

JAF 2000036466C

~~TOP SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

402 DOD/DFOISR
TOP SECRET CONTROL
Copy No. _____
Case No. <u>02-F-1450</u>
T.S. No. <u>02-TS-092</u>
Document No. <u>1</u>

HISTORY OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

1 JULY 1975 - 31 DECEMBER 1976

HISTORICAL STUDY NO. 161 (U)

VOLUME I

NARRATIVE

[Signature]
 RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY
 General, USAF
 Commander in Chief

CLASSIFIED BY: CINCSAC
"RESTRICTED DATA"

"This material contains Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure to any unauthorized person is prohibited."

FOIA CASE
99-2141/215/216

(RC1) 99-HQ-048

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

77-HA-404
CY 2 OF 7 CYS

15 JULY 1977

99-SCXP-006

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION	
1ST REVIEW DATE: <u>4/7/00</u>	DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
AUTHORITY: <u>ADPC 64DC 61AD</u>	<input checked="" type="radio"/> 1. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
NAME: <u>[Signature]</u>	<input type="radio"/> 2. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: _____
2ND REVIEW DATE: <u>2/9/01</u>	<input type="radio"/> 3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
	<input type="radio"/> 4. COORDINATE WITH: <u>DOD</u>
	<input type="radio"/> 5. CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
	<input type="radio"/> 6. OTHER (SPECIFY): _____

OCN: 92-TS-AFHRA-027
RC 1

pp contain...
1 table of...
...not provided for review

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

March as contingency mobility units in the CONUS while the 43d Strategic Wing at Andersen and the 376th Strategic Wing at Kadena were the Pacific contingency mobility units.⁷¹

2
C
C
O
(S/XGDS) The B-52D, the primary aircraft for contingency operations, could deliver weapons in a wide range of contingency missions including aerial mine-laying operations, reconnaissance/surveillance operations, psychological operations, and show of force. Because rapid contingency support was essential to the deterrence of aggression, units were to deploy within (b) (1) after notification.⁷²

(S/XGDS) Headquarters SAC made the important assumption that the

(b) (1)

Because Korea had been a festering world trouble spot, the U.S. had included it in theater warfare plans. As recently as October 1975, Headquarters SAC and 3d Air Division reviewed the SAC forces necessary to support the U.N. in South Korea.⁷⁴ In August 1976, the nearest B-52D bombers and six KC-135's TDY to Andersen were assigned to the 43d Strategic Wing and additional KC-135 tankers were assigned to the 376th Strategic Wing.

The Korean Incident

(U) (S) On 18 August 1976, North Korean soldiers murdered two U.S. Army officers who were supervising the pruning of a poplar tree in the Joint Security Area (JSA) of the United Nations Command in Korea. The next day, the JCS declared DEFCON Three for U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea. The U.S. protested the killings and served notice again to P'yongyang that the U.S. was not ready to pull out of South Korea. Consequently, the U.S. directed a number of military show of force actions in which SAC played a principal role.

(U) (S) Refueling Support. At 0032Z on 19 August, the JCS alerted SAC to provide inflight refueling for an F-111 squadron deploying to Taegu, Korea.⁷⁵ Within hours, SAC rapidly established three TTF's to support the F-111's. The Fairchild TTF was composed of 10 KC-135's and two spares. The Eielson TTF was composed of 20 tankers and five spares while the Kadena TTF was composed of 13 tankers and two spares. The

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Handwritten notes in left margin:
35
30129520
333215
314 (a)

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

tankers flew to the staging base before all the F-111's had departed Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, at 2025Z on 19 August.⁷⁶ The scheduled refuelings were completed and the 18 F-111's were in place at Taegu by 0855Z on 20 August--12 and one-half hours after the last aircraft departed from Idaho.⁷⁷ General Dougherty expressed his appreciation to TAC's commander:⁷⁸

Please convey my personal congratulations and the admiration of the men and women of SAC to the tigers of the 366TFW. The timely movement of all scheduled aircraft over a difficult and demanding route has again proved that TAC possesses the best fighter aircrews in the world. SAC is pleased and proud to have participated in this noteworthy achievement and we continue to commit our tankers to be "ready for contact" when and where needed.

