



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

January 9, 1980

MEMORANDUM TO: OES - Mr. Pickering  
AF - Mr. Keeley  
IO - Mr. Bridges  
S/P - Mr. Gallucci  
PM/NPP - Mr. Humphreys  
T - Mr. Salmon

FROM: S/AS - Allen W. Locke *AL*

SUBJECT: Secretary's Views on South African Nuclear  
Situation

I have prepared the attached record of the Secretary's views on South Africa on the basis of discussions with Arnie Raphel.

Attachment:

As Stated

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SECRETSecretary's Views on South African Nuclear Situation1. Handling the Press Report

Secretary agrees with Smith (Ref. Smith memo to the Secretary January 8, 1980) that we should release the conclusions of the Press panel to the public and share the report to the degree possible with allies.

2. Relations with South Africa

Secretary agrees with Smith that we should make an attempt to reach a nuclear settlement with South Africa. With respect to assurances, it would be satisfactory if the US were to make clear to the South Africans that we were proceeding on the basis of our understanding of South Africa's nuclear policy (e.g., that the Vorster assurances remain in effect), and the South Africans did not take exception to that understanding.

3. UN Sanctions

The Secretary agrees that the US should support some kind of UN sanctions if there is no progress with South Africa on the nuclear issue.

A. Timing

The Secretary is of the view that we cannot put off the question of sanctions indefinitely, but that we should see how discussions with South Africa are going and how the Namibia and other relevant situations stand before deciding to go for sanctions. The sanctions question must be approached in the broad context of our dealings with South Africa, rather than in the more narrow nuclear context.

B. Options

Before we discuss sanctions with others, we should be sure what options are available and what are their relative merits (general sanctions as opposed to purely nuclear, conditional vs. unconditional, voluntary vs. mandatory, etc.) This does not preclude consulting with allies such as the UK and France to determine their views, but the Secretary should be informed in advance of such consultations.

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