid-June, college seniors are fair game for all of us up lifters, viewers with alarm, Chautauqua-style orators, even for occasional unemployed politicians. From now until mid-June college seniors are to be repeatedly reminded how fortunate they are and what they should do with their hard-won educational disciplines; they are to be warned repeatedly that the old order is changing, that the sky is overcast, visibility low; and they are to be urged and goaded and implored to accept the challenge to remake the future.

Thirty-two years ago- (and I might say quite a number of pounds and a good many inches around the waist ago)-when I graduated I believe I listened to these same challenges flung down by orators whose names I have completely forgotten. Now it is my turn to be forgotten. In doing my homework this morning on this evenings oration, I not only let my mind run back to the state of the world 32 years ago when I graduated from Princeton but I also glanced at the Nassau Herald of 1922 in the hope that I could find something about myself that would impress you. Well, I must say, in the long corridor of retrospect, I don't look as important as I thought I was. I discovered that when my senior class voted to bestow the sobriquet of "biggest politician" upon one of its members I received only eight votes-but when it voted on "thinks he is biggest politician" I won second place, and that was due to a conspiracy among my roommates. For the title of "most likely to succeed," I received the impressive total of two votes- (I don't know yet who the other fellow was).

Thirty-two years ago my classmates and I graduated into a world that was quite different from the one you enter-in 1954. Before settling down to the business of trying to earn a living, I did some more travelling. It was a happier, more hopeful world than the one I saw on a recent journey around the globe. A terrible war to make the world safe for democracy had just ended victoriously. A noble concept, the League of Nations, had emerged from the chaotic aftermath of that elemental struggle. It was the twilight of kings, the dawn of world-wide democracy. Optimism was boundless and people proclaimed that we were on the threshold of the new era of universal and perpetual peace and prosperity.

It didn't turn out that way. It wasn't a threshold after all. A bitter young man, an author, soon wrote, "I was always embarrassed by the words 'sacred,' 'glorious,' and 'sacrifice' and the expression 'in vain.' We heard them, sometimes standing in the rain almost out of earshot, so that only the shouted words came through, and had read them, and proclamations that were slapped up by billposters over other proclamations, and I had seen nothing 'sacred,' and the things that were 'glorious' had no glory and the 'sacrifices' were like the stockyards at Chicago, if nothing was done with the meat except to bury it."

But I don't need to tell you, a generation that was born and nurtured in the depths of depression and came to consciousness in war and to maturity in the confusion of world revolution-I don't need to tell you that your elders have made something of a mess of things. Things didn't turn out as we had thought they would in 1922, and somehow the hope and

the easy confidence we felt dissolved as more and more the articulate and vocal among us doubted their beliefs and believed their doubts.

Nor do I need to enumerate for you in sepulchral tones the problems that you face. You know them only too well. Perhaps you can solve them. I would not presume to tell you how to do it. This University has given you the tools with which to try. Moreover, even if I would guide you, I could not. What a man knows at fifty that he did not know at twenty is, for the most part, incommunicable. The laws, the aphorisms, the generalizations, the universal truths, the parables and the old saws-all of the observations about life which can be communicated handily in ready, verbal packages-are as well known to a man at twenty who has been attentive as to a man at fifty. He has been told them all, he has read them all, and he has probably repeated them all before he graduates from college; but he has not lived them all.

What he knows at fifty that he did not know at twenty boils down to something like this: The knowledge he has acquired with age is not the knowledge of formulas, or forms of words, but of people, places, actions-a knowledge not gained by words but by touch, sight, sound, victories, failures, sleeplessness, devotion, love-the human experiences and emotions of this earth and of oneself and other men; and perhaps, too, a little faith, and a little reverence for things you cannot see.

Nonetheless, I would speak to you not of the past, when my generation held its hopes so high-a time when even I received two votes as the most likely to succeed-but rather I would speak to you of the future, of your future. And if I cannot advise you on how to solve the momentous problems of your future, perhaps I can venture to suggest some duties and, if you please, some rules of conduct that, it seems to me, devolve upon the educated man because that is what you are about to be. I would speak to you briefly, then, about the educated man and his government, and about the educated man and his university.

The political organization that goes by the name of the United States of America consists of no fewer than 155,000 governing units, school boards, conservation districts, municipalities, states, the nation, etc. It is operated by some one million elected officials, ranging from mosquito district trustee to President, and by some six million full-time employees. Our government is so large and so complicated that few understand it well and others barely understand it at all. Yet we must try to understand it and to make it function better.

For the power, for good or evil, of this American political organization is virtually beyond measurement. The decisions which it makes, the uses to which it devotes its immense resources, the leadership which it provides on moral as well as material questions, all appear likely to determine the fate of the modern world.

All this is to say that your power is virtually beyond measurement. For it is to you, to your enlightened attention, that American government must look for the sources of its power. You dare not, if I may say so, withhold your attention. For if you do, if those young Americans who have the advantage of education, perspective, and self-discipline do not participate to the fullest extent of their ability, America will stumble, and if America stumbles the world falls.

You know that our record as citizens in recent years has been something less than perfect. Too often our citizens have ignored their duty to their government. Too often they have not even bothered to vote. But this is not all. Participating in government in a democracy does not mean merely casting a ballot on election day. It means much more than that. It means an attitude, a moral view, and a willingness to assume a day-to-day responsibility for the good conduct of your government. How many times have you heard the good citizen demand for example that the gambling laws be enforced without fear or favor-except, of course, for the slot machines in his own country club? How many good citizens do you know who constantly deplore waste, inefficiency, and corruption in government, and who also go out and ring doorbells for candidates they believe in? Not very many. Far more say, "politics is dirty"-and that is about their only protest about the quality of government, and far more use the word 'politicians' as a term of opprobrium, disrespect and dishonor-and this in the land of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln. How many respectable citizens do you know who protest loudly about lawlessness and venality but don't hesitate to 6x a traffic ticket? And then there are the unscrupulous for whom anything goes if it is within the letter of the law, or at least not too far outside; the numerous kind for whom legality and morality are synonyms. 'The Fix' has become endemic in our political life.

I would remind you of an axiom of political science: People get the kind of government they deserve. Your public servants serve you right. Our American government may be defined perhaps, as the government that really cares about the people. Just so, our government demands, it depends upon, the care and the devotion of the people.

Now it is sadly true that there are corrupt officials, that don't get caught, if not as many perhaps as the cynical suspect. It is also true that there are at every level of our government able, patient, patriotic, devoted public servants-yes, and Army officers too-but all too often their reward is ingratitude, contumely, and lately even investigation. In years gone by we required only of our career servants, upon whom the successful operation of this huge mechanism of government depends, that they serve at a financial sacrifice and that they serve with little glory or public recognition. Increasingly, it appears, we also require them to run the risk of being branded as 'subversive,' 'undesirable,' as 'security risks.' It becomes increasingly hard to attract good men to government, and no wonder. Thoughtful men do not enjoy living in an atmosphere of constant guerilla warfare and suspicion.

You who have spent four years on this campus know better than most people that your greatest satisfactions, your greatest rewards, resulted from the free interplay of ideas. You know that your most penetrating insights resulted from the exchange and the interchange and dash of ideas. And I would remind you that just as a great university cannot operate in any but an atmosphere of intellectual freedom, neither can a great government. It is the function of the democratic form of government to nurture freedom. No less does the democratic form of government require freedom as the condition in which it can function at all.

I would suggest to you, then, that it is the duty of an educated man in America today to work actively to put good men into public office-

and to defend them there against abuse and the ugly inclination we as human beings have to believe the worst. I would suggest that it is not enough merely to vote but that we, all of us, have the further obligation to think, and to maintain steadfastly the rights of all men to think freely.

It is always true that when the citizens of a democracy become apathetic, a power vacuum is created, and corrupt men, or incompetents or worse rush in to fill it. But today our situation is even more dangerous than that. In ordinary times the corrupt or the incompetent can be suffered for a while and then ejected. But these are no ordinary times. The world's fate now hangs upon how well or how ill we in America conduct our affairs. And if a bad man is elected trustee of a sanitary district, or if an able man in Washington is left to shift for himself in the face of unjustified attack, then our government is diminished by that much-and even more because others will lose heart from his example. So YOU as educated, privileged people have a broad responsibility to protect and improve what you have inherited and what you would die to preserve-the concept of government by consent of the governed as the only tolerable way of life.

We in our country have, indeed, placed all of our faith, we have placed all of our hope, upon the education, the intelligence and the understanding of our people. We have said that ours is a government conducted by its citizens, and from this it follows that the government will be better conducted if its citizens are educated. It's as simple as that We believe that the people will find their way to the right solutions, given sufficient information. We believe with Lincoln, "Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people?" (although I must confess to having entertained certain private fleeting doubts upon occasion). We have bet all our chips, if you please, on the intellectual improvement of our people. This is a magnificent gamble-but it is a gamble, for it raises the question whether we have reached the awesome pinnacle of world power we now occupy too soon, before we have sufficiently elevated our national mind to lead the world wisely. Only the educated man entertains doubts, and doubt is the beginning of wisdom; but doubt is not wisdom's fulfillment, and in a time of crisis the man who doubts may fall prey to the strong dumb brute-to the man on horseback.

There is in the moiling masses of Asia a tremendous power, potentially the greatest power on earth, and today our enemies conspire to gain the mastery of this power. They have at their disposal, as we all know, a powerful weapon, for communism is a perversion of the dream of justice. And while we see its leading attribute as the perversion, the illiterate, the toiling masses still have their eyes fixed on the dream.

We too have a powerful weapon, truth, and we gain our strength from our thoughtful citizenry, which seeks and holds the truth with both its heart and its mind. The question is, however, whether we have come to decisive responsibility too early, before we were ready, before we had matured sufficiently. No man can say with certainty. Personally I am optimistic and confident, but this question will not be answered tomorrow; it will be answered in y&r lifetime, and it will be answered in large part by you, the privileged American.

If I have made your tasks and your responsibilities sound formidable, which indeed they are, may I also remind you that this is what makes the

prospect of your careers so exciting. There is a wonderful passage in Emerson, and happily I couldn't lay my hands on it—I'll spare you from it. I hope sometime you will read that essay. It says the time to live is not when everything is serene, but when all is tumult—when the old admits being compared with the new. This is the time of early morning, when it is fresh and exciting. I think this is your generation, I cannot be sure. Change is the order of life and difficulties its meat. You live in a time of historic change and of infinite difficulty. But do not let the difficulties distract you. Face the problems of you; time you must, deal with them you must. But do not allow the alarms and excursions and partisanship of our political scene to distract you, do not let even the awful problems of the atomic age claim all your attention. Dare, rather, to live your lives fully, boldly; dare to study and to learn, to cultivate the mind and the spirit, even though it isn't fashionable in your community. For though our people become prosperous as never before and though our foreign policy triumphs, these things are but instruments of the proper purpose, the higher purpose, of Western man—the cultivation of the mind and of the spirit.

It would be presumptuous, and out of character for me to lecture you about your spit-it. That I must leave to the wiser, and to better men. But perhaps you'll forgive me if I draw on my own haphazard, desultory experience—(I have not always been an unemployed politician, you know)—to say a word about intelligence and experience as attributes of the good judgment you will need—the good sense, if you please.

Don't be afraid to learn; to read, to study, to work, to try to know, because at the very best you can know very little. And don't above all things—and I am sure President Dodds will agree with me—be afraid to think for yourself. Nothing has been, in my judgment, more disheartening about the contemporary scene the last several years in America than the growth of the popularity of unreason—of anti-intellectualism. One thinks of those chanting, screaming crowds that walked over precipices in Germany—and not so long ago. The conformists—unreason and anti-intellectualism—abominate thought. Thinking implies disagreement and disagreement implies nonconformity and non-conformity implies heresy and heresy implies disloyalty. So obviously thinking must be stopped. This is the routine. But I say to you that bawling is not a substitute for thinking and that reason is not subversion but the salvation of freedom. And don't be afraid of unpopular positions, of driving upstream. All progress has resulted from people who took unpopular positions. All change is the result of a change in the contemporary state of mind. Do you remember—and here again I shall tap a resourceless memory—some words of Materlinck, who was writing about the Spanish Inquisition and said that in those times to the conservative they should not kill so many and to the radical they should not kill any. Don't be afraid of being out of tune with your environment, and above all pray God that you are not afraid to live, to live hard and fast. To my way of thinking it is not the years in your life but the life in your year; that count in the long run. You'll have more fun, you'll do more and you'll get more, you'll give more satisfaction the more you know, the more you have worked and the more you have lived. For yours is a great adventure at a stirring time in the annals of men.

You have a better chance than many people to give a lot and therefore to take a lot of life. If we can't look to people like you for this leadership, for good judgment, for wise directions for ourselves and for the convictions of our society, then where can we look? For here at Princeton, which for more than two centuries has transmitted from one generation to the next the riches of Western civilization, you have gotten some grasp of the basic principles on which our culture is founded—the concept of the supremacy of the individual, the worth of a human being, and the necessity for a climate of freedom in which these values may find means of expression.

And before you depart from this campus that you and I have known and loved, stay a moment, my young friends, and think a bit, inquire—these halls, this campus, our university, what do they mean? "university" is a proud, a noble and ancient word. Around it cluster all of the values and the traditions which civilized people have for centuries prized most highly. The idea which underlies this University—any university—is greater than any of its physical manifestations; its classrooms, its laboratories, its clubs, its athletic plant, even the particular groups of faculty and students who make up its human element as of any given time. What is this idea? It is that the highest condition of man in this mysterious universe is the freedom of the spirit. And it is only truth that can set the spirit free.

The function of a university is, then, the search for truth and its communication to succeeding generations. Only as that function is performed steadfastly, conscientiously, and without interference, does the university realize its underlying purpose. Only so does the university keep faith with the great humanist tradition of which it is a part. Only so does it merit the honorable name that it bears.

When you depart, think occasionally upon your university's inherent ideas and purposes, as its outward trappings recede. Don't forget that Princeton is a university, as well as your University; and that it has obligations to the whole of mankind not just to you—obligations which it can neither ignore nor shirk, and which cannot, consistently with its honorable name and its place in the community of scholarship, be sacrificed to passing passions and prejudices. As members of the alumni family I trust you will be alert to its needs; they are imperative, and you can meet them if you will as many of your predecessors are today, but keep, I beg you, always in the forefront of your mind the realization that the single greatest need of any university, as of any seeker after the truth, is not just the money, not expensive libraries and laboratories, but this freedom, this thing that seems so inchoate to you now, freedom to do its work, to pursue its inquiries, to conduct its discussion, to extend the limits of learning.

The right to the serene pursuit of truth did not descend like manna from heaven; it was won by hard fighting, and the fight goes on and on to the end of time—even as the struggle between good and evil. See to it then, that no one, for whatever reason or in the service of whatever interest, diverts this University from its classic objective. As its graduates, as individuals who have made in it an investment of the golden, ir retrievable years of your lives, you cannot, I suggest, do less. And carry away with you some of the wise serenity of the timeless courage, the unhurried objectivity which is the atmosphere of Princeton and which represents the

collective imprint of its founders, students and teachers who have gone before you.

The university in America is the archive of the Western mind, it **is** the keeper of **Western** culture, and the foundation of Western culture **is** freedom. **Princeton**, or any other university, great or small, **has** the obligation of transmitting from one generation to the next **that** heritage. The faculty and administrators of a **university** can do that only if they are free. I think we **believe** with Gladstone that it is liberty alone **that** fits men for liberty.

I came here last night in darkness, after not having been here for some four or five years. I came with an old friend and an old classmate. We drove a little through the campus, after dusk. It was soft, **the** air fresh, the beginning of spring. I thought of some words **that** I read here long ago, written by an English poet, **Alfred Noyes**, who stayed on the Princeton campus for a few years. They went something like **this** if I am not mistaken:

Now **lamp-lit** gardens in the blue dusk shine
Through dog-wood red and white,
And round the gray quadrangles, line by line,
The windows **fill** with light,
Where Princeton calls to Magdalen, tower to tower,
Twin lanthorns of the law,
And **those** cream-white magnolia boughs **embower**
The halls of old Nassau.

Sentimental? Yes. **Nostalgic**, childish? Perhaps. Yet lovely, beautiful, true. Your days are short here; this is the last of your springs. And now in the serenity and quiet of this lovely place, touch the depths of truth, feel the hem. You will go away with old, good friends. Don't forget when you leave why you came.

July 11, 2001 5:47 PM

TO: Secretary Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Navy Training

At some point, it seems to me that rather than look for something to replace **Vieques**, what we really need to do is to get down to some facts:

- Precisely what does the Navy actually think it needs to train?
- Precisely what kind of training has the Navy actually been getting at **Vieques** in recent years?
- Precisely what type of training has the Navy been getting on the West coast?
- Are there other ways to achieve the training that is actually necessary, such as at sea against sleds, electronics, etc.?

When all of that is nailed down, we should go looking for alternatives. If we do it any other way, as we seem to have been doing, I suspect we will never find Utopia.

When you have the answers to these questions, please brief me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071101-14

353

115010

U12619 /02

July 12, 2001 11:22 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NSC and Cabinet Meetings

You ought to tell Steve Hadley that someday in a press conference, the President is going to be asked how many NSC meetings he has had and how many cabinet meetings he has had. It could be embarrassing.

DHR:dh
071201-21

334 NSC

12 Jul 01

U12620 /02

snowflake

July 16, 2001 3:58 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *WR*
SUBJECT: Restrictions on Hiring

Why don't you **draft** a letter for me to send to Senator Byrd explaining this business about not being able to hire **CPAs**. Maybe he will take an interest in getting the legislation changed.

Please draft it **up**.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071601-42

230.02

16 Jul 01

July 17, 2001 8:04 AM

SUBJECT: Goals

The four things I would like to accomplish before I leave DoD:

1. Move missile defenses forward to defend our people and forces.
2. Move \$10 to \$20 billion of waste into weapons and improve the efficiency of how the Department deals with itself, the Congress and contractors.
3. Through transformation prepare the U.S. for the asymmetrical threats of the future-terrorism, homeland defense, cruise and ballistic missile defense and cyber-attacks.
4. Improve intelligence.

DHR:dh
071601-60

0720 DAD

172410

U12630 /02

July 18, 2001 8:23 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Security Clearances

The idea of changing the security clearance update from five years to six years would change the backlog enormously. Other possible ideas would be to review the questions they are asking and to not require them to go back to the beginning-just go back to the last update.

Why don't we get some people thinking about that?

Thanks.

380.01

7/19

Lin Wells - ASD - C³I

DHR:dh
071801-S

Lin - Please let's discuss. What would this take?

Larry

18 Jul 01

U12676 /01

TO: Doug Feith
cc: General Shelton
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: July 21, 2001
SUBJECT: **Maritime Meeting**

CH 100

There was a meeting set up that was part of the mil-to-mil relationship between the U.S. and China. It was a maritime meeting.

There was a time when we thought we would use it to discuss the EP-3 incident.

It was supposed to meet in San Francisco some time back, and to my knowledge it has never met. We ought to **find** out what the status is and think through how we want to handle it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
072101.010

21740

U13932 /01

To: Vic Warburton -
12:15 / 23 July 01

July 23, 2001 9:23 AM

TO: ExecSec
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Op-ed by Cal Thomas

Please include this op-ed regarding the problem of waste in government spending in the read-ahead for my meeting with Cal Thomas later this week (7/26).

Thanks.

Attach.

7/22/01 op-ed by Cal Thomas, *Washington Times*, "Surplus Shrinkage"

DHR:dh
072301-19

... encouraged Americans to drive more than they used to. In fact, we drive twice as many miles today as we did 50 years ago, more than off-

CAL THOMAS

When the government originally forecast

Democrats say it's because of President Clinton's "excessively large" annual military budget and his combination of a single defense system. Republicans say it's because Democrats

The Republicans are right about spending that wrong in discussing the possibility of being the only

America as well as Democrats. The problem is hypocrisy

The most serious problem is the lack of a national defense strategy

Clinton's administration has spent more money on military equipment

Clinton's administration has spent more money on military equipment

TERRY EASTMAN

... the Hill hearing that didn't


Surplus shrinkage

Defense surplus is shrinking, says a report from the University of Nebraska. The report says that the surplus is shrinking because of the need to modernize the military and the fact that the surplus is being used to pay for the military's operations.

The report also says that the surplus is being used to pay for the military's operations. The report says that the surplus is being used to pay for the military's operations.

The report also says that the surplus is being used to pay for the military's operations. The report says that the surplus is being used to pay for the military's operations.

The Hill hearing that didn't



make vehicles more dangerous, but it has done precisely that. To meet the CAFE requirements, automakers have cut the weight of vehicles

Why? Primarily because the...
importing 52 percent today...
ing 30 percent of... in 1975...

Charli Coon is an energy policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation

lobbyists grease the palms of politicians with contributions.


Stories of lost money at the Education Department have been widely reported. At the Labor Department, the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) had been receiving, as recently as two years ago, about \$9 billion a year, more than three-fourths of total discretionary Labor Depart-

ment funds. But when asked to account for the ETA grants, the agency said the information was not available in a "single volume" or "in detail." In addition, the department said producing the data on a fiscal year basis was too time-consuming, cumbersome and difficult.

Government never believes it spends too much, only that the

workers are taxed too little and that taxpayers are greedy if they want some of their money back. With such irresponsible spending, taxpayers should keep more of their money and government should get less.

Cal Thomas is a nationally syndicated columnist.



making him one of the few people ever to have been chosen for the same bench by presidents of different political parties.

More was said in praise of the three nominees than questions were asked of them by the few senators

Justice Antonin Scalia.

Justice Scalia disdains resorting to legislative history, because doing so encourages judges to expand their power and effectively write new laws. He insists, more strongly than any judge anywhere, on a tax-

Received 25 July 2001
9:30 a.m.

As of: July 24, 2001
11:00 a.m.

**READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD:
CAL THOMAS INTERVIEW, LA TIMES SYNDICATE**

FROM: Torie Clarke, 703-697-9143

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 20 2001

Time/Location:

July 26, 1:00-1:30 p.m., SecDef Office

Background:

You have a session scheduled with Cal Thomas, an *LA Times* syndicated columnist. Thomas is a self-proclaimed conservative; he strongly advocates missile defense, a forceful U.S. foreign policy on China, and generally supports Administration initiatives. He does not, however, allow his political views to color his take on waste and misuse of tax dollars (including DOD), or of the churches' collective ability to administer the Administration's faith-based initiative.

Objectives:


- Advance Freedom to Manage
- Reinforce Administration's position on missile defense
- Maintain consistency on Administration's approach to China

Likely topics of discussion:

Missile defense, budget needs and Congressional opposition to both; Asia/Pacific focus/strategy shift from Europe; QDR; Transformation, Freedom to Manage, and China

Attachments: Biography, selected quotes and recent editorials, including 22 July ed. on the surplus and government waste

Prepared by: Maj. Jay Steuck, OASD/PA/703-697-7385



Los Angeles Times
SYNDICATE

We represent more than 140 writers, artists, publications and online services, selling to customers in more than 100 countries.

Cal Thomas

Political and Social Commentary



Award-winning commentator Cal Thomas stands at the forefront of conservative values in America

A persuasive spokesman for traditional views, he is articulate, thoughtful and quick to spot hypocrisy from the right or the left. Whatever his topic -- abortion, religious rights, the family, welfare reform, a balanced federal budget, crime, censorship or school choice -- Thomas presents crystal-clear arguments. He draws on an extensive journalistic background that includes association with NBC, PBS, CNBC, Fox News and, during his Army service, the

Armed Forces Radio and Television. You can e-mail him at jctlatyn@aol.com.

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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM – Selected Cal Thomas quotes

Spending is up, Surplus is down -- July 20

(NOTE: As requested for inclusion, this is the op-ed that ran in the July 22 edition of the *Wash. Times.*)

Why is the government's surplus not as large as originally forecast? Democrats say it's because of President Bush's 'obscenely large' (actually paltry) tax cut and his commitment to a missile defense system. Republicans say it's because Democrats spend too much. The Republicans are right about spending but wrong in accusing the Democrats of being the only guilty party. Republicans know how to spend as well as Democrats. Their problem is hypocrisy, because the GOP is supposed to be the party of fiscal restraint and smaller government.

Report nails Washington 's wasteful ways -- June 20

In the middle of dueling comments this month between President Bush and House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt about whether the new tax cut is a boon to the economy or a sop to the rich that will return us to deficit spending.. . came the baritone voice of Republican Sen. Fred Thompson of Tennessee. Thompson delivered a **two-**volume report compiled by the Senate Government Affairs Committee, which Thompson chaired.. . "There's pervasive and continuous mismanagement, waste, fraud and duplication" in much of the federal government "that the average American would find shocking." The real threat to government financial stability and its ability to meet its obligations is not the tax cut but government's failure to be competent and honest with the money taxpayers fork over. Former Vice President Al Gore was supposed to have "re-invented government." It appears he reinforced its worst habits.

Missile defense sensible -- May 4

It always has been a mystery as to why the left so viscerally opposes a missile defense system. When Ronald Reagan first proposed such a plan, the left mocked it as "Star Wars," a fantastical delusion about as realistic as the George Lucas movie of the same name. On Tuesday, President Bush laid out a philosophical and geopolitical rationale for a missile defense system that was even better than Mr. Reagan's. Mr. Bush rightly called for "moving beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty." He said clinging to it "enshrines the past."

Source: [All Sources](#) > [News](#) > [Major Newspapers](#) **i**
Terms: [cal thomas and date geq \(01/24/2001\)](#) (Edit Search)
Focus: **column**

The Denver Post, July 20, 2001 Friday

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The Denver Post

July 20, 2001 Friday 2D EDITION

SECTION: DENVER & THE WEST; Pg. B-07

LENGTH: 798 words

HEADLINE: Spending is up, surplus is down

BYLINE: Cal Thomas,

BODY:

Why is the government's surplus not as large as originally forecast?

Democrats say it's because of President Bush's 'obscenely large' (actually paltry) tax cut and his commitment to a missile defense system. Republicans say it's because Democrats spend too much.

The Republicans are right about spending but wrong in accusing the Democrats of being the only guilty party. Republicans know how to spend as well as Democrats. Their problem is hypocrisy, because the GOP is supposed to be the party of fiscal restraint and smaller government.

Examples are numerous, but perhaps the most ludicrous of all is an expenditure unearthed by the CATO Institute. The Fair Taxes for All Coalition, which has opposed the administration's tax cut, has received \$ 618 million in taxpayer money to help with its campaign. What is more preposterous than subsidizing an advocacy group that opposes giving taxpayers their money back?

Do you like paying \$ 150 million to have professional athletes mentor our youth? Rep. Tom Osborne, R-Neb., sponsored the funding amendment to the education bill for the program. It's apparently patterned after TeamMates, a Nebraska mentoring program Osborne founded using \$ 1 million in tax money.

Columnist Debbie Schlusel writes on WorldNetDaily.com that Osborne, who once coached the University of Nebraska football team, used players to mentor at-risk youth. Trouble is, notes Schlusel, Osborne 'allowed criminal after criminal to play on his team - rarely disciplining them and constantly coming to their defense - in his win-at-all-costs mentality.' Osborne's players included sex offenders, women batterers and other assorted thugs. Should our tax money pay for another such program?

From the outrageous to the ridiculous: Two years ago, \$ 14,000 of our money went to convert a charcoal grill to natural gas at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Did it not occur to anyone that a few hundred bucks would have bought a gas grill at the local hardware store? Another \$ 40,000 was designated to move a bathroom wall in the Commandant of Cadets residence so an adjoining bedroom interior could be widened by one foot. The money came from an account that's supposed to support troop readiness, according to the Air Force Auditing Agency.

We're spending \$ 150 million to relieve apple growers who reported loss of markets for their

2000 crop. Another \$ 5 million went to the Lincoln Library in Illinois, as did \$ 2 million for something called the Vulcan Monument. According to Citizens Against Government Waste, Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., tried to kill funding for the Vulcan Monument but got only 10 votes. Members of Congress love their pork and are equal opportunity spending pigs.

Here are some more spending proposals for 2002: \$ 5,773,000 for wood utilization research; \$ 1 million for Satsuma orange research; \$ 499,000 for swine waste management research; and \$ 198,000 for tropical aquaculture.

The sugar industry receives billions of dollars more in price supports than its sugar is worth, according to the General Accounting Office. As Mike Thomas wrote in the Orlando Sentinel: 'Sugar growers grow all the sugar they can. They plow every acre possible in the Everglades and pipe the dirty water onto public land. Last year, because of the federal program, the government had to buy \$430 million of sugar. Maybe the feds can sprinkle it on the cheese they give out. Until then, we pay \$ 1.4 million a month to store it.'

Stuff like this continues because lobbyists grease the palms of politicians with contributions.

Stories of lost money at the Department of Education have been widely reported. At the Labor Department, the Employment and Training Administration had been receiving, as recently as two years ago, about \$ 9 billion a year, more than three-fourths of total discretionary Labor Department funds. But when asked to account for the ETA grants, the agency said the information was not available in a 'single volume' or 'in detail.' In addition, the department said producing the data on a fiscal year basis was too time consuming, cumbersome and difficult.

Government never believes it spends too much, only that the workers are taxed too little and that taxpayers are greedy if they want some of their money back. With such irresponsible spending, taxpayers should keep more of their money and government should get less. Cal Thomas is a former NBC News reporter and a former vice president of Moral Majority. He is the author of nine books including 'Blinded by Might: Can the Religious Right Save America?'

LOAD-DATE: July 20, 2001

Source: [All Sources](#) > [News](#) > [Major Newspapers](#) 

Terms: [cal thomas and date geq \(01/24/2001\)](#) (Edit Search)

Focus: **column**

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Date/Time: Tuesday, July 24, 2001 - 7:20 AM EDT

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Terms: [cal thomas](#) and [date geq \(01/24/2001\)](#) ([Edit Search](#))
Focus: [column](#)

Milwaukee Journal Sentinel June 20, 2001 Wednesday

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Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

June 20, 2001 Wednesday FINAL EDITION

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 13A

LENGTH: 778 words

HEADLINE: Report nails Washington's wasteful ways

BYLINE: CAL THOMAS Los Angeles Times

BODY:

In the middle of dueling comments this month between President Bush and House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt about whether the new tax cut is a boon to the economy (Bush) or a sop to the rich that will return us to deficit spending, huge debt and the end of civil society (Gephardt) came the baritone voice of Republican Sen. Fred Thompson of Tennessee.

Thompson delivered to Office of Management and Budget Director Mitch Daniels a two-volume report compiled by the Senate Government Affairs Committee, which Thompson chaired until Democrats took over the Senate leadership. The report details waste and fraud in government costing billions of dollars. "Across the board, government is being undermined," Thompson said at a Capitol Hill news conference. "There's pervasive and continuous mismanagement, waste, fraud and duplication" in much of the federal government "that the average American would find shocking."

The real threat to government financial stability and its ability to meet its obligations is not the tax cut but government's failure to be competent and honest with the money taxpayers fork over. Former Vice President Al Gore was supposed to have 're-invented government." It appears he reinforced its worst habits.

The recent problems with the FBI not knowing where some of its records were in the Timothy McVeigh case, and the U.S. Postal Service claim of a huge surplus -- only to reverse itself and "discover" it is operating under a huge deficit and needs still another rate increase -- are two examples.

Thompson cited four problem areas he called "endemic to government."

The first is work force management. The report blames staff reductions in the Clinton-Gore administration, which, it says, "actually detracted from the capacity of agencies to carry out essential functions and made them more vulnerable to fraud, waste and mismanagement." Thompson says government is losing too many good people and not attracting enough new ones, at least in part because of the difficulties in getting people confirmed and the massive paperwork and intrusive background investigations required of high-level nominees.

The second problem mentioned by Thompson is financial mismanagement throughout government: "The government can't pass an audit, it can't balance its books, and the same can be said for just about every component and department of government," he said. We don't know how much money we have, we don't know how much money we spend, and we don't know how much various programs cost."

An astounding \$20 billion in overpayments are identified in the report. Thompson says that's just the tip of the iceberg. Medicare alone has paid \$20 billion to people who are dead; the payments began after they died. The GAO has placed four different areas on the "high risk" financial mismanagement list. Among them are the Defense Department, which Thompson called "the poster child for financial mismanagement, and has been for years and years." We've seen \$1 trillion in accounting entries that were not supported by the proper documentation, he said. Thompson cited \$41 million spent on an ammunition tracking system that was abandoned after eight years because the ammunition could not be properly tracked. Good for President Bush for refusing to pump new money into the Pentagon until it has accounted for what has already been spent.

The third area named by Thompson for improvement is information technology management. "We spend \$40 billion a year for it, he said, but "we can't manage major computer projects."

The fourth is overlap and duplication. Thompson says while this has been studied before, the committee report "pulls it together in a way that (is) more comprehensive." Seven different federal agencies administer 40 different job-training programs; there are 50 different programs for the homeless; 100 different programs serve at-risk or delinquent youth; 17 departments and agencies operate 515 research and development laboratories. And there's much more. The problem, notes Thompson, is that "once a program is created, you're never going to get rid of it."

Every federal agency should be required to come before Congress in each budget cycle and justify the money it receives and spends. No program should be regarded as permanent. The "Results Act," a law designed to improve the performance of various government programs and make them more accountable to the public, is supposed to help in this process, but as Thompson noted, it will work only if the president and Congress live up to its requirements.

Cal Thomas' **column** is syndicated by Tribune Media Services.

LOAD-DATE: June 20, 2001

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to kill "infidels." Others worship their politics. Why shouldn't we use all of the expertise at our disposal to do what is necessary to preserve, protect and defend the United States and our interests abroad?

Mr. Bush threw a large bone to the left when he coupled his proposal with the possibility of further reductions in our nuclear weapons stockpile: "We can, and will, change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over." We won't need as many nuclear weapons if we have a system in place to shoot down any missiles that might be launched toward American territory. An enemy will think more than twice about attacking the United States if he knows that his attack will be repelled and that he will be left vulnerable to a counterattack.

Although the president pledges to be in regular consultation with our allies and Congress, his proposal to build a missile defense system puts America and American interests first, which is where the country and those interests ought to be.

Cal Thomas' column is distributed by Tribune Media Services.

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9:30 a.m.

As of: July 25, 2001
9:00 a.m.

ADDENDUM TO THE READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY R **SECRET HAS BEEN**
CAL THOMAS INTERVIEW, LA TIMES SYNDICATE

JUL 26 2001
[Handwritten signature]

FROM: *T. Clarke* Clarke, 703-697-9143

Time/Location:

July 26, 1:00-1:30 p.m., SecDef Office

Issue:

After reading the Wash. *Times* coverage of your session with them yesterday, Mr Thomas e-mailed us, specifically requesting that you "look into" the issues of homosexuals in the military and women in combat. He intends to ask you about those topics at tomorrow's interview.

Recommendation:

Maintain your current practice of not commenting with any substance on these issues. Your handling of them at the *Wash. Times* session was appropriate; it confines debate to the matters at hand and avoids adding extraneous issues.

Attachment: Cal Thomas e-mail

Prepared by: Maj. Jay Steuck, OASD/PA/703-697-7385

Steuck, Jay, Maj, OASD-PA

From: JCTLATSYN@aol.com

Sent: Wednesday, July 25, 2001 7:30 AM

To: Jay.Steuck@osd.mil

Subject: Re: Secretary of Defense interview, July

Dear Major Steuck - I read the Secretary's interview in today's Washington Times. One thing I noticed is that he said he had no time to look into the "socialization" (my word) of the military regarding women in combat and the gays in the military controversy. Would you kindly ask him if he has a moment to look into it before I see him on Thursday? It is one of the questions I had that many people are concerned about and I would appreciate a more detailed answer. Thanks.

Cal Thomas

P.O. Box 20809

Alexandria, Va. 22320- 1809

7/25/01

11-L-0559/OSD/403

July 23, 2001 1:25 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone
Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Here is a good article by General McCaffrey on missile defense.

Attach.

July 2001 *Armed Forces Journal International* article by Barry R. McCaffrey,
"Challenges to US National Security: The Imperative of Ballistic Missile Defense"

DHR:dh
072301-36

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Challenges To US National Security

SECRET HAS SEEN
JUL 23 2001

The Imperative Of Ballistic Missile Defense

The United States is now fully engaged in an increasingly heated debate over the wisdom and feasibility of developing and deploying a Missile Defense (MD) against deliberate or accidental attacks with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Whether such attacks are targeted at regional US allies, forward-deployed US forces, or directly against the US mainland, the threat is real and demands action. The importance of the ultimate Missile Defense decision could rank with the transatlantic consensus reached following World War II on the Soviet Cold War threat to the West. Our final conclusion must be based on careful judgment and the absence of partisan warfare.

Strategists, legislators, and defense intellectuals have struggled during the past 15 years with the issues of deterring nuclear warfare and developing global treaties to slow or halt WMD proliferation and the transfer of fissile material, missile technology, and weapons design data. We should be enormously proud of our patient and incremental work to defuse the potential global disaster that menaced us at the height of the Cold War, when both superpowers were poised on hair-trigger alert to unleash an exchange of 24,000 (total) nuclear weapons. All of us who lived through this long night of looming Armageddon ought to vow that we will never again tolerate a deterrence strategy based on such insane levels of mutual danger.

But nuclear deterrence also helped keep the peace with less resource expenditure for massive standing armies and, despite the seeming madness of a strategy based on mutually assured destruction, the bi-polar balance of power created an arguably more stable and predictable world than the one we live in today.

With the end of the Cold War, the twin pillars of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and the 1972 ABM Treaty no longer provide the assurance to our allies, our armed forces, and our 281-million people that we will not be at risk of political-military blackmail and the threat of a first strike by an international rogue state with missiles tipped with chemicals, biological agents, or nuclear warheads.

The North Koreans tested a 1,300-kilometer missile in 1993. On 31 August 1998, they successfully achieved third-stage separation

of a Taepo Dong-1 missile. In the coming decade, they may successfully develop the Taepo Dong-2, which will be four times the size of its predecessor and capable of hitting the US with a nuclear warhead.

Without question, the Iraqis also now have a theater missile capability and could possibly create a small ICBM force in the coming 10 to 15 years. In September 2000, Iran successfully tested the Shahab 3 solid-fuel missile with a range far in excess of the Israeli frontiers. Of supreme concern to Europe, Libya has now received the first of

Editor's Note: This is the first of periodic commentaries entitled "Challenges To US National Security" by retired four-star Army General Barry McCaffrey. His essays in our Journal will bring to bear on current national security issues the experiences he gained during 36 years of public service as a military officer and Administration Cabinet officer. McCaffrey's extensive combat service included the award of three Purple Heart medals for wounds received in action as well as twice being awarded the Army Distinguished Service Cross—the nation's second-highest award for valor. He served in senior joint militia assignments at NATO HQ, the JCS, and as C-in-C US Southern Command, and as the strategic planner for the Army Staff. He was awarded the State Department's Superior Honor Award for the SXART II Treaty negotiations while serving as General Colin Powell's assistant. His political-military experience included extensive work on issues in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Americas, the Pacific Rim, Europe, and the FSU states. McCaffrey now serves as the Olin Distinguished Professor of National Security Studies in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. He previously served nearly five years as the White House Director of National Drug Control Policy dealing with the global problems of addiction, violence, and corruption.

50 North Korean No Dong missiles. Libya should have little difficulty in creating a rudimentary nerve agent or biological bomblet capability in the coming decade.

The missile-threat picture in the coming decades must also take into account the



Increasing poverty and security incompetence of an unraveling Russian nation, sitting on enough fissile material for 60,000 to 80,000 weapons. The UN International Atomic Energy Agency estimates that the decades of Cold War confrontation left a global legacy of more than three-million kilograms of fissile material. Fortunately, there is something we can do to protect our allies, deployed US military forces, and America in the coming decade.

The United States must provide the leadership for a diplomatic and military coalition of international partners primarily based on NATO, Japan/Korea, and the friendly Persian Gulf oil states to produce an effective, multi-layered Missile Defense capability to protect against these threats and changing international politics. There is no question that within 15 years, a US-European-Russian-Japanese science-engineering coalition will have the required technology to create a multi-layered Missile Defense (MD) and an integrated, sea-based Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD). The purpose of such a coordinated effort would be the deterrence of rogue states from creating, funding, and deploying an ICBM or theater missile WMD warhead threat.

The key to successful deterrence of this threat will be the existence of both a substantial US retaliation and first-strike preemptive capability, as well as a layered Missile Defense system with a very high probability of destroying a missile attack by a rogue actor or knocking down an accidentally launched missile. A sea-based, boost-phase missile defense system with a limited protective umbrella would not threaten the second-strike retaliatory capability of a country with the physical size of China or Russia. We cannot accept open skies and pieces of paper as our sole safe-



Deterrence will not be successful if Missile Defense is the sole new initiative. We also need to create a new security concept to replace the 1972 ABM Treaty that no longer protects either the United States or the former Soviet Union.

Whether the US produces a Missile Defense or not, we must acknowledge that the Chinese seem to have already embarked on a massive expansion of their current, static, 20-ICBM force equipped with 3-megaton warheads.

The scientific development of Missile Defense and the associated diplomatic and security concepts will require great political-military wisdom by the US as well as skillful collective negotiations with the international community.

guards against accidental launch or rogue state threat of attack.

Deterrence will not be successful if Missile Defense is the sole new initiative. We also need to create a new security concept to replace the 1972 ABM Treaty that no longer protects either the United States or the former Soviet Union. Russia could be expected to accept a negotiated security arrangement that will provide it with both the political recognition that country needs as well as substantial Nunn-Lugar funding to reduce from the 1996 START II weapons levels of 3,000 to 3,500 warheads to a much lower threat posture of 1,500 warheads or less. Russia and the US must also cooperatively examine the protocols required to take national nuclear forces off "hair-trigger alert" and build a 72-hour delay in the possible nuclear response capability.

Across the political spectrum we are seeing growing indications of support for this vitally needed measure. President Bush, Senator Daschle, Senator Lugar, former Senator Nunn, and others have signaled a willingness to consider this dramatic move for nuclear deescalation. The time to act on this concept is now. Moscow's leaders should be soundly assured by their own intelligence analysis that no likely US Missile Defense Strategy in the coming 20 years could possibly protect the US from a Russian response from mobile, land-based and submarine-launched nuclear firing units.

Furthermore, revisions to the ABM treaty are required to allow the Missile Defense scientific creative process to seriously begin. Under current provisions, our US scientific-engineering community is prohibited from doing any real analysis and testing of sea-based, airborne, or space-based systems. Such treaty revisions ideally should be legitimized by respectful consultations, first with our NATO allies and then with the Russians. If these consultations fail, we must be prepared to walk away from the treaty unilaterally and design a new deterrence concept for debate that better reflects the realities of a post-Cold War world.

There are obviously many perils as we move to rapidly create a new concept of US and NATO nuclear deterrence security to replace the outmoded MAD assurances of the Cold War period. Whether the US produces a Missile Defense or not, we must acknowledge that the Chinese seem to

have already embarked on a massive expansion of their current, static, 20-ICBM force equipped with 3-megaton warheads. We should not be surprised to see a ten-fold increase in the Chinese ICBM nuclear missile threat, to include a new class of ballistic missile submarines with multiple warheads as well as DF31 and DF41 mobile, solid-fuel rockets that the US could not target for either a first or second strike.

Of course, the loss of US secret nuclear weapons data to China through espionage as well as the commercial sale of US missile technology during the past eight years has exacerbated the problem. This has created a tough situation. The Chinese expansion of their nuclear attack capability appears to be already under way, preceding any possible stimulus of US Missile Defense. Clearly, the Chinese need to be engaged by US diplomatic and military leadership to mitigate this ongoing expansion of the Chinese nuclear threat. Similarly, we will need sustained and candid diplomacy with India and Pakistan to avoid a secondary response in South Asia to the expected Chinese nuclear warfighting enhancements.

There will be great security uncertainties on the part of our allies as the US moves ahead with Missile Defense; however, this is a course of action we simply cannot avoid unless we are willing to leave the American people at risk of possibly suffering millions of casualties sometime during the coming decades. The scientific development of Missile Defense and the associated diplomatic and security concepts will require great political-military wisdom by the US as well as skillful collective negotiations with the international community. The Rumsfeld Commission's July 1998 Report points the way. We also must carefully consider the counter-arguments, such as those posed by the Nunn-Turner Nuclear Threat Initiative.

The technological luddites among us believe that the required technology to achieve a successful US Missile Defense and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense is not achievable. Others argue that we would stupidly bankrupt ourselves in the process of achieving this initial capability to counter threats such as those posed by Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. But the massive savings achieved in reducing the US nuclear force down to 1,500 weapons will, in large part, mitigate the cost of an effective Missile Defense.

Many of these arguments against Missile Defense are not logically persuasive, but they do mask an understandable fear of the arms-control consequences of creating a new "Grand Bargain." Nonetheless, within a decade, the US can—without question—build a serious, layered, Missile Defense system made up of Ground-Based Intercept sites in Alaska and North Dakota supplemented by achievable modifications to our 27 sea-based Aegis guided missile cruisers and our total of 57 planned Aegis guided missile destroyers. Within a generation, revolutionary technologies can be fielded, such as space-based laser systems or an Air Force flying platform with a boost-phase airborne laser.

All change, both good and bad, is resisted with equal intensity. In the end, the Russians will not be our enemy again. They cannot afford it, and we must not allow it. But we cannot in good conscience fail to confront a growing vulnerability with an effective US ballistic missile defense. It is no exaggeration to suggest that we may face the prospect of millions killed and maimed sometime in future years if we do not begin to act effectively—and soon.

Turning to history, we recall the frightened allied political leaders in 1941 who pointed with alarm to the enormous vulnerability of the heavily defended British Fortress of Singapore to Japanese army ground attack from the Malaysian peninsula. Lt. Gen. Arthur Percival, the British joint commander, refused to seriously consider this fatal weakness to his sea-oriented strategy, stating: "I believe that defenses of the sort that you want to throw up are bad for the morale of troops and civilians."

AU through the recorded history of warfare, each advance of military offensive capability has required the creation of a credible defense—or it invited the one-sided slaughter of the vulnerable. US Missile Defense and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense are now scientifically possible. To develop the needed technology, the nation must summon the political will through reasoned political debate. Internationally, there remains a clear challenge for the United States and NATO to use new initiatives in diplomacy and cooperative security to halt the inexorable slide of the global community into ever-greater risk of destruction. The time to act is now. ■

snowflake

July 23, 2001 8:33 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Project

Here are the materials the head of GAO left. Let's get working on the project.

Thanks.

Attach.

GAO Publication: "Major Management Challenges and Program Risks"

DHR:dh
072301-g

310.1

23 Jul 01

U12784 /01

GAO

January 2001

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks

Department of Defense

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUL 23 2001



DOD BUSINESS PROCESS TRANSFORMATION – A WAY FORWARD
May 14, 2001

DRAFT

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUL 23 2001

I* CURRENT CHALLENGES

- There is substantial waste, inefficiency and ineffectiveness in DOD's current **business** processes.
- DOD has six of twenty-one agency specific "high risk" areas (i.e., systems modernization, financial management, infrastructure management, inventory management, weapons systems acquisition, contract management). The two government-wide "high risk" areas also apply to DOD (i.e., human capital strategy, computer security).
- These weaknesses can put DOD's mission performance at risk.
- DOD is the primary obstacle to a clean opinion on the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government.
- There is a significant imbalance between DOD's wants versus related needs and overall affordability given the long range budget pressures resulting from known demographic trends and escalating health care costs.

II* HOW DID **WE** GET WHERE WE ARE

- DOD's cultures and approaches are resistant to change (hierarchical, process-oriented, stovepiped, and internally focused; service vs. service, services vs. **SecDef**, civilian vs. uniformed; too many layers/components and too many players/systems; self interest vs. collective best interest; ownership vs. stewardship. Inadequate emphasis on budget execution, inappropriate success measures and lack of accountability – get money, spend money, hit milestones vs. get results that are **cost/beneficial**; the "I have a dream" mentality in connection with weapons systems; current acquisition processes result in DOD **getting** some of what they want but not enough of what they need).
- Lack of sustained attention from the very top (i.e., turnover, time, background and interest)
- Lack of clear institutional lines of responsibility and accountability (i.e., who's in charge and what are the consequences for not following their lead).
- Lack of incentives and consequences (i.e., people and financial resources).
- Failure to pursue DOD-wide business process enterprise solutions and shared service concepts.
- Limited Congressional and Executive Branch oversight.

III. KEY REFORM ELEMENTS

The keys to business process reform are:

- Address DOD management challenges in an interrelated manner-to achieve an integrated, enterprise-wide solution.
- Secretary of Defense must provide visible leadership and be committed to reform.
- Establish clear lines of responsibility, authority and accountability that are tied to the Secretary.
- Give accountable officials decision making authority and funding control for business transformation and related projects.
- Maximize the use of best practices.
- Put results oriented performance measures, incentives, penalties and accountability mechanisms in place.
- Have periodic internal and external reporting and oversight.

DOD BUSINESS PROCESS TRANSFORMATION - A WAY FORWARD
May 14, 2001

DRAFT

Iv. ONE POTENTIAL OPTION FOR ADDRESSING THESE CHALLENGES

- A variety of options could be used to address the problems. This potential option sets forth a management structure and associated processes for achieving business process transformation at DOD. It addresses the key reform elements including: the need for more top level attention within DOD, maximizing the use of best practices, providing top-level control over resource and development activities, focusing on achieving results, increasing incentives and accountability and enhancing oversight by the executive and legislative branches. Major features of the option are:
 - Add a new Deputy Secretary of Defense for who would focus on business process transformation (The Deputy would have a term appointment of at least 5-7 years and the potential for re-appointment).
 - Form a high level DOD Transformation Council or Board headed by the new Deputy and comprised of top level stakeholders from within DOD (e.g. CFO, CIO, CHCO, CAO, CLO, Services) and advisors from outside of DOD (e.g., OMB, and Treasury).
 - The council or board should have a broad charter to achieve business transformation in an integrated fashion. The council or board should have resource allocation authority over business process and associated business information system change decisions to include:
 - Limiting further investment in existing legacy business information systems;
 - Developing a DOD-wide set of integrated enterprise architectures to guide and constrain business system enhancements;
 - Ensuring business system investments are not approved unless they are compliant with relevant architectures or otherwise approved for a waiver; and
 - Identify opportunities for introducing commercial best practices particularly with respect to DOD's weapon system acquisition process, including assuring that key weapon system acquisition decision points (milestones) are supported by adequate information.
 - In the short term, minimizing the resources spent on the annual financial audits to the level necessary to determine the auditability of the statements, and shifting audit resources to identifying and correcting underlying financial management problems that are hindering the preparation of accurate **financial** statements and other management information.
 - Establish a unified investment account for all proposed business process and business information system resource investments.
 - Provide periodic reporting to the Executive Branch and the Congress (with periodic validation of reported information).

V. DESIRED RESULT

- Billions of dollars will eventually be freed up for defense priorities through eliminating waste and inefficiency in **existing** business processes.
- Tie resource allocations to corporate level decision making.
- Mission risk is reduced (i.e., better business support processes and accountability).
- More informed basis for weapon system acquisition decisions.
- Elimination of the primary obstacle to a "clean opinion" on the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government.
- Enhanced budget integrity and execution information.
- Enhanced implementation of management reform legislation (e.g., CFO, **GPRA** and Clinger-Cohen).
- Enhanced public image and confidence in DOD stewardship of resources and assets.
- Developing a financial management information systems initiative that could serve as a model for an integrated government-wide financial system.

snowflake

July 25, 2001 6:37 AM

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DK*
SUBJECT: Replacement for Vieques

101501

Here is an article on **Guantanamo** Bay as a replacement for **Vieques**.

What do you think?

Attach.

July 2001 *Marine Corps Gazette*, "Guantanamo Bay, The Replacement for Vieques"

DHR:dh
072501-1

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JUL 25 2001

Guantanamo Bay, The Replacement for Vieques

by Capt Ivan I. Monclova

There is a viable alternative to realistic live fire training for east coast MEUs and supporting naval forces.

Since the bombing accident in Vieques that led to the death of some of the support personnel there, training for both the Navy and the Marine Corps has suffered. The incident served as a flash point so that the locals could demand that the Vieques impact and training areas be returned and for training to cease. Everyone is familiar with the long hiatus of training after the bombing incident and the events that led to the partial reopening of the ranges. However, we are still conducting only limited training, especially where naval gunfire and the use of live ordnance is concerned. The United States spent \$90 million for the continued lease of the ranges in Vieques. Despite the millions spent, the future of this facility is still in jeopardy as the strong public sentiment in Puerto Rico against our use of the island continues. There has been a search for a new training ground that has spanned from the east coast to Scotland. However, the

solution is simple and not far away from Puerto Rico—Guantanamo Bay, (Gitmo) Cuba.

Gitmo is capable of replacing all training functions that Vieques provides and more. I have conducted training in Vieques, where I had the opportunity to conduct light armored vehicle (LAV) gunnery, mortar, air, and naval gunfire. Additionally, we conducted amphibious landings and tactical operations ashore. I have spent the last 2 years in Gitmo as a company commander and am intimately familiar with the ranges and facilities aboard the base. There is no doubt that Gitmo not only offers more live fire training opportunities than Vieques but also tactical training. The current air officer at Guantanamo Bay, Capt Caleb Jones, has led the vanguard on researching and pushing the Navy to recognize the value of Gitmo. I believe that the Navy and Marine Corps should immediately abandon Vieques, move all training to Gitmo, and save the taxpayers millions in wast-

ed dollars. The result would be potentially the finest amphibious training facility the world has ever seen.

Gitmo was the center for naval training for years, and the Atlantic Fleet used to use its neighboring waters for wargames and naval gunfire. When not training they were able to use the shelter of one of the best deep-water ports in the world. For more than 40 years, both tenant and visiting tactical aviation (TacAir), artillery, naval gun fire, and infantry units utilized the base. The training center was moved from Guantanamo to Puerto Rico in the 1980s in an effort to consolidate commands and facilities so as to save money. Guantanamo Bay is now a minimally maintained installation in an attempt to lower overall operating costs for the Navy.

It has several ranges, but the largest is Hicacal Range, which remains very active with weekly use by mortars, heavy machineguns, Mk19s, and small arms from the Marine Corps security





Figure 1.

Left: Outline of the portion of impact area that contains air targets. Right: Vieques impact area overlaid on Hicacal air target area.

force unit stationed onboard the base. The last air and 155mm artillery were fired back in 1994. The ranges in Gitmo are still active and ready to accept TacAir, artillery, mortars, LAV, and tank gunnery right now. A special operations capable Marine expeditionary unit, or MEU(SOC), could deploy today for Gitmo and conduct live fire from every organic weapons system they possess, with perhaps the exception of TOW missiles. (This is due to the large surface danger zone of the TOW's rear blast area, not the maximum range of the weapon.) Every aviation platform the Marine Corps and Navy possesses can conduct live fire strafing and bombing on Hicacal Range. Recently, a 5-inch 54 and 5-inch 62 naval surface fire support feasibility study was approved by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) for Hicacal Range.

The Vieques impact area is .8 square miles. Hicacal encompasses 2.5 square miles. Figure 1 shows a to-scale comparison of Hicacal impact area with the Vieques impact area superimposed. The Hicacal impact area is about equivalent to the G-10 impact area in Camp Lejeune.

Figure 2 is an overall map of Guantanamo Bay and shows some of the existing facilities and ranges upon the base. A discussion of some of the more salient opportunities is next which focuses on artillery, air, ground, naval gunfire, and maritime prepositioning force (MPF) training.

Artillery

Until May 1996, a battery (six guns) of M198 155mm howitzers was stationed with the Marine barracks. Up to 1994, 10th Marines sent a detachment to Gitmo to shoot the barracks' battery annually or semiannually. There are several prepared artillery

positions on Gitmo that fire into the Hicacal impact area. Artillery can be landed, emplaced, fired, displaced, and more. The artillery safety box for Gun Position #1 (GP #1) and a comparison with Vieques' impact area is shown in Figure 3.

Air Facilities

Gitmo possesses two airfields, one active and one inactive. The active airfield at 8,000 feet is capable of handling most military aircraft. There exists a tower, facilities, hangars, fuel, ammunition storage bunkers, crash crew, etc. Use of live ordnance is authorized in Hicacal, unlike Vieques.



Figure 2. Fragmentation impact area, ranges, and artillery gun positions.




Figure 3. GP #1 safety box located within solid line at Hicacal with comparison to Vieques impact area outlined within dotted line (GPs #2 and 3 are very similar).

There are strafing targets and vehicle hulks to fire upon. Combined arms training is possible with marking and suppression of targets allowed by both

mortars and artillery. Soon naval gunfire could be combined with this. The other airfield is inactive and cannot support fixed-wing aviation; however, it presents unique training opportunities. These include airfield seizure, raids, and a noncombant, evacuation operation (NEO) site. This can all be incorporated into a robust ground maneuver package.

Ground Training

There are numerous surface-fired weapons ranges for mortars, grenades, tanks, LAVs, .50 caliber machineguns, and small arms. There is even a fully operational known distance rifle range. A platoon of tanks (M60s) was once a permanent part of the barracks and conducted gunnery upon the Hicacal Range on a regular basis. A military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) facility in the form of abandoned housing areas and barracks exists that would require a minimum amount of effort to make into a training facility. There is an unused airfield for airfield seizures, NEOs, forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), and other MEU(SOC) training missions. The residents of Gitmo (all active duty or civilians who support base operations) are expected to be evacuated on a moment's notice and are used to conduct regular evacuation drills.

Each time a MEU(SOC) unit arrived, a simulated NEO could be executed accomplishing two training goals simultaneously. Prison camps line the coast, and there are several others farther inland for realistic raid/rescue and inextremis hostage rescue training. (Camps were abandoned in 1997.) Amphibious training will not be diluted on Gitmo since there are beaches that support LCM/LCU/LCAC/rigid raiding craft/combat rubber reconnaissance craft landings. Since

the Hicacal impact area is equivalent in size to G-10 impact area at Camp Lejeune, east coast Marines will have a comfortable feel for what can be accomplished with such an area. Finally, there are other portions of the base that provide ample room for maneuver areas for tactical exercises.

Naval Gunfire


Gitmo enjoys a deep-water port capable of holding any ship in the Navy's inventory and has the facilities available to refuel and sustain them. Naval gunfire was conducted on Gitmo in the past, but fired only at towed targets out to sea. However, now that approval from the CNA for naval surface fires has been received, the Hicacal Range, with some additional work and establishing procedures, could handle naval gunfire. Naval units will have the ability to conduct tactical training at sea within the huge warning area that is already in existence (W- 1001.) The potential for amphibious and carrier battle groups to conduct training is obvious.

Support Facilities

The base is operational with a fully functional hospital and large bivouac areas that already have head and shower facilities. The ammunition supply point is very large, and naval, air, and ground ordnance can all be stored in the ammo bunkers. The port is operational with heavy cranes, fuel, moorings, water, etc. MPF could use the port as well. There are large warehouse facilities and apron space on which to place the rolling stock of an MPF ship, especially the abandoned airfield.

Conclusion

Puerto Rico is a beautiful country that once supported some of the training that tested the Marine Corps' fledgling amphibious doctrine. Its training facilities are excellent, and the facilities here are world class. There can be no



McCalla Field (unused) for airfield seizure/NEO/raid/FARP.

comparison to the high standard of living and liberty offered to our servicemembers who support training there. The sunk costs have been enormous, and the thought of abandoning training there appears like an admission of defeat. However, training in Puerto Rico is becoming untenable and not worth the cost. There is a requirement for both the Navy and Marine Corps to fully train their personnel prior to deploying them into harm's way, and that training is available.



Unused housing areas for MOUT training (also abandoned barracks for same purpose).

Guantanamo Bay offers a unique opportunity that should be used. It supports every kind of training that the Marine Corps and the Navy once conducted at Vieques and has the potential for far more. There are over 300 days of sun each year, providing year-around training in the same way that Vieques once did. Live fire, combined arms, and unique training facilities are ready for use. Huge amounts of money, studies, range certifications,

environmental impacts, etc do not need to be conducted to transform Gitmo into the ultimate training facility—everything already exists there. Every range is a certified active range ready for use right now. Only naval gunfire on Hicacal needs to be ironed out but is feasible. Instead of spending \$90 million on Vieques, let's abandon it and be done with the political troubles there.

The final issue is one of political concern. Many might think that such a ramp up in military training might have a negative impact with Cuba. The fact is that we have used this base in the past to conduct all of the training that has been proposed without overly concerning the Cubans. It would be a resumption of training to a level that once existed. Politically, it would ease tensions with Puerto Rico, and we could return their island to them.

Just imagine if half of the \$90 million spent on appeasing the Puerto Ricans on Vieques was put toward upgrading Gitmo's existing facilities and creating new ones. The Marine Corps must seize the moment and make the move quickly. Within months, not years, an amphibious training center like none we have had in decades, if ever, could be fully operational. East coast MEU(SOC) deployments and carrier battle groups can then go into harm's way fully trained and ready to execute the myriad of missions they are expected to accomplish.



>Capt Monclova recently graduated from Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) where this article won first place in the A WS Professional Writing Award requirement. He is currently serving at Officer Candidates School and will join 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion at Camp Lejeune this fall.

snowflake

July 25, 2001 10:17 AM

TO: Tom White
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Training

I met with *Washington Times* journalists yesterday, and they tell me that discipline is down in the Army ever since they started having joint training with women.

Do you know anything about that?

T h a n k .

DHR:dh
072501-23

505

1012058

U12643 /02

July 26, 2001 12:28 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: OSD Manning

Please get me a piece of paper that shows me how many people work in each one of the OSD activities. I was told today there are 1,200 people in the OSD Inspector General's office.

I need a piece of paper that shows it across the board.

If you are the wrong person, ask David Chu to get it. He may be the right one.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072601-19

→ To: USDC -
I'll forward, but
I told SecDef we'd get
him a second version that
had the abbreviations
spelled out. He won't know
the jargon. Please have
someone quickly re-do.

Ferry Diller
7/21

July 26, 2001 3:28 PM

SUBJECT: Staff Meetings

At the next staff meeting, I want to ask everyone to bring me ideas they have for improving their organization so that others can hear about them. For example, Tom White is going down to three layers between himself, the action officer and the Secretariat.

He is merging a lot of offices. He is going from a total staff of 3,000 to 500, with no one-on-ones.

DHR:dh
072601-28

337

2.6.501.01

U12650 /02

snowflake

July 26, 2001 3:36 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Staff Consolidation

Please get a study done as to how we could do something with the Joint Staff. I don't see why they should have separate Public Affairs, General Counsel and Policy shops. We have that at OSD.

Get me a breakdown of how Joint Staff is organized so we can be thinking about what we might want to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072601-249

0205CS

26T4101

U12647 /02

snowflake

July 26, 2001 4:37 PM

SUBJECT: JROC

JROC is not doing the job. There is no budget line for integration.

We need to review programs.

The real issue is: What are you trying to do? What are you trying to accomplish?
The system doesn't even answer that question or even pose it.

DHR:dh
072601-35

334

U12648 /02

260101

snowflake

July 27, 2001 12:18 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: David Chu
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Reimbursable Rate

I want to change our reimbursable rate for **detailees** so it incorporates all costs, including lifetime healthcare.

We are getting destroyed. We have to get a good figure, and then we have to figure out how to get it implemented.

DHR:dh
072701-8

240

275101

U12651 /02

snowflake

July 30, 2001 9:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Treaties




I need a briefing on what all these treaties are—IMF, CBTB, etc.-all the ones I am going to be talking to Ivanov about.

I need a paragraph or a single page, basically stating what each treaty does and what the principal provisions are that affect us and affect them-but not a lot of detail.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073001-1



092.2

30 Jul 01

U13266 /01

July 30, 2001 10:02 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Senator Graham

I want to have a meeting with Bob Graham on the subject of missile defense and deterrence.

Please see if he can come down here for breakfast some morning-just Wolfowitz, Graham, **Cambone**, me. Allow 1½ hours. If he wants to bring another Senator along, he could suggest who it might be.

He is interested in a lot of subjects, and he wants to know that people are thinking about these subjects. He is interested in small **nucs**, disproportionate power, having only 16 minutes to make a decision, and how it looks from the standpoint of a President.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073001-3

373.24

30 Jul 01

U12656 /02

snowflake

July 31, 2001 7:21 AM

TO: , Peter Rodman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statement of Principles

In the meeting, you will recall that the Defense Minister of **Australia** said he was hoping to have some sort of a statement of principles in September concerning the Navy. We better think through what that is going to be between now and then.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073101-1

AUSTRIA

31 Jul 01

July 31, 2001 8:27 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ✓
SUBJECT: Oil

We ought to have on our radar screen the subject of oil-Venezuela, the
Caucases, Indonesia-anywhere we think it may exist and how it fits into our
strategies.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073101-16

463

3150101

U12665 /02

July 31, 2001 8:30 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **D**
SUBJECT: Congressional Restrictions

We ought to look at the various Congressional restrictions that exist around the world-like on Indonesia, Azerbaijan and so forth-and think through which ones, if any, we want to try to get Congress to moderate or change in some way.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073101-17

032

3150101

U12666 /02

July 31, 2001 10:24 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Baseline

How do you do an across-the-board cut if you don't have a good baseline?

If we can't figure out where our detailees are, how do we know how many actual employees we have in the various entities that would be cut back?

DHR: dh
073101-22

Copy to: *Chen - 8/3*
S. Curcio

→ *Da Chen, USD(P-R)*

David-

*I gave this to SecDef
but said I was skeptical
of the numbers and that
I would provide you a copy.*

D. R. to
8/3

snowflake

July 31, 2001 3:24 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Legislation

Please find out who can figure out what kind of legislative changes we might want to make with respect to military construction, and let's get it fashioned.

Thanks.

Attach.
U12043/01 SecDef memo to Di Rita, dtd 7/5/01

DHR:dh
073101-45

600.1

3150101

U12662 /02

snowflake

July 31, 2001 3:34 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reductions

I just noticed that the total **SecDef** office is civilian 27, military 29, for a total of 56. Why don't we get it down so it is roughly equal, military and civilian, and reduce the number down to at least 40-45. Why don't you come back with a proposal as to how you propose to do that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073101-48

020050

3152101

U12661 /02

August 1, 2001 9:01 AM
I # 009219

T O : Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lisa at the NSC

23002

There is a woman named Lisa on the NSC staff, who works on consequence management. I heard her brief when I was on the **Gilmore** Commission, looking at homeland defense. She is impressive. We ought to take a look and see if we want to bring her over to the Pentagon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080101-5

1A501

AUG 2 2001

U14221 /01

snowflake

August 1, 2001 9:43 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressional Relations

I have to keep doing Congressional relations. I have to have a breakfast, a lunch or a 5:00 p.m. event with members of Congress several times a week, or I have to go up on the Hill and meet with different groups, like the Illinois delegation or whatever.

We are not doing as much as we should.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080101-14

032

1 Aug 01

U12673 /02

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone
J.D. Crouch

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 3, 2001

SUBJECT: **Article from *The Atlantic Monthly***

Here's an interesting article that says Russia is finished.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
080301.01
Attach. "Russia is Finished" *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 2001, by Jeffrey Tayler

RUSSIA

AUG 01

U13551 /01

TAYLER



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The Atlantic Monthly | May 2001

Russia Is Finished C

The unstoppable descent of a once great power into social catastrophe and strategic irrelevance

BY JEFFREY TAYLER

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(Contributors)

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The Atlantic Monthly.

From the archives:

"Where Europe Vanishes" (November 2000)

The story of the Republic of Georgia illustrates that the peoples of the Caucasus may prove as incapable of self-rule as they were resistant to rule by outsiders. By Robert D. Kaplan

"The Future Did Not Work" (March 2000)

"The fall of the Soviet Union has stimulated an abundance of postmortems on communism and its place in the twentieth century." By J. Arch Getty

During the Cold War years I perceived Russia through a Cold War prism—as a land of vast, frozen twilight realms of steppe and forest where a drama was being acted out that involved players of satanic evil or saintly good and doctrines that promised either mankind’s salvation or its ruin. I developed a passion for the country, a passion that derived in part from a weighty postulate: that what happened there concerned not only Russians but the rest of the world. In its Soviet incarnation Russia had nuclear weapons and a powerful military, a threatening and subversive ideology, a tendency to invade its neighbors or meddle in their affairs, and the might to wreak havoc on other continents. Russians I came to know spoke of the future of their country as if it would be the fate of humanity, and I agreed with them.

Intrigued by this drama, I set out in 1993, after the Cold War had ended, to cross Russia, journeying more than 8,000 miles from Magadan, a former gulag settlement on the Sea of Okhotsk, to Europe. I wrote a book about the trip. I made Moscow my home. I married a Russian. My life—as much as it can be, given that I carry an American passport—is Russian. But having devoted half my life to this country, and having lived through most of its “transition,” I have arrived at a conclusion at odds with what I thought before: Internal contradictions in Russia’s

From *Atlantic Unbound*:

Interviews: "Russia's Other World" (March 10, 1999)
Jeffrey Tayler talks about his new book, *Siberian Dawn*, which tells the story of his **8,000-mile** odyssey through lands rarely visited.

"Dead Souls" (January 1999)

A prominent demographer warns that the spread of tuberculosis and AIDS in Russia will soon make Western hand-wringing over the pace of Russian "economic reform" seem quaint. By Murray Feshbach

"Was Democracy Just a Moment?" (December 1997)

The global triumph of democracy was to be the glorious climax of the American Century. But democracy may not be the system that will best serve the world-or even the one that will prevail in places that now consider themselves bastions of freedom. By Robert D. Kaplan

"Thin Walls, Bad Neighbors" (November 1997)

In the new Russia making yourself at home is still no easy task. By Jeffrey Tayler

From *Atlantic Unbound*:

Executive Decision: "Is It Time to Confront Russia?" (January 26, 2000)

"Now is the time for you to decide what our policy on Chechnya and the new Russian government should be." An interactive poll. By Jack Beatty

Atlantic Abroad: "The Moscow Rave" (December 24, 1997)

Bars, parties, and prostitution-a look at the nightlife in contemporary Moscow. By Jeffrey Tayler

Elsewhere on the Web
Links to related material on other Web sites.

Background Notes: Russia (May 2000)

The U.S. State Department's profile of Russia: an

thousand-year history have destined it to shrink demographically, weaken economically, and, possibly, disintegrate territorially. The drama is coming to a close, and within a few decades Russia will concern the rest of the world no more than any Third World country with abundant resources, an impoverished people, and a corrupt government. In short, as a Great Power, Russia is finished.

Why this should be so will become apparent during a look back at the past decade and how its events stemmed from Russia's Eastern Orthodox civilization and a decimating, isolating, long-ago invasion whose consequences determine the relation between citizen and state to this day.

OCTOBER, 1993

Despite the grave images the media show us, the full extent of Russia's weakness is not apparent to most visitors at first. Trains run on time. Stores open on schedule. The obvious poverty of shantytowns and slums is rare. Though rising sharply, street crime is still less common than in major cities of the West. At times gruff in public, Russians privately maintain a superb civility and dignity, and their oriental tradition of hospitality toward strangers puts Westerners to shame. Customs now regarded as quaint (or sexist) in the West-such as a man's opening doors for a woman and paying for his date's meals-are the rule, and only the indigent dress shabbily. Standards of education, especially in math and science, exceed those of all but a few Western countries; the average Russian high schooler may have a grasp of U.S. or European history that would humiliate an American college student. The remnants of the Soviet welfare state ensure that few starve; the apartments the Soviet government gave to its citizens make Russia a country of homeowners to a great extent. During the spring and summer months Russians take to the streets to enjoy the clement weather; in the endless, magenta-hued dusks of May and June the well-lit central avenues of Moscow and St. Petersburg resemble fashion runways, with poised, long-legged beauties strolling arm in arm with their dates. On street comers, or in pedestrian underpasses during the winter months, buskers play the balalaika, sing "Kalinka," and chant Eastern Orthodox hymns. In sum, few visitors find cause for despair, and Armageddon appears well at bay. Reform and prosperity, it would seem, are a hair's breadth

overview of Russia's history, geography, demographics, government, and relations with the United States.

Russian History

A comprehensive index of links to timelines, archives, discussion groups, and profiles of historical figures. Posted by the Russian Studies Program at Bucknell University.

away, and those who would deny this are shortsighted pessimists.

I, too, thought this way when I arrived in Moscow. In 1993 I was an optimist. How could one not be, after six years of perestroika, the defeat of the Communist coup-plotters in 1991, and the innumerable positive assessments by prominent Westerners, from Presidents to journalists to economists and investors? The image of Boris Yeltsin mounting a tank in front of the Supreme Soviet during the attempted coup and announcing, in his kingly baritone, that Russia would remain free of tyranny retained perfect clarity in my mind's eye. Moreover, in 1993 Yeltsin had just prevailed in a national referendum that granted him a mandate to continue his free-market and democratization reforms. History in Russia was beginning anew. What needed to be changed would be changed; problems that needed solving were going to be solved.

One warm afternoon in early October of 1993 I was strolling through the **Kitai-Gorod** neighborhood of central Moscow with a young woman by the name of Lena. An accountant, Lena had cropped flaxen hair and hazel eyes that radiated purpose; she was well spoken and curious. We talked about Pushkin's poetry, about the Michael Jackson concert that had just taken place in Moscow, about which designers were chic in the West, about how she liked to spend her days off at her parents' dacha. But when our conversation turned to Russia, a hardness invaded her eyes. I took the position that Yeltsin would keep the country on the reformist path; she countered with declarations that "nothing good will ever come of Russia," that the truth about what was going on here would never be known, that one who thought otherwise was naive, and that Russians were, above all, an unpredictable people, given to wild swings and dangerous extremes, lacking the patience and adherence to principle that democracy demanded. She scoffed at forecasts of prosperity and laughed at Westerners, with their belief in progress, the rule of law, and the goodness of men. I answered that this would all change, and we argued. But it was a beautiful day, the poplars stood red and gold in the fresh autumn air, and we soon dropped the subject. Suddenly we realized that we were almost alone on the streets, although it was a weekend afternoon. Only the distant sound of sirens broke the silence.