U (S) This refueling commitment of SAC's was further tested 20 August. The F-111 aircraft needed logistical support. MAC began airlifting materiel to Korea to support these fighters via C-141 and C-5 aircraft. SAC provided the 12 KC-135's to refuel these C-5's flying non-stop from Mountain Home to Taegu. Nine of the tankers came from the Eielson TTF and refueled the C-5's southeast of Alaska shortly after takeoff at 0830Z on 20 August.⁷⁹ Three KC-135's, comprising the Yokota TTF, refueled the C-5's east of Japan and then recovered at 0248Z on 21 August at Kadena.⁸⁰ General Carlton praised SAC's flexible response which made possible the short-notice C-5 deployment that began even before the F-111 deployment was completed.⁸¹

U (S) In the meantime, on 19 August, with tropical storm Dot threatening Okinawa, the 376th Strategic Wing made plans to evacuate its aircraft from Kadena.⁸² With the approval of Headquarters SAC, the 376th removed its four KC-135's from alert to prepare for evacuation.⁸³ The evacuation, which began at 2355Z on 19 August, involved relocating seven KC-135A's, five KC-135Q's and three RC-135M's to Yokota, three KC-135Q's and one RC-135T to Clark, and three KC-135's to Andersen.⁸⁴ With the storm passing 60 miles south-southwest, the peak winds at Kadena reached only 47 knots.⁸⁵ The aircraft returned to Kadena on 21 August.⁸⁶

U (S) Three of the tankers evacuated to Yokota participated in a refueling mission that had begun on 20 August when SAC provided nine KC-135's to refuel two GBU-15 equipped F-4E fighters deploying from

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Egin AFB, Florida, to Osan AB, Korea, via Elmendorf AFB, Alaska.⁸⁷ One
 KC-135 from Blytheville and two from Grand Forks refueled the fighters on
 their way to Alaska. Then, three Eielson TTF tankers refueled the tactical
 fighters as they began their flight across the Pacific. At the half-way
 point the Eielson TTF tankers were relieved by the three Yokota based tank-
 ers which then refueled the fighters as needed on the final leg to Korea.⁸⁸

(U) (S) SAC maintained a KC-135 tanker on strip alert at Kwang Ju, Korea,
 to provide support during any contingency. On 20 August, the 314th Air
 Division at Osan required another KC-135 be deployed to Kwang Ju.⁸⁹ Head-
 quarters SAC responded on the same day by moving one of the 43d Strategic
 Wing tankers from Yokota to Kwang Ju. The two tankers provided inflight
 refueling support for F-4E, F-4D, and F-4C aircraft.⁹⁰ The second tanker
 remained at Kwang Ju until 7 September when it returned to Kadana.⁹¹

(U) (S) B-52 Operations. With the F-111 squadron, C-5, and F-4E
 deployments, the move of the KC-135 to Kwang Ju, and tropical storm Dot
 all occurring on 20 August, SAC units were quite busy. In the meantime,
 on 19 August, the JCS alerted SAC to conduct B-52 bombing operations
 in Korea. SAC considered Nightmare Range, but it was too close to
 the DMZ.⁹² A second choice, Koon-Ni, was too close to a village.⁹³
 The Chik-Do range could be used for B-52's to drop MK 117 750-pound
 bombs from 25,000 feet after the Republic of Korea cleared the range.⁹⁴
 Headquarters SAC directed, however, that no live drops be made on any
 range in South Korea unless it so directed.⁹⁵

(U) (S) On 19 August, Headquarters 3d Air Division directed the
 43d Strategic Wing to commence a practice contingency generation exer-
 cise that included the installation of conventional bomb racks in the
 B-52D's.⁹⁶ The Category "A" sorties were not taken off alert. Later,
 the 3d Air Division directed the 43d to load flares and ammunition
 aboard the generated B-52D's.⁹⁷

(U) (S) The JCS directed the 43d Strategic Wing to fly B-52D
 training sorties over South Korea using two or three B-52's per cell
 during daylight. While the B-52's would not carry bombs, they would

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

fly high enough to be easily detected by North Korean radar, which was located north of the DMZ.⁹⁸ SAC established the route, low altitude profiles, bomb runs, rules of engagement, and recall procedures for the aircraft.⁹⁹

(S/ACDS) Headquarters 3d Air Division then requested that the 314th Air Division at Osan furnish six MIG Combat Air Patrol (CAP)--capable of shooting down MIG's--aircraft to fly between the 37th parallel and the DMZ during the inclusive time of 2146Z on 21 August and 0114Z on 22 August to provide fighter support to the first three B-52D aircraft flying over South Korea.¹⁰⁰ SAC planned the times to coincide with Operation Paul Bunyan, the joint United Nations Command operation in which the remains of the poplar tree in the JSA were chopped down.¹⁰¹

(S/ACDS) Three B-52D aircraft flew from Andersen over South Korea with three buddy KC-135 tankers and recovered at Andersen. The B-52's made their first bomb run from a high altitude (31,000-32,000 feet) with the second and third runs at medium altitude (15,000-16,000 feet). Headquarters SAC had cancelled the low level altitudes for these B-52 sorties.¹⁰² Detachment 9, 1st Combat Evaluation Group, scored the synchronous simulated release mission.¹⁰³

(S/ACDS) On 22 August 1976, Headquarters 3d Air Division notified Headquarters SAC that it needed a total of nine B-52's and crews to continue flying the three B-52 sorties per day and maintain its aircraft on ground alert. The 43d Strategic Wing also needed KC-135 support, and consequently readjusted the redeployment of KC-135 aircraft and crews from Andersen.¹⁰⁴ SAC then moved an additional tanker and crew from Okinawa to Andersen to support the B-52 missions.¹⁰⁵ That same day, SAC's contingency management group inactivated.¹⁰⁶ General Dougherty expressed his appreciation for SAC's accomplishments,¹⁰⁷ with General Jones adding his the next day.¹⁰⁸

(S/ACDS) The 43d Strategic Wing made plans for a standdown for maintenance and planned to fly between one and three Korean training sorties per week afterwards. The 3d Air Division requested that SAC permit the 1st CEG personnel to provide a Korean low level terrain avoidance route for B-52's flying RBS missions over South Korea.¹⁰⁹

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

(S) As the B-52's flew from Andersen to Korea and back, they passed over part of the Japanese islands. Political sensitivities in Japan could be affected by bombers flying over Japan. On 26 August, the American Embassy in Tokyo asked if the B-52's were flying across Japanese territorial air space.¹²⁰ Secretary of State Henry Kissinger replied that they were.¹²¹ As a result, SAC directed B-52's not to fly over any Japanese land mass.¹²²

(S) SAC planned to continue the bombing runs after 31 August, but on 30 August, the JCS directed the sorties be terminated.¹²³ However, the JCS notified SAC the next day that B-52 Korean training sorties would commence 2 September.¹²⁴ On 31 August, SAC relieved the 43d Strategic Wing of its four ground alert sorties in order to support the B-52 training missions.¹²⁵ The mission was flown 2 September with three B-52's scheduled and two across the target.¹²⁶ The 3d Air Division planned three missions the week of 4-11 September,¹²⁷ but on 7 September, the JCS directed return to DEFCON Four for U.S. forces in Korea.¹²⁸ On the following day, they terminated the B-52 training flights over South Korea.¹²⁹

(S) During the ten days of the B-52 Korean flights, Headquarters SAC did not know if the JCS wanted the B-52 flights to continue.¹³⁰ Therefore, it explored several possibilities to continue and expand these flights, with recommendations from 3d Air Division.*¹³¹

(S) The redeployment of the three B-52's was originally scheduled for 1 September,¹³² but when the JCS directed continuation of the B-52 training missions beyond the tenth day, SAC postponed the B-52D redeployment while the KC-135 and augmentation personnel redeployment continued as scheduled.¹³³ After the JCS cancelled the B-52 sorties, the B-52D's redeployed on 3 September.¹³⁴

(S) On 20 October, General Keck informed Headquarters USAF of some of the problems encountered during the Korean Incident. At the beginning of the crisis too many channels of communications were open

* (U) See "Busy Hurdler," this chapter.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

between the JCS, USAF, and SAC. Since this had been a JCS directed action, he suggested having all official calls channeled from the JCS crisis action team directly to the SAC contingency management team. Another problem concerned the identification of "Korean Training Sorties" for the B-52 vis-a-vis show-of-force sorties. General Keck stated, "In future crisis situations, consider tasking B-52 assets in a role consistent with the overall intent of the operation. Better tasking might have been achieved if no reference to training had been made." A third deficiency he identified concerned the composition and requirement for tanker task forces; these were not fully identified and therefore, taxed the resources of the 6th Strategic Wing. General Keck recommended that as much warning as possible be provided on total refueling requirements necessary. Finally, the late decision to continue the B-52 missions past Day 5 and end on Day 10 had an impact on the management of SAC resources, causing a delay in deployment of B-52D aircraft to Andersen. General Keck recommended that lead time be considered before sending out execution messages.

Sea Reconnaissance/Surveillance

SAC had long possessed anti-submarine warfare, mine laying and sea search responsibilities as collateral roles in support of the U.S. Navy. The 509th Bomb Group flew one of the first SAC sea surveillance missions with B-29 aircraft in 1946. Since the Cuban Crisis of 1962 when SAC's B-47's sighted Soviet vessels enroute to Cuba, however, SAC's activity had been negligible while it still kept up the plans for maritime operations during war times. In the 1965-1973 time period, the B-52, which had been regarded as a strategic bomber in its first decade of service in SAC, assumed another role, that of a conventional bomber. After conclusion of the war in Southeast Asia

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED