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POLICY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000



1993 JUL 29 PM 12:08

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



17 July 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Talbott-Yeltsin Conversations

In our meeting this morning we talked about recent conversations between Strobe Talbott and President Yeltsin. The attached cable is Strobe's summary. I call to your attention primarily the section on Ukraine and what appears to be a very positive statement in support of early deactivation of Ukraine warheads along the lines of your proposal.

FW
Frank G. Wisner

Attachment

R. L. ...

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** SECRET SPECAT **

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E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, MICRE, US, RS

SUBJECT: YELTSIN: TOKYO, UKRAINE NUCLEAR DEAL, MTCR

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT DELIVERED PRESIDENT
CLINTON'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON THE NUCLEAR
TESTING MORATORIUM AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CTB FOR WHICH
YELTSIN EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE. YELTSIN DESCRIBED
PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR DISMANTLEMENT AND THEN OUTLINED AN
"AGREEMENT" WITH UKRAINE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO START I AND
NPT RATIFICATION INVOLVING RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY
"GUARANTEES"; USE OF TWO RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED STORAGE
SITES IN UKRAINE TO FACILITATE EARLY DISMANTLEMENT;
RETURN OF ALL WARHEADS TO RUSSIA IN EXCHANGE FOR RUSSIAN
NUCLEAR FUEL FOR UKRAINE POWER REACTORS; AND RUSSIAN
HELP IN PERMANENTLY DISABLING MISSILE SILOS IN UKRAINE.
ON MTCR, YELTSIN ACCEPTED U.S. ASSURANCES ON NOT
INTERRUPTING RUSSIAN SPACE PROGRAM NOW PARTIALLY

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Frank Perez,
Senior Reviewer

SECRET

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DISPERSED TO SEVERAL NEW CIS STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, BUT WAS NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO U.S. LANGUAGE. ON INDIA, HE MADE THE CASE THAT CONTRACTS PRE-EXISTED U.S. LAW AND HE PROPOSED A TRANSITION PERIOD UNTIL JANUARY 1994 BEFORE MODIFICATIONS TO CONTRACT TO CUT OFF TRANSFER OF PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY COME INTO EFFECT. END SUMMARY.

3. PRESIDENT YELTSIN ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SHOKHIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV MET AMBASSADOR TALBOTT ACCOMPANIED BY PICKERING, UNDERSECRETARY DAVIS AND VICE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR FUERTH AT THE KREMLIN AT NOON JULY 3 FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES.

4. TALBOTT BEGAN BY CARRYING GREETINGS FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON AND OUTLINED U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR TOKYO STRESSING THE PRESIDENT WAS DOING ALL HE COULD TO PREPARE FOR A SUCCESSFUL MEETING.

5. TURNING TO THE CTB, TALBOTT EXPLAINED OUR POSITION ON TEST BAN MORATORIUM AND DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER NOTING THE DECISIVE NATURE OF THE STEP IN FOLLOWING UP VANCOUVER DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE.

6. YELTSIN TERMED THE MESSAGE VERY ENCOURAGING AND REPEATED THAT RUSSIA WOULD CONTINUE ITS MORATORIUM: "UNTIL SOMEONE ELSE WHO ALSO HAD ACCEPTED A MORATORIUM HAD TESTED, AFTER WHICH RUSSIA WOULD THINK ABOUT WHAT TO DO." TURNING TO DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HE SAID IN MAY 4500 WEAPONS HAD BEEN DISMANTLED, INCLUDING 1000 STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND THAT THEY LOOKED TOWARD USING THE PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM FOR FUEL. A SIMILAR NUMBER APPLIED TO DISMANTLEMENT FOR JUNE. RUSSIA WAS AHEAD OF START I REQUIREMENTS AND MOVING ON TO START II EVEN BEFORE RATIFICATION.

7. TURNING TO UKRAINE, WHICH HE CALLED THE MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE HE FACES, YELTSIN SAID HE HAD BEEN DEVOTING ALL HIS ENERGY, WORKING WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AND HIS COLLEAGUES, TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE WHEN HE MET KRAVCHUK LAST TIME. UKRAINE HAD MADE A FOUR POINT PROPOSAL TO ASSURE RATIFICATION OF START I AND THE NPT. FIRST, RUSSIA WILL GIVE "GUARANTEES" ON NUCLEAR SECURITY. SECOND, TWO RUSSIAN CONTROLLED NUCLEAR STORAGE SITES IN UKRAINE WILL BE USED TO HOUSE DISMANTLED MISSILE WARHEADS. THIRD, UKRAINE WILL RECEIVE LOW ENRICHED URANIUM NUCLEAR FUEL IN RETURN FOR WARHEADS TURNED OVER TO RUSSIA. FOURTH,

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RUSSIA WOULD HELP DISABLE MISSILE SILOS IN UKRAINE WHICH UKRAINIANS WERE HESITANT TO DESTROY WITH EXPLOSIVES BY FILLING THEM WITH CONCRETE. HE STRESSED THAT UKRAINE HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH START II; THESE ARRANGEMENTS COVERED ONLY START I. HE ADDED THAT 68 TONS OF NUCLEAR FUEL WOULD BE SUPPLIED IN RETURN FOR THE MIRV WARHEADS. THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE BILATERAL OR TRILATERAL AND RUSSIA PREFERRED THAT THE U.S. SHARE HALF OF THE COST OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL. KUCHMA AND KRAVCHUK BOTH SAID THAT WITH THESE ARRANGEMENTS START I AND THE NPT CAN BE RATIFIED.

8. AFTER CONGRATULATING YELTSIN, TALBOTT TURNED TO MTCR. STRESSING THE NEED FOR EARLY AGREEMENT ON BOTH SIDES, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VANCOUVER COMMITMENTS TO BOTH PARTIES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING THE AGREEMENT WRAPPED UP BEFORE TOKYO FOR SIGNATURE THERE, TALBOTT THEN REVIEWED THE TWO AREAS OF CONCERN THAT HAVE EMERGED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS: THE CIS STATES AND THE CONTRACT WITH INDIA.

9. ON THE CIS STATES, THE U.S. SIMPLY WANTS A COMMITMENT THAT RUSSIA WILL NOT DO WHAT IT HAS ALREADY TOLD US IT IS IN ITS INTEREST NOT TO DO -- NOT ASSIST ITS NEIGHBORS TO ATTAIN A BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY. THIS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE USE OF A CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO DEAL WITH DISCREPANCIES THAT MIGHT ARISE, NOT INTRUSIVE INSPECTION.

10. ON INDIA, WE ARE PREPARED TO HELP WITH INDIA. HE THEN URGED MOVING ON TO INITIALLING THE AGREEMENTS TODAY AND TO GET THE SPACE LAUNCH AND SPACE COOPERATION AGREEMENTS READY FOR SIGNATURE IN TOKYO.

11. YELTSIN REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD ANY SURPRISES. THE INDIA DEAL INVOLVED OLD CONTRACTS, MADE AT A TIME WHEN THEY WERE NOT AWARE OF U.S. LAW. THERE WERE RULES ON RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. RUSSIA WOULD NOT SUCCUMB TO U.S. PRESSURES, AND AS A GREAT POWER, IS NOT IN A POSITION VIZ INDIA TO CHANGE THE DEAL. SOME 80-90 PERCENT OF THE TECHNOLOGY HAD ALREADY BEEN DELIVERED TO INDIA. YELTSIN PROPOSED THAT THE CONTROLS BEGIN 1 JANUARY 1994; A "SMALL" TRANSITION PERIOD.

12. ON THE CIS, THE U.S. APPROACH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO RUSSIA. RUSSIA DOES NOT WANT TO SEE INDIGENOUS CAPABILITIES DEVELOP IN THE CIS AND RUSSIA COULD SUPPORT

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U.S. LAW HERE (KOZYREV REMINDED HIM IT WAS AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME AND YELTSIN AGREED). SO LONG AS IT WAS NOT IMPOSING A VERIFICATION REGIME, RUSSIA COULD AGREE. SHOKHIN INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THE LANGUAGE IN THE PROPOSED MEMORANDUM DID NOT CONFORM TO TALBOTT'S ASSURANCES.

13. TALBOTT REASSURED PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT THE U.S. POSITION WAS AS HE PRESENTED. AGREEMENT DID NOT FOLLOW. YELTSIN'S PARTING WORDS: WE NEED UNTIL JANUARY 1994 FOR A TRANSITION ON THE INDIA CONTRACT AND IN RETURN WE'LL ACCEPT THE U.S. POSITION ON THE CIS STATES. PICKERING UNQUOTE DAVIS

BT

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