That evening I arrived home and turned on the television to scenes of mayhem and carnage in central Moscow. A couple of weeks earlier Yeltsin had ordered the Supreme Soviet, which opposed him, to disband. The deputies had refused; they had proclaimed a new government and appointed their own President. They had locked themselves inside the Soviet; soldiers

and demonstrators had surrounded it; and a standoff had ensued. While Lena and I were out strolling, some of the demonstrators had broken through the line of soldiers and set off on a rampage through town, shooting their way to the main television station, which they attempted without success to take by force. The next morning Yeltsin ordered tanks into the streets, and I watched from the bank of the Moscow River as they blasted the **white-marble** citadel of the Supreme Soviet into a flaming, blackened shell, as snipers fired on passersby from rooftops, as crowds ran screaming along the embankment.

The deputies surrendered that evening, but for the next two weeks the Kremlin imposed a curfew. From the moment the nightly curfew began, cries to halt, bursts of gunfire, and screams would echo outside my apartment and last until dawn. My neighbors and I assumed that the shooting and screaming had something to do with Ministry of Internal Affairs troops apprehending curfew violators or hunting down the Chechen guerrillas whom, it was said, the Chechen speaker of the Supreme Soviet had installed in Moscow, but we never learned exactly what was going on. There were rumors and more rumors; the media were biased in Yeltsin's favor and could not be fully trusted. During the day troops rounded up Chechen and Azerbaijani street traders, often beating them, seizing their goods and money, and bulldozing their kiosks before expelling them from Moscow. This they did with the approval of the mobs that gathered to watch: many saw the dark-skinned Caucasians as outsiders who stirred up trouble, or as *mafiozy*.

Reformer or no, Yeltsin had the guns, and he used them. As under the czars and Stalin, so under Yeltsin-might would prevail in Russia, dialogue would be drowned out in the rattle of gunfire and blasts of artillery, violence would be used by the state against those who opposed reforms that were at least ostensibly for the good of the country. But there was something new this time: the violence received accolades from Western politicians whom most Russians had until then viewed as honorable and above the tumult of Russian politics. Because the West supported the bombardment and sided so openly with Yeltsin afterward, many saw the West as colluding with Yeltsin to weaken Russia. From then on Russians began deriding Yeltsin as the *stavlennik* ("protege") or *marionetka* ("puppet") of the West. Russians' view of their country, as Lena had expressed it to me, was imbued with pessimism (which turned out to be justified), fatalism, and an awareness of irreconcilable traits and historical contradictions. If reform depended on democracy, and democracy required dialogue and trust, what did it mean that when faced with one of his first major crises, Yeltsin started shooting at his adversaries? In short, what had really changed?

THE RULE OF LAWLESSNESS

The leaders of the October, 1993, uprising were charged with inciting mass disorder, imprisoned, given amnesty in early 1994, and released, sufficiently chastised that most have not since participated in national politics. With his survival at stake, Yeltsin proposed a constitution that would grant him czar-like powers. A referendum was held, and the constitution passed into law. Liberal Russians (and I) viewed the constitution with some alarm. Did Russia really need a new czar? Wasn't an overly powerful executive branch of government what had always plagued Russia? But then, Yeltsin had staked his career on defeating the Communists, who appeared to pose the greatest threat to reform, so we gave him the benefit of the doubt.

In 1994, in order to stay in Moscow, I took a job as the co-manager of a Russian-American company that provided **physical**-protection services to Western businesses opening up in Russia. (My partner was Russian, a former deputy chief of the Moscow militia.) If in politics some sort of order had been restored, in other areas of national life, specifically business and the economy, a war was being waged—a war that, more than the uprising of 1993, would poison Russia and pervert its course, and of which I would acquire personal, nerve-shattering knowledge.

One September evening in 1994 I was driving home from work across central Moscow. The sky was a soup of gray drizzle and black cloud. Traffic was light; cars drifted past me or I passed them in a swooshing slush of rain and flying mud. I turned off the Garden Ring Road onto Vtoraya Tverskaya-Yamskaya Street and pulled up to a traffic light. It was red. I waited.

About halfway up the next block a man entered a Mercedes parked at the curb. A few seconds later an explosion tore the car apart and blew out the windows in the surrounding buildings, and the shock wave hurled pedestrians to the ground. A column of flame erupted from the vehicle; glass and scraps of metal tinkled and clanked as they fell to the ground. I jumped out of my car to look, and then a second, lesser explosion—the Mercedes's gas tank—scattered shreds of metal within a twenty-yard radius.

A couple of minutes later a militia car arrived, but the officers did little more than gawk at the burning vehicle. By the time a fire engine had pulled up, black smoke overhung the street, and the flames shooting from the wreckage reached into the branches of a tree above. The firemen brought out a hose and managed to extinguish the blaze with a torrent of white foam, which spread over the street like dirty snow. Steam resembling winter fog arose from the burnt car. The blaze out, the firemen threw aside

their hose and pried open the door with a crowbar. The inside of the vehicle was a skeleton of charred, twisted metal. A few chunks of singed flesh were all that remained of the man inside.

The radio first reported this as the murder of a prominent actor; then reports said a banker. It turned out to be the contract killing of a *mafija* boss whose alias was Sylvester.

A great gangland war was on in Russia, and I again heard gunfire in the night around my apartment. Bankers, businessmen, and innocent bystanders were being murdered in shootouts, contract hits, and car and apartment bombings-sometimes at the rate of several a day in Moscow alone. Competing territorial criminal gangs, many of which operate under the protection of police and state officials, were establishing their turf, taking over businesses across Russia, eliminating those who resisted. Government security services, so powerful under the Soviets, now found themselves outgunned; they were also vulnerable to corruption, because most officers and soldiers earned less than \$150 a month.

From the archives:

"Hoods Against Democrats" (December 1998)
In Bulgaria the distinction between the state and organized crime is clear-for now. By Robert D. Kaplan

"The Wild East" (June 1994)
Organized crime has Russia even more firmly in its grip than has been reported. By Seymour M. Hersh

There was nothing subtle, hidden, or surreptitious about the *mafija*. *Mafiozy* often drove armored Mercedes and BMWs equipped with sirens and flashing lights and used them to force other cars to the side of the road; to avoid traffic jams they turned onto the sidewalk, honked, and shot ahead, sending pedestrians diving out of the way. They gathered at nightclubs where the cover charges alone could exceed \$400; they ordered cognac at \$200 a shot and hookers at \$1,000 a session; they dressed in Versace and Hugo Boss suits; they maintained diamond-clad concubines of mesmerizing, icy beauty. Outside Moscow they built grand dachas for themselves, their wives, and their mistresses; they vacationed on the Riviera and in the Swiss Alps. In a land where honesty was a fault and the good were always the losers, always the poor, *mafiozy* became role models for many of the young, who in at least one survey named "contract killer" and "hard-currency prostitute" as the professions to which they most aspired. Money (and guns) made kings-understandably, in view of both Russia's poverty and the revulsion the young felt for the Soviet dogma of self-abnegation for the sake of a bright future, which never came. A free and fair market was an abstract concept; driving a \$200,000 armored Mercedes 600 that could survive a bomb explosion under its chassis was fun.

The *mafiozy* were richer, cleverer, more lavish, and more aggressive than the expatriate businessmen arriving in Moscow, lured by Western journalists' portrayal of Russia as the "Wild East"-a tantalizing but deceptive catchphrase that implied frontierlike opportunity for all in a munificent wilderness. When the expatriates discovered that the odds had been stacked against them, they came to our security firm for protection; they were frightened, insomniac, at times trembling, and always stunned. Where was the reforming Russia that would let them get rich while preaching the gospel of the free market to reverent native subordinates?

The Byzantine nature of Russia's legal environment provides organized crime with an entree into businesses by making violations of the law-matters for blackmail-inevitable, and by leaving entrepreneurs at the mercy of corrupt bureaucrats and state agencies. It is impossible to operate a business successfully in Russia and also observe all the laws, because there are too many contradictory laws. The approximately twenty different levies on the books would tax a company as much as 105 percent if they were paid; businesses must evade taxes to at least some extent or go bankrupt. Most enterprises maintain a secret *chornaya kassa* (a "black accounting book" that accurately shows profits and losses) but submit to auditors from the Tax Inspectorate the *belaya bukhgalteriya* ("white accounts"-false records of low profits and high expenses). The auditors themselves are barely getting by: they work for a commission (a percentage of the taxes they collect), and may be receptive to bribes, gifts, rented women, and so on.

State agencies other than the Tax Inspectorate suffocate businesses and add to the mess. Registration, re-registration, and certification with municipal departments cost enterprises hundreds of employee hours. Bureaucrats may expedite paperwork for bribes. Unbribed, they may "forget" or "misplace" one's papers, deny requests, delay decisions, fail to show up for meetings, or send one back to a lower-level bureaucrat for this or that document or stamp or signature. Fire, sanitary, and labor inspectors make frequent and unexpected calls on businesses. If something is not in order, or the inspectors are not adequately bribed or *fêted*, they may order the company closed, seize assets, or arrange for arrests. Legal redress most often fails: the government rarely loses in court against the accused, and judges are known to be on the take.

Enter the *mafija*. It has been estimated that 80 percent of Russian businesses pay *dan'* ("tribute," or protection money) to a *krysha* ("roof," or racket), but the real number is probably higher; one may assume that any business operating openly has a *krysha*.

(Entrepreneurs providing clandestine services are less likely to run into trouble.) *Mafiozy* approach businesses directly, visiting in groups of three or four; one of them speaks in a friendly manner, warning directors that they must pay *dan*'—15 to 20 percent of their company's gross earnings—or suffer violence at the hands of unnamed gangs. If the *mafiozy* operate under the guise of a security agency, they may insist that the director sign a contract—a ruse that has deceived some businesses into relinquishing control of their bank accounts. Once a business has acquired a *krysha*, it must resist the advances of rival gangs or risk falling prey to *razborki*—a settling of scores over territory. If businesses refuse to pay, which is rare now, the thugs mount an escalating campaign of pressure, starting with verbal threats, moving on to beating and kidnapping, and ending with well-placed bullets or the torture of loved ones or a bomb placed by the door of the businessman's apartment.

If businessmen attempt to conceal revenues from the *krysha* victimizing them, they may be exposed by moles the *mafija* has placed within their companies. Often, in return for payment, accountants or secretaries provide the mob with information about their employers' violations of tax laws. In any case, a businessman may simply be unable to cope with the mobsters' demands, which can increase at any time: in addition to regular *dan*', thugs may demand "gifts" in the form of SUVs, rented women, or bags of cash. However, the *mafija* can play a useful role in business development: if competitors with lower prices or better goods appear on the scene, fires, theft, murder, and other bedlam can be arranged.

In most countries organized crime affects principally illegal trade (narcotics, prostitution, gambling), but in Russia the mob can take over any business—not only because most businesses have to break the law to stay afloat, and thus leave themselves vulnerable to extortion, but also because so much economic activity takes place in untraceable cash. Although Russian law requires that a business open a bank account, Russian banks are notoriously unreliable—failing frequently, closing unexpectedly, disappearing with their depositors' money, or charging high fees for irregular services. A business may thus be forced to conduct most of its transactions in cash. Other Russian financial institutions have proved no more reliable: investment houses have turned out to be pyramid schemes, and millions of private investors have lost their life savings when the schemes collapsed.

A country with a \$340 billion economy and no reliable banking system or financial sector makes a poor investment, to say the least, and capital flight has become a necessity for many businesses. It is estimated that for most of the nine years since

the fall of the Soviet Union some \$2 billion a month has fled the country for banks in the Caribbean, Switzerland, and elsewhere. Aid from international lending agencies totaled \$66 billion through 1998; in the mid-1 990s roughly \$10 billion a year in aid poured into Russia while at least double that flowed out.

Faced with such danger, disarray, corruption, and deceit (most of which is well publicized by the Russian media: news shows frequently amount to chronicles of bribery, death, and dismemberment), Russians have stopped feeling outrage and have resigned themselves. The murder of an entrepreneur "as a result of his business activity" (to quote a phrase beloved by militia press centers) arouses no surprise, only a shrug. The excesses of mobsters on a Moscow street provoke no indignation, only envy. It is accepted that the chaos and contradictory laws benefit those in power-that the state has abandoned its people to the thugs because it is in league with them. In any case, those in power, be they *mafiozy* or the government, have the guns; thoughts of overt resistance are rare.

Continued

1 | 2 | 3 | 4

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TO:

(b)(6)

Cathy Mainardi
Larry Di Rita
Admiral Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 4, 2001

SUBJECT: **DoD Ethics Regulations**

I want to make absolutely sure that the security people, drivers and the people that help me in any way who are government employees do not do things of a personal service nature, which could be seen as a violation of the law.

I recently read an Inspector General's report on a senior officer. There is an allegation that some of the individuals who work in close proximity to the admiral may have done some things that could be described as personal services, and therefore not appropriate activities for people being paid by the taxpayers.

I don't know quite how to handle this matter, given the fact that I am here generally 14 hours a day and I don't have much of a life beyond what I do here. It takes enormous effort for me to handle the one or two things a week that may relate to personal business, such as renewing insurance on my place in New Mexico or something where I have to talk to Nancy Pardo in Chicago. In those cases we pay for phone calls, the faxes, and postage.

In any event, I do want all of you to be sensitive to this. I don't want people to try to be helpful, as much as I know they'd like to be. Each of you has to be very careful about suggesting to anyone connected with me that they do something for me or any member of my family or a friend, or at our house, that could be considered personal. We probably have to be careful about moving Joyce's baggage in and out of the car.

In any event, think about it and then let's make sure that the security people, the drivers, and others are very, very sensitive to this, so that there is no issue.

Of course, I have sent a sizable check to the government that would fully reimburse the taxpayers for any personal service that may, by error, be performed. Nonetheless, I want to avoid it.

Thank you

DHR/azn
080501.16

238
4 Aug 01
U12854 /02

snowflake

August 6, 2001 5:25 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Directive

I think we need to get a directive out that by a specific date the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the Service Secretariats will have fully interoperable systems so we can communicate with each other.

That message alone ought to help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080601-27

311

6 Aug 01

U12681 /02

August 7, 2001 12:30 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
cc: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 3 ↯
SUBJECT: Responses to Congressional Letters

Newt Gingrich called. He said he noted in the press the letter from 80 members of the Congress about the size of the Army.

He said we ought to think about dividing Congressional letters into two categories (we might think about doing this with letters in general).

The first category would be letters where they have taken a position that is clearly not defensible. It may be they have to take that position because of their constituency. In this category, we would respond by pointing out why that position doesn't work.

The second category is letters like the one on the size of the Army. We would agree with them that it would be desirable to have a large Army; in fact, it would be desirable to have a lot of large things. The question is the matter of trade offs-where do they see the money can be taken from without damaging the national security, and how could we go about doing that? In the process, we would explain to them what the challenges are.

I think he has a good point. He said he would like to work with you or whoever is working on that letter, to get a good response. I told him I would be delighted.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080701-17

032

7 Aug 01

U12684 /02

snowflake

August 9, 2001 7:28 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Travel Schedules

Do we get the travel schedules of the Chiefs, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman so we have a sense of how many days they are in town and how many days they are out of town?

I don't want to make a big deal about it, but if it is easy, I would like to see it.

Thanks.

WHR:dh
080901-1

U14771 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/444

1111

1111

snowflake

August 9, 2001 8:33 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reserves

SECDEF HAS SEEN
SEP 15 2001

110.01

Any reserves or any money we have tucked away, I want to personally know about, and I don't want the Comptroller's office or anyone else to be dispensing it without my being involved.

Please give me a tabulation of what we have and where it is located, so that I have a very clear sense of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
080901-2

9 AUG 01

snowflake

August 9, 2001 7:42 AM

TO: VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret.)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Director, Joint Staff

I am going to need more names for the Director, Joint Staff. The one we talked about may not work.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
08090144

08090144

4 AUG 2001

August 11, 2001 12:47 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: VTC

They ought to figure out a way to make that VTC with the President better. That rush of air that happened every time someone stopped talking isn't necessary. They have a better system than that.

090

Thanks.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 21 2001

SECDEF -

DHR:dh
081101-8

JOINTSTAFF INVESTIGATED. WHITE HOUSE SYSTEM MANAGER WILL INSTALL NEW EQUIPMENT AT CRAWFORD TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM. SEE ATTACHED.

w/r

Ed 8/20

11 Aug 01

*8/20
1917
DH*

August 11, 2001 2:18 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Trip to Texas

W
W
W
W
W

I am going to go to Texas on the 24th of August. I am going to need two-plus hours alone with the President.

Then I will go on to Taos.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081101-10

Larry -
Talked to Albert Hawkins
8/15. Asked for 3 hours
+ lunch based on
conversation with
SECDEF @ scheduling
meeting 8/14. (SECDEF +
POTUS had
discussed couple
hours)
Subjects DPG, QDR,
and NPR plus CJCS
announcement
PA Talking points +
nomination package.
Last subject is a
sample WAR PLAN.

11 AUG 01

U12705 /02

snowflake

August 15, 2001 7:42 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Timing of QDR

One of the legislative proposals we should make is to change the due date of the QDR until a year after an administration is in. There is just no way to get it done when you first walk in.

Let's get that added to our list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081501-6

310.1

15-Aug-01

U12707 /02

August 16, 2001 12:24 PM

SUBJECT: Anecdote for Missile Defense

Anecdote

Missile Defense

The United States does not today have the ability to defend against ballistic missiles. No nation currently has the ability to defend against ballistic missiles, except for Russia, where Moscow has a deployed missile defense system with interceptors armed with nuclear warheads.

Think back to England during the World War II "blitz," when they were on the receiving end of German V-1 and V-2 missiles.

In the 1980s, there was the SCUD war between Iran and Iraq.

Think back ten years ago, to the Gulf War, when Iraq was firing ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia and Israel and people were being **killed**—28 Americans killed and 99 seriously wounded by one ballistic missile into Saudi Arabia .

DHR:dh
081601-5

373.24

16 Aug 01

U12708 /02

snowflake

W. A. Ford 9/20
1/55
August 16, 2001 10:48 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Executive Secretariat

Let's get the Executive Secretariat functioning so that if the Policy shop holds something past the deadline, we know it a day or two before and someone can jog them.

Also, please make a note to bring that up at the next staff meeting-that things are getting stuck in places.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081601-13

*Original
for Exec Sec
9/20/01*

312

16 Aug 01

U12864 /02

August 16, 2001 11:46 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Western Sahara

Please take a look at the UN Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara. It appears we have 15 DoD personnel there. Is there some way we can reduce that number?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081601-20

UN

16 Aug 01

U12712 /02

snowflake

August 16, 2001 11:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
 VADM Giambastiani *Di Rita 8/16*

CC: VADM Holcomb (Ret.)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Fire Fighting

Please track down the question of the Army as Executive Agent giving me that paper on forest fires.

Please find out why the Air Force guard force fire fighting never came to me.

Something is wrong with this system. I want it fixed.

Thanks.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 18 2001

Sent in 8/16

DHR:dh
081601-23

-SEC`Y OF ARMY SIGNS ALL DEPLOYMENT ORDERS FOR DOMESTIC DEPLOYMENTS

-SEC`Y ARMY NOW HAS NOTIFICATION SYSTEM UP & RUNNING.

000,92

16 Aug 01

U12862 /02

*18
09/20*

snowflake

August 17, 2001 10:23 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: GAO Report

Please give me a report on how the GAO can say what they said-that our equipment is not aging. The fact of the matter is that the Reagan buildup bought all the equipment, and then the Clinton procurement holiday didn't buy any equipment. It is incomprehensible that the equipment could not have aged.

And if it aged, it is ^{hensible} ~~incompressible~~ that it could not cost more to maintain.

How in the world can the GAO say what they said?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081701-12

U12713 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/454

090h

no from / /

8. Pentagon Harbors Antimissile Skepticism


By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON, Aug. 15

The head of the Pentagon's missile defense programs said today that he was not fully confident in the "basic functionality" of the antimissile system that successfully intercepted a mock warhead in space last month.

The official, Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, the director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said that because of the uncertainties the next test of the system in October, would be a replay of the July 14 test, with no additional complexities like more decoys aboard the target missile.

The system is designed to destroy an intercontinental-range ballistic missile before its warheads re-enter Earth's atmosphere.



Defense Daily August 16, 2001

Pg. 5

9. BMDO Moves Ahead With Ft. Greely Testbed Preparation

By Kerry Gildea

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) remains on track to clear land by the end of the month at Ft. Greely, Alaska, for an interceptor testbed, and is keeping open an option to conduct future flight tests there, Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, the BMDO director, told reporters yesterday.

Anything that BMDO does in terms of clearing land or preparing a testbed site at Ft. Greely or testing there is subject to ABM Treaty compliance reviews, he noted. So far, BMDO has been able to execute its planning and test program without a problem he noted.

The five-silo testbed at Ft. Greely also could be used if needed as an emergency system similar to the early use of the Northrop Grumman [NOC] Joint STARS in the Gulf War, Kadish noted.

BMDO, as part of its revised and bolstered missile de-

fense program, plans to expand its tests to include future interceptor flight tests out of Kodiak as well (Defense Daily, June 28). BMDO has acknowledged that there would be safety concerns over testing from Ft. Greely because interceptors would fly over populated land.

However, Kadish said that while flight testing will be conducted from Kodiak first, that "does not preclude" BMDO from flight testing out of Ft. Greely. The distance between Kodiak and Ft. Greely is about 500 miles.

"That is not unprecedented to fly out of the interior of the United States," he said.

For example, Kadish said, during some flight tests at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), N.M., boosters are often flown from nearby Ft. Wingate into WSMR. During such tests, people are moved out of the area, he noted.

"We have to look at the feasibility, the safety risks, the costs of it," Kadish added. "But, I can tell you from an overall test perspective, we would like to launch from where we would operate."

Earlier this month, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told Congress that BMDO can lawfully use FY '01 military construction funds to build the testbed (Defense Daily, Aug. 7). Wolfowitz also informed the lawmakers a sole-source contract would be awarded by the Small Business Administration on behalf of BMDO to Aglaq Construction Enterprises for the site construction.

Blomberg.com

August 15, 2001

10. No Proof For U.S. Military's Claim On Aging Equipment, CBO Says

By Tony Capaccio

Washington -- There's no evidence to support the U.S. military's claim that its cost to maintain aging equipment has soared, says the Congressional Budget Office.

The services have used that claim to argue for more money, saying accounts for pay, medical benefits, housing, training and other fixed costs

are being drained for spending on old equipment. The Bush administration has also used it as a rationale for new equipment that will modernize and "transform" the military.

CBO concluded the average age of many types of equipment, including tanks and ships, is not much greater than it was 20 years ago. And, it found no evidence that spending on "aging equipment" has increased dramatically or driven total operations and readiness spending.

"CBO's findings are in conflict with the service's statements that spending on Operations and Maintenance for equipment is growing rapidly," said the report signed by CBO director Dan Crippen. "Those statements are sometimes based on selective data," said CBO, a non-partisan agency.

"CBO's findings are likely to damage the-services credibility," said Steven Kosiak, defense budget analyst for the non-partisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Focusing attention on the aging equipment issue has led the services avoid cutting costs "related especially to headquarters, training, administration, communications, and base operations, where substantial cost growth has occurred over the past decade," he said.

'Death Spiral'

Military and civilian Pentagon leaders since the late 1990s have claimed the U.S. is locked in a "death spiral" where money better spent on readiness and new systems is going to aging aircraft, ships, tanks and helicopters. The Bush administration has embraced this theme.

"Aircraft, tanks and other equipment are now beginning to become so old that operations and maintenance costs for those systems have begun to skyrocket," Defense Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told reporters Aug. 8. "When things get old they break more often and the repair bills are a lot higher."

Overall, "only about 20 percent of total O&M spending is devoted to equipment," said CBO. The operations and

maintenance budget for fiscal 1999 -- the best available data -- totaled about \$102 billion, with roughly \$20 billion going to sustaining equipment.

The average age of General Dynamics Corp. M1-A1 tanks, for example, "was slightly lower in 1999 than 1980, 11 years versus 12 years," said CBO.

Disputed Figures on Spare Parts

The Army's total spending on spare parts consumed per operating hour for its five top weapons systems -- a measure designed to track aging and maintenance -- rose by only 12 percent since 1995, or an average of 2 percent a year, said CBO.

Army officials have claimed that since 1998 costs for spare parts for these systems grew 30 percent -- "but this reflects costs in only selected operating units," CBO said.

"The limited data available on the most expensive systems do not support assertions that costs for all aging systems are rising rapidly," said CBO.

"The report suggests we don't need billions of dollars to sustain aging equipment but eventually we're going to need billions to replace the aging equipment," said Christopher Jehn, the CBO's former director of national security programs and now Cray Inc. head of congressional relations.

"Yes, aging equipment is a little more expensive every year to maintain and the Department needs to address that problem but equipment maintenance and operating costs represent 6 percent or 7 percent of the overall defense budget," Jehn said. "So that's not what's driving the defense budget up."

'Selective Information'

To illustrate its point on the selective use of information, CBO highlighted the June 6 testimony of Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Ryan to the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee.

Ryan said flying-hour costs have risen almost 50 percent.

Ryan "used 1996 as the base year -- a year in which the Air Force says spare parts were

under-funded because of errors in forecasting," said CBO. "If data for 1995 through 2000 are used instead, the measured growth is only 10 percent."

Air Force Secretary James Roche repeated some of Ryan's points during a breakfast meeting yesterday with reporters.

"Of all of the shocks that we've had coming into office, the fact that there was under-funding in such a pervasive manner has really surprised me," Roche told the Defense Writers Group.

"It surprised me in terms of maintenance and increased cost-per-flying hour," Roche said. "It's not because the amount that you have put into maintenance stayed the same -- it grew. The aircraft have aged. It's now 22 years -- that's the average age per airplane."

"Not a New Trend"

CBO said the average age is 20 years, up from 13 in 1980 -- and "such aging is not a new trend." Likewise, Air Force flying hour costs "were no higher than they had been in 1996," or about \$7,000; and average annual spending for depot maintenance went up and down between 1975 and 1999, before flattening to \$266,000 per aircraft since 1993, it said.

CBO estimated that spending on Air Force aircraft operations and maintenance increases by 1 percent to 3 percent for every additional year of age, after adjusting for inflation. That translates into an increase of \$80 million to \$230 million per year in an annual Air Force O&M budget of \$22 billion, said CBO.

"It's clear that for the past few years they have been using data very selectively and that the effect has been to paint a very misleading picture of the overall impact of equipment aging on operations and maintenance costs," Kosiak said.

Miami Herald
August 15, 2001

11. SouthCom General Considered For Joint Chiefs Chairman

ould oversee military overhaul

By Tim Johnson and Frank Davies

WASHINGTON -- As President Bush prepares to select the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to oversee an ambitious overhaul of the U.S. military, among the dark-horse names he is reportedly considering is that of Marine Gen. Peter Pace, head of the Miami-based Southern Command.

Pace, who oversees U.S. military operations in Latin America, is among a handful of generals and admirals under consideration -- although military experts say it is difficult to predict who will get the top job.

"It's like picking the pope. There are a lot of factors you don't know about," said retired Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Yet Pace's name has percolated up in a couple of recent press reports, and some in the Marine Corps consider it that branch's turn. The last three chairmen have been Army generals. Naval and Air Force officers have also held the post -- but never a Marine Corps general. Army Gen. Henry Shelton, the current chairman, is to step down Oct. 1. At the latest, Bush would announce his replacement early next month to allow time for Senate confirmation.

Shelton's replacement will inherit a tough assignment. The Pentagon is stirred up over reports that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld may pay for the military's modernization by cutting troop strength from its current 1.4 million members.

Aides have also talked of slashing up to two of the Army's 10 divisions, six air wings from the Air Force, and two aircraft carrier groups from the Navy.

The next chairman of the Joint Chiefs will effectively be faced with cushioning the blow of any military cuts.

"This decision is very important for Rumsfeld," said Jack Spencer, a defense analyst for the conservative Heritage Foundation. "The perception is that his plans for overhaul have put him at loggerheads with the people in uniform."

Because of the pending changes at the Pentagon, observers are studying the possi-

ble list of candidates with particular attention.

"You definitely need a strong leader if you're talking about those kind of force cuts," said Michele Flournoy, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, a Washington think tank.

"Some of them on the list would probably say, 'I don't want to preside over those combat cuts, so take me off the list.'"

Rumsfeld told Pentagon employees last week that he needs an officer with command and war-fighting experience "who has the respect of the men and women in the armed services."

He also cited personality as a significant consideration. "It has to be a person that I feel good about working with. All of us here work long hours in this building. . . . If you're going to spend that much time with somebody, you dam well better like them."

Pace became the top Marine candidate after the corps' commandant, Gen. James Jones, took himself out of running. Colleagues and observers speak of Pace in glowing terms.

"He looks like a movie star. He's humble. . . . I think he'd be an unbelievably effective guy. . . . You could not find a finer combat leader and policy guy than Pete Pace," said retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who recently retired as White House drug czar after serving as chief of the Southern Command.

"Pete's a very bright guy. He's got a good combat record and he's got a great personality," Trainor said.

Others commonly mentioned as in the running for the chairmanship include the current vice chairman, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers. Adm. Dennis Blair, head of the Pacific Command, won points for his handling of the April 1 collision of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft with a Chinese fighter jet that forced the U.S. naval plane down on Hainan island in China.

"He's one of the best minds in the military," said Flournoy. "He's got a stellar track record, and has become somewhat of an Asia expert."

Another frequently mentioned name is Air Force Gen.

Ralph E. Eberhart, who as head of the Space Command champions military capabilities in space, an area where Rumsfeld wants to make his mark.

In contrast to the strategic strengths of other candidates, Pace has built a solid back-ground in issues of staffing and combat preparedness.

"He is seen as especially good on the issues of readiness and personnel [and] that's important when you're talking about massive reorganization and troop cuts," Spencer said.

Before assuming the Southern Command post, Pace served as the Pentagon's liaison to the public to explain why the Navy needed to resume using the Puerto Rican island of Vieques for bombing practice.

The top post over the arena commonly called SouthCom has not been a traditional springboard for the military's top job.

"You don't think of the SouthCom as a breeding ground for the joint chiefs," said Raul Duany, a former spokesman for the Miami-based command. "I would be surprised if it's Gen. Pace. He's very low-key, low-profile."

Duany added that he had met another possible candidate, Adm. Vern Clark, the current chief of naval operations, and found him "very impressive."

The Washington Times reported Saturday that Clark, a surface ship officer who is a deeply religious man, has emerged as a "dark-horse candidate" to be the next chairman, and had been interviewed twice by the White House.

Trainor said the only sure bet is that Rumsfeld and Bush will not pick a maverick, an officer likely to fight staff or weapon cuts or someone without tested managerial skills. "It's not just merit. It's not just talent, or intellect, courage or bravery. It's a lot of politics," Trainor said.

snowflake

August 18, 2001 10:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Thornberry Article

Congressman Mac Thornberry wrote an article in *Defense News* in the July 30-August 5 issue called "The Political Challenge of Transformation." It is superb. We ought to make sure we get it in the *Early Bird*, and then we ought to send it around to all the senior people in the Pentagon so they all see it and read it.

We might also want to think about getting it up on the Hill to members of Congress. It is about as good a piece as we are going to find.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/30-8/5/01 *DefenseNews* article by Rep. Mac Thornberry, "The Political Challenge of Transformation"

DHR:dh
081801-2

381

18 Aug 01

U12715 /02

DefenseNews

July 30-August 5, 2001

www.defensenews.com

BOEING TO
PAY FOR U.K.'S
APACHE
SIMULATOR WOES 39



The Political Challenge of Transformation

By REP. MAC THORBERRY

Transforming the U.S. military was a centerpiece of President George W. Bush's campaign for the White House, but after only six months some commentators are ready to throw in the towel.

They say that the opponents of reform, from both ends of the political spectrum, have already succeeded in thwarting the most significant proposals coming from the administration's strategic reviews. These skeptics believe that what remains largely will be incremental improvements with a new label.

There is no doubt that change is difficult. *Washington Times* columnist Tony Blankley prophesied in the Feb. 14 issue that transformation would be "the most sustained test [leadership for the Bush administration, mandating] battle with the Department of Defense bureaucracy and the deeply vested interests in Congress, the defense contractors and the legions of think tank theorist."

Even talking about change can be threatening to entrenched interests, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has discovered. In fact, the current round of news stories speculating about Rumsfeld's difficulties with Congress and limited influence at the White House may be part of an attempt to sabotage his effectiveness in forcing change. Yet the obstacles to change in the military must be overcome if the United States is to

remain the pre-eminent world power in the 21st century.

Transformation does not find many political advocates. First, it is hard to define, and does not lend itself to the ever-necessary seven-second sound bite. Its meaning further is confused by the tendency to slap a transformation label on existing plans and incremental upgrades of current systems.

When transformation is discussed, most of the focus is on new, high-tech weapons which, it is feared, will drain dollars from current needs. Opponents try to tie it to particular futuristic weapons that seem far from reality in order to more easily discredit it.

In reality, transformation is about much more than technology. Reforms in the personnel system, in organizational structure and doctrine probably are more significant.

A second political problem for transformation is that it has no obvious constituency. Defense programs have come to resemble highway projects, spreading out across the country to gather political support. There is a strong incentive to protect current programs and the jobs and funding that accompany them.

And that incentive is even stronger with constant funding shortfalls, which make each dollar more precious. Any money used to transform the force is seen as contributing to the current imbalance and viewed as something to be resisted.

Everyone gives lip service to the future, but what service, what company, what member of Congress is eager to sacrifice now for

something that may contribute to the overall good in 20 years? Careers in the Pentagon, the board room, or the halls of Congress are not advanced by creating the disruptions that go with real change, so there are very few voices willing to speak up for the future and move beyond rhetoric to make serious choices.

Third, transformation is necessarily a big-picture issue, and the current strategic environment does not encourage taking the larger, longer view. The great national struggles in two world wars and in the Cold War required that the overall national interest be placed above parochial concerns. Without that kind of over-arching, clearly understood strategic challenge, more parochial views and perspectives dominate. And the willingness to undergo significant change, to a career, a program, a way of thinking, is absent.

So, is the effort to transform the military already doomed? I am encouraged by the fact that past transformations did not require changing the entire force. As Rumsfeld has pointed out, only 10 to 15 percent of the German Army was changed to phenomenal success with the blitzkrieg.

And innovation need not require a lot of money. Military history professors Williamson Murray and Allan Millet, in their book "Military Innovation in the Interwar Period," found that "in spite of low military budgets and considerable antipathy towards military institutions in the aftermath of the slaughter in the trenches, military institutions were able to innovate in the 1920s and

1930s with considerable success."

Transformation is about fundamentally changing the conduct of warfare to better prepare for the future. But it is a process, not a particular destination. Because the exact nature and source of threats and capabilities we will face simply is unknowable, we have to prepare for uncertainty.

That means having a military organization that can respond quickly and resolutely, and it requires a military culture that cannot only tolerate, but also foster, debate and change.

We must focus on the key enablers, giving extra attention to remaining pre-eminent in space, leveraging information warfare, defending the homeland and defeating weapons of mass destruction. To achieve these goals, we must experiment, but it must be true experimentation with a way to integrate lessons learned back into daily decision-making.

Most importantly, we must remember that history is filled with fallen powers that resisted change, dismissed threats and watched their military advantage diminish.

Transforming the military to protect future generations will never appear on a pollster's radar screen or in a focus group of top issues. But it is incumbent on each of us in positions of responsibility to rise above the pressures of the moment, acting with vision and courage to honor those who have come before us and to protect those yet to come.

Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Iowa, serves on the U.S. House Armed Services and Budget committees.

R + R

snowflake

August 18, 2001 1:25 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: CINCs

Is there a law **specifying** that CINCs should be called Commanders-in-Chief, as opposed to Combatant Commanders or something else?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081801-10

322

18 Aug 01

U12718 /02

snowflake

August 20, 2001 9:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Checklist

The checklist looks like a good start. It needs a section that says "special considerations," like when Jerry Lewis was the guy who stopped the F-22.

Obviously, with your fertile mind, you can think of other special situations.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/16/01 "Major Announcement Checksheet"

DHR:dh
082001-1 1

020 DAD

28 Aug 01

U12719 /02

AUG 2 0 2001,

*MAJOR ANNOUNCEMENT
CHECKSHEET*

EVENT

Single Page Talking Point for:

- SecDef
- DepSec
- Service Secretaries
- All Under Secretaries
- LA
- PA
- GC

RESPONSIBILITY

Affected Service or Under Secretary

Legislative Activities:

Congressional Big Eight Notified

- Prior to Announcement
- Post-Announcement

Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs

Relevant Congressional Staffs
Briefed

- Prior to Announcement
- Post-Announcement

Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs

Affected Members of Congress
Briefed

Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs

Public Affairs Activities:

Press Release drafted/approved

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

Subject-matter expert background
briefings

- Prior to announcement
- Post-announcement

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

snowflake

August 20, 2001 12:51 PM

SUBJECT: Paul Gigot

I want to talk to Paul Gigot some day about the goal of increasing warning and reducing surprise being capable of deterring asymmetrical threats to the United States and our deployed forces by moving the defense establishment into the 21st century.

381

DHR:dh
082001-34

20:2501

U12721 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/462

snowflake

August 20, 2001 1:46 PM

TO: Service Secretaries

cc: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Recruiting

Attached is an article **from** Charles Moskos at Northwestern University on recruiting. I think you will **find** it interesting.

After you have had a chance to look it over, let's visit.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/12/01 Moskos Itr to **SecDef** re: How to Save Defense Dollars and Upgrade Recruitment

DHR:dh
082001-45

340

20 Aug 01

U14075 /01

AUG 20 2001

Department of Sociology

1810 Chicago Avenue, 1st Floor
Evanston, Illinois 60208-1330Telephone (847) 491-5415
E-mail sociol@northwestern.edu
Fax (847) 491-9907

12 August 2001

To: Hon. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Hon. David Chu, Undersecretary of Defense
Hon. Charles Abell, Assistant Secretary of Defense

From: Charles Moskos
tel. 847-475-1170; c-moskos@nwu.edu

Subject: How to Save Defense Dollars and Upgrade Recruitment

In constant dollars, per capita costs of military personnel are double that of the draft era. Beyond military salaries, personnel expenditures include housing, family allowance, medical, recruitment, and civilian contractor costs. Indeed, the trade off between personnel expenditures and weapons development has made national missile defense a source of contention in military planning.

By introducing a short-enlistment option, the armed forces will both raise recruit quality and reduce personnel costs. Military recruitment centers on the high school graduate -- and recently, those without diplomas as well. Recruiter focus on this population is self-limiting.

Today, some two-thirds of high school graduates go directly on to higher education. Without encompassing the broad and expanding pool of college students and graduates, there can be no end to recruitment woes. This is not to exclude continuing appeals to the high school graduate, but it is to recognize that what can attract college youth differs from the prevailing enlistment philosophy. Recruiting just five percent of the 1.2 million who annually receive a bachelor's degree would end recruitment woes.

The biggest disincentive for college youth is the long enlistment. With such inducements as high recruit pay, bonuses, and job training, the armed forces try to get recruits to sign on for three, four, or more years. For college youth, this a nonstarter. Rather than stress military career opportunities, recruitment appeals must reinvigorate the concept of the citizen-soldier. Namely, a short active-duty tour followed by a reserve obligation.



Surveys conducted on college campuses show that between one-tenth and one-fifth of graduates from selective universities show some propensity to join the military under certain conditions. The prime condition is a short active-duty enlistment. Namely, two years, 18 months, or even 15 months. Other key conditions increasing enlistment propensity for college students are an overseas assignment and post-service educational benefits.

A GI Bill that paid off student loans would be especially attractive. Moreover, those with bachelor's degrees are often those who most want a break in the academic routine before going on to graduate or professional education. And there is one another consideration. Much as the original GI Bill allowed millions of veterans the opportunity to pursue a bachelor's degree, a GI Bill for the 21st century would enable veterans to go on to graduate school.

Beyond resolving recruitment problems, short-enlistments have other advantages. At a time when American youth marry later and later, the lower enlisted ranks are becoming increasingly married with attendant costs in family benefits. With more college youth entering the military, the proportion of married soldiers and single parents in the junior ranks would drop markedly (and with it a drop of service members on food stamps),

Three major arguments can be raised against the short enlistment. These are given below with rejoinders.

(1) "Short enlistments would increase demands on the training base," Currently, one in three soldiers fails to complete their initial enlistments. Even more troubling is the rise in AWOL and desertion rates in recent years. High quality recruits would reduce attrition dramatically. Much better to have a soldier serve 18 months honorably than to be discharged prematurely for cause. Short-term enlistees, moreover, would enter reserve components after their active-duty, thus alleviating another severe recruitment shortfall.

(2) "The peacekeeping missions for which our military is increasingly deployed require professional soldiers." Let us remember that in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, the vast majority of combat soldiers had only six months of training before being sent to war. Peacekeeping is precisely the kind of mission that would be most attractive to soldiers seeking a change of pace by serving their country in a rewarding way.

(3) "Today's military requires high technical skills that cannot be met by short-termers." Precisely. Higher compensation should be aimed at those whose skills required extended training and job experience, Across-the-board pay raises for military personnel are misguided.

To put it baldly, we now have overpaid recruits and underpaid sergeants. A private earns around **\$1,100** a month, not including room and board or enlistment bonuses. Pay raises should be focused on the career force not on the lower enlisted ranks. In the draft era, the pay ratio between a master sergeant and a private was seven to one; today it is less than three to one. Restoring something like the old balance would be the best way to resolve retention problems in hard-to-fill skills and leadership positions.

One major obstacle in recruitment, however, is beyond the military's control. Namely, the substantial federal aid given to college students who do not serve their country. We now spend annually over \$20 billion in grants and loan subsidies to college students. We have, in effect, created a GI Bill without the GI. In the long-term, there must be a push to link federal college aid to a term of service -- whether military or civilian. It is noteworthy that a 1995 Gallup poll found that 40 percent of the American public favor this proposition, an amazing level of support for a concept that has not even entered the public debate.

Of great significance is the growing tendency for young people to take a year off in their pursuit of higher education (New York Times, Apr 17, 2001, p. 1). Indeed, consideration ought be given to establish a commission that would look at ways to enhance both military recruitment and civilian service options. Different forms of youth service should be viewed as complimentary rather than contradictory.

One other positive consequence of a short enlistment must not be overlooked. If serving one's country became more common among privileged youth, more future leaders in civilian society will have had a formative citizenship experience. This can only redound to the advantage of the armed forces and the nation.

August 20, 2001 4:14 PM

SUBJECT: SACLANT

With the demise of the Soviet navy, we don't need SACLANT, as such.

At the minimum, we ought to separate the Joint Forces Command from it because it is distracting from what JFC is supposed to be doing.

DHR:dh
082001-61

USJFCAN

20 Aug 02

U12720 /02

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: August 25, 2001
 SUBJECT: EPA

I did talk to Christie Todd-Whitman. She says we need to get discussions underway and **very** soon between her office and the Pentagon. She wants to be helpful. I told her that I would probably get our General Counsel to get it started. Please see that it happens.

Thanks.

9/5

OYO EPA

TO: JUSD (AT: L)
 → Roy DuBois -
 As discussed.

DHR/ann
 082501.06

Jerry D. Rita

25 Aug 01

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita
Admiral Giambastiani

*Actual 9/20
7:42P*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Complete - Ongoing

DATE: September 4, 2001

SUBJECT: Support Staff

In the future, I would think that if I am in New Mexico I probably ought to have a secretary here with me.

(b)(6) was here for the first part and then left, and when she was gone it was vastly more difficult for me to function. Also, we needed to have someone back there who is capable of typing and sending things back. Everything I got back and had so many mistakes on it, and had not been proof-read, that it just doubled my work load.

Thanks.

02012

DHR/azn
090401.25

4 Sept 01

U12867 /02

TO: Admiral Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: September 7, 2001

SUBJECT:

It took us five minutes to get connected to the Powell/Rice call this morning. And then when I was talking to Colin Powell, the COMs cut us off.

We have got something to improve the communication system around here.

DHR/azn
090701.13

311

754 01

U13072 /02

snowflake

September 10, 2001 8:34 AM

00001

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Newspapers before Sunday Shows

In the future, if I am on the morning programs on Sunday, we have to arrange to have newspapers brought to my house.

I can't seem to get my newspapers delivered in time for me to read them before the shows, and I can't go on the shows without having read them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091001-5

*→ To: ASD/PA
for action.*

*Di Rita
(Polson take them to him.)*

~~*also to [unclear]*~~

Di Rita

100001

U15126 /01

September 10, 2001 10:15 AM

Number of defense agencies-1 5

Number of health care activities and surgeons general-3

Number of inspectors general-14, plus thousands of assigned staff

Number of separate legal functions-1 0
4 general counsels and 6 judge advocates general

Congressional relations functions-17 in Services and Agencies

Public Affairs Functions-16 in Services and Agencies

Is this all really necessary?

DHR:dh
091001-15

Dgo DAD

10 Sep 01

U12728 /02

September 10, 2001 11:24 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Leahy

I have to go see Senator Leahy and talk to him. He had some classified issues he wanted raised.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091001-21

*To: ASD/LA
FYI*

*Copy to
Cathy Merendi*

00001

105EP01

U15127 /01

snowflake

September 10, 2001 3:10 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Wallop

Please add Malcolm Wallop to that group that comes in with Frank **Gaffney** from time to time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091001-44

To: ASD/PA -

*Malcolm Wallop runs
a group called "Frontiers
for Freedom".
Di Rita*

U15128 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/474

080

1058701

snowflake

September 10, 2001 5:56 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Armed Forces Staff College

Jim Roche has suggested that they abolish the Armed Forces Staff College. Apparently, they have a **16-week** program that is worth about 4 weeks, and they could cover the same subjects in the Army, Navy and Air Force Staff Colleges.

Please look into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091001-54

352

1050pp01

U12725 /02

snowflake

September 12, 2001 4:06 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Schedule and Recognition

There will be a national day of prayer on Friday, and I will be going to the National Cathedral.

Someone ought to be thinking through what kind of an event we are going to have for the people who died here.

DHR:dh
091201-2

293

1254901

U12729 /02

snowflake

Approved by [Signature] 9/13/01

September 13, 2001 5:15 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Statement on Classified Information

Copy to Mr. Di Rita

I wonder if someone ought to get my **statement** on classified material, polish it a bit and then send it out to all **agencies and senior** officials within the Department, and possibly the intelligence **community**.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091301-11

380.01

13 Sep 01

U13074 /02

snowflake

Acc. INFO 9/20/01

September 13, 2001 5:22 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Air Marshals

OBE
Air Marshalls were
retired so
request pertained
by Joint Staff
040 Transportation

I have agreed to send the only two people in the Department of Defense who are trained as air marshals to assist the Department of Transportation for 30 days, preferably on a reimbursed basis.

That is all that I have agreed to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091301-14

13 Sep 01

U13076 /02

snowflake

Arrival 9/12
0912

September 14, 2001 11:58 AM

- Captive.
- Tracking system
developed 9/19.

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tracking Assignments

I am giving lots of assignments. You are sitting in the room and hear all that. You need to keep track of them and help me track that they get done.

I don't have the feeling that happens. Does it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091401-15

2001

14 Feb 02

U13079 /02

nowflake

Asst A 9/20/01

September 16, 2001 10:43 AM

TO:

(b)(6)

FROM:

Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT:

Mat and Frame Cabinet Prayer

1 copy to [signature] 9/20/01

Please frame this in roughly the same size and similar frame as we did the President's prayer out in the hallway.

Thanks.

335 SD

DHR:db
091601-1

1650901

U13080 /02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
Prayer at Cabinet Meeting
September 14, 2001
National Day of Prayer and Remembrance

Ever-faithful God, in death we are reminded of the precious birthrights of life and liberty You endowed in Your American people. You have shown once again that these gifts must never be taken for granted.

We pledge to those whom You have called home, and ask of You -

Patience, to measure our lust for action;
Resolve, to strengthen our obligation to lead;
Wisdom, to illuminate our pursuit of justice, and;
Strength, in defense of liberty.

We seek Your special blessing today for those who stand as sword and shield, protecting the many from the tyranny of the few. Our enduring prayer is that You shall always guide our labors and that our battles shall always be just.

We pray this day, Heavenly Father, the prayer our nation learned at another time of righteous struggle and noble cause—America's enduring prayer: Not that God will be on our side, but always, O Lord, that America will be on Your side.

Amen.

September 16, 2001 10:49 AM

SUBJECT: Military Leadership

1. I talked to General **Keane** about wanting him to stay a bit where he is.
2. I am talking to General Shelton about possibly revising some of the **CINCdoms**, and there might be some earlier opportunities. But, in the back of my mind, I have it that he goes to Joint Forces Command when Buck **Kernan** completes his two years.

322

DHR:dh
091601-2

1650001

U12738 /02

9/20/01
ACRN
September 16, 2001 11:09 AM

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Paper for Ivanov

Russia

Please tickle this memo from (b)(6) that shows that Ivanov read "Rumsfeld's Rules" for when I meet with him in NATO, if I go.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091601-5

16 Sep 01

U13082 /02

snowflake

Info

4/19/19

September 17, 2001 9:40 AM

SUBJECT: Bob Burns

On Sunday, September 16, about 5:45 p.m., as I was leaving the Pentagon, I saw Bob Burns, Associated Press reporter for the Pentagon. I slowed down, rolled down my window and said with a laugh, "Bob, you can't seem to get your work done in a normal working day."

He turned to me without a smile on his face and said, "Mr. Secretary, as an American citizen, I want you to know how deeply I appreciate and value the fact that you are in the important post you are in. I am grateful."

Amazing.

DHR:dh
091701-17

335 SD

17 Sep 01

U13086 /02

snowflake

September 17, 2001 7:18 PM

TO: J. D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Invitation to DCI

You are going to want to get the invite out to George Tenet fast. You might want **Cambone** to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091701-35

U15454 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/485

001

10280

September 17, 2001 7:27 PM

TO: Major Michael P. Stapleton, USAF
Aide-de-Camp to the Chief of Staff, USAF

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Flag and Letter

I very much appreciate your sending me the **Nichole** Carter flag and letter. I have sent it to the White House for the President.

Thank you so much.

Sincerely,

DHR:dh
091701-36

335 SD

17 Sep 01

U15455 /01

snowflake

September 18, 2001 8:05 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: TV Interviews

In the future when I do these TV interviews from the Pentagon, I would like to be sitting down so I can lean forward, rather than standing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091801-2

U15457 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/487

000:1:100

1832
PO

snowflake

September 18, 2001 8:17 AM

333 WHT

TO: Jaymie Durnan
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: President's Visit

I understand you are the one who came up with the idea of having the President go to the cafeteria. It was a **homerun!**

Thank you very much.

DHR:dh
091801-3

1828701

U15458 /01

September 19, 2001 3:13 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Torie Clarke
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Following are some concepts that I offer for consideration as elements of speeches, press briefings and talking points, internally and externally. It is always helpful if we are all working off the same sheet of music.

1. **Terrorist Attack.** The September 11th terrorist attack on the U.S. was carefully planned. There may well be more attack plans in place, and we must recognize that. It is likely that the terrorists planned not only the September 11th attack and future attacks, but that they planned how they would hide and what evidence they wished to leave behind for us to find to confuse our search. Therefore, it will take a sustained effort to root them out.
2. **Expectations.** The world needs to have realistic expectations. This campaign is a marathon, not a sprint. No terrorist or terrorist network, such as the Al-Qaida network, is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise missiles or bombers. We recognize that it will take time and pressure on the countries that harbor these people for the foes of terrorism to be successful. Therefore, the fact that the first, second, or third wave of our efforts does not produce specific people should not come as a surprise. We are patient and determined.
3. **Worldwide Support.** The legitimacy of our actions does not depend on how many countries support us. More nearly the opposite is true: the legitimacy of other countries' opinions should be judged by their attitude toward this systematic, uncivilized assault on a free way of life.
4. **Coalitions.** The coalitions that are being fashioned will not be fixed; rather, they will change and evolve. While most countries are concerned about terrorism, and properly so, each country has a somewhat different perspective and different relationships, views and concerns. It should not be surprising that some countries will be supportive of some activities in

350.001

19 Sep 01

U15566 /01

which the U.S. is engaged, while other countries will not. Which group any country falls into will depend on the nature and location of the activity. We recognize that some countries will have to conceal or downplay their cooperation with us. That needs to be understood and accepted.

5. **Fear.** We understand that people have fears-fear for themselves, their families and their governments. Therefore, some will be reluctant to join an effort against terrorism or at least some aspects of our efforts. Terrorists terrorize people. We accept that fact. However, we need people's help and any information they can provide that will assist us. A number of countries are helping quietly and we appreciate that. Indeed, we ask people across the globe to provide us any information they have that can help in rooting out terrorists and their networks.
6. **Against Terrorism, Not the People.** We are after terrorists and the regimes that support them. This is not a war against the people of any country. The regimes that support terrorism terrorize their own people as well. We need to enlist all civilized people to oppose terrorism, and we need to make it safe for them to do so.
7. **Not Against Islam.** This is not a war against Islam or any other religion. The Al-Qaida terrorists are extremists-whose views are antithetical to those of most Muslims. Their actions threaten the interests of the world's Muslims and are aimed in part at preventing Muslim people from engaging the rest of the world. There are millions of Muslims around the world who we expect to become allies in this struggle.
8. **Secondary Effects.** Finally, there will be secondary effects. We recognize that as we continue to go after terrorism, our activities will have effects in a number of countries. We have to accept that, given the importance of the cause. As a result, relationships and alliances will likely be rearranged over the coming years.

DHR:dh
091901-10

September 19, 2001 3:13 PM

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Terrorism

0005

Following are some concepts that I offer for consideration as elements of speeches, press briefings and talking points, internally and externally. It is always helpful if we are all working off the same sheet of music.

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95 Sep 0

U15594 /01

We recognize that some countries will have to conceal or downplay their cooperation with us. That needs to be understood and accepted.

5. **Fear.** We understand that people have fears-fear for themselves, their families and their governments. Therefore, some will be reluctant to join an effort against terrorism or at least some aspects of our efforts. Terrorists terrorize people. We accept that fact. However, we need people's help and any information they can provide that will assist us. A number of countries are helping quietly and we appreciate that. Indeed, we ask people across the globe to provide us any information they have that can help in rooting out terrorists and their networks.
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DHR:dh
091901-13

snowflake

Account 9/26/02

September 20, 2001 9:33 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Deployments

370

We might want to have a standard statement on deployments.

Please get a draft to me, I will look at it and then we can send it to other people. I think everyone ought to answer those questions by referring them to the Pentagon. Then we ought to have a specific answer.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092001-2

20 Sep 01

U13092 /02

snowflake

Actual
9/26
1:05

September 21, 2001 12:57 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Acadmies

Let's get the military academies focused on pushing Arabic language instruction soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092101-2

11-L-0559/OSD/494

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 22, 2001
SUBJECT: **New Cabinet Post**

*Approved
9/22
1542*

I have no information about what Tom Ridge's new office is going to be. We certainly ought to make sure that no one suggests that it be the authority to call over here and tell us where to move troops. We have the world to worry about.

Get the Deputy's Committee into that subject and find out what written materials exist. Make sure that the Department is not put in a position that's untenable.

Thank you.

384

DHR/azn
082201.03
9

*CC
D. F. ~~Feeth~~*

22 Sep 01

U13105 /02

snowflake

Handwritten signature

September 22, 2001 8:56 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Security

Here is a memo that follows up on the memo I sent you the other day about getting DARPA to work on the problem of security for airports, airplanes and seaports. Newt Gingrich wrote the memo, and it's first rate.

Please put some people on it, establish a **timeline** and tell me when you think you can get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/01 Gingrich memo, "Creating An American System of Security for Airports, Airplanes and Seaports"

DHR:dh
092201-2

384

22 Sep 01

U13099 /02

Creating An American System Of Security For Airports, Airplanes And Seaports

Newt Gingrich

September 2001

When you drive through a toll booth at seventy miles an hour with the device on your windshield charging your credit card without stopping you are experiencing the American system of capital investment, entrepreneurship, science and technology. It has been replacing the low capital, low technology, people intensive systems (the long line at the toll booth waiting for change **from** the attendant).

As we confront 21st century terrorism with the threat of weapons of mass destruction we need to **develop** much more powerful systems of security for our **airports, airplanes,** and ports. Ideally, that system would use science and technology to maximize security while **minimizing inconvenience...It would be a system of capital investment with relatively** low human costs.

DARPA is the only federal agency with the systems orientation, the scientific relationships, and the rapid contracting authority to develop a system of this sophistication. It should be designed for both passengers and Freight including container cargo. It should use the best of instrumentation combined with very high-speed computing to provide remarkable accuracy with great efficiency.

As an example, it is conceivable that five years from now airline personnel could walk through a retinal scan without slowing down and be matched against their record. Those who prefer not to do that could inconveniently stand in line for a traditional check. **It is** conceivable that every container could be put through a high-speed **analyser** as it entered the United States and those companies or countries that wished to cooperate could actually check the containers before shipping in a supervised program. Companies and countries that did not want to cooperate could end up in a long line to wait entry **after** inspection so just in time production would come **from** cooperative companies **and** countries.

Similarly, we may **want** to think through defensive measures that could be built into airliners, imagine devices that locked the plane into autopilot in the event of a takeover (cat four planes can literally land themselves) or imagine a cockpit designed to seal itself off in a crisis or to actively disarm terrorists. This may seem like science fiction but so did **nano-scale** devices, DNA analysis, stealth and ultra high speed computing to people a generation ago.

With a driving entrepreneurial leader it should be possible **to** make America the **best-**defended country with minimum inconvenience to our citizens. In the long run a high technology capital intensive system would also be the cheapest both in personnel, costs to the government, and in lost time to the economy.

SecDef should establish a **DARPA** very high priority project to develop **optimised** security using science and technology.

snowflake

Agan
9/26
0717

September 22, 2001 11:37 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

9/24

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: CINC Travel

Please draft a memo from me to the CINCs admonishing, cautioning or raising the question about the extent to which they travel during the coming period.

333

Thanks.

COL WHITMORE —
PLS DRAFT.

DHR:dh
092201-13

Complete 10/1
Giving to CINCS @ mtg

22 Sep 01

U13101 /02

INFO 09/26/01

September 22, 2001 12:36 PM

snowflake

SUBJECT: **Jamie McIntyre**

At some press conference when we are going up to the Hill for money and I am doing a press briefing, I want to make a point of saying to **Jamie McIntyre** that we need every hundred dollar bill we can get and see if he'll throw one.

110.01

DHR:dh
092201-22

22 Sep 01

U13104 /02

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: September 23, 2001
SUBJECT:

DR *R&R* *J-ATG*
SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT 23 2001 *10/23*

Have somebody pull my confirmation hearings and take out where I said the thing that worried me the most when I went to sleep at night was intelligence failures, and second, pull out of there anything I said about transformation and asymmetrical threats and terrorism, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and let's get those quotes elevated, isolated in a piece of paper so we've got them.

They were ^{present} ~~presented~~, as fate would have it.

Thank you.

SecDef -

There are some pretty good nuggets attached. Torre has circulated a lot of excerpts along those lines. It's good stuff.
D. Rita

DHR/azn
092301.26

QUOTES FROM SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S CONFIRMATION HEARING

The problem of terrorism is an exceedingly serious one. It's a problem for us in our homeland. It's a problem for deployed forces. It's a problem for our friends and allies. And I think it was Lenin who said that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, and that's what it does; it changes people's behavior. And the wonderful advantage is a terrorist can attack at any time in any place using any technique, and it is physically impossible to defend at every time in every place against every technique.

..So it is not something that ends, it is something you need to be attentive to. It's something we need to have vastly better intelligence than we do today. And it's something that needs to not simply be a Defense Department problem or a homeland defense problem, but it's also a diplomatic problem. We have to find ways to function in this world where we work with people and try to create an environment that is less hospitable to terrorists and to terrorism.

"The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to armed conflict or the end of challenges or threats to U.S. interests; we know that. Indeed, the centrifugal forces in world politics have created a more diverse and less predictable set of potential adversaries, whose aspirations for regional influence and whose willingness to use military force will produce challenges to important U.S. interests and to those of our friends and allies..."

We all know that history is filled with instances where people were surprised. There were plenty of signals, plenty of warnings, plenty of cautions, but they weren't taken aboard, they didn't register, they weren't sufficient to cause a person to act on those concerns. It wasn't that the information wasn't there; it just didn't register. . . .

As to a single big idea, I don't know, but it may be this: It may be that one of the biggest things we have to do is what I mentioned earlier, and that is recognize that the deterrents of the Cold War worked. Those deterrents very likely will not work as well or as broadly as we will need during the period of this era of globalization, or post-Cold War period, or whatever we're going to end up calling it; that the problems are different, and the demands will be different, and that we as a people have an obligation to be smart enough to think about those things and to see that we get arranged, as a defense establishment, with our allies so that, in fact, we dissuade people from doing things. "

"President-elect Bush has outlined three overarching goals for bringing U.S. armed forces into the **21st** century. First, we must strengthen the bond of trust with the American military. The brave and dedicated men and women, who serve in our country's uniform, active Guard and Reserve, must get the best support their country can possibly provide them, so that we can continue to call on the best people in the decades to come.

Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorism, the newer threats against space assets and information systems, as members of the committee have mentioned. The American people, our forces abroad, and our friends and allies must be protected against the threats which modern technology and its proliferation confront us.

And third, we must take advantage of the new possibilities that the ongoing technological revolution offers to create the military of the next century. Meeting these challenges will require a cooperative effort between Congress and the Executive Branch and with industry and our allies as well.

If confirmed, I look forward to developing a close working relationship with this committee and with the counterpart committees and the House of Representatives to achieve these goals and to fashion steps to help to transform our defense posture to address those new challenges. "

“Credible deterrence no longer can be based solely on the prospect of punishment through massive retaliation. It must be based on a combination of offensive nuclear and non-nuclear defensive capabilities working together to deny potential adversaries the opportunity and the benefits that come from the threat or the use of weapons of mass destruction against our forces, our homeland, as well as those of our allies.”

“Well, I’ve been made aware of Senator **Frist’s** and (**Sen. Kennedy’s**) interests and Senator Roberts’. I would rank **bioterrorism** quite high in terms of threats. I think that it has the advantage that it does not take a genius to create agents that are enormously powerful, and they can be done in mobile facilities, in small facilities.

And I think it is something that merits very serious attention, not just by the Department of Defense, but by the country. And I have an interest in it and certainly would intend to be attentive to it”.

“I want you to know that I understand the task facing the Department of Defense is enormously complex. It is not a time to preside and tweak and calibrate what’s going on. It is a time to take what’s been done to start this transformation and see that it is continued in a way that hopefully has many, many more right decisions than wrong decisions.”

“We also need to make darn sure that we’re dealing with our allies in a way that they are brought along. We’re not alone in this world, we have some enormously important allies in Asia and in Europe and friends in other parts of the world, and I think that those relationships, as well, are terribly important.”

“...I have had an impression over the years that we have a significant role in helping to deter aggression in the world, and the way you do that is to be arranged to defend in the event you need **to...Having** been at NATO and looking at different countries, and what the different countries bring to that alliance, it’s pretty obvious that the United States has some things we bring to it that are notably different from some of the other countries. It is also true that the other countries can bring significant things.

And I don’t think that it’s necessarily true that the United States has to become a great peacekeeper, if you will. I think we need to have capabilities, as you’re suggesting, that are distinct from war-fighting capabilities. But I also think other countries can participate in these activities that are needed in the world from time to time and bring -- they can bring the same capabilities we can to that type of thing, whereas they cannot bring the same capabilities we can, for example, with respect to airlift or **sealift** or intelligence gathering or a variety of other things.”

“I’ve met with Saddam Hussein and I met with the elder Assad as Middle East envoy and these people are intelligent, they’re survivors, they’re tough. They don’t think like we do, and goodness knows they don’t behave like we do with respect to their neighbors or their own people. . . . that’s why this intelligence gathering task we have as a country is so much more important today, not just because of proliferation, but because the weapons are so powerful. And it’s not a matter of counting beans in Russia; how many missiles, how many ships, how many tanks? It’s a matter of knowing a lot more about attitudes and behaviors and motivations and how you can alter their behavior to create a more peaceful world.”

"I would repeat what I said about the importance of considerably improving our intelligence capabilities so that we know more about what people think and how they behave and how their behavior can be altered, and what the capabilities are in this world. I think the goal ought not to be to win a war. The goal ought to be to be so strong and so powerful that you can dissuade people from doing things they otherwise would do and you don't have to even fight the war. That takes me to the second point.

The second point is I don't know that I really understand what deters people today. Because I don't think one thing deters everybody. I think we need to understand that there are different parts of the world. There are different types of leaders with different motivations. And we have to do a lot better job of thinking through deterrence and assuring that we've done the best job possible."



snowflake

Agenda
w/ 9/26
DHR

September 24, 2001 9:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Comments on Islam

Related to
092501-14

The argument that we are fighting Islam is nonsense. We have come to the aid of Muslims several times, the biggest being the **Kosovo** air war and Bosnia, and we ought to get a couple of examples and get them into my talking points.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092401-1

11-L-0559/OSD/504

snowflake

Info *D/26*
1520

September 24, 2001 2:27 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Preparation for Meetings

337

I received four papers from Feith, Wolfowitz and others 30 minutes before I left for the PC meeting on Sunday.

I told them I thought they really ought to stop doing work for me if I won't have time to read it. It is good work, and it could be helpful, but often it arrives at a time where it does me no good. If I see it after the meeting is over, I assume it is OBE, so I never read it.

It concerns me to see these busy people wasting time. God bless them-they are smart, able people, they are working their tails off. Why don't we have a rule that unless they can get me a piece of paper 24 or 36 hours in advance, don't bother.

R4 Feith

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092401-15

U13115 /02

snowflake

IMP 9/20/07

September 24, 2001 11:45 AM

SUBJECT: NSC

The NSC is tactically, not strategically oriented. It is a problem.

DHR:dh
092401-16

334 NSC

245 (2007)

U13114 /02

TWFD
9/27
0841

September 25, 2001 6:23 PM

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Peter Rodman
J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Clearance

In thinking through one of the problems between State and Defense, we have to make sure that none of your people at the levels below you folks end up clearing things and then getting it up to you and you not agreeing, and then we have to go back and undo the clearance with State and NSC.

We ought to be able to avoid that. I am told that in one instance, Collins or somebody approved something and then you folks changed that. In any event, Colin hopes we will be able to not give approval until we have it all the way up to the top.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092501-g

DR
DR
DR

25
5901

U13124 /02

snowflake

Agreed
9/27
0807

September 26, 2001 10:43 AM

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Oil Pipelines

463

Should we think about something with respect to protecting our oil pipelines in terms of homeland defense, and should we put anything in the QDR like Ted Stevens suggested?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092601-6

26 Sep 01

U13129 /02

Actual
9/23
1413

September 27, 2001 8:25 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Herman Pirchner

Here is a letter from Herman Pirchner, a friend of mine that someone in your shop should act on.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/24/01 Pirchner ltr to SecDef

Afghanistan

DHR:dh
092701-10

275801

U13135 /02

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL

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www.afpc.org

September 24, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
2206 Kalorama Road NW
Washington, DC 20008

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Under a Smith-Richardson grant, AFPC Senior Fellow, Elie Krakowski has been exploring ways to replace the Taliban government. During the past year, he has held discussions with relevant officials in Pakistan, India, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, and an anti-Taliban area of Afghanistan.

Someone from your policy shop should debrief him. His phone is 410-764-3980.

Best wishes,



Herman Pirchner, Jr.
President

PS: Liz and I join millions of other Americans who sleep better at night because you are our Secretary of Defense.

snowflake

Info Area
11/3

September 28, 2001 2:53 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Spy

Please look at this article about a spy-another person we let off with a sentence that is too light.

Attach.
9/28/01 *Tampa Tribune*, "Spy Sentenced to Life in Prison"

DHR:dh
092801-6

380.015

2850p01

U13138 /02

"The usage rate of precision-guided munitions has been growing," said Gregory Fetter, an analyst with Forecast International Inc. "They were the stars of the Balkans."

Chicago-based Boeing may have trouble increasing JDAM production because it already had been meeting a surge in demand because of conflict in the former Yugoslavia, he said.

An Air Force report said supplies of JDAMS were "depleted severely" after that conflict and production simulations showed that suppliers wouldn't be able to meet future surges in demand, according to Aerospace Daily, a trade publication. Boeing spokesman Robert Algarotti declined to comment.

Shares of Boeing rose 11 cents to \$34.40 today. They have fallen 48 percent this year, primarily on concern regarding the company's commercial-aircraft business.

Spare Parts

Boeing and other makers of missiles, including Raytheon and Lockheed, may have to boost production because missile inventories can be depleted quickly in wartime, analysts said.

Larry Dickerson, an analyst at Forecast International said missiles typically take about 10 months to make.

Aircraft engine makers General Electric Co. and United Technologies Corp.'s Pratt & Whitney also may see a boost because of more demand for parts and spares, analysts said.

Textron Inc., maker of Bell helicopters, may see sales rise if there is a protracted war. CEO Lewis Campbell wouldn't say if the military has asked for production increases.

"If and when the nation gears up for stronger military actions, there are many, many Bell helicopters," Campbell said in an interview. "That usually means an increase in spares and replacement part volumes going up."

Smiths Group Plc, a U.K.-based aircraft components maker expects an increase in orders for spare parts for F-16 fighter jets and Chinook helicopters, said CEO Keith Butler-Wheelhouse.

"Aircraft are expensive beasts to maintain," said Richard Aboulafia, an analyst with the Teal Group.

New York Times
September 28, 2001

49. In A Military Town, Osama's Place Cafe Is Tasting Tolerance

By Stephen Kinzer

SPRING LAKE, N.C., Sept. 26 — In a town full of soldiers, on the edge of Fort Bragg, there could be worse names for a restaurant these days than Osama's Place, but it is hard to think of any.

That, however, is the name of a homey little cafe here. An American flag now hangs near the front door, and only a few regular customers have stopped coming in.

Others say they feel sorry for the unfortunate owner and wish him well when they order their burgers or pita sandwiches.

The name Osama has long been an honorable one in the Arab world. It means "big cat," and the walls of Osama's Place are decorated with framed pictures of lions and tigers. But the fact that this is the given name of a most reviled terrorist has given it a tinge that sends shudders down some spines.

Osama's Place was opened in 1997 by Osama Yousef, a Jordanian who settled in North Carolina more than a decade ago.

It is a pleasant spot, with a handful of tables and, behind a Formica counter, a short-order grill. Roof fans turn languidly in the autumn warmth.

In 1999 Mr. Yousef sold the restaurant to another Jordanian, Ghassan Mustafa, who chose not to change its name.

"This was already a popular place, and people around here knew it by a certain name," Mr. Mustafa said on a recent evening. "Now I'm having bad luck."

Since declarations by American leaders that this month's terrorist attacks were probably planned by Osama bin Laden, some customers have urged Mr. Mustafa to change his restaurant's name. He seems uncertain how to respond.

"I'm not going to do it," he said defiantly at one point. "When Timothy McVeigh did that terrorism in Oklahoma, nobody who owned a place called Timothy's changed the name. So why should I?"

Later, however, one of Mr. Mustafa's waitresses, Tina Jeter, said several people she knows had urged her to quit.

She has heard others curse the restaurant's owner and suggest that he might have been connected to the attacks. A few, Ms. Jeter said, have even told her they would like to bomb Osama's Place.

Mr. Mustafa, a Muslim, looked surprised and hurt. "You never told me that," he said.

"I didn't want to get you upset or hurt your feelings," Ms. Jeter replied.

That sent Mr. Mustafa, who is 27, into silent reflection.

"Maybe I should think about changing the name," he said after a few moments. "People are very frustrated these days."

"I love this country as much as I love my own country. I work 12 hours a day, six days a week. People here all know me."

"But what if someone who isn't from here drives by and gets some crazy idea?"

Business at Osama's Place is steady for most of the day and evening. No one seems uncomfortable ordering house specialties like Osama's Steak Sub or Osama's Chicken Calzone.

"Muslims come in all shapes and colors," one woman said as she picked up a takeout order. "If anything happens while I'm in here, I hope I'd have the courage to stand up against it."

Many families in Spring Lake have at least one member who is posted at Fort Bragg. Dozens of them have been and still are regulars at Osama's Place.

"A lot of people might not want to come in here, but not necessarily people from the base," Sgt. Rick Young said as he waited for his pizza. "They're often more educated than you might think."

Mr. Mustafa's cousin Mohammed Mahmoud helps be-

hind the counter. He said he shared the anger that most Americans were now feeling.

"I don't think anything is going to happen to us," Mr. Mahmoud said, sounding less than certain. "American people are very smart, and they wouldn't do anything against us."

"But maybe a few of them are not smart. I don't know. What do you think?"

Tampa Tribune
September 28, 2001

50. Spy Sentenced To Life In Prison

By Paula Christian

TAMPA - A soldier known as the "perfect spy" stood at attention and, without displaying a shred of remorse, accepted his punishment Thursday for 25 years of betraying his country.

Life in prison.

George Trofimoff won't be remembered as history's most-famous spy. But he goes to federal prison, at age 75, with dubious distinction.

Trofimoff, who passed military secrets to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, was the longest-working spy in U.S. history, federal prosecutors said. A retired colonel in the Army Reserve, he also is the highest-ranking officer ever convicted of espionage.

Trofimoff's spy work was so damaging, prosecutors said, that it might have changed the world if the United States and the Soviets had gone to war.

"The events of this past month really show how fragile our national security is," said Department of Justice prosecutor Laura Ingersoll. "What [Trofimoff] did for 20-plus years with... the Soviet Union could have had consequences we can only be grateful we never had to face."

Trofimoff originally faced 27 to 33 years in prison. But he received a life sentence, in part, because President Bush asked for it.

Assistant Secretary of Defense John Stenbit wrote to the presiding judge on the president's behalf, asking that Trofimoff spend the rest of his life behind bars. Anything less,

snowflake

Attn: [Signature] 11/17

September 29, 2001 9:00 AM

Related: 093001-02

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Correspondence Related to Attacks

Let's make sure I send notes to all the people who were killed or wounded in the Pentagon attack and also the military or civilian workers who may have been in any of the four airplanes that crashed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092901-9

DDG-5

295801

U13139 /02

snowflake

WHR
10/2
0724

September 29, 2001 2:05 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Thinking

I ought to meet with the three Service Secretaries and tell them what I see as the problem in the building that everyone is looking at things in the "old think" way.

T h a n k s .

DHR:dh
092901-17

337

29 Sep 01

U13141 /02

Info D 10/2
0729

September 29, 2001 4:13 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Big Picture

310,1

As we go forward, we are going to be making a lot of changes-standing joint task forces, unified command areas of responsibility, program decisions, weapon system decisions etc. Every time we do it, we ought to get the releases written in a way so they tie back to the QDR and to the Defense Planning Guidance. We ought to have a regular rhythm so we always reach into those documents and pull out things we said previously. Also reach back into my confirmation hearing, other testimony and the President's Citadel speech, so we keep showing the foundation and the progression sequentially.

A good time to start is in this major speech we have been developing. We ought to be thinking about doing that as we do every press briefing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092901-24

29 Sep 01

U13143 /02

TO: Tony Dolan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 30, 2001
SUBJECT:

INDACT
10/1
117

Related. 093001-9

Regarding the letter to the people who were killed or wounded in the attack on the Pentagon or who were involved in any of the four aircraft that crashed, you might want to take a look at the letter Forrester wrote my father. A copy is in my inter-office. Not that it is appropriate, but as a style it is excellent.

You might want to think about that.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
093001.02

snowflake

Approved
De/2
0720 ✓

#27

October 1, 2001 7:55 AM

TO: General Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information Ops

We asked to see the leaflets and the radios to get our arms around that. I think the time is now.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100101-2

091.412

1 OCT 01

U12032 /02

snowflake

✓ Account Note
0736

October 1, 2001 8:55 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response

Here is an e-mail on Canada. Let's get Tony **Dolan** to draft a letter **from** me to Gordon Sinclair that says what ought to be said. God bless him! You've got to love somebody who stands up for you when things are tough.

When our hostages went to their embassy in **Tehran**, the Canadians risked their lives to protect them. They have been there time and time again in every effort we have been involved in. They are truly a neighbor one would pray for.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/14/01 e-mail of Canadian article

DHR:dh
100101-10

CAH/IDA

1 OCT 01

U12871 /02

Junio e-mail for jleardes3@junio.com printed on Friday, September 14, 2001, 7:37 PM

From: Miller Tanny <TMiller@ECEMG.org>
 To: 'ANT' (E-mail) <Ant@VA.Gov>, 'Jimmie' (E-mail) <stark@erl.com>, 'Frank Sordora' (E-mail) <frank@erl.com>, 'Jannurhythmic@aol.com' (E-mail) <Jannurhythmic@aol.com>, 'Jimmie' (E-mail) <Jimmie@erl.com>, 'Lory Sotano' (E-mail) <LorySotano@aol.com>, 'Lynn Baker' (E-mail) <LynnBaker@erl.com>, 'Life McLaughlin' (E-mail) <life@erl.com>, 'Lynn Baker' (E-mail) <LynnBaker@erl.com>, 'Mark' (E-mail) <mark@erl.com>, 'Mike Hess' (E-mail) <MikeHess@erl.com>, 'Rabecca Gill' (E-mail) <RabeccaGill@erl.com>, 'Sally' (E-mail) <Sally@erl.com>
 Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2001 09:25:09 -0400
 Subject: FW: Canadian Article - America: The Good Neighbor

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT - 1 2001

> This was forwarded to me by a friend. Take a moment to read this!

- >> encourage everyone to forward this article on. We are the greatest nation
- >> in the world and we should all recognize this even if no one else does.
- >>
- >> This, from a Canadian newspaper, is worth sharing.
- >>
- >>
- >> America: The Good Neighbor
- >>
- >> Widespread but only partial news coverage was given recently
- >> to a remarkable editorial broadcast from Toronto by Gordon
- >> Sinclair, a Canadian television commentator. What follows is the full text
- >> of his trenchant remarks as printed in the Congressional Record.
- >>
- >> "This Canadian thinks it is time to speak up for the Americans
- >> as the most generous and possibly the least appreciated people on all
- >> the earth.
- >>
- >>
- >> Germany, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Britain and Italy were
- >> lifted out of the debris of war by the Americans who poured in
- >> billions of dollars and forgave other billions in debts. None of these
- >> countries is today paying even the interest on its remaining debts to the
- >> United States.
- >>
- >>
- >> When France was in danger of collapsing in 1956, it was the Americans who
- >> propped it up, and their reward was to be insulted and swindled on the
- >> streets of Paris. I was there. I saw it.
- >>
- >>
- >> When earthquakes hit distant cities, it is the United States that hurries
- >> in to help. This spring, 59 American communities were flattened by
- >> tornadoes. Nobody helped.
- >>
- >>
- >> The Marshall Plan and the Truman Policy pumped billions of dollars into
- >> discouraged countries. Now newspapers in those countries are writing about
- >> the decadent, warmongering Americans. I'd like to see just one of those
- >> countries that is glowing over the erosion of the United States dollar
- >> build its own airplane. Does any other country in the world have a plane to

- >> equal the Boeing
- >> Jumbo Jet, the Lockheed Tri-Star, or the Douglas DC10? If so, why dont
- >> they fly them? Why do all the International lines except Russia fly
- >> American Planes?
- >>
- >> Why does no other land on earth even consider putting a man or woman on
- >> the moon? You talk about Japanese technology, and you get radios. You
- >> talk about German technology, and you get automobiles. You talk about
- >> American technology, and you find men on the moon - not once, but several
- >> times - and safely home again. You talk about scandals, and the Americans
- >> put theirs right in the snow window for everybody to look at. Even their
- >> draft-dodgers are not pursued and hounded. They are here on our streets,
- >> and most of them, unless they are breaking Canadian laws, are getting
- >> American dollars from ma and pa at home to spend here.
- >>
- >> When the railways of France, Germany and India were breaking Down through
- >> age, it was the Americans who rebuilt them. When the Pennsylvania Railroad
- >> and the New York Central went broke, nobody loaned them an old caboose.
- >> Both are still broke. I can name you 5000 times when the Americans rood
- >> to the help of other people in trouble. Can you name me even one time when
- >> someone else raced to the Americans in trouble? I don't think there was
- >> outside help even during the San Francisco earthquake.
- >>
- >> Our neighbors have faced it alone, and I'm one Canadian who is damned
- >> tired of hearing them get kicked around. They will come out of this thing
- >> with their flag high. And when they do, they are entitled to thumb their
- >> nose at the hands that are gloating over their present troubles. I hope
- >> Canada is not one of those."
- >>
- >> Stand proud, America!
- >> This is one of the best editorials that I have ever read regarding the
- >> United States. It is nice that one man realizes it. I only wish that the
- >> rest of the world would realize it. We are always blamed for everything.
- >> and never even get a thank you for the things we do. I would hope that
- >> each of you would send this to as many people as you can and emphasize
- >> that they should send it to as many of their friends until this letter is
- >> sent to every person on the web. I am just a single American that has read
- >> this.

Get more from the Web. FREE MSN Explorer download : <http://explorer.msn.com>

W10
524
9.9.16

Info
10/3/01
1429

October 2, 2001 8:41 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: E-mail on Afghanistan

You may want to circulate this e-mail. It is kind of interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/28/01 e-mail

DHR:dh
100201-7

AFGHANISTAN

2002

U12873 /02

DiRita, Larry, CIV, OSD

From: David_Davis@hutchison.senate.gov
Sent: Friday, September 28, 2001 3:54 PM
To: larry.dirita@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: Must Read

SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT -1 2001

Forward Header

Subject: Grunt Special *IMPORTANT * READ*
Author: SendMeHack@aol.com at internet
Date: 9/28/2001 1:49 PM

THIS IS AN IMPORTANT READ. PLEASE GIVE IT MAX CIRCULATION. TRY TO GET THIS DOCUMENT IN THE HANDS OF THE POLICY AND DECISION MAKERS.

KNOWING YOUR ENEMY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT KEY TO WAR. THIS LETTER WAS WRITTEN BY A VERY BRIGHT AND AFGHANISTAN STREET-SMART WEST POINT GRAD TO HIS CLASSMATES. HE KNOWS THE TERRAIN, THE ENEMY, AND THE WEATHER IN AFGHANISTAN FROM BEING THERE, NOT FROM BOOKS.

BURN HIS WORDS AND ADVICE INTO YOUR BRAINS.

WE'LL WIN -- IF WE ALL HANG IN THERE UNTIL IT'S OVER OVER THERE.

HACK

CLASSMATES:

Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan. I was first there in 1993, providing relief and assistance to refugees along the Tajik border, and in this capacity have traveled all along the border region between the two countries.

In 1998 and 1999, I was the Deputy Program Manager for the UN's mine action program in Afghanistan. This program is the largest civilian employer in the country with over 5,000 persons clearing mines and UXO. In this later capacity, I was somewhat ironically engaged in a "Holy War," as decreed by the Taliban, against the evil of landmines; and by a special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those who might have died in this effort were considered to be "martyrs" -- even an "infidel" like myself.

The mine action program is the most respected relief effort in the country, and because of this I had the opportunity to travel extensively without too much interference or restriction. I still have extensive contacts in the area and among the Afghan community and read a great deal on the subject.

I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but quite frankly, I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and have not had time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would like to use them as a basis for sharing some observations.

First, he is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and character. I want to touch on that later, but first I want to share some comments about our "enemy."

Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast majority of the people live day-to-day, hand-to-mouth in abject conditions of poverty, misery and

11-L-0559/OSD/522

deprivation. Less than 30% of the men are literate, the women even less. The country is exhausted, and desperately wants something like peace. They know very little of the world at large, and have no access to information or knowledge that would counter what they are being told by the Taliban. They have nothing left, nothing that is except for their pride.

Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban. The non-Afghan contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the war against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created with assistance by our own government.

OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred to by us in the country at the time) restored this network to bring in more fighters, this time to support the Taliban in their civil war against the former Mujehdeen. Over time, this military support along with financial support has allowed OBL and his 'Arabs' to co-opt significant government activities and leaders. OBL is the "inspector general" of Taliban armed forces; his bodyguards protect senior Talib leaders and he has built a system of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which were designed to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to do that?). His forces basically rule the southern city of Kandahar.

This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 years or so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part of the local Afghans. At the same time, the legitimacy of the Taliban regime has started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions have become even harsher.

It is my assessment that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban. Indeed the Taliban have recently had a very difficult time getting recruits for their forces and have had to rely more and more on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or from OBL. OBL and the Taliban, absent any US action, were probably on their way to sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside doctrines have experienced in Afghanistan -- defeat and dismemberment. | (★)

During the Afghan war with the Soviets, much attention was paid to the martial prowess of the Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time, and most of us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all want to go help the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against the Soviets.

Those concepts were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while never conquered as a nation, are not invincible in battle. A "good" Afghan battle is one that makes a lot of noise and light. Basic military skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural constraints that no matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor. Indeed, firing from the prone is considered distasteful (but still done).

Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with fighters owing allegiance to a "commander," and this person owing allegiance upwards and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is secured by payment. And while the Taliban forces have changed this somewhat, many of the units in the Taliban army are there because they are being paid to be there. All such groups have very strong loyalties along ethnic and tribal lines.

Again, the concept of having a place of "honor" and "respect" is of paramount importance and blood feuds between families and tribes can last for generations over a perceived or actual slight. That is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the Russians. It is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large bunch of Afghans into a military formation. The "real" stories that have come out of the war against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot different from our fantastic visions as cadets.

When the first batch of Stingers came in and were given to one Mujehdeen group, another group -- supposedly on the same side -- attacked the first group and stole the Stingers, not so much because they wanted to use them,

but because having them was a matter of prestige.

Many larger coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when all the various Afghan fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such as blocking or overwatch) and instead would join the assault group in order to seek glory.

In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of fatalities were lower for all involved.

As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not THAT good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less so than the Afghans. So why is it that they have never been conquered? It goes back to Dr. Kern's point about will.

During their history, the only events that have managed to form any semblance of unity among the Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign invaders. And in doing this, the Afghans have been fanatical. The Afghans' greatest military strength is the ability to endure hardships that would, in all probability, kill most Americans and enervate the resolve of all but the most elite military units.

The physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the weather, and the harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to their advantage and use well. (NOTE: For you military planner types and armchair generals: around November 1st, most road movement is impossible, in part because all the roads used by the Russians have been destroyed and air movement will be problematic at best). Also, those fighting us are not afraid to fight. OBL and others do not think the US has the will or the stomach for a fight. Indeed after the absolutely inane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming consensus was that we were cowards who would not risk one life in face-to-face combat.

Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent, that action and others of the not so recent past, have reinforced the perception that the US does not have any "will" and that we are morally and spiritually corrupt.

Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the extremists/Arabs and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to fight coordinated battles, and their lack of external support. More importantly through is that we have to take steps not to play to their strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us by increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down trying to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up and down mountain valleys.

I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and well beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to second guess current plans or start an academic debate, I would share the following from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans.

First, I would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can buy off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter. Second, also with this cash, I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership, making it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on existing discord. Third I would support the Northern alliance with military assets, but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans.

Fourth would be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give these guys a reason to live rather than the choice between dying of starvation or dying fighting the "infidel." Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of the country not under Taliban control (these are much more than the press reports) again to demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with peace. Sixth, I would consider very carefully putting any female service members into Afghanistan proper -- sorry to the females of

our class but within that culture a man who allows a women to fight for him has zero respect, and we will need respect to gain the cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan will work with a man who fights with women.

I would hold off from doing anything too dramatic in the new term, keeping a low level of covert action and pressure up over the winter, allowing this pressure to force open the fissions around the Taliban that were already developing -- expect that they will quickly turn on themselves and on OBL.

We can pick up the pieces next summer, or the summer after.

When we do "pick up" the pieces, I would make sure that we do so on the ground, "man to man."

While I would never want to advocate American casualties, it is essential that we communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can and will "engage and destroy the enemy in close combat." As mentioned above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry operations against the enemy are essential. There can be no excuses after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate this except for ground combat.

And once this is all over, unlike in 1989, the US must provide continued long-term economic assistance to rebuild the country.

While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to share a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will not abide by the Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners unless there is a chance that they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner exchange.

During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed, there did exist a "trade" in prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take home with them.

This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya where similar videos are being made today and can be found on the web for those so inclined. We can expect our soldiers to be treated the same way. Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos of US prisoners having their heads cut off.

Our enemies will do this not only to demonstrate their "strength" to their followers, but also to cause us to overreact, to seek wholesale revenge against civilian populations, and to turn this into the world-wide religious war that they desperately want.

This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For further collaboration of this type of activity please read Kipling).

This will not be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve and somewhat conversely of compassion and of a character. Towards our enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of our military character for a long time. But to those who are not our enemies we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of during war. We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there are many, but for shrewd military logic.

For anyone who is still reading this way too long note, thanks for your patience. I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more concise manner.

Thanks, (b)(6)

Gang, Wednesday I gave you the address of a site on "rumors" that does not function correctly ~ seems to change every time I try to go there and has lots of pop-ups ~ so you'll have to get there indirectly by using this address:

Decision

Acron
10/2
1149

October 2, 2001 6:00 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: India

Let's get going on mil-to-mil with India.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100201-20

INDIA

2 Oct 01

U12874 /02

D. Aron
10/10
1092

October 8, 2001 6:15 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Dov Zakheim
Tom White
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *WR*
SUBJECT: Providing to States

In thinking about it, anything the Pentagon provides to states free, without reimbursement, they will want a lot of. Anything we charge them for will cause them to be judicious and responsible in their requests.

It is much like health care-if an employee has to pay each time he goes to the doctor, he is much more careful about how often he goes.

I think we ought to be very careful about what we do in this regard.

Please give me a report as to where we stand thus far-what we are giving free and what we are charging for.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100801-14

092

80701

U12876 /02

October 10, 2001 8:41 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Costs of Campaign

At some point we are going to have to figure out what all this is costing us and how we are going to pay for it. We need to determine how it will affect other things and what we need to do in advance so we don't get stuck in a hole.

Please think it through, talk to Paul and come back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101001-8

110 01

10 OCT 01

snowflake

Acen Doll
7638

October 10, 2001 12:29 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Visuals

I need to start seeing films, overheads, video and **photos**—I haven't seen any more of those NIMA photos of starving people going **across** the landscape. I am seeing very little. Everyone in the room is seeing all **kinds** of video and **pictures** and talking about them, and I have no idea what **they** are talking about.

Why don't you assign Jacoby—that is **something** useful he could do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101001-12

*Copy to
Jacoby*

OK

10 Oct 01

U12884 /02

snowflake

D. Aronoff
10/10/01

October 10, 2001 12:31 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: UBL

We should be getting a daily report on UBL and where ~~they~~ think he is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101001-14

*Report
CIA for providing*

AF GIAMBASTIANI

10/10/01

U12883 /02

snowflake

FWD
10/14
1637

October 10, 2001 2:38 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Torie Clarke

cc: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Communication of Classified Material to Congress

At the NSC meeting on October 10, 2001, the President said Colin and I could, as an accommodation to Congress, brief our committees on classified materials in a way that we feel is appropriate.

Powell, if they are still blocking our bill or blocking our confirmations because of the Presidential memo, we ought to get this word to them fast. This is not a backing off of the President's original memo. This is a reflection of what was meant and as an accommodation to Congress that there is a full recognition that the members of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committee need to be able to deal with classified matter that the Secretary determines is appropriate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101001-17

580.01

10 Oct 01

U12881 /02

48

Agenda 10/16/01
1117

snowflake

October 13, 2001 12:07 PM



TO: Gen. Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Interagency Activities

I will leave it in your hands to solve the Europe and Pacific commands issues on visibility into interagency activities.

Thanks.

322



DHR:dh
101301-11

13 Oct 01



U12029 /02

Approved 10/16/01
TOSB

October 13, 2001 12:21 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Suggestion from John Robson

If you think this letter from John Robson is worth feeding into the IO people, go ahead and do it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/09/01 Robson ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
101301-12

000.5

12-0-101

U12897 /02



SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT 13 2001

JOHN E. ROBSON
CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENT

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
OF THE UNITED STATES

Larry Di Rita
10/12

October 9, 2001

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
1000 Defense, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1 000
Fax: 703-697-8339

Don,

There is one area where it seems to me the near term campaign against terrorism, and probably the long term, might be strengthened. That is mounting a persistent powerful, global media effort to depict Bin Laden (and his terrorist successors) personally as savage, bloodthirsty, inhuman and beyond the pale of humanity, civilization and the core teachings of Islam.

I conjure up articles, cartoons, TV and radio of Bin Laden as a monster feasting on his innocent victims, blood and fragments of flesh dripping from his **teeth, clips of the** recent victims, body parts, etc. juxtaposed with, for example, his TV remarks on Sunday at the time of **the** first attacks.

Maybe something like this is already under way, but the basic idea would be to put together a U.S. led global media effort to keep projecting this image of Bin Laden across the world and do so in friendly media and other public outlets where it **may be** very difficult to gain entry (e.g., Muslim media).

My guess is we would have a big learning curve and would need to enlist people who possess sensitivity and understanding of how messages are effectively sent in difficult to penetrate situations. But it strikes me that this part of the campaign is essential.

You are doing great!

My best regards.

Sincerely,

snowflake

*Agrew
10/16
1115*

October 15, 2001 7:37 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: National Interest Assessment

We ought to think about a national interest assessment. (Brzezinski suggested it.)

How to deal with the states that may have been involved, regardless of whether they were or not, because they may be involved in the future.

We have to create the right climate in the country so that that is doable.

DHR:dh
10/15/01-13

381

15 10/15

U12913 /02

snowflake

*Info Diolla
11/18*

October 13, 2001 2:42 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sources of Fire

There are three ways civilians could be killed:

1. From errant US missiles.
2. From **Taliban** ground fire.
3. From opposition forces (this is the third one I could not remember earlier).

We should keep that in mind.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101301-21

AF 21111-1111

130101

U12800 /02

Answer 10/16/113

October 15, 2001 8:20 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: UAVs

Would you please get program decision memoranda drafted to instruct the Services to do what they should on UAVs. After you get them drafted, Pete Aldridge has gone over them and all of us are comfortable, let's just send them down. We need to quit begging them to do what is right and just tell them to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101501-7

452

15061 01

U12906 /02

snowflake

*DAW
10/16
11/2*

October 15, 2001 9:18 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Briefings for Senior DoD

I want to get Tommy Thompson over sometime to speak to the senior people at DoD about homeland defense and what he is doing.

I also think we might want to get John Ashcroft over sometime to talk to our senior civilian and military people.

Make sure we fill the room each time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101501-16

384

15 OCT 01

U12909 /02

snowflake

Handwritten initials and numbers: 10/16/01, 1136

October 15, 2001 9:23 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Chronology

Completed 10/16/01

DDOIS

Please let me know exactly what time:

First tower at WTC was hit 1246Z / 0846 EDT
Second tower at WTC was hit 1302Z / 0902 EDT
Pentagon was hit 1337Z / 0937 EDT
Aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania 1403Z / 1003 EDT

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101501-17

*Times taken from DDO Log
(Compiled data from multiple
Sources, including NORAD)*

15 OCT 01

U12910 /02

snowflake

Agan
10/16
1059

October 15, 2001 11:02 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: **McCaffrey** E-mail

See if you can get that **McCaffrey** e-mail. I would like to read it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101501-22

Attached

000.5

15 04 31

U12901 /02

Wall Street Journal
October 10, 2001

War Without End

Following is an e-mail exchange that occurred Sept. 19 between a senior cadet at West Point and one of his professors, retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey. From 1996-2001, Gen. McCaffrey served as the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. He earned three Purple Hearts in Vietnam and led the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division in the Persian Gulf War.

Cadet: Could you describe what you think the United States should consider as an "endstate" on the matter of dealing with terrorists? Eradication, containment, or some other option? And what would the United States consider the literal and figurative center of gravity?

Gen. McCaffrey: Great issue to consider . . . we have too liberally borrowed from the language of science to deal with the imperfections of political and security analysis.

There will be no **endstate** . . . we will, if successful, manage this chronic threat to our survival, economy, and self-confidence by dramatically lowering the risk. We will build a series of defensive programs that will make a multiple order of magnitude increase in our day-to-day security. Second, we will form a coalition based on common danger. Much of the globe will join us to leverage foreign intelligence services and security forces to fight these FTO's forward in the battle area. Finally, we will at last take the gloves off and use integrated military power to **find**, fix, and destroy these organizations.

We are going to disrupt these people thru pre-emptive attack . . . we will deceive them, we will run psyops on them . . . at selected points and times they will be killed suddenly, in significant numbers, and without warning. Tomahawk missiles, 2000 lb laser guided weapons dropped from B2's or F22's at very high altitude, remote control booby traps, blackmail, and at places . . . small groups of soldiers or Seals will appear in total darkness . . . blow down the doors and kill them at close range with automatic weapons and hand grenades. We will find their money and freeze it. We will arrest their front agents. We will operate against their recruiting and transportation functions. We will locate their training areas and surveill or mine them. We will isolate them from their families. We will try to dominate their communication function and alternately listen, jam, or spoof it. We will make their couriers disappear. If we can find out how they eat, or play, or receive rewards, or where they sleep . . . we will go there and kill them by surprise.

The military component will be a supporting but lesser aspect of a strategy that will be based fundamentally on diplomatic and economic leverage to compel cooperation with international law. Of prime importance, we must reduce the environmental factors that feed this type of extremist madness . . . foreign aid must be dramatically increased to address the misery and poverty of the Palestinians, the Afghans, the Sudanese and others.

We must also not be unwilling to confront the State sponsors of terror . . . Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Cuba, North Korea . . . none can be allowed to provide the base for another sickening strike against our civilian population or our Allies. Conventional military power will be used at the end of the day to place at risk those states who present a direct threat to our security. If deterrence does not work with coherent political and economic measures in support of a threat capability . . . then their political will

must be shattered with overwhelming violence directed at their armed forces and the political decision-makers.

The big challenge will be to organize America to protect our transportation, our economic activity, our entertainment, etc., with minimal invasion of our privacy and our free movement. We will constrain domestic law enforcement through the protection of our Judicial System. We will ensure the unfettered operation of a free press. We will have to be zealous to protect the Bill of Rights and the dignity and safety of foreigners living among us during this war.

We can do all of this. We have no option. The American people will depend on you and your fellow soldiers to step forward and stand between us and the barbarians.

snowflake

*Personal file
10/16
2012*

October 15, 2001 11:08 AM

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Your Suggestion

Thanks for your note of 9/25. It is a good idea. I am not dictating, but I am making some notes. I'll think about trying to convert.

DHR:dh
101501-25

020512

15 5/10/01

U12902 /02

DR

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 15 2001

Some years ago, someone (maybe Muggy Hoffmann?) suggested you keep a diary. You did for awhile, and I have it in the safe.

This is an outrageous thing to suggest, but since I spend time archiving now, it came to me that this would also be a good time for you to dictate maybe two minutes each night your personal impressions and feelings of the day.

You could keep a Dictaphone on your night table and record your thoughts at day's end. When the tape is full, you could send it to me for transcription, and I could keep your notes in the safe.

It would also help when you write your (someday) book.

Just a thought.

NP

9/25/01

P.S. Thanks for your note. It meant the world.

TH TM

snowflake

THW
10/15/01
1039

October 15, 2001 11:42 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld (3)
SUBJECT: Al Hunt

I saw CNN or whatever it was last night-Al Hunt said that Rumsfeld says the US doesn't have any interest in a post-war Afghanistan. I never said anything like that.

DHR:dh
101501-30

ALFRED HUNTS

13 Oct 01

U12904 /02

Agw Ddtb
9/22

October 16, 2001 3:38 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statement

Do you remember when it was that Putin or Ivanov said to me that a difference of 500 warheads wouldn't change the world, but a difference of 1,000 warheads would. It might have been in the meetings you were in.

Please check the cable traffic and memos for me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101601-2

Russia

1602701

U12914 /02

snowflake

October 17, 2001 7:04 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Automatic Membership

Please pull together a list of all the things I am automatically a member of because of my role as Secretary of Defense. For example, I understand I am now a member of the Homeland Security Council. Of course, I am also a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council.

Are there other things like that? As I recall, the last time I was here I was a member of the board of the Red Cross.

Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101701-3

~~SECRET - HAS BEEN~~

11/9
Sec Def -
Response attached. If you have questions about any particular membership, I have a binder with an explanation of ~~each~~ each.

D. Lita

WFF
10/18
2624

snowflake

October 18, 2001 9:18 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Article

You might want to put this "Extreme Mortman" article in the *Early Bird*. It is pretty funny.

Thanks.

Attach.
1 0/17/01 Thiessen memo to **SecDef** w/*National Journal* article attached

DHR:dh
101801-5

0200.7

180<T 0)

U12919 /02

October 17, 2001 8:30 AM



TO: The Secretary of Defense
FROM: Marc Thiessen
SUBJECT: Donald Rumsfeld, Uncorked

Thought you would enjoy this column **from** *National Journal* on your press briefings-its quite funny.

The author is Howard Mortman, one of the humorists I had sent to you as a possible Alfalfa writer.

Attach.

Mortman column, 1 O/1 7/0 1

EXTREME MORTMAN

Donald Rumsfeld, Uncorked

By Howard Mortman
NationalJournal.com
Wednesday, Oct. 17, 2001

I must confess that I'm quite taken with Defense Secretary **Donald Rumsfeld**. I'm just nutty about his press conferences.

I love the way he holds up well to the media. Robust, feisty, with some acidity, but very, very refreshing. He's a study in, well, oenology.

Listening to a Rumsfeld press conference is like drinking a fine wine -- a fine wine waiting to be corked since the Ford administration. He's great at reassuring relief from all the somber news. Rumsfeld is less solemn, more sommelier.

Everyone's palate is a little different. But here's my day-by-day tasting guide to Don Rumsfeld press conferences.

Sunday, Oct. 7:

QUESTION: Are U.S. forces on the ground in Afghanistan now? And more broadly, could you illuminate at all the so-called less visible side of this operation?

RUMSFELD: Not really. If we wanted it to be overt, we would have discussed it.

Tasting notes: Not fancy, just an everyday answer. Bright, fresh and expressing a vivid truth.

RUMSFELD: We certainly would not be using airdrops in portions of the country where we were not satisfied that it would be safe for humanitarian relations. We don't discuss operational activities.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us, is there any plans to send significant numbers of...

RUMSFELD: I answered that question before you asked it.

Tasting notes: Rich and ripe, this answer showcases the individual flavors of Rumsfeld accentuated by years of aging in Washington barrels.

QUESTION: Apparently, there were strikes in Kandahar and Kabul, and there's talk about the electricity system going down. Are you running the risk of being characterized as attacking the Afghan people rather than the military targets?

RUMSFELD: You know, in this world of ours, if you get up in the morning, you're running a risk of having someone lie and someone mischaracterize what it is you are doing.

Tasting notes: This answer has a brilliant color and a pleasing dry yet full-bodied flavor. It goes well when the questioner wants you to eat crow.

Monday, Oct. 8:

QUESTION: . . . Yesterday, according to your figures and General **Myers'** figures, you dropped 37,500 **MREs** -- humanitarian **MREs**. Is this purely humanitarian, or is it also part of a psy-ops because on the humanitarian **MREs** there's a picture of the American flag...?

RUMSFELD: . . . It is quite true that 37,000 rations in a day do not feed millions of human beings. On the other hand, if you were one of the starving people who got one of the rations, you'd be appreciative.

Tasting notes: Combines the vintners blend with the reserve. This is a special treat. No wimpy whines and no wimpy wines!

Tuesday, Oct. 9:

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as far as talking about intelligence, are we getting enough help from Pakistan, because General **Musharraf** -- he has fired most of his top military aides and intelligence officials, so where do we stand now? And also, what role is India playing in this campaign? And finally, if we are going to drop medicine there, do they know what kind of medicine and how to use them?

RUMSFELD: You all have gotten in the habit of asking three questions at once. And it would sure make life simpler if you didn't.

Tasting notes: A beautiful, crisp and herbaceous answer. I think this answer is one of his best. A briit champagne for a brute campaign.

QUESTION: . . . A military effort here could be decade long.... Do you think that's within the realm of possibility? And could you also preview tonight's battle plan the way you have done for us the last two days?

RUMSFELD: That was a big improvement. You went from three to two [questions].

Tasting notes: This answer is aging quite gracefully. Soft and buttery, with a hint of pepper.

Friday, Oct. 12:

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I know you want to hold us to one question, so I only have one question for you, and then one for General Myers.

RUMSFELD: Uh-oh. We ought to have a new rule: You can ask two questions, and then we can pick the one we want to answer.

Tasting notes: Again, this is a lovely vintage for this wine. Drink now, but may still improve.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it's been confirmed that among the targets that was hit was the Suburban vehicle that belongs to **Abdullah Omar**. Was that an effort to kill him?

RUMSFELD: How is that confirmed?

QUESTION: Reliable sources, sir.

RUMSFELD: I had a feeling that was the case.

Tasting notes: The expected tight, elegant, age-worthy wine from this secretary. Excellent. Take his cue: Buy a case.

QUESTION: Secretary Myers, I mean General Myers, can you just outline any British involvement in.. .

RUMSFELD: Now you've given my title as well as my...

QUESTION: Well, he's bigger than you are, Mr. Secretary.

RUMSFELD: He sure is.

Tasting Notes: Fantastic, gamey, evolved nose. Nice fruit and length. Creamy, keroseney, interesting nose. Very spritzy. Good for years yet.

Monday, Oct. 15:

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the skipper of the Enterprise used the phrase "clean-up mode" to describe the state of the airstrikes, sort of suggesting that they're almost wrapped up. You seem to be suggesting they could go on for a while longer than you expected at the beginning.

RUMSFELD: Go with me.

Tasting notes: Bold and authoritative. Real meaty depth with some tannins. Quite pleasing to the palate. Serve immediately.

If this is a new kind of war, then Don Rumsfeld is a new kind of briefer. The Bordeaux of briefing. A **fine** cabernet in a fine Cabinet.

Please pour me another glass.

##

1/22
0600

snowflake

DATA

October 19, 2001 8:21 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Late to Meetings

with forgiveness
for outside
visitors

337

What do you think about having a **rule** that if people cannot get to a meeting on time, they shouldn't come? We should remove their nameplate from the table.

It bothered me when Pace came in so late yesterday to the Italian MoD meeting.

Thanks.

Caplet
10/21/01

10/21

SecDef via ADM G

DHR:dh
101901-7

I'm for the idea. CONCUR

If we proceed, Protocol could simply deny entry to anyone ^(US) after the door is closed.

Di Rita

Tell Myer
Pace
Wolfe
See what they think
DR

YES - NO - SEE ME

1905
10/21/01

U12921 /02

October 22, 2001 8:06 AM

Q
Agenda
10/25
DBA 2

TO: RADM Quigley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if you can get this cartoon.

Thanks.

Attach.
1 0/2 1/0 1 *Washington Times* cartoon

DHR:dh
102201-5

33587

22 DBA 61

U12923 /02

...great, a terror-
...nical control.
...of terrorism is
...n. Over the past 50
...to 50 million peo-
...uted for having dif-
...views. Next to the
...committed ter-

...revolution of the notorious "counter-
...revolutionary" crime used to put
...tens of thousands of Chinese dissi-
...dents to death since the Commu-
...nists took power.
...Reports of arrests, trials and sen-
...tences of this nature can be heard
...nearly everyday, not to mention the
...295 confirmed deaths of Falun Gong

...emerging as a potential partner in
...the war against terrorism. China
...wakes up smiling, Sept. 12 and on,
...at the windfall of the U.S. war on
...terrorism. It must be very thankful
...to Osama bin Laden.
...But the Bush administration
...should not be fooled by China's
...jumping onto the bandwagon of anti-


...face-value for China, not China's
...order going.
...The Bush administration should
...not loosen up due vigilance on
...China's continued abuse of human
...rights, its crackdown on religious
...freedom, its suffocating of free
...exchange of ideas, its persecution of
...political dissidents.

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...Mr. Arafat is part of
...t the solution.
...n't shift the blame.
...the terrorists carry
...ings of restaurants
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...e that when they go,
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...s ready to let Mr.
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...One, hostile to his
...peace" — Mr. Arafat's
...ied any real mean-



ing, Mr. Arafat would have agreed to that deal. But he couldn't, because the people he represents want no deal with Israel, no peace.

To them, the Middle East conflict ends only when the blue-and-white flag with the Star of David flies no more.

At least some Israelis know better than to believe Mr. Arafat. When he promises to round up those who commit terrorist acts, he either

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of Rights, they did
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). Rather, they
S of broad human
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associate with lib-

not seek a ruling structure that would mold the people into whatever suited the government's needs. They did not desire, nor could they justify a government that would exercise such despotism over its citizens' minds and bodies.

Instead, they did something quite extraordinary: They created a government that encouraged a free market of ideas, that encouraged a diversity of perspectives and they trusted that through the friction of these diverse minds, we would achieve progress.

So when we think of America, we think of a broad tapestry of

perspectives, united by the common belief in freedom, liberty and the pursuit of happiness under God.

With this liberty, however, comes a special responsibility.

Here, the government does not hammer its values into the youth. It does not fabricate principles and indoctrinate the young in a rigid pattern of being. Here, in America, we are given so much liberty that the heroic task of instilling a value system is left to each individual family.

This is an extraordinary act of faith. We are given so much liberty, we

leave it to each parent to demonstrate to their children, the ideas of compassion, human goodness and love. With our sense of self-government, we leave it to each individual family to instill in their children a sense of individual striving and personal responsibility.

For this reason, we must never allow ourselves to be lulled into indifference when it comes to family values.

So it saddens me when I read that marriage rates have plummeted to a 40-year low, or that divorce rates continue to hover just above 50 percent. It worries me when I read that parents now spend less time with their children, or that the children of dual-income families are left largely to raise themselves. Each day these children come home, they cook

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Founding Fathers
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JWP D 10/25
0830

October 22, 2001 2:09 PM

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: The Coalition

Afghanistan

Please look at the attached editorial on the coalition. That is a homerun ball!

Attach.

1 0/2 1/0 1 *Washington Post* editorial: The Coalition and the Mission

DHR:dh
102201-29

22 OCT 01

U12928 /02

The Coalition and the Mission

Sunday, October 21, 2001; Page B06

THOUGH THE conflict in Afghanistan has steadily escalated, support for the U.S.-led campaign against the al Qaeda terrorist network has appeared only to grow stronger in the last week. Despite some loud and occasionally violent domestic protests, Pakistan's military government has held firm, and appears to be actively collaborating in the effort to break up the Taliban regime that it long nurtured. Secretary of State Colin Powell, flying from Islamabad to New Delhi, seems to have had some success in cooling rising tensions between Pakistan and India. Meanwhile, President Bush received relatively strong backing from Chinese President Jiang Zemin, as well as from other Asian leaders gathered for an Asia-Pacific summit meeting in Shanghai.

The strength and breadth of what is now called "the coalition" is important; intelligence from China or financial cooperation from southeast Asian states may end up contributing as much to the destruction of al Qaeda as bombing in Afghanistan. The solidarity of so many nations with the United States also should help in the vital battle for public opinion in the Muslim world. But as the Afghan campaign continues, and other targets in the war against terrorism develop, it will be worth remembering a caution offered the other day by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. "There is no single coalition in this effort," Mr. Rumsfeld said. Instead, he said, there should be "a number of flexible coalitions that will change and evolve. Let me reemphasize that the mission determines the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission."

It's not hard to guess why Mr. Rumsfeld would have felt moved to volunteer those comments at the beginning of one of his news conferences. Having worked diligently to assemble so many countries for the fight against al Qaeda, the Bush administration is now being advised that any further action against terrorism must preserve "the coalition" -- or, as Mr. Jiang and others have suggested, be agreed on by the United Nations. This is a recipe for paralysis, advanced by those who oppose any forceful U.S. action outside of Afghanistan, or against any terrorist organization other than al Qaeda. Arab and European governments are particularly worried about a potential U.S. campaign against Iraq; preferring the corrupt stability and business opportunities offered by Saddam Hussein to the elimination of his stores of anthrax, they whisper that any such move would represent a revival of the Bush administration's much-disparaged "unilateralism." What would "the coalition" offer as an alternative? That's easy: pressure Israel, the most easily agreed-upon "cause" of Muslim anger.

An Israeli-Palestinian settlement is certainly something worth working for, and there's no question that any new strategy for Iraq will have to be prudently weighed against other counter-terrorism objectives. But the reality is that the common wisdom of the coalition fails to account for the way the world has been changed by Sept. 11. Problems that for decades have been ignored or regarded as secondary, such as the lack of political freedom or economic progress in the Arab states, where Islamic extremism is strongest, now must be at the heart of any serious long-term effort to combat terrorism. The calculus in judging the importance of destroying biological and chemical weapons stocks in Iraq and other rogue states also has changed. To act effectively in this new world, the United States will not only have to form different sorts of coalitions, it may have to take action against some of the current members of the al Qaeda alliance. In that sense, the greatest danger to the war on terrorism is not that the Bush administration will resort to unilateralism. It is that the United States will fail to act aggressively and creatively enough, over time, to break the current coalition apart.

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Account 10/23
0830

snowflake

October 22, 2001 2:41 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Taliban Disinformation

What do you think about putting together a cell to keep track of all the lies from the Taliban and develop a quick response capability, so that when the Taliban says something that isn't true, we can crack it fast.

In addition, if we want to put something out fast, we will have an ability to respond rapidly with the truth.

In any event, we ought to have a log of all the Taliban lies, so we can knock them down and disseminate them so people will know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102201-32

Afghanistan

102201

U12929 /02

snowflake

*Two Digs
0909*

October 22, 2001 6:12 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: On Time for Press Conferences

0001

In the future, please make sure you don't let me go down to a press conference late when I am backed up against the Crown Prince of Bahrain, for example, as I was today.

That was embarrassing to be 15 minutes late, but it would have been equally embarrassing to seem to be running out of the press conference. I just do not want to do that.

We have to allow enough time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102201-51

2
2
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U12932 /02

snowflake

WAGN

October 23, 2001 6:55 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Real-Time Video

Complete 10/22/01

AFgh en. 514

I want to go over and see one of these operations on the television as it is happening, so I can listen and watch, see people do it and get my head clear on what is going on and where the problem is.

I am concerned.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102301-1

2304701

U12933 /02

Acc'd 10/25
1716
10/24/01

October 23, 2001 8:26 AM

10/24

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Islam

The Crown Prince of Bahrain suggested we get some folks from Harvard to help us better understand Islam. I need you to pull together a group of people to do that.

We can then have a point paper to get out for Torie to use and for all the people in government.

We need to start doing a better job of showing how Islam is being hijacked by terrorists.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102301-8

0003

23 Oct 01

U12934 /02

S.P.S.
10/29
10/29

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: October 27, 2001

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

Don,

We are working on bringing Fouad Ajami and Bernard Lewis – two of the best people in the US on this subject – in for a session next week. That should produce some initial input.

We are also working on a larger project to bring a group together late in November on “Winning the Battle of Ideas.” I’ll keep you posted as that develops.

✓/A.M.C.

S.P.S.

The Deputy I office
is not sure if the 550
gave these to the D.I.
on Saturday.

(cc) to 10/29

21

snowflake

October 23, 2001 9:08 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
cc: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Plans

I have been waiting and waiting for a report on what we plan to do for the rest of the world. I have pushed, I have sent memos and I have begged and pleaded.

There must be some kind of an interim report someone can give me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102301-11

110.01

23 OCT 01

Account 10/25/01

October 23, 2001 11:03 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: McCaffrey E-mail

You might want to circulate this McCaffrey e-mail. It is pretty good.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/10/01 Wall Street Journal article, "War Without End"

DHR:dh
102301-20

000.5

23 Oct 01

U12935 /02

Wall Street Journal
October 10, 2001

The McCaffrey Email
SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT 23 2001

g
10/13
WIDELY REPORTED ON
BY
NEWS
ANCHOR
OVER
LAST
10
DAYS

War Without End

Following is an e-mail exchange that occurred Sept. 19 between a senior cadet at West Point and one of his professors, retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey. From 1996-2001, Gen. McCaffrey served as the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. He earned three Purple Hearts in Vietnam and led the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division in the Persian Gulf War.

Cadet: Could you describe what you think the United States should consider as an "endstate" on the matter of dealing with terrorists? Eradication, containment, or some other option? And what would the United States consider the literal and figurative cent& of gravity?

Gen. McCaffrey: Great issue to consider . . . we have too liberally borrowed from the language of science to deal with the imperfections of political and security analysis.

There will be no endstate . . . we will, if successful, manage this chronic threat to our survival, economy, and self-confidence by dramatically lowering the risk. We will build a series of defensive programs that will make a multiple order of magnitude increase in our day-to-day security. Second, we will form a coalition based on common danger. Much of the globe will join us to leverage foreign intelligence services and security forces to fight these FTO's forward in the battle area. Finally, we will at last take the gloves off and use integrated military power to find, fix, and destroy these organizations.

We are going to disrupt these people thru pre-emptive attack . . . we will deceive them, we will run psyops on them . . . at selected points and times they will be killed suddenly, in significant numbers, and without warning. Tomahawk missiles, 2000 lb laser guided weapons dropped from B2's or F22's at very high altitude, remote control booby traps, blackmail, and at places . . . small groups of soldiers or Seals will appear in total darkness . . . blow down the doors and kill them at close range with automatic weapons and hand grenades. We will find their money and freeze it. We will arrest their front agents. We will operate against their recruiting and transportation functions. We will locate their training areas and surveill or mine them. We will isolate them from their families. We will try to dominate their communication function and alternately listen, jam, or spoof it. We will make their couriers disappear. If we can find out how they eat, or play, or receive rewards, or where they sleep . . . we will go there and kill them by surprise.

The military component will be a supporting but lesser aspect of a strategy that will be based fundamentally on diplomatic and economic leverage to compel cooperation with international law. Of prime importance, we must reduce the environmental factors that feed this type of extremist madness . . . foreign aid must be dramatically increased to address the misery and poverty of the Palestinians, the Afghans, the Sudanese and others.

We must also not be unwilling to confront the State sponsors of terror . . . Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Cuba, North Korea. . . none can be allowed to provide the base for another sickening strike against our civilian population or our Allies. Conventional military power will be used at the end of the day to place at risk those states who present a direct threat to our security. If deterrence does not work with coherent political and economic measures in support of a threat capability . . . then their political will

must be shattered with overwhelming violence directed at their armed forces and the political decision-makers.

The big challenge will be to organize America to protect our transportation, our economic activity, our entertainment, etc., with minimal invasion of our privacy and our free movement. We will constrain domestic law enforcement through the protection of our Judicial System. We will ensure the unfettered operation of a free press. We will have to be zealous to protect the Bill of Rights and the dignity and safety of foreigners living among us during this war.

We can do all of this. We have no option. The American people will depend on you and your fellow soldiers to step forward and stand between us and the barbarians.

h/c/b

DA [unclear]
10/24
1200

snowflake

October 23, 2001 11:14 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Munitions Supplies

Do you have someone who keeps track of how our munitions supplies are **doing**— the various types, how fast we **are using** them, how long they will last and what needs to be acquired?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102301-22

*Complete
10/25/01
Brief from DRS that
was given to MES, plus
msg. Filed in Smart Book*

47

23 OCT 01

U12026 /02

DAVEN

snowflake

October 24, 2001 2:02 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: B-2s

Complete

At 2:02 PM

Please find out why we are not using B-2s in Afghanistan anymore.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102401-26

✓

2402101

U12940 /02

October 24, 2001 6:10 PM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Response to Newt Gingrich

Please send following e-mail to Newt Gingrich:

Newt,

Your piece on tone in the media dated October 24 is *right on the mark*. I hope lots of people read it.

I hope I have not fallen into that trap!

Regards,

DHR:dh
102401-32

.....
Please respond by _____

*Sent - 10/25/01 11:55am
agf*

*Complete
10/25/01*

006.7

24 Oct 01

U12937 /02

10/24
100

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 24 2001

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2001 9:38 AM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Mark-Holman@who.eop.gov; mmatalin@georgewbush.com; llibby@ovp.eop.gov; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil; feithd@mail.policy.osd.mil

Subject: tone in the media

there is a grave danger that optimistic reassurances will ultimately erode the systems' credibility.
we do not know what will happen next?
we do not know how bad it will be?
we do not even know what it will be.

we do not know who is doing various things which may or may not be coordinated.

In the second world war the BBC reported bad news in the same calm tone it reported good news. The decision was made that reporting bad news honestly was the price of long term believability.

From Ridge through Ari to the cabinet we have to find a tone and style that communicates things could get worst, we could get hit, but we are determined to work our way through it. We need a little more grimness and a little reassurance.

the current tone is going to undermine credibility if things keep evolving and each press event is a catch up with the gap between the last press event and the new reality.

I know this is hard but I have heard enough in the last 24 hours that it seemed important to send this in newt

(*)

cc. L. Di Rita

→ SecDef -
Newt's been
really firing a lot of
e-mails one way. Here is
one that is particularly
good.

Larry Di Rita

10/24

10/24/2001

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2001 12:02 PM
To: 'Thirdwave@aol.com'
Subject: From SecDef

Newt,

Your piece on tone in the media dated October 24 is right on the mark. I hope lots of people read it.

I hope I have not fall into that trap!

Regards,

Don Rumsfeld

11-L-0559/OSD/571

Approved
October 27
12:27

October 25, 2001 1:04 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PA&E

0:20 PHE

We have to fix PA&E fast. I am crippled. We need to start a search. I simply have to have someone, and my instinct is to maybe pull someone out from under Dov.

Let's talk.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102501-30

.....

Please respond by 10/26

10100088

U12945 /02

snowflake

Handwritten: *10/28/01*

October 25, 2001 1:06 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: MoD of Ukraine

UNCLASSIFIED

Please have someone draft a letter to the MoD of Ukraine, who just stepped down because his missile hit an airplane.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102501-31

.....

Please respond by 10/30

UNCLASSIFIED

U12946 /02

D 10/27
FILE

October 26, 2001 7:39 AM

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Turkey

Turkey

This article on Turkey is exactly right. Let's see what we can do to help Turkey.
Please get a program.

Thanks.

Attach.

1 0/25/01 *Wall Street Journal* op-ed, Melik Kaylan, "The Turkish Model"

DHR:dh
102601-4

.....
Please respond by 11/7

36 Oct

U18765 /01



The Turkish Model

By MELIK KAYLAN

As American eyes scan eastward across a troubled Islamic horizon of equivocal friends and outright enemies, they should rest their gaze on Turkey, an unfaltering ally, and take heart. Turkey's decades-long fortitude in the service of Western interests and a Pax Americana has garnered meager applause from its allies—and a ton of trouble from its regional rivals. Yet it remains our most dependable resource in the Islamic world, and, as the world's most successful secular Muslim democracy, is set to play perhaps the most critical role of all our allies. We should dance a jig of gratitude for what Turkey has endured for our side up to now, because it points the way to what it could do for us henceforward.

Various Temptations

The Turks have outfaced and outlasted all of the last century's devouring political upheavals. Consider how their neighbors—from the Balkans, the Soviet bloc, and in the Middle East—succumbed to the various temptations of fascism, communism, non-alignment, and Islamic fundamentalism, when Turkey did not. The country has not always presented a pretty face during its self-protective exertions, especially in the area of human rights. Encircled by the likes of Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria, Turkey has performed maintained a kind of "Bunker Democracy."

How else, one might ask, could Turkey have stayed the course while permitting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to station anti-Soviet ICBMs within its borders, making it a prime nuclear first-strike target, and letting the U.S. use its air bases against Iraq, once a valuable trading partner? The same grim self-discipline kept the Turks from recent foreign adventures in defense of their ethnic cousins who were enduring slaughter in Bosnia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya.

But now it's time for the Turks, with Western support and encouragement, to come out of their bunker and exert themselves in shaping history outside their borders. That they were among the first allies to volunteer unconditional support for the U.S., offering everything from bases to soldiers, shows that they are willing. Their record shows that they are able.

What remains is for the West to help Turkey mobilize its potential.

Turkey offers pivotal strategic and cultural salients in the fight against Islamic terrorism. For the immediate purposes of a possible ground war in Afghanistan, the battle-readiness of Turkish troops among allied forces will prove invaluable. Turkey has NATO's largest standing army in Europe, and has just fought a fierce internal war against Kurdish Marxists in terrain and conditions not unlike Afghanistan. Politically, the troops' very presence in their midst furnishes the allies with an early propaganda victory. This is not a West vs. Islam crusade, because non-fundamental-

fray. But important shifts have begun to unfold in the region's alignments. Uzbekistan has allowed the U.S. to use its military bases in early contravention of Russian directives. Indeed, American and British special forces are already said to be operating from those Uzbek bases.

Now is the time for Turkey, as a Western proxy, to replace Russia's influence in the area. This will have several salutary strategic effects. It will deprive the region's militant Islamists of an important legitimizing and colonial role, it will invalidate the invocation of "jihad" among those who wish to export fundamentalism against the Turkish states, since a war

As a leading secular Islamic state, Turkey can use its influence—and its sizable army—to help America & defeat Islamic terrorism in Central Asia and beyond.

ist Muslims such as Turks will fight for the Western side.

Moreover, the Turks already have a regional interest in Afghan affairs: Their Turkic cousins, the Uzbeks, have a sizable minority living in Afghanistan that supports the Northern Alliance. Leaders of the Afghan-Uzbek militia such as Gen. Rashid Dostum have, over the years, spent time in Turkey. And like the Turks, both the Uzbeks in Uzbekistan and their fellow ethnic Uzbeks who live in Afghanistan have adhered to a secular form of Islam for almost a century.

In the post-Soviet era, Afghanistan's Uzbek militias have received their war materiel from Russia, which has meant that many other Afghan Muslims and nationalists have viewed them with suspicion. This has set back the cause of secular Muslims in Afghanistan. But it has suited Russian strategy perfectly well. Russia has used the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to retain a post-Soviet colonial hold on its former Central Asian client states, the "stans," such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, several of which abut the Afghan border. Several are also hugely rich in natural resources, enough to shift the world's dependence on Mideast oil.

Although most of these states are ethnically Turkic, Turkey has stayed out of the

fought against other Muslims—aligned with Turkey not Russia—is no jihad. It will create a secular Turkic continuum, or bloc of states, to counteract both the Iranian and Pakistan-Afghan fundamentalism abroad in the region. Ultimately, it will also help free up strategic reserves of oil and gas, currently under Russian veto, possessed by ex-Soviet republics. Alleviating the region's poverty is perhaps the most obvious counter to the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism.

And yet, the infusion of wealth has not exactly countered it in Saudi Arabia. Which is where Turkey's cultural role in the region also becomes paramount. For centuries, the Ottoman Empire presided over Muslim doctrine and much of Islam's geography. Its subjects lived under a precise and codified system of multiethnic religious tolerance. One might say, with hindsight, that the Ottomans conferred a sanity on the Middle East that has not existed since their departure. These days, Turkey endures as the most prominent secular Muslim society in the world: indeed as one of Islam's few functioning democracies, Turkey and its Kemalist system can furnish other Muslim countries with an alternative model to the fundamentalism of Saudi-built mosques and madrassas.

The U.S., and the British before them,

championed the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia for decades. The result is evident for all to see: Saudi cultural influence has grown out of all proportion, allowing them to export their primitive home-grown form of jihadist Wahhabism throughout the world. The time is long overdue for the West to help effect an equivalent but countervailing dissemination of the Turkish model through the Islamic geosphere.

Arabian Approach

There is no reason why Indonesia or Malaysia, so far from the Mideast, should opt for an Arabian approach to religion except that it was the only one on offer. Several non-Arab Muslim countries have elected women prime ministers. For these cultures, the Kemalist system with its liberation of women to dress, work, travel and study in relative freedom, is surely more sympathetic than the Saudi variety. Turkey can be to Islam what Hong Kong was to China, an example that ultimately prevails because it advertises a manifestly better life gained through a freer pursuit of happiness.

However, the West must foster and abet Turkey's elevation into the role of paradigm, as it did successfully with Hong Kong and so disastrously with the Saudis. The throw-weight of the Turkish message depends on the success of Turkey's economy, the expansion and export of its secular education system, the optimism of its pro-Western youth culture.

Turks have already done much of the work for us. Istanbul today is one of the most entrancing and dynamic cities on earth, certainly in the Islamic world. Like Hong Kong was to China, Istanbul too stands in colorful contrast to the dour circumspection that prevails in most Islam & capitals. Many a hypocritical fundamentalist repairs there to savor its douceur de vivre along with a good many refugees from the Muslim world's myriad self-strangling economies.

However unwittingly, the Turks have already crafted a cultural product much in demand. For our own sakes, it's time the West helped package it and export it to the Muslim world.

Mr. Kaylan, a writer based in New York, is completing a history of Istanbul.

Don't Panic. We Can Fight Smallpox.

By ELIZABETH WHELAN

As frightening as the threat of anthrax has been, the nightmare scenario for biological warfare calls for another pathogen—one which, unlike anthrax, can be transmitted from person to person.

Smallpox fits this description well. It is spread through face-to-face contact, by means of infected saliva or respiratory droplets, usually in a closed setting. It can also be spread by infected linens or clothes: It was probably first used as a biological weapon during the French-

contagious. A person infected with smallpox does not become contagious until he or she is too sick to be walking around. If you are wondering if the guy next to you on the subway has smallpox and decide to hold your breath between stops just in case, you are worrying needlessly. In the

ues for infection would not be relevant. But such means of transmission is at this point only theoretical.

Third, it would be difficult to acquire and disseminate the virus—much more so than anthrax. Even if there were an illicit source of smallpox, a terrorist would have to overcome sophisticated scientific and technological obstacles to cultivate it (one would need to grow the virus in eggs or animal cells) and disseminate it (putting it in the form of inhalable particles). Theoretically, it would be possible

prevented death and disease associated with a pox disease in primates—monkeypox—similar to smallpox in humans.

Fifth, we have standard protocol in place for dealing with infectious disease. Right now, physicians (nearly all of whom have never seen a case of smallpox) are being educated to be on high alert for the symptoms of smallpox, particularly the high fever and unique rash which appears on the face and extremities. Should a case be diagnosed—and make no mistake, one case would be considered an epidemic and a worldwide catastrophe—the nation



Acted 10/27/01 11:54

October 26, 2001 8:02 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Press Briefings

110000

We have to avoid having briefers react to every single event. We need them to kind of cool it down.

The press needs news and, therefore, they are going to keep trying to get it. But we don't have to keep reacting to everything.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102601-6

.....
Please respond by _____

10120000

U12949 /02

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: October 27, 2001
SUBJECT: **Bernadine Healy**

Is there anything we could use Bernadine Healy for?

Thank you.

DHR/azn
102701.14

11:15 AM

Please respond by: _____

2312

27 OCT 01

U18389 /01

snowflake

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: October 27, 2001

*Aug 10/27
1310*

SUBJECT: **Pronunciations**

Attached is a memo that I am told is correct. Someone ought to check it out. If it is right, then we sure ought to make sure the President is given that information, as well as the folks in the Pentagon.

000,3

Thank you.

DHR/azn
102701.06
Attach: Memo on Pronunciation

8:49 AM

2705101

U12954 /02

MEMORANDUM

10/27/01

We've got to say "Islam" with an "S" instead of a "Z" instead of "Izlam" and the same thing with Muslim. It's "Muslim" as opposed to "Muzzlum." It's got to be with an "S" instead of a "Z."

Thanks.

DHR/azn
102701.05

8:49 AM

snowflake

TO: Secretary Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: October 31, 2001
SUBJECT: **Naval Officers**

T
~~*11/15*~~
12/5
Done
2/16
0930

Is it true that one out of every five naval officers is an M.D., physician's assistant, or other type of health professional?

If so, is that such a core competence of the Navy that it makes sense to have that percentage of the naval officers in that one discipline?

2/16/02

Thank you.

11/15

SecDef

DHR/azn
102701.17

9:35 AM

It is true. We validated the number when we did the Sept 10 War on Bureaucracy speech. It's a long-standing issue in the navy. No response yet from SecNav

Please respond by: _____

but I assume he's aware of it.

A. R. T.

1/21/02

U12969 /02

snowflake

10/30 1700 ACN 11/5
October 29, 2001 2:39 PM 1711

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memorial Service

CRB

Whose idea was the one-month anniversary memorial service at the Pentagon?

Thanks.

*Completed
10/29*

DHR:dh
102901-23

.....
Please respond by _____

10/29

SECRET -

(703) 812-2345

It was a collective decision as best I can recall. Some short time after the Sept 11 hit, we (me, Mills, others at that level) batted it around and we just decided 30 days made sense.

290CT01

U12959 102 Dilite

snowflake

#78

(A) 11/1
0957

October 29, 2001 6:37 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Volunteer

Please have someone evaluate this letter to me from Nathan Bedford Makowski.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/26/01 Makowski letter

DHR:dh
102901-37

.....

Please respond by November 6.

AFg
ANISTAN

29 OCT 01

U11706 /02

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
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NATHAN BEDFORD MAKOWSKI

(b)(6)

October 26, 2001

Secretary of Defense
 Donald Rumsfeld
 The Pentagon
 Arlington Virginia

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 29 2001

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

Please take this letter to heart. After some thought, and much contemplation, it is my firm belief that if Mr. Bin Laden is in Afghanistan, he is probably hold up in the ancient city ruins at Farah, or somewhere near there. Located in the west of the country, the surrounding area lends itself well to hiding, and is very deep within the Taliban control area. In addition, its location near the border of Iran, makes for a quick getaway into a definite Anti-American state. Farah, is located on the River Farah, which flows across the border to Iran. This river is most likely navigable to small power boats, and would provide a covert escape route. It is also located in a fertile valley, rich with agriculture, for fresh food supplies, as well as providing cover from the air.

I am a Bounty Hunter, I am a Soldier, a Pilot, a Submariner, a Tanker, a Combat Engineer, a Diver, a Skydiver, a Horseman, an Outdoorsman, a Hunter, and an extreme adventurer. I propose the following:

Forming a posse, composed of seven three man teams. AU members to be drawn from the special forces, all snipers, and me. All team members to be whitewashed. All team members to form up in Nevada, to receive specialized hand-to-hand training, to include helicopter insertion with horses, water crossing with horses, and long range endurance riding. Each man will be supplied with two horses, one for riding, and one for packing. Each man will be equipped with specialized communications, rudimentary survival gear, medical equipment, semi auto sniper rifle, and three thousand rounds of ammo. In addition, each 3 man team will be equipped with stripped version of M-60 for maximum fire support, and six thousand rounds of belted ammo for same. LAAW rockets will supply greater punch for harder targets.

After training, this unit will deploy to a forward area, where it will be covertly inserted into a remote area approximately 50 miles from Farah. It will then proceed in teams of three, on preplanned routes under cover of darkness with the aid of night vision. It will locate secure hide areas and lay low during the day, while feeding and resting the horses. It will then proceed to reconnoiter pre assigned targets, and to plant remote sensory units, such as Sentinel. The teams will remain in theater, and receive night time re-supply as needed. It will also have access to air assets in case air support or extraction is needed. If Bin Laden or his HQ are located, reinforcements can be brought in to assist.

The advantage of horses is obvious. Horsemen are not uncommon in many areas of this nation, and Buzkashi is perhaps the national sport. Horses and their hoof prints, would be quite common. Six horses per team, would attract little attention. Especially if operatives are dressed in traditional garb. In addition to one specific area of search, the mounted team could be employed in other suspect areas.

I would like the opportunity to train, and to lead this team. I fully understand the risks involved.

Sincerely,

Nathan Bedford Makowski

snowflake

Agw
10/31/01

October 30, 2001 7:23 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Threat

I have the details on the threat if you want them.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/29/01 SMA note

Complete

DHR:dh
103001-5

.....
Please respond by _____

000.5

100001

U12962 /02

snowflake

October 30, 2001 3:09 PM

TO: Pete **Aldridge**
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Weapon Systems

We need more weapon systems that are like the AC-130, where the ordnance can be directed in a more **precise** way than can some of our other platforms and weapons.

Thanks.

DHR:db
10300146

.....
Please respond by _____

470

30 OCT 01

019141 /01

snowflake



~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

#24 (W) 11/1000

October 30, 2001 2:41 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CINC Commanders' Estimates

322

I received this package dated 1 October. My apologies-I just got around to reading it. The type is so small, and the detail is so messed up. It is absolutely unhelpful.

Would you please have someone on the Joint Staff read it, tell me what is important and then you tell me what you think I ought to do with it? I can't even plow my way through it, it is so poorly prepared and presented.

Thanks,

Attach.
1 O/O I/O 1 CJCS forwarding CINC Commanders' Estimates

DHR:dh
103001-49

.....
Please respond by _____

30 Oct 01

UNCLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

U15063 02

snowflake

October 30, 2001 3:09 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Weapon Systems

We need more weapon systems that are like the AC-130, where the ordnance can be directed in a more precise way than can some of our other platforms and weapons.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103001-56

.....

Please respond by _____

snowflake

Q11/E
3/250

October 30, 2001 3:53 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Advocates

You ought to take note of the people who appear on these programs, like David Gergen, Chuck Hagel, John McCain, etc. Then we ought to try to stay in pretty close touch with those folks.

The more they are wired into what we are thinking, the better off they are going to be. We ought to make sure they get all of our talking points.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103001-62

.....

Please respond by _____

000.99

300101

U12960 /02

Present Only
11/2
0130

October 31, 2001 7:45 AM

Afghanistan

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Reply to Newt Gingrich

Please send the following e-mail response to Newt Gingrich:

Newt,

There is not a chance in the world we are going to stop bombing or stop our operations during Ramadan.

DHR:dh
103101-1

.....
Please respond by _____

U12975 /02

31 OCT 01

(b)(6) [redacted], CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2001 6:50 PM

To: (b)(6) [redacted]@osd.pentagon.mil; libby@ovp.eop.gov; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil;
feithd@mail.policy.osd.mil

Subject: a bombing halt could be a disaster

If the United States suspends bombing for Ramadan and there is a terrorist act in the United States the outrage could become enormous. The whole Ramadan argument is a symptom of our losing the public relations war. From the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel in 1973 to the Iran-Iraq war which respected no halts there is a clear pattern that Arabs fight when it suits them. There will be real disgust among Americans if we back down.

If Arabs want the bombing to start they can help us get bin Laden and the Taliban. Short of that we should treat this kind of public posturing with icy contempt.

This is very dangerous for us here at home

newt

cc: L.D. Rita
Adm. Giambastiani

10/30/2001

11-L-0559/OSD/590

snowflake

11/2 07:00
~~October 31, 2001 3:12 PM~~

Agenda
11/15
1323

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Outputs

We need a weekly report on outputs, not efforts, as to what we are doing on the terrorism campaign. Please get Barry Watts, Dov Zakheim, etc., put together a group, think it through and get back to me ~~sometime before I leave town on Friday.~~ *as soon as possible after I return from Moscow, etc.*

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103101-33

.....
Please respond by 11/11

OSD, 5

2 Nov 01

U12869 /02

1/2
0800

D 12/3
1835

snowflake

November 1, 2001 11:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Audiotapes

DR

See under

000.3

Someone sent me these tapes concerning Muslims. I think someone ought to listen to them and see if there is anything good we ought to use in there.

Thanks.

Attach.
Three audiotapes

DHR:dh
110101-2

Please respond by

11/30

SecDef -

FYI, note the attached info.

D. R. White

1 NOV 01

U14654 02

snowflake

Handwritten initials and date: DHR 11/1/01

November 1, 2001 1:30 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*,
SUBJECT: Locke Rush

000.3

Please take a look at this letter from Locke Rush, a friend of mine from Princeton. I think maybe we ought to get the political folks who were here, choose six or eight of **them** (not all of them), and then really put them to work on the influence campaign.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/28/01 Rush ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
110101-7

.....
Please respond by _____

1 Nov 01

U14656 02



**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON**

Mr. Locke Rush

(b)(6)

Dear Locke,

Thanks so much for your thoughtful note and your excellent idea. Interestingly, I had a meeting the day before with a group of the top Republican and Democrat political experts, and they did have some excellent advice. I think you are on the mark. It is a campaign, and we best get in it!

I appreciate your thoughtfulness and support.

Best regards,

Oct 28, 2001

Dear Rummie,

It's been a long time since I saw you at Princeton - a lifetime. After Sept. 11 you were in my thoughts and heart so I decided to write this letter.

When Jackie and I were in Italy in Sept. we used to watch you on CNN and amidst all the tragedy and drama, it was most reassuring to us to see & listen to you. Your bearing, your words, your heart were extremely important to us and gave us hope amidst the turmoil.

I have spent a good portion of the last 30 years studying and participating in religions other than Christianity. During this time I have been fortunate to come in contact with a number of people whom I feel have true wisdom and insight into the problems we face today.

Some of these acquaintances are Muslim and speak to me with great concern about the need to open up public dialogue with Muslim leaders throughout the world and also to begin a broad, deep and concentrated effort to win the war of words. They feel, as do I, that the present time is crucial to counteract the erroneous and damaging messages that are being spread throughout the world. I feel that this dangerous mix of pure Islam and politics has to be addressed and that it can but be done by people of Muslim faith who also support our way & principles of life.

I am not much of a political animal but during each presidential election in this country I am amazed at the expertise and

dissect the opposing party's points and in less than an hour have their candidate neatly and effectively pointing out the flaws in the opponent's argument. Also, the 'negative' campaigning which we have so finely honed could be used beautifully to point out the flaws in the terrorists' actions as well as to debunk much of their rhetoric. A small 'army' of these political experts turned loose to gather lies, evidence, distortions and personal historic data could be devastating, over time, to the terrorists particularly if delivered by Muslims themselves.

If I can be of any assistance in the above ideas please let me know. I am sure the administration needs all the help it can get.

I think you are doing a really fine job, Rummel; it is comforting to have you at the helm so to speak. May God bless you, your efforts and your family and may He show His grace and protection on you always. I wish you all the best in your work and my prayers are with you daily.

Joche Runk

tel.
fax
e-mail

(b)(6)

snowflake

November 1, 2001 2:35 PM
11/5
1330

Afghanistan

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Media

Last night on *Hardball* with Chris Matthews, a Northern Alliance spokesman, **Haron Amin**, said the United States has not given the Northern Alliance what it promised in terms of **APCs**, etc.

He was a clean cut little weenie who obviously has never been in Afghanistan. It was enormously unhelpful to the United States. We ought to let somebody know that that fellow needs a muzzle.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110101-12

.....
Please respond by _____

1 Nov 01

U14653 02

snowflake

~~SECRET~~

Agent A 11/1/01
4:26

November 1, 2001 3:55 PM

VIA HUMINT CHANNELS

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Taliban Falsehoods

You should be keeping a list of all these Taliban reports that are proven false, like the shot down airplane and the American having been captured. We ought to get a laundry list of those, and you ought to give them to me so when someone asks me a question like that I can list a whole series of things that are false.

Please do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110101-20

.....*
Please respond by _____

000.5

1 Nov 01

VIA HUMINT CHANNELS

U14794 02

~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

November 1, 2001 4:18 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: James Carville

231.2

James Carville has volunteered to help in the information war. I would think you ought to include him in that information group you are putting together. He is a very smart, tough guy.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110101-22

.....
Please respond by _____

1 NOV 01

U18110 /01

snowflake

November 1, 2001 4:25 PM

Wagon
11/5
1404

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan City

Afghanistan

The city McWethy keeps talking about is phonetically spelled *Chuka Karez*. The Taliban said 100 civilians were killed.

Please get Larry Di Rita to get the Joint Staff to get an answer for that, and then you give it to McWethy and tell me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110101-25

.....
Please respond by _____

1 Nov 01

U14659 02

snowflake

Acad 11/2/01
1352

November 2, 2001 8:35 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Taped Interviews

That Brokaw interview was a disaster. He cut me off a third of the way through my answers. I don't think we ought to do interviews where they are going to do that.

I would rather do live or with a program where they are going to carry some of the meat of it. The reason I raise it is that you have me down for 60 *Minutes* with Dave Martin on November 9, and I am inclined to think I would just be all over the cutting room floor again.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110201-1

.....
Please respond by _____

000,77 SD

2 Nov 01

U14660 02

snowflake

Approved
11/2/01

November 2, 2001 8:54 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Press Statements

Some papers carried the bulk of the text of my statement from the beginning of the press availability on November 1. It is clear to me that if we have a good statement, we certainly ought to have it printed and passed out. Then it will have a better chance of getting printed, at least by the papers that aren't there-and certainly by the reporters who are there, who might not have been able to get it all down.

Let's plan on doing that when we have a good one, which we ought to have every time!

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110201-4

.....
Please respond by _____

000.7 SD

2 Nov 02

U14661 02

snowflake

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: November 5, 2001
SUBJECT:

12
DRL
Larry Di Rita
11/30

11/30
1/26

000.5

I need a piece of paper that has about 6 or 8 most egregious, chilling statements by UBL, on one page.

Thanks.

Please respond by: _____

DHR/azn
110501.16

5 Nov 01

U14664 02

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Torie

DATE: November 30, 2001

SUBJECT: Most egregious and chilling statements by UBL

I have attached a one pager with the most chilling and egregious statements recently made by UBL. I have also attached a one pager on the Taliban and Al-Quaida claims...equally out there. Our IOTF was very helpful in finding these. For some we do not have dates.

IOTF = Info Ops Task Force

Statements by UBL

“Yes, we kill their innocent; and this is legal, both religiously and logically.”
(UBL videotaped statement 10 Oct)

“History should be a witness that we are terrorists.” (UBL videotaped statement)

Regarding the WTC; “The towers were supposed to be filled with men supporting the economical powers of the U.S., who are abusing the world.. .we are treating them like they are treating us.” (UBL statement 20 Oct)

“Afghanistan is the only Islamic country.” (UBL interview 8 Nov)

“The twin towers were legitimate targets.” (UBL videotaped statement)

“I say the events that took place on Tuesday, the 11th of September, against the twin towers and Washington, I say the events were great by all measurement.” (UBL Interview 10 Oct)

“Killing Jews is a top priority.” UBL videotaped statement

The hijackers were; “blessed by Allah to destroy Americas economic and military landmarks.” (UBL videotaped statement)

The attackers of the WTC and the Pentagon; “are blessed and will reside in paradise.” (UBL videotaped statement)

TALIBAN and al-Qaida STATEMENTS OR CLAIMS

- The U.S. is deliberately poisoning humanitarian food drops to the Afghan people.
- Taliban have irrefutable evidence the U.S. is deploying chemical and biological weapons against the people of Afghanistan.
- Taliban want dignity for women while the rest of the world does not.
- The U.S. is intentionally targeting civilians. Attacks on against residential areas, schools, and mosques are deliberate.
- Taliban claims the U.S. has killed over 1,500 civilians in the air-strikes since the U.S. operations began
- U.S. was dropping cluster bombs disguised as humanitarian food boxes. America is committing genocide in Afghanistan for political goals.
- The Taliban has made a strategic retreat from Kabul in order to save civilians from the fighting.
- Numerous U.S. soldiers have been killed and captured by the Taliban.
- Taliban claims the U.S. is using nuclear weapons in Afghanistan.
- UBL is not a terrorist.

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita
cc: Trip Coordinators
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: November 5, 2001
SUBJECT: Support in Meetings

*Approved
DHR/azn
12/15*

NOTED

337

Next time we go overseas we want to make sure that someone is assigned for each meeting, who is going to do the notes and someone assigned to do the cable, when they get out.

If it is a small meeting and only Doug Feith is in the meeting and there are several of them the cables never get done. We have to not have him be in all the meetings when there is only one person. Let's rotate people.

Thanks.

Please respond by: _____

5 Nov 01

DHR/azn
110501.22

U14666 02

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: November 5, 2001
SUBJECT: Overseas Trips

*Info
11/7
1210*

333 SD

If I am going to be giving gifts, I have to know what is in them. I can't just pass them out.

Thanks.

*Noted
11/7/01*

Please respond by: _____

DHR/azn
110501.23

5 Nov 01

U14667 02

snowflake

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 5, 2001
SUBJECT: Press

*Approved
W. 11/7
11/15*

Are you keeping a list of the total number of times I have met with the press?
Including what I do on these trips? I think I ought to look at that sometime. It
must be just soaring.

Thanks.

Please respond by: _____

DHR/azn
110501.25

006.75D

5 NOV 01

U14668 02

snowflake

November 7, 2001 7:57 AM

*DAW
11/8
1350*

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Schedule of Franks' Call

SECRET HAS BEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

In the future, let's start the call with Franks in the evening 30 minutes before the call with the President. That way we can finish and I can talk to him without being in such a rush.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110701-3

.....
Please respond by _____

*SCHEDULED STARTING 11/8 30 MIN.
PRIOR.*

*W/R
Ed*

7 Nov 01

U14673 02

November 7, 2001 11:50 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Armed Forces Institute of Pathology

Please look into this memo I received from Jim Denny.

Thanks.

Attach.
09/24/01 Denny ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
110701-7

Please respond by _____

920

Nov 01

U18278 /01

MEMO *from the Office of James M. Denny*

SECRET HAS BEEN

NOV - 7 2001

Bears Tower, Suite 9420
233 S. Wacker IL 60606 Drive
Chicago,
Ph: (312) 875-4042
Fax: (312) 875-4044

DATE: September 24, 2001

TO: Don Rumsfeld

FROM: James M. Denny 

Bernie Wagner called me to express his concern regarding a proposal to cut the budget of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. Bernie is involved with the Institute (I believe as a board member) as a result of legislation circa 1975 which added a civilian component to the Institute designed to facilitate the solicitation of grants from the private sector to fund research at the Institute. In the intervening years, the Institute has become a standard-setter for the diagnosis of cancer and currently receives about 60,000 requests annually for second opinions. If his recollection of the numbers is correct, the Institute has a budget of approximately \$60 million and receives private sector grants of approximately \$20 million. The proposal is to cut the budget from \$60 to \$30 million. Bernie's concern is that a budget cut of this magnitude could result in the loss of the private sector support and could render the Institute incapable of providing second diagnostic opinions. Since veterans account for a significant percent of these requests, Bernie was worried that a cut would produce a vocal backlash and he wanted to be sure you were aware of this so that you would not be blindsided.

My conversation with Bernie was in early September and I suspect that this issue has been over run by subsequent events.

snowflake

4 #76 11/9
0645

November 8, 2001 9:58 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Aid to Afghanistan

We simply must provide medical attention, food and warmth for the people of Afghanistan. It is heartbreaking.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110801-17

COMPLETE

Please respond by _____

Afghanistan

8 Nov 01

U12015 /02

snowflake

SECRET
2001 NOV 12 11 4: 53

November 12, 2001 2:58 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
David Chu
Tom White
Gordon England
Jim Roche

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Joint Chiefs

If you think back to the Quadrennial Defense Review process, the Defense Planning Guidance process, the Fiscal Guidance process, as well as the Nuclear Posture Review, we had numerous meetings that included all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The pattern established of including them with the civilian leadership in considering matters that were a blend of our collective responsibilities was a good one. It worked. We were able to hear their individual views. Of course, they met separately in the tank and gave us their collective views, as they properly should. I found it helpful to me, and I know that each of you did as well.

I raise this as a reminder because, as we go about our business in acquisition, personnel and readiness and other aspects of our work, it strikes me that it is important for each of you to see that we continue to get the benefit of the extensive background and experience of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

My suggestion is that we find ways to ask them for their collective judgment, but also find ways to include them in the process in a way that we get their individual views, as well. Sometimes a collective view is a compromise, and that is understandable and fine. Finding ways to build them into the process and for each of you to learn their perspectives first-hand is a helpful thing to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110801-25

.....
Please respond by _____

020 JCS

12 NOV 01

Approved
0702

November 8, 2001 11:49 AM

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Peter Rodman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Major Non-NATO Allies

092

I notice we have gone ahead and offered Bahrain status as a major non-NATO ally. My instinct tells me that Oman, Singapore and Kuwait are probably getting pretty close to qualifying as well.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110801-28

.....
Please respond by _____

8 Nov 02

U14680 02

snowflake

SMA copy 11/10
1423

November 9, 2001 3:26 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Percentage of Effort

Please tell the folks at CENTCOM that they should show the percentage of effort on support to opposition groups so we know where they are putting their beef. It doesn't give you any clue to that in this report.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110901-16

.....
Please respond by 11/15

Called CINC (CENT EA. Will begin tomorrow (10 Nov)
SPD

g
H. Giambastiani

g
11/10/01

U12868 /02

David D. [unclear]
1157

November 13, 2001 8:20 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
cc: Dov Zakheim
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Presidential Veto

110.01

What would the implication be if the President vetoed the Defense Authorization bill, and we had to live on the Appropriations bill? Would it be good, bad, mixed?

Please explain the implications.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111001-4

.....
Please respond by _____

13 Nov 01

U14689 02

Action 11/14
0953

November 12, 2001 3:19 PM

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Safire Article

Turkey

Let's talk about this Safire article when you meet with me.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/05/01 NYT Safire op-ed, "The Turkey Card"

DHR:dh
111201-3

.....
Please respond by _____

12 Nov 02

U14691 02

Essay

WILLIAM SAFIRE

The Turkey Card

Reached *by cell phone* in purgatory, where he is expiating his *sin* of imposing wage and *price controls*, *Richard Nixon agreed to an interview* with his former speechwriter.

Q: How do you **think** the war in Afghanistan is going?

Nixon: You call that a war? Light bombing of a bunch of **crazies** with beards, based on a policy of **Afghanization** before you even get started? That's strictly reactive and purely tactical.

Q: Would you send in a couple of divisions of American ground troops?

Nixon: No. The Bush people are employing the right tactics in their "phase I" — suppressing terrorist operations, helping the opposition make trouble, playing for breaks with payoffs and assassinations. What they fail to see is the global picture. They need to develop a grand strategy.

Q: Which is —

Nixon: Know your real enemy. It's not just bin Laden and his terrorist cells. It's the movement threatening **to take** over the Islamic world. Those beards and their even more dangerous state sponsors **want** the Saudi and **Kuwaiti** oil. That would give them the money to build or buy the nuclear and germ weapons to eliminate the reasonable Muslims and all **the** Christian and Jewish infidels.

Q: How would you stop them?

Nixon: Split 'em, the way we **split** the Communist monolith by playing **the** China card against **the** Soviets. Your generation's card is Turkey, the secular Muslim nation with the strongest army.

Q: **The Turks** have already **volunteered** about a hundred commandos — you **mean we** should ask for more?

Nixon: **Get** out of that **celebrity-terrorist** -Afghan **mindset**. With the world dazed and everything **in flux**, **seize the moment**. I'd make a deal with **Ankara** **right** now to move across **Turkey's** border, and annex the northern **third** of Iraq. Most of it is in **Kurdish** hands already, in our no-flight zone, — but the land-to make part of Turkey is **the** oil field around **Kirkuk** that produces nearly half of **S a d d a m Hussein's oil**.

Q: **Doesn't that mean war?**

Nixon: **Quick war**, justified by **Sad-**dam's **threat** of germs and **nukes** and **terrorist connections**. **We'd** provide **air cover** and **U.N.** Security Council support **in return** for **the** Turks' setting up a **friendly** -government in **Baghdad**. **The freed** Iraqis would **start pumping their** southern oil like

mad and help us bust up OPEC for good.

Q: What's in it for the Turks?

Nixon: First, big money — **north-**em Iraq could be good for nearly two million barrels a day, and the Euro-**pean** Union would fall all over itself **welcoming** in the Turks. Next, Turkey would solve its internal -Kurd problem by making its slice of Iraq an autonomous region called **Kurdi-**stan.

Q: But that would mean new borders, and don't Arab states worry about dismemberment?

Nixon seizes- the moment.

Nixon: Turks are Muslims but **not** Arabs. When Syria was the -base for terrorist operations against Turkey, the Turks massed troops on the **bor-**der and Damascus caved, kicking the terrorist boss out of the country **and** he's now in a Turkish jail. And **what's** the big deal about new **borders?** **Iraq** was a **20th-century** British **concoction**. Only 50 years ago, **Israel** became a state, and soon **there'll be a** Palestinian **state**. New times, — new borders.

Q: Speaking of **Israel** —

Nixon: Let me say this about **that**. I'd tell Sharon to annex the Jordan Valley, to protect Jordan but **then** to hand over the **West Bank** or he's down the tubes. I know, **you** disagree, Bill, but we're going **for the** grand strategic enchilada. Then I'd tell the Saudis and other rich **Arabs** to build good housing and plants **in Pal-**estine or accept a million **Palestinian** immigrants. With Iraq's threat **neu-**tralized and Iran **coming around**, the sheiks **will** ante up in a **hurry**.

Q: But what about **punishing bin** Laden in Afghanistan —

Nixon: Change the flow of **money** and power in the Middle East **and bin** Laden and **his** boys will fall **into our** hands like rotten fruit. Just **use this** crisis to reshuffle the deck and **break** out of the trap. Leapfrog **"phase I,"** and there'll be no heavy allied **casual-**ties, no parades to stop the bombing, no **Taliban**, no germ scares. I **have to** go expiate now. **Call** me soon **about** Russia. How do you **turn this damn** new phone off? □

snowflake

1:01 PM

INFO
11/14
0940

TO: Gen. Tommy Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 12, 2001

SUBJECT: **Leaflets**

You might consider heavy radio and leaflet drops along the border of Pakistan telling people that it is unsafe to be there. I haven't thought it through, but it crossed my mind that that might help you cork the bottle.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
01001.09

117201-9

Please respond by _____

Pakistan

12 Nov 01

U14694 02

snowflake

Handwritten signature
209

November 12, 2001 5:20 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DIA

030 DIA

How much longer will Admiral Wilson be at DIA?

We should start thinking about who the new person ought to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111201-24

.....

Please respond by _____

12 Nov 01

U14701 02

snowflake

Adams 11/14
ASD
November 12, 2001 4:06 PM

TO: Tony Dolan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld a J
SUBJECT: Quote

461

There is a John Adams quote something to the effect of "I must fight a war so that my children can study science," or something like that. Could you please get that for me? It is pretty good.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111201-g

.....
Please respond by _____

12 Nov 01

U14695 02

Approved
11/14
1152

November 13, 2001 9:08 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Foundation

010 0017

A friend of mine, ^b (b)(6), suggested yesterday that the Pentagon think of developing something like the National Park Foundation is to the Department of Interior and the National Park system. We have so many historic sites that we could raise money through the private sector, like the National Park Foundation does for the park system.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111301-3

.....
Please respond by _____

13 Nov 01

U14704 02

Handwritten initials and date: "A... 11/14/01"

November 13, 2001 10:16 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich

231.2

Because of the way things are going in Afghanistan, I suggest we get Newt Gingrich to focus on something other than Afghanistan. That is to say, the rest of the world.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111301-7

.....
Please respond by _____

13 Nov 01

U14702 02

snowflake

Agan D 11/17
1255

November 15, 2001 8:24 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: **MilAir**

U
C
C

We might want to send out a policy on who we take to **Ramstein** and who we fly around.

Why don't we try to get something drafted that sets a new precedent that is more respectful of taxpayers' dollars?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111501-2

.....
Please respond by _____

15 NOV 01

U14709 02

November 16, 2001 9:13 AM

0205D

TO:

(b)(6)

VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Calendar

Every day I have to ask for my calendar. I shouldn't have to do that. Tonight it is 5:40 p.m. I say to myself, "Gee, I haven't seen my calendar."

I need to get it mid-day so I can affect it for the period ahead. Please don't make me ask for it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111601-4

.....
Please respond by _____

(b)(6)

VADM G
and I will start (trying to)
take in tomorrow's calendar
each day around mid-day.
Don't just send it in.

cc: VADM G

D. Di Rita

16sep01

U14714 02

*Do not write
DJS*

November 28, 2001 3:04 PM

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Monthly Calendar

Please try to keep my monthly calendar up to date and include the times of events.

I can't figure out what to accept or decline except by looking at my calendar, and I find my monthly calendar, for the most part, doesn't have anything on it. I end up accepting things that are in conflict.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112801-15

Please respond by _____

020511

28 Nov 01

U14810 02

snowflake

Agenda (W) 11/20
0723
November 19, 2001 9:28 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press

006.7

You might want to talk to John Hughes, who wrote this article in the *Christian Science Monitor*. He clearly doesn't know all that you have been doing or all the background meetings we have been having.

It is not a very helpful article.

Thanks.

Attach.

1 1/1 4/0 1 *Christian Science Monitor*, John Hughes, "Pentagon and Press Can Both Do Their Jobs"

DHR:dh
111901-4

.....
Please respond by _____

19 Nov 01

U14713 02

Christian Science Monitor November 14, 2001

60. Pentagon And Press Can Both Do Their Jobs

By John Hughes

SALT LAKE CITY - When I was State Department spokesman in the Reagan administration, Bernie Kalb, then diplomatic correspondent for one of the three major television networks, came to me to confirm what could have been a major scoop for him.

He'd been tipped that an American seized in the Middle East, and being held by the Hizbullah, was actually a CIA agent. I told Bernie that I could only continue our discussion off the record. We fenced, and finally Bernie went back to his network and got its agreement that we could talk off the record.

Then I told Bernie that the American was in fact the CIA station chief in the country where he'd been captured, but we didn't know if his captors knew that yet. If Bernie's network went with that story, the CIA man would certainly be killed. Bernie and his network kept silent. Ultimately, the torturing him terribly, the Hizbullah did find out the CIA officer's identity, and they killed him. But he did not die because of any leak or indiscretion on the part of the press. Bernie and his network behaved honorably. Of course, it helped that Kalb and I had been friends for years, racketing around Southeast Asia as foreign correspondents together. It helped that I trusted him. I knew him as a patriot as well as a professional.

I tell this story to illustrate that over the years responsible journalists and news organizations have kept many secrets that, if published, might have put heroes at risk, or run counter to the national interest. For instance, when Iranian radicals seized the American Embassy in Iran, some Embassy officers who were outside the Embassy, sought refuge in the homes of friendly diplomats from other countries, and stayed safely there throughout

the long months of the embassy siege. A number of journalists knew that and never reported it.

As a lifelong journalist who spent a few years in government, I'm familiar with both sides of the press-versus-government tension that currently afflicts Washington. More specifically, it's a press-versus-Pentagon tension, as reporters bridle at their inability to get to the war front to find out for themselves what's going on, and at home a distrustful military clamps down on information that it says could endanger lives and security if published.

For now, public opinion seems to be favoring the Pentagon. But that could change, and in any major foreign adventure - and especially in time of war - better that government should engage the press as friend, not foe.

Though the press and military have jostled through history, the current distrust between them took root in the Vietnam War. Reporters in Vietnam were allowed widespread travel and access to combat, but found their first-hand observations often at odds with the optimistic views advanced by military briefers at the "Five O'clock Follies" in Saigon.

With the lessons of Vietnam in mind, the military in the Gulf War discouraged reporters from wandering under their own steam, but produced frequent briefings at headquarters by the charismatic commander, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who paid special attention to the press. In the Afghan campaign, the press has so far been denied access to troops and pilots involved, but has been briefed directly by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, who clearly is in command of wartime information but who has not satisfied the Pentagon Press Corps.

Not all military briefings need be mass ones, on camera. Small background briefings for trusted reporters, columnists and editorial writers, and TV anchors and editors, in which strategy is confidentially explained, can be mutually beneficial.

Clearly, the press cannot expect to trot alongside every clandestine special operations unit in Afghanistan. But after the Gulf War, formulas for coverage were worked out between news organizations and the military that included access to "all major military units." They should be implemented as time and place permit.

The mission of the military is to spearhead the war and ultimately achieve victory. The role of the press is to report the campaign and inform the public how the government is doing. Neither side will always agree with the way the other is doing its job. There are complications, because the war against terrorism requires new, nontraditional, and sometimes secretive measures.

But it is not heretical to suggest that journalistic professionalism and patriotism can coexist for the common good.

John Hughes, a former editor of the Monitor, served as assistant secretary of State for public affairs from 1982 to 1985.

USA Today November 14, 2001 pg. 17

61. Will Missiles Return To Sting?

By Alan J. Kuperman

Federal investigators are treating the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 as an accident, and it may well turn out to be just that. But the possibility of a terrorist act crossed every mind when the news broke Monday that an airliner had dived into a New York neighborhood. There was instant speculation that the airliner might have been the victim of a bomb - or, even more ominously, a surface-to-air missile.

Not likely this time, we are being assured. But the risk remains: No amount of heightened security within an airport will stop the launch of a man-portable surface-to-air missile from an off-site location. During takeoff and landings, lumbering civilian airliners are defenseless against such missiles,

which have fallen into troublemakers' hands around the globe.

Ironically, the roots of this missile proliferation lie in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan in the mid-1980s. At that time, the occupying Soviet army was using helicopters to batter the Afghan mujahedin rebels, our allies. After 2 years of heated debate, the United States in late 1986 provided the rebels one of our highest-technology weapons: the man-portable Stinger anti-aircraft missile.

At first, the Stinger had a decisive impact, shooting down dozens of Soviet and Afghan military aircraft in a few months. In short order, however, the Red Army adopted a series of technical and tactical countermeasures that effectively nullified the Stinger. The Soviets retrofitted aircraft with flares, infrared beacons and exhaust baffles to disorient the missiles, and their pilots operated at night or employed terrain-hugging tactics to prevent the rebels from getting a clear shot.

Within about a year, the Stinger became so ineffective that the rebels essentially stopped firing them. That's when the Central Intelligence Agency made a crucial error. Basking in the Stinger's early success, and apparently unaware that the rebels had stopped firing the missiles, the CIA provided the rebels hundreds more. With no immediate need for the missiles, the rebels either sold them at international arms markets or squirreled them away for future use.

Thanks to this CIA mistake, the missiles spread to rebel and terrorist groups around the world. In 1987, it was reported that an Iranian boat had fired a Stinger that hit a U.S. helicopter in the Persian Gulf but failed to explode. In 1991, Tunisian fundamentalists reportedly used a Stinger in a failed assassination attempt. In the early 1990s, Stingers shot down aircraft in civil wars in Bosnia (twice) and Tajikistan, according to reliable accounts. In addition, an anti-aircraft missile was used in 1994 to shoot down the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and

Agw D11/20
0725

November 19, 2001 11:30 AM

33520

TO: ~~Torie Clarke~~ Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Thank You Note

Let's get a thank you note off to Bigger and the African-American woman who co-chaired that **function** for women that I spoke to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111901-15

.....
Please respond by _____

Done

D. R. A.
11/27

111901

U14721 02



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 300

November 13, 2001

The Honorable Judy Biggert
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 205 15

Dear Madame Chair:

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I would like to thank you for your visit to the Pentagon with your colleagues **from** the Women's Issues Caucus.

We truly appreciate your interest and recognize that your cooperation is **an** important element of bipartisan support for the policies of the President and the Secretary of Defense. We especially welcome your interest in the restoration of the Pentagon and in promoting a better understanding of the brutality of the **Taliban** regime.

If you ever need any assistance with Department matters or wish to share your ideas and *views*, please do not hesitate to contact me or Mary Beth **Carozza**, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs (House) at (703) 697-2536.

Sincerely,

Powell A. Moore
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Legislative Affairs)

snowflake

① Action
11/20
1836

November 20, 2001 8:22 AM

340
ohc

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruitment

Please get me some facts on recruitment and let me know where we are.

Is recruitment up because of all of this or not? I keep hearing contradictory information about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112001-5

.....
Please respond by _____

1000001

U14725 02

D. Aron
11/28
1719

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Doug Feith
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 23, 2001
RE: Lists

000.5

We ought to think through what are the bad things that could happen, and what are the good things that could happen that we need to be ready for in both respects. Please give me a list of each.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112301.10

Respond by: _____

23 NOV 01

U14729 02

snowflake

Answer
01/20
1737

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 23, 2001
RE: **Foreign Visitors**

091112

See me about developing a system to force our bureaucracy to work so we can follow-up from these foreign visitors that I meet with and who I say I would like to help, and then we don't ever seem to do anything for them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
'112301.14

Respond by: _____

23 NOV 01

U14732 02

snowflake

426

*Agree
Duke
07/13*

November 26, 2001 8:06 AM-

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: David Kennerly

See Attached

35521

David Kennerly may want to go on our next trip to Europe.

Also, he would like you to give him a call. He says the **number** he has for you doesn't seem to work. Once again, I am your action officer!

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112601-3

.....
Please respond by _____

26 Nov 01

U14831 02

6 11600.
November 28, 2001 2:00 P.M.

TO: SECDEF
FROM: TORIE CLARKE
SUBJECT: David Kennerly

[Handwritten signature and date 11/27]

Have sent an **email** to Kennerly and re-confirmed all working phone numbers.
If he goes with us, he's got to be part of your delegation and not working media.
Thank you for being my action officer.

mct
112601-03

11-L-0559/OSD/637

November 26, 2001 8:08 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Town Hall

12/24
NOON CS

Dave

555 50

Please see me about the Fort Bragg visit. I didn't think the Town Hall thing worked.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112601-4

Please respond by _____

Response Attached

arrv Di Rita

12/21

10 NOV 91

U14830 02

TO: SECDEF
FROM: Torie
DATE: December 19, 2001
SUBJECT: Town Hall

After you got rolling at Fort Bragg, the town hall seemed to go pretty well. Plenty of room for improvement though. As we plan future town hall meetings, we'll do a better job of encouraging questions.

snowflake

Di Rita
11/27/01
Agree

November 26, 2001 1:29 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Languages

Please give me a piece of paper showing me the languages spoken in Afghanistan, by percentage.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112601-14

See attached
11/26

Please respond by

11/27

AFGHANISTAN

26 Nov 01

U 14829 02

November 26, 2001

MEMO TO SECDEF

From: Di Rita

Subj: Languages in Afghanistan

<u>Language</u>	<u>Percentage of Population Speaking</u>
• Afghan Persian (Dari)	50%
• Pashtu	35%
• Turkic languages (Uzbek/Turkmen)	11%
• 30 Minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashai)	4%

NOTE: Dari and Pashtu are both Indo-European languages that use the Arabic alphabet. Pashtu (sometimes spelled Pashto) was declared the official language of Afghanistan during the reign of Zahir Shah. Dari has been the traditional language of business and government, though.

Answer 11/27/01
06/26

snowflake

November 26, 2001 2:22 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Central Time

Please find out what time it was in Chicago when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

Thanks.

*See Response
attached
11/26*

DHR:dh
112601-17

.....
Please respond by _____

380

26 NOV 01

U14823 02

November 26, 2001

MEMO TO SECDEF

From: Di Rita

The Pearl Harbor attack occurred at 7:55 a.m. in Hawaii.

That would have made it 12:55 p.m. in Chicago, December 7.

11/27 3:00pm
November 26, 2001 5:46 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Doug Feith
Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

I want to see a first report on lessons learned from Afghanistan by December 20.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112601-24

.....
Please respond by December 20.

SECDEF:

1/29
30

RESPONSE ATTACHED

V/R
EP

AFGHANISTAN

26 Nov 01

U04682 /02

snowflake

D/1/20
1682

November 28, 2001 7:34 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

(Afk)
Larry Di Rita
4/30

SUBJECT: Reporters Killed

How many reporters have been killed so far in Afghanistan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112801-5

Please respond by _____

AFGHANISTAN

28 Nov 01

U14823 02

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Torie

DATE: November 29, 2001

SUBJECT: Reporters Killed

There have been eight reporters killed in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. They are:

Azizullah Haidari	Reuters (1 1/20)
Harry Burton	Reuters (1 1/20)
Julio Fuentes	El Mundo (Spanish Newspaper) (1 1/20)
Maria Grazia Cutuli	Corriere della Sera (Italian News) (1 1/20)
Joanne Sutton	Radio France Internationale (11 /12)
Pierre Billaud	Radio Television Luxembourg (11 /12)
Volker Handloik	free-lancer (1 1/12)
Ulf Stromberg	TV 4 (Sweden) (1 1/27)

AFGHANISTAN: Swedish journalist killed by armed robbers in Taloqan

[Read more about press freedom conditions in AFGHANISTAN](#)

[Email this article to a friend](#)

New York, November 27, 2001—The Committee to Protect Journalists is deeply saddened by the loss of our colleague **Stromberg**, a cameraman for the Swedish channel TV4. He was murdered early this morning during a robbery at the house in Taloqan where he and several other journalists were staying.

At around 2 a.m. Tuesday morning, armed gunmen broke into the house and entered the room where two journalists from the Swedish newspaper *Aftonbladet* were sleeping. The intruders demanded money, which they were given, and also stole equipment including cameras, computers, and a satellite phone, according to *Aftonbladet*.

The robbers threatened to kill the two journalists—Martin Adler, a photographer, and Bo Liden, a correspondent—but left the room after an Afghan translator intervened on their behalf, according to a Reuters report. The gunmen then proceeded to the room Stromberg was sharing with his TV4 colleague Rolf Porseryd, a correspondent. Porseryd told reporters that Stromberg went to the door and slammed it shut when he saw the gunmen, who fired several shots before fleeing.

Stromberg, 42, was apparently hit in the chest by a bullet fired through the door. Though colleagues rushed him to a local hospital, his wounds were fatal.

“Immediate threats to war reporters include being targeted by armed factions, getting caught in the cross fire, or stepping on a land mine,” said CPJ executive director Ann Cooper. “Unfortunately, the dangers posed by anarchy and lawlessness in Afghanistan are just as worrisome.”

Journalists flee Afghanistan

Scores of foreign journalists had been based in Taloqan, but Reuters reported today that most planned to evacuate. A spokesperson for TV4 told CPJ that Porseryd and two other colleagues based in Kabul left Afghanistan today and would accompany Stromberg’s body to Sweden. Adler and Liden of *Aftonbladet* also left the country today.

Stromberg is the eighth journalist killed in Afghanistan since the beginning of the U.S. military campaign there [\[more\]](#). This year, more journalists have been killed while reporting in Afghanistan than in any other country in the world.



Northern Afghanistan

AP Photos

		CPJ Briefings: <i>Press Freedom Reports from Around the World</i>		
COVERING THE NEW WAR				
INTRODUCTION	FRONTLINE REPORTING	CASES		
CPJ HOME PAGE	WASHINGTON VIEW	LINKS		

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Read first-hand accounts by journalists covering the war in Afghanistan.

- **November 20, 2001**—CPJ today confirmed that **four journalists** were killed in Afghanistan on November 19 when gunmen ambushed their convoy near the town of Sarobi, about 90 kilometers (60 miles) east of Kabul.

Azizullah Haidari, an Afghan-born photographer for the Reuters news agency; **Harry Burton**, an Australian television cameraman for Reuters; **Julio Fuentes**, a Spanish correspondent for the Madrid-based newspaper *El Mundo*; and **Maria Grazia Cutini**, an Italian journalist for the Milan-based newspaper *Corriere della Sera*, were dragged out of their cars by the gunmen and executed.

Colleagues identified the bodies of the journalists today in Jalalabad.

Altogether, seven journalists have **been killed** this year while covering the war in Afghanistan. Three foreign correspondents were killed on November 11 when the Northern Alliance convoy they were traveling with came under Taliban fire. [Click here for more details.]

- **November 20, 2001**—CPJ welcomed the recent release of Japanese free-lance reporter Daigen Yanagida by Taliban authorities. Separately, CPJ confirmed the release of four Pakistan-based guides who had been arrested along with the Western reporters they escorted into Afghanistan. [Click here for more details.]

- **November 16, 2001**—CPJ is deeply concerned about the U.S. bombing of the Kabul offices of Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based, Arabic-language satellite news channel.

Early Tuesday morning, U.S. aircraft dropped two 500-pound bombs on the building housing the station, according to a spokesperson at the U.S. Central Command in Tampa. No Al-Jazeera staff remained in the building at the time of the bombing, which destroyed the facilities.

U.S. Central Command spokesperson Col. Rick Thomas told reporters that the building was a “known al Qaeda facility in central Kabul.” However Mohammed Jassim al-Ali, Al-Jazeera’s managing editor, told The Associated Press that U.S. forces “know where we are located, and they know what we have in our office, and we also did not get any warning.” CPJ continues to investigate the circumstances behind the bombing.

- **November 12, 2001**—CPJ is deeply saddened by the deaths of three colleagues killed while reporting in northern Afghanistan.

Johanne Sutton, a reporter for **Radio France International**; Pierre Billaud, a reporter for **Radio Television Luxembourg**; and Volker Handloik, a free-lance reporter on assignment for the German news magazine *Stern*, were killed on the evening of November 11 when Taliban forces fired on their Northern Alliance military convoy.

Taliban forces opened fire on the convoy and hit the convoy's armored personnel carrier with a rocket-propelled grenade. Three journalists survived the attack: Paul McGeough, a reporter for the Australian newspaper *The Sydney Morning Herald*; Véronique Rebeyrotte, a reporter for France Culture radio; and Levon Sevunts, a reporter for the *Montreal Gazette*.

CPJ continues to investigate competing claims about how the journalists were killed. A Northern Alliance general told CNN that the bodies of Billaud and Handloik were found in a Taliban trench and suggested that the two had been "assassinated." However, McGeough told CNN he does not believe the journalists were targeted.

CPJ is also investigating reports that an Afghan translator traveling with the group is missing.

'INTRODUCTION

By Joel Simon

New York, October 16, 2001—The September 11 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., and the subsequent international response, have generated a media mobilization of unprecedented scale. Journalists covering this story face considerable risks as well as restrictions from governments around the world that have their own reasons to silence independent reporting.

CPJ will monitor these global developments and will focus its advocacy on ensuring that journalists covering the "war on terrorism" are able to work freely.

CPJ believes that journalists play a crucial role in reporting on conflict by providing the public and policy-makers with the information needed to understand events and make decisions. Journalists are especially critical because they are often the only civilians present on the field of battle.

Risks

At least one journalist was killed covering the World Trade Center attack. The body of free-lance photojournalist William Biggart was found in the rubble at ground zero on September 15. Biggart had rushed to the World Trade Center with his camera shortly after hearing about the attacks.

Most of New York City's television stations had broadcast facilities on the top floors of the World Trade Center's north tower. Several broadcast engineers are still missing. They include WCBS-TV engineers Isaias Rivera and Bob Pattison; WNBC-TV engineer William Steckrnan; WPIX-TV engineer Steve Jacobson; WABC-TV engineer Donald DiFranco; and WNET-TV engineer Rod Coppola.

With a military response now under way in Afghanistan, international journalists have massed in Pakistan, and the Central Asian republics that border Afghanistan. Most journalists entering Afghanistan do so with the help of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, traveling into rebel-held areas

by helicopter from Dushanbe.

In the weeks after the September 11 attack, only a handful of foreign correspondent were able to report from Taliban-held territory. On September 28, Taliban authorities arrested a British reporter who crossed the border from Pakistan hidden beneath the all-encompassing *burqa* gown. Yvonne Ridley of London's *Sunday Express* was held for 10 days in Jalalabad and Kabul and threatened with espionage charges. She was released on October 8. The following day, French reporter Michel Peyrard and two Pakistani guides were arrested when Peyrard also tried to enter the country under cover of a *burqa*. Taliban officials have accused the three men of espionage.

On October 13, the Taliban invited a group of international journalists to tour Koram, a village in eastern Afghanistan, that was reportedly damaged in US airstrikes. According to a report filed by CNN's Nic Robertson, the group of international reporters have been able to report from the city of Jalalabad under the supervision of government minders. Meanwhile, international reporters based in neighboring Pakistan have reported a number of incidents, including physical attacks by protesters and government restrictions that prevented them from reporting freely. CPJ continues to monitor reporting conditions in Afghanistan and neighboring countries.

In the United States, CPJ is closely monitoring several anthrax cases reported at media outlets. In Boca Raton, Florida, on Friday, October 5, The Sun photo editor Robert Stevens died of inhalation anthrax. On October 12, news services reported that an NBC Nightly News employee had contracted cutaneous anthrax, which is rarely fatal. She is expected to recover fully.

On October 15, ABC News president David Westin announced that a seven-month-old infant who had visited ABC's newsroom on September 28 had contracted cutaneous anthrax. The infant, who is the son of a producer for ABC News, is responding well to antibiotics.

Restrictions

At the same time, CPJ has noted with concern a number of incidents from around the world where officials suppressed critical coverage relating to the September 11 attacks. A free-lance cameraman working for The Associated Press in the West Bank City of Nablus was threatened, for example, after he filmed images of a group of Palestinians celebrating the September 11 attack.

In China, the media have been banned from expressing any opinion about the attacks. And in the United States, the State Department tried to censor a VOA broadcast that contained an interview with a Taliban official. Meanwhile U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell called on Qatar-i ruler Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani to use his influence to rein in satellite channel Al-Jazeera's news coverage, which the U.S. government apparently feels has been unbalanced and anti-American.

On October 10, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice phoned a group of U.S. television executives and asked them to use caution when airing pre-recorded messages from Osama bin Laden and his associates because of suspicion that the statements could contain instructions to terrorist cells. Rice did not explain the basis for the suspicion.

CPJ is also closely monitoring the U.S. Department of Defense as it develops guidelines for pool reporters (see below) who cover military operations.

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**WASHINGTON VIEW:
Pentagon sets guidelines for pool reporting
By Frank Smyth**

Washington, October 2, 2001—The U.S. Department of Defense has promised to provide journalists covering future military operations with the “best access possible” but warned that logistics could be difficult since military operations will be “all over the map.”

DOD officials said they have no plans to implement any form of censorship, but refused to rule out censorship as a possibility. When asked whether DOD would demand prior review of copy filed by pool reporters, a senior DOD official said, “I cannot guarantee that it won’t occur.”

In a September 28 meeting with bureau chiefs in Washington, D.C., Department of Defense (DOD) spokesperson Victoria Clarke explained the Pentagon’s guidelines for pool reporting. Media pools will be noncompetitive, and each member of any specific pool will be required to share information with colleagues from other media. Pool reporters will also be required to “remain with the pool escort officers or assigned units” until the pool is officially disbanded.

The transcript of the meeting has been posted on the Internet.

DOD officials told CPJ that they would seek to preserve the security of operations and the safety of troops by ensuring that personnel who speak with journalists do not divulge classified information. All DOD sources will request that journalists withhold any information that could conceivably jeopardize either the security or safety of U.S. personnel or operations.

The guidelines for pool reporters covering a particularly sensitive military operation could include the submission of copy prior to publication. The review would be used to ensure that reports do not include information that could potentially violate operational security.

DOD officials stressed that the greatest obstacle to providing access for the press will be logistical, since many of the military actions are expected to be carried out by clandestine Special Forces detachments. “The operations may last hours, three days, or a week,” said one official.

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CASES

Afghanistan

Afghanistan: CPJ concerned about Canadian journalist believed kidnapped (November 28, 2001)

Afghanistan: Swedish journalist killed by armed robbers in Taloqan (November 27, 2001)

Afghanistan: Taliban prisoners reportedly attack British journalist (November 26, 2001)
Afghanistan: ITN reporter wounded by shrapnel (November 26, 2001)
Afghanistan: Taliban expel foreign journalists (November 26, 2001)
Afghanistan: CPJ welcomes release of Japanese journalist (November 20, 2001)
Afghanistan: Four journalists killed (November 19, 2001)
Afghanistan: U.S. airstrike destroys Al-Jazeera office in Kabul (November 13, 2001)
Afghanistan: CPJ mourns three journalists killed on assignment (November 12, 2001)
Afghanistan: French journalist Peyrard released (November 5, 2001)
Afghanistan: Japanese journalist detained in Taliban territory (November 1, 2001)
Afghanistan: CPJ demands release of French journalist and Pakistani guides (October 16, 2001)
Afghanistan: Taliban charge three journalists with espionage (October 10, 2001)
Afghanistan: Taliban arrest French journalist and two Pakistani guides (October 9, 2001)
Afghanistan: British journalist freed (October 9, 2001)
Afghanistan: Detained British journalist faces trial in Afghanistan (October 4, 2001)
Afghanistan: CPJ disturbed by Taliban accusations against jailed journalist (October 3, 2001)
Afghanistan: CPJ demands release of British journalist and colleagues (October 1, 2001)

Benin

Benin: Journalists arrested, newspaper censored, over bin Laden article (October 3, 2001)

China

China: Government cracks down on coverage of America's newest conflict (October 2, 2001)

Indonesia

Indonesia: CPJ confirms attack on journalists covering anti-American protests (October 24, 2001)

Liberia

Liberia: Radio host arrested for airing anti-American commentary (September 20, 2001)

Palestinian National Authority

Palestinian National Authority: CPJ concerned about ongoing restrictions on journalists (October 4, 2001)

Palestinian National Authority: CPJ protests harassment of journalists covering West Bank celebrations of U.S. terrorist attacks (September 18, 2001)

Pakistan

Pakistan: Government bars Indian journalists (October 30, 2001)

Pakistan: Authorities release French reporter Aziz Zemouri (October 16, 2001)

Pakistan: CPJ urges Pakistani authorities to release French journalist Aziz Zemouri (October 13, 2001)

Pakistan: American journalists threatened by protesters (October 10, 2001)

United States

United States: CPJ concerned about threatening incidents (October 13, 2001)

United States: CPJ dismayed by U.S. pressure against Arab satellite news channel (October 4, 2001)

United States: State Department pressures VOA to kill Taliban interview (September 27, 2001)

United States: Photojournalist among World Trade Center dead (September 21, 2001)

LINKS

GENERAL

Library of Congress country studies. -Get in-depth historical, political, economic, and social information about countries in the region.

University of Texas Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. — Get regional, country, and city maps.

Yahoo! full coverage. — Get news from wires, papers, magazines, radio, tv, and other web sites.

Washington File. — Get all U.S. government statements relating to international affairs.

Institute for War and Peace Reporting

SOUTH ASIA

BBC — South Asia

AFGHANISTAN

PBS Newshour background on Afghanistan

News about Afghanistan from around the world

PAKISTAN

The Friday Times -Lahore, Pakistan, newspaper published by 1999 CPJ award-winners Jugnu Mohsin and Nazam Sethi.

Pakistan Daily

CENTRAL ASIA

News from Central Asia and the Caucasus

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Tajikistan

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Uzbekistan

The Times of Central Asia

MIDDLE EAST

Middle East international — London

Middle East Report — US

BBC- Middle East

Ahram Weekly — Egypt

Gulf Daily News

Haaretz — Israel

Iran Daily

Jerusalem Post — Israel

Jordan Times

Khaleej Times — United Arab Emirates

Lebanon's Daily Star

Oman Observer

Syria Times

Turkish Daily News

Yemen Times

ASIA

Asia Times Online

Asia Week

Far Eastern Economic Review

ARABIC LANGUAGE

Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel

Sahafa Online — List of Newspapers and other media

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12
080

snowflake

November 28, 2001 1:21 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Calendar Rescheduling

COMPLETE

*12/10
09:30*

15

I have a feeling that the things I want to do that we have to drop off the calendar don't get put back on. For example, I still need a dentist appointment.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112801-10

.....

Please respond by _____

660 SD

Done

*Larry Di Rita
12/10*

10:00 AM

U14805 02

snowflake

November 28, 2001 1:26 PM

D. Aron
11/29
0252

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dm*
SUBJECT: ICRC

Please be sure you give me the material on the comment Paul Grossrieder, the Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross, made and what I actually said.

I am told Paul Wolfowitz is meeting with him, and we need to get him straightened out.

080

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112801-1 1

.....*

Please respond by _____

U14806 02

28 Nov 01
10 11 28

snowflake

*In PD 11/29
0757*

November 28, 2001 1:38 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Overscheduled

We have to stop doing this to me. There is no way I can function if I have the calendar I have. I don't have a single second to do anything. I cannot make the phone calls I need to make, I cannot debrief after the previous meetings, etc.

I have had four meetings today, and all I have is a stack of about three inches of paper that I haven't dictated off of.

It isn't going to work.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112801-12

.....
Please respond by _____

020510

28 Nov 01

U14807 02

snowflake

(1) 11/28
0936/Agan

November 28, 2001 3:05 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ralston Brief

Please check with Dick Myers and see if he thinks we ought to get the Ralston brief to the Principals plus Treasury, FBI and Justice.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112801-16

Done

Please respond by _____

12/4

FWD

28 Nov 01

U14811 02

snowflake

November 29, 2001

11/30/01
10:20 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information Operations

091.412

Please take a look at this article, particularly the marked section, and see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Book Review, Christopher Willcox, "The Cultural Cold War"

DHR:db
112901-1

.....
Please respond by _____

29 Nov 01

U14822 02

THE CULTURAL COLD WAR

By Frances Stonor Saunders

(NEW PRESS, 608 PAGES, \$29.95)

By CHRISTOPHER WILLCOX

LET'S BEGIN by stipulating that there was, indeed, a Cold War. By definition, it was a battle, involving not only armaments but ideas, rhetoric and moral suasion. The stakes were high, especially in Western Europe, where communists were both plentiful and menacingly influential.

While all this may seem self-evident, it is not entirely clear that Frances Stonor Saunders, author of "The Cultural Cold War," is convinced. She professes to be shocked, shocked that the Central Intelligence Agency engaged in deceptive practices such as covert funding of foundations, conferences and magazines.

Again and again in this fascinating, if sometimes wrong-headed, account, Ms. Saunders notes that the Soviet Union and its allies were also deeply engaged in this battle. At one point, she acknowledges that the Soviet Union was spending more on cultural propaganda in France alone than the U.S. was spending in the entire world. She is silent on how Washington was supposed to deal with this juggernaut. But she fairly bristles with indignation at the CIA's shenanigans.

What this book reveals, perhaps unintentionally, is that the CIA was actually far more sophisticated than is generally believed about assessing the Soviet threat and countering it. Almost from the beginning, the agency chose a strategy that exploited the noncommunist left as the best bulwark against communism. Thus the people on the payroll and the invitation lists were not yahoos of the far right but marquee names from the liberal-left intelligentsia, people like the British poet Stephen Spender and the French political philosopher Raymond Aron. Some of these worthies, like the American writer Irving Kristol, eventually moved to the right. But others, like the American historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., remained Cold Warriors of a liberal cast.

In a more direct way, Ms. Saunders makes a real contribution to popular understanding of the postwar period by clarifying the role of organized labor in the anticommunist struggle. Irving Brown, the Paris-based operative of the American Federation of Labor, plays a starring role in her narrative, funneling money and other forms of support to noncommunist labor groups and creating all kinds of delightful difficulties for Marxist-influenced unions.

The centerpiece of the CIA's covert campaign was a front organization called the Congress for Cultural Freedom, headed from 1956 to 1967 by a CIA agent named Michael Josselson. (It appears from the text that the author had access to both Josselson's papers and to his widow because the story sometimes reads as if told from his point of view.) At its peak, the congress had offices in 35 countries, published 20 prestigious magazines, spon-

sored art exhibitions, put on high-profile conferences and rewarded musicians and artists with prizes and commissions.

Ms. Saunders tells this part of the story exceedingly well, and there are some wonderful vignettes, such as the effort by CIA-funded intellectuals to "out" fellow travelers at a 1949 Soviet-sponsored "Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace" at the Waldorf Astoria in New York. Downstairs, in the grand ballroom, are playwrights Lillian Hellman and Clifford Odets and hundreds of other luminaries. Upstairs, in a CIA-arranged suite, is a "counter-conference": "Telephone cords webbed across the room and at the end of the tangle callers were leaning animatedly into each receiver." As waiters hovered nearby, "some members of the party looked on nervously. . . . Who was going to pick up the tab? Sidney Hook, the philosopher from New York University, who had booked the suite, seemed unconcerned about the escalating cost."

In the suite with Hook were the writers Mary McCarthy and Elizabeth Hardwick, Hardwick's poet-husband Robert Lowell and David Dubinsky of the Ladies' Garment Workers Union. The CIA not only paid for the suite but saw to it that the "counter-conference" got press coverage.

Of all the enterprises covertly funded by the CIA, none was more influential than the British magazine Encounter. Edited at first by Mr. Kristol and Stephen Spender and later by Melvin Lasky and Spender, Encounter became the West's most important vehicle for highbrow anti-Marxist commentary. It also featured some of the best cultural and political thinking of its time. The first issue, which appeared in 1953, featured a meditation on death by Albert Camus, a memoir by Christopher Isherwood, a review of Andre Malraux's "Voices of Silence" and Leslie Fiedler's legendary polemic against the Soviet spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

By the time the true source of the magazine's funding came to be known in 1967, Encounter had published virtually every important, anti-Marxist literary voice in the Western world, from T.S. Eliot to Arthur Koestler and Ignazio Silone. And Mr. Lasky, in particular, had become the ultimate mandarin of Cold War literary salons. This book is pretty unfriendly to him, and it suffers as a result. Of all the people who deserve some credit for the defeat of Soviet communism in our time, Mr. Lasky ranks high on my list. Did he, and the CIA for that matter, break some rules in taking the war to the enemy? Undoubtedly so. Did they, unlike some of their critics, understand the true nature of the adversary? Absolutely.

The book trails off after the funding scandal breaks and we are left with a demoralizing epilogue on the subsequent fate of the participants. Stephen Spender, for example, wimps out completely, trying to convince anyone who will listen that he did not know about the CIA funding. Many

who knew Spender believe he had been "witting."

Ms. Saunders concludes with a diatribe against "unexamined nostalgia" for the golden days of American intelligence. I prefer the view of the British writer Malcolm Muggeridge, whom Ms. Saunders, to her credit, quotes: "If I accept, as millions of other Western Europeans do, that America is destined to be the mainstay of freedom in this twentieth century world, it does not follow that American institutions are perfect, that

Americans are invariably well-behaved, or that the American way of life is flawless. It only means that in one of the most terrible conflicts in human history, I have chosen my side, as all will have to choose, sooner or later."

Mr. Willcox, the former editor in chief of Reader's Digest, was program adviser for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty from 1984 to 1988.

The covert funding of foundations, conferences and magazines

snowflake



~~SECRET~~

Agg
11/30
1021

November 29, 2001 10:33 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*
SUBJECT: **Sitreps**

Afghanistan

These **sitreps** are pretty good. There are some things in here **we** ought to try to use in my opening statements.

Thanks.

Attach.
J2 Sitreps

DHR:dh
112901-3



Please respond by _____

U14821 02

29 Nov 01

~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

snowflake

FWF 11/30
11/29/01

November 29, 2001 10:50 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bureaucrats

I am unhappy with the career bureaucrats in OSD. I feel they are undermining our decisions and are taking too long to get things done.

Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112901-7

.....
Please respond by _____

310.1

29 Nov 01

U14801 02

snowflake

Handwritten initials and date: *Handwritten* 11/30/01

November 29, 2001 3:11 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Influence Campaign

Please come up with a proposal for me on how we should institutionalize the influence campaign.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112901-16

.....
Please respond by _____

091.412

29 Nov 01

U 14797 02

snowflake

D 11/30
1436

November 29, 2001 3:16 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Anecdotes

ds 12/4
1920

350.001 SD

Have you ever pulled together that anecdote material I gave you and given me back all of that speech material?

Thanks.

Complete

DHR:dh
112901-19

.....
Please respond by _____

SA Nov 01

U14793 02

December 4, 2001, 11:15 AM

TO: The Secretary of Defense

SECDEFHASSEEN

FROM: Marc Thiessen

DEC 04 2001

SUBJECT: Anecdotes

Here is the anecdote material. I have returned the original folders, as you gave them to me, and also a set of the reorganized files.

We have the papers organized as follows:

- **Anecdotes** (broken into categories and organized alphabetically)
- **Background information** (other helpful information, organized alphabetically by subject)
- **Other materials** (such as your old speeches and various reports and papers you have collected on defense and foreign policy subjects)

I have a set of these materials in my office as well, so that all the speechwriters can access them as they prepare remarks for you.

I have read through the anecdotes, and some of the speeches. But it might be a good project to have a researcher take the time to carefully read through all of your old speeches and the other materials here, to pull out more anecdotes, quotes, statistics, and ideas that could be useful for future remarks.

Attach.

Original SecDef speech/anecdote files
Set of reorganized SecDef speech/anecdote files

11-L-0559/OSD/665

snowflake

12/3 CA 1841

November 29, 2001 5:47 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld M
SUBJECT: CNN

006.7

Are you familiar with the CNN show this afternoon when three of our Pentagon press folks were being interviewed and beaten up on us?

What do you think about fashioning some opening remarks, where I praise what we have done with the press during this conflict and how we have educated people about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112901-24

.....
Please respond by _____

/

Sq Nov 01

U14790 02

1705
TO: SECDEF

FROM: Torie Clarke



SUBJECT: CNN Talkback Live Remarks

Attached is the transcript from the 1/29/01 **Talkback** Live segment in which Pentagon reporters made remarks regarding access to information and troops. We have highlighted comments by Bowman (Baltimore Sun), **Franken** (CNN), and Walter Cronkite.

Attachments
as stated

Welcome!



CNN.com / TRANSCRIPTS

SEARCH

- MAIN PAGE
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- CNN International
- askCNN

- EDITIONS
- CNN.com Asia
- CNN.com Europe
- set your edition

Languages

Time, Inc.



CNN TALKBACK LIVE

Do Journalists Belong on Front Lines?

Aired November 29, 2001 - 15:30 ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

JOIE CHEN, HOST: Do journalists belong on the front lines?

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENT: As you know, U.S. reporters or international reporters have not been able to get anywhere near U.S. forces.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

SEN. CARL LEVIN (D), MICHIGAN: They can't worry about having the press to protect.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

CHEN: Should reporters arm themselves for battle?

Also today: America's first combat casualty inside Afghanistan.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: He was a patriot, obviously. We need more of it if we are to win this battle against terrorism.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

CHEN: What really happened in Mazar-e Sharif?

Good afternoon, and welcome to **TALKBACK LIVE: AMERICA SPEAKS OUT**. We're ready to speak out today. The Pentagon and the media. In all, it's been a rocky relationship during wartime. Some say,

3-D Aircr
Who's On
Entertain
Shop our



though, that the war in Afghanistan has presented even more challenges than usual. We will get to that in the minute.

First, though, we want to check on what is happening on war front today. Somebody who is on the ground near Kabul, here's CNN's Ben Wedeman. Ben, if you could talk to us, there are some developments around Kandahar.

BEN WEDEMAN, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Yes, it appears the pressure is increasing on Kandahar, which is the last Taliban stronghold in the country. According to reports we are hearing, anti-Taliban Pashtun tribal elements -- militias, essentially -- are poised around that city.

However, the Northern Alliance is now -- is denying earlier claims that their forces had entered the city. But we do know the situation is very tense inside that town. According to one report, a -- one of the residents of the city was hung there, accused of being a U.S. spy. They kept the body hanging there as a message to the people of Kandahar. Joie.

CHEN: Ben, talk to us also about the developments and what has been learned at Mazar-e Sharif with regard particularly to the American, the CIA operative, Mike Spann.

WEDEMAN: Well, it appears he was killed during this uprising by the Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners who were taken following the fall of Konduz. Now the situation is very unclear in that they still, in fact -- there are still Taliban soldiers and al Qaeda elements inside that compound.

The latest report is in fact that two workers who had come to clear away bodies from there were shot by the Taliban or al Qaeda -- it is not clear -- elements within the -- within the compound itself.

U.S. forces, we know of course, were involved. Not only air forces but special forces as well. By and large, despite these reports of the shooting of workers clearing away the bodies there, it does appear that the situation is under control. Joie.

CHEN: Ben, you know that this hour we do want to talk about the media's relationship with the military and with the situation at large, about how you cover events in a war region like this. Can you talk about your own sense of safety, security, ability to get to the front lines and whether you have the access you feel you need?

WEDEMAN: Well, certainly, what I've been covering is from the Northern Alliance side. By and large the access is not too difficult to get to the front, which is actually part of the problem in some cases.

People have been killed when the Northern Alliance essentially invited them to hop on top of an armored personnel carrier and drive into battle into pitch darkness. That sort of access is not the sort of thing that you -- that you necessarily want to take advantage of.

It's not a safe environment up at the front lines. It's -- it's chaotic. There's no protection in terms of places to hide, necessarily. You have to wear your flak jacket, your helmet.

But the fighting can be very chaotic here, because neither side has trained soldiers. These are essentially just people from the village who have lived all their lives carrying automatic weapons and they don't necessarily fire them with the most precision.

Another danger, of course, is that God forbid in the event that somebody is hurt, there are no medical facilities. I have never seen a Northern Alliance medic, for instance. Their field hospitals, I'm told, are quite ghastly. Basically that is where they take people to die. They don't really have much in the way of -- of medicine. So if by chance you are hurt here, you are in big trouble. Joie?

CHEN: One can imagine, Ben. We want you to stand by here. We want to add a couple other voices to the conversation today.

At the Pentagon for us is our old friend, CNN correspondent Bob **Franken**. He's our national correspondent, now working at the Pentagon. Also in our Washington bureau today, retired Army General Edward Atkeson. And Rich **Noyes** is with us. He's the director of media analysis for the Media Research Center. We thank you all for being with us.

Bob, I want to start with you because this is where the question arises: The relationship between the media and the military. There is some feeling now that the media has not had much as much access as it is entitled to or needs to cover the story properly from the U.S. Defense Department.

BOB FRANKEN, CNN NATIONAL CORRESPONDENT: Well, it is a complicated question. First of all, what responsibility does the military -- the United States armed forces -- what responsibility do they have to do the independent job of the media? Should they be responsible to take us along?

The problem that I've have had when I have accompanied official Pentagon pools and the like is that they -- they impose such severe restrictions and oftentimes make it so difficult to file that you have to wonder if in fact we should operate as independently as possible.

What we are seeing is that those -- those news units that are operating independently are getting in fact remarkable coverage.

What we do not have access to -- however, that probably is the problem -- is the actual operation of the U.S. military. For instance, it is very limited, very, very strict control on the U.S. wartime setup in Afghanistan, and there's -- for a lot of good reasons -- pretty strong censorship.

The question is, should the independent media -- all of us -- take the time and the effort and the money, go on our own to try get as close as possible. It is a complicated problem. It's always a problem.

Finally, the last thing that is extremely difficult to deal with is the improved technology. Back in World War II, of course, there was no television. In the Vietnam war it was filmed but it was sent back somewhere and sometimes the reports were delayed for quite a while.

Now the battle is over whether there should be live coverage of the war, and that is quite a difference between the media and the military establishment that really doesn't want to lose control by allowing live coverage of the war.

CHEN: General, are the circumstances different this time? Circumstances that might require even more limitations than, say, during the Gulf War, when a lot of the media had a lot of trouble, a lot of disagreement with the Pentagon over access.

GEN. EDWARD ATKESON, U.S. ARMY (RET.): Enormous difference in this war. This isn't a conventional campaign of any sort. It's largely a bunch of tribes wandering -- very competitive tribes.

We've lost four reporters just traveling from Pakistan in toward Kabul. Just ambushed by we don't have the vaguest idea who they were.

The United States is not running these operations. They are not in command of the various different districts. We just have advisers and assistants with the local forces and we have really no command authority over them all. At all. So it is very difficult to say we ought to just turn these chaps loose.

CHEN: I want to ask Ann here to talk to Rich Noyes from the Media Research Center about your concerns about the media not having as much access.

ANN: Well, as somebody who remembers Vietnam and -- and Lyndon Johnson and so forth, I am really, really concerned that we know what is going on. I think that in a democracy the public's right to know is just as important as many other rights in our country.

CHEN: Rich, speak to that. Balancing the military's right and responsibility to do the job they're supposed to do.

RICH NOYES, MEDIA RESEARCH CENTER: Well, I think the military does have an obligation to provide access to journalists wherever and whenever it -- it feasibly can.

But one of the problems with this war, as the general just alluded, it's very -- been very unconventional. You cannot send a reporter along with a group of only six or eight or 10 special forces. And so far, you know, we really have not had ground access to the American military because the American military hasn't had much of a presence until just recently.

The access has all been through the Northern Alliance. And you've seen American reporters and other international reporters traveling with the Northern Alliance and getting the story from that vantage point. Now, there has been a small beach head established by the Marines in the southern part of Afghanistan.

There's a beginning of some journalists who are getting in there, and I think it will probably grow over time. But the war may also be over more quickly before there can be much of a greater journalistic presence. So I think, you know, from the vantage point that the war is going to continue on and we will know whether we are winning or losing, I think, rather quickly. There won't be the same situation you had in Vietnam where it dragged on for years and years and it was hard to figure out what really was happening on the ground.

CHEN: Hear you. We do want to continue this conversation but we do have to take a break here. As we go to it I just want to read Artie's comment to us by e-mail. "Reporters have a purpose: to report the events to a point. If they just go to make a name for themselves, well shame on them."

I also want to mention to you the **TALKBACK LIVE** on-line viewer vote. Not a scientific poll. But the view from the public on-line here saying, "Should journalists have unrestricted access to the front lines in Afghanistan?" No, the Pentagon has the right to limit access," by far. 78 percent of you say the Pentagon does have the right to limit access. Only 22 percent say they do not. We'll take a break, come back with more right after this.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

WALTER CRONKITE, FORMER CBS EVENING NEWS ANCHOR: The importance of their being there is that the American people have the right to know -- they have the duty to know what their boys and girls are doing in their name and it must be reported.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Hi. I'm Kimber Jackson (ph) from Boston University. It is a reporter's job to inform the public of what is going on in the world. There is a war and people are dying, and I want to know the whole truth about it.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

CHEN: The truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth. We did have to say good-bye to Ben Wedeman, our reporter at Kabul. He did have to go back to work. But joining us now is Tom Bowman, military affairs correspondent for the "Baltimore Sun."

Other panelists are staying with us as well. But Tom, since you're just joining us now, talk to -- talk to us a little bit about what it is reporters want now that they are not getting?

TOM BOWMAN, "BALTIMORE SUN:" Well, first of all, we want access to Army ground forces. We're going into eight weeks now, and our reporters have yet to be with Army forces either in Uzbekistan, where the 10th Mountain Division has more than a thousand forces. And again, some of those forces are now moving into northern Afghanistan to set up some security areas down there.

And secondly, there are special forces aboard the USS Kitty Hawk, a carrier in the Arabian Sea, and there is no access to them either. So I think all of us are heartened that we were able to go with the Marine Corps down in southern Afghanistan but we'd like greater access at

CHEN: We've got Bob out here in our audience, a vet himself. One with a little bit of concern about the media and its access.

BOB: Well, my concern is the front-line troops, these guys are a well-oiled machine, they are working hard, they've got a lot of things to do, a lot of things in mind, but aren't the other guys are getting in their way? They're busy. They don't have time to take care of and babysit a reporter.

Go Bob!

CHEN: Yeah, Tom, they are busy.

BOWMAN: Well, I would just like to point out that some of our best understanding of war real, particularly in the 20th century, has come from having reporters on the front lines.

We think of Guadalcanal Diary and the writings of Ernie Pyle, the photos that Robert Capa took at D-Day, and perhaps one of the most

famous photos ever taken in the 20th century, the flag raising at Iwo Jima. Those occurred because reporters were with the troops on the front line.

CHEN: And -- and did that help your understanding? I mean, is that the balance that you seek, Bob?

BOB: The flag raising happened after the battle. The battle was -- was just winding down.

BOWMAN: That is not true, sir.

BOB: I mean, it was not the front line of action at that moment.

CHEN: Tom?

~~... I'd like to point out that the
misconception is that the battle was over when the flag was raised.
The battle raged for several more days. Many more were killed
again, reporters have been reporting military conflict since the Civil
War. And again, it is important for us to be there.~~

CHEN: Bob Franken, you know, there's these lessons of history. Some of the folks in audience here have been talking quite a bit about Vietnam.

~~FRANKEN: Well, it's an interesting -- interesting argument about
Vietnam. Many in the military -- many in the military -- believe that
the reason the Vietnam war was lost because of reporting that was so
adversarial by the independent media in the United States that it
caused the loss in Vietnam.~~

~~The other side of that, of course, is were it not for the independent
media in the United States that that war that many continued
to fight would have continued without any truth, quote unquote,
getting to the American people.~~

~~That is really at the core of this, the argument for the press having as
much access is that the independent media is the only way that the
people need to in fact inform the people free of government restriction.
Because no matter how honorable the people in government are, they
have a point of view which they are going to present in an unbalanced
way unless there are independent media out there.~~

CHEN: And the public did not know about the bombing in Cambodia for like a year. So.

~~FRANKEN: On and on and on. The problem that I felt that I had when
I was in the Pentagon pool during the Iraq war was that the -- the
restrictions were so severe that I was not able sometimes to show just~~

how awful the war was. It was kind of a sanitized version of the war. And we deprived as a result our viewers of the, quote, total truth.

CHEN: And Maya has another concern about that relationship, actually between the media and the military getting too close.

MAYA: Well, the concern is that if the -- the journalists actually arm themselves, then the question becomes: can they be as objective as they need to be in their reporting?

So I mean, I totally agree with you in terms of making sure that we have a free and open democracy in terms of making there's journalism on the front lines. But they can remain objective if they indeed start to arm themselves and do other things in order to protect themselves?

CHEN: Or even if they are just with...

~~FRANKEN: Well, there are two cases. One is you arm yourselves.~~

~~Number one, is that you then are considered a combatant. And actually, number two is that you are considered a combatant. You carry ID -- usually -- which says this is an unarmed person. He is a combatant. He is here to do a specific thing. Arming yourself takes away that ID and actually, I believe what happens is you then become a target for more people who might not have targeted you if they thought you were unarmed.~~

CHEN: Right. And some folks might not read that ID until they've killed you and come up to your body. In any case.

~~FRANKEN: That could be, yes.~~

CHEN: General, talk to us a little bit about these concerns, perhaps, of the media and military becoming close in a way that blurs the objectivity?

ATKESON: Well, I think there is an aspect that we have not addressed here at all and that is the morale of the troops. Soldiers like to be reported on. They like to have something in their -- in their home paper that will tell what they are doing. They like to know that the American people are interested in what they're doing.

So the commander has to take that into consideration as he balances the risks he takes by allowing information to get out through unauthorized channels that may compromise his operations.

CHEN: Yeah, and before we take a break...

~~DOWNMAN: That's a good point. He makes such a good point. CHEN:~~

Before we take a break here, I do want to read an e-mail from James in San Francisco. "More journalists than U.S. troops have been killed in Afghanistan. However, we aren't calling them heroes. Without reporters on the front lines we'll never know what's going on over there." That from James.

Audience, we are going to ask you to take a break. Panelists, you as well. We will back and talk more after this.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

CHEN: Welcome back. We have just a few moments here on **TALKBACK LIVE**. Before we leave you this hour I want to stop with Linda from Nebraska who's here in our audience. Linda, can the media be trusted if the military lets them go along or gives them more information?

LINDA: I think they could. I really do. Because yes, they are out there to let the people know but I think that they can be trusted. Maybe I am just too much of a trusting person.

CHEN: Rich, got any concerns about that?

NOYES: Well, the Pugh Research Center just did a poll and they found that about 40 percent agrees with Linda, that they would like the media to figure out how they can cover this war. But 50 percent -- more than that -- wanted to let the Pentagon have more control over how journalists were able to access this war. So the public is really not giving any pressure to the Pentagon to open this war up any further.

CHEN: Tom, last word from you. Should there be more trust? More in that relationship?

BOWMAN: Well, I think, again, we should have access to the front-line forces. And some Army officers I talked to are frustrated, as are some journalists.

They don't want reporters with their troops. And one Army officer today mentioned to me -- a little bit tongue in cheek -- he said the reason we have journalists and Marines on the ground is because the Army special forces made it safe for them to be there.

CHEN: Unfortunately, we are going to have to leave the conversation there. Quickly ran out of time this afternoon with so many good guests. Thank you all for being with us today. And to you in our studio audience and at home as well.

Please join us tomorrow afternoon at 3:00 eastern when **TALKBACK LIVE: AMERICA SPEAKS OUT** will speak out again.

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November 30, 2001 8:10 AM

ACTION
12/4
1805

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Long-Term Policies

DA

092

Who would be a good person from the Pentagon we could afford to engage in an extracurricular project to look at long-term U.S. policy with respect to Muslims?

Who would be the best person to look at long-term policy in South Asia?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
113001-3

.....
Please respond by _____

30 Nov 01

U14788 02

snowflake

December 1, 2001 9:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
 cc: Ray Du Bois
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld₃ A
 SUBJECT: Outplacement Service

COMPLETE

12/27
16/15

ds

250.02

When I was at Searle and General Instrument, I used an outplacement service anytime I had to reduce people.

Why don't we do that with respect to BRACs—if people have to be laid off. why don't we use an outplacement service? It is humane, rational, helpful and not terribly expensive.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120101-7

.....
Please respond by _____

12/27

Response Attached.
Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

1 Dec 01

U14785 02

December 3, 2001 8:31 AM

4470
12/3
1614

381

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: WMD

Attached is a memo Cap Weinberger sent me that is worth reading.

Thanks.

Attach.
1 O/1 7/0 1 Weinberger ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
120301-1 1

.....
Please respond by _____

3 Dec 01

U14763 02

2001 OCT 19 AM 8:47

Forbes

P & ONE: 202.835.8394

FAX: 202.789.1199

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 03 2001

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
CHAIRMAN

October 17, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE
HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD, AND
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE
HONORABLE PAUL WOLFOWITZ

SUBJECT: Briefing of October 12, 2001

At the end of the very helpful briefing/meeting you held on October 12th, you asked us to consider, "What should we have done 2 to 3 years ago to make it less likely that we would be subject to weapons of mass destruction?"

In specific answer, there are some short term things we could have done, or actually are doing that will help.

But I think the more important paths we could follow--or should follow--have their roots in history, with a longer range than 2 to 3 years ago.

First, short term:

- (A) We have now fully embarked on the acquisition and deployment of missile defenses, thanks to the Rumsfeld Commission report. . This means an effective missile defense (not "limited") and to deploy that, we of course need to abandon the ABM Treaty consistent with Article 15 of that Treaty.
- (B) As part of general homeland defense, we should involve as many people as possible, by the use of large-scale education programs in chemical warfare, use of gas masks and foreign hostile capabilities. We should strengthen our border controls against hostile persons and substances. So a major public information campaign on all aspects of what used to be called "civil defense" needs to be launched. The events on September 11th should make it more possible to train and equip more people so they can understand, and deal with, all forms of hostile border incursions.

Second, long term – long range programs and policies based on lessons learned from our history:

- (A) After World War I we disarmed; disbelieved any possibility of a renewed threat from Germany, because the Versailles Treaty "prevented" Germany from rearming, and we paid the penalty when a re-armed Germany attacked Poland and

I-01/012829

U17573 / 01

France. We did not put an army of occupation in Germany largely because we wanted to end all talk of war. We had ignored all the warnings and all the German promise breaking, taking refuge in the academic argument that the Versailles Treaty was too harsh anyway.

- (B) Japan had been making threatening noises and actions since they captured Manchuria. Again we paid little attention. Japan saw how easily Germany regained her power, by breaking promises with no cost, and indeed with appeasement to face.

Only Churchill and a very few others saw the dangers and so it took the most devastating war in history to demonstrate again that there are some governments that it is folly to trust.

- (C) After World War II, we did better. We demanded and received unconditional surrender in Europe and in Asia (against the opposition of many here who thought such demands would only "prolong the war").

We rooted out the governments and leaders responsible for it all in Germany, Italy, and Japan (even though for sound strategic reasons we **left** the Emperor in place).

We tried many as war criminals; we put in armies of occupation and gave generous but thoroughly audited and supervised funds for reconstruction **and** economic aid.

Those three defeated governments shortly became and remain our closest friends and supporters, through NATO and bilaterally, for more than 60 years.

We did not leave the old guilty governments in power. We did not accept or rely on their worthless promises.

- (D) We did neglect our military badly but we retained our recognition that sometimes you do have to fight for peace. We did it in Korea and later to protect a small Arab country, Kuwait, from being stolen by Iraq.

As in Korea, we were greatly aided by a skillfully constructed coalition, **and** won a **stunning** military victory.

But again we forgot the lessons of history. We accepted the worthless promises of Saddam Hussein and **left** him in power. As history told us he would, he broke most of his promises and began to rebuild his shattered military.

We never considered deposing him and putting in an army of occupation (Arab, not Western), and he is, and will be as long as he lives, a constant threat to a **real** peace in the Middle East.

In Grenada, on an infinitely smaller scale we did it right: We won a complete military victory. We kept an occupation force there during the short time it took to sweep away the **left** wing anarchists who had caused all the trouble. We stayed only long enough to ensure the people could choose a new government with whom they and their neighbors could live in peace.'

Conclusion:

The touchstone and the key of these lessons is that there is much evil in the world; ignoring it and hoping that promise of war criminals and terrorists will be kept, will only lead to long and more vicious wars.

Our failure to learn these lessons of history could lead us to the belief, induced by our natural desire to "get it over with", to thus forget what we must do now to keep a peace won by our troops and our people.

So I hope we will not be dissuaded by arguments that the coalitions we have put together will not hold if we use the lessons of our past and be willing to follow what will be a long hard military victory with the equally **difficult** task we must follow to complete our victory, by eliminating, not trying to deal with, those who caused it all.

I must say I am horrified by today's suggestion that we might include "moderate elements of the Taliban movement in a new, broad-based, government in Afghanistan." I remember all too clearly when once the attempt was made to beguile us into thinking there were "moderate elements" in Iran.

Incidentally if we need yet another example we can go all the way back to the **Napoleonic Wars**. After a European coalition defeated Napoleon in the field, Europe trusted his promises that he would stay in exile on Elbe. When he broke that promise and the coalition had to defeat him again at Waterloo, the coalition led by Great Britain locked him up firmly and effectively on St. Helena where he died. The subsequent peace lasted nearly 3 00 years!

Sap

DeTTON
05 12/4
1620

December 3, 2001 10:40 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DN
SUBJECT: Next Case

I have a feeling we are going to have to make our case on anything we do after Afghanistan.

You have to get a team together and decide what we ought to say and shouldn't say for each of the items in our "Way Ahead."

Please do that and get back to me soon.


Thanks.

DHR:dh
120301-26

.....
Please respond by _____

AF (1/14/01)
1/1
3 1/10 01

U14760 02



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~KEYWORD~~

*Review
12/4
1955*

December 3, 2001 12:00 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Foreign Assistance

092

Here is a compilation of how countries are helping. We ought to make sure we use these in our talking points when we meet people from those countries-not just me, but everyone in the Department of Defense.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated Chart: Assessing Relative Progress of Nations in War on Terrorism

DHR:dh
120301-29

.....
Please respond by _____

3 Dec 01

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~KEYWORD~~

U15067 02

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

snowflake

December 3, 2001 12:11 PM

Action
12/4
1753

TO: Steve Cambone
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Planning

020 00A

You and the Deputy have the responsibility of getting back to me and telling me how we are going to make the Department of Defense capable of doing its planning, which it obviously is not capable of doing at the present time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120301-30

Please respond by _____

3 Nov 01

U14759 02

snowflake

December 3, 2001 5:48 PM

Action
03 12/4
18/15

Action
Completed
1/17
15/15

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: What Is Left

Please tell Denny Watson and Gen. Franks I would like to **have** a review of what we think is **left** by way of **SAMs** and **MANPADs**. It **looks** to me like an awful lot are being used up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120301-48

.....
Please respond by _____

471
SW
.94

3 Dec 01

U14755 02

December 4, 2001 9:46 AM

Renow
to 12/4
1905

020155

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Absent

On Tuesday, December 04,200 1, it appears that the five top policy people in the building are gone. I don't think we should manage our affairs that way. Someone has to be here.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120401-1

.....
Please respond by _____

4 Dec 01

U14753 02

NO
12/7
12/31

December 4, 2001 10:00 AM

Compton
CentCOM

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA
SUBJECT: Gen. Franks Phone Call

When you were out of town, Pete Verga ended up on my phone call with Tommy Franks. I don't like that. I did not authorize you to put a substitute on that call.

These phone calls are personal, they are getting way too many people on them and I am going to cut them down.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120401-2

Please respond by _____

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 06 2001

12/5/01

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

12/6

→ SD

This resulted from a misguided initiative on the part of my staff. Won't happen again.

Doug Feith

4 Dec 01

SECDEF-
COL BUCCI ALLOWED
VERGA TO SUBSTITUTE ON THE
CALL WITHOUT ASKING. IT
WON'T HAPPEN AGAIN.
I'LL TAKE THE
HIT SIR.

v/r

EP

U14746 02

U14746 0 2

snowflake

7:20 AM

INFO
12/5
1827

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December 4, 2001
SUBJECT: **Ruth Wedgewood**

00001

If Ruth Wedgewood is the woman you wanted to include, please include her. I just read her piece in *The Wall Street Journal*. She's a star!

Thank you.

DHR/azn
120401.04

Please respond by: _____

7/11/01

U14752 02

0955

snowflake

7:23 AM 12/7/01 1820

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: December 4, 2001
SUBJECT: *Insight Magazine*

Handwritten arrow pointing to 'Torie Clarke' and initials 'DR'.

Completed
Larry D. Ritt
12-7

381

Please get me the *Insight Magazine* article by Michael Waller. I don't know what the date is, but the article is entitled "Defense First."

Thank you.

Have you go.
T.C.

DHR/azn
120401.05


Please respond by: _____

4 Dec 0

U14751 02

Insight

ON THE NEWS



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Issue Date: December 24, 2001

Defense First

Posted Nov. 30, 2001
By J. Michael Waller

President George W. Bush is on the brink of a stunning new accomplishment in defense of the nation. Bit by bit, senior administration figures tell Insight, he is dismantling what they say he regards as a failed and discredited system of treaties,

Cover Story



ERIC DRAPER/PHOTOS

The National Security Council meets with President Bush at the White House.

arms-control processes and official cover-ups that have hog-tied the United States for decades while allowing adversaries and rogue regimes to develop, proliferate and deploy weapons of mass destruction. Presidential insiders say Bush believes a decade of morally corrupt winks and nods at proliferators and state sponsors of terrorism helped make possible the carnage of Sept. 11.

Never again, Bush says. No more slaps on the wrist. No more looking the other way. No more haggling over endless negotiations or cramming for artificial deadlines, knowing all the while that the bad guys will lie and cheat and that the State Department will help conceal their embarrassment.

Even before Sept. 11, members of Bush's national-security team blamed the antique arms-control process for preventing the United States from defending itself against emerging missile threats, while rewarding Russia and China as they sold biological-, chemical- and nuclear-weapons technology -and the missiles to deliver them — to terrorist regimes.

Incredibly, Bush's lieutenants are finding what one source calls "rank insubordination" within the State Department and elsewhere. Insight has learned that some U.S. officials opposed to the new



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town

Action
05 12/15
174E

December 4, 2001 5:36 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Painting/Photo

DR

↑ 1/15

060

A thought might be to put a world-class photo of the Pentagon in my office where George Marshall is. I don't know if we have one. It might even be one that shows where the airplane went in. It would have to be big-even a painting of the Pentagon might be the answer.

Please think about it. There has to be a really spectacular photograph we could get enlarged and put up there, or think about putting there.

Before anyone goes crazy and spends a lot of money and does it, I would like to see what someone is thinking about. I don't want anyone to just pop off and do something.

W

|||

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120401-7



Please respond by _____

1/17

SecDef-

I'm gathering some photo catalogs from various sources to get some ideas. Will bring to you soon. A. P. L. 1/27

40001

U14748 02

1330

snowflake

December 5, 2001 7:08 AM

Person 45
12/5/01
1822

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Congressional Follow-Up

Complete 2/5/01
1822

015

At the meeting I had with Members of Congress, there was an African American woman who was very supportive and wanted to talk with one of our lawyers about the tribunal issue.

I want to know that that has been done. Please find out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120501-2

.....
Please respond by

12/5

~~SECRET~~

Jim Haynes spoke with her today. He is speaking with other members ~~on~~ who have raised questions, too, to solicit their thoughts.

SECRET

U14899 02

DiRita

snowflake

SECDEF -7 12 10 37

December 5, 2001 7:14 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Concert Offer

Please have someone look at this letter from Robert Rosenthal and take care of it.
It looks like a good idea to me, but I don't know enough about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/03/01 Rosenthal letter to **SecDef**

DHR:dh
120501-5

.....

Please respond by _____

*CRD -
Task to PA
for response.*

Di Rita
Larry Di Rita
12/6

U19168-1/01

ROBERT and NINA ROSENTHAL FOUNDATION, INC.

2040 Avenue of the Stars – Fourth Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067-4703

rosenthalx@aol.com

Telephone: 310-286-7691

FAX: 310-286-0121

December 3, 2001

SECDEF HAS SEEN
DEC 05 2001

THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD

Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I am on the Board of the Western Music Association. The WMA includes among its members Riders in the Sky, Sons of the San Joaquin, Don Edwards, Joni Harms, Hot Club of Cowtown and many others who have appeared on local and national television.

The WMA would like to offer to the United States war effort a series of shows at military bases. These concerts would be aimed not just at our soldiers, but would be directed at the full military family including wives and children. It is our belief that the families of our fighting men should always be included as they too participate in the totality of the defense of the United States.

The WMA is thinking along the lines of holding concerts at bases such as Fort Bliss (1st Cavalry Division), Fort Bragg (82nd Airborne Division), Fort Campbell (10 1st Airborne Division), Norfolk Naval Station (US Atlantic Fleet), Camp Pendleton (1st Marine Division) and Eglin Air Force Base.

We would supply a country headliner and two or three additional acts from the members of the Western Music Association. I have been told that Charlie Pride and Dwight Yokum have already expressed interest in headlining two of the concerts. I can also say that Sam Elliott and Katharine Ross would be thrilled to MC a couple of the concerts. Sam Elliott is starring with Mel Gibson in a big military movie entitled "We Were Soldiers Once and Young" scheduled for a Spring release.

Our concerts will not be playing hard rock, heavy metal or rap that insults women and bashes police. Just family oriented music which, I promise you, will not be boring. It will be up beat and patriotic, just like our members who are most enthusiastic about this potential tour.

These concerts will not cost the government any funds. The WMA will obtain a limited number of sponsors and my Foundation will guarantee any overages.

I have kept this letter to a bare minimum. If the ideas expressed above pique your interest I

U19168 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/696

THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD

Secretary of Defense

December 3, 2001 — Page No. 2

will be most happy to discuss it either by telephone or in person with any of your staff who you would ask to contact me.

My thanks for any consideration your office can give to this offer.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert M. Rosenthal". The signature is stylized with a large initial "R" and a long horizontal stroke.

ROBERT M. ROSENTHAL

snowflake

December 5, 2001 7:45 AM

12/12
07:45

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Attention

Dave

373.24

It is interesting that we had a successful ballistic missile test on Monday night, but at the Tuesday press briefing the subject never came up. I wonder if it would have come up if it had been a failure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120501-13

.....
Please respond by _____

Response attached

Larry Di Rita

12/12

5 Dec 01

U14999 02

TO: SECDEF

FROM: oTone

DATE: December 11, 2001

SUBJECT: Press Attention

Interesting, yes, but I am not concerned about the lack of interest in the success of the missile defense test.

As I've said all along, I think missile defense's appropriate "position" is as one piece of a broader deterrent strategy.

snowflake

December 5, 2001 12:53 PM

SP
12/12
2001

Afghanistan

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Women in Afghan Government

2 1 Deputy Premier
1 House Minister

Closed
12/12
2001

I told somebody to get us the information on how many women are going into the Afghan government. I want to mention that sometime this week in a press briefing.

It is clearly a Bush administration accomplishment, the pressure that was put on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120501-26

Please respond by _____

5 Dec 01

U15068 02

December 11, 2001

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Tofie Clarke

SUBJECT: Women in Afghan Government

According to the people in the CIC, 2 women are a part of the new 30 member interim government in Afghanistan. One serves as a Deputy Premier in charge of Women and Children's issues. The other serves as a House Minister in charge of Health Affairs.

The interim government will be in place for 6 months until a traditional tribal council can convene. The new leader is **Hamid** Karzai.

11-L-0559/OSD/701

snowflake

December 5, 2001 7:19 AM

Actual
B/B
1752

TO: Torie Clarke
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Hospital Visits

I probably ought to go to a hospital sometime and visit some who were wounded in the Pentagon.

Larry, you ought to think about me going to hospitals if and when those wounded in Afghanistan come back and are at Walter Reed or Bethesda.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120501-g



Please respond by _____

704

5 Dec 01

U14744 02

snowflake

December 10, 2001 7:38 AM

12/24
12/10 ds

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reporting on Burial in Arlington

Don

687

MSNBC reporting on Burlingame was just **disgraceful**. They said we would not let him be buried in Arlington, which is flat untrue. We told them he could be buried there.

It is **disgracefully** bad. Brian Williams ought to be ashamed of himself.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121001-3

.....
Please respond by _____

Response attached

Larry Di Rita

12/12

10 Dec 01

U15085 02

TO: SECDEF

FROM: *Torie*

DATE: December 11, 2001

SUBJECT: Reporting on Burial at Arlington

Talked to a producer at MSNBC and expressed our views. She seemed to take it seriously.

snowflake

December 10, 2001 7:48 AM

Action
12/10/01
1755

Afghanistan

TO: Torie Clarke
CC: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Warfare

Oliver North has an interesting article here about all the record breakers in this conflict. It seems to me we ought to get an authoritative piece done on this. I suppose the Joint Staff and Policy ought to work on it.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/09/01 *Washington Times* op-ed, Oliver North, "Rollout for New Ways of Warfare"

DHR:dh
121001-5

.....*

Please respond by _____

10 Dec 01

U1508/4 02

The Washington Times

www.washtimes.com

Rollout for new ways of warfare

Oliver North

Published 2/9/2001

First in a series

ABOARD THE USS BATAAN, LHD-5.

America's generals and admirals are often accused of preparing for the next war by refighting the last one. Whatever the validity of that charge in

the past, it certainly isn't the case in Operation Enduring Freedom. This campaign against Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terror network and the Taliban despots in Afghanistan is being made up "on the fly" by soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who are rewriting military textbooks with one hand while they fight this new kind of war with the other.

After a week of firsthand observation for FOX News, I see similarities to all other wars: massive numbers of ships, planes, men, materiel and munitions; days and nights of backbreaking, **sweat-**drenched work being done by young Americans, thousands of miles from family and friends; countless hours of mind-numbing boredom punctuated by brief moments of stark terror; and loved ones at home, hoping and praying that a father, son, or brother — a mother, daughter, or sister — return safely and soon. But beyond these common connections to wars past, there is much more that is unique about Operation Enduring Freedom than anything our military has ever done before.

Right from the sneak attack on September 11, this war has been one for the record books. Most U.S. civilians killed in any war: 3,308. Greatest number of aircraft hijacked in a single day: four. Shortest time to build an international alliance to tight back: 26 days. Most journalists killed in a single week of war: eight.

Since Oct. 7, when our counterattack began, records have continued to be set. The longest duration combat sorties in history: 44 straight hours (more than 14,000 miles by the B-2 bombers based at Whitman Air Force Base in Missouri). Longest Close-Air-Support mission in aviation annals: 11 hours (by the U.S. Air Force 332nd Air Expeditionary Group). Highest number of Close Air Support sorties flown in a single day in direct support of non-U.S. forces on the ground: 71 (by Navy, Marine and Air Force F/A-1 **8's**, **F-14's**, F-15's, F-16's, and AV-8 Harriers). Deepest amphibious air assault ever conducted: 441 miles (by the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit). Longest resupply route to support a unit in hostile territory: 950 miles — round-trip (for the Marines at Forward Operating Base "Rhino" near Kandahar). Number of countries helping to win a war that do not want to be identified as "U.S. allies": seven.

That last entry in the record books is one reason why this war is so very challenging for those who are fighting it. U.S. commanders on-scene with whom I met last week know that the heads of state in the region don't dare risk being seen as too close to the U.S.-led war effort for fear that we will again abandon the theater once Osama bin Laden has been run to ground. And because Afghanistan is a landlocked country, surrounded by nations where we have no U.S. military bases from which to launch offensive operations, it has made the fight to finish al Qaeda and the Taliban an extremely complex, long-distance effort.

Over the course of four days last week, I was afforded a unique opportunity to see, firsthand, just

how sensitive and difficult this entire operation is. A brief chronology of my trip reflects the extraordinary challenges in this campaign — and how steadfast and creative young Americans are overcoming them in order to win the first war of the 21st century.

The trip began at 5th Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain where Vice Admiral Charles Moore, Jr. and his staff provide the Naval Component — the ships, sailors and Marines — to the U.S. Central Command for this new kind of warfare. From there it was a four-hour flight aboard a twin-engine Navy C-2 packed with replacement personnel and critically needed equipment to the flight deck of the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) in the Arabian Sea. While there, “The Big Stick” launched dozens of F-14 Tomcats and F-18 Hornets for six- and seven-hour strike missions against targets in Afghanistan.

After linking up with two Navy doctors who were headed for “Rhino,” the Marine forward operating base some 450 miles inland, we boarded a 30-year-old CH-46 “Sea Knight” helicopter for the 60-mile trip to the USS Bataan (LHD-5), one of our newest amphibious assault ships. In the brief time we were aboard, the 844-foot warship took on food, fuel, bombs, ammunition and spare parts from the USS Detroit, launched and recovered AV-8 Harriers for strikes against targets in Afghanistan and coordinated another highly sensitive operation in support of the Marines in Afghanistan.

As darkness began to close in over the Arabian Sea, the Bataan launched its two high-speed Air Cushion Landing Craft (LCACs) for the 45-knot, 30-minute trip to the venerable USS Shreveport (LPD-12). There we loaded tons of weapons, ammunition, water and equipment for the Marines ashore. Once it was totally dark, our “pilot” — a Navy chief — donned his night-vision goggles and we headed inland from over the horizon, “flying” at almost 50 knots without lights across the surface of the water.

When we arrived at “Red Beach,” Navy and Marine Shore Party personnel leaped to the task of unloading all the supplies, personnel and equipment, reloaded it all aboard a well-protected convoy and trucked everything to a small, but well-guarded airfield less than 10 miles inland. Just moments after it all arrived, in a remarkable demonstration of interservice coordination, a U.S. Air Force C-130 landed, hastily loaded the contents of the trucks into its cargo bay and took off for the Marine base near Kandahar.

By dawn, there was no sign that tons of munitions and cargo and scores of U.S. military personnel had staged across “Red Beach.” No U.S. ships were visible offshore. And at a dirt airstrip in Afghanistan, the Marines were unloading another planeload of vitally needed supplies and personnel. Less than 48 hours after they arrived, the doctors I first met aboard the USS Bataan were treating more than 20 casualties inflicted by an errant U.S. bomb.

Next: Why this war is the way we will fight in the future.

Oliver North is a nationally syndicated columnist and the founder and honorary chairman of Freedom Alliance.

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Return to the article

snowflake

December 10, 2001 11:57 AM - \$

ACTION
12/10/01
1940

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Lunch/Tour at Pentagon

557

Would you please have someone work with Joyce to arrange a Cabinet spouse tour of the Pentagon and lunch with me in January. She thinks there wouldn't be enough Cabinet wives to make it worthwhile, but we could include some of the White House staff spouses as well.

Please have someone talk with her, she can pick a date in January, and then they can work up a program with her. We'll have a tour, then the lunch in my dining room.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121001-17

.....
Please respond by _____

10 Dec 01

U15088 02

12/10
1860 snowflake

December 10, 2001 1:05 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Past Confirmation Hearings

Please have someone see if the word "Vietnam" was mentioned in Secretary McNamara's confirmation hearings, and if "Afghanistan" was mentioned in my hearings.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121001-21



Please respond by _____

12/15

*Copy to DM
done 12/11*

Col Sam the PA

*Please have
someone check the
records. Thanks.*

Larry Di Rita
Larry Di Rita

020 SD

10 Dec 01

snowflake

Action
12/10
1910

December 10, 2001 1:09 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Larry Di Rita
Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Journal on War

Today the President said Karen Hughes is working on and has a draft of what has happened during the war so far, minute-by-minute, and that we should all take a look at it so we are all on the same wavelength.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121001-22

.....
Please respond by _____

10 Dec 01

U15077 02

December 10, 2001 2:43 PM

ACTION
AS 12/13
1058

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Doug Feith
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Way Ahead

000.5

In connection with the way forward work each of you is doing, it seems to me that we ought to be thinking about Khobar. Let's factor that in, as well as the USS COLE.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121001-26

.....
Please respond by _____

10 Dec 01

U15079 02

snowflake

December 12, 2001 12:20 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Weakening of Deterrence

COMPLETE
12/24
1040

000.5

I dictated a paper on things that have weakened the deterrent. Paul and I started working on it. It was retyped and given to him to edit.

Please get it back from him no later than close of business today. I want to have it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121201-1s

.....
Please respond by 12/12

12 Dec 01

U15096 02

snowflake

December 12, 2001 8:20 AM

Action
12/12/01
1655
JS

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Boyce Speech

UK

I read in the paper somewhere that Boyce of England, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, gave a talk that was critical of the U.S. Can you see if you can get it? It was in today's *Early Bird*.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121201-3

.....
Please respond by _____

12 Dec 01

U15093 02

1310

snowflake

December 12, 2001 8:24 AM

AS Action
12/14
1206

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Rules on Use of MilAir

T 12/21

580

Why don't you get somebody to work up a set of rules as to how we are going to use military aircraft, handle reimbursement, etc.

I think we need policies so we can live with them and stick with them. There is no reason the Department of Defense ought to do things on a non-reimbursed basis for other departments. Indeed, I think it is probably against Congressional intention.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121201-5



Please respond by _____

12/12

SECDEF HAS SEEN
DEC 13 2001

I want to
cut back.

Of course. NSC seems
to be on our side on
this one. The
State Dept was
frustrated to
come back with
me into
Friday p.m. to review
their understandings.

SecDef -

U15092 02

We're reviewing
current directives internally,
and I'm meeting with
people at State & NSC

12 Dec 01

11-L-0559/OSD/714

D. Rita

Action
12/13/01
11/12

December 13, 2001 7:37 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Biological Early Warning System

370.64

Here is a note from Newt Gingrich. Would you please see if somebody could get this briefing-you, or whoever is appropriate? Then please get back to me and let me know what it is about.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/12/01 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
121301-3

.....
Please respond by _____

13 Dec 01

U15099 02

From Newt Gingrich

(b)(6), CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 13 2001

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2001 6:59 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; tether@darpa.mil
Cc: James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil; art.cebrowski@osd.pentagon.mil;
Subject: nsf proposal with dod potential

you may want to get a briefing from Rita Colwell at the NSF about NEON, the National Ecological Observatory Network, which really should be better named: Biological Early Warning System...to establish monitoring sites that will allow early detection of biological intrusion, either deliberately or naturally, of pathogenic biological agents (biological weapons of mass destruction. The heart of the matter is to create a background baseline against which to measure any insertion of biological or chemical agents. It is a little like creating an electrocardiogram baseline for cardiac analysis for a patient. It has great potential both here at home and abroad.
DOD and CIA may want to explore the advantage of creatig a global netowrk of these observatories as a baseline for biological warfare data worldwide.
Newt

D

cc: Dr. Rita
Admiral G

12/12/2001

11-L-0559/OSD/716

snowflake

ACKNOJ
7/17
12/21
1011

December 14, 2001 8:25 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: BRAC

323.3

Please pull together the language in the BRAC legislation that some people think is positive and enables us to pickle things. I would like to know what it says.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121401-2

.....
Please respond by _____

14 Dec 01

U15101 02

snowflake

December 14, 2001 8:29 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
cc: Rich Haver
DIA
NSA
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Language Assistance

I was talking to Jim Billington, the head of the Library of Congress, yesterday. He tells me they have a great deal of language capability that is available to help in any way we might want.

You folks should keep that in mind.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121401-4

.....
Please respond by _____

0911.Y

14 Dec 01

U19454 /01

snowflake

ACTION
12/17
1107

December 14, 2001 8:37 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Letters of Condolence

273

Let's get letters written to both the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of India, Fernandez and Singh, expressing condolences for the attacks that just took place in Delhi.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121401-7

.....
Please respond by _____

14 Dec 01

U15105 02

snowflake

12/17
0946

December 14, 2001 9:07 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Authorization Bill

110,01

You can tell Charlie Aldinger that I do not plan to recommend that the President veto the authorization bill, on the basis that the BRAC is in 2005, rather than 2003.

My earlier statement when I indicated I would recommend a veto was based on the thought that BRAC would not be in there at all.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121401-1 1

.....
Please respond by _____

14 Dec 01

U15107 0 2

December 14, 2001 12:15 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: NCA

The Joint Staff has a way of assigning responsibility to the National Command Authorities (NCA).

The NCA are two people-the President and the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, it seems to me it is an improper use of the phrase. It is improper use of NCA to suggest that is the deciding authority. The ambiguity is unhelpful. It seems to me we ought to decide things as to whether the deciding authority is going to be the President or me, and I can make that decision and work it out with the President.

Why don't we get this practice slowed down and stopped?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121401-13

.....
Please respond by _____

381

14 Dec 01

403458-02




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS AND DIRECTIVES

Whit Feb 26, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~EXECUTIVE~~ SECRETARY

SUBJECT: National Command Authorities

Please confirm that the guidance outlined in the attached memo and signed by the Director, Joint Staff pertaining to the use of the term, "National Command Authorities" is correct. We have not been able to find any guidance regarding this issue that has been published by the SecDef or his immediate staff.


L. Edward Curry, Director
C&D

CCD - The Bridge for SecDef Correspondence

11-L-0559/OSD/722



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9399

Reply ZIP Code:
203 18-0300

MCM-0003-02
11 January 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR JOINT STAFF DIRECTORS

Subject: Use of the **Term** "National Command Authorities"

1. The **Secretary** of Defense has directed that use of the term, 'National Command Authorities,' be discontinued. The term originates from **the** Unified Command Plan and is defined as "the President and the Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alternates and successors.* It is used **extensively in** deployment orders, execute orders, directives, instructions, publications, **and** many other **DoD** and interagency documents.
2. In future, please discontinue use of the term "National Command Authorities." Documents should instead refer **specifically** to the "President" or the "Secretary of Defense," or both, as appropriate. In most cases, the term "National Command Authorities" can simply be replaced by 'the **Secretary** of Defense.' In each of your subject matter areas, however, there will be cases requiring involvement by the President or by both the President and the Secretary of Defense. Those cases will have to be identified and annotated appropriately. In case of doubt, consult with OCJCS/LC.
3. I appreciate your assistance in this matter, both in preparing documents originating from your directorates and in reviewing documents prepared by **the** Combatant Commanders, **the Office** of the Secretary of Defense, and interagency departments.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of **Staff**:

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "John P. Abizaid".

JOHN P. ABIZAID
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

Inside The Navy
February 4, 2002

Rumsfeld Banishes Term 'National Command Authorities' From DOD

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has directed the Pentagon to cease using the term "National Command Authorities" in all Defense Department documents and instructions. It should be replaced with references to the president, defense secretary, or both, according to a Jan. 11 Joint Staff memorandum obtained by Inside the Navy.

"Documents should instead refer specifically to the 'President' or the 'Secretary of Defense,' or both, as appropriate," the memo reads. "In most cases, the term 'National Command Authorities' can simply be replaced by 'the Secretary of Defense.'" However, some defense matters will require the involvement of and therefore a reference to the president and defense secretary, the memo states. "Those cases will have to be identified and annotated appropriately," the memo reads.

Army Lt. Gen. John Abizaid, director of the Joint Staff, sent the three-paragraph memo to the other Joint Staff directors. Abizaid has eight directors of numbered Joint Staff divisions working under him, and a director of management.

The NCA terminology originated from the Unified Command Plan, which defines the NCA as "the President and the Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alternates and successors," according to the Abizaid memo. The phrase is used extensively in DOD deployment orders, dire-s, instructions, publications and other Pentagon and interagency documents, according to the Jan. 11 memo.

A Pentagon official said the change is more of an administrative matter than a change in policy or operations, and that it is primarily an effort to clarify the individual being referred to in DOD documents. Another source said the phrase NCA was a Cold War relic that needed to be replaced.

"I appreciate your assistance in this matter, both in preparing documents originating from your directorates and in reviewing documents prepared by the Combatant Commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and interagency departments," the Abizaid memo concludes. Copies of the memo were sent to the military services and commanders-in-chief.

-- *Christian Boehmfalk*

snowflake

December 15, 2001 12:01 P M

119

12/21
0900

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: NCA

Done w/ memo
From DJS
1/10
1037

The Joint Staff has a way of assigning responsibility to the National Command Authorities (NCA).

The NCA consists of two people-the President and the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, it seems to me, it is not wise to suggest that the NCA is the deciding authority, in that it is ambiguous as to which one.

It seems to me we ought to decide as to whether the deciding authority is going to be the President or the Secretary of Defense, and I can work that out with the President.

Why don't we get this practice stopped?

Thanks.

[Faded text]

DHR:db
121501-1

.....

Please respond by _____

381

13 Dec 01

U12006 /02

Reply ZIP Code:
203 18-0300

{DATE 1}

MEMORANDUM FOR JOINT STAFF DIRECTORS

Subject: Use of the Term "National Command Authorities"

1. The Secretary of Defense has directed that use of the term, "National Command Authorities," be discontinued. The term originates from the Unified Command Plan and is defined as "the President and the Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alternates and successors." It is used extensively in deployment orders, execute orders, directives, instructions, publications, and many other DoD and interagency documents.

2. In future, please discontinue use of the term "National Command Authorities." Documents should instead refer specifically to the "President" or the "Secretary of Defense," or both, as appropriate. In most cases, the term "National Command Authorities" can simply be replaced by "the Secretary of Defense." In each of your subject matter areas, however, there will be cases requiring involvement by the President or by both the President and the Secretary of Defense. Those cases will have to be identified and annotated appropriately. In case of doubt, consult with OCJCS/LC.

3. I appreciate your assistance in this matter, both in preparing documents originating from your directorates and in reviewing documents prepared by the Combatant Commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and interagency departments.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

{NAME 1}
{Rank 1}
(Title 1)

AS Anna
Felix
1003

snowflake

December 17, 2001 12:50 PM

373.24

TO: , Torie Clarke
Jim Haynes
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DL

SUBJECT: GAO Report

Please **find** out who was charging that the program was fraudulent, They ought to be put down now **that** these allegations havt been **investigated and** found not valid.

How do we do **that**?

Thanks.

Attach.

12/13/01 *Early Bird* article, *Defense Daily*, "GAO Report Expected to Dismiss Allegations of Missile Defense Fraud"

DHR:db
121701-1

Please **respond** by _____

17 Dec 01

U151 12 02

3

efforts," Ms. Zhang of the Foreign Ministry said.

New York Times
December 14, 2001
25, A Setback For Missile Shield As Booster Rocket Falls Test

By James Dada
WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 — A test of a prototype booster rocket for missile defense failed today "when the rocket veered off course seconds after liftoff and had to be destroyed over the Pacific Ocean," the Pentagon said.

The three-stage rocket, assembled by Boeing, lifted off from Vandenberg Air Force base north of Los Angeles at 1:15 p.m. today, Eastern Standard Time, but malfunctioned just 30 seconds after launch and was ordered to self-destruct as it swerved off course, officials said.

The booster fell harmlessly into the Pacific about six miles from Vandenberg, said Bryan G. Whitman, a Pentagon spokesman. He said the cause of the malfunction was not yet known.

The booster is being developed to carry antimissile weapons, known as kill vehicles, that can home in on and demolish long-range missile warheads 140 miles above the earth's surface.

Although Boeing successfully tested one of the prototypes in late August, the interceptor booster program has been plagued by problems and delays. The Pentagon had wanted to begin using the new launch system in tests to shoot down target rockets over the Pacific starting early next year. But it has postponed those plans for more than a year because of the program's problems.

As a result, the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, which oversees most missile defense testing, announced last summer that it was seeking proposals for alternative booster systems.

"It's one of the minor mysteries of missile defense as to what the problem with this thing is," said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a defense policy Web site. "It

was originally considered one of the lowest risk parts of the system, and it has just turned out to have one problem after another."

Boeing officials, could not be reached for comment tonight. The company, which is looking to its space and military divisions to compensate for falling revenues "in its commercial airline division, is also the lead contractor on the overall missile defense program.

The Boeing booster is intended to be assembled largely from commercially available rocket components, including a motor by Alliant Techsystems and second and third stages built by United Technologies.

The plan is for it to have greater acceleration than the modified Minuteman launch vehicles the Pentagon has been using for missile defense tests, enabling it to catch up to fast-moving intercontinental ballistic missiles heading toward the United States.

The failure today came even as Congress was approving a \$3 billion increase, to \$8.3 billion, for President Bush's missile defense program.

Defense Daily
December 14, 2001
Pg. 5

26. GAO Report Expected To Dismiss Allegations Of Missile Defense Fraud
By Kerry Gildea

The General Accounting Office (GAO) is expected to release a new report in January dismissing allegations that the Pentagon falsified the results of its ground based missile defense tests a year ago, according to congressional aides.

Earlier this year a group of House critics, led by Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio), called on the FBI to investigate allegations that DoD has covered up failures in the ground based midcourse missile defense program, formerly called national missile defense (NMD), and the system's vulnerability to countermeasures (Defense Daily, June 23). But, the FBI, which closed its investigation several months

ago, cleared the Pentagon of any wrongdoing.

"Though the FBI completed its report, I-Jill sources, said GAO was asked to conduct a similar investigation at the requests of Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa). The report is currently at the Department of Justice and DoD for comment, they said.

House lawmakers called for the initial FBI investigation when missile defense critic Ted Postol, a professor at MIT, made the allegations of criminal conduct.

"Investigation revealed that Postol's claims that data had been altered was un-derground," according to FBI documents sent on May 10 from Thomas Kubic, deputy assistant director of FBI's criminal investigations division, to Kucinich.

"As to Postol's claims that the system is incapable of distinguishing between warheads and decoys, there is dispute among scientists about the ability of the system to discriminate based on scientific grounds," the FBI said. "This is a scientific dispute and Postol's attempt to raise it to the level of criminal conduct had no basis in fact."

Postol's conclusions were based on "an incomplete set of documents" and those documents were "missing crucial scientific information," according to the FBI letter.

This month, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) scored the third intercept in its ground based midcourse missile defense program. Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of BMDO, told reporters before the test that a success would clear the way to add more complex decoys in future tests beyond the single balloon decoy used to date (Defense Daily, Dec. 5).

This summer, Kadish shot back at critics of the program who have been warning the system is too expensive, incapable of defending against ballistic missiles and will be useless when challenged by enemy decoys and countermeasures.

"Those who say that it is technologically impossible for the national missile defense

system to do adequate discrimination do so on the basis of very limited knowledge and without the benefit of testing results that we have generated to date and will generate in years ahead," Kadish said at a House Armed Services Committee hearing in June. "In the future, we will add even more tools to the discrimination toolbox, to include the infrared sensors or Space Based Infrared Low satellites, which will be used to track the warhead. As our computing power grows and discrimination sensors improve and multiply, it will get harder and harder to defeat our maturing NMD system."

Kadish also gave classified briefings on the countermeasures for interested members of Congress.

Los Angeles Times
December 14, 2001
Pg. 1

27. Al Qaeda Uses Bait And Switch

War: Tora Bora fighters make feint toward surrender, then press forward. Others escape.
By Megan K. Stack and Norman Kempster, Times Staff Writers

TORA BORA, Afghanistan — As furious fighting swept the hillsides here Thursday, killing dozens of anti-Taliban soldiers, it seemed likely that fruitless attempts to broker the surrender of besieged Al Qaeda fighters may have done more harm than good.

As another cease-fire between hundreds of Al Qaeda holdouts "and Afghan tribal forces collapsed Thursday morning, anti-Taliban leaders complained that some of the combat-hardened followers of Osama bin Laden had used a feint toward submission to improve their position on the rocky battlefield while others took the opportunity to escape.

"They ceased fire as an excuse to run away," tribal commander Haji Ayub said.

At the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld agreed that many of the Al Qaeda fighters have wriggled out of the trap that was set for them by the anti-Taliban lead-

snowflake

December 17, 2001 1:00 PM

Act
12/17
1205

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Gifts

333 SD

Please make sure you give me the coins, hat, pennant and the various other things that were provided to us during the trip to Afghanistan and the other countries on this trip.

Thanks.

DHR dh
121701-3

COMPLETE
12/19
1100

.....
Please respond by _____

17 Dec 01

U15113 02

8
12/20

December 17, 2001 3:10 PM

5021
12/21/2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: McNamara

DL

Done

020SD

Please find out whether or not Vietnam was mentioned at all during Secretary McNamara's confirmation hearings to be Secretary of Defense.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121701-5

.....
Please respond by _____

12/20

SecDef -

The issue did not arise
The question of potential hot spots came up, and the dialogue involved Korea, Formosa, and Lebanon. Vietnam was not discussed.

In your testimony, Afghanistan did not come up, either.

U15114 02

Di Rita

17 Dec 01

ISP

December 17, 2001 3:40 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Presence in Central Asia

Asia

We need to think through what presence we want in Central Asia when the war on terrorism is over.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121701-16

.....

Please respond by 1/4

17 Dec 01

10

U04098 /02

INFO
B. 01/03
0806

snowflake

December 19, 2001 2:05 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Invitation to Ukraine

I invited the Minister of Defense of Ukraine to visit the United States sometime, so we will be hearing from them.

Thanks.

DHR:db
121901-2

19 Dec 01

U15116 02

December 19, 2001 2:25 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Tom White
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: National Guard

325

Is there anything we ought to be doing with respect to this "Tarnished Guardians" article? It seems to me it might offer us an opportunity.

Thanks.

Attach
12/17/01 USA Today article, Moniz and Drinkard: "Misconduct Marks Guard Command"

DHR:dh
121901-7

12/19/01

U01033 A02

Vice President Richard B. Cheney last week said he believes most al Qaeda cells can be disbanded without direct U.S. military force.

"There may be a few cases where military force is the only option, or where military force is required for one reason or another to wrap up these cells," he told Fox News Channel.

USA Today
December 17, 2001

Pg. 1

Tarnished Guardians - Part 1

6. Misconduct Marks

Guard Command

Lack of oversight by Pentagon, states let misbehavior flourish

By Dave Moniz and Jim Drinkard, USA Today

WASHINGTON

Americans have taken comfort since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks as National Guard units nearly every state have been sent out to protect airports, power plants and other critical parts of the nation's infrastructure. Yet, at a time when the 460,000-member Guard is playing such a vital role, an investigation by USA TODAY reveals a pattern of misconduct in the Guard's upper echelons that has continued for more than a decade. Much of the misconduct has gone unpunished as governors, state legislatures and members of Congress look the other way and Pentagon investigators are powerless to root out the problems.

The abuses range from inflating troop-strength reports and misusing taxpayer money to sexual harassment and stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars in life-insurance payments, some intended for the widows and children of Guardsmen. Together, they raise questions about the quality of some of the Guard's top leaders and the political spoils under which many are

USA TODAY identified nine states in which the highest-ranking officer, called an adjutant general, has engaged in misconduct during the past

decade. However, the full extent of the abuses may never be made public because the Pentagon has refused to allow open access to its investigative reports. The identified states are New York, Illinois, Kentucky, California, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Colorado, Wyoming and Massachusetts.

After interviews with more than 100 present and former Guard members and a review of 10 years of Pentagon documents, many never before disclosed, the newspaper has found that:

*Guard officials in many states have repeatedly inflated Army Guard troop-strength reports to hide a shortage of soldiers. Within individual National Guard units, as many as 10% to 20% of the troops are "ghost soldiers" who exist only on paper, government investigators and Guard officers say. The practice raises questions about the Guard's ability to field fully ready units in this time of crisis.

Some Guard units inflate troop levels so that the federal government won't transfer those units, and the money that goes with them, to states that can recruit.

*Pentagon records show that during the past five years, National Guard generals have committed serious offenses at roughly double the rate of regular Air Force and Army generals. During that time, 16 Air National Guard generals committed such offenses compared with 14 in the Air Force. The Air Force has about twice as many generals. In the Army Guard, 55 generals committed serious offenses compared with 65 in the Army. The Army Guard has 193 generals, the Army 365.

*In the nine states where interviews and investigations show adjutants general have committed misconduct, little has been done to improve the selection process or oversight. One of the nine states, Kentucky, has created a selection advisory panel to help the governor pick the state commander. Another, Illinois, passed a law allowing the governor to pick someone from outside the Guard — an active-duty or reserve officer — for the top job, issued sexual har-

assment guidelines and created promotion-review panels.

The problems in the Guard's leadership extend to the top. This year, the Pentagon investigated the Guard's top officer, Lt. Gen. Russell Davis, head of the National Guard Bureau, the Guard's administrative headquarters. The investigation found that Davis failed to discipline a senior aide who had sexually harassed a colleague and misled federal investigators about his role in the incident.

The report said his testimony was "not credible" and "failed to meet the standard for honesty." The finding against the head of the National Guard Bureau resulted in a stem letter of rebuke by the secretary of the Air Force.

Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel and military analyst at Boston University, says the litany of offenses committed by top Guard commanders is "deeply troubling."

"It should be a cause for deep and profound concern" if Guard commanders aren't held to the same standards of conduct as regular military officers, Bacevich says.

Independent armies

The National Guard spends \$13 billion a year in federal defense money, but the Pentagon has virtually no control over these state-run militaries. The two-star generals who command the National Guard in the 50 states report to the governors, not the Defense Department. Consequently, the Pentagon has no power to remove incompetent or corrupt adjutants general. They are state, not federal, employees.

Because the Constitution gives control of the National Guard to the states, the Guard also is not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the standard of conduct for regular military personnel. Instead, the states typically have their own laws similar to the federal military code, but the Pentagon has no role in enforcing them unless Guard troops are placed on active duty for missions overseas such as in Bosnia and Kuwait.

All but two adjutants general are appointees of state governors. In Vermont and South Carolina, they are

elected. Adjutants general often don't meet military or educational qualifications required of active duty generals. Governors can pick lieutenant colonels for adjutant general, skipping three ranks and the intense training that goes with them.

The Guard traces its roots to colonial times, when each state defended itself with a homegrown militia. Today, most Guard members are part-timers who hold full-time civilian jobs and perform military drills one weekend a month. Many of the Guard's leaders, including the adjutants general, are full-time soldiers working for their states.

Regular military officers say they have great respect for the competence and sacrifices made by most of those who serve part time in the Guard. The National Guard's contributions in war and peace are well known and include fighting in World War II, Korea and Desert Storm, as well as helping citizens during hurricanes, floods and wildfires.

However, Guardsmen interviewed by USA TODAY say they are often demoralized by the behavior of some top leaders who tarnish the organization.

Officers familiar with misuse of office and misconduct cases involving adjutants general say reforms are long overdue. One of those is Ron Triggs, a Wyoming attorney and retired Army Reserve lieutenant colonel who has handled numerous legal cases involving the Guard and Reserves.

"System is dysfunctional. The system is dysfunctional and has been for a long time," Triggs says.

Guard senior officers rise through a system that, unlike the active military, allows some with little formal education to get top jobs. Dozens of senior Guard officers — lieutenant colonels, colonels and generals — have been promoted with no college degrees or with degrees that required little academic work. In one case described in an Army investigation, a Guard general obtained a correspondence degree by completing few requirements. He got 119 of 134

college credits for his military evidence," which is a slightly lower standard than in criminal cases. Westerdahl Guard lawyer who complained

Lt. Gen. Davis, who was cases. left office last year at the end about 250 improper flights of his term. Guard officials in France had taken. Some of the

pointed head of the National The newspaper's review, of Colorado said they did not flights were joy rides in Guard

Clinton, says that the Guard interviews with Guard mem- know how to locate Wester- fighter jets flown to impress a

does not have a leadership bers, military officers and law dahl. A spokesman for Gov. France belonged. France de- clined comment.

problem and that oversight enforcement officials, shows works well. "Could it be bet- that: Bill Owens said that Wester- dahl had been investigated

ter? Yes," Davis says. *Wyoming Adjutant Gen- eral Ed Boenisch remains in during the tenure of Gov. Roy

Davis did not respond to charge of the Wyoming Guard Romer and that, under state

several USA TODAY requests despite two Pentagon investi- law, Owens could not replace

for interviews about his own gations in the past three years. Westerdahl until his term ex- pired.

misconduct investigation. According to documents in pired. *Illinois Adjutant General

However, Brig. General those cases, investigators *Illinois Adjutant General

Ron Rand, head of Air Force those cases, investigators *Illinois Adjutant General

public affairs, described the found that Boenisch stopped Richard Austin was the subject

letter of reprimand written to Guard members from exposing of a 1998 Pentagon investiga- tion that concluded that during

Davis by the Air Force secre- wrongdoing, improperly dis- tion that concluded that during

tary as the kind that could be charged officers, retaliated summer training two years

career ending for a general on against whistleblowers and ap- earlier, Austin got drunk in

active duty. "At a minimum," proved a plan in which one of front of his soldiers and "dis- played conduct unbecoming an

Rand says, "it means that cor- his lieutenant colonels falsified officer and a gentleman." The

rective behavior is required." documents to receive a pro- officer and a gentleman." The

Maj. Gen. Russ Groves, motion he had been denied. report also found that Austin,

who commanded the Kentucky Boenisch declined to be in a "drunken and reckless

Guard until he retired last interviewed for this article, but manner," drove a vehicle car-

summer, says many governors an e-mail response from his rying soldiers during that same

are beginning to look for bet- public affairs staff said he did- training exercise. Pentagon of-

ter-qualified Guard command- n't violate military rules or ficials say that active duty offi-

ers. "There is a new generation regulations. Rachel Girt, a cers are routinely relieved of

that comes from a background spokeswoman for Gov. Jim command for such offenses,

it is less political and more Geringer, said the governor's but Austin retained command.

it based," says Groves, a office believes the investiga- He left office in 1999 and was

diversity of Kentucky profes- tions exonerated Boenisch. appointed deputy director of

of. *The Pentagon determined aeronautics for the state of Illi-

Even so, the political ap- in 1998 that California Adju- nois's Department of Trans-

pointment system that puts tant General Tandy Bozeman portation.

Guard commanders in power engaged in an "inappropriate Gov. George Ryan said Austin

remains largely unchanged, relationship" with a female of- served out his term under

and Defense Department in- ficer in the California Guard. Ryan's predecessor, Gov. Jim

vestigations show that Guard The military prohibits relation- Ryan's predecessor, Gov. Jim

officers who committed of- ships between commanders Edgar.

fenses faced few conse- and their troops because it can create the impression of favor-

quences. itism. Bozeman could not be

A string of offenses Bozeman continued the equipment for personal use,

A pattern of misconduct reached for comment. despite being initiated improper investiga-

over the past decade is re- Bozeman continued the equipment for personal use,

vealed in court documents, relationship despite being initiated improper investiga-

criminal cases and Pentagon warned by numerous officers tions of subordinates and re-

investigations obtained by that it was damaging morale in tiated against soldiers who

USA TODAY through the the California Guard, Pentagon reported misconduct. Gov.

Freedom of Information Act. investigators reported. Paul Cellucci fired Vezina in

The Pentagon provided He retired as head of the 1999.

reports only for those miscon- California Guard in a routine *Kentucky Adjutant Gen-

duct cases the newspaper was change of command in 1999 eral Robert DeZam was sen-

able to discover on its own. when Democrat Gray Davis tenced to 15 months in federal

Citing privacy laws, the Penta- replaced Republican Pete Wil- prison in 1997 for perjury after

gon denied access to all other son as governor. he lied to Pentagon investiga-

investigation reports. *A 1999 Pentagon report tors about his role in asking

The investigations were found that Colorado Adjutant Guard officers to make \$500

conducted by inspectors gen- General William Westerdahl campaign contributions to

eral from the Army, Air Force regularly used National Guard Gov. Brereton Jones. DeZam

Department of Defense. In aircraft for personal vacations, lost an appeal and served his

cases, those accused of had improper relationships sentence.

conduct typically do not with subordinates, failed to *Colorado Adjutant Gen-

have lawyers and are not given properly report an accident in- eral John France retired at the

the evidence presented against volving an aircraft he piloted end of his term in 1995, the

them. The IG makes a ruling and improperly retaliated same year a Pentagon report

based on a "preponderance of against a Colorado Army found that he had threatened to

*Because almost all of the money for Guard units comes from the federal government, governors and state legislatures tend to largely ignore their operation.

Buddy Stroud, who led the Guard in Louisiana for 18 years, says the Guard exists in a gap between federal and state oversight, and governors often leave concerns in the hands of their adjutants general.

Dean LeVay, a federal immigration judge in Arizona who retired from the Army Guard as a colonel three years ago, says he found it impossible to get the governor or the Legislature interested in investigating misconduct.

"Everyone at the state level thinks the federal level has a handle on the problems," LeVay says.

No enforcement power

The Pentagon can and does investigate adjutants general. Officials say, however, that they have no power to enforce their findings. All the Pentagon can do is forward its findings to the National Guard Bureau, which can recommend action to governors, who have the power to discipline or remove adjutants general.

Unlike command positions in the regular military, top Guard jobs often are viewed as political rewards to be handed to a governor's ally.

Charles Rogers, an Oklahoma district attorney who helped prosecute former adjutant general Alsip for embezzlement, says he was "appalled, shocked and sickened" that someone like Alsip could ever be chosen to command the military.

Rogers says that Alsip, who was appointed adjutant general after donating \$15,000 to Gov. David Walters, would never have risen to such an important position in the regular Army.

"The adjutant general in Oklahoma makes more money than the governor," Rogers says. "It is a great big political m"

He emphasizes that it could be a mistake to assume the Guard is corrupt from top to bottom.

"But 'to the extent that at the top the National Guard is a bunch of political hacks and

cronies, it imperils the ability of our nation to respond," Rogers says.

New York Times
December 17, 2001

7. Rumsfeld Pays Call On Troops And Afghans

By Thom Shanker

BAGRAM, Afghanistan, Dec. 16 — Walking beside a minefield on his way to meet Afghanistan's provisional leaders, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld offered America's long-term support to the new government today but made clear that the Pentagon's war aims had not been fully met and must not be compromised in securing the post-Taliban peace.

Mr. Rumsfeld, whose Pentagon became a front line in the Sept. 11 attacks, arrived at an air base with hangars bearing bullet scars and littered with the carcasses of warplanes. He is the first senior Bush administration official to visit Afghanistan since the start of the American military response.

No air of triumphalism marked his visit, which was not announced until just hours before his C-17 military transport plane touched down. He chose none of the victor's oratory in rallying American troops here and in his private discussions with leaders who are to take power on Dec. 22.

Instead, Mr. Rumsfeld told Hamid Karzai, the provisional head of government, and Gen. Muhammad Fahim, the incoming defense minister, that much work remained in hunting down the Taliban and members of Osama bin Laden's organization, Al Qaeda.

To the troops, he said the war was not over. "The Taliban is not running the country at the moment," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "There still are Al Qaeda and Taliban people in the country, in the mountains, hiding in the cities, in the caves and across the borders. There are a lot of fanatical people. And we need to finish the job."

Mr. Rumsfeld held meetings with the two anti-Taliban

commanders, Mr. Karzai and General Fahim, in a bomb-damaged room with Afghan carpets laid wall to wall and camouflage netting serving as draperies.

Tents pitched inside the frosty United States operations center sheltered computers and communications equipment as Mr. Rumsfeld, wearing a windbreaker from the Army Special Operations Command, greeted Mr. Karzai, who arrived wearing a lambskin hat and a traditional robe of blue and green plaid.

Referring to the members of Al Qaeda, most of them fighters from foreign lands who turned this country into a base of operations under the Taliban, Mr. Karzai said, "They considered themselves the rulers of Afghanistan."

Opposition forces were incapacitated by their civil wars, he said, and the military assistance from the United States was "the opportunity we wanted."

"You helped Afghanistan liberate itself — for a second time," he added, referring to American military aid that helped rout the Soviet Army.

The Bush administration's mental map of the world had no doubt labeled Afghanistan "Terra Terroris," but after setting foot here today, Mr. Rumsfeld said it was still too soon to declare Afghanistan liberated from terror, terrorism and terrorists.

He said his meetings with the two interim leaders was "to make sure we're all on the same wavelength as to what's left to be done."

The new government, Mr. Rumsfeld said, is "going to have to be something that fits Afghanistan and is not uncomfortable for the neighbors, and that is able over time to develop enough cohesion so that it can keep these factions from fighting with each other and keep terrorists out and manage crime and, the good Lord willing, deal with the heroin and the drug problems."

The defense secretary announced that Washington was likely to support an international peacekeeping force being considered to help restore order in Kabul, the capital, by contributing logistical support,

intelligence and transportation, and that the United States might agree to having American forces stand by with a "quick reaction capability as backup" should the peacekeeping force run into trouble. The force is expected to have 3,000 to 5,000 members and could eventually be sent into cities other than Kabul.

Mr. Rumsfeld flew to the base in a cavernous C-17 military cargo plane, the first to make a daylight landing here since the air base, 20 miles north of Kabul, fell to allied forces.

But continuing security concerns were underscored as the door swung open and Mr. Rumsfeld's delegation was warned that the plane was parked on a strip of tarmac sandwiched between mine-fields.

An Afghan honor guard greeted the secretary, and a local security force of fighters from the Northern Alliance lined the runway.

It was at times hard to tell the allies apart, Afghan from American. One scruffy soldier wearing the uniform favored by the Northern Alliance — a pakol, the woolen hat with round flat crown, as well as a patterned sweater with a scarf and vest — was assigned to the pool of drivers for Mr. Rumsfeld's visit.

"Welcome to Afghanistan, sir," he said crisply with the best of United States Army discipline before explaining that many of the American troops whose missions bring them into contact with Afghans wear local garb to present a lower profile.

The air base at Bagram, built in the 1950's with assistance from the Soviet Union, is the only active airfield for heavy freight traffic in Afghanistan.

Mr. Rumsfeld also visited a base in the region that is home to the Special Operations forces that have been so prevalent in this military campaign. The base's location could not be disclosed under ground rules set by the Pentagon.

One AC-130 pilot, an Air Force captain who gave his name only as Jason, described

INFO
01/03
1340 ds

December 19, 2001 2:45 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Slovenia

SLOVENIA

The Slovenian MoD wants to come to Washington, DC.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121901-8

19 Dec 01

U15120 02

Action
15 01/03
1250

December 19, 2001 2:50 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld. *DR*
SUBJECT: Cable from NATO?

Someone ought to check with Ambassador Burns and see if he plans to do a reporting cable on my remarks at lunch on the subject of NATO in 20.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121901-10

NATO 092

19 Dec 01

U15121 02

snowflake

December 27, 2001 8:53 AM

Action
01/03
1755
S

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Categories

320.2

I would like to have a couple of cards laminated that show:

1. The number of people in corps, divisions, platoons, etc.
2. MEWS
3. Planes in air wings
4. In short, the different categories for the different Services.

Please show it to me in draft before you put it all together, and I will tell you if you have everything I need.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122701-11

.....
Please respond by _____

27
Dec 01

U15136 02

Rec'd 1/2
JA

snowflake

December 27, 2001 11:48 AM

TO: Secretary Tom White
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fort Sam Houston

I just saw this clipping. Please make sure you visit with me about that before anything happens, please.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/23/01 San Antonio Express-News, Sig Christenson, "Fort Sam May Land a New Command"

DHR:db
122701-31

.....
Please respond by _____

322

27 Dec 01

U00695 /02

Washington Times
December 24, 2001
Pg. B1

22. Scientists Cite Lax Security At Detrick

By David Dishneau, Associated Press

FREDERICK, Md. — Accounting for deadly microbes in the Army's germ-warfare defense laboratory at Fort Detrick was lax during much of the 1990s, said some former scientists at the post.

Supervisors often did not check whether researchers were keeping track of lab materials as required. When they did, some researchers gave them photocopies of old reports, said Richard Crosland, who was laid off in 1997 from the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick.

Others said that while it would have been nearly impossible for an unauthorized person to enter a restricted area, nothing would have prevented approved workers from removing deadly germs from the labs.

"As far as carrying anything out, microorganisms are small," said Luann Battersby, a biologist who left the research institute voluntarily in 1998 after eight years. "The problem would be getting in, not getting out."

Fort Detrick spokesman Charles Dasey said inventory control had been re-emphasized since the recent anthrax mailings, which focused attention on the institute as a potential source of the bacteria.

Mr. Dasey also said Fort Detrick's security staff conducts random exit searches and has video cameras trained on important laboratory areas. Miss Battersby said those measures did not exist when she worked there.

The Army said it had accounted for all the Ames anthrax — the strain found in letters mailed to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, South Dakota Democrat, and Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Vermont Democrat — that the research institute produced.

Yet the scientists, none of whom worked with anthrax, said it would have been easy to

walk out with a few cells in a petri dish or smeared on their clothing that then could be grown and processed.

"No matter what you do, there is not any way you can prevent a determined, skillful microbiologist from stealing traces of a microbial culture that he is working with, because it takes so few microbes to start a culture," said Mark Wheelis, a microbiologist at the University of California in Davis who serves on a biological-weapons committee of the Federation of American Scientists.

Mr. Wheelis said labs that work with toxic microbes historically have limited access to those with security clearance, but have paid scant attention to what goes out the door.

"Bioterrorism wasn't a major issue until a few years ago," Mr. Wheelis said. "Nobody was thinking that one of these respected, trusted scientists might actually steal one of the cultures with malevolent intent."

Mr. Crosland, 55, who was suing the Army for age discrimination stemming from his 1997 layoff, said the Army's disinterest in tracking the botulinum toxin with which he worked was typical of what he observed during more than a decade at the research institute.

"There was never an audit in the 11 years I was there as to what was in my laboratory and what was supposed to be there," Mr. Crosland said. "They never tried to balance what was brought into the institution against what was actually in the institution."

San Antonio Express-News
December 23, 2001

23. Fort Sam May Land A New Command

By Sig Christenson, Express-News Military Writer

San Antonio is one of two communities at the top of a Pentagon list of sites to relocate U.S. Army South, which is headquartered in Puerto Rico and has suffered from the political and environmental controversies there, according to a memo from Maj. Gen. Al-

fred A. Valenzuela, the head of the command.

Valenzuela, a San Antonio native, said in the memo dated Aug. 22 that studies have recommended either Fort Sam Houston or Fort Benning, Ga., as the new home for Army South, which could bring as many as 600 to 1,000 civilian jobs.

Valenzuela's spokesman, Lt. Col. Tom Budzyna, said "the word on the street" was that Fort Sam Houston was the choice, but stressed "the final decision is going to be made by the chief of staff of the Army and the secretary of the Army with the consent of Congress."

In San Antonio, Mayor Ed Garza said the Alamo City appeared to have a strong shot at the headquarters, which is likely to move to the continental United States due to ongoing problems in Puerto Rico.

"I think there's an overall good feeling about San Antonio," Garza said. "When we were up in Washington several weeks ago, this was kind of a buzz at the congressional meetings and the other meetings that we went to."

"But we all know the political process that exists as well, and I think we are allowing the facts to speak for themselves," he added. "We're allowing the city and the existing military infrastructure that we have in place to be our selling points to attract this to San Antonio."

In addition to bringing hundreds of jobs to San Antonio, the move could settle the nagging issue of what to do with the Depression-era Brooke Army Medical Center, which is being eyed as the Army South's headquarters.

Perhaps more important, leaders in Washington and here agree, the relocation of Army South from Puerto Rico to San Antonio might help fortify the post against possible shutdown during a new base closure round set for 2005.

Army South oversees operations in Central and South America and has 1,250 military and civilian workers. It pumps \$160 million a year into the economy of Puerto Rico, but myriad problems there are

prompting the Pentagon to strongly consider a move.

The number of jobs and the financial impact of the organization on San Antonio, or some other city it might move to, isn't clear because any changes made to Army South could reduce or increase its size.

Some civilians would transfer to the new headquarters, though that number isn't known, either.

There's little doubt, however, that a move is in the cards. The controversy over the Navy bombing range at Vieques and festering problems there have convinced Valenzuela that the Pentagon must relocate the organization to the United States.

Although a decision to move Army South to Fort Sam Houston is seen by many as a tonic for what has ailed the dilapidated BAMC, abandoned in 1996, it isn't a done deal.

Army South has been at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, since leaving Panama in 1999.

Pentagon leaders backed away from a decision on a new site as Christmas neared, a number of Defense Department and congressional aides said last week.

The Army's chiefs ordered a look at a variety of sites after Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., sought to have the headquarters relocated to Keesler AFB in Biloxi, they said.

Lott's play for the headquarters sparked interest in Army South from other lawmakers, prompting the Pentagon to backpedal.

A Lott spokesman declined comment, while one officer close to Army Secretary Thomas E. White said there was no rush to make the decision.

"There is much discussion about the issue, and the Army wants to use this to ensure that a good solution is reached that satisfies concerns, issues and needs of the Army," said Col. Jim Allen, who added that he doesn't know when the choice will be made. "I'd just rather be deliberate and right than speedy and faulty."

Studies like the ones that identified Fort Sam Houston and Fort Benning as the top lo-

snowflake

December 27, 2001 3:26 PM

Action
01/02
1145

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: RADM Calland

Action Done

000:71 SD

I would like to meet with Admiral Calland. Dick Myers thinks I ought to visit with him. He is the SOCCENT commander. He is in the U.S, now-let's see if we can see him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122701-45

Please respond by _____

MTG
SCHED FOR
1400 1/3/02

27 Dec 01

U15138 02

The United States Navy



United States Navy Biography

Rear Admiral Albert M. Calland III United States Navy Commander, Special Operations Command Central

Rear Admiral Albert M. Calland, III, U.S. Navy, entered the U.S. Naval Academy in June 1970. Upon graduation in June 1974, Admiral Calland was temporarily assigned to the Academy until January 1975 when he entered Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training (Class 82). Following BUD/S graduation in June 1975, he was assigned to Underwater Demolition Team ELEVEN where he served as assistant SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) platoon commander.

Rear Adm. Calland reported to SEAL Team ONE in 1977 where he made two deployments to the western Pacific as both a SEAL Delivery (SDV) and SEAL platoon commander. In June 1981, Rear Adm. Calland was ordered back to BUD/S for instructor duty where he served as diving phase officer and later senior instructor BUD/S training.



In June 1983, he was transferred to Naval Special Warfare Group ONE as Research, Development, and Acquisition/Tactical Development and Evaluation officer and served in that capacity until being assigned to Commander Naval Surface Forces, Pacific staff in 1984. While assigned to COMNAVSURFPAC, he served as the Naval Special Warfare/Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Mine Warfare officer.

In May 1986, Rear Adm. Calland became the Executive Officer of Special Boat Unit TWELVE. From August through December 1987, he was deployed to the Arabian Gulf in support of *Operation Earnest Will* as Commander, Naval Special Warfare Task Unit, Pacific aboard a mobile sea base. During that operation units under his command participated in the capture of *the Iran Ajar* minelayer. He completed his Executive Officer tour in April 1988 and was assigned to Commander Naval Special Warfare Command as Assistant Chief of Staff for Programs/Research, Development, and Acquisition.

In May 1990 he began his first joint assignment at the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla., where he served as program analyst and Mobility Branch Chief for the Programs Division of the Directorate of Resources (SOJ8). Admiral Calland returned to SEAL Team ONE in November 1993 as Commanding Officer and served in that position until January 1995. After completing Senior War College at the Industrial College of Armed Forces (ICAF) he was assigned duty as Deputy Director for Operations at the Joint Special Operations Command, Ft Bragg, N.C. From June 1997 until June

1999, Admiral **Calland** commanded the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, a CNO Priority ONE Major Command. He served as Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Rear Adm. **Calland** has a Master of Science degree in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington, D.C. His personal decoration include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal (two awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (five awards), the Navy Commendation Medal, and various other campaign and service awards.



Return to the Biographies top page

snowflake

Action 83
15 01/02
1550

December 29, 2001 1:49 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Info from Denny

*Deton
Complete
to 001
1/11
1502*
IRAA

Please ask Denny to get some information on the Iraqi Kurds in the north and the Shias in the south. I would like to know how many there are, how well they are armed, what they do, what their history is, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122901-14

*01/02
1600*
*BRIEFED TO SD - INFO WILL
BE READY 01/04.*
v/r

29 Dec 01

U15143 02

①

snowflake

December 29, 2001 2:32 PM

ACTION
aloz
1020

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Library

331.1

Please follow up on this transformational library idea **from** Newt Gingrich. I don't know who **the** right person is to get after it.

Thanks.

Attach
12/26/01 Newt Gingrich e-mail to **SecDef** re: Transformational Libraries

DHR:dh
122901-20

29 Dec 01

①

U15144 02

From Newt Gingrich

(b)(6)

, CIV, OSD

From: Thlrwave2@aol.com

Sent: Wednesday, December 26, 2001 8:49 AM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: transformational libraries

please give to the secretary, paul ed and larry, thanks newt

I hope you had a merry christmas and have a happy new year

I heard the other day the Pentagon library was closed by the airplane attack and will probably be reopened in crystal city. I think there is a transformational alternative that would work far better.

you should transform the library into an on-line facility whose non-classified materials could be accessed by anyone in the world.

you should get the Marshall Center to develop an on line civilian and military leadership library for countries making the transition to democracy.

you should develop a special section for third worlds militaries (it is conceivable that each of our service schools could develop a core on-line library for their branch that could be accessed by their counterparts anywhere in the world).

there ought to be a procurement section with hot links to major American suppliers on the assumption that helping American sales abroad both lowers production costs at home by sharing the overhead costs and increases our influence with other militaries.

You could establish an international library advisory board which allowed the other countries to let us know what books, information, journals they need on line.

If every active, reserve and guard member could access military learning on line it would accelerate the process of learning and transformation.

If the Pentagon staffs had access to real time information and the latest publications on line it would accelerate the research you need done.

If DOD became the leading site on the planet for military learning you would have enhanced our influence with virtually every foreign military and the civilian leadership which tries to manage them.

Jim Billington at the Library of Congress has already led the way in putting over 5 million documents on line where they are available for free worldwide. I suspect he has staff who could help think this through.

This would be a transformational approach to a new library and would contrast sharply with the symbolism of moving the Pentagon library to Crystal City where it will almost never be accessed by Pentagon personell.

Newt

2

12/27/2001

11-L-0559/OSD/747

December 29, 2001 2:32 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
 Gen. Pace

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
 Doug Feith
 Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: War Gaming for Iraq

Iraq

Attached is a note from Newt Gingrich, which is very interesting. I would like to see some data on the point he makes here on war gaming for Iraq.

Please figure out a format, and then have someone Pull together.

We also might want to think about a transformational war game in February.

Thanks.

Attach
 12/25/01 Newt Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: War Gaming for Iraq

DHR:dh
 122901-21

1/21

SECDEF -
CTCS RESPONSE
ATTACHED. *1/12*
Ed

29 Dec 01

JHM 3 7:24 R

U05865 /02

SECDEF CONTROL#

From Newt Gingrich

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

①
56

From: **Thirdwave2@aol.com**
 Sent: Tuesday, December 26, 2001 4:01 PM
 To: (b)(6) @osd.pentagon.mil
 Subject: please distribute to **secdef,paul,ed** and **larry,thanks**
 War Gaming for Iraq

Have we done any war gaming for an **iraq** scenario? The exchange rate in 1991 was:
 3700 to 5 in tank exchange (the five American **tankes** were lost to land mines, seven tanks were hit by **t-72s**
 but none hurt):

armored **personell** carriers **3000:3** (one of the three was killed by an American helicopter)
 artillery **2100-0** (two-thirds of the **iraqi** artillery in the theater was destroyed almost all by aircraft)
 there were 100,000 Iraqi deserters and 85,000 Iraqi prisoners.

To the best of my knowledge no war game prior to Desert Storm showed this outcome. No war game prior to Afghanistan showed the **campaign** we are living through.

Our policy **formulation** continues to be dominated by an analytical framework that is World War I through Desert Shield in nature (heavy forces, attrition warfare, gradual American victory but with significant losses)

The fact is we have been going through a transformation in military capability which first became evident in the 1982 Syrian-Israeli campaign in which the exchange rate was 102-1. This was the first proof that a **theaterwide** information capability would annihilate a world war two force. ✓

The second great proof of this transformation was the performance in Desert Storm. I know of **now** official studies which concluded that we had taken too many men and too much ammunition. Yet it is clear that the planning for Desert Shield was a World War I-World War 2 **style** heavy military with no notion of the catastrophic capabilities that are now beginning to emerge.

The current campaign in Afghanistan is **simply** act three of this transformation (Kosovo would have been but the NATO political complexity blocked the introduction of the special forces who **would** have annihilated the Serbians by pinpointing **airpower** in real time.

My guess is that none of the current analysis of the **iraq** opportunity take into account the historic **FACTS** of these three campaigns.

We should insist on such transformaitonal war games in February at the latest.

Newt

1
x

②

12/27/2001

11-L-0559/OSD/749

TO: Admiral David Jeremiah
cc: David Chu
Charlie Craigin
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 26, 2001
SUBJECT: **Military Housing**

My son in law is an architect. He went to school at MIT. He heard about our interest in military housing and said that MIT is doing some fabulous things with respect to low cost housing.

We might want to take a look at that.

DHR/azn
0325601.01

U06203 /01

620

26MAR01

snowflake

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: May 12, 2001
SUBJECT: **DIA**

0120 DIA

Why don't you talk to Rich Haver and let's think about setting up a "B" team to take a look at DIA to pick some areas we are interested in, and have them go in and actually do what we did on the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, but do it just for DIA. By implication it would be done for CIA as well, I suppose.

There would be several advantages:

1. We would probably learn something;
2. It would certainly get the intelligence community's attention, particularly DIA.

We could get four or five people to do it, like maybe Woolsey, Schlesinger, Chris Williams, Garwin, Lee Butler, Blechmann. There is any number of people who could be helpful. Get kind of a bipartisan group together to do it. We might do ourselves some good.

What do you think?

Thanks.

12 May 01

DHR/azn
051201.17

U12609 /02

July 2, 2001 9:32 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Article Regarding Phony Savings

Look at this article in the Defense Daily that says, "You've got phony savings in there." Curt **Weldon** is a good guy – someone ought to go up and talk to him.

DHR:cd
0702014

01 Jul 01

26 asking him to explain how he will pay for the defense budget amendment in light of dwindling budget surpluses.

Marc Selinger

Defense Daily
June 27, 2001
Pg. 1

WAK

27. Weldon Says Rush Budget Contains 'Phony' Savings Estimates
By Kerry Gildea

The Bush administration has included \$1 billion in savings assumptions in its FY '02 budget plan based on "phony numbers," according to Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee panel on readiness.

"We have a responsibility to expose those phony numbers," Weldon yesterday told the vice chiefs of staff from the military services testifying before the panel. "They were phony when Bill Clinton offered them and they are phony when George Bush offers them. And, I say that as a Republican."

The vice chiefs declined to comment on the budget submission or the savings estimates outlined.

"We can't touch that...I am not playing games...we don't have that information," Army Gen. John Keane, Army vice chief of staff, told Weldon.

Weldon said the savings are misleading, particularly one that banks on Davis-Bacon reforms through the Congress, which Weldon said simply will not happen.

Any poor assumption in the defense budget could further set back the military's readiness, according to Weldon, who said he also is concerned about what the services do with the funds Congress authorizes and appropriates.

The General Accounting Office reported last year that over a five-year period, 1994-98, DoD changed funding in various operations and maintenance accounts by almost \$43 billion compared with the amounts the Congress originally designated for them, Weldon noted.

"I understand that operational needs of the military require the movement of funds during the year of execution, but movements of this magnitude, outside of the normal legislative process and without a timely notification to Congress are unacceptable," Weldon said.

The services vice chiefs told the panel they are prepared to send another reprogramming request to Capitol Hill that will include: a \$100 million reprogramming for the Army; \$180 million for Navy; \$400 million for Air Force; and \$27 million for the Marine corps.

The vice chiefs did not provide specifics on any procurement programs that would be effected by the reprogramming.

The vice chiefs also expressed concerns if the Congress does not finish work by the end of July with the \$6.5 billion supplemental package under consideration.

While individual soldiers will not feel the effect of that funding shortfall immediately, later in the summer there will be increased problems, Keane said.

In documents provided to Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), the Pentagon said if it does not get the money by the end of July it will have to shift millions out of procurement accounts to avoid personnel and readiness problems (Defense Daily, June 26).

Washington Post
June 27, 2001
Pg. 23

In The Loop
28. Senators Have A Cambone To Pick
By Al Kamen

Won't be around for the July 4 fireworks? You might be able to catch a preview today at the Senate Armed Services Committee. Word is Chairman Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.) & Co. are preparing some to cuff about nominee Stephen A. Cambone, who's up for a job as principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.

If Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's relations with the Senate are less than warm and fuzzy, Cambone's are even cooler, sources say, with both sides of the aisle. Something about the august lawmakers and staff feeling Cambone does not treat them with the respect they require.

Cambone briefed Hill aides May 31 on the Pentagon's plans and its defense strategy review. But after 90 minutes of charts and lecture, Cambone only had time for a few questions before he had to go. Some aides were said to be displeased.

Then Cambone raised sensitive Senate eyebrows when he briefed foreign officials on the ballistic missile defense plan during Rumsfeld's recent trip to Europe. The Senate doesn't like nominees to presume confirmation by doing things such as occupying their anticipated offices or briefing bloc defectors interviewed at the center, which is administered jointly by German, British, French and American officials.

In addition, he is suspected of passing along classified materials that included Soviet and Warsaw Pact Order of Battle documents, which would have divulged American knowledge of the military and Cambone, also a special assistant to Rumsfeld, could brief if he were wearing that assistant's hat. Cambone will get harrumphed at, sources say, but should make it through fine.

On the other hand, two other nominees, assistant secretary-designate for international security matters Jack D. Crouch II and undersecretary-designate for policy Douglas J. Feith still face tough battles.

One indication of Mr. Trofimoff's value to Soviet officials arose in the monthlong trial when Oleg Kalugin, a former K.G.B. general, testified that Mr. Trofimoff had been listed in the 1970's at the top of the K.G.B.'s list of American assets. Mr. Trofimoff was even invited to a resort for Soviet military officers as a reward for his labors, Mr. Kalugin said.

"You can gauge the significance of that information by how the K.G.B. ranked him as their No. 1 spy in terms of giving them information," said Mac Cauley, the United States attorney for the Middle District of Florida. "It was pretty vital information."

Mr. Cauley called the verdict "a great victory for our office," the product of an eight-year investigation that involved the F.B.I. and Army intelligence.

Until his arrest last June, Mr. Trofimoff had been leading a seemingly quiet retirement in Melbourne, Fla. He worked bagging groceries at a super-

ized American whose parents were Russian emigres, could be sentenced to life in prison. Sentencing is scheduled for Sept. 27.

As the verdict was read in a Tampa courtroom, Mr. Trofimoff, a balding, slightly overweight man with a military bearing, silently glanced at his weeping wife and shrugged, a prosecutor said.

His lawyer, Daniel Hernandez, said he would appeal. Law enforcement officials said it would be difficult to assess fully the damage Mr. Trofimoff did to American and allied intelligence. He is believed to have furnished Moscow with the testimony of East

Washington Post
June 27, 2001
29. Retired Army Employee Is Found Guilty Of Spying
By Christopher Marquis
WASHINGTON, June 26 — A federal court jury in Florida today convicted a retired civilian employee of the Army of spying for the Soviet Union and then Russia over at least 25 years.

The Army employee, George Trofimoff, 74, was found guilty of providing highly classified documents to Moscow from a NATO interrogation center in Nuremberg, Germany, from 1969 to 1994.

Mr. Trofimoff, a naturalized American whose parents

snowflake

December 7, 2001 2:16 PM

INFO 12/10/01 11:25 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Population

I think you said you thought Kabul had a population of about 200,000. I have no idea how many people live there now, but here is the last census on some of those major cities.

Thanks.

Attach.
Population

DHR:dh
1207014



Please respond by _____

7 Dec 01

U15072 02

Population of Major Afghan Cities

Kabul 2,000,000

Herat 750,000

Kandahar 329,000

Mazar-e-Sharif 232,000

snowflake

December 28, 2001 8:15 AM

Done 3/11

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Earmarks

110.0

Please get me the list of those 4,000 earmarks in our legislation. I need to get a sense of what that is about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
1228014

.....

Please respond by _____

10 1 11 01

U15130 02

snowflake

July 26, 2001 12:28 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: OSD Manning

Please get me a piece of paper that shows me how many people work in each one of the OSD activities. I was told today there are 1,200 people in the OSD Inspector General's office.

I need a piece of paper that shows it across the board.

If you are the wrong person, ask David Chu to get it. He may be the right one.

Thanks.

U
L
O
O
S
D

→ To: USA(C) -

I'll forward, but I told SecDef we'd get him a second version that had no abbreviations spelled out. He won't know the jargon. Please have someone quickly re-do.

*Larry Diller
7/31*

26 Jul 01

DHR:dh
07260149

snowflake

TO: Adm. Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: May 29, 2001

SUBJECT:

You might want to call down to Maj. Gen. Robert **Magnus** and thank him for his favorable comments. I appreciate them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
OS2901.24

452 v

29 May 01

U10137 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/758

gress of the new national military strategy next month, but defense officials differ widely on whether a formal document will be issued by the end of June. While President Bush is expected to sound themes of his emerging security strategy in a May 25 speech in Annapolis, MD, some sources say it could take until the end of the summer to see those objectives translated into published guidance on how military forces are to be shaped and sized for the future.

Others say that with the level of experience resident in the Bush administration's National Security Council — a former defense secretary in the role of a powerful vice president, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as secretary of state, and a defense secretary who's done the job before — a new strategy could literally be crafted in hours, if need be.

The uniformed military is eager to start the official part of the QDR with a clear new strategy in hand, rather than a reverse scenario in which the Pentagon takes stock of available forces and cash, and derives a "strategy of the possible." But the fact that a strategy could be handed out -- fait accompli -- is not lost on them. Military officials are chafing at the bit to share with Rumsfeld -- who has made clear he is seeking to move beyond the traditional preparations for two overlapping, major wars -- the work the Joint Staff and services have done to date on exploring strategy alternatives.

From there, the military is also confident it has a pretty good handle on the implications various strategies might have for force size, readiness, and other key military factors. "We're not starting with something that no one understands," said one Pentagon source interviewed this week.

If the QDR kicks off in earnest in June, it could be completed by the end of September, when the review's results are to be conveyed to Congress. At that point, Rumsfeld's team would like to feed QDR conclusions into the process of crafting the fiscal

year 2003 budget, several defense sources said.

Regardless of whether Rumsfeld turns to the military to provide substantial input into the QDR, the work of the Joint Staff-led panels and the results of Nimble Eagle could help inform Shelton's assessment of risk in the strategy and force structure laid out by the QDR, which the law also says is due in September.

-- *Elatne M. Grossman*

San Diego Union-Tribune
May 23, 2001

8. Officials See No Easy Solutions For Lack Of Military Spare Parts

'Cannibalization' hurting readiness, lawmaker says

By Pauline Jelinek, Associated Press

WASHINGTON -- The Pentagon system for dispensing spare parts for airplanes, tanks and other equipment is broken, and officials aren't sure how to fix it, according to officials.

At least 154,000 times a year, a military mechanic takes a part from one airplane and puts it on another because a new spare part is not on hand, states a preliminary report by the General Accounting Office.

"The practice is called 'cannibalization' and it's eating into ... readiness," Rep. Christopher Shays, R-Corm., said at a House subcommittee hearing where the report was discussed yesterday.

Cannibalization is also a waste of time and money -- costing 1 million extra work hours a year -- and it risks damaging the aircraft as well as the morale of mechanics doing the work, said others who testified.

Shays called it "robbing Peter to repair Paul," adding that the plane being repaired gets a used part and the one cannibalized gets a new part it didn't need in the first place. Work is doubled: the mechanic has to remove the part from one plane before putting it on another.

Once cannibalized, a multimillion-dollar aircraft can sit idle for months or years, said

Neal Curtin, GAO director of defense issues.

In one case, about 400 parts had been removed from a plane that "eventually had to be shipped by truck to the (maintenance) depot to be rebuilt," he said.

Witnesses said cannibalization is widespread because the services are trying to maintain readiness on an aging fleet at a time of increased deployments.

Lt. Gen. Michael Zettler, deputy chief of staff for Air Force installations, said cannibalization is used "only when it is absolutely mission-critical."

He acknowledged in a prepared statement that it's done more than is desirable, but blamed some of it on design problems that show up after years of use, resulting in the widespread need for more parts than expected. Also, fewer companies are making certain parts, having left the market during the Pentagon's 1990s downsizing.

Pentagon spokesman Rear Adm. Craig Quigley said, "You do what you need to do, given the availability of parts."

"It is largely an issue of funding," he said at the regular Pentagon briefing. "I'll use the family car as a good example: the older it gets, the more repair you're going to do. And yet, it's also expensive to buy a new car."

The report follows one earlier this year that said department inventory management is ineffective, resulting in excessive stocks of some parts and too few of others.

Rep. Dennis Kucinich, D-Ohio, said that in some cases the military just doesn't know where a part is or how many it has.

"This is clearly not due to lack of funding since the Department of Defense is wasting millions on unnecessary items," he said.

Though the problem has been under scrutiny since 1990 and the services have formed committees, study groups and other programs to fix it, no one has statistics on how big the problem is, Curtin said.

"Because they view cannibalization as a symptom of

spare parts shortages, they have not closely analyzed other possible causes or made concerted efforts to measure the full extent of the practice," he said.

The Pentagon has been unable to document how many times it is done, the reasons or how much time and money it is costing.

It also can't determine which cannibalizations are necessary, what alternatives are available, what improvements or changes need to be implemented to limit the waste, and to what extent morale would be increased by reducing the causes of workload cannibalization, Curtin said in prepared comments.

Aerospace Daily
May 24, 2001

9. Marines Expect To Field First Operational V-22 Squadron In About 2004, General Says

The Marine Corps expects to field its first operational squadron of the V-22 Osprey in about 2004 after fixing the tiltrotor aircraft's hydraulics, flight control software and other problem areas, Maj. Gen. Robert Magnus told the Defense Writers Group May 23.

The Navy Department is restructuring the V-22 program to address various deficiencies identified recently by a Defense Department-appointed blue-ribbon panel (DAILY, April 19), which was set up to review the program after two fatal crashes last year.

Magnus, assistant deputy commandant for plans, policies and operations, said before deploying the V-22, the Marines plan to carry out the suggestion of DoD's former chief weapons tester, Philip Coyle, to further examine vortex ring state, a condition that can cause a loss of lift during a high rate of descent and that was implicated in the April 2000 crash that killed 19 Marines. The December crash was attributed to hydraulic and software problems.

Magnus, who oversees the Marine Corps' input in DoD's upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review, also said he is

comfortable with his involvement in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's ongoing defense strategy review. He said he has been involved in many meetings on the review, and that some military officials may have complained to the press that they were shut out of the Rumsfeld review because they like having "perfect situational awareness."

Rumsfeld's review is expected to be folded into the QDR, which will help shape the fiscal 2003 budget.

Magnus told The DAILY that he suspects the Bush Administration will preserve the V-22, which the Marines want as a replacement for CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters, and the Joint Strike Fighter, which the Marines want as a replacement for AV-8B Harriers and F/A-18 Hornets. But he said he won't be surprised if some military aviation programs undergo changes in schedule and the number of aircraft procured.

JSF expected to survive Rumsfeld, who met with the House Armed Services Committee in private for more than two hours May 23, had little to say afterward, except that he hasn't made any decisions on weapons programs, and that most weapons decisions will be made in the FY 2003 budget.

Rumsfeld also said he plans to send Congress a request for a fiscal 2001 supplemental defense appropriations bill as early as this week. An amended FY 2002 budget is expected a few weeks after that.

Some Democratic committee members told reporters that they were frustrated that they didn't learn much at the meeting, which focused on process. But committee Chairman Bob Stump (R-Ariz.) and ranking Democrat Ike Skelton (MO.) both described the meeting as productive.

— Marc Selinger

San Diego Union-Tribune
Miy 23, 2001

10. Latest Attempt To Keep Osprey Program Alive Has Its Doubters

Civilian manager is now in charge

By Otto Kreisher, Copley News Service

WASHINGTON -- The Marine Corps' troubled Osprey has survived another near-death experience.

But this week's decision by the Pentagon's top civilian acquisition official to give the tilt-rotor aircraft one more chance has placed the Marines' top aviation program in the hands of a tough-minded civilian manager instead of Navy officials who kept it going through years of cost growth, technical problems and three fatal accidents.

From the commandant, Gen. James L. Jones, down to the Marine spokesman for the Osprey, the decision by acquisition czar Pete Aldridge to keep the program alive while the plane's contractors try to fix a myriad of problems was greeted with extreme caution.

"I need to know more about the implications of the decision," a clearly troubled Jones said when asked about what most Osprey supporters had at first thought was a positive development.

"The far-reaching impacts of the DoD (Defense Department) decision are unclear at this point," said Capt. David Nevers, a Marine public affairs officer.

John Issacs, one of the Osprey's most vocal critics, wondered, "Has he (Aldridge) saved it, or has he taken it over to kill it?"

"If I were the Navy, I would have more confidence if they had retained control," said Issacs, director of the Council for a Livable World.

Although the decision by Aldridge does keep the MV-22 program alive, it is clear its future is far from secure. And, if it survives, it could be an additional four or five years before Ospreys begin to replace the aged CH-46 and CH-53D helicopters at the Miramar Marine Corps Air Station and Camp Pendleton.

In simple terms, Aldridge took away from the Navy's civilian acquisition executive the crucial production decisions on the Osprey. That means he will decide when, or if, the MV-22s are allowed to go into full production, a decision the Navy was about to make in December before the last of the crashes that have killed 30 Marines and contractor employees.

Aldridge also announced formation of a top-level executive review committee that will monitor the effort to resolve the many safety and reliability questions that put the Osprey on the verge of cancellation.

At the same time, however, he approved the multi-phased plan Navy officials proposed to deal with the MV-22's problems. He also authorized release of the money necessary to buy enough Ospreys during the next few years to keep the production line alive while the contractors try to fix design problems.

But Nevers added a word of caution: "We don't believe that by allowing the Marines to go ahead to procure the aircraft already funded indicates what the production rate will be in the future, or what DoD will decide ultimately."

The Marines want to buy 360 Ospreys and the Air Force 50 in a \$40 billion program

Nevers and a spokeswoman for the Naval Air Systems Command, which normally supervises Marine aviation programs, were not sure how Aldridge's action affected their managers.

What is clear is that the heat is on the contractors, the Bell and Boeing helicopter units, to do what they have not done in the past 12 years -- produce an aircraft that is both safe and reliable.

At a Capitol Hill forum held yesterday by Osprey supporters, company executives indicated they had gotten the message.

After talking enthusiastically about the potential market for tens of billions of dollars in military and civilian tilt-rotor aircraft, Bell chief executive Terry Stinson said he recognized that "we can't be suc-

cessful if we don't provide safe and reliable aircraft."

And the man that has to be impressed, Aldridge, is a former astronaut, a onetime Air Force secretary and the executive of an aerospace firm that won the Pentagon's top award for efficient acquisition programs.

InsideDefense.com
May 23, 2001

11. Senate Confirms Gordon England As Navy Secretary

The Senate last night confirmed former General Dynamics executive Gordon England to be the secretary of the Navy, by unanimous consent.

During his nomination hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, England was pressed by Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) over his intentions to recuse himself from decisions involving General Dynamics. England told McCain that he would do so on a case-by-case basis, an answer McCain said was "not good enough."

Inside the Navy this week reported the committee has changed gears somewhat for England and the other service secretary nominees over a standing policy regarding recusals. ITN reported that for several years the committee has had a Policy discouraging confirmed defense officials from recusing themselves -- in spite of federal ethics regulations that require nominees to do so for one year on decisions involving former employers.

The committee sent a letter to the White House stating the committee generally prefers divestiture to recusal but also said the committee does not insist the Bush administration waive the recusal requirement for nominees, ITN reported.

— Thomas Duffy

San Diego Union-Tribune
May 23, 2001

12. Navy Identifies Two Killed In Plane Crash

The Navy yesterday identified the two officers killed Monday in the crash of their single-engine trainer near here.

page 10 of 17

12/21
1630

snowflake

December 21, 2001 12:51 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E P A

Let's set up Christie Todd-Whitman to come over and do this. You should make sure she is primed to do it in a way that makes sense from our standpoint.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/25/01 SecDef memo to Di Rita

DHR:dh
122101-25

040 EPA

Please respond by _____

1/31

→ TO: Pete Aldridge

you can see
the evolution of this
in the attached notes
Let me know when you
want to put something
together.

Di Rita

21 Dec 01

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: August 25, 2001
 SUBJECT: EPA

I did talk to Christie Todd-Whitman. She says we need to get discussions underway and very soon between her office and the Pentagon. She wants to be helpful. I told her that I would probably get our General Counsel to get it started. Please see that it happens.

Thanks.

9/5

~~TO: JUSD (AT&L)
 → Asy Du Bois -
 As discussed.
 Larry D. Rita~~

DHR/asm
062501.06

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 21 2001

12/20

SECDEF -

Follow up into attached,
 fyi.
 D. Rita

12/17
08:00



Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations & Environment)

12/20

INFO ONLY,
NO ACTION
REQUIRED

TO: Secretary of Defense

THROUGH: E.C. Aldridge *12/13/01*

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Jr. *Ray DuBois*

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DATE: December 11, 2001

DEC 21 2001

SUBJECT: Governor Christie Todd Whitman

- Larry DiRita asked that I send you a short note following up on my meeting with Gov Whitman and the ensuing discussions between our two senior staffs.
- I met with Gov Whitman pursuant to her dinner with you. She and I had a very constructive discussion to include her commitment to work with the DoD on resolving long standing thorny issues; e.g., land use controls, PCB transfers from Mare Island, PCB disposal from Japan, health standards for perchlorate and recovery of "economic benefit" in enforcement.
- She would like me to address an upcoming EPA Regional Directors meeting here in Washington (TBD).
- In the meantime, JP Woodley (ADUSD/Environment) will visit EPA Region 7 in Kansas City on 11-12 December and will continue his meetings with individual Regional Directors over the next several months.
- The Mare Island PCB issue has been resolved after a detailed and lengthy set of discussions initiated at my meeting with Gov. Whitman. The Mayor of Vallejo and others have called to thank us for persevering with EPA.
- Finally, Gov Whitman said she thought that a very effective way for the SecDef and the EPA Administrator to demonstrate a unified position, especially to disavow any notion that since DoD is at war, the environment is no longer a concern would be for her to come over to the Pentagon to address our senior leadership on environmental issues, etc. (as Paul O'Neill did on workplace safety).

SECDEF
If she come we can ask her to brief our people on how EPA can make it easier to close bases. DiRita

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meehan Book Excerpts

Attached is a copy of an excerpt from a book with some questions we might want to consider as we go along.

Attach.

DHR:dh
031001-1 1

381

10 Mar 01

**SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR A
NEW SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO ASK
AND WHY**

The development of a national military strategy is both a dialectic and iterative process shaped by those charged with the responsibility. Strategy is a result of objectives and policy, which by the nature of the political element are in a constant state of change—these changes in defense objectives or policy must bring change to military strategy, military force structure, and priorities for budgeting in a constrained resource environment.

Given the impediments to the development of a national military strategy and the unfortunate results of the past, a new Secretary of Defense can overcome these obstacles by seeking the answers to a set of questions I suggest that should align his thinking with the logic of the PPBS process. This set of questions is not lengthy, and its answers do not provide policy and strategy in and of themselves; the answers provide input to the policy process and lead naturally to another set of questions of a Secretary's choosing, to clarify for himself the evolution and direction of his defense policy.

The Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary for Policy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should all participate in the discussion. The Service Secretaries are not included. Because strategy is a policy and operational concept and the Service Secretaries are not in the operational chain of command as detailed by the 1947 National Security Act, they

should not be included in the process. (The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is also not in the chain of command but is the principal advisor on defense policy to the Secretary of Defense; the Service Secretaries' primary roles are to oversee the mission of their respective Service, "... to organize, train, and equip.")

Because, by law, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged with the responsibility of providing the Secretary of Defense a recommended strategic concept, the majority of the input on military strategy must come from the JCS. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should provide proposed defense guidance, and then the Secretary should consider it as the basis on which to develop military strategy.

The answers to the Secretary might take the form of written responses, but it is imperative they be followed up with face-to-face discussions among the principals. Again, I must emphasize that the process is iterative. Having the answers to the suggested questions is *never* enough. Policy initiatives or changes demand that the total military implications of the policy be reviewed to ensure the extent of the implications are in fact aligned with what the President and the Secretary believe and desire the policy to demand.

For example, given President Carter's direction to establish a Rapid Deployment Force, did he or Secretary Brown envision the fiscal costs involved with such an undertaking or the separate strategy or command structure demanded by the implementation of a policy of '<defending access to Middle East oil'?

Perhaps most useful to a new Secretary of Defense might be the assistance which the process of answering the suggested questions will have in his transition to office. The transition of political power from one

administration to another is an interesting phenomenon in American politics, but it appears to be reinvented on every occasion. Generally speaking, there is no set agenda for a transition, and seldom is there anyone available who has gone through the process before. If as suggested earlier in this paper, a new Secretary's time is taken with programing actions from the outset, then the problems associated with operating without a national military strategy will continue as I described.

Questions

By answering the following questions early in an administration's term, a Secretary may avoid the inevitable later in his term when he mutters, "... if I only knew then what I know now."

- 1. One minute prior to my being sworn into office, what formal foreign policy treaties and commitments is the United States obligated militarily to discharge?*
- 2. To what commitments beyond formal foreign policy has the- United States obligated itself which would call for military capability to either enforce or execute?*

The answers to these two questions would emphasize the concept that military strategy must be the supporting element of the nation's political objective through the application of military capability as well as provide knowledge of the extent and size of United States commitments.

- 3. What is the military requirements process, and how does it play into the PPBS process?*
- 4. What is the Joint Chiefs of Staff Planning Force, and how does it differ from the Department's Five Year Defense Proggm and why?*

5. *What is the strategy-force mismatch and the related concept of military risk?*

The answers to these questions get at the heart of the PPBS process-that is, military requirements and budgeting to meet those requirements-and give a Secretary of Defense the numerical and military rationale of what the CINCs and JCS suggest in their best judgment is necessary to counter the evolving threat over the long term. The explanations of strategy-force mismatch and military risk provide an understanding of the seriousness of the current and programmed force structure in relation to foreign policy commitments, the threat, and potential wartime scenarios.

6. *What are the major defense policy principles under which the JCS and CINCs are currently operating and the JCS understanding of the total military implications of those policies?*

The answers should provide a Secretary an understanding of what the JCS believes defense policy means and its military and force implications, and most important, these questions should permit the Secretary an opportunity to gauge his intent in policy against what he desires-i.e., a dialogue which would put all parties concerned on the same track.

7. *Using major policy principles as a base, what nation & military strategy (and alternatives) will translate defense policy into requirements for military capabilities and force structure to counter the threat?*

Specifically, the strategy developed and approved by the Secretary should be a clear statement in military terms of the intent of a Secretary's policy for further translation into military capabilities. Follow-on discussions would reveal whether the intent of a Secretary's policy

is being followed. Once approved, the strategy should be published intact in the Defense Guidance to provide in one publication the defense objectives, strategy, and guidance that lead to the programs and budget of each of the Services to support the strategy.

8. *For all major programs currently budgeted or planned, what is the JCS explanation of where each fits into the approved strategy and why?*

9. *For each major program, what is the JCS priority for each in relation to all other programs?*

Once the strategy is developed and approved, the comparison of a program to that strategy becomes easy. The examination of a program with the strategy as its basis permits the Secretary to determine the relevance and priority of that program in relation to other programs in a constrained budget.

snowflake

TO: Chris Williams

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 26, 2001

SUBJECT: **Foreign Military Training**

I've been over this foreign military training paper. I would like it redone; specifically, on the page that says response to SecDef question, it shows that there are a variety of programs and yet the attachment doesn't distinguish among the programs.

I would like to see a separate sheet showing the country on the number of students and the cost *within each program category*, if that's possible.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
032601.18
Attach.

350.2

26MAR01

snowflake

March 10, 2001 4:24 PM

TO: ~~RDML Quinn~~ (w/o ATTACH.)
 CC: ~~BILLSCHWEIDER~~ (w/o ATTACH.) Chris Williams WORKING
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 9R

SUBJECT: Foreign Military Training

Here is the Congressional report on foreign military training. I started signing everything, and I got tired. You can have somebody sign the rest of them with the machine.

Nowhere in here do I see a succinct summary of what we have done to train people from other countries—the countries, the number of people in one column, the types of training in another—so I can get a grip in a one- or two-page overview of the whole program. I thumbed through here, and I didn't see anything like that.

Second, I think this program is enormously important, and it is something I think we want to talk about in our testimony before Congress. Maybe we should try to do two things: increase the funds for it and enable us to not require that foreigners pay the full value. There are some countries that really cannot afford it, and it is very much in our interest to have a hand in training those people.

Why don't you see if you can get me some answers to some of this. Thanks.

~~Attach.~~

SIR,

DHR:dh
031001-8

Remme -
 Don by O'Grady's
 by GMY - full MT
 JH cut w. cut.
 + Proj effort cut-

Some answers provided
by the Policy Shop.

✓R

JJ/SMA



DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2800

SECRET OF DEFENSE 15 MAR 2001

2001 MAR 16 PM 12: 50 100/014821-PMD

B3/16/01

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *-COPY PROVIDED*

THROUGH: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR *CAW* 3/16/01
POLICY MATTERS (Chris Williams, 695-5 136) *J.P.S.*
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY SUPPORT) *P.V.* 3/15
(Pete Verga, 697-0285) *cc provided.*
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Bear McConnell, 693-047 1)

A.R. Kuty Jr

FROM: Director, DSCA, Lt Gen Tome H. Walters, Jr., USAF, 604 6004
(Prepared by: Rita Verry, DSCA/PPP, 601-3672)

SUBJECT: Congressional Report on Foreign Military Training

PURPOSE: To provide answers to questions on Foreign Military Training posed by Secretary Rumsfeld.

COORDINATION: N/A

Attachments
As stated

U05497 /01

RESPONSE TO SECDEF QUESTION: FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING

GENERAL

- Secretary Rumsfeld asked for a succinct summary of what we have done to train people from other countries and the types of training programs provided.
- Secretary Rumsfeld also emphasized the importance of the program and requested information concerning increasing funds for these programs and enabling us to not require that foreigners pay the full value (TAB 1).

SUMMARY

- The annual Foreign Military Training Report (3 volumes) provides Congress with an extensive overview of all foreign students trained during the last fiscal year as well as proposed training for the upcoming year,
- Over 64,000 students were trained at a cost of approximately \$516M in FY00. Breakouts by country for FY00 are provided at TAB 2.
- Training was provided through several programs:
 - Foreign Military Sales (FMS)---\$346M
 - Department of State (DOS) funded activities. For example: International Military Education and Training (IMET); Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funded training; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL); Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC); and Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) drawdown for narcotics education and training---\$95M
 - Department of Defense (DOD) funded activities. For example: Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities; Humanitarian Demining; Service Academy; Aviation Leadership Program; Exchanges; and Regional Programs---\$75M

IMPORTANCE OF THE PROGRAM

- The Military Departments, CINCs, and OSD staff strongly agree this program is' enormously important. All have been pushing to increase it---with some success. IMET funding has grown from \$49.8M in FY00 to \$57.9M in FY01 . We requested \$65M for FY02.
- All want it to grow further and are hoping to reach \$100M over the next three years. We are studying the numbers of student quotas available and schoolhouse maximum capacity levels to help define realistic limits.
- Most countries do receive a reduced tuition rate. 118 of the 180 countries listed in the report currently receive IMET dollars which allows them to pay only the incremental costs necessary to add their students to an existing class---vice having to pay the full cost.

FY00 Foreign Military Training Information

Country	Number of Students Trained	Total Cost
Albania	183	\$1,134,018
Algeria	12	\$129,422
Angola	4	\$14,422
Antigua And Barbuda (UK)	61	\$346,276
Argentina	282	\$1,169,724
Armenia	14	\$242,417
Australia	1,044	\$7,017,650
Austria	59	\$201,317
Azerbaiian	84	\$1,299,767
Bahamas	12	\$149,319
Bahrain	437	\$2,396,207
Bangladesh	57	\$823,014
Barbados	18	\$277,595
Belarus	15	\$310,767
Belgium	265	\$2,812,480
Belize	45	\$161,000
Benin	406	\$1,812,659
Bolivia	531	\$1,936,876
Bosnia & Herzegovina	321	\$2,191,978
Botswana	124	\$589,142
Brazil	329	\$3,826,537
Brunei	12	\$103,132
Bulgaria	244	\$2,200,967
Burkina FASO	3	\$14,422
Burundi	3	\$7,462
Cameroon	126	\$805,562
Canada	1,226	\$7,360,602
Cape Verde, Republic Of	9	\$137,422
Central African Republic	4	\$109,960
Chad	125	\$397,067
Chile	445	\$1,221,492
Colombia	5,490	\$13,900,263
Comoros	1	\$7,462
Congo (Brazzaville)	4	\$14,422
Costa Rica	254	\$1,038,937
Cote d'Ivoire	778	\$3,177,255
Croatia	178	\$1,440,639
Czech Republic	392	\$2,133,409
Denmark	275	\$4,574,618
Djibouti	6	\$228,422
Dominica	44	\$91,638
Dominican Republic	275	\$892,518
Ecuador	662	\$3,359,826
Egypt	1,462	\$14,920,934
El Salvador	349	\$1,731,304
Equatorial Guinea	1	\$7,462
Eritrea	4	\$41,422
Estonia	253	\$2,628,426
Ethiopia	4	\$159,462
Fiji	22	\$222,560

FY00 Foreign Military Training Information

Country	Number of Students Trained	Total Cost
Finland	74	\$419,893
France	580	\$3,960,191
Gabon	7	\$61,422
Gambia	4	\$14,422
Georgia	416	\$3,941,164
Germany	1,740	\$21,353,185
Ghana	62	\$464,422
Greece	1,642	\$6,211,525
Grenada	44	\$87,957
Guatemala	70	\$516,171
Guinea	127	\$264,422
Guinea-Bissau	5	\$36,422
Guyana	23	\$219,233
Haiti	189	\$257,000
Honduras	540	\$1,105,971
Hungary	284	\$1,704,946
Iceland	13	\$25,000
India	28	\$601,468
Indonesia	6	\$109,649
Iraq	22	\$117,651
Ireland	4	\$79,774
Israel	1,253	\$21,994,351
Jamaica	1,365	\$747,670.86
Japan	4,005	\$13,143,935
Jordan	604	\$3,200,146
Kazakhstan	49	\$980,649
Kenya	115	\$449,152
Kiribati	1	\$13,139
Korea	3,494	\$9,643,399
Kuwait	772	\$10,924,033
Kyrgyzstan	77	\$948,785
Laos	5	\$51,541
Latvia	354	\$2,895,229
Lebanon	178	\$1,441,777
Lesotho	73	\$100,422
Liberia	2	\$6,960
Lithuania	362	\$1,930,953
Macedonia	305	\$1,094,450
Madagascar	33	\$207,929
Malawi	894	\$1,322,422
Malaysia	595	\$1,460,487
Maldives	1,314	\$275,507
Maldives	1,314	\$1,616,986
Malta	69	\$130,000
Marshall Islands	2	\$25,086
Mauritania	4	\$14,422
Mauritius	28	\$118,508
Mexico	564	\$2,770,908
Micronesia	2	\$25,086

FYOO Foreign Military Training Information

Country	Number of Students Trained	Total Cost
Moldova	89	\$774,436
Mongolia	136	\$586,266
Morocco	48	\$971,103
Mozambique	101	\$360,422
Namibia	14	\$189,422
Nepal	66	\$283,014
Netherlands	5,787	\$37,960,552
Netherlands Antilles (NE)	0	\$0
New Zealand	118	\$405,231
Nicaragua	144	\$437,533
Niger	4	\$14,422
Nigeria	129	\$723,979
Norway	716	\$26,845,685
Oman	1	\$429,643
Pakistan	44	\$565,507
Palau	1	\$30,000
Panama	41	\$230,976
Papua New Guinea	102	\$244,014
Paraguay	136	\$389,934
Peru	995	\$5,185,627
Philippines	595	\$3,126,103
Poland	1,005	\$3,903,759
Portugal	105	\$794,836
Qatar	59	\$1,147,855
Romania	353	\$4,571,343
Russia	364	\$1,995,390
Rwanda	10	\$170,960
Samoa	69	\$96,947
Sao Tome And Principe	4	\$52,462
Saudi Arabia	1,608	\$80,548,783
Senegal	760	\$3,331,659
Seychelles	26	\$251,000
Sierra Leone	2	\$6,960
Singapore	1,255	\$24,538,124
Slovakia	149	\$1,061,509
Slovenia	8361	\$1,437,623
Solomon Islands	21	\$74,560
South Africa	470	\$960,936
Spain	1,289	\$6,915,240
Sri Lanka	344	\$1,208,045
St Kitts And Nevis	46	\$146,638
St Lucia	46	\$128,000
St Vincent And Grenadines	63	\$208,319
Suriname	154	\$631,276
Swaziland	22	\$119,422
Sweden	77	\$1,639,945
Switzerland	80	\$571,389
Taiwan	662	\$10,034,461
Tajikistan	38	\$423,045
Tanzania	14	\$181,422

FY00 Foreign Military Training Information

Country	Number of Students Trained	Total Cost
Thailand	1,468	\$6,934,171
Togo	5	\$14,422
Tonga	64	\$181,507
Trinidad-Tobago	127	\$996,328
Tunisia	90	\$1,137,712
Turkey	833	\$9,653,797
Turkmenistan	73	\$555,328
Tuvalu	1	\$11,947
Uganda	24	\$261,422
Ukraine	451	\$2,369,622
United Arab Emirates	186	\$6,162,902
United Kingdom	607	\$5,291,834
Uruguay	94	\$408,132
Uzbekistan	67	\$1,052,400
Vanuatu	5	\$100,507
Venezuela	590	\$2,677,004
Viet Nam	4	\$40,736
Yemen	- 101	\$308,462
Yugoslavia	46	\$198,494
Zambia	168	\$370,422
Zimbabwe	73	\$1,220,480
	64,150	\$516,268,348

snowflake

April 26, 2001 6:59 AM

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: BAH Rates

Attached is some material on the BAH Rates, which you might want to take a look at sometime, and then we could discuss the subject.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/9/01 SecDef memo to de Leon re: "BAH Rates"

DHR:dh
04260 1-2

240

26 APR 01

U08304 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/776

April 9, 2001 5:36 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: BAH Rates

DR

I just read your memo on BAH rates.

On the assumption that the President is not going to want supplementals, there must be a way to do this with a contingency fund of some kind that can be triggered in, in the event that energy rates go up or some other things.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach,

4/3 Memo from Mr. de Leon re: Enlisted Advisors and BAH Rates

DHR:dh
04040 J-49

April 16, 2001

yes. Mr. Secretary, if emergency conditions present themselves in an area like the BAH and unexpected utility rates, the Department could use its reprogramming authorities to move dollars into the BAH account. While the reprogramming would need Congressional approval, it is quite possible that this adjustment in BAH rates could occur without the need for a supplemental.

R

11-L-0559/OSD/777

April 3, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld

From: Rudy de Leon 

Re: Enlisted Advisors and BAH Rates

Mr. Secretary:

Admiral Tracey reports that she has draft legislation that would give the Secretary of Defense the authority to adjust BAH rates mid-year if circumstances merit. The services are discussing this issue right now and trying to determine the threshold that would trigger an out of cycle adjustment.

With respect to the west coast (California and Washington state), the BAH rates were adjusted in January to provide extra dollars for higher utility rates.

She also believes that the BAH process needs a mechanism to foresee rate increases that are accelerating because of extraordinary circumstances (like the soaring energy rates on the west coast).

At the same time, no single formula will ever get it budgeted exactly right. This will put pressure on the Department, and, from time to time necessitate supplemental funding.

11-L-0559/OSD/778

snowflake

March 27, 2001 6:29 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: BAH

I am told we can only change BAH once a year, and with the California energy crisis, it is a problem. That might be a law we want to adjust. I got that from the senior enlisted folks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032701-10

11-L-0559/OSD/779

137791-01

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

April 26, 2001

From:

(b)(6)

MEMO FOR

TO:

C&D

THRU:

ExecSec

MIC
4/27/01

27 APR 1810


JCB

1. Please forward these memos from SecDef to the addressees, along with their associated attachments.
2. NOTE: Some attachments are comprised of previous SecDef memos-please take care that these memos do not get separated out and then sent again. They are part of the attachments.

3. Please control a file copy.

No further action or coordination is required at this time.

Thanks,
DH



snowflake

May 29, 2001 9:56 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Training and Leader Development Panels

Would you please read this material from General Shinseki and then circulate it to the appropriate people in OSD?

Thanks.

Attach.
4/23/01 Shinseki memo to SecDef w/attachment

DHR:dh
052901-14

353

29 May 01

U10084 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/781



**UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF**

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

April 23, 2001

2001 APR 26 AM 11:16

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000



Dear Mr. Secretary:

On June 6, 2000, The Army chartered three Training and Leader Development Panels to review, assess and provide recommendations for the training and development of the Army's 21st Century leaders. The first panel focused on commissioned officers, the second panel, which began in January, focuses on Non-Commissioned Officers, and the third panel will focus on Warrant Officers.

The findings, conclusions, and recommendations are comprehensive, credible, and founded on feedback received from a sampling of almost 14,000 interviews (Executive Summary attached). Acceptance of the conclusions and recommendations provides The Army a clear azimuth for adapting existing training and leader development programs to the requirements of Army Transformation and the Objective Force.

The panel confirmed our assessment that The Army needs a mechanism to continually assess, evaluate, and obtain feedback on its training and leader development programs and recommended an Army Training and Leader Development Management Process to meet that need. Other strategic recommendations address Army Culture, the Officer Education System, our Systems Approach to Training, collective training programs, lifelong learning and a Training and Leader Development Model. The report's 84 recommendations will serve as the starting point for our quarterly assessment and feedback sessions focused on training and leader development for the Objective Force.

Prior to releasing the reports, I intend to inform selected members of Congress about the key findings. The Army staff is now developing an implementation plan that immediately addresses all priority one, near-term actions. We have briefed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on the report's contents and are prepared to brief you, if desired. The report provides compelling evidence that our main effort in achieving The Army Vision should be the development of our People. As we implement the recommendations of these panels, we will focus our efforts on the skill sets that enable our Objective Force Soldiers and leaders to conduct decisive actions across the full spectrum of military operations.

Very respectfully,

Eric K. Shinseki
General, United States Army

11-L-0559/OSD/782

U08195- /01

4/30
2:40
DAX

Executive Summary

PURPOSE

ES-1. This is the Army Training and Leader Development Panel's (ATLDP) report of its findings, conclusions, and recommendations, with an action plan for Army Staff policy review and resourcing determinations. This report applies primarily to commissioned officers. Subsequent Panel efforts will address noncommissioned officers, and warrant officers.

BACKGROUND

ES-2. The Army is addressing Doctrine, Organization, and Materiel in its Transformation Campaign Plan. It is finalizing FM 1, *The Army*, and FM 3-O (100-5), *Operations*. It is fielding the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) while developing the Organizational and Operational Concepts (O&O) for the Interim Division (IDIV) and the Objective Force. Work progresses in fielding the Future Combat System. With Doctrine, Organization, and Materiel initiatives well underway, the Chief of Staff, Army, (CSA) chartered the Panel to look specifically at training and leader development, part of Line of Operation 5 of the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan.

ES-3. The Army Vision of being more strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the operational spectrum has three component parts: Readiness, Transformation, and People. The Panel's initial mission analysis and planning focused on Transformation and contributing to the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan. However, as the Panel began contacting soldiers in the field it became apparent that its mission was principally about people. Soldiers and their families are the Army's center of gravity, and as such, they became the focus of the Panel's effort. The Panel assessed Army training and leader development doctrine and practices to determine their applicability and suitability for the Interim Force. The Panel also worked to determine the characteristics and skills required of Information Age Army leaders who must conduct strategically responsive operations in tomorrow's full spectrum battlespace.

ES-4. The Panel's work provides compelling evidence that a main effort in Army Transformation should be to link training and leader development to prepare Army leaders for full spectrum operations. Linking these two imperatives commits the Army to training soldiers and growing them into leaders. This report, then, is about the Army's people, their beliefs, and the systems that sustain their commitment to the institution. It is also about the practices that dilute their efforts and detract from their remarkable, selfless, and honorable service to the Nation.

WHAT THE FIELD TOLD US

ES-5. The soldiers interviewed in the field transmitted their thoughts in clear text and with passion. Pride in the Army, service to the Nation, camaraderie, and Army values strongly influence the decisions of officers and their spouses to make the Army a career. They communicated the same passion and dedication for selfless service to the Nation and the Army as any generation before them. However, they see Army practices as being out of balance with Army beliefs. A detailed discussion and the supporting data and analysis about what they said are in Chapter 2, Strategic Conclusions and Recommendations, and the Study Group appendices. This is a summation of what they said:

- While fully recognizing the requirements associated with a career in the Army, soldiers steadfastly commented that the Army Culture is out of balance and outside the Band of Tolerance. They cited the following examples:
 - An undisciplined operational pace impacts every aspect of Army Culture.
 - The Army expects more commitment from officers and their families than it currently provides. The Army is not meeting the expectations of officer cohorts regarding their operational experiences, time with family, and the value of their service.

Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report (Officers)

- Micromanagement is pervasive in the force. Institutional invulnerability to criticism is pursued at the expense of trust in subordinates and underwriting their developmental process.
- There is some mistrust of senior leadership. Issues include: insufficient senior to subordinate contact, leaders are not the primary trainers, leaders not present during training, leaders focused up versus down, and leaders unwilling to turn down excessive and late taskings.
- The **Officer** Evaluation Report (OER) is unfair both in its system and application.
- In the area of leader development, the field raised the following issues:
 - There is a lack of consistent, integrated, and thoughtful leader development
 - The officer corps does not fully understand effective leader development; so effective leader development programs do not exist.
 - Personnel management drives operational assignments at the expense of quality developmental experiences.
 - Lieutenants want to be platoon leaders and lead soldiers, not serve in captain staff positions. They are disappointed because they are rushed through developmental leadership positions and often do not have the opportunity to master their tactical and technical leadership skills.
 - The Officer Education System (OES) does not train and educate officers in the skill sets they need for full spectrum operations.
 - The Army lacks training and education publications and standards for its legacy and interim forces.
- Under the area of training, soldiers raised the following concerns:
 - The Combat Training Centers (CTCs) are a great training and leader development experience, one the Army must sustain.
 - Army training doctrine is fundamentally sound but must be adapted to reflect the Operational Environment and the tools required to train in that environment.
 - Units cannot execute home station training in accordance with Army training doctrine because of the undisciplined application of that doctrine, resource shortages, and limited training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS).

PANEL DISCUSSIONS

ES-6. The Panel's discussions were critical in framing the results of Study Group efforts and synthesizing their findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the tactical to the operational and strategic levels. The Panel supports Study Group major findings in the areas of Army Culture, the OES, Army training, the Systems Approach to Training (SAT), and the link between training and leader development. The Panel investigated two other key areas-

- * First, the Panel looked at how the Army develops its current leader competencies for its leaders and units to operate in the operational environment envisioned for the Objective Force. The Panel defined competency as an underlying characteristic related to effective or superior performance. Competencies provide a common language to discuss leader and unit performance, and leader selection, development, and advancement. This common language enables the Army to assess leadership and units, and feedback the results into its training and leader development programs. Competencies also provide a **roadmap**, enabling leaders and units to know what they have to accomplish.
- The Panel found that the Army's current leadership doctrine uses two methods to develop leader competencies-values-based and research-based. The Army's values-based leader competencies are irrefutable, even if the environment changes. They are at the heart and soul of the soldier's profession. They are the foundation on which all other leader competencies are based. The research method examines the performance of successful leaders, systematically analyzing their behavior and validating them as consistent with superior performers to derive the remaining skills, knowledge, and attributes. These research-based competencies can change over time as the environment changes. As the Army undergoes Transformation, it is using a third method (strategy-based) for developing leader competencies driven by


the Army's strategic direction. The strategy-based method enables the Army to position itself and its leadership for the future, even when that future is uncertain.

- The Army depends on leaders and units that have the requisite leader competencies to execute full spectrum operations. They must thrive in a complex environment **marked** by the challenge of high-intensity combat and the ambiguities inherent in stability operations and support operations. They require competencies that are matched to those new operating conditions and that support the requirement for lifelong learning, which emphasizes the leadership skills and attributes to help the leader and unit-
 - Become aware of the need for new competencies in rapidly changing environments.
 - Know how to develop those new competencies.
 - Transfer that learning and associated competencies to other leaders and units.
 - Institutionalize learning in the Army's culture and systems to increase self-awareness and adaptability.
- The Panel concluded that given the ambiguous nature of the Objective Force's operational environment, Army leaders should focus on developing the "enduring competencies" of self-awareness and adaptability. In this context, self-awareness is the ability to understand how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn how to correct those weaknesses. Adaptability is the ability to recognize changes to the environment; assess against that environment to determine what is new and what to learn to be effective; and the learning process that follows.. .all to standard and with feedback. Self-awareness and adaptability are symbiotic; one without the other is useless. Self-awareness without adaptability is a leader who cannot learn to accept change and modify behavior brought about by changes to his environment. Adaptability without self-awareness is irrationally changing for change sake, not understanding the relationship between abilities, duties, and the environment. Because these two competencies are so important, the Panel describes them as metacompetencies. They enable lifelong learning and their mastery leads to success in **using** many **other** skills required in full spectrum operations. The operational environment requires **lifelong** learning by Army officers and units that have ingrained **the** metacompetencies of self-awareness and adaptability as the most important skills and characteristics requisite for mission success in the Objective Force.
- The Panel concluded that the Army must use all three strategies to harness the potential of its leaders. The values-based method provides the foundation for leader competencies. The research-based method provides successful leader competencies of leaders past and **present**. The strategy-based method enables lifelong learning through the enduring competencies of self-awareness and adaptability for an uncertain and constantly changing environment.
- Second, the Panel concluded that to be an efficient learning organization, the Army must have standards and effective assessment, evaluation, and feedback systems for leaders, units, and itself. While the **after-action review (AAR)** process is a time-tested and proven system for units, there appears to be no approved feedback mechanism for individual leaders. Additionally, the Army lacks an institutional mechanism that provides an assessment, evaluation, and **feedback** on the status of its training and leader development programs.

METHODOLOGY

ES-7. The CSA directed the Panel to focus initially on commissioned officers and to plan for similar, follow-on studies of noncommissioned officers and warrant officers.

ES-K The Panel task organized four Study Groups, an Integration Team, and a Red Team from its members. Three Study Groups assessed the unit, institution, and self-development pillars of the Army's current Leader Development Model. A fourth Study Group examined Army Culture as it relates to officer development, service ethic, and retention. Senior officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian subject matter experts from industry and academia provided the Study Groups and the Study Director with expert advice and direction. The Panel's analytic process was thorough, and concentrated on specified and implied tasks directed by the CSA and the Panel's Executive Agent, the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command. The Study Groups used comprehensive surveys, focus group interviews, personal interviews, and independent research to compile data for analysis. They traveled around the world conducting surveys and interviews with more than 13,500 leaders and spouses around the Army.




ES-9. The Panel convened on 12 June 2000. The Panel conducted a mission analysis and literature review to prepare for conducting field interviews and surveys. Following the fieldwork, the Panel conducted an analysis of the information collected, determined conclusions, and made recommendations. The Panel provided the CG, TRADOC, and the CSA with in-process reviews at regular intervals. The Study Director conducted an initial outbrief to the CSA in Washington, D.C. on 10 October 2000, followed by briefings to Army General Officers throughout October, November, and December.


RESEARCH DEMOGRAPHICS

ES- 10. The Panel contacted approximately 13,500 soldiers in 61 locations worldwide from all cohorts, components, and major commands using surveys, focus group interviews, personal interviews, and independent research. These research demographics provided extensive and credible sampling data to determine findings, develop conclusions, and make recommendations.


ES-I 1. Nearly 13.5% (9,000+) of active component officers and 1,058 reserve component personnel were interviewed or surveyed. Contacts included personnel committed to the Army as a career, those undecided, and those considering leaving the Army, resulting in a full range of opinions on all issues. The charts below show the breakout of the comprehensive surveys and focus group interviews. They also show the distribution between genders, rank, type of unit (TOE and TDA), and the distribution among the combat, combat support, and combat service support officers. Commissioned



officers comprised 76% of the research sample, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) 21%, and warrant officers (WOs) 3%. Army General Officers (GOs) also participated in the study through interviews and surveys.



The sampling data demographics of gender, race, and rank reflect Army demographics.




STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

ES-12. Since 1988, the Army's operational doctrine has evolved from AirLand Battle, to War and Military Operations Other Than War, to contemporary full spectrum operations. The Army's training doctrine—FM 7-0 (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 7-10 (25-101), *Battle Focused Training*—is separate and distinct from its leader development doctrine, FM 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership*. The Army cannot continue the practice of maintaining training and leader development as separate and distinct imperatives.

ES-13. The Army depends on self-aware and adaptive leaders who have the requisite technical and tactical competence and leader skills to execute full spectrum operations. Those leaders must thrive in a complex environment marked by the challenge of high-intensity combat and the ambiguities inherent in stability operations and support operations. From the Army's perspective, no clear-cut line distinguishes "war" and "operations other than war." Stability operations may explode into firefights without warning, requiring Army forces to interact with local populations and displaced persons while in the midst of decisive operations. The dominance of Army forces in high-intensity, open maneuver compels adversaries to attack asymmetrically, exploiting physical and mental vulnerabilities.

At the same time, Army forces must retain the ability to close with and destroy the well-equipped and motivated enemy who refuses to yield vital terrain and facilities, with each operation being conducted under the close scrutiny of the media. Technology will not provide convenient solutions to these challenges.


ES-14. Today's Operational Environment is not new. It has evolved since 1989 with the fall of the Iron Curtain and breakup of the Warsaw Pact. The Army has recognized for a decade the need to change to remain relevant to the strategic environment. Left to its own devices, the Army has been slow to adapt. Today, it continues to fall behind in adapting training and leader development programs. The Operational Environment has changed faster than the Army has adapted its training and leader development programs. Consequently, these programs must change quickly to become relevant. The Panel found significant evidence that current programs and resourcing are not working. They reflect neither what it takes to train and grow today's leaders nor the pervasive impact of Army Culture on training and leader development. They also do not reflect the significance of being a learning organization and of learning from educational and operational experiences using uniform, published standards for soldiers, leaders, and units. Training standards for legacy forces are outdated. They do not exist for, or lag behind the fielding of, new organizations. Yet these standards are the basis for assessment and feedback to leaders, units, and the Army. The educational experience is not providing officers the skill sets they need to operate successfully. The Army is not executing its training doctrine. Units cannot train to standard in accordance with Army doctrine because of an undisciplined application of that doctrine, resource shortages, and limited TADSS.



ES-15. The Army has no model reflecting how it thinks about training and leader development. It has no decision management process to assess the components of its training and leader development. The Army is at a strategic decision point for training and leader development. There are two possible **courses** of action-

- Maintain the **status** quo by investing in existing systems, models and procedures.
- Establish new systems, models, and procedures from the best of existing programs to develop leaders for full spectrum operations.

The latter course of action is the better way, but it will take leader resolve, focus, and resources to implement.



ES-16. To move ahead, the Army must be willing to challenge everything from FM 7-O (25–100), *Training the Force*, and FM 7-10 (25–101), *Battle Focused Training*; to OERs; to OPMS XXI; to unit status reporting; to the way the Army designs forces, assigns operational missions, and allocates resources. This requires extensive work, **but** Army leaders are equal to the task.

ES-17. Many of the tools that served the Army well during the Cold War are no longer adequate. The Army must adapt OES curricula to prepare for a new **operating** environment characterized by regional threats, full spectrum operations, and Information Age technology. To prepare for the noncontiguous, nonlinear battlefields facing the Army during Transformation and beyond, all leaders must be warfighters first. They must be competent in conducting combined arms operations and bonded to the Army before, and as a higher priority than, to their branch. They **must be** cohesive as a year group and as an officer cohort, self-aware and adaptive, and committed to lifelong learning. A restructured OES can provide these opportunities. Renewed emphasis on home station training to standard, recapitalizing/modernizing CTCs, and investing in TADSS round out the Army’s new strategic opportunities. The Army must base both OES and training programs on the SAT, with well-defined and measurable standards.


STRATEGIC CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ES-18. The Panel compiled and analyzed data from more than 13,500 leaders, using comprehensive surveys, focus group interviews, personal interviews, and independent research. This work led to a number of strategic conclusions. An outline and summary of the strategic conclusions and recommendations follows.

Army Culture	OES	Training	SAT	Training and Leader Development
Service Ethic	Quality & Relevance	Training Doctrine	Training and Educational Products	Skills and Characteristics
Families	Faculty	Home Station Training	support Structure	Proponency
Operational Pace	Accreditation	Training Aids, Devices, Simulations, and Simulators		Lifelong Learning
Retention	Joint Professional Military Education	Combat Training Centers		Officer Standards
Micromanagement				Self-Development
OER				Distance Learning
Officer Personnel Management				Training and Leader Development Model
Mentoring				Management Process

ARMY CULTURE

ES-19. Army Culture is out of balance. There is friction between Army beliefs and practices. Over time, that friction threatens readiness. Training is not done to standard, leader development in operational assignments is limited and does not meet officer expectations, and officers and their families elect to leave the service early. Army Culture is healthy when there is demonstrated trust that stated beliefs equate to actual practices. Such a balance is vital to the health of the profession of arms and to the Nation it serves. Officers understand that there always exists a level of imperfection caused by normal friction between beliefs and practices. This is the Band of Tolerance.



However, officers expressed the strong and passionate feeling that Army Culture is outside this Band of Tolerance and should be addressed immediately. The Army must narrow the gap between beliefs and practices. It must gain and sustain itself within the Band of Tolerance.

ES-20. The first step in improving training and leader development is to recognize that the Army Culture has a direct impact on both of them. In re-establishing balance, leaders must clearly understand that Army Culture is an interwoven mixture of interdependent systems characterized by beliefs and practices. Changes in one system have second and third-order effects on other systems and, ultimately, on how balance is achieved and maintained.

ARMY CULTURE CONCLUSIONS

ES-21. The Panel reached conclusions on the following aspects of Army Culture: the Army Service Ethic, operational pace, retention, micromanagement, the Officer Evaluation Report, personnel management versus leader development, and mentoring.

THE ARMY SERVICE ETHIC

ES-22. The field demonstrated strong support for the underpinnings of an Army Service Ethic: pride in their profession, commitment to the Army and its values, belief in the essential purposes of the military, and patriotism. However, the Army's Service Ethic and concepts of Officership are neither well-understood nor clearly defined. They are also not adequately reinforced throughout an officer's career.

OPERATIONAL PACE


ES-23. Excessive operational pace is a major source of the degradation in the quality of training and leader development. It reduces the quality of operational and educational experiences adversely affecting leader development. It is detrimental to readiness, leader development, and officer job satisfaction; leads to micromanagement; and is a major reason for attrition among all cohorts.

RETENTION

ES-24. Retention is a significant issue across three officer cohorts (lieutenants, captains and majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels). This is a result of a perceived lack of commitment from the Army, limitations on spouse employment, a perceived imbalance between Army expectations and the family, the lack of work predictability, and only limited control over assignments. An excessive operational pace, unmet leader development

expectations, and Army family considerations are major influences on career decisions. Officers do not perceive a commensurate commitment from the Army to them and their families, despite their belief that the Army expects a high degree of commitment from them. Officers want predictability, stability, and more control over their assignments. Officer spouse comments were consistent with those of their husband/wife. Spouses expressed the same commitment to an Army Service Ethic as their husband/wife.

Retention Issues

 <p>Not meeting junior officers' expectations to lead soldiers.</p>	 <p>Do not perceive reasonable assurance of a successful career.</p>	 <p>Do not feel valued for their experience and expertise. Need stability for their families.</p>
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MICROMANAGEMENT

ES-25. Micromanagement has become part of the Army Culture. There is a growing perception that lack of trust stems from the leader's desire to be invulnerable to criticism and blocks the opportunity for subordinates to learn through leadership experience. This climate is in part a direct result of the rank imbalance at company grade level. Many officers have not been properly developed at their current level or position before they are moved to a higher position for which they have been neither educated nor trained. Inexperienced officers, a high operational pace, and associated high standards of achievement encourage senior officers to be more directive in their leadership and less tolerant of mistakes. These practices impact directly on retention and leader development.

THE OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT

ES-26. The OER is a source of mistrust and anxiety. The OER has two fundamental purposes: provide for leader development, and support personnel management. The OER is not yet meeting officer expectations as a leader development tool. The leader development aspects of the OER are seldom used, and senior raters seldom counsel subordinates.

ES-27. Selection boards clearly indicate that the OER is giving them what they need to sort through a very high quality officer population and select those with the greatest potential to lead soldiers. They are confident that the trend for selection will continue with even better results as the OER matures. **However**, despite recent high promotion rates (98% to captain and 92% to major) and three years experience with the current OER, there is considerable anxiety in the force over the evaluation system. Field feedback indicates that officers are concerned about the impact of a center of mass rating on career progression. Officers believe the forced distribution system causes senior raters to pool officers and rate by position. They see the term "center of mass" as negative and believe that a center of mass OER in a branch-qualifying position is career ending. Many junior officers simply do not trust the system or what their leaders are telling them about the OER.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT VERSUS LEADER DEVELOPMENT

ES-28. Assignment requirements, instead of individual leader development needs, drive officer personnel management. DA Pam *600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, focuses on career gates rather than the quality of developmental experiences. Assignment officers make assignments based on quotas to fill spaces rather than leader development. The Army assignments system is driven by **requirements** to fill spaces rather than quality leader development. Officers and field commanders have little say in the current process.

MENTORXNG

ES-29. Officers believe mentoring is important for both personal and professional development, yet a majority of officers report not having mentors. The Army's mentoring definition and doctrine need revising. Officers would like to see a greater emphasis on mentoring, but do not want formal, directed programs.

ARMY CULTURE RECOMMENDATIONS

ES-30. Capitalize on the strong commitment of Army officers and their spouses for service to the Nation and the Army. Define and teach an Army Service Ethic and **Officership** throughout OES from Officer Basic Course (OBC) through the War College, with special emphasis in the OBC and Captains Career **Course (CCC)**. FOCUS on officers' personal and professional expectations from their experiences, and contribute to a common Army understanding of what it means to serve.

ES-3 1. Conduct a complete review of all Army systems to determine which ones demonstrate that the Army is not equally committed to its soldiers-either in actuality or perceptions-and develop an action plan to attack these issues.

ES-32. Reduce the operational pace, which helps address micromanagement and facilitates establishing the conditions for effective leader development. Incorporate the following requirements into the CSA's DA Training Guidance and AR 350-1—

- Re-establish discipline in the training management process by locking-in training schedules in accordance with published Army doctrine. This assists in protecting quality time for soldiers and their families **in unit** assignments and protects weekends and planned holidays from routine garrison training activities for the active component force.
- Eliminate nonmission-related compliance training in AR 350-41, *Training in Units*, and other DA- and MACOM-level documents.
- Protect weekends from routine garrison training and staff activities in active component TOE and TDA units, and MACOM and Army staffs. Require the first General Officer in the chain of command to approve exceptions.
- Schedule four-day weekends in conjunction with national holidays to demonstrate through policy the Army's commitment to quality family time.
- Establish DA and MACOM policies and procedures that vest validation of internal and external taskers 10 subordinate commands in one staff agency. Ensure taskers are valid within the unit's capabilities and prescribed notification times to enforce adherence to the Army training management process.

ES-33. Address officer retention in the three cohorts—

		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Protect junior officers' initial experiences: ensure adequate time in jobs, with associated criteria-based, quality job experiences. Require Major General approval to assign lieutenants above brigade.• Provide training in the Institution through distance learning for lieutenants selected to fill captain staff positions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provide all majors with quality resident intermediate level education based on OPMS XXI.• Eliminate CGSOC educational opportunity as a discriminator.• Eliminate CGSOC selection board starting with Academic Year 03-04.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Place value on service.• Provide stability and educational incentives to retirement-eligible officers.
<p>← Resource Commitment to Spouses and Families →</p>		

ES-34. Continue to work Well Being Task Force and Army Family Action Plan issues to restore the officers' trust that the Army is committed to them and their families. Proactively and frequently communicate to the field the Army's efforts to improve these quality of life areas.

ES-35. Conduct a review of the OER this year to examine its leader development aspects, the terms "above center of mass" and "center of mass," and the counseling and forced distribution requirements. Involve the field in the review. Find effective (multiple, iterative, active) ways of communicating with the Army about selection rates of officers with center of mass ratings for CGSOC, major, lieutenant colonel, battalion and brigade command, and colonel. Reinforce the leader development aspects of the OER to increase communications between junior and senior officers.

ES-36. Revise DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, to focus on growing leaders and providing quality educational and operational experiences rather than time-driven, check-the-block career mapping. Revise the assignment process to give the chain of command more influence on when to reassign junior officers. Permit the chain of command to retain junior officers in critical developmental jobs until they gain quality leader experiences or prove they are not able to meet the standard. Align captain requirements with authorizations. Review captain positions for conversion to lieutenant. Review the use of senior NCOs and Warrant Officers as Limited Duty Officers to fill captain staff positions or nominative assignments. Validate requirements based on DA FY 01 authorized end strength and priorities. Provide lieutenants serving in captain staff positions the standards for those positions, tools to assess their knowledge and a reachback capability to the institution where they can receive the educational experience needed by distance or distributed learning. Establish qualitative standards for branch qualification at lieutenant, captain, and major based on operational experiences, not just on the number of months assigned.

ES-37. Publish the revised definition of mentoring, and develop doctrine for mentoring in FM 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership*. Teach it throughout OES, so junior officers understand what mentoring is and how they should be mentored, and field grade officers understand how they should be mentoring junior officers. Place emphasis in Pre-Command Courses so future battalion and brigade commanders understand Army doctrine, their role in mentoring, and the expectations of officers they will mentor.

OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

ES-38. Over the past ten years the Army's institutional training and education system has attempted to remain relevant to the Operational Environment. But the basic structure and methods within the OES have not appreciably changed. OES also suffers from a lack of resources to provide quality educational experiences. OES must adapt to meet the emerging requirements of full spectrum operations and the transforming Army. It must develop standards and expectations for each course, assess performance against the standards, and provide feedback.

OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM CONCLUSIONS

ES-39. The quality and relevance of OES instruction from OBC through CGSOC does not meet the expectations of many officers. The OES sufficiently teaches branch technical and tactical skills, but combat support and combat service support officers are not adequately taught the basic combat skills necessary to lead and protect their units in full spectrum operations. OES does not satisfactorily train officers in combined arms skills or support the bonding, cohesion, and rapid teaming required in full spectrum operations. With the increasing emphasis the Army places on battle command in war, it must add stability operations, and support operations to OES. The increasing importance of self-aware and adaptive leaders in full spectrum operations requires OES to educate officers on these qualities. The Army misses shared training opportunities in education because the Officer, Noncommissioned Officer, and Warrant Officer Education Systems are stovepiped and not interrelated. The Army's most experienced instructors teach the most experienced students (e.g., Senior Service College) while less experienced instructors teach the least experienced students (e.g., OBC). OES lacks the

courses required to teach officers the skills they require in many of the OPMS XXI functional areas, and does not adequately teach digital operations.

ES-40. **OES Linkage.** The Army must link OES from OBC through Senior Service College (SSC), and inculcate Army Culture, Service Ethic, Commitment, Officership, and Warrior Ethos.

ES-41. **Shared Training.** The Army misses out on shared training. The Army's traditional teaching methodology does not adequately prepare lieutenants to work with platoon sergeants and captains when they initially arrive at their first unit. Significant leadership experiences in NCOES, OBC, and CCC are usually conducted in peer groups. Officers and NCOs come to TRADOC schools expecting to learn how to lead and win in combat. Instead, they often sit in classes where their time is crammed with knowledge-level, classroom instruction in weapons and tactics. Knowledge-level (low level of learning) instruction is required, but this instruction alone cannot grow self-aware and adaptive leaders. The Army must develop battle-focused, execution-based education and training to complement the small group instruction methodology for learning.

ES-42. **CGSOC Selection Policy.** Current CGSOC selection policy makes education a discriminator, particularly for the 50% of officers who do not receive resident education to prepare them for their duties and responsibilities. OPMS XXI and full spectrum operations demand that all officers receive the benefit of an Intermediate Level Educational (ILE) opportunity to develop their talent for their next ten years of service.

ES-43. **OES Accreditation.** There is no comprehensive Army OES accreditation process to **measure—**

- Faculty-Verification of selecting, assigning, and certifying.
- Curricula-Assessment to ensure attaining of curricula purpose and end states, updating curricula, and OES/NCOES/WOES synchronization.
- Facilities-Assessment of physical plant, infrastructure, **training** areas, and improved simulations to simulate the Operational Environment in conjunction with resident live, virtual, and constructive training in accordance with established standards.
- Students-Assess diagnostic and post-instructional exams, remedial training, and **360-degree** assessments.

ES-44. **Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).** Army officers graduating from JPME II and serving in joint billets agree the education effectively prepared them for joint and multinational assignments. They believe attendance at JPME II is important for their job success, but throughput at the Armed Forces Staff College limits the numbers that can attend. Officers who had to wait one or more years, or who did not attend JPME II while assigned in a joint billet felt strongly that JPME II would have significantly improved their initial performance. JCS J7 Military Education Division indicates there is a JPME II training backlog of 2,500 officers for 9,066 joint positions because the Armed Forces Staff College only conducts three courses per year with 300 students each session.

OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS

ES-45. Develop an OES model for full spectrum operations that links OES from OBC through SSC and teaches the Army Service Ethic, particularly in the OBC and CCC. This OES model transforms OBC, CCC, and CGSOC/Intermediate Level Education (ILE). The revised OES produces bonding, rapid team building, cohesion, and trust in cohorts, functional area expertise for OPMS XXI leaders, and leaders who are adept at digital operations. Specific course objectives are-

- * OBC-Develop and implement a new two-phased OBC for lieutenants.
 - First phase is an initial entry course that provides basic small unit combat training to all lieutenants at a central location. This course focuses on establishing a common Army standard for small unit fighting and leadership; teaching common platoon leader skills and Officership; providing opportunities for hands-on, performance-oriented **field** training; and providing opportunities for lieutenants to train with NCOs and captains as part of a combined arms team conducting full spectrum operations.
 - During the second phase of the new OBC, proponent schools provide lieutenants with training on platoon-level, branch-specific technical and tactical skills.

The end state of the new OBC-Lieutenants who have a common bond with their combined arms peers, are technically and tactically proficient small unit leaders, and are ready to assume leadership positions in the transforming Army.

- CCC-Develop and implement a new CCC.

The new CCC provides combined arms training to all captains. This course focuses on establishing a common Army standard for fighting, leading, and training combined arms units; teaching common company command skills, and **Officership**; teaching battalion- and brigade-level combined arms battle captain skills; providing opportunities for hands-on, performance-oriented field and simulation training; and providing opportunities for captains to train with lieutenants and **NCOs** as part of a combined arms team conducting full spectrum operations. The new CCC must also provide captains with training on company-level, branch-specific technical and tactical skills.

- The end state of the new CCC-Captains ready to be successful company commanders and battle captains who can plan, prepare, execute, and assess combined arms operations and training at the company, battalion, and brigade level.

- ILE-Provide all majors with a quality resident ILE based on OPMS XXI, giving them a common core of Army operational instruction and career field, branch, or functional area training tailored to prepare them for their future service in the Army.

- This is required by the demands of full spectrum operations and OPMS XXI. ILE for all majors meets that requirement by developing the talent in the officer corps and tailoring their education for their 10th through 20th years of service. It also ends education opportunities as a discriminator for branch qualification, promotion, and command selection. With ILE, all majors receive the same common core instruction that “re-greens” them on Army warfighting doctrine. Following the common core, educational opportunities are tailored to the officers’ career field and functional area. Functional area officers in the three nonoperations career fields receive additional functional area specific training, e.g., qualification course, Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS), and Training With Industry (TWI). Operations Career Field (OPCF) officers will attend the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC) that will give them a graduate-level education in tactical **warfighting** and prepare them for combat command.

- The end state of ILE-Majors with a common warfighting knowledge of division, corps, and joint operations and who possess a better understanding of their career field’s contribution to warfighting. Field grade officers who have the technical, tactical, and leadership skills required to be successful in their career field, branch, and/or functional area.

- Coordinate scheduling of courses in Army Training Resources and Requirements System (ATRRS) to facilitate shared training events between OES, NCOES, and WOES. The goal is to periodically combine **lieutenants**, warrant officers, and sergeants from ANCOC and BNCOC to train adaptive leadership skills in a realistic unit environment and build self-confidence during the educational experience. This challenges the students by providing them with the kind of leadership experience needed to lead forces after graduation and provides them the educational experience more effective by group interaction.
- Embed digital C2 training in new OES courses. Implement an Institutional Digital Education Plan.
- Change the faculty selection and assignment strategy to ensure the best qualified, most experienced instructors (former battalion commanders) are used throughout OES and focused on providing the least experienced students a quality educational experience.
- Establish a comprehensive Army OES military accreditation process to maintain academic standards over time in four areas; faculty, curricula, facilities, and students.
- Develop a web-based feedback system from Army OES schools to units to maintain relevancy with the field.
- Increase the opportunity for officers to become JPME II certified prior to serving in a joint or combined billet by seeking legislative authority to conduct JPME II at the CGSOC and Army War College.

TRAINING

ES-46. Nonmission taskings, an excessive operational pace, and shortage of training resources make it harder and harder to execute home station training in accordance with Army training doctrine. Beyond the day-to-day consequences of missed training opportunities, there is a long-term impact on leader development when junior officers become battalion and brigade commanders. Many do not know or understand what right looks like and may not fully understand the principles of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing training and then retraining to standard. The principles and processes of current training doctrine are sound, but the Army must adapt them to the Operational Environment for TOE and TDA units. The same modernization effort driving the Army's Transformation must also drive the development of TADSS. Many units conduct home station training with modernized weapons and command and control systems using TADSS that are outdated and do not adequately model Army system behaviors and characteristics. Many units have weapons and command and control systems with no associated TADSS. A bright spot in training is the operational and leader development experience the CTCs provide to soldiers, their leaders, and units. The Panel found that the Army must sustain the CTCs, but to do so requires their recapitalization and modernization.

TRAINING CONCLUSIONS

TRAINING DOCTRINE

ES-47. Training doctrine requires adapting to accommodate multiple, asymmetric and unpredictable threats, the Operational Environment, full spectrum operations, **warfighting**, stability operations and support operations, joint and combined operations, and battle staff training. It should include the fundamentally sound principles from current doctrine and the "best practices" in use today, to meet the requirements of the future.

HOME STATION TRAINING

ES-48. Home station training is often not conducted to standard because of an undisciplined application of Army training doctrine exacerbated by an excessive operational pace, resource shortages, and nonmission training requirements.

TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS AND SIMULATIONS

ES-49. TADSS are outdated or nonexistent. Many TADSS do not adequately model the behavior or characteristics of Army systems. The Army often fields new systems without TADSS. There is no **live-virtual-constructive** training strategy as part of an Army Training Strategy that sets priorities and allocates resources in the Program Objective Memorandum. Leaders lack a clear understanding of the role simulations and simulators could play in their training programs.

COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS

ES-50. Officers widely accept the CTCs for their training and leader development experience. The CTCs require recapitalization and modernization to remain relevant.

TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS

TRAINING DOCTRINE

ES-5 1. Rewrite FM 7-O (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 7-10 (25-1 01), *Battle Focused Training*, to adapt to full spectrum operations. Consider training management tools developed to meet training requirements in today's environment. Link both to operational (FM 3-0, (100-5) *Operations*) and leader development (FM 6-22 (22-1 00), *Army Leadership*) doctrine.

HOME STATION TRAINING

ES-52. Incorporate the following requirements into the CSA's Training Guidance and Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training*-

- Give more training time to company commanders and platoon leaders by providing more discretionary training opportunities. Return to a bottom-up versus top-down approach to training management.
- Develop and establish a set of Army standards that serves as the baseline requirement for stability operations and support operations.
- Train on **warfighting** METL tasks unless ordered to change to stability operations or support operations tasks by the Corps Commander.
- Direct units to conduct stability operations or support operations training not more than 90 days prior to deployment for active component and 390 days for reserve component forces, and adjust **warfighting** readiness reporting requirements during this period.
- Require redeployment and reintegration from stability operations or support operations take 270 days for active and reserve component forces and adjust unit readiness reporting during this recovery period.
- Place responsibility for pre-and post-deployment training with MACOM commanders, using their own resources to help reduce the Army's operational pace.
- Direct FORSCOM to conduct stability operations and support operations training using home-station resources, and USAREUR to continue with the CMTC model.

ES-53. Resource base operations to minimize borrowed military manpower.

TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS AND SIMULATIONS

ES-54. Fund and field training support packages to support **warfighting** integration as **part** of each new system fielding. Upgrade TADSS when the operational system is upgraded. Direct Program Managers to enforce fielding of all **new** systems with their corresponding TADSS.

ES-55. Direct MACOM commanders to develop prioritized requirements for live-virtual-constructive training in their theaters. Synchronize this input into an Army Training Strategy and resource the strategy in the Program Objective Memorandum.

ES-56. Recapitalize legacy system and non-system TADSS to keep pace with force modernization. Do not field systems without associated TADSS. (TADSS must complement system upgrades.)

ES-57. Field the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer family of virtual systems.

ES-58. Field simulation and simulators to enable effective aviation home station and institutional training. These include the Aviation Combat Tactical Trainer, a Tactical Engagement Simulation System (TESS) for the **OH-58D**, AH-64 Combat Mission Simulator, and UH-60 Flight Simulator.

ES-59. Fund CBS to maintain relevance to the training audience until WARSIM reaches full operational capability. Continue development of WARSIM to meet IOC and FOC schedules. Continue development and fielding of ONESAF to increase simulation training realism and reduce training operational tempo.

ES-60. Continue the investment strategy for MILES 2000 to replace aging MILES I systems.

COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS

ES-61. Recapitalize, modernize, staff, and resource the CTCs to provide full spectrum, multiechelon, combined arms operational and leader development experience in all types of environments, across the full spectrum of conflict.

ES-62. Synchronize fielding of ABCS to the CTCs in the Army Digitization Master Plan to enable effective training of digital units by CTC Operations Groups.

ES-63. Conduct a review of Operations Group missions; tables of distribution and allowances; organization; equipment; doctrine; and tactics, techniques, and procedures at each CTC to validate requirements to continue training the legacy forces while also training the Initial Brigade Combat Team and Interim Division brigades and battalions.

ES-64. Conduct a review of CTC baseline troop lists for each CTC. Determine what the Army can and should OC, starting with division, then corps, and echelons above corps. Resource CTC OC authorizations to fully support revised baseline troop lists.

ES-65. Provide BCTP Operations Groups A and B with additional OCs to cover each of the seven BOS within a brigade HQ during a division WFX to increase assessment and feedback.

SYSTEMS APPROACH TO TRAINING

ES-66. The SAT process is fundamentally sound, but not executed well. TRADOC is not providing the Army with up-to-date training and educational products due to a severe lack of training development resources. These products are the foundation for standards-based training and leader development. The result is a seriously eroded foundation for building solid, standards-based training and leader development programs in the Army.

SYSTEMS APPROACH TO TRAINING CONCLUSIONS

ES-67. TRADOC is not updating or developing training and education products fast enough to support legacy and transformation forces.

ES-68. Training expertise has gradually moved over time from the proponent schools and centers to the CTCs.

ES-69. Soldier Training Publications (STP), Mission Training Plans (MTP), and Training Support Products (TSP) that provide the foundation for standards-based training and leader development are not being updated rapidly enough to support Army needs. Many are obsolete or do not exist. The force is evolving faster than the institutional training base can provide up-to-date training and educational products.

- Army of Excellence products-mostly obsolete.
- Limited Conversion Division-do not exist.
- Force XXI products-limited.
- Initial Brigade Combat Team products-in initial development.

ES-70. Other than the TRADOC Common Core, the Army lacks comprehensive officer performance standards (by branch, functional area, and rank) for commissioned officers. The lack of officer standards impacts leader development. Standards are the basis for assessments, feedback, and corrective action. The Army is a standards-based organization, and yet it has little in the way of objective criteria with which to assess officer performance.

SYSTEMS APPROACH TO TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS

ES-71. Reinforce the importance of standards-based training in accordance with FM 7-O (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 7-10 (25-101), *Battle Focused Training*. Enforce the SAT process in accordance with TRADOC Regulation 350-70, *Systems Approach to Training: Management, Processes, and Products*.

ES-72. Redesign the SAT development and support structure to leverage the subject matter expertise in the CTCs for training and doctrine development. Reallocate some training developers and doctrine writers and place them OPCON to CTC Operations Group. These training developers and doctrine writers will develop, write, publish, and update training and doctrine while the Operations Groups provide the subject matter experts to review their work. Prioritize efforts and resources. First to IBCT, then to FXXI and LCD, then to AOE legacy forces. Prioritize this effort to publish battalion training products required to support the CSA's directive to conduct an external ARTEP for every divisional battalion in FY 02.

CTC	Publication Responsibility
BCTP	AOE, FXXI Corps and Division, and IDIV.
NTC	AOE (Heavy), FXXI Brigade, and Battalion.
JRTC	AOE (Light), IBCT.
CMTC	Limited Conversion Division, Brigade, Battalion.

ES-73. Leverage experience of Title XI officers and NCOs in developing STP, MTP, and TSP in conjunction with Forces Command (FORSCOM) and United States Army Pacific (USARPAC).

ES-74. Invest in and exploit network technology to develop a more streamlined and effective SAT process where training and doctrine publications are web-based and updated as the lessons learned from the CTCs are validated. Expand the capabilities of the GEN Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library as a web-based SAT resource (<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdls.htm>).

TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

ES-75. Army training and leader development programs do not develop self-aware and adaptive leaders. The lack of a single proponent for training and leader development divides attention and resources between these two key programs and results in their competing for resources. The Army's current leader development model is outdated. The Army has no balanced, integrated and progressive training and leader development model that shows how it thinks about training and leader development. It has no process to periodically assess and provide feedback on the components of training and leader development that leads to decisions for establishing priorities and allocating resources to sustain or improve them. The Army, as a learning organization, needs leaders that value lifelong learning through a balance of educational and operational experiences rounded out by self-development.

TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT CONCLUSIONS

Proponency

ES-76 Currently, the proponency for training and leader development is vested in separate staff elements at DA level. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations is responsible for matters relating to training and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel is responsible for matters relating to leader development. The lack of a single proponent for training and leader development results in unsynchronized policy and resourcing of these two key imperatives. There is no funding line for leader development in the POM and leader development currently tends to compete poorly for funding against other training priorities. If training and leader development are to be fully linked, the responsibility for both should rest with a single proponent on the DA Staff.

Lifelong Learning

ES-77. Learning organizations support self-awareness and adaptability. Lifelong learning requires standards, tools for assessment, feedback and self-development. Part of Army Culture should be the commitment by its leaders to lifelong learning. This is done by balancing educational and operational experiences and by emphasizing self-development to fill the gaps in knowledge that educational and operational experiences do not provide. To be a learning organization, the Army must develop, fund, and maintain an Armywide Warrior Development Center using information technology. This will allow soldiers, leaders, and units to find standards, training and educational publications, assessment and feedback tools, and access to distance and distributed learning programs for self-development and lifelong learning.

ES-78. Self-development enables officers to gain knowledge not learned from educational and operational experiences. Most officers understand the importance and role of self-development in lifelong learning.

However, Army training and leadership doctrine does not adequately address it, the Army leaders do not emphasize its value, and the Army does not provide the tools and support to enable its leaders to make self-development an effective component of lifelong learning. Self-development requires feedback on performance from AARs, mentors, counseling, 360-degree feedback, etc. Many perceive self-development merely as a way to cut costs associated with schooling rather than accepting the potential of self-development as a means toward lifelong learning. Self-development should be the foundation of a professional's lifelong learning process by effectively linking operational and educational experiences with the tools to fill knowledge gaps.

ES-79. Distance learning is the technological means to provide self-development tools to the officer corps. It can also be used to distribute educational experiences from the school to the field. The Army has not yet convinced the officer corps of the benefits of distance learning. Officers believe distance learning increases their workload and decreases what little personal time they have. They are concerned that it prevents them from coming together as a cohort, takes away the opportunity to interact with their peers in resident courses, replaces small group instruction, and takes away the respite from the operational pace Army schools provide. Distance learning is acceptable in the field for self-directed self-development.

Training And Leader Development Model

ES-SO. The Panel identified the components of a training and leader development model in this report. They are Army Culture, standards, feedback, experience, education, self-development, and training. The model portrays these components and a guiding set of principles with which to train soldiers and grow leaders through training and leader development programs that are inextricably linked. When the model is followed, the product is a self-aware and adaptive leader. The current leader development model does not include training and lacks an assessment and feedback mechanism.

Management Process

ES-8 1. The Army has no established mechanism to continually assess and obtain feedback on its training and leader development programs. Instead, it reacts to change by periodically engaging in Armywide reviews of training, education, and leader development. A management process is necessary to assess and obtain feedback on the components of training and leader development programs in the Army. This process should regularly update the CSA on training and leader development issues to obtain decisions and set priorities for allocating resources in the POM.

TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

Proponency

ES-82. Establish a single Army proponent for training and leader development to improve the linkage between training and leader development, policy, and resourcing.

Lifelong Learning


ES-83. Provide the doctrine, tools, and support to foster lifelong learning in the Army through balanced educational and operational experiences supported by self-development.

- Develop, fund, and maintain an Armywide Warrior Development Center using information technology where soldiers, units, and leaders can go to find standards, training and education publications, assessment and feedback tools, and access distance and distributed learning programs for self-development and lifelong learning. Expand, as an example, the capabilities of the GEN Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library.
- Develop, publish in digital form, and maintain commissioned officer performance standards by branch, functional area, and rank. These standards will inform the officer corps about what they should know and provide the basis for personal assessment that leads to self-awareness and adaptability.

- Prioritize efforts and resources to deliver the most important training and educational publications in the following order: IBCT, Force XXI, Limited Conversion Division (LCD), and Army of Excellence (AOE) units. Accept risk with AOE units.
- Communicate the benefits of distance learning as part of the lifelong learning process. Integrate distance learning in the active component deliberately, building on the distance learning successes of the reserve components. Emphasize the value of lifelong learning.
- Focus distance learning on self-directed, self-development.
- Resource distance learning in the active component to provide reachback capability to lieutenants assigned to fill captain staff positions. This provides lieutenants access to web-based, self-development modules to accelerate and enhance their ability to meet the requirements of these assignments.
- Publish a definition of and doctrine for self-development in FM 6-22 (22-100), *Army Leadership*, and incorporate in FM 7-0 (FM 25-100), *Training the Force*, FM 7-10 (FM 25-101), *Battle Focused Training*, AR 600-100 *Army Leadership*, AR 600-3 *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, and DA PAM 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army*. Teach self-development doctrine, an awareness and understanding of the tools to enable self-development, and the expectation for self-development in OES.
- Provide support to officers pursuing self-development and gradually introduce a 360-degree feedback strategy starting in OES and then expanding to the field.

Training And Leader Development Model

ES-84. Adopt the Panel's proposed Training and Leader Development model. It is a balanced, integrated, and progressive training and leader development model that assures full spectrum capability. The model shows the components of Army training and leader development programs, the process, and the products that link training and leader development into a single entity. An assessment and feedback process enables the Army to examine the components of its training and leader development processes and determine which must be adjusted, establish priorities, and allocate resources to its training and leader development programs to continue producing self-aware and adaptive leaders and trained and ready units. The model's components are described below.



Army Culture

ES-85. The Army can have adequate training and leader development programs but if its beliefs and practices are out of balance, leaders leave the Army, rendering training and leader development programs less effective. Officers are firmly and deeply committed to the concept of an Army Service Ethic. They are motivated by service to the country and recognize the essential nature of selfless service as a foundation of the profession. They embrace a Warrior Ethos, the Army Values, and lifelong learning. These cultural issues must remain in balance for the Army to get the greatest return on its investment in training and leader development programs.

Standards

ES-86. The Panel found that outdated standards for legacy forces, a lack of standards for some units, such as the Limited Conversion Divisions, and a shortage of standards for others, such as FXXI Divisions and Corps inhibits standards-based training and leader development programs for education, unit training, and self-development.

Feedback

ES-87. The Army's training doctrine has feedback as part of the training management process. Assess training against measurable standards and feed this assessment back into the training program to sustain those tasks trained to standard and improve those where the standard was not met. For units, the AAR process provides this feedback mechanism. For leaders, there is no feedback mechanism and, as the Army demonstrates by its periodic **Armywide** reviews of training, education, and leader development, it has no mechanism to continually assess, evaluate, and obtain feedback on the status of the components that make up its training and leader development programs. The Army must address leader and Army feedback systems in its model.

Balancing Field And Institutional Experience

ES-88. A balance between operational and educational experiences provides the best method to train soldiers and grow leaders. These experiences must be synchronized and mutually supporting. Self-development facilitated by distance learning, technology, standards and feedback fills the knowledge gaps between educational and operational experiences. It is the key to lifelong learning.

Self-development

ES-89. Educational and operational experiences cannot provide officers all the knowledge they need to be self-aware and adaptive leaders. Self-development is essential to lifelong learning and provides the training and education operational and educational experiences cannot supply.

TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES

ES-90. The Army is doctrine based. Through strict adherence to this doctrine, diverse units worldwide can share a common understanding of its application. A key aspect of this doctrine is the principles on which it is founded. Selected enduring principles of FM 7-O (25-100), *Training the Force*, and FM 226 (22-100), *Army Leadership*, must be interwoven to adapt training and leader development to meet the requirements of full spectrum operations.

- Mission Focused
- Doctrinally Based
- Performance Oriented
- Train as You Fight
- Leader as Primary Trainer
- Know Yourself
- Lifelong Learning
- Mentorship

- **Mission Focused.** Nonmission requirements impact not only a unit's ability to accomplish training in accordance with the Army's training doctrine but also junior leader development. Resource shortages — time, ranges, people, etc.—also affect the leader's ability to effectively **execute** unit training. Everything the Army does must be mission focused; to do anything else distracts from mission accomplishment.
- **Doctrinally Based.** Operational, Training, and Leadership doctrine provides a common operating framework and language for soldiers, leaders, and units throughout the Army. They must be adapted to the operating environment and linked to each other.
- **Performance Oriented.** Soldiers learn through doing. Performance-oriented training has the highest knowledge retention rate among the adult learning techniques. Both training and leader development programs must be focused to provide the chances to grow through a balanced approach of operational and institutional hands-on experiences.


- **Train as You Fight.** This principle has been validated by the Combat Training centers. Soldiers in operations such as Desert Shield attributed their success in actual combat operations to training for combat through the rigorous operational experience of the CTC.
- **Leaders as Primary Trainers.** Leaders are responsible for planning training, preparing, executing, assessing, and feeding back the results to their units, and soldiers. Their personal participation in each step is essential as they set the azimuth for their units accomplishments to the standards the Army has set. Leaders must **be** present for training.
- **Know Yourself.** Self-aware and adaptive leaders are the basis for success in full spectrum operations. The relationship between self-awareness and adaptability is symbiotic, The greater self-awareness gained by assessment against measurable standards, the more adaptive the leader. Through a commitment to lifelong learning enabled by self-development, leaders can narrow the knowledge gaps not provided through educational and operational experiences.
- **Lifelong Learning.** Part of the Army's Culture should be the commitment by its leaders to lifelong learning. Learning organizations support self-awareness and adaptability. Lifelong learning requires standards, tools for assessment, feedback, and self-development.
- **Mentorship.** Mentoring enables senior leaders to train and educate officers. Mentoring is not a formal program, but part of the stock and trade of the soldier's profession. It focuses on the art of leadership.

ES-9 1. Trained and ready forces led by self-aware adaptive leaders are the end state of the model. The model combines Army Culture, standards, feedback, and operational and educational experiences through operational assignments, schooling and self-development to achieve that end. The model constantly measures itself against embedded training and leader development principles.

ESTABLISH AN ARMY TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT PROCESS

ES-92. Establish an Army Training and Leader Development Management Process to-

- * Facilitate better assessment and feedback of training and leader development issues and initiatives through the Army's Transformation.
- Brief the CSA regularly on training and leader development issues to obtain decisions, set priorities and allocate resources in the Program Planning, Budget, and Execution System (PPBES).



IMPERATIVES

ES-93. There are 84 recommendations in Chapter 3. Seven areas are imperatives. Army leaders must endorse and take action on them if the Army is to make substantial improvement in training and leader development. The seven imperatives are listed below.

ES-94. **Army Culture.** Recognize the strong relationship between Army Culture and the quality of training and leader development programs. Army Culture must operate routinely within an acceptable Band of Tolerance for the Army to effectively train soldiers and grow leaders. Any change that widens the gap between beliefs and practices in the Army Culture impacts the Army's ability to train soldiers and grow leaders.

ES-95. **Officer Education System.** Adapt the OES to meet the needs of the transforming Army and the realities of the Operational Environment. Largely untouched since the end of the Cold War and progressively under-resourced during downsizing, the OES is out of synch with Army needs. Adapting the OES requires a new approach that focuses each school on a central task and purpose, links schools horizontally and vertically in the educational process, synchronizes the educational and operational experiences of officers, and educates officers to established, common standards.

ES-96. **Training.** Revitalize the Army training system by updating training doctrine, improving home station training, and modernizing the CTCs. Training doctrine (*FM 7-O (25-100), Training the Force*, and *FM 7-10 (25-101), Battle Focused Training*) must be adapted to account for the Operational Environment and realities and linked to operational (*FM 3-O(100-5), Operations*) and leadership (*FM 6-22(22-100), Army Leadership*) doctrine. In the mean time, commanders and units must adhere to existing training doctrine, principles, and practices to help reduce operational pace. The Army must provide commanders with the necessary resources. This includes increasing the availability and quality of TADSS to support training. Finally, the Army must recapitalize, modernize, staff, and resource the CTCs to provide full spectrum, multiechelon, combined arms operational and leader development experiences.

ES-97. **Systems Approach to Training.** Commit to returning to standards-based training. Standards-based training has been the strength of Army preparedness since the end of the Vietnam War. Standards are the basis for developing training, assessing performance and providing feedback. Yet, the Systems Approach to Training designed to document and publish those training standards has atrophied. Without common standards, soldier, leader and unit readiness-and battlefield success-are in doubt. These common standards must be documented, accessible, and digital.


ES-98. **Training and Leader Development Model.** Adopt a model that clearly shows how training and leader development are linked. The existing leader development model is inadequate. A new model must clearly communicate the Army leadership's intent and must be understandable for junior leaders, staffs, and outside agencies. The Panel determined that the model must be based on Army Culture; mandate standards for soldiers, leaders, and units; provide feedback to soldiers, leaders, units, and the Army; and balance operational and educational experience through education, assignments, and self-development. The product of the model should be self-aware, adaptive leaders, and trained and ready units. The model is meant to be all encompassing with respect to focusing institutional education, guiding field training and advocating self-development in a lifelong learning paradigm. It should also help the Army develop a mature management process that continually addresses training and leader development issues in a decision making forum for the CSA.

ES-99. **Training and Leader Development Management Process.** Adopt and institute a management process to facilitate managing change. The Army must have a management plan or else risk losing sight of the reasons for change. Today, the Army has no management system for both training and leader development. This management process must be iterative, collaborative, and comprehensive. It must provide issues to the CSA on a recurring basis to measure progress, adjust priorities, and apply resources. Momentum is essential; initially this decision forum should meet quarterly with the CSA to build momentum, interest, and enthusiasm throughout the Army.

snowflake

May 29, 2001 8:52 AM

TO: Charles Abell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Promotions



Please take a look at this package and then visit with David Chu and tell me what you two think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/11/01 General Counsel Memo to SecDef re: Promotions

DHR:dh
052901-S

210

29 May 01

U10096 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/805



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

May 11, 2001, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Acting General Counsel *XJD 5/14/01*

SUBJECT: Promotions

- You asked for my views about whether we could reduce the amount of processing officer nomination packages receive between the Services and the Senate (Tab A).
- Promotion laws require that such packages must be submitted through you to the President, and by the President to the Senate (for most officer promotions).
- OSD review and assembly of routine nomination packages and non-routine general and flag officer (GFO) nominations with substantiated adverse information duplicate some aspects of Service nomination review, but ensure impartiality and consistency.
- Since 1988, DoD has been required to inform the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) of adverse information pertaining to GFO nominees (Tab B), and promulgated guidance for processing nomination packages, including those with adverse information.
- You may permit the Services to forward nomination packages directly to you or the Deputy Secretary, by-passing the OSD staff, and the President could, without further review, forward packages to the Senate. You and the President would then rely on each Service Secretary to perform the appropriate reviews.
- Such a procedure eliminates the impartial OSD review, which frequently is touted to the SASC as a primary reason that it should rely on the information provided by DoD. Also, the SASC indicated in 1989 that a procedure that compelled it to conduct substantial reviews would not "be in the interests of the Department" (Tab B).
- I recommend that you discuss this matter with the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, Charlie Abell, who recently served as a SASC staffer and worked nominations, before you direct any changes in OSD nomination processing procedures.

Attachments:

As stated *✓*

Prepared By: James O. Smyser, 614-7676



11-L-0559/OSD/806

*5/15
0740*

snowflake

May 10, 2001 2:25 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Promotions

I am told it takes months for commanders, captains, rear admirals, and admirals to get through the confirmation process. The Services spend a long time going through it, checking everything, then it comes up to OSD and it goes through a process, then it goes to the White House and it goes through a process, then it goes to the Hill and goes through a process.

What do you think about having a reform where the Service is the checker, and we approve it swiftly and by exception the White House does the same thing and the real responsibility is left with the Senate. If they want to hire a lot of people and do all that, why not let them?

DHR:dh
051001-19

11-L-0559/OSD/807

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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

89 AUG 16 AM 10:12

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 206 10-6060

o o e c p m
o cy: Gen J
sf

July 7, 1989

The Honorable Donald J. Atwood
Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is in response to your letter of June 26, 1989, concerning the provision of information to the Armed Services Committee bearing on the fitness of nominees for general and flag officer positions.

Under the current policy, which was initiated on August 17, 1988 by Secretary Carlucci, the Department informs the Committee "when potentially adverse information is known" about a nominee. This procedure was initiated by Secretary Carlucci as a result of concern expressed by the Committee that a general officer had received a letter of reprimand containing significant allegations of misconduct shortly before his nomination was submitted to the Senate, and that the Committee had not been informed of that matter during its consideration of the officer's nomination. Secretary Carlucci reviewed this incident and reported to the Committee on September 19, 1988, that he was "most concerned that the handling of [the] . . . nomination could be considered an act of bad faith. I am confident that the procedures I have been established will safeguard the integrity of the nomination process and preclude a recurrence."

Your letter indicates a concern that the Department might be furnishing information that is "trivial and perhaps unfair." The Department has not brought to our attention any situation under the policy adopted last year in which the Committee has either declined to recommend confirmation, or has taken any other action adverse to a nominee, as a result of a Departmental decision to forward information that was "trivial and unfair."

As you and Secretary Cheney well know, our Committee is quite sensitive to the need to treat adverse personnel information with discretion, and you can be assured that we shall continue to so. The alternative to transmittal of adverse information by the Executive Branch would be for the Committee to review all personnel records and investigations that might be pertinent to the nominee, a process that would greatly diminish the Committee's capability to process in a timely fashion the substantial numbers of nominees for military positions forwarded by the Executive

Branch. I do not think that such a procedure would be in the best interests of the Department.

To date, none of the information that has been brought to the attention of the Committee under the procedure adopted last year has been inconsistent with our original understanding of how this process should operate. The Committee will continue to ensure that any and all information provided to the Committee on these nominations is handled with care and discretion.

I appreciate your taking the time to share your concerns with me, and I hope that you will find this information helpful,

Sincerely,



Sam Nunn
Chairman

TO: Larry Di Rita
Adm. G

5/6/12

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: June 9, 2001

RE:

I want anyone who does anything around me to be told that I don't want them to use initials that I don't understand. I don't want them to use acronyms I don't understand, and I want them to date everything!

I have to ask questions about every third piece of paper I receive. There is no reason for that to be the case.

3/2

BYRD 6/12

DHR/azn

BUCCI SPB 6/12

WHITMORE — (EXEC SEC MAs)

TRIP COORDINATORS —

THIESSEN —

CLARKE —

MOORE —

~~EXE~~ POLICY MAs —

USDs —

ASDs —

9 Jun 01

U10729 /01



ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

2001 JUN 26 AM 8:30



INFORMATION MEMO

June 21, 2001 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY &
LOGISTICS) *E. G. Chalmers*

SUBJECT: ABC News Report on "New Radar Systems"

- A recent ABC News Report claimed several countries are working on "new radar system" to render the B-2 obsolete.
- These systems are a well understood class of radar known as passive coherent location systems (PCLS). PCLS demonstrate less of a threat to US aircraft than commercially available and widely deployed early warning radars.
- The Air Force has done flight testing with the Lockheed "Silent Sentry" PCLS. Testing has shown this system has significantly less detection range and comparable tracking accuracy to widely available early warning radars.
- Tab A is the press review citing the ABC news report. Tab B is the Air Force press release responding to PCLS claims.

(U) COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Devin Cate, OUSD (A&T)/DSP, 697-1282



11-L-0559/OSD/811

U11449 / 01

snowflake

June 15, 2001 10:12 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stealth

Do you have **anything** on this article I have circled on stealth?

Attach.
6/15/01 SIRO Press Review

DHR:dh
061501-2

cc: Susan Hill

11-L-0559/OSD/812

FRIDAY, 15 JUNE 2001

UNCLASSIFIED

H I G H L I G H T S

1. (MIDDLE EAST) A Palestinian fired from close range at an Israeli van in the West Bank on Thursday, killing an Israeli army intelligence officer, jeopardizing a new, U.S.-mediated cease-fire agreement. The shooting, along a major thoroughfare, took place during a scheduled meeting between the Palestinian and the Israeli officer, a Palestinian security official in the Gaza Strip said on condition of anonymity. A soldier in the car then shot and killed the Palestinian, the Israeli military said. A soldier was wounded in the attack. Later that day, Palestinians fired several mortar shells at the Jewish settlement of Morag in the Gaza Strip, the military said, but no one was hurt. Israel ordered its army to start easing restrictions on the Palestinians following a security meeting on 13 June in Tel Aviv. At the Netzarim junction, a major flash point in the Gaza Strip, Israeli tanks pulled back about a 100 yards on Thursday, then approached again part-way. Stone-throwing Palestinian youths pelted Israeli military jeeps. Soldiers responded with stun grenades and tear gas. No injuries were reported. Major General Giora Eiland, Israeli Chief of Military Operations, said soldiers would begin to lift restrictions by mid-afternoon Friday, and Israeli forces would redeploy. The plan calls for Israel to pull its forces and heavy weapons back to points they held before the hostilities erupted. Eiland said the timetable could be accelerated if the Palestinians work to prevent attacks. -AP, 14 JUN 01-

2. (BALKANS) Macedonia asked NATO on Thursday to be ready to help it disarm ethnic Albanian rebels, if the guerrillas eventually agree to peace terms now on offer. Macedonian authorities have also extended a four-day cease-fire. Although ruling **out Western** intervention, NATO Chief George Robertson told a news conference that he **will be** taking the request back to NATO headquarters **"to see what we can do."** Robertson supports Macedonian President Trajkovski's peace plan that provides for a system of disarmament and decommissioning. The guerrillas, meanwhile, outlined for the first time their demands for ending the insurgency. Wary of the Macedonian government, the guerrillas also want the western alliance to get involved, asking that NATO troops be deployed throughout the country and demanding an amnesty for their fighters and wide-ranging reforms to improve the status of Albanians. Meanwhile, Britain said on Thursday it had offered to send training teams to help the Macedonian army but according to the Ministry of Defense, the Macedonians had yet to make a direct request for help. -REUTERS, 14 JUN 01-

C A P S U L E S

1. (U.S./CHINA) A six-person team from the contractor **Lockheed Martin is en route to Hainan Island to begin dismantling and shipping home the damaged EP-3 Navy spy plane, U.S. and Chinese officials said Thursday.** -AP, 14 JUN 01-

2. (U.S./STEALTH) China, Russia, and several European and U.S. **companies** are working on a new radar system that threatens to render the stealth B-2 bomber fleet obsolete by making the **radar-** evading planes more detectable, ABC's World News Tonight reported on Thursday. -REUTERS, 14 JUN 01-

3. (RUSSIA/OSCE) According to Reuters, the **55-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe** has agreed to pay the **Russian Ministry of Justice for a 25-man protection squad** for its **two-or-three-man monitoring team that is returning to Chechnya after withdrawing in December 1998.** -REUTERS, 14 JUN 01-



STATEMENT

United States Air Force

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 1690 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1690
(703) 695-0640

June 14, 2001

USAF ANALYSIS OF PASSIVE COHERENT LOCATION SYSTEMS

The Department of Defense remains interested in any and all advanced detection techniques to support US military operations around the world. The US Air Force has analyzed the capabilities of much talked about passive coherent location systems (PCLS) to evaluate the practical limitations as well as advantages of passive systems. These air defense 'radars' use TV, radio or cell phone transmitters combined with sensitive receivers to track aircraft. Some have characterized them as "counter-stealth" systems. A recently published article in the London Daily Times as well as interviews with Lockheed Martin, the designer of the Silent Sentry passive tracking system, suggest a continuing misunderstanding of the practical applications of such an air defense asset.

The Air Force participated in testing of Lockheed Martin's Silent Sentry system at various locations on the east coast, using commercial broadcast TV and radio transmitters, to assess its ability to develop tracks on military and commercial aircraft. As part of these tests, an instrumented aircraft with highly precise differential GPS onboard was flown against the PCLS system. This aircraft position data was then compared to Silent Sentry tracks. The Air Force used this data to, validate a model of the PCLS system, which accurately matched its true performance. This model was then used to compare PCLS in an air defense role to traditional long-range early warning radars.

The testing and models show the PCLS system has significantly less detection range and comparable tracking accuracy to commercially available and widely deployed early warning radars. During testing, Silent Sentry created more false tracks than other typical air defense radars. The testing did not include jamming or other techniques that could potentially degrade detection performance during military engagements.

The US Air Force's early involvement and independent analysis of PCLS successfully demonstrated some limited performance against military and commercial air vehicles. As a result of demonstrated performance, the Air Force currently has no plans to pursue further development of the Silent Sentry system and does not consider PCLS technology "counter stealth."

-30-

1602

snowflake

June 25, 2001 1:25 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Legacy Systems

Let's get this issue of how we get legacy systems interoperable into the management group. Please do it.

Thanks.

Attach. .
6/17/01 Di Rita note to SecDef and 6/1/01 PA&E memo to SecDef re: Legacy Systems

DHR:dh
062501-23

311 CCC

7/11
Jaymie -
for Soc Agenda.
Would it fit into 7/19
meeting, or next?
Larry

25500

U12341 /01

~~TO SECRET~~

snowflake

May 21, 2001 2:48 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Interoperability of Legacy Systems

Is there any way to set a deadline for all legacy systems to **be** interoperable with respect to command and control?

DHR:dh
052101-44

6/17

Barry Watts (PA/E)

Response attached.

DR

P.S. This would be a good issue for the Senior Executive Council (Aldridge + Service Secretaries) to address.

*dlr
1730*

DUSD (FM) 5/24 1500 11-L-0559/OSD/816

*TAB A
01may118*



PROGRAM ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800

6/18
1730

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 JUN -1 PM 5: 22



INFO MEMO

June 1, 2001 1:31 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D. Watts 06/01/01*

SUBJECT: Setting a Deadline for Making Command and Control (C2) of Legacy Systems Interoperable

- You asked Dr. Zakheim whether there is “any way to set a deadline for all legacy systems to be interoperable” with regard to C2 (TAB A).
- A realistic deadline of 2007 or 2008 can be set if two conditions are met:
 - (1) interoperability is limited to technically achievable goals (e.g., fielding common data links and tactical radios)
 - (2) the acquisition system can enforce migration by the services to interoperable C2.
- Enforcement is the pivotal issue in achieving such a deadline.
 - Heretofore, our acquisition oversight system has not been able to enforce interoperability across the military services. (A)
 - C3I and AT&L have developed new directives that, when signed, should enable OSD to insist on interoperability certification at acquisition boards.
 - Unless these changes are implemented and interoperability enforced, success within any reasonable number of years is doubtful.
- What might be a realistic deadline for doing such things as fielding common data links and tactical radios, and how much might that cost?
 - ASD(C3I) currently estimates that acquisition oversight changes would require some \$570M during FY02-07, of which less than 40% is in the current program.
 - Accelerated acquisition of initiatives, such as interoperable tactical radios, data links, and the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) would require another \$8.4B over FY02-07, of which less than 40% is programmed.
 - If we completed investment in these programs, 2008 might be a reasonable deadline for achieving force-wide C2 interoperability.



snowflake

April 10, 2001 7:56 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon
CC: PAUL WOLFOVITZ
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: O'Keefe Memo

Please take a look at this memo from Sean O'Keefe and tell me which, if any, of these items you think we ought to start getting implemented and how.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/4/01 Memo from Sean O'Keefe, "Transition Agenda Thoughts"

DHR:dh
041001-23

0311 Transition

10 Apr 02

U12586 /02



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

snowflake

February 21, 2001 9:10 AM

TO: Dr. Wolfowitz
Dr. Zakheim
Honorable Pete Aldridge
Dr. Cambone
Dr. Schneider

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Sean O'Keefe Memo

Attached is a memo that was given to me by Sean O'Keefe last month. He has some interesting ideas. Why don't you take a look at it, and then we can talk about it. Thanks.

Attachment

DHR:dh
022101-10

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

11-L-0559/OSD/819

J. •

(C) 714

Transition Agenda Thoughts
January 4, 2001

Working Assumptions:

Leadership is sorely needed: Pursuit of the current national security agenda and strategy is either vacuous or bankrupt. There is no way to maintain the current agenda short of adding \$50 billion each year for the foreseeable future which would still result in doing less with substantially more resources – nor would this be prudent. The current strategy is not in concert with the present national security challenges. Thus, even “fully funding” the current strategy will yield a force and program structure which is expensive, but unresponsive to the present global challenges.

Strategy review in 2001: It will take time to properly define the alternative strategy. The Bush-Cheney approach is to spend a good portion of 2001 conducting a strategy and budget review which will be driven “top-down.” Reconciling imbalances between defense and foreign assistance resources will be only one of the elements of the review. Within defense, the challenge will be to yield an approach which re-balances the procurement, R&D, and operations budgets across services and agencies. To be successful, it has to be led by the Secretary of Defense, but conducted by a limited cohort of OSD loyalists to assure that it’s focused and timely. The earliest completion of this review will contribute to its success – mid-summer 2001 if at all possible.

Planned QDR is a “non-starter”: The current plans for the Quadrennial Defense Review are internally driven. At best, the QDR will incorporate 3 “service-centric” focus which will yield incremental, known solutions to pending issues. At worst, it will provide grist to litigate every decision made by the Clinton-Gore team that the institution doesn’t like. It is unlikely to yield creative strategy alternatives, and may not even prove to be an appropriate vehicle for a point of departure for the Bush-Cheney strategy review.

Amendment will be forwarded by late spring 2001: In order to stake out an agenda early in the Bush-Cheney Administration before the comprehensive strategy and budget review is complete, a budget amendment for defense will be required. Throughout the campaign the Bush-Cheney team announced its intent to use this vehicle to incorporate several key distinguishing features. The institution (the military services, et al) intend to lobby for 311 its priorities to be included in such an amendment. Short of well considered guidance, this amendment could yield a disparate collection of service priorities.

A transition strategy:

To avoid the institutional forces setting the agenda, to preserve options for **the** more **extensive** strategy review, and to put a stake in **the** ground with **the** spring budget amendment, **the** following six factors should **be** incorporated into the defense transition plan. These six elements could form the basis of institutional **“guidance”** and budget amendment guidelines,

While the incoming Administration may separately develop **program** or policy **initiatives** which should **be included** in **the** amendment, **the** military services and DOD elements could be restricted to these six areas for issues to include in the upcoming amendment.

Six elements of past & future orientation:

The six items represent three areas of focus to signal a **clear break** with the past strategy framework and **three** areas which explore potential future parameters for the **larger** strategy **review** focus. In all **cases**, the results of the **institutional** consideration **will** provide the new Administration team with valuable insights into the **obstacles** in managing **the Department** toward new directions.

Three issues to demonstrate a break from the past:

- 1) *Reconfigure 20% of the R&D budget to C4ISR initiatives:* The senior civilian and military **leadership** have lamented **the** severe shortage of **C4ISR** related resources. This **approach** would force a prioritization of initiatives, with a **clear** requirement to **make choices**. There should be a clear priority for commercial **approaches** where they exist. It could be left up to the services, or led by **the** Chairman to select the **C4ISR** initiatives and to **OSD** to decide which elements of the current **R&D** program will be diverted. The latter is preferable and **more likely** to include hard choices, ✓
- 2) *Plan to Competitively Outsource 25% of the support establishment:* It's commonly held that competitive **outsourcing** will yield **30%** savings over current cost performance. **Yet**, the **Department** is unwilling to pursue **these** initiatives in earnest for a variety of institutional reasons – most prominent of which is a conviction that the **initiative** will be **endorsed** and the savings pocketed before any outsourcing is actually undertaken. To break that bias, the outsourcing objective should not include an expected savings target. This will signal the sincerity that the objective is outsourcing and savings will be an **attendant** benefit. Whatever **resultant** savings accrue can be plowed into the longer term strategy review and **potentially finance** those priorities later. ✓

- 3) *Base Closure/Infrastructure realignment*: The senior military leadership has gotten religion that base closure will be the answer to long term resource prayers. No amount of political cajoling, however, will yield a new closure process. Therefore, a comprehensive list of base closure candidates should be prepared using the existing authority and procedures. It's a long, drawn out process which, in 1990, forced the Congressional leadership to the negotiating table to find a better, more efficient, less political method. Ten years later, the leverage may work again, but it has to begin with a candidate list. At minimum, this action will demonstrate a willingness to carry the standard and may well reveal the military leadership's priorities. This presents a real opportunity to continue consolidation of common support functions in logistics, communications, medical and intelligence and adoption of best business practices. ✓

Three initiatives to signal potential new direction:

- 4) *Fund the enablers to enhance extant systems*: The Bush-Cheney team has indicated an interest in "skipping a generation" to avail new technology in future systems. Along the way, current systems planned for fielding can incorporate new technology into current systems at minimal cost. A policy which requires including systems such as Link 16, for example, into current and new aircraft systems can significantly improve "battle space awareness" and improve connectivity with C4ISR assets. Specifically signaling inclusion of such systems in the amendment will immediately yield a list of significant candidates and send a strong message that these are the right kind of initiatives to pursue as an interim strategy. To be sure this will represent a significant culture and resource change, ✓
- 5) *Define mission objectives and identify different assets to accomplish the tasks*: Challenge the institution to do zero-based reviews and to come up with alternatives to accomplishing tasks without using the current assets to meet the objectives. For example, precision deep strike, rapid deployment and battle space command & control missions always yield the answers respectively that cruise missiles/long range aircraft, forward deployment, and reconnaissance aircraft are required. By challenging the institution to omit current solutions, different asset employment options may emerge to reveal the varied mission utility of B-2, mobile off shore bases, and UAVs, for example. Great care must be exerted in identifying the mission definitions, but the results could be illuminating. ✓ +
- 6) *Solicit joint basing configurations*: The assessment of infrastructure utility, encroachment, and capacity are heavily influenced by service "ownership." A commitment to advance at least two joint-service base configurations will yield some creative uses of extant capacity – and might even promote operational jointness in a more meaningful way than merely by well intentioned doctrine. Including the resources in the amendment to make two joint operating bases a reality will demonstrate commitment to this concept,

There is nothing particularly magic about **these** six initiatives other than **they are** collectively a strong **statement** that the past strategy is about to **change in some direction** to be **determined**, and that standard **current practices** in the future are not likely to endure. **All** but issues **#4** and **#6** are “**zero sum**” propositions. Indeed, those two **initiatives** should **consume** a small fraction of the spring **budget amendment** increase.

Plenty **of room** is preserved **for** other specific **program** initiatives **the new** Administration may seek to highlight. This approach preserves much needed time to engage in a comprehensive strategy review. Meanwhile, this transition agenda keeps the Department and its **parochial institutions** engaged in meaningful directions in **the meantime** rather than litigating grievances about **the** past Administration’s decisions.

.... and it’s a start....

snowflake

July 23, 2001 11:18 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: AF Mess Halls

430

Here are Jim Roche's views on the mess halls. This ought to be a subject for the management group. Why don't you put it on their agenda?

Thanks.

Attach.

7/17/01 SecAF memo to SecDef re: "Air Force Dining Facilities"

DHR:dh
072301-27

23Jul01

U12636 /02

F #

April 25, 2001 8:34 AM

SUBJECT: Outsourcing

The Marines are now outsourcing 100% of their mess halls.

Why don't the Army, Navy and Air Force do that?

I want to talk to the Service Secretaries about this.

DHR:dh
042501-2

→ JECOST-

7/18

Air Force Secretary
Response attached. I
am following up with Army/NAVY
to get you further info.
D. Ritz

7/19
0925

July 17, 200 1

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: James Roche
SUBJECT: Air Force Dining Facilities

Sir,

Re your recent question, "Marines outsource 100% of their mess halls, why doesn't the Air Force do it?":

As I understand the issue, the USMC contracts out commissary services at garrison operations in the continental United States, but uses naval food service personnel when deployed overseas and/or on ships. We outsource food services entirely at approximately one-third of our active Air Force units, and we do some level of commissary outsourcing (KP and cleaning services) at more than half our active bases.

The Air Force operates the remaining dining facilities at those units with day-to-day operational missions in order to train and equip military personnel for wartime and contingency food service operations. Our food service airmen learn about wartime conditions and the particular requirements of "contingency feeding" an airborne expeditionary force by participating in field training exercises and real-world deployments. The cost of outside contractors serving food in wartime conditions (training, liability insurance, availability, etc.) makes it more effective for us to bring that mission in-house.

We believe we have the right mix of in-house and contract capabilities to fit the particular needs of our forces, but we will continue to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of that mix as part of the Business Initiatives Council process.

V/R,



snowflake

July 23, 2001 11:11 AM

TO: Jim Roche
CC: General Jumper
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: AF Quotes

352.001

Attached are some quotes from my **friend** Ron Fogleman that you might **find** interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.
1997 Quotable Quotes, Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman

.DHR:dh
072301-25

23 Jul 01

U12802 /01

1997 Quotable Quotes



SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUL 23 2001

Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, U.S. Air Force chief of staff

A compilation of quotes to support the efforts of senior Air Force leaders in communicating the Air Force message.

Air Force

- This is a force that **was** forged in fire -- that was formed in the crucible of combat in the second World War.
 - Our service has become a source of great pride for the nation.
 - The Air Force has been globally engaged, supporting America's interest around the world in a variety of operations.
 - We are respected around the world for what we bring in peace and war.
 - When the United States takes the lead in a crisis, the Air Force is going to be engaged.
 - The Air Force has become the instrument of choice when it comes to introducing U.S. presence and influence around the world.
 - We're helping shape events by participating in Joint Chief of Staff exercises, regional exercises and contingency operations.
 - The unique characteristics of air and space power -- speed, range, flexibility, precision and global perspective -- provide our air and space forces unparalleled access to 100 percent of the earth's population, every center of government, and any trouble spot on the face of the earth.
-

Quality People

- The men and women of the United States Air Force are the pride of the American people and of this nation They represent the very best of American society.
- Our troops are the foundation of our strength -- they make us the envy of the world.
- We have a great Air Force, made up of diverse people, who bring different talents and capabilities to the table.
- Our engagement capability is only made possible by the dedication and quality of the men and women who serve in our Air Force.

Total Force Team

- Our guard and reserve forces are probably the best insurance policy for national security in the entire world.
- Our guard and reserve forces have made a major difference in our ability to sustain the kind of operations tempo and personnel tempo that's required of our service.
- The Air Force has been in the forefront of America's military in using its guard and **reserve** forces in day-to-day operations.
- We depend on reservists and guardsmen to be full-time players on our Air Force team.
- I'm **particularly** proud of the way the Air Force has integrated its guard and reserve forces, and the way we've used them in the new world environment that's unfolding.

Leadership and Command

- The success or failure of any organization depends on good leadership.
- A leader is someone who makes things happen. You don't have to have stars on your shoulders or chevrons on your sleeve to be a leader. Anybody who wants to make things happen is a leader.
- Leaders must create a climate in which everyone can achieve their full potential.
- Command is the highest privilege that we can bestow upon any Air Force officer.
- To be a good commander, you have to have a passion for both the mission you are assigned and for your people.
- Leaders have got to be physically vigorous. You've got to be visible, and you've got to show a kind of leadership that instills pride, confidence and optimism in the troops.
- One of the first things a leader should do is take inventory of your people to determine how you can leverage their skills to achieve the unit mission.

Air Superiority/Air Dominance

- Air dominance is the enabler for all other forces to operate on the battlefield.
- Air dominance is the ultimate in air superiority. It entails the ability to take away the enemy's sanctuaries, to own his air space, and to operate there with impunity.

- Gaining superiority over somebody else's air space has been one of the constants in warfare of the 20th century. It's the key to winning battles and wars with fewest casualties.
 - Air superiority gives you both freedom from attack and freedom to attack.
-

Tactical Air Modernization/F-22

- Tactical air modernization will be expensive, but it's the enabler for all the other forces on the battlefield.
 - The F-22 won't just defend our air space -- it will allow us to dominate the other guy's air space and take away his sanctuaries.
 - The whole idea is to attain and maintain air superiority quickly in a theater -- that's what the F-22 is all about.
 - The F-22 is a revolutionary aircraft. It combines maneuverable stealth, advanced integrated avionics and supercruise.
 - The F-22 will be America's air superiority fighter far into the 21 st century.
 - The combination of stealth and maneuverability will shrink the effectiveness of the weapons envelope for enemy surface-to-air missiles and from air-to-air missiles.
 - There is a need for an air superiority aircraft, and that is what the F-22 is designed for.
-

Force Protection

- The bombing of the Khobar Towers was a real wake up call for us -- it significantly increased our awareness of the sophistication and the level of terrorism out there.
- Terrorist groups and unconventional warfare units now have the technology, training and financial backing to attack us anywhere in the world.
- Our force protection initiatives must ensure we have the resources and the capability to safeguard our people.
- Security no longer ends at the base perimeter.
- We must assume responsibility for a much larger tactical perimeter that will keep the threat away from our people and equipment.
- It's not a question of if we're going to get struck again, it's when we're going to get struck again.

Airborne Laser

- The Airborne Laser is a revolutionary new weapon system which will dramatically alter future battles.
- Its unique ability to defend against theater ballistic missiles will ensure our nation's military forces, and those of our allies, are able to operate independent of any adversary's potential capability.
- The Airborne Laser will complement the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter to dominate the sky.
- The Airborne Laser will become a recognizable deterrent against weapons of mass destruction by confronting an adversary with the prospect those weapons will fall back on its own territory.
- The Airborne Laser provides a means to destroy theater ballistic missiles when they are most vulnerable – in their boost phase.
- By attacking missiles in the boost phase, the Airborne Laser **takes** the fight to the enemy.
- The airborne laser system is an essential addition to our nation's air and space dominance force.



snowflake

*DAW
10/16
1101*

October 13, 2001 2:01 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruitment

Isn't this the time to get high schools and colleges to permit on-campus recruiting of young people for the U.S. Armed Forces? Why not get a national effort going on it?

Thanks.

Attach.
8/15/01 SecDef memo

DHR:dh
101301-16

DR

10 Oct 01

U12894 /02

*snowflake

→ JECDEF

JECDEF HAS S

August 15, 2001 5:07 PM '01

Responses Attached

TO: David Chu
CC: Charlie Abell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Education Leaders

Larry Di Rita

10/10

I thought that meeting with the educators was useful. You folks probably knew all that, but I found it informative.

Some random thoughts:

1. Someone mentioned the idea of a second career and how it might be fashioned so it still benefits the military, possibly in the reserve component. There might be a thought in there.
2. I was unaware that 1 out of every 3 new people coming into the military drops out before their tour is complete. What is the story on that? Does that mean we are bringing the wrong people in?
3. Should we have someone look at the high schools around military bases to see if they refuse to allow recruiters in?
4. What about getting Dr. Eliot Cohen to take a look at war colleges and see if they really are as pedestrian as he indicated?
5. I can't imagine there is a way to tie student aid to military service, but if there is, it is interesting.
6. What about GI Bill for grad school?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081501-10

11-L-0559/OSD/833

Issues and Answers

1. Someone mentioned the idea of a second career and how it might be fashioned so it still benefits the military, possibly in the Reserve Component. There might be a thought in there.

- We encourage people finishing their active duty commitment to move to a Reserve unit; in fact, we recruit aggressively and pay handsomely when a skill is in short supply. In years past, we haven't pushed for ex-military to join the Federal civilian workforce but now are working that harder. For example, we have eliminated disincentives like the forfeiture of some military retirement pay when a veteran is employed as a Federal civilian, helping those cross-flows.

2. I was unaware that 1 out of every 3 new people coming into the military drops out before their tour is complete. What is the story on that? Does that mean we are bringing the wrong people in?

- First-term attrition rates (within the first 36-months of service) historically have been in the 30-percent range. We know that high school diploma graduates are about twice as likely as nongraduates to complete their initial service obligations, with three-year attrition rates of roughly 20 and 50 percent, respectively. As a result, the Services prefer to enlist high school graduates. In fact, about 90 percent of new recruits hold that traditional diploma. Yet, the 30-percent attrition rate has been persistent as a consequence of losses brought about by poor physical conditioning or inadequate motivation. Programs recently have been put in place to help recruits meet physical fitness standards and to adjust to military discipline. We are spending more effort in saving them – a habit we may have misplaced during the drawdown.

3. Should we have someone look at high schools around military bases to see if they refuse to allow recruiters in?

- We've looked at recruiter access to high schools in high-military-density states and cities. Frankly, the correlation is not strong. Many schools denying access are private schools (often with religious affiliations) or those with school board policies discouraging release of student names or phone numbers to third parties. A new law takes effect in July 2002, requiring that senior officers visit schools that deny access. Problems unresolved after 120 days would be reported to Governors, requesting their help. For denials unresolved within a year, DoD would notify congressional delegations and Defense oversight committees. Congressional intent is to get public officials to push for wider access for our military recruiters.

4. What about getting Dr. Eliot Cohen to take a look at war colleges and see if they really are as pedestrian as he indicated?

- Dr. Cohen appears to represent a minority view, but this is something I will want to explore in concert with the Joint Staff.

5. I can't imagine there is a way to tie student aid to military service, but if there is, it is interesting.

- Today, we offer several programs that tie money for college, or repayment of student loans, to military service. Three Services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) offer a student loan repayment program, with Army offering up to \$65,000 while the Navy and Air Force offer up to \$10,000. New troops also may enroll in the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) program during their initial training. Members must agree to have their pay reduced by \$100 a month for 12 months, in return for a monthly stipend of up to \$650 for 36 months (\$23,000) in college assistance. The Services also may offer a college fund "kicker" in concert with the MGIB, paying up to a total of \$50,000. Finally, all Services currently offer tuition assistance of up to 75 percent (a maximum of \$3,500 per year) to those attending college courses while on active duty.

6. What about GI Bill for Graduate School?

- It's already in force. Currently, the Montgomery GI Bill pays a monthly stipend of up to \$650 for 36 months for full-time college attendance toward an undergraduate or graduate degree. The Montgomery GI Bill also may be applied to courses leading to a certificate or diploma from business, technical or vocational schools; cooperative training programs; apprenticeship or job training programs; flight training programs; or correspondence and accredited independent study courses. It's very flexible.

Asst. Dir. 10/16/01

snowflake

October 15, 2001 1:58 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Memo

Please take a look at this memo I sent Paul Wolfowitz. Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.
092401-21


DHR:dh
101501-41

ISLAVE

15 Oct 01

U12899 /02

October 2, 2001 12:34 PM

TO: 
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Israeli MoD

We just talked to the Israeli MoD. He offered again to give us as much information from his four decades of experience of his country with terrorism. I think we ought to review and see how we feel about the linkage we have through the **intel** community and see if we may want to strengthen the relationship directly through **DoD** on the subject of terrorism and see what they know that we don't know and that we may not be seeing in our **intel**.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
100201-17

snowflake

October 23, 2001 11:08AM

Handwritten: 10/23/01
1712

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Speech Material

There is some really good stuff for the speechwriters in these excerpts from my confirmation testimony. The last paragraph was not highlighted, but it should have been. It is the best!

Let's get some of that stuff woven into my remarks.

Thanks.

Attach.
Quotes **from** Confirmation Hearings

DHR:dh
102301-21

Handwritten: 350.0015D

Handwritten: 23002101

U12936 /02

snowflake

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: September 23, 2001
SUBJECT:

DR *R&R* *10/23*
SECDEF HAS SEEN
OCT 23 2001 *10/23*

Have somebody pull my confirmation hearings and take out where I said the thing that worried me the most when I went to sleep at night was intelligence failures, and second, pull out of there anything I said about transformation and asymmetrical threats and terrorism, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and let's get those quotes elevated, isolated in a piece of paper so we've got them.

They were ^{present}~~presented~~, as fate would have it.

Thank you.

SecDef -

There are some pretty good nuggets attached. There has circulated a lot of excerpts along those lines. It's good stuff.
D. Rita

DHR/azn
092301.26

QUOTES FROM SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S CONFIRMATION HEARING

The problem of terrorism is an exceedingly serious one. It's a problem for us in our homeland. It's a problem for deployed forces. It's a problem for our friends and allies. And I think it was Lenin who said that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, and that's what it does; it changes people's behavior. And the wonderful advantage is a terrorist can attack at any time in any place using any technique, and it is physically impossible to defend at every time in every place against every technique.

...So it is not something that ends, it is something you need to be attentive to. It's something we need to have vastly better intelligence than we do today. And it's something that needs to not simply be a Defense Department problem or a homeland defense problem, but it's also a diplomatic problem. We have to find ways to function in this world where we work with people and try to create an environment that is less hospitable to terrorists and to terrorism.

"The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to armed conflict or the end of challenges or threats to U.S. interests; we know that. Indeed, the centrifugal forces in world politics have created a more diverse and less predictable set of potential adversaries, whose aspirations for regional influence and whose willingness to use military force will produce challenges to important U.S. interests and to those of our friends and allies..."

“

We all know that history is filled with instances where people were surprised. There were plenty of signals, plenty of warnings, plenty of cautions, but they weren't taken aboard, they didn't register, they weren't sufficient to cause a person to act on those concerns. It wasn't that the information wasn't there; it just didn't register. . . .

As to a single big idea, I don't know, but it may be this: It may be that one of the biggest things we have to do is what I mentioned earlier, and that is recognize that the deterrents of the Cold War worked. Those deterrents very likely will not work as well or as broadly as we will need during the period of this era of globalization, or post-Cold War period, or whatever we're going to end up calling it; that the problems are different, and the demands will be different, and that we as a people have an obligation to be smart enough to think about those things and to see that we get arranged, as a defense establishment, with our allies so that, in fact, we dissuade people from doing things. “

"President-elect Bush has outlined three overarching goals for bringing U.S. armed forces into the **21st** century. First, we must strengthen the bond of trust with the American military. The brave and dedicated men and women, who serve in our country's uniform, active Guard and Reserve, must get the best support their country can possibly provide them, so that we can continue to call on the best people in the decades to come.

Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorism, the newer threats against space assets and information systems, as members of the committee have mentioned. The American people, our forces abroad, and our friends and allies must be protected against the threats which modern technology and its proliferation confront us.

And third, we must take advantage of the new possibilities that the ongoing technological revolution offers to create the military of the next century. Meeting these challenges will require a cooperative effort between Congress and the Executive Branch and with industry and our allies as well.

If confirmed, I look forward to developing a close working relationship with this committee and with the counterpart committees and the House of Representatives to achieve these goals and to fashion steps to help to transform our defense posture to address those new challenges. "

“Credible deterrence no longer can be based solely on the prospect of punishment through massive retaliation. It must be based on a combination of offensive nuclear and non-nuclear defensive capabilities working together to deny potential adversaries the opportunity and the benefits that come from the threat or the use of weapons of mass destruction against our forces, our homeland, as well as those of our allies.”

“Well, I’ve been made aware of Senator **Frist’s** and (**Sen. Kennedy’s**] interests and Senator Roberts’. I would rank **bioterrorism** quite high in terms of threats. I think that it has the advantage that it does not take a genius to create agents that are enormously powerful, and they can be done in mobile facilities, in small facilities.

And I think it is something that merits very serious attention, not just by the Department of Defense, but by the country. And I have an interest in it and certainly would intend to be attentive to it”.

“**I** want you to know that I understand the task facing the Department of Defense is enormously complex. It is not a time to preside and tweak and calibrate what’s going on. It is a time to take what’s been done to start this transformation and see that it is continued in a way that hopefully has many, many more right decisions than wrong decisions.”

“We also need to make darn sure that we’re dealing with our allies in a way that they are brought along. We’re not alone in this world, we have some enormously important allies in Asia and in Europe and friends in other parts of the world, and I think that those relationships, as well, are terribly important.”

“...I have had an impression over the years that we have a significant role in helping to deter aggression in the world, and the way you do that is to be arranged to defend in the event you need **to...Having** been at NATO and looking at different countries, and what the different countries bring to that alliance, it’s pretty obvious that the United States has some things we bring to it that are notably different from some of the other countries. It is also true that the other countries can bring significant things.

And I don’t think that it’s necessarily true that the United States has to become a great peacekeeper, if you will. I think we need to have capabilities, as you’re suggesting, that are distinct from war-fighting capabilities. But I also think other countries can participate in these activities that are needed in the world from time to time and bring -- they can bring the same capabilities we can to that type of thing, whereas they cannot bring the same capabilities we can, for example, with respect to airlift or **sealift** or intelligence gathering or a variety of other things.”

“I’ve met with Saddam Hussein and I met with the elder Assad as Middle East envoy and these people are intelligent, they’re survivors, they’re tough. They don’t think like we do, and goodness knows they don’t behave like we do with respect to their neighbors or their own people. . . . that’s why this intelligence gathering task we have as a country is so much more important today, not just because of proliferation, but because the weapons are so powerful. And it’s not a matter of counting beans in Russia; how many missiles, how many ships, how many tanks? It’s a matter of knowing a lot more about attitudes and behaviors and motivations and how you can alter their behavior to create a more peaceful world.”

"I would repeat what I said about the importance of considerably improving our intelligence capabilities so that we know more about what people think and how they behave and how their behavior can be altered, and what the capabilities are in this world. I think the goal ought not to be to win a war. The goal ought to be to be so strong and so powerful that you can dissuade people from doing things they otherwise would do and you don't have to even fight the war. That takes me to the second point.

The second point is I don't know that I really understand what deters people today. Because I don't think one thing deters everybody. I think we need to understand that there are different parts of the world. There are different types of leaders with different motivations. And we have to do a lot better job of thinking through deterrence and assuring that we've done the best job possible."



snowflake

Asad *9/27*
0844

September 25, 2001 7:07 PM

Related to 092501-3

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pentagon Security

I want to begin calming down the security at the Pentagon. I think we ought to think about expanding the parking a little, and I think we ought to have fewer policemen and not look like a war zone.

Thanks.

DHR:db
092501-13

006

25 Sep 0

U13121 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/843

snowflake

Agan W 9/27
08118

September 25, 2001 7:24 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Language Training

You have to get somebody working on seeing that we start teaching more languages-Arabic, Afghan, whatever-in our Monterey language school. They need to be told I am told, or else they aren't going to be able to do it. Also, the war colleges and the military academies.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092501-15

091.4

25 Sep 01

U13126 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/844

snowflake

August 17, 2001 4:08 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority

I signed this, and I shouldn't have. I would like to see the criteria for how the awards are going to be made.

I am happy to delegate the authority, but I think we ought to have some good, clear idea of the basis on which they are going to be awarded.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/7/01 P&R action memo to **SecDef** re: Proposed Delegation [U 13975/01]

DHR:dh
081701-17

248

17 AUG 01



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET HAS BEEN

AUG 21 7 2001



ACTION MEMO

August 7, 2001, 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *(Signature)*

DepSec Action _____

FROM: David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

David S.C. Chu 15 Aug 01

SUBJECT: Section 1132 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 – Proposed Delegation

- The attached memorandum will delegate authority to approve awards up to \$25,000 for civilian employees to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) with authority to redelegate. (Tab A)
- Section 1132 authorizes the Secretary of Defense the authority to approve awards in excess of \$10,000 up to \$25,000. (Tab B)
- Current DoD regulations authorize the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) (ASD (FMP)) to approve awards of \$10,000 to civilians and up to \$25,000 for military awards. (Tab C)
- When you grant this delegation to me, I anticipate re delegating the authority to the ASD (FMP), which will make the authorities the same for both military and civilians.

RECOMMENDATION: That you delegate this authority to me by signing the memorandum. (Tab A)

COORDINATION: Tab D

Prepared by: Tim Curry, ODASD (Civilian Personnel Policy), 697-5472

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>8/16</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>8/17</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>8/17</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>8/16</i>



8/17 15:30



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE FENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authorities and Assignment of Responsibilities of the
Secretary of Defense under Section 1132 of the Floyd D. Spence National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001

The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) is delegated the authority and assigned responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense under Section 1132 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398, October 30, 2000) (relating to the authority to approve cash awards of up to \$25,000 for civilian employees).

This authority may be re-delegated in writing to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy).

11-L-0559/OSD/847

SEC. 1132. APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR CASH AWARDS IN EXCESS OF \$10,000.

Section 4502 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(f) The Secretary of Defense may grant a cash award under subsection (b) of this section without regard to the requirements for certification and approval provided in that subsection.”

SEC. 1133. LEAVE FOR CREWS OF CERTAIN VESSELS.

Section 6305(c)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

“(2) may not be made the basis for a lump-sum payment, except that civil service mariners of the Military Sealift Command on temporary promotion aboard ship may be paid the difference between their temporary and permanent rates of pay for leave accrued under this section and section 6303 and not otherwise used during the temporary promotion upon the expiration or termination of the temporary promotion; and”.

SEC. 1134. LIFE INSURANCE FOR EMERGENCY ESSENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EMPLOYEES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 8702 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(c) Notwithstanding a notice previously given under subsection (b), an employee of the Department of Defense who is designated as an emergency essential employee under section 1580 of title 10 shall be insured if the employee, within 60 days after the date of the designation, elects to be insured under a policy of insurance under this chapter. An election under the preceding sentence shall be effective when provided to the Office in writing, in the form prescribed by the Office, within such 60-day period.”

(b) APPLICABILITY.—For purposes of section 8702(c) of title 5, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)), an employee of the Department of Defense who is designated as an emergency essential employee under section 1580 of title 10, United States Code, before the date of the enactment of this Act shall be deemed to be so designated on the date of the enactment of this Act.

Subtitle E—Intelligence Civilian Personnel

SEC. 1141. EXPANSION OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEM POSITIONS.

(a) AUTHORITY FOR SENIOR DOD INTELLIGENCE POSITIONS THROUGHOUT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.—Section 1601(a)(l) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking “in the intelligence components of the Department of Defense and the military departments” and inserting “in the Department of Defense”; and

(2) by striking “of those components and departments” and inserting “of the Department”.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT FOR PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR POSTEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE.—Section 1611 of such title is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(l), by striking “an intelligence component of the Department of Defense” and inserting “a defense intelligence position”;

(2) in subsection (b)—

SUBCHAPTER 451

AWARDS

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SUBCHAPTER 451
AWARDS

- References:
- (a) DoD Directive 1400.25, "DoD Civilian Personnel Management System," November 25, 1996
 - (b) Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 430, 451, 531 and 534
 - (c) Chapters 12, 21, 33, 43, 45, 53 and 71 of title 5, United States Code
 - (d) Section 1124 of title 10, United States Code
 - (e) Executive Order 10717, "The President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian-Service," June 27, 1958, as amended
 - (f) Executive Order 9586, "Medal of Freedom," July 6, 1945, as amended
 - (g) Executive Order 11494, "Establishing the Presidential Citizens Medal," November 13, 1969
 - (h) Executive Order 10431, "National Security Medal," January 19, 1953
 - (i) DoD Instruction 1416.4, "Quality Step Increases for Employees Subject to the Classification Act of 1949," March 4, 1963 (hereby canceled)
 - (j) DoD Instruction SO 10.39, "Work Force Motivation," November 16, 1984 (hereby canceled)
 - (k) DoD Instruction 5 120.16, "Department of Defense Incentive Awards Program: Policies and Standards," July 15, 1974, as amended (hereby canceled)
 - (l) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel) Memorandum, "Department of Defense Implementation Plan for Time Off as an Incentive Award," June 12, 1992, as amended (hereby canceled)
 - (m) DoD Directive 1432.2, "Honorary Awards to Private Citizens and Organizations," February 28, 1986 (canceled)
 - (n) DoD Directive 5 120.15, "Authority for Approval of Cash and Honorary Awards for DoD Personnel," August 12, 1985 (canceled)
 - (o) DoD 7000.14-R, "Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation," Volume 8, "Civilian Pay Policy and Procedures," June 1994, authorized by DoD Instruction 7000.14, "DoD Financial Management Policy and Procedures," November 15, 1992

A. PURPOSE

This Subchapter implements DoD policies under references (a) through (c) and delegates authority, assigns responsibility, and establishes requirements for awards and awards programs for civilian employees within the Department of Defense. Additionally, this Subchapter establishes DOD-level awards for private citizens, groups or organizations, provides guidance for awards established by Components for private citizens and others, provides guidance for awards to military personnel under reference (d) above and issues procedures to be observed by Components in recognizing or recommending to the Secretary of Defense civilian employees or others for Presidential-level awards established under references (e) through (h). This subchapter also cancels references (i) through (l) and supersedes references (m) and (n).

B. POLICY

1. It is **DoD** policy under **DoD** Directive 1400.25 (reference (a)) to encourage the full participation of **DoD** personnel at all levels in improving Government operations **and**, under references (a) through (h) to pay cash awards, grant time-off, **or** incur necessary expenses for the honorary and informal recognition of **DoD** personnel, either individually or as a **member** of a group, on **the** basis of:

a. A suggestion, invention, productivity gain, superior accomplishment, or other personal effort that contributes to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of Government operations or achieves a significant reduction in paperwork;

b. A special act or service in the public interest in connection with or related to official employment; or,

c. Performance as reflected in the **employee's** most recent rating of record as defined by S CFR 430.203 (reference (b)).

2. Awards under this Subchapter shall be granted consistent with Equal Employment Opportunity and **Affirmative** Employment Program policies and shall be free from discrimination regardless of race, color, religion, age, sex, national origin, or disability.

3. Awards programs for civilian employees shall involve employees or their representatives in program development and implementation as appropriate. The method of involvement shall be in accordance with applicable law.

4. Policies and standards governing awards for which both **DoD** civilian and military personnel are eligible shall be applied equitably to the extent consistent with applicable law and regulation.

5. Awards granted under this Subchapter shall be subject to applicable **ax** rules.

6. Awards granted under this Subchapter shall be given due weight in qualifying and selecting an employee for promotion as required by **5 U.S.C.** 3362 (reference (c)).

7. Awards which are separate from awards and awards programs created to recognize civilian employees may be established to recognize private citizens, groups and organizations that significantly assist or support **DoD** functions, services or operations performed as a public service. Such awards shall be established and administered consistent with Section 0 of this Subchapter.

C. DEFINITIONS

1. **Award.** Something bestowed or an action taken to recognize and reward individual or team achievement that contributes to meeting organizational goals or improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of the Government or is otherwise in the public interest. Such awards

include, but are not limited to, employee incentives that are based on predetermined criteria such as productivity standards, performance goals, measurements systems, award formulas, or payout schedules.

2. Award Program. The specific procedures and requirements established in a DoD Component for granting awards under 5 CFR 45 1 (reference (b)) and this Subchapter.

3. Monetary Award. An award in which the recognition device is a cash payment that does not increase the employee's rate of basic pay.

4. Non-Monetary Award. An award in which the recognition device is not a cash payment or time-off as an award but rather an award of a honorific value, e.g. a letter, certificate, medal, plaque or item of nominal value.

5. Time-Off Award An award in which time-off from duty is granted without loss of pay or charge to leave and for which the number of hours granted is commensurate with the employee's contribution or accomplishment.

6. Tangible Benefit. Savings to the Government that can be measured in terms of dollars.

7. Intangible Benefit. Savings to the Government that cannot be measured in terms of dollars.

D. AWARD RESTRICTIONS

1. Limitations of Awards During a Presidential Election Year. Components shall not grant awards under the conditions set forth under 5 CFR 45 1.105 (reference (b)). This applies to monetary and time-off awards. However, non-monetary awards such as certificates, plaques and items of a similar nature are permitted provided that the form of the non-monetary award avoids the appearance of replacing a bonus. As non-monetary awards may take a wide variety of forms with a wide variance, both in terms of direct costs and the appearance of such value, recognition by non-monetary award should create the inherent impression of symbolic value (an honor being bestowed) rather than monetary worth (cash value).

2. Prohibition of Cash Award to Executive Schedule Officers DoD Components shall not grant cash awards under the conditions set forth under 5 CFR 451.105 (reference (b)).

E. ELIGIBILITY

1. General. Civilian employees who meet the definition of "employee" under 5 U.S.C. 2 105 (reference (c)) are eligible to receive awards under this Subchapter. Unless otherwise provided, under 10 U.S.C. 1124 (reference (d)) members of the Armed Forces are eligible to be paid monetary awards for only suggestions, inventions, and scientific achievements. Performance awards may be paid to Senior Executive Service (SES) employees only under

5 CFR 534.403 (reference (b)) and not on the basis of this Subchapter. Private citizens and organizations may be recognized for significant contributions to the Department with non-monetary awards only.

2. Former Employees Under 5 CFR 45 1.104 (reference (b)), awards for contributions made by an individual when employed by the Department of Defense may be paid to a former employee ~~or~~ to the estate or legal heirs of a deceased employee. Awards to ~~separated or~~ deceased members of the Armed Forces for contributions made while the member was on active duty may be paid to the former member or to the member's estate or legal heirs. . .

3. Non-Appropriated Fund Employees Employees paid with nonappropriated funds are not eligible to receive monetary awards paid ~~from~~ appropriated funds but may receive non-monetary awards under this subchapter.

4. Foreign National Employees

a. A foreign national individual who meets the definition of employee **as defined** under 5 U.S.C. 2105 (reference (c)) and is paid **with** U.S. funds, i.e. direct hire employee, is eligible to receive awards under this Subchapter.

b. A foreign national individual who ~~is~~ paid on a cost reimbursable basis by agreement with a foreign country, i.e. indirect hire employee, is not eligible to receive monetary awards but may receive non-monetary awards under this Subchapter.

F. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy (ASD(FMP))** shall:

a. Issue **DoD-wide** policies and procedures governing the establishment and administration of awards and awards programs;

b. Review and, if merited; forward to the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) recommendations for awards that would grant more than **\$10,000** to an individual employee;

c. Review and approve or disapprove, as appropriate, a recommendation for an award of more than \$10,000 for a suggestion, invention, or scientific achievement by members of the Armed Forces, regardless of the number of individuals who may share therein;

d. Review and endorse, if appropriate, **DoD** Component recommendations for honorary Presidential-level awards; and,

e. Establish DOD-level awards and awards programs and delegate administration of such programs where appropriate.

2. The **Director of Administration and Management (Office of the Secretary of Defense) (DA&M)** shall work jointly with the **ASD(FMP)** in the development and establishment of DOD-level awards and shall administer the DOD-level civilian honorary awards program.

3. The **Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy (DASD(CPP))** shall:

a. Recommend **DoD-wide** policies and procedures governing the establishment and administration of awards and awards programs;

b. Evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of **DoD** Components' award program(s) and make recommendations as may be necessary; and,

c. Coordinate **DoD-wide** awards information.

4. The **Heads of the DoD Components** shall;

a. Ensure **the** development, implementation, application, and evaluation **of** one or more awards programs for employees covered under this Subchapter;

b. Ensure funds are obligated consistent with applicable **DoD** Component financial management controls and delegations of authority;

c. Ensure that awards programs do not conflict with or violate any other law or Government-wide regulation;

d. Ensure that criteria for awards do not discriminate against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, age, sex, national origin, or disability;

e. Endorse to the ASD(FMP) for review or approval recommendations for awards that would grant more than \$10,000 to a single civilian employee; and,

f. Endorse to the ASD(FMP) for review and approval recommendations that would result in an award of more than \$10,000 for a single contribution by members of the armed forces, regardless of the number of individuals entitled to share therein.

G. AWARD PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

The establishment, administration or operation of award programs shall provide for:

1. Reviewing award recommendations for which approval authority has not been delegated to officials at lower levels within the organization;

2. Communicating the relevant parts of award programs to managers, supervisors, and employees;

3. Evaluating and assessing awards and award program(s) to ensure that awards: (1) are used to motivate, recognize, and reward eligible personnel; (2) exhibit a close, demonstrable link between performance, accomplishment, or contribution to **DoD** Component goals and objectives and the receipt of *an* award; and (3) **are** granted commensurate with the value of the **employee's** contribution or accomplishment;

4. Documenting all cash and time off **awards** in compliance with 5 CFR 45 **1.106(e)** (reference (b)); filing award documents in compliance with the requirements of **5 CFR 45 1.106(f)** (reference (b)); reporting awards data to the Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) in compliance with 5 CFR **45 1.106(g)** (reference (b)) or reporting awards data as required by OPM on an as needed basis; reporting cash awards for military members as required in section **H.4.c.** below; and following appropriate **DoD** financial management regulations on civilian pay policies and procedures under **DoD 7000.14-R** (reference **(o)**);

5. Granting quality step increases consistent with the provisions of 5 CFR 53 1 Subpart E (reference (b)) and Section J, "Quality **Step** Increases", of this Subchapter.

6. Documenting justification for awards that are not based on a rating of record under **5 CFR 45 1.103** (reference (b)); and,

7. Developing guidelines requiring managers and supervisors to demonstrate involvement in equal employment opportunity-related activities to receive awards, as appropriate.

H. MONETARY AWARDS

1. General Under 5 U.S.C. 4502 (reference c)

a. A monetary award is in addition to **the** regular pay of the recipient;

b. Acceptance of a monetary award constitutes an agreement that the use by the Government of an idea, method, or device for which an award is made does not form the basis of a further claim of any nature against the **Government** by the employee, his or her legal heirs, or assigns; and

c. A monetary award to, and the expense for the honorary recognition of, an employee may be paid from the fund or appropriation available to the activity primarily benefiting or **the** various activities benefiting.

2. Awards to Other Agency or Component Personnel For awards approved for employees of other Federal agencies or other **DoD** Components, the Component(s) that benefits shall make arrangements to transfer funds to the **individual's** employing Component or agency. If the administrative costs of transferring funds would exceed the amount of the award, the Component employing the individual shall absorb the costs and pay the award.

3. Calculation of Savings. Tangible savings shall be calculated on the basis of estimated net savings for the first full year of operation. Exceptions may be made in the case where an improvement with a high installation cost will yield measurable savings continuing more than one year. In this instance, the award may be based on the average annual net savings over a period of several years. The years may not exceed the reasonable life of the initial installation or the clearly predictable period of use, whichever is shorter.

4. Awards to Military Members.

a. Under 10 U.S.C. 1124 (reference (d)), the total amount of the monetary award made for a suggestion, invention, or scientific achievement may not exceed \$25,000, regardless of the number of persons who may be entitled to share therein.

b. Under 5 CFR 45 1.104 (reference (b)), funds shall be transferred to the DoD Component having jurisdiction over the member.

c. Cash awards for military members shall be reported annually to the DASD(CPP) consistent with instructions on a DD Form 1609. The reporting requirements for military personnel are assigned DD-MA(A) 1345.

5. Examples of Awards Scales Appendices C and D are models of awards scales based upon tangible and intangible benefits.

I. PERFORMANCE-BASED CASH AWARDS

Under 5 U.S.C. 4505a reference (c)),

1. Monetary awards may be granted to an employee whose most recent rating was at Level 3 (fully successful level or equivalent) or higher, as defined in 5 CFR 430.208 (reference (b));

2. An award granted under this section may not exceed 10 percent of the employee's annual rate of basic pay, except that the Component Head may determine that exceptional performance by the employee justifies an award exceeding 10 percent and may authorize an award up to 20 percent of the employee's annual rate of basic pay. For an award that is paid as a percentage of basic pay, the rate of basic pay shall be determined without taking into account any locality-based comparability, special law enforcement adjustment, or interim geographic adjustment;

3. Employees may not appeal a decision not to grant an award or the amount of the award paid under this section. This does not extinguish or lessen any right or remedy under Chapter 12, Subchapter II of 5 U.S.C. (reference (c)) or Chapter 71 of 5 U.S.C. (reference (c)), or any of the laws referred to in 5 U.S.C. 2302 (reference (c)); and

4. Awards granted under this section shall be paid as a lump sum and may not be considered to be part of the basic pay of an employee.

addition to a periodic step increase under section 5335 of reference (c). It provides an incentive and recognition of high quality performance above that ordinarily found in the type of position concerned by granting faster than normal step increases. An employee is eligible for **only** one quality step increase within any 52 week period.

2. Under section 531.504 of reference (b), an employee covered by a performance appraisal program established under part 430, subpart B of reference (b) must receive a rating of record of Level 5 (“**Outstanding**”) (or equivalent) as defined in Section 430.208 (reference (b)) in order to be eligible for a quality step increase. An employee covered by a performance appraisal program that does not use a Level 5 summary level must receive a rating of record at the highest summary level under the program and must demonstrate sustained performance of high quality significantly above that expected at the Level 3 (“Fully Successful” or equivalent) level in **the** type of position concerned as determined under component established performance-related criteria. As quality step increases become part of base pay, the grant of a quality step increase should be based on performance which is characteristic of the employee’s overall high quality performance and the expectation that this high quality performance will continue in the future.

3. Quality step increases shall be reported to the Central Personnel Data File consistent with 5 CFR 53.1507(b) (reference (b)).

K. SUGGESTION AWARDS

1. General

a. To be considered for an award, a suggestion must:

(1) Identify an improvement in the quality of operations, a cost reduction opportunity, or an improvement in the timeliness of service delivery that results in tangible or intangible benefits to the U.S. Government; and,

(2) Be adopted in whole or in part for implementation. The suggestion should set forth a specific proposed course of action to achieve the improvement or cost reduction.

b. Ideas **or** suggestions that point out the need for routine maintenance work, **recommend** enforcement of an existing rule, propose changes in housekeeping practices, call attention to errors or alleged violations of regulations, or result in intangible benefits of “good **will**” **are not** eligible for consideration.

c. **DoD** personnel who make suggestions concerning improvement of materials or services purchased from a contractor may be paid a monetary award only if the improvement results in tangible benefits or intangible benefits to the Government. The suggestion must be

processed through Government channels to identify correctly the origin of the proposal and the benefits to the Government. Government employees or members of the Armed Forces shall not be paid awards based upon benefits to the contractor.

2. Award Amounts and Financing

a. awards for suggestions shall be based upon tangible or intangible benefit&r a combination thereof.

b. When a suggestion is adopted by another organization, the benefiting organization shall share in the cost of the total award commensurate with the benefit. The **suggester's** organization will notify the benefiting organization(s) of the amount due and the benefiting organization(s) shall take prompt action to transfer the funds.

L. INVENTIONS

1. General

a. **DoD** Component **offices** responsible for patent matters shall determine that the invention is of value or potential value to the Department of Defense and that the invention was made under circumstances that resulted in **the** Government initiating action to obtain the title or license.

b. To be considered for an award, the **DoD Component's office for patent** matters shall verify to **the** appropriate award **office** that conditions in section L. I .a-, above, have been met.

c. If the conditions under paragraph L. 1 .a. above, are not met, but the invention is determined to be of value to the Department of Defense and the inventor consents to consideration for an award, the inventor will be required to sign a claim waiver agreement to be paid an award.

2. Award Payments

a. Eligible personnel may be paid a nominal initial monetary award and an additional monetary award when the patent covering the invention is issued.

b. **If** an application for a patent is placed under a secrecy order, the individual will become eligible for the additional award when a Notice of Allowability of the application is issued by the U.S. Patent **Office** instead of issuance of a patent.

c. Awards under this section are not authorized if a monetary award has been paid for the same contribution as a suggestion.

M. HONORARY AWARDS

1, DoD Components shall not title a Component established award or **award** program “Department of **Defense**” or “Secretary of Defense,” either in whole or in part.

2. **Honorary** awards to DoD personnel may be granted independently or in **addition** to a monetary **or** a time-off award.

3. Appendix A lists DOD-level honorary awards for which career civilian employees may be eligible. It also lists Presidential-level awards for which both civilian employees, military members and private citizens may be eligible+

N. TIME-OFF AWARDS

1. **General** Time-off awards are an alternate means of recognizing the superior accomplishments of employees with other than monetary or non-monetary awards. Decisions to grant time-off awards shall be based upon the same criteria or circumstances as for any other incentive award. Time-off awards shall not be granted to create the effect of a holiday or **treated** as administrative excusals or leave; i.e. they shall not be granted in conjunction with a military **“down” or “training”** day or the like which would grant the entire civilian employee population, or a majority of the civilian population, a time-off award to be used on a specified day. Though time-off awards may not have an immediate budget consequence, supervisors and managers shall consider fully wage costs and productivity loss when granting time-off awards and shall ensure that the amount of time-off granted as an award is commensurate with the individuals contribution **or** accomplishment.

2. Award Amount Limits.

a. **The** amount of time off granted to any one individual in any one leave year should not exceed 80 hours. For part-time employees or those with an uncommon **tour** of duty, total time off granted during any-calendar **year** should be based on the average number of hours of work generally worked during a two-week period.

b. The amount of a time-off award granted to an individual for a single contribution should not exceed 40 hours. For part-time employees or those with an uncommon tour of duty, the maximum award for any single contribution should **be** one-half of the amount of time that would be granted during the year.

3. **Time Limit to Use Award.** Time off granted as an award should be scheduled and used within one year after the effective date of the award.

4. **Conversion to Cash Award.** Under 5 CFR 45 1.104 (reference (b)), a time-off award shall not be converted to a cash payment under any circumstances.

5. Portability. A time-off award shall not be transferred **between DoD** Components. Managers **and** supervisors should make every effort to ensure that the employee is able to use the time-off award before he or she leaves the granting Component,

0. AWARDS FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS

1. General. Private citizens, groups, and organizations that significantly assist or support DoD functions, services, or operations may **be** recognized to demonstrate the interest of DoD management in improving **efficiency** and effectiveness, and to encourage citizens **and** organizations in their efforts to assist in the accomplishment of DoD missions. The awards shall be honorary only. Appendix B lists DOD-level awards for which non-career individuals or private citizens may be eligible.

2. Eligibility

a. Any person, group, or organization, except for those described in paragraph **O.2.b.**, below, may be considered for recognition under, this section based on a significant contribution to the Department of Defense performed **as** a public service.

b. Persons or organizations having a commercial or **profitmaking** relationship with the Department of Defense or with a DoD Component shall not be granted recognition, unless the contribution is substantially beyond that specified or implied within the terms of **the** contract establishing the relationship, or the recognition is clearly in the public interest.

SUBCHAPTER 451

APPENDIX A

DOD AND PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL HONORARY AWARDS

A. DOD-LEVEL HONORARY AWARDS

1. Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award

a. **General.** This award is -the **Department's** highest award given to **career DoD** civilian employees whose careers reflect exceptional devotion to duty and whose contributions to the **efficiency, economy, or other improvements in DoD** operations are of a significantly broad scope. Awards may be granted for contributions in a scientific field or for accomplishments in technical or administrative endeavors. Career **DoD** employees normally compete for **this** award with the competition culminating with an annual ceremony recognizing from five to seven employees from throughout the Department of Defense. To have received this award through strict competition is considered extremely prestigious. On rare occasions, when recommended by Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of Defense Agencies or Heads of OSD Components, the Secretary of Defense may approve this award on a non-competitive basis. When granted non-competitively, the justification for the award must show that the nominee's contributions to the mission of the organization are of such major significance that immediate recognition is warranted. All nominations for this **award** must be submitted to the Director, Administration and Management, **OSD**, for forwarding to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

b. **Additional Information.** Further information on eligibility, criteria, and nominating procedures may **be** obtained from Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Personnel and Security, Labor and Management Employee Relations Division.

2. Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Award

a. **General** This award is the second highest award granted to career civilian employees of the Department of Defense and other Government Agencies who have distinguished themselves by exceptionally meritorious service of major significance to the **Department** of Defense. This award requires review by the **OSD/JS** Incentive Awards Board (IAB). The IAB recommends approval or disapproval of the award. The final approval rests with the Secretary of Defense.

b. **Additional Information.** Further information on **eligibility, criteria,** and nominating procedures may be obtained **from** Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Personnel and Security, Labor and Management Employee Relations Division.

B. PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL HONORARY AWARDS

1. President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service

a. **General.** Established by E.O. 10717 (reference (f)), this award is the highest honor for extraordinary achievement in Federal service. It is granted by the President to career service individuals whose accomplishments and achievements exemplify, to an exceptional degree, imagination, courage, and extraordinary ability in carrying out the mission of the Government. This award is highly selective and nominated individuals should have received their Component's highest award for civilians to be considered.

b. **Additional Information.** Further information on eligibility, criteria and nominating procedures may be obtained from the Defense Civilian Personnel Management Service.

2. Presidential Medal of Freedom

a. **General** Established by E-O.9586 (reference (g)), this medal is awarded by the President for exceptionally meritorious contributions to national security interests of the United States, world peace, cultural, or other exceptionally significant public or private endeavors. It is bestowed at the sole discretion of the President. The basis for nomination must be of the most significant nature to the nation as a whole.

b. **Additional Information.** Further information on eligibility, criteria and nominating procedures may be obtained from the Defense Civilian Personnel Management Service.

3. Presidential Citizens Medal

a. **General.** Established by E.O. 11494 (reference (h)), this medal is awarded by the President to individuals who have performed exemplary deeds of service for the country of similar nature to the Medal of Freedom, but of a lesser impact or scope.

b. **Additional Information.** Further information on eligibility, criteria, and nominating procedures may be obtained from the Defense Civilian Personnel Management Service:

4. National Security Medal

a. **General.** Established by E.O. 10431 (reference (i)), this medal is awarded by the President to individuals for extraordinary contributions to the country specifically related to matters of national security.

b. **Additional Information.** Further information on eligibility, criteria, and nominating procedures may be obtained from the Defense Civilian Personnel Management Service.

SUBCHAPTER 451

APPENDIX B

**DOD-LEVEL HONORARY AWARDS
FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS**

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DISTINGUISHED PUBLIC SERVICE AWARD

1. **General.** This is the highest honorary award granted to non-career Federal employees, private citizens, and foreign nationals who have performed exceptionally distinguished service of significance to the **Department** of Defense as a whole or service of such exceptional **significance** to a **DoD** Component or function that recognition at the Component level is **insufficient**. The nominee may have rendered service or assistance at considerable personal sacrifice and inconvenience that was motivated by patriotism, good citizenship and a sense of public responsibility. To be eligible, the nominee shall be an individual who does not derive his or her principal livelihood from the Federal Government.

2. **Additional Information.** Further information on eligibility, criteria, and nominating procedures may be obtained from Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Personnel and Security, Labor and Management Employee Relations Division.

B. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AWARD FOR OUTSTANDING PUBLIC SERVICE

1. **General** This is the Department's second highest honorary award granted by the Secretary of Defense to **non-career** Federal civilian employees, private citizens and foreign nationals for contributions, assistance or support to Department of Defense functions that are extensive enough to warrant recognition but are lesser in scope and impact than is required for the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Award. To be eligible, the nominee shall be **an** individual who does not derive **his** or her principal livelihood from the Federal Government.

2. **Additional Information.** Further information on eligibility, criteria, and nominating procedures may be obtained from Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Personnel and Security, Labor and Management Employee Relations Division.

SUBCHAPTER 451

APPENDIX C

SCALE OF AWARD AMOUNTS BASED ON

TANGIBLE BENEFITS TO THE GOVERNMENT

<u>BENEFITS</u>	<u>AWARDS</u>
<u>Estimated First-Year Benefits</u>	<u>Amount of Award to Employee</u>
Up to \$100,000 in benefits	10% of benefits,
\$100,001 and above in benefits	\$10,000 plus 1% of benefits above \$100,001, up to \$25,000 with the approval of the Office of Personnel Management.
	<i>Presidential approval is required for all awards of more than \$25,000.</i>

SUBCHAPTER 451

APPENDIX D

SCALE OF AWARD AMOUNTS BASED ON

INTANGIBLE BENEFITS TO THE GOVERNMENT

VALUE OF BENEFIT	EXTENT OF APPLICATION			
	LIMITED	EXTENDED	BROAD	GENERAL
	Affects functions, mission, or personnel of the facility, installation, regional area, or an organizational element of headquarters. Affects small area of science or technology.	Affects functions, mission, or personnel of an entire regional area, command, or bureau. Affects an important area of science or technology.	Affects functions, mission, or personnel of several regional areas or commands, or an entire department or agency. Affects an extensive area of science or technology.	Affects functions, mission, or personnel of more than one department or agency, or in the public interest throughout the Nation and beyond.
<i>MODERATE</i> Change or modification of an operating principle or procedure with limited use or impact.	\$25 - \$125	\$126 - \$325	\$326 - \$650	\$651 - \$1,300
<i>SUBSTANTIAL</i> Substantial change or modification of procedures. An important improvement to the value of a product, activity, program, or service to the public.	\$125 - 325	3326 - \$650	\$651 - \$1,300	\$1,301 - 53,150
<i>HIGH</i> Complete revision of a basic principle or procedure; a highly significant improvement to the value of a product or service.	\$325 - \$650	\$651 - \$1,300	\$1,301 - 3,150	\$3,151 - \$6,300
<i>EXCEPTIONAL</i> Initiation of a new principle or major procedure; a superior improvement to the quality of a critical product, activity, program, or service to the public.	\$650 - \$1,300	\$1,301 - \$3,150	\$3,151 - \$6,300	\$6,301 - \$10,000

Coordination Page

General Counsel

Mr. William J. Haynes II July 18, 2001

Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy)

Mr. J. L. Schrader *JLSchrader 8/8/01*

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Force Management Policy)

Ms. Gail McGinn *GM 8/13/01*

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force
Management Policy)

Mr. Charles S. Abell *CSA 8-13-01*



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO 2001 NOV -5 PM 3: 23

September 28, 2001, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

David S. C. Chu a Nov 07

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority for Civilian Cash Awards

- In response to your note (Tab A), while each Component may develop its own awards program, the program must be developed and administered within the framework of the Department of Defense policy on awards (Tab B). Within this framework, the type of awards and criteria for awards are varied within any one Component and across the DoD.
- Each Component has published an awards regulation and has established awards scales based on tangible and intangible benefits, which must be applied consistently across the Component. Tab C illustrates some examples of criteria within some of the Components.
- Under the old authority, awards over \$10,000 were reviewed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) (ASD (FMP)), but OPM had to approve awards in excess of that. Annually, the ASD (FMP) reviewed and forwarded to OPM an average of 30 awards over \$10,000 with most based strictly on tangible benefits.
- Delegating the \$25,000 authority is consistent with DOD's policy of giving the Components maximum flexibility to manage their awards programs. Currently, Component Heads may approve awards up to \$10,000. The \$10,000 limit was set in 1954 and currently has a value in 1954 dollars of approximately \$4,000.
- We have not observed any improper use of current awards authority and are confident the Heads of the Components will continue their practice of approving awards for their employees appropriately.

248

Coordination: Tab D

Prepared by: Tim Curry, ODASD (Civilian Personnel Policy), 697-5472

*28
Sep 01*



snowflake

August 8, 2001 10:27 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ³ *TR*
SUBJECT: Manning

This paper from Dov tells the **authorized**—it doesn't tell how many people are in those authorized jobs.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/31/01 memos on OSD Manning

020 OSD

DHR:dh
080801-20

Copy RDM done - 8/17 SC

To: Doc Cooke -

Can you provide the additional info Sec Def seeks? Thanks.

Di Rita

8 Aug 01

Office of the Secretary of Defense 7-26-01

Authorized Positions

	Civilian	Military	Total
Total SecDef	27	29	56
Total USD(P)	284	127	411
Total A&T	401	80	481
Total USD(C)	281	42	323
Total P&R	135	85	220
Total OSD	1515	482	1997

Other Activities 7-16-01

Authorized Positions

	Civilian	Military	Total
American Forces Information Service	299	347	646
Office of Economic Adjustment	35	3	38
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces	59	0	59
Defense Legal Services Agency	104	9	113
Washington Headquarters Services	1502	169	1671
Total	1999	528	2527

Washington Headquarters Services 7-16-01

Authorized Positions/Full Time Equivalents

Org (funding)	Civilian	Military	Total
Correspondence & Directives (o&m)	41	29	70
Budget & Finance (o&m)	43	0	43
Real Estate & Facilities (o&m)	144	9	153
Real Estate & Facilities (rev funds)	736	1	737
Real Estate & Facilities (bldg mgmt)	70	1	71
Personnel & Security (o&m)	188	18	206
Federal Voting Association Program (o&m)	13	0	13
Director for Information Operations and Reports (o&m) 43		0	43
General Counsel (o&m)	14	0	14
Freedom of Information and Security Review (o&m) 18		10	28
Defense Privacy Office (o&m)	4	1	5
Miscellaneous/Special Programs (o&m) (to include but not limited to: mess stewards, White House communications agency, Petagon Reservation managers, Summer Hires, State/Defense Program, Commission Support and Receptionists in support of SecDef , DepSecDef and Senior Staff [floaters])	188	100	288
Total	1502	169	1671

Component	Non-DCIO				(Note 1)	(Note 2)	Total
	Auditors	Criminal Investigators	Criminal Investigator	Non-Criminal Inspectors			
Army			46		1613		1659
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command		644			(Note 3)	839	1483
Army Audit Agency	541						541
Internal review	825						825
Navy			14		259		273
Naval Criminal Investigation Service		928		13		721	1662
Naval Audit Service	259						259
Marine Corp Non Appropriated Fund Audit Service	86						86
Other	31						31
Air Force			28		636		664
Air Force Office of Special Investigations		1373		2		554	1929
Air Force Audit Agency	713						713
Inspector General, DoD	524	239		75		346	1184
OSD			39				39
Defense Contract Audit Agency	3546						3546
Agencies/Activities:	294						294
TOTAL	6619	3164	127	90	2508	2460	15188

NOTES:

1. Active duty military & civilians assigned to **IG** positions.
2. **Includes** management, technical, administrative and support, policy and oversight, and **followup** personnel.
3. Includes **HQDA**, **MDW**, **INSCOM** and **AMC**, as well as 1400 (estimated) in Total Army **IG** offices.

snowflake

November 12, 2001 4:39 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memberships

334

We ought to review this list of memberships and find out who my representative is on each one. Then we ought to change the representatives to make sure we have the people we want.

Please come up with a current list and a proposed list of changes.

Thanks.

Attach.
1 1/07/01 GC memo to SecDef re: Automatic Memberships

DHR:dh
111201-14

.....
Please respond by _____

done
Larry Di Rita
2/13

12 Nov 01

U14696 02

11/9
1700



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECRET HAS BEEN

INFO MEMO

NOV 13 2001

November 7, 2001, 11:11 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense

WJ Haynes 11/9/01

SUBJECT: Response to Your Query Concerning Automatic Membership

- You requested (tab B) a list of groups of which you are a member by virtue of your position as Secretary of Defense.
- The list at tab A is the result of our search of statutes and Executive Orders establishing Secretary of Defense membership on councils, committees, and other groups.
- We have not undertaken an exhaustive effort to determine the exact status of many of these committees. For most, representation has been delegated or has devolved to subordinate DoD officials. Some of these committees, although still "on the books," are moribund.
- Your note mentioned the Red Cross. The President appoints eight members of the Red Cross Board of Governors, traditionally including the Secretary of Defense. President Bush has not yet made his appointments.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: John A. Casciotti, 697-9657

*5733
11/10*

UNCLASSIFIED



Secretary of Defense Memberships

MOST SIGNIFICANT MEMBERSHIPS

- 1. National Security Council, member**
 - Committee on Foreign Intelligence, member
 - Committee on Transnational Threats, member
 - 50 U.S.C. §402

- 2. President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board**
 - Exec. Order No. 13,231, 66 Fed. Reg. 202 (Oct. 16, 2001)
 - SecDef or designee

- 3. Homeland Security Council, member**
 - Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51812 (Oct. 8, 2001)

- 4. Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Chairman**
 - 22 U.S.C. §275 1
 - SecDef may designate a DASD-level or above representative to perform his routine duties
 - DepSecDef designated Committee Chairman
 - USD(AT&L) Chairs interagency group supporting committee

OTHER MEMBERSHIPS

- 5. Invasive Species Council, member**
 - Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999)
 - Primary Representative is ADUSD (E), Mr. John P. Woodley

- 6. U.S. Coral Reef Task Force, member**
 - Exec. Order No. 13089, 63 Fed. Reg. 32701 (Jun. 11, 1998), 16 U.S.C. §6401, note

- 7. American Heritage Rivers Interagency Committee, member**
 - Exec. Order No. 13061, 62 Fed. Reg. 48445 (Sep. 11, 1997)
 - SecDef or ASD-level designee

- 8. Export Administrative Review Board, member**
 - Exec. Order No. 12981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62981 (Dec. 5, 1995), continues the Board established by Exec. Order No. 11533 (Jun. 4, 1970) and Exec. Order No. 12002 (Jul. 7, 1977), amended by Exec. Order No. 13020 (Oct. 12, 1996), Exec. Order No. 13026 (Nov. 15, 1996) and Exec. Order No. 13118 (Mar. 31, 1999)

- No alternate Board member shall be designated, but the acting SecDef or Deputy Secretary may serve in lieu of SecDef
- Board responsible for interagency dispute resolution concerning export license applications; Board meets only when necessary to resolve dispute

9. Board of Directors, National Veterans Business Development Corporation, nonvoting ex officio member

- 15 U.S.C. §657c

10. National Advisory Committee on Semiconductors, member

- 15 U.S.C. §4632
- SecDef or designee
- DDR&E advised that the Committee ceased activities in 1992

11. Trade Policy Committee, member

- Exec. Order No. 12188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (Jan 2, 1980), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. §2171 note
- SecDef may designate a subordinate officer at the ASD-level to go in his stead to meetings when he is unable to attend

12. National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, ex officio member

- 20 U.S.C. §80
- DoD Historian advised that Board met once in 1980

13. DoD Advisory Council on Dependent's Education, cochairman

- 20 U.S.C. §929
- SecDef or SecDef designee

14. Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace, member

- 22 U.S.C. §4605
- SecDef may designate an DoD PAS official

15. White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, member

- Pub. L. No. 106-579 (36 U.S.C. §116 note)
- SecDef or designee

16. Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, ex officio member

- 38 U.S.C. §542
- SecDef or SecDef designee (after consultation with DACOWITS)
- DACOWITS Military Director is SecDef designee

17. Advisory Council on Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance, member

- 38 U.S.C. §1974
- DoDD 1341.3, "Servicemen's Group Life Insurance," assigns the DoD Comptroller

responsibility for financial policy and ASD(FMP) responsibility for administrative policy of the SGLI Program

-Council meets once a year

18. Professional Certification and Licensure Advisory Committee, ex officio member

-38 U.S.C. §3689

19. Advisory Committee on Veterans Employment and Training, ex officio non-voting member

-38 U.S.C. §4110

-Committee meets quarterly

20. National Capital Planning Commission, ex officio member

-40 U.S.C. §71a

-SecDef from time-to-time may designate an alternate to serve in his stead

-SecDef designee is Jerry Shiplett, Special Assistant to the Director, Real Estate and Facilities

21. Interagency Council on the Homeless

-42 U.S.C. §11312

-SecDef or designee

22. Civilian Community Corps Advisory Board, member

-42 U.S.C. §12623

23. Corporation for National and Community Service, ex officio non-voting member

-42 U.S.C. §12651a

24. Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, member

-Exec. Order No. 13,122, 64 Fed. Reg. 29201 (May 25, 1999)

-Task Force terminates May 15, 2002 unless the Task Force reaches a consensus recommending continuation of activities

25. Economic Adjustment Committee, Chairman (yearly rotating basis w/ Secretaries of Commerce and Labor) or member

-Exec. Order No. 12,788, 57 Fed. Reg. 2213 (Jan. 21, 1992)

-SecDef or designated principal deputy

-Director Office of Economic Adjustment (DUSD(IA&I)), serves as Committee Chair

snowflake

October 17, 2001 7:04 AM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Automatic Membership

Please pull together a list of all the things I am automatically a member of because of my role as Secretary of Defense. For example, I understand I am now a member of the Homeland Security Council. Of course, I am also a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council.

Are there other things like that? As I recall, the last time I was here I was a member of the board of the Red Cross.

Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101701-3

~~SECRET - HAS BEEN~~

11/9
Sec Def -
Response attached. If you have questions about any particular membership, I have a binder with an explanation of ~~each~~ each.

D. White

snowflake

November 12, 2001 5:03 PM
Handwritten: *Approved 11/12/01*

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Format for Memos

Complete

312

Please tell people to stop using only their titles and start using their names in addition to the titles on correspondence.

Here is a memo. I don't know who these people are. This is not the way to do business. They should put their names on memos so I know who they are.

Also, please give me David Trachtenberg's background. I would like to see who he is.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/09/01 ASD(ISP) memo to ExecSec

DHR:dh
111201-20

Please respond by _____

11/13

*Sec Def -
I'll readdress the problem. You were not the intended recipient of this memo. I'll get Trachtenberg's bio. Di Rita*

12 Nov 01



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

SMA-3
SECDEF HAS SEEN
NOV 12 2001

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
THROUGH UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

for Ryan

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Prepared by: Mr. Stephens, 614-4533

[Signature] NOV 9 2001

SUBJECT: Absence from Washington, DC Area

I will be on TDY from the Washington, DC area to New York City from 1530,
9 November 2001, through 0001, 12 November 2001. In my absence, Mr. David
Trachtenberg, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security
Policy will oversee the organization as Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Policy.


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FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>

11/26
1415

snowflake



D. Azn
11/28
0930

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 23, 2001
RE: Calendar

470

Set me up with Pete Aldridge to discuss this memo on weapons. ~~Fifteen~~ minutes would be fine.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112301.06

Attach. Memo dated 11/9/01 re: Weapons

Respond by: _____

TO: Monica Generous-

This meeting is scheduled for

Thursday, 29 Nov., at

5:30 p.m. Use the attachment as the basis for the read ahead

23110101

Thanks

U14728 02

11-L-0559/OSD/880

D. Rita

Larry Di Rita

11/27

snowflake

November 9, 2001 2:46 PM



MTG
P. A.

TO: Gen. Myers
Dov Zakheim

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Weapons

FYI, attached is a memo in response to my memo of October 30.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/08/01 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef, "Gunship-Like Weapons"

DHR:dh
110901-13

.....
Please respond by _____

583
SECDEF HAS SEEN 11/8

NOV - 9 2001

November 8, 2001

9/1/8

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge 

Subject: Gunship-Like Weapons

You sent me a note stating “we need more weapon systems like the AC-130, where the ordnance can be directed in a more precise way” I agree, and this memo will describe what we are doing.

Two general points. First, the use of the **gunship** requires air superiority, and some self defense capability from ground fire. The **gunships** have been used infrequently, and one could suspect that their proficiency has eroded over time. Second, the **gunship’s** advantage is that it couples target identification, man-in-the-loop decision making and organic firepower in a single platform. The older Air Force A-10s possess similar capabilities. This leads me to suggest the following:

--maximum the use of **gunship** crew training to enhance current effectiveness;

--upgrade the current **gunship** fleet with additional capabilities, such as small UAVs and air-to-surface missiles, to augment their guns and cannons (we have been in contact with the SOF at Hulbert AFB to start such a program);

--augment the **gunships** withUCAVs, but this will take some time to get theUCAVs of sufficient size even to achieve a fraction of the kill capability of the AC-130 (we are currently working on 3000 pound payloadUCAVs);

--refine the target kill **chain**—target ID, decision and rapid target destruction—to “mimic” the **gunship** in its operation, requiring an integrated approach sensors, decision making and lethality (we have a Time Sensitive Target Study underway to do this).

For Information Only.

snowflake

October 30, 2001 3:09 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Weapon Systems

We need more weapon systems that are like the AC-130, where the ordnance can be directed in a more precise way than can some of our other platforms and weapons.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
103001-56

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/883

snowflake

D 12/5
1451

December 3, 2001 6:02 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Quote

See response

Here is an article where they say I was asked if U.S. forces would pour gas into a cave complex. I don't remember them asking me that at all. I think they mentioned that someone had talked about doing that, and I pointed out that people have a choice to surrender and that the opposition forces had put water in a tunnel. Then I said people would do what is necessary to do. I wasn't talking about gas.

Afghanistan

You ought to check the text.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/03/01 Siro Press Review

DHR:dh
120301-50

.....
Please respond by _____

3 Dec 01

U14754 02

TO: SECDEF

F R O M :  Torie

DATE: December 5, 2001

SUBJECT: Quote from "Meet the Press"

Attached please find transcript pages from last Sunday's "Meet the Press."

One could infer from your response to Russert's question about using gas on tunnels that you haven't ruled it out.

MONDAY, 3 DECEMBER 2001

DEC 03 2001

H I G H L I G H T S

1. (MIDDLE EAST) A suicide bomber detonated nail-studded explosives on a bus in Haifa Sunday killing 15 people, just hours after Islamic militants set off deadly explosions in downtown Jerusalem. The two suicide attacks and a Gaza shooting killed 26 people -- many of them teens -- and injured nearly 200. Condemning the bombings in Israel as acts of terrorism, UN Secretary-General Kofi **Annan** told Palestinian leaders to take immediate and decisive action to punish those responsible for the carnage. According to Palestinian security source quoted in Palestinian press, "Palestinian security agencies in the West Bank arrested 50 members of **Hamas** and the Islamic Jihad Movement on Sunday." Israel's cabinet will hold an emergency meeting on Monday to decide on new steps to combat a fresh wave of Palestinian attacks, a senior Israeli official said after talks on Sunday between President Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Asked about a declared Palestinian state of emergency to rein in militants, the official said Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat "tells tales whenever he's afraid." The official said Israel no longer expected effective action from Arafat, whom Sharon has accused of directing attacks against Israelis and that Israel would act on its own to stop the violence. -AP/FBIS/ REUTERS, 2 DEC 01-

2. (AFGHAN CAMPAIGN) According to **Qatari** press on Sunday, Mawlawi Abidallah, governor of Spin Boldak, said that the **Taleban** Movement will not negotiate its surrender with the tribes. American forces in Afghanistan, now numbering up to 2,000 troops, may resort to extraordinary measures to crush the **Taleban** militia and root out al-Qa'ida terrorists from fortified cave and tunnel hide-outs, according to U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. When asked if the U.S. forces would pour gas into the cave complexes to flush out the terrorists, Rumsfeld replied, "One will do whatever it is necessary to do. If people will not surrender, then they've made their choice." He did note that opposition forces had flooded a tunnel in Mazar-e Sharif. For now, the U.S.-led campaign is relying on the persuasive power of airstrikes near Kandahar and in the mountains south of Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan. They are also relying on the incentive of \$25 million in reward money for information from Afghan locals on the whereabouts of Usama bin Laden and his lieutenants. Russia opened a high-tech hospital in Kabul Sunday, but a crowd of Afghans standing behind Russian guards remained deeply sceptical about their intentions. -AP/FBIS/REUTERS, 2 DEC 01-

3. (AFGHANISTAN RESTRUCTURING) According to **Agence** France Presse on Monday, the head of Afghanistan's new interim authority will come from royalists loyal to the ex-king, while the Northern Alliance will hold on to the Defense Ministry. Alliance foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah said the names for an interim government had yet to be discussed. -FBIS, 3 DEC 01-

C A P S U L E S

1. (SPAIN) Basque separatist group ETA claimed responsibility on Sunday for killing two local police officers last month. -REUTERS, 2 DEC 01-

2. (RUSSIA) A military cargo plane with 18 people on board caught fire and crashed Sunday in the Russian Far East while attempting an emergency landing. -AP, 2 DEC 01-

3. (YUGOSLAVIA) The NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping force in Kosovo announced on Sunday it had detained six people during a major weapons search across the UN-governed province. -REUTERS, 2 DEC 01-

4. (UNITED ARAB EMIRATES) The rulers of the seven states comprising the United Arab Emirates re-elected Abu Dhabi's ruler Sheikh Zaid bin Sultan al-Nahayan on Sunday as president of the oil rich federation for a further five-year term. -REUTERS, 2 DEC 01-

5. (SWAZILAND) According to an announcement made on Sunday, Swaziland's King Mswati III has appointed political conservatives and royal family members to draft the nation's first constitution since his father overturned it in 1973. -REUTERS, 2 DEC 01-

6. (INDIA) Maoist rebels used explosives to blow up the home of regional minister Arabinda Dhali's home and a police station in northern India on Monday. -REUTERS, 3 DEC 01-

7. (NEPAL) Nepal reinforced troops fighting an uprising by Maoist insurgents on Sunday as the rebels attacked government installations and a foreign aid agency. -REUTERS, 2 DEC 01-

8. (SRI LANKA) Sri Lanka's leading parties, running neck and neck in violent campaigning for a snap parliamentary election, were set to bring their efforts to a climax with massive rallies on Sunday night. The elections are set for 5 December. -REUTERS, 2 DEC 01-

T R A V E L

1. RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IGOR IVANOV arrived in Bucharest on 2 December.

2: CROATIAN PRESIDENT STIPE MESIC arrived in Kiev on 2 December.

3. LESOTHO PRIME MINISTER PAKALITHA MOSISILI arrived in Beijing on 2 December.

4. DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER JOZIAS VAN AARTSEN arrived in Tehran on 2 December.

Rumsfeld: We will argue vigorously against any, anyone attempting to make an arrangement that would let him go. We are not physically in control of Afghanistan. The opposition forces that have been opposing the Taliban are the ones that are physically on the ground. We've got some handfuls of people, you know, a thousand or something, 1,500, 2,000, in that range, 1,500 to 2,000 people in a big country. So what we have to do is constantly work with those opposition leaders so that they understand how determined we are that those senior Taliban and senior al Qaeda leaders are not released and that the foreigners are not released to go destabilize another country.

Russert: The search for Osama bin Laden. There is constant discussion about him hiding out in caves, and I think many times the American people have a perception that it's a little hole dug out of a side of a mountain.

Rumsfeld: Oh, no.

Russert: The Times of London did a graphic, which I want to put on the screen for you and our viewers. This is it. This is a fortress. This is a very much a complex, multi-tiered, bedrooms and offices on the top, as you can see, secret exits on the side and on the bottom, cut deep to avoid thermal detection so when our planes fly to try to determine if any human beings are in there, it's built so deeply down and embedded in the mountain and the rock it's hard to detect. And over here, valleys guarded, as you can see, by some Taliban soldiers. A ventilation system to allow people to breathe and to carry on. An arms and ammunition depot. And you can see here the exits leading into it and the entrances large enough to drive trucks and cars and even tanks. And it's own hydroelectric power to help keep lights on, even computer systems and telephone systems. It's a very sophisticated operation.

Rumsfeld: Oh, you bet. This is serious business. And there's not one of those. There are many of those. And they have been used very effectively. And I might add, Afghanistan is not the only country that has gone underground. Any number of countries have gone underground. The tunneling equipment that exists today is very powerful. It's dual use. It's available across the globe. And people have recognized the advantages of using underground protection for themselves.

Russert: It may take us going from cave to cave with a great group of men I know in the United States military, the tunnel rats, to try to flush out Osama bin Laden.

Rumsfeld: We're entering a very dangerous aspect of this conflict. There is no question about it. It is a confused situation in the country. The amount of real estate they have to operate on has continually been reduced. The noose is tightening, but the remaining task is a particularly dirty and unpleasant one.

Russert: If need be, would we put gas into those caves to flush them out?

Rumsfeld: Well, I noticed that in Mazar, the way they finally got the dead-enders to come out was by flooding the tunnel. And finally they came up and surrendered, the last hard core al Qaeda elements. And I guess one will do whatever it is necessary to do. If people will not surrender, then they've made their choice.



Russert: Let me turn to the situation on the ground. This is a headline from the Washington Post, "U.S. talks to Moscow about force in Kabul taken off guard by the arrival of scores of Russian troops in Kabul." Colin Powell spoke to the foreign minister by phone and urged Moscow to avoid abrupt diplomatic and military moves in Afghanistan.

Are we surprised, are we concerned the Russians are trying to reassert their influence in Afghanistan by sending in troops with our permission?

Rumsfeld: Actually, I did receive a call from the minister of defense on the subject indicating that they wanted to bring some planes in. The planes were cleared for the Bagram Airport, and they indicated what they were bringing in, the numbers of people and what the purpose was. It was to begin to reestablish some diplomatic activity and to have sufficient forces to protect that diplomatic activity, to move toward some humanitarian assistance. I am not concerned at the moment. I have not seen anything in their behavior that was untoward.

Russert: Other countries. Let me show you another headline from the New York Times, "Many eager to help; few are chosen." Thirty-five countries offered to help send aircraft, ships, soldiers to help hunt down Taliban and al Qaeda and support those forces. But they've been basically doing nothing but support. Why not bring in the Brits, the French, the Turks to help us in this search?

Rumsfeld: Well, first of all, they've been doing a lot more than your comment suggests. They have ships. They have provided intelligence. We have coalition forces physically on the ground operating in Afghanistan today, non-U.S. coalition forces. One of the issues has been that the United States seems to have persuaded Afghanistan that we do not covet their land, that we do not want to stay, that we are there to rid that country of the Taliban and the al Qaeda. And Afghans are historically skeptical about non-Afghans. And so when we try to bring in coalition forces to assist us, sometimes we've had difficulty. That is to say, the forces on the ground have not quite been ready to bring in other countries besides the United States.

So we have some foreign nationals, non-U.S. coalition partners in there. But it takes a good deal of discussion with those opposition forces. And that is what's caused some of the delay. We are very anxious to have the right kind of help.

Second, the work going on in Bonn to try to figure out whether or not there's a need for stabilizing forces is taking place. And until some decision is made as to whether or not it's appropriate to have a peacekeeping force, and, if so, what countries might be most appropriate to make up that peacekeeping force, I think that it is not surprising that the peacekeeping force has not gone in.

Russert: Once Taliban has been destroyed, Osama bin Laden in custody, there'll be a need for a multinational force, peacekeeping force, as you said, in Afghanistan to help stabilize it.

Rumsfeld: That's not clear. If the forces on the ground are able to provide a stable situation such that the humanitarian aid can get in, then there wouldn't be a need for an international peacekeeping force.

snowflake

December 1, 2001 9:26 AM

11/30
B 12/4
1608

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Burial at Arlington

687

Where do Joyce and I fit in regards to the issue of burial at Arlington?

Thanks.

Attach.
Eligibility Requirements for Arlington National Cemetery

DHR:dh
120101-8

.....

Please respond by _____

U14784 02

1/2001

(PA?) 11/30

DR: SECDEF

issue of burial at Arlington
CIA Agent Spuna has arisen
and his wife has enquired.

my administers the program
is aware of the matter at hand.

rules for burial are attached
SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 1 2001

a nutshell, he'd need a waiver
burial, but not for ash
movement.

D. R. T.



and Burial at Arlington National Cemetery

Forces (except for training purposes only).

y service with the Armed Forces.

ctive duty (other than for training), is retired
f 60; and is drawing retired pay.

s separated honorably prior to October 1,
ent or greater disability rating.

awarded one of the following decorations:

Cross (Air Force Cross or Navy Cross)
Medal

e United States.

who served on active duty (other than for
ving positions:

ent
States or an Associate Justice of the

il held the position, in 5 U.S.C. 5312 or
chedule) or

; I under the provisions of 22 U.S.C. 66
dum dated March 21, 1988

le a POW, served honorably in the
lied on or after November 30, 1993.

1. The surviving spouse, widow or widower, minor children, permanently dependent children, and certain unmarried adult children of any of the above eligible veterans.

j. The surviving spouse, minor children, permanently dependent children, of any eligible veterans buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Eligibility Requirements for Columbarium Inurnment

- a. Any member of the Armed Forces who dies on active duty.
- b. Any former member of the Armed Forces who retired from active duty.
- c. Any former member of the Armed Forces who served on active duty other than for training purposes.
- d. Any member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces who dies while:
 - On active duty for training or performing full-time service under Title 32, United States Code;
 - On authorized inactive duty training including training performed as a member of the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard (23 USC 502); or,
 - Hospitalized or being treated at the expense of the United States for an injury or disease incurred or contracted while on that duty or service, performing that travel or inactive duty training, or undergoing that hospitalization or treatment at the expense of the United States.
- e. Any member of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps of the Army, Navy or Air Force whose death occurs while:
 - Attending an authorized training camp;
 - On an authorized practice cruise;
 - Hospitalized or receiving treatment at the expense of the United States for injury or disease incurred while attending that camp or cruise, performing that travel, or receiving that hospitalization or treatment at the expense of the United States.
- f. Any citizen of the United States who, during any war in which the United States has been engaged, served in the Armed Forces of any government allied with the United States during that war, whose last service ended honorably by death or otherwise, and was a citizen of the United States at the time of entry into that service and at the time of death.
- g. Certain commissioned officers of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, formerly the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey; and U.S. Public Health Service.
- h. Spouses, minor children and certain adult children of those listed above.
- k. A former member of a group certified as active military service for the purpose of receiving benefits by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs by the provisions of Section 401, Public Law 95-202.

December 27, 2001 9:42 AM

TO: Gen. Franks
 cc: Gen. Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Looking Ahead

Attached is an article from the *New York Times* from December 27 that is well worth reading.

It might give us some thoughts as to how we want our footprint arranged in the Middle East **after** things settle down. The time to get started may be sooner rather than later.

Thanks.

Attach.
 12/27/01 *New York Times*, Douglas Jehl, "Holy War Lured Saudis As Rulers Looked Away"

DHR:dh
 122701-24

Please respond by _____

Saudi Arabia

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
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27 Dec 01

New York Times
December 27, 2001
Pg. 1

Holy War Lured Saudis As Rulers Looked Away

By Douglas Jehl

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia, Dec. 21 — In the last decade, as thousands of young Saudis left their country to wage Islamic holy war, Saudi leaders let them go, aware of the danger they might pose to the United States, but more focused on the danger they would pose at home.

At least four times in the last six years, Saudis who were trained or recruited in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kosovo or Bosnia have been among the terrorists who carried out bombings of American targets — in Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen. But not until October, after the American military campaign in Afghanistan began, did Saudi Arabia detain young men trying to join that fight.

Until then, the Saudi royal family performed a diplomatic and political balancing act. Choosing accommodation over confrontation, the government shied away from a crackdown on militant clerics or their followers, a move that would have inflamed the religious right, the disaffected returnees from other wars and a growing number of unemployed.

It appears to have been a miscalculation of global proportions, Western diplomats now say. As they look back to examine the roots of the Sept. 11 attacks, officials in Saudi Arabia, Europe and the United States describe a similar pattern. In country after country, Al Qaeda's networks took hold, often with the knowledge of local intelligence and security agencies. But on the rare occasions that countries did address the terrorist threat, they chose to deal with it as a local issue rather than an interlocking global network.

The result: for Osama bin Laden's most audacious strike against the United States, Europe was his forward base, Saudi Arabia his pool of recruits, the United States a vulnerable target.

In interviews here, former senior Saudi officials said they had recognized the exodus of warriors as a source for concern, for the kingdom and its American ally. But they insisted that they thought the danger could be contained.

Only after Sept. 11 did Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic ties to the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which was spreading a fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam dear to the Saudis even as it forged ever closer ties with Al Qaeda. The Taliban were recognized by just three countries.

The severing of ties appears to have been belated. In the waning days of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, a former Saudi official estimated this month that the number of Saudis there, as combatants, prisoners or casualties, probably numbered between 600 and 700, and possibly as many as 1,000.

As many as 25,000 Saudis received military training or experience abroad since 1979, according to estimates by royal Saudi intelligence.

Rather than prevent young Saudis from enlisting in military ventures abroad or silence the sheiks encouraging them, some officials say Saudi Arabia has mostly tried to deflect the problem outside its

borders.

“The Saudis’ policies made the world safer for Saudi Arabia and the Saudi regime,” said Martin Indyk, an assistant secretary of state for Middle East policy during the Clinton administration, who has become a prominent critic of the Saudi strategy. “I don’t think it was their intention to make it unsafe for the United States. But that was the actual, if unintended, consequence of buying off the opposition, and exporting both the troublemakers and their extremist ideology.”

Saudi officials say that an aggressive effort to stop the flow of holy warriors or halt financial transfers to militant groups or address the sources of a *drift* toward radicalism might have only inflamed the sentiment of extremists who saw both the Saudi government and the United States as their targets.

“There was absolutely no way and no reason to stop them from going,” said one former senior Saudi official. He said that his government had “of course” seen the jihadis, or holy warriors, as a major problem, and had tried to monitor their travels with help from foreign governments. But he insisted that the young Saudis would have found a way around any barriers that were imposed.

Although a blanket ban on travel is clearly not enforceable, Western **officials** say that the Saudi government could have made a greater effort to identify potential terrorists or jihadis and disrupted their travel plans. Since Sept. 11, for example, the Saudi government has discouraged travel — especially those under suspicion — to countries like Afghanistan.

Among 15 Saudi hijackers who helped to carry out the Sept. 11 attacks, American **officials** say, some came from this new generation of jihadis, apparently recruited while traveling. Others were apparently recruited in Saudi Arabia itself. But none appeared on any Saudi watchlist, an American **official** said.

A former American ambassador to Saudi Arabia said that the problems posed by an exodus that exposed young Saudis to further extremism and to members of Mr. bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization should have meant that the issue was addressed directly. But he said the United States had never pressed for Saudi action.

“Alarm bells should have rung,” said Wyche Fowler Jr., the former ambassador, who served in Riyadh until the beginning of this year. “Someone should have said, wait a minute, we can’t have people marching off to choose their own jihad, without examining the foreign policy and security repercussions.”

Through its history, Saudi Arabia has always tried to balance contradictory goals, preserving ties to the United States and the West, its defender in the Persian Gulf war, while accommodating what most analysts view as a deeply conservative majority that sees those ties as alien and potentially harmful to Islamic interests.

The United States, meanwhile, has tried to balance its heavy dependence on Saudi oil — it imports about 18 percent of its oil from the kingdom — with concerns about radicalism within the country. It has been wary of undermining or questioning the Saudi royal family. On both sides of a crucial alliance, hesitation and caution long prevailed over the confrontation of difficult issues.

Until Sept. 11, the Saudi balancing act seemed to be acceptable. The participation of its citizens in the earlier attacks had not received much attention in the West. At home, an internal terrorist threat that had flared in 1995 and 1996 seemed to have been shut down.

But with the attacks of Sept. 11, American and some Saudi officials say, shortcomings in the Saudi approach have become clearer.

In one of two 90-minute interviews for this article, a former senior Saudi official acknowledged that his government might have underestimated the extent of the problem, but he said the full dimensions of the problem had become apparent only with hindsight.

“That there were people calling for jihad against America, well, bin Laden had been calling for that for the last three years,” said the former Saudi official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “The call had been there, the declaration had been there. But the fact that we had people who were willing not only to heed that call, but to go against everything Islamic, that was unimaginable.”

A Sheik's Influence: Young Saudis Intent On Becoming Martyrs

In a cramped office at the rear of Princess Zohra Mosque, Sheik Saleh al-Sadlaan is dispensing judgments that carry enormous weight. On this night, his callers in person and by phone line up for his rulings on countless matters Islamic, from divorce to fasting and prayer.

The hardest questions, he says, include some that have become among the most frequent. Is it time, young Saudis want to know, to wage jihad in the defense of the Muslims, whose suffering appears, nightly on their television screens, from places like Chechnya and the Middle East.

“If he says go, we will go, because he is our sheik,” declared a prayer caller, Abdul Hadi, 24. In fact, Sheik Sadlaan said he had spent years trying to persuade his best young Saudis to stay home. But his advice seems tinged with ambivalence.

“If he truly wants to defend Islam, that is one thing,” he said. “If he just wants to be brave, that is something else.” In the last few years, he said, young men have come to him “more often than I can say,” ready to leave their lives as students behind, having set their sights on martyrdom.

A half-blind man of 61, Sheik Sadlaan is a professor at the kingdom's leading Islamic university and a religious adviser to a senior member of the royal family. What he says carries the weight of the **ulemaa**, Saudi Arabia's official religious establishment, and what he says, carefully, is that the king is his in-ram, and the king does not currently advise young men to march off to holy war.

But asked about other scholars, like Sheik Hamoud al-Shuaibi, who since Sept. 11 and the American retaliation have openly called for jihad against the United States, Sheik Sadlaan stops short of condemnation.

“He made a mistake, but it was not a major one, and it does not detract from his reputation,” he said of Sheik Shuaibi, a former teacher.

Even the Saudi government is not known to have taken action against Sheik Shuaibi, despite his statements that those who support infidels, or unbelievers, should be considered unbelievers themselves, a statement that would seem perilously close to treason in Saudi Arabia, still home to more than 5,000 American troops.

Out of roughly 10,000 religious scholars in the kingdom, perhaps just 150 embrace such a radical view, according to American estimates. But among this group, only a handful is known to have been detained by Saudi authorities since Sept. 11, and in the videotape recently broadcast in the United States, Mr. bin

Laden was eager to know how Saudi scholars had interpreted his actions.

‘What is the stand of the mosques there?’ Mr. bin Laden was heard to ask.

‘Honestly, they are very positive,’ answered the visitor, identified by a senior Saudi official as Khaled al-Harbi, a veteran of conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Bosnia, who named several Saudi scholars as having spoken out in favor of Mr. bin Laden’s campaign.

Even if only a small fraction of Saudi religious scholars are sympathetic to such causes, Sheik Sadlaan acknowledged that some Saudis saw their rulings as more credible than his own, because of his close ties to the government and the royal family. (The mosque is named for the mother of his patron, Prince Abdelaziz bin Fahd, a minister of state and the son of the king.)

In 9 cases in 10, the sheik estimated, juggling a visitor’s questions with the demands of an insistent phone, he had persuaded young Saudis to set aside their dreams of jihad. But he wondered how often his advice made a real difference.

‘If they don’t like what I have to say,’ he said, ‘they’ll go to some other scholar, who will tell them what they want to hear.’

Bin Laden’s Rise: An Early Glimpse Of Militant Forces

Shortly after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, Osama bin Laden approached Prince Sultan bin Abdelaziz al-Saud, the Saudi defense minister, with an unusual proposition. Mr. bin Laden had recently returned from Afghanistan, heady with victory in the drive, backed by Saudi Arabia and the United States, to expel the Soviet occupiers.

As recounted by Prince Turki bin Faisal, then the Saudi intelligence chief, and by another Saudi official, the episode foreshadowed a worrying turn. Victorious in Afghanistan, Mr. bin Laden clearly craved more battles, and he no longer saw the United States as a partner, but as a threat and potential enemy to **Islam**.

Arriving with maps and many diagrams, Mr. bin Laden told Prince Sultan that the kingdom could avoid the indignity of allowing an army of American unbelievers to enter the kingdom, to repel Iraq from Kuwait. He could lead the fight himself, he said, at the head of an group of former mujahedeen that he said could number 100,000 men.

Prince Sultan had received Mr. bin Laden warmly, but he reminded him that the Iraqis had 4,000 tanks, according to one account.

‘There are no caves in Kuwait,’ the prince is said to have noted. ‘You cannot fight them **from** the **mountains** and caves. What will you do when he lobbs the missiles at you with chemical and biological weapons?’

Mr. bin Laden replied, ‘We fight him with faith.’

The conversation ended soon afterward, and the proposal was **left** to rest. But Saudi **officials** now say that the episode offered an early glimpse of several of the forces the kingdom would spend the rest of the decade trying to contain.

One such force was represented by Saudi veterans of the Afghan war, at least 15,000 men who had helped to drive the Soviets from Afghanistan in the name of Islam. Many returned to ordinary lives, but others did not.

Some remained in exile abroad, enlisting in other conflicts, in places like Bosnia. Others were jailed by the Saudi government.

In one sign of concern, a person knowledgeable about the kingdom said, the Saudi interior ministry conducted extensive psychological profiling of 2,500 veterans in an effort to identify those who were a potential security threat.

A second force was Mr. bin Laden himself, who soon returned to Pakistan. As early as 1992, Prince Turki said, "We started receiving information that he was active in recruiting Saudis to go there, and that he was in cahoots, so to speak, with some very unsavory characters, from Egyptian Al Jihad to Algerian groups, people who espouse terror as a means to carry out political ends."

A third was anti-Americanism, which gave further ammunition to Mr. bin Laden's cause, particularly when American troops stayed behind in Saudi Arabia after the Persian Gulf war. Mr. bin Laden was only one among the critics who said that the presence of "infidel" forces, for the protection of the kingdom, showed that the ruling al-Saud family was no longer legitimate, since its responsibilities included the protection of Islam's holiest sites at Mecca and Medina.

At the same time, Saudi officials concede, the problem of internal discontent was intensifying for other reasons: a surging population, stagnant revenues that sent per capita income plunging and growing unemployment.

Some of that disenchantment prompted direct criticism of the Saudi government. Royal profligacy and corruption were increasingly seen as indefensible.

The response was evasive. For decades, a former senior Saudi official said, the Saudi approach has been "to argue, and then to co-opt, in a way, and to act as if crimes weren't committed unless there were actual calls for an uprising against the government."

In the case of Mr. bin Laden, who by 1992 had in fact called for a toppling of the government, the Saudis moved slowly. They stripped him of his citizenship in 1994. But their attitude still betrayed uncertainty: for several years they relied on emissaries from Mr. bin Laden's family in the hope they could persuade him to change, officials said.

Among a series of shocks that brought extremism to the kingdom, the first came in November 1995, with a bombing in Riyadh that killed 5 Americans and wounded 37. Within months, four Saudis had confessed to the crime, including one who had served in Afghanistan, saying they had been inspired by Mr. bin Laden's calls to oust the nonbelieving forces from the kingdom.

Then in June of 1996 came a second attack. The bombing of an air base in the eastern city of Al Khobar, killed 19 American airmen and wounded hundreds more. Mr. bin Laden was long suspected of involvement, but Saudi and American investigators ultimately discounted that theory, blaming Saudi Shiite Muslims with ties to Iran.

Mr. bin Laden declared war against the United States in 1996, and two years later, he announced the forging of his "Coalition Against Crusaders, Christians and Jews." Yet it was not until June 1998 that

the Saudis sought his arrest.

On a trip to Afghanistan, Prince **Turki** won what he said had been agreement from **Mullah** Muhammad Omar to surrender Mr. bin Laden. Three months later, after the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Mullah Omar reneged.

“We didn’t leave any stone unturned,” Prince **Turki** said in an interview of the effort to secure Mr. bin Laden’s arrest. He said his government had maintained relations with the Taliban even afterward, despite the fact that Mr. bin Laden’s group had been implicated in the August attacks, in order to “leave a door open” for a Taliban change of heart. In fact, it seems clear that Saudi ambivalence toward a movement close to its own Wahhabi interpretation of Islam persisted.

Some American experts did question whether the Saudi government was prepared to bring Mr. bin Laden back home, and face a potential backlash from his admirers. “I think there was a conscious idea among the Saudis that they would rather have Osama in the Hindu Kush than anywhere else,” said F. Gregory Gause III, an expert on Saudi Arabia at the University of Vermont.

In the Kenya attack, the terrorists included Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-‘Owhali, a Saudi who later confessed to being recruited in Afghanistan. In the next major terrorist attack, the bombing in Yemen of the destroyer Cole in October 2000, another Saudi, **Tawfiq al-Atash**, who lost a leg in Afghanistan, has been identified by American officials as a likely leader.

In response to these events, the Saudis stepped up their supply of intelligence to the United States on Mr. bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network, officials from both countries said.

George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, traveled four times to Saudi Arabia between 1996 and 2000; Mr. Fowler, the ambassador, worked closely but secretly with Bakr bin Laden, the dissident’s elder brother, to shut down sources of Al Qaeda’s financing.

At the same time, the Saudis stepped up their oversight of money transfers. But one problem persisted: the charities whose funds sometimes found their way into the hands of extremists included prominent members of the royal family on their boards.

With more conflicts involving Muslims breaking out in Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere, many Saudis reached deep into their wallet. Since 1992, one Saudi charity, the Al Haramin Foundation, has increased twentyfold in size, distributing hundreds of millions of dollars over those years to schools and refugee camps in what officials of the group say are strictly humanitarian missions.

American officials say this largesse has been prone to significant “leakage,” with money channeled to extremist causes and terrorist groups.

“The Saudi government never intentionally funded terrorism; that’s nonsense,” argued a former State Department official with long service in the region. “But what you had was a really serious command and control problem.”

Sharing Intelligence: Cautious Cooperation But Strained Ties

Almost every day since Sept. 11, an F.B.I. official based at United States Embassy in Riyadh has met with Saudi counterparts to discuss the investigation, regular, face-to-face encounters that both sides regard as a major development in intelligence-sharing between the two countries.

But the two sides still walk on eggshells, the Americans careful in their questions, and the Saudis guarded in their answers, American officials said. Even in the post-Sept. 11 meetings, one senior Bush administration official said, the Saudis “dribble out a morsel of insignificant information one day at a time.”

There are reasons for such caution, Saudi and American officials say. The very idea of close ties between the home of Islam's holy sites and the West remains alien to many Saudis. Since the Persian Gulf war of 1991, the partnership has come under increasing strain, because of differences over Israel and Iraq, over the American troop presence, and over terrorism, on which American requests for cooperation have often been perceived as insensitive to Saudi sovereignty.

“The United States sometimes expects Saudi Arabia to do publicly what they are willing to do only privately,” said David Mack, a former deputy assistant secretary of state who served during the early 1990's as the top American diplomat in Riyadh. “They do not by inclination like to talk about what they're doing, whether it's good or bad.”

Still, some American officials say the United States has leaned much too far in the direction of deference, thus failing to avert terrorist attacks.

In the mid- 1990's, one administration official recalled, the Saudis would not acknowledge the existence of a Shiite Muslim group called Saudi Hezbollah, which was later acknowledged by the Saudis to have been among those responsible for the 1996 bombing in Al Khobar. “They would take our request and promise to get back to us and never did,” the official said.

On the issue of Saudis heading off to holy war, Mr. Fowler, the former ambassador, said: “I'm willing to acknowledge up front that we missed it. It's the kind of thing that with hindsight, I wish I had thought to raise.”

Even on terrorist financing, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said during a visit to the kingdom in September that he had not asked the Saudis to freeze the assets of people and groups linked to Mr. bin Laden, even though the United States had asked all countries to do so. He said at a news conference that such matters were being handled by others.

“We understand that each country is different,” he said, “each country lives in a different neighborhood, has a different perspective and has different sensitivities and different practices, and we do not expect every nation on the face of the earth to be publicly engaged in every single activity the United States is.

Not infrequently, Saudi and American officials say, the tiptoeing results in miscommunication. This month, a delegation led by a senior State Department official arrived in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, to discuss the issue of terrorist financing, only to find that the kingdom's most senior princes were already in or on their way to Jidda, for their annual retreat in the last 10 days of Ramadan.

For their part, Saudi officials say they were angry that the United States has not shared in advance some of its investigative findings, including the recent videotape showing Mr. bin Laden and a Saudi visitor.

Scrambling to respond, some Saudi officials mistakenly identified the visitor as a Saudi cleric who, it turned out, was still in the kingdom.

A former Central Intelligence Agency official said that American deference and other constraints, including efforts by the Saudis to discourage efforts by American diplomats to mingle with ordinary

people, had left the United States dangerously dependent on the Saudis for information that could affect American as well as Saudi security.

“It’s not that there are divisions within the intelligence community about Saudi Arabia,” said the official, Kenneth M. Pollack, who served on the National Security Council staff in the Clinton administration. “It’s that the intelligence community doesn’t know.”

Undetected Danger: Hijackers Remain Mystery to Saudis

Saudi officials have revealed next to nothing about the Sept. 11 hijackers. The official position is that even the theory that Saudi citizens were involved remains unproven, But in private, Saudi and American officials say the real mystery to the Saudi government is not whether Saudi citizens took part, but how so many of them were able to evade detection by the Saudi authorities.

“All names that have been mentioned in the incident,” Prince Nayef, the interior minister, said in an interview, when asked what his government had learned about the Saudis named by the Americans as hijackers, “they do not have the capability to act in a professional way.” The statement amounted to yet another denial of Saudi involvement in the Sept. 11 attacks.

To the Saudis, American officials say, the fact that the Saudis involved in the assaults were unknown to them was almost as startling as the attacks themselves.

In recent years, the mubahith, the Saudi equivalent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, infiltrated Al Qaeda cells within the kingdom, while the monitoring of the Saudis fighting abroad was thought to have kept a handle on potential troublemakers.

American officials say it is now clear that Al Qaeda networks were more deeply entrenched in Saudi Arabia than either the United States or Saudi Arabia understood. But they also say the Saudis may have missed clues left by young men like **Hani** Hanjour, a reclusive, religious young Saudi who told his family that he was working as a pilot in the United Arab Emirates from 1997 to 2000, but never left a phone number, and is now suspected of having been in Afghanistan at least part of that time.

Among the Saudi hijackers, only two, including Khalid al-Midhar, ever turned up on the State Department’s antiterrorist watchlists, American officials say, and not until after they entered the United States. They had been identified as suspicious, not by the Saudi authorities, but because they stopped in Malaysia to meet with Mr. **Atash**, the suspect in the Cole attack:

Some American officials say that the Saudis placed a higher premium on hounding potential troublemakers out of the kingdom than keeping tabs once they left.

“Isn’t it better that they go off and fight a foreign jihad, rather than hang around the mosques without a job and cause trouble in Saudi Arabia?” said one such official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity in summing up what he called the Saudi view. “They’ve radicalized a group that wouldn’t have been so radical had they stayed home.”

At the Zohra mosque in Riyadh, Sheik Sadlaan said the end of Ramadan seemed like a good time for reflection. The news from Afghanistan had been disturbing, with the names of young Saudis killed in battle beginning to circulate around the kingdom, posted on Web sites but never mentioned in Saudi newspapers, which operate under close government supervision.

The dead included young men like Badr Muhammad al-Shubaneh, whose tearful relatives were telling callers that they still could not explain why the 22-year-old college freshman, a social studies student at King Fahd University in Riyadh, had abruptly left the kingdom a year ago, to end up killed in Afghanistan in the first week of December.

“It’s a big problem,” Sheik Sadlaan said of the zeal for jihad. “It will create problems for the country and beyond.”

But with Muslims seen as under siege in so many places, he said, he could not imagine the militancy ending any time soon. “It’s not just the Saudis,” he said. “The strong desire to help and defend and fight for the Muslims — it’s felt all over the Arab world.”

snowflake

November 19, 2001 11:20 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Newt Minow

Attached is a letter from Newt Minow. He is a wonderful, talented, brilliant, dedicated human being. I consider him a close friend and can vouch for him in every respect.

He indicates there may be a vacancy on the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

I can think of no one who would be better than Newt. He may be 75, but he has the energy of a 40-year-old and brain cells as fine as Einstein's

Let me know what I should do, who I should talk to. I think he would be a world-class appointment.

Regards.

cc: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Honorable Karl Rove

Attach.
1 1/15/01 Minow ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
111901-13

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19 Nov 01

W01456 / 01

11-L-0559/OSD/903

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WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER

WRITER'S E-MAIL ADDRESS

November 15, 2001

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1 000

Dear Don:

Like every American, I want to help.

I can contribute to our efforts to communicate what America stands for through the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia and the new Radio Afghanistan. As a nation, we have not been sufficiently imaginative in communicating, especially in the Middle East.

The federal agency in charge, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, is by law a bi-partisan group appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. There is a Democratic vacancy right now.

If you think well of the idea, please give this letter and enclosures to the appropriate person in the White House. A number of Democratic Senators (Durbin, Biden, Lieberman, Dodd, Rockefeller) think well of me, and Charlotte Beers and I have been friends for many years.


Enclosed are two pieces I have written on these issues in the New York Times and USA Today, and my own background. As you know, I have been given different bi-partisan assignments by three Presidents over the past forty years.

There is a negative, as you well know. I am a senior citizen, 75 years old. But sometimes, gray hair helps.

11-L-0559/OSD/904

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
November 15, 2001
Page 2

All best,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Newton N. Minow". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent horizontal stroke at the end.

Newton N. Minow

NNM/ks

Enclosures

Essay

WILLIAMSAFIRE

Equal Time for Hitler?

WASHINGTON

The primary source of information for the average Afghan is the radio, often a transistor made 30 years ago. The 20 transmitting towers of the Taliban's Radio Shariat (meaning "Islamic law") are spewing out hate of America all the time.

Why is there no Radio Free Afghanistan broadcasting the truth about the consequences of harboring the headquarters of terrorism?

Why are Afghans not told that their rulers' decision to hide Osama bin Laden is the direct cause of the withdrawal of U.N. relief and the starvation that they now face?

Why are the voices of revered, mainstream Muslim clerics not broadcast denouncing the perversion of Islam by the terrorists, and reminding the faithful that murder by

America is:
asleep at the
microphone.

suicide will lead not to heaven but to eternal damnation?

Before a single bomb is dropped on a suspected training camp, the U.S. should be doing what it knows best how to do: using psychological warfare to weaken the grip of the terrorists on the local population.

We are failing to make life more difficult for the terrorists in their caves because the Bush war planners have not thought of it yet. The chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, overseer of our several official overseas broadcasters, is an amiable Gore fund-raiser long awaiting replacement. The Voice of America leadership is even more vacant.

Which U.S. government broadcaster should be charged with stirring anger among Afghans at rulers eager to bring further devastation to their country? That mission of countering Radio Shariat's propaganda should go to RFE/RL, the "radio free" outfit experienced in acting as a surrogate free press in repressive nations like Iran, Iraq and China.

but evenhanded journalists at the V.O.A., backed by political holdovers on the Broadcasting Board, don't want those hard-sell types invading their turf. The V.O.A. broadcasts to Afghanistan with fine impartiality in the Dari, Pashto, Urdu and Arabic languages, and yesterday stepped up its time on the air: RFE/RL broadcasts only in Turkmen and Uzbek, understood in Afghanistan's north, where our problem is not.

In the squabble over a measly \$15 million in expansion money, here is why the V.O.A. is the wrong voice in this area in wartime:

On the day after the twin towers catastrophe, a V.O.A. reporter in London broadcast an account of two interviews. One was with a cleric who "warns that no accusations against Islamists or Arab groups should be made before knowing the full truth." This was "balanced" by an interview with Yasir al Serri, identified only as "a leader of Egypt's largest Islamist group, the Gama'a Islamiyya, which has worked to overthrow the Egyptian government."

Listeners were not informed that this terrorist group killed 58 foreign tourists and 4 Egyptians four years ago. The reporter said that al Serri "warns that retaliation by Washington will only lead to more violence. He lays the blame for the unprecedented assault on the U.S. financial and military policy in the Middle East."

Stung by criticism of this broadcast, Andre de Nespera, the V.O.A.'s news director, admitted that the extremist was improperly identified, but argued that for the agency to remain "a credible news organization," such interviews with terrorists "will be part of our balanced, accurate, objective and comprehensive reporting; providing our listeners with both sides of the story."

After a call from Jesse Helms's office protesting "equal time for Hitler," the bureaucrat warning the vacant V.O.A. director's seat issued a belated guideline that "we will not give a platform to terrorists or extremist groups."

The nation is on a kind of war footing. Even in peacetime, news credibility does not flow from splitting the moral difference between good and evil. In the climate of today's undecided war, private media in democracies are free to take either or neither side, but U.S. taxpayer-supported broadcasting is supposed to be on our side.

That's why we need an American signal in Afghanistan's five languages with a clear, truthful message: Bin Laden and his gang are the cause of present and future misery, and the suicides who murder innocents are eternally punished by Allah.

And for the Pentagon's choosers of "targets of value": consider, in the first strike, the score of towers and mobile transmitters of Radio Shariat.

To the Editor:

William Safire (column, Sept. 20) is exactly right: we should use radio to get the truth directly to the Afghan people. The Afghans do not know that their starvation is the result of their dictators' efforts to protect Osama bin Laden. We allow the Taliban to monopolize all information available to Afghan men, women and children.

We made the same mistake for years with Slobodan Milosevic, enabling him to have exclusive access to the ears, eyes and minds of the people of Serbia, Radio, loud and clear, is inexpensive and effective. But if we are to succeed in building opposition to terrorism, we must pay as much attention to launching ideas as we do to launching bombs.

NEWTON N. MINOW
Chicago, Sept. 20, 2001

The writer is a former chairman of the Federal Communications Commission.



By Ted S. Warren AP

For Big Hurt, the pain subsides

Frank Thomas hitting stride again after rough year 1C



Thursday, February 15, 2001

The Forum

How would U.S. react now to a '13 days' crisis?

By Newton N. Minow

After my wife and I saw the movie *Thirteen Days*, we remained sitting silently in the dark theater for a few minutes, unable to move. We were frozen back in time to our own days in Washington during the Cuban missile crisis.

Like others in the audience old enough to remember October 1962, I thought about where I was, how frightened I was for my family and the world — and how much has changed since then, not all of it for the better of our country.

As President Kennedy's chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), I was in New York on Oct. 22, 1962, working with European and American broadcasters to develop international communications satellites. At 7 a.m., I received an urgent call from Pierre Salinger, Kennedy's press secretary, who simply said, "National emergency! Get to the White House at once." I raced to the next shuttle flight and was in the White House in less than two hours.

Salinger was waiting with Don Wilson, deputy director of the U.S. Information Agency which then supervised the Voice of America (VOA). Soviet missiles with nuclear capability were in Cuba, they said, aimed at the United States. Kennedy, who would speak to the nation at 7 p.m., wanted his speech translated into Spanish and sent by VOA to the Cuban people.



New Line/Beacon Pictures via GNS

Tense times: Scene from the movie *Thirteen Days*, about the Cuban missile crisis.

VOA radio signals to Cuba were completely jammed by Cuba and the Soviet Union, but VOA engineers had found six U.S. commercial radio stations that broadcast strong signals into Cuba. My assignment was to arrange for these commercial stations to carry the VOA and the president's message to the Cuban people at 7 p.m.

"One condition," Salinger added. "This is a deep secret. You can't tell the stations what is going on." As an inexperienced 36-year-old, I mumbled OK and raced to my office.

I swore our senior FCC staff to secrecy and explained the assignment. They were aghast. This, they said, violated every rule they could think of: no commercial station had ever been taken over, even during wartime. But this was more urgent: We were trying to avert nuclear war.

Working with VOA engineers, we quickly determined there were seven broadcast stations, not six, plus two shortwave stations capable of reaching Cuba, and that AT&T could patch a line from the VOA transmitters to all nine stations without delay. I also brought in a senior FCC commissioner, Robert Bartley, our national defense expert. Bartley was the nephew of former House speaker Sam Rayburn. I figured that would help once news of this reached Congress.

After we had the technology in place, I told Salinger I had to inform the stations and request

their cooperation. By this time, rumors were spreading of a national emergency, and Salinger didn't want that done because of the risk of leaks. But when I insisted, he said use your own best judgment. I called each station and asked that the person in charge give us a phone number where we could reach him or her at 6 p.m. for an urgent conference call from the White House. And, I added, this was a national emergency, with lives at stake—no leaks, please.

There were no leaks. At 6 p.m., Bartley, Salinger and I called the nine stations' representatives. We requested their help as citizens and asked that they announce at 7 p.m. that their stations would broadcast the VOA in Spanish to Cuba. All agreed. As I left the White House, I saw President Kennedy and gave him a thumbs up: The Cuban people would hear his speech. I went home, listening to the speech on my car radio. More scared than I had ever been as a soldier in the China/Burma/India theater during World War II. I hugged my wife and children and prayed.

The next morning, I was invited to part of the meeting of the executive committee dealing with the missile crisis. American intelligence reported that many Cubans had heard the VOA loud and clear. Our plan had worked. President Kennedy looked at me and said let's do it again tonight I left to start all over again. This went on every night for the duration of the week.

Then it was all over. Several weeks after the crisis ended, a few of the stations called and asked where they should send their bills. I asked, what bills? They politely said they had canceled evening commercials for a week: who was going to make up the revenue losses? They had a point, but I had no budget for this. Nor did anyone else. Finally, I suggested to Salinger that the president invite the broadcasters to lunch in the White House to thank them personally and have their pictures taken with him. This worked. No bills were sent.

The next year, however, the president of a small religious college asked to see me. His college, he said, had both a radio and a TV station. The radio station was doing fine, but the TV sta-

tion had a minor technical regulatory problem at the FCC. I said I was sorry to hear that. He then looked in my eyes and said, "Chairman Minow, do you remember when you asked us to help you and the president with our radio station during the Cuban missile crisis, and we helped in every way we could?" I said, "Yes, I remember." He then looked even more deeply into my eyes, took my hand, and said, "Chairman Minow, in view of how we helped you, do you think you could find it in your heart to" I interrupted him and said, "I got your message. Consider it done."

I later called the staff and asked that the technical regulatory question be dropped. Today, it probably be investigated by a special prosecutor, but I would do it again.

Those memories, prompted by seeing *Thirteen Days*, made me reflect on how dramatically things have changed. In 1962, I saw how powerful the blockade was in putting pressure on the Soviet Union and Cuba to back down. But while we were cutting off Cuba from supplies, we were opening up Cuba to information, and that, too, played a role. Today, the VOA has the techniques and power to surmount jamming. Technologies such as communication satellites, the Internet and cable networks such as CNN have erased national boundaries. Like Joshua's trumpet, they make old walls tumble down.

But while a new world has opened up, another world has closed down. I wonder whether we could get the same level of cooperation today that made our efforts possible in 1962, when news organizations held their stories and broadcasters gave up their evening broadcast time. Everyone did this without rancor, jockeying for position or bureaucratic wrangling.

The Cuban missile crisis lasted 13 days. In today's information age, would President Kennedy have been forced to act in 13 hours? Or even 13 minutes? I worry less today about whether we have the technology to respond than about whether we have the character.

Newton N. Minow was Federal Communication Commission chairman from 1961 to 1963.

NEWTON N. MINOW

BACKGROUND

Place and Date of Birth: Milwaukee, Wisconsin
January 17, 1926

Home Address: 179 East Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60603
or
660 Winnetka Mews
Winnetka, Illinois 60093-I 960

Office Address: c/o Sidley Austin Brown & Wood
10 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Family Information: Married to Josephine **Baskin**
Three Daughters-Nell, Martha
and Mary

Education:

Schools Attended: Milwaukee Public Schools
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Degrees: B.S. – Northwestern University, 1949
J.D. – Northwestern University, 1950

Honorary Degrees: LL.D. – Brandeis University, 1963
LL.D. – University of Wisconsin, 1963
LL.D. – Northwestern University, 1965
LL.D. – Columbia College, 1972
LL.D. – Governors State University, 1984
LL.D. – DePaul University, 1989
LL.D. – RAND Graduate School, 1994
LL.D. – University of Notre Dame, 1994
LL.D. – Roosevelt University, 1996
LL.D. – Barat College, 1996
LL.D. – Santa Clara University School of
Law, 1998

Professional History:

1965 to present:	Sidley & Austin (1)
1963 to 1965:	Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Director, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
1961 to 1963:	Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, by Appointment of President John F. Kennedy
1955 to 1961:	Partner, Stevenson, Rifkind & Wirtz (part of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison)
1953 to 1955:	Associate, Mayer, Brown & Platt
1952 to 1953:	Assistant Counsel to Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, State of Illinois
1951 to 1952:	Law Clerk to Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, U.S. Supreme Court
1950 to 1951:	Associate, Mayer, Brown & Platt

(1) Including service with a predecessor firm, Leibman, Williams, Bennett, Baird & Minow, which consolidated with Sidley & Austin on October 15, 1972 (Partner, 1965-1 991; Counsel 1991-) Also, Sidley & Austin merged with Brown & Wood in May 2001 and is now known as Sidley Austin Brown & Wood

Corporate Directorships:

Aon Corporation
Manpower, Inc.

Prior Corporate Directorships:

Big Flower Press Holdings, Inc.
CBS Inc.
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
Field Communications
Sara Lee Corporation
Tribune Company
True North Communications (formerly Foote, Cone & Belding)

Civic and Public Service Directorships:

Arthur Andersen & Co., Public Review Board (Chairman, 1974-1 983)
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) (Chairman, 1978-1 980; Director, 1973-1 980)
RAND Corporation (Chairman, 1970-1 972; Trustee, 1965-1 975, 1976-1 986, 1987-1 997; Advisory Trustee, 1997-)
Trustee and Former Chairman, Chicago Educational Television Association (Chairman, 1967-1 973; Trustee, 1964-1 991; Life Trustee, 1991-)
Trustee, Mayo Foundation (1972-1 981); Emeritus Trustee (1981-)
Trustee, Northwestern University (1975-1 987); Life Trustee (1987-)
Trustee, University of Notre Dame (1965-1 977, 1983-1 996); Life Trustee (1996-)
Trustee, Chicago Orchestral Association (1975-1 987); Life Trustee (1987-)
Trustee, Carnegie Corporation of New York (Chairman, 1993-1 997; Trustee, 1987-1 997)
Trustee, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1987-1993)
Chairman, CBS Foundation (1986-1991)

Civic and Public Service Directorships (Continued):

Chairman, Bi-Partisan Study of Campaign Costs in the Electronic Era, Twentieth Century Fund
Chairman, Board of Overseers, Jewish Theological Seminary (1975-1977)
Co-Chairman, Presidential Debates, Sponsored by League of Women Voters (1976, 1980)
Director, Commission on Presidential Debates (1993-)
Director, Bi-Partisan Advisory Commission for 1988 and 1992 Presidential Debates
Member, Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, appointed by
President George Bush (1992)
Former Member, U.S. Department of State's Advisory Committee on International Communications
and Information Policy
Member, Commission on Public Interest Obligations of Digital Broadcasters, appointed by
President Bill Clinton, 1998-1 999

Academic Appointments:

Visiting Fellow, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1986)
Director, The Annenberg Washington Program Communications Policy Studies, Northwestern
University (1987-1 996)
Annenberg Professor of Communications Law and Policy, Northwestern University (1987-)

Legal Memberships:

American Bar Association, Fellow of
Chicago Bar Foundation, Fellow of

Civic and Public Memberships:

Center for Public Resources Judicial Panel
Chicago Committee, Council on Foreign Relations
Commercial Club of Chicago (President, 1987-1 988)
Visiting Committee, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1980-1 986)
Visiting Committee, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University (1968-1 974)

Club Memberships:

Century Association (New York)
Chicago Club
Mid-Day Club

Honors and Awards:

John Henry Wigmor Award, Northwestern University School of Law (1950)
Named One of Ten Outstanding Young Men in the United States (1961)
George Foster Peabody Broadcasting Award (1962)
Phi Beta Kappa Distinguished Broadcasting Award (1965)
Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar (1977-1 978)
Northwestern Alumni Medal (1978)
Ralph Lowell Public Broadcasting Award (1982)
Man of the Year Award, Notre Dame Club of Chicago (1988)

Honors and Awards (Continued):

Elected Fellow, American Academy of Arts & Sciences (1989)
Abraham Lincoln Centre Humanitarian Service Award (1990)
Harvard Club of Chicago/Chicagoan of the Year (1991)
The Fellows of the Phi Beta Kappa Society Award (1999)
Silver Gavel Award, American Bar Association (1996)

Military Service:

U.S. Army – 1944 to 1945 (Sergeant, China-Burma, India Theater)

Miscellaneous:

Co-Author of *Abandoned in the Wasteland: Children, Television and the First Amendment*, published in 1995 by Hill & Wang (division of Farrar, Straus & Giroux)
Author of *Equal Time: The Private Broadcaster and The Public Interest*, published in 1964 by Antheneum Publishers, New York City
Contributor to *As We Knew Adlai*, published in 1966 by Harper & Row, New York City
Contributor to *Public Interest and The Business of Broadcasting*, published in 1988 by Quorum Books, New York City (Edited by Jon T. Powell and Wally Gair)
Co-Author of *Presidential Television*, published in 1973 by Basic Books, Inc., New York City
Co-Author – Weil Lecture, *Electronics and the Future*, Oxford University Press, 1977, New York City
Co-Author of *For Great Debates*, published in 1987 by Twentieth Century Fund, New York City
Co-Author of *Lines of Battle*, published in 1987 by Time Books
Author of *How Vast the Waste/and Now*, published in 1991 by the Gannett Foundation Media Center at Columbia University in the City of New York
Co-Author of *Opening Salvos: Who Should Participate in Presidential Debates*, published in 1999 by The Century Foundation (formerly the Twentieth Century Fund)
Co-Author of *A Digital Gift to the Nation; Fulfilling the Promise of the Digital and Internet Age*, published in 2001 by The Century Foundation (formerly the Twentieth Century Fund)
Numerous Newspaper, Magazine and Professional Journal Articles

August 14, 2001

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