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National Intelligence Officers	1	NFAC 5262-80 25 July 1980
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MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intellig Deputy Director of Central I	encero contr
VIA:	Deputy Director for National National Intelligence Office	Foreign Assessment
FROM:	Robert C. Ames	3
i Kori.		r for Near East and South Asia
SUBJECT:	Monthly Warning Assessment:	Near East and South Asia

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- 1. The meeting began with a review of two warning related items currently in progress. The first item was the Syrian Alert Memo and the requirements it generated from the NSC. The second item was the SNIE on Iraqi Nuclear Activity and Likely Israeli Response, currently in the TOR stage. We hope to have this SNIE out in two weeks, but might issue an alert memorandum sooner if we obtain more evidence of a possible Israeli preemptive strike at an Iraqi nuclear facility.
- 2. Syria and the Soviets: Discussion of the possibility of the development of a stronger security relationship between Syria and the USSR was generated by an ACSI paper on this subject. ACSI's point was that Asad might panic and offer more to the Soviets than he would under ordinary circumstances. We should, therefore, assess the implications of a new and possibly substantial level of Soviet presence and access in Syria. The case for Soviet restraint was based on the shakey nature of the Asad regime (why back a loser from a minority sect), friendship treaties were not guarantees for anything in the Arab World (Egypt and Iraq), and the reaction of Arab moderates would be loud and clear. Discussion was inconclusive, and it was decided that a coordinated response to the NSC's follow-up questions, which include the Soviet angle, would be a good place to get a Community view.

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3. Afghanistan/Pakistan: There is some concern around town that after the Olympics the Soviets might make a massive move into Afghanistan that might have some spillover into Pakistan. The group did not share either of these concerns. In Afghanistan the Soviets are practicing a policy of economy of forces. They are not hurting in Afghanistan, and the price they are paying is not high. They are getting valuable experience and are making "trial and error" progress. Unless there is some dramatic change in the level and the style of the insurgency, the Soviets will stay at current force levels. The Soviets also probably will not make any dramatic military move into Pakistan. They cannot stop this kind of insurgency by punitive raids - there are no major depots, the Soviets would be chasing ghosts. If the Paks got too troublesome, the Soviets would use subversion to get rid of Zia and cause political chaos in Pakistan that they could exploit.

- 4. <u>Iran</u>: We briefly reviewed the necessity of devoting some of our intelligence resources to the "after Khomeini" problem. We are probably too involved in current reporting and need to do more long-term thinking.
- 5. <u>Lebanon</u>: The Phalange victory over the Chamounists could well be the most explosive event in this explosive region since the 1973 war. We need to know more about Bashir Jumayyil's intentions. Does he just want to unite the Christian heartland, or does he want to unite all Lebanon by force of arms? Are the Israelis or Syrians behind this move? Bashir is an ambitious, unpredictable young man and if he is not content with his victory over the Chamounists, his next move could drag us all into the maw of Lebanon.

Robert C. Ames

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