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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600



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SECURITY POLICY

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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July 21, 1993

Mamedov

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR
SECURITY AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION

SUBJECT: TALBOTT/MAMEDOV TALKS: HIGHPOINTS

Strobe Talbott hosted a Russian delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov Monday and Tuesday. In addition to Mamedov, the Russian delegation included General Staff and Russian Foreign Intelligence Agency representatives. John Gordon and I attended from DoD. Also present on the U.S. side were Deputy CIA Director Bill Studeman, Moscow embassy DCM Jim Collins, and NSC staff, in addition to Talbott. Secretary of State Christopher joined our meeting briefly today.

We helicoptered to Carlisle Barracks Monday for the talks, proceeded to get soaked in and had to take a bus back to Washington.

The talks were broken into two groups, corresponding to the hottest issues in U.S.-Russian relations: peacekeeping, especially Georgia; and proliferation, especially Ukraine.

I led the discussion on Ukraine, focusing on your early deactivation proposal. At Tab A are my talking points. At Tab B is a non-paper detailing our proposal that I handed to the Russian side. At Tab C is a non-paper on HEU prepared by State and also handed to the Russians.

Here are the main points:

On Ukraine:

- 1) It became quite apparent to us that the reason we haven't heard back from the Russians about early deactivation is that they failed to understand key aspects of the proposal. The garbled version they were working with was totally unacceptable to them, so they just didn't pay any attention to it. For

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example, they had the impression that we intended warheads to be dismantled in Ukraine rather than in Russia. Yesterday's meeting made important progress at clarifying our proposal and re-kindling their interest.

2) When the proposal was explained to them, the reaction was one of general, though unofficial, approval. They remain concerned that payment to the Ukrainians for HBU contained in weapons on Ukrainian territory implicitly settles the issue of ownership in favor of the Ukrainians. They're also afraid that deactivation will begin with the SS-19s but never get around to the SS-24s, which the Ukrainians will retain.

3) With these misunderstandings resolved, Talbott and I discussed the following sequence for moving forward over the next two months:

a) We preview these ideas and distribute the non-papers to Tarasiuk later this week and to Morozov next week.


*Today I
leave for
Kiev to
prepare
the way
for your
Memo on
meeting.
LCL*

b) At the same time, we prepare a formal agreement based on our proposals and ask President Clinton to transmit it to President Yeltsin late this week, noting that this agreement responds to President Yeltsin's Tokyo suggestion that a tripartite U.S./Ukrainian/Russian "Security Treaty" be devised.

c) Once we have agreement from the Russians we will try to secure agreement to the same text from the Ukrainians.

d) The objective is to have in place a basic agreement by early September so that the appropriate conditions are created in Kiev in late September for favorable Rada consideration of START and NPT.

Non Responsive



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Non Responsive

Attachments:

1. Talking Points from Dr. Carter
2. Proposal Handed to Russians
3. Non-paper on HEU

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