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ACTION ACDA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 EUR-12 INR-06 IO-03

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FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2100  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
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SALT 53

SUBJECT: NOV. 28 SALT MEETING

1. SUMMARY: BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT TODAY'S MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. SEMENOV LED OFF, FOLLOWED BY SMITH'S FORMAL PRESENTATION ON THIS SUBJECT (FOR TEXTS SEE SEPTELS). SEMENOV NOTED THAT IT MAY BE IMPORTANT, WITH REGARD TO ABMS, TO "LIMIT, HALT AND EVEN TURN BACK THEIR DEVELOPMENT." HE LISTED THREE POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO LIMITING ABMS: THE SIDES COULD DEPLOY NO RPT NG BALLISTIC MISSILES, INASMUCH AS WORK ON THE SYSTEMS IS IN THE BEGINNING STAGES; ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE LIMITED ABM DEFENSES; AND A THIRD POSSIBILITY WOULD BE THE DEPLOYMENT OF "THICK AREA SYSTEMS," WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS. SEMENOV ALSO RECOMMENDED A BAN ON DISSEMINATION BY THE TWO SIDES OF ABMS TO THIRD PARTIES, ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF ABM SYSTEMS BEYOND THE TERRITORIES OF THE TWO SIDES, AND ON SEA-BASED ABMS. (END SUMMARY)

2. IN OPENING HIS STATEMENT, SEMENOV NOTED THE NEED TO DISCUSS AT THE SUBSEQUENT PHASE QUESTIONS CONCERNING BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS, CORRESPONDING TO THE PREVIOUS EX-

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CHANGE OF VIEWS IN WHICH IT WAS AGREED THAT "SYSTEMS OF DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES" WOULD BE DISCUSSED ALONG WITH OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

(SEMENOV THUS LIMITED HIS STATEMENT TO ABMS AND DID NOT RPT NOT INCLUDE A DISCUSSION OF SAMS.)

3. SEMENOV NOTED HIS AGREEMENT WITH SMITH'S EARLIER STATEMENT THAT OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS MUST BE REGARDED AS INTERRELATED. NEW OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS GAVE RISE TO DEFENSIVE ARMS WHICH IN THEIR TURN STIMULATED "THE QUANTITATIVE GROWTH AND IMPROVEMENT OF OFFENSIVE ARMS."

4. SEMENOV AGREED WITH SMITH'S EARLIER STATEMENT OF NOV. 20 THAT THE DEPLOYMENT BY ONE SIDE OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS CAN DRIVE THE OTHER SIDE TO COMPENSATING INCREASES OR IMPROVEMENTS OF ITS OFFENSIVE FORCES. SEMENOV ADDED THAT THIS COULD TAKE THE FORM OF DEPLOYING MEANS OF PENETRATING THE ABM DEFENSES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE REACTING SIDE MAY CHOOSE TO CREATE CORRESPONDING MEANS OF DEFENSE AGAINST A MISSILE ATTACK, OR IT MAY CHOOSE BOTH.

5. CONTINUING HIS GENERAL REMARKS, SEMENOV NOTED THAT ABM DEFENSES ARE A CLEAR ILLUSTRATION OF THE UNEXPECTED TURNS WHICH OCCUR IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS BY APPLYING MODERN TECHNOLOGY; IT MAY BE IMPORTANT TO LIMIT, STOP, AND EVEN TURN BACK THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN TIME. ORIGINALLY THE DEVELOPMENT OF ABMS FOR DEFENSE OF CITIES AND POPULATIONS APPEARED TO THE DESIGNER'S MIND TO HAVE AN EXCLUSIVELY HUMANE PURPOSE. THE ONLY PROBLEM WAS TO OVERCOME THE ENORMOUS TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES. HOWEVER, AS TIME WENT ON, WHEN MEANS OF OVERCOMING THESE PROBLEMS WERE DETERMINED, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT DEFENSIVE WEAPONS COULD TO A CERTAIN DEGREE BECOME OFFENSIVE, AS THEY COULD PUT IN DOUBT THE INEVITABILITY OF RETALIATION.

6. SEMENOV THEN PUT FORTH SEVERAL HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES AS TO HOW THE ABM PROBLEM COULD BE HANDLED, HAVING IN MIND THE ASSURANCE OF SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES. FIRST, HE POSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD NOT DEPLOY ANY ABM DEFENSES. THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE INASMUCH AS WORK ON ABM SYSTEMS IS AT A BEGINNING STAGE. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH DEFENSE AGAINST POSSIBLE UNAUTHORIZED LAUNCHES OR PROVOCATIONS ON THE PART OF THIRD COUNTRIES.

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7. THE SECOND POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR BOTH SIDES TO AGREE ON CERