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DELIVER GARTHOFF 8:00 AM

SUBJECT: Paper A-5, Strategic Considerations

Delegation is authorized to use following paper.

SALT Negotiating Paper (A-5)

I. RECOMMENDED U.S. APPROACH

A. Purpose

Our purpose in any preliminary discussion of strategic ~~foreign~~ considerations would be (1) to set forth elements of U.S. strategic thinking as a foundation for subsequent discussions, and (2) to determine as much as possible about Soviet strategic planning, the seriousness with which they consider strategic arms control, and their approach to SALT.

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DRAFTED BY ACDA/WEC: I.B. Richards	DRAFTING DATE 11-15-69	TEL EXT. 20927	APPROVED BY: ACDA - Philip J. Farley
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CLEARANCES:

- ACDA - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Dr. Rochlin RR
- State - Mr. Spiers RL
- DOD/OSD - Mr. Tucker RL
- S/S - Mr. Brown RL
- JCS - Maj. Gen. Demler RL
- WH - Mr. Sommers RL
- CIA - Mr. Clarke RL

FORM FS-413 4-68 UJM

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
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by F. Smith Date JUN 20 1981

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U.S.S.R.  
countries other than the ~~USSR~~ might be able to launch  
in the next decade, and (c) protect against possible  
accidental launches.

c. We would hope to achieve and maintain a stable  
U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship which would minimize  
any incentive to initiate nuclear war.

d. We believe that agreed limitations on offensive  
and defensive strategic systems can be found which con-  
tribute to the maintenance of a stable U.S.-Soviet  
strategic relationship and could enhance the security of  
both countries and of the entire world.

e. We believe that strategic arms control can pro-  
vide assurance to each side that its security will be main-  
tained, while at the same time ~~reducing~~ reducing the risks, ]

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tensions, and costs of an unrestrained strategic arms competition.

f. We believe that there would be value in continuing U.S.-Soviet discussion of issues arising from our strategic ~~ambulatory~~ relationships.

g. We would like to hear Soviet views on strategic objectives.

2. Uncertainties in Strategic Force Planning

a. One of the features of the past relationship which may have caused both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to expand strategic armaments to present levels ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> uncertainty. Deployments made by one side to ensure against uncertainties may well have constituted an element in the decisions made by the other side.

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b. Due to the long lead-times involved in developing strategic weapons systems, decisions frequently must be made on the basis of very limited knowledge.

Miscalculations concerning the other side's future force levels and capabilities can result in a decision to build additional strategic forces, which in turn may generate a reaction and thus continued arms competition.

c. We believe that every effort should be made to reduce these uncertainties and possible miscalculations. We realize that neither side wishes to relinquish military secrets. However, within the limits set by security considerations, we believe that it is both desirable and feasible to reduce the areas of uncertainty.

3. Stability

We are concerned with stability in two senses.

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We want to maintain crisis stability, by which we mean a strategic force relationship in which neither side has ~~perceived~~ an incentive to ~~preempt~~. We also want to maintain a stability in strategic force relationship under which neither side ~~perceives~~ the necessity for undertaking major new arms programs to avoid being placed at a strategic disadvantage.

a. Generally, the greater the survivability of strategic weapons systems on both sides the less the incentive for either side to strike first in a crisis situation or to undertake new arms programs in an attempt to gain a strategic advantage. Survivability is thus not only essential to deterrence and therefore to crisis stability, but also contributes to a stable strategic relationship.

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c. Another factor affecting stability is the capability of the deterrent forces to penetrate defenses. Crisis stability could be seriously eroded if one side deployed defenses which reduced the other side's retaliatory capability below the level which it would consider adequate for deterrence. Defensive deployments could also prompt the other side to make compensating increases or improvements in its offensive forces in order to ~~maintain a~~ desired maintain a ~~level~~ level of penetration capability. Clearly this factor is complicated by the problem of protecting each country from the level of attack of which ~~third~~ third countries are capable.

d. In our view, long term ~~strategic~~ strategic stability would be enhanced, both as it affects the probability of war outbreak in a crisis and as it affects the prospects

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for avoiding strategic arms build-up, by frank discussion of activities which could improve or detract from stability. Arrangements for continued discussions of such subjects could be a concomitant of a strategic arms limitations agreement.

4. Relative Total Missile Throw Weights

Total missile throw weight is a measure of the ability, potential or actual, of a strategic missile force to create damage either in a first strike or in a retaliatory role. Therefore, a large difference between the total missile throw weights of two countries ~~which~~ might imply a large difference in strategic missile capabilities. We would like to hear Soviet views on the importance of total missile throw weight and of significant differences in total throw weights.

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5. Nuclear Capabilities of Other Countries

We are engaged in bilateral discussions toward an agreement to limit only the strategic forces of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.; however, our strategic planning will continue to take into account the potential strategic nuclear threats of other nations.

D. Issues to be Avoided in Discussions with Soviets

1. Although our purpose is to explore Soviet strategic thinking on as broad a basis as possible, we must ~~XXXX~~ avoid any statements committing, or appearing to commit, the U.S. to any arms control proposal or position. We must not prejudice U.S. positions on issues; however, any light that ~~XXXX~~ our exploration might shed on these issues will assist U.S. decision-makers.

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2. Statements which reveal specific U.S. force planning must be avoided; we must limit our statements to data contained in unclassified official documentation.

3. Above all, we must avoid creating the impression that we are on an intelligence "fishing" expedition.

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END

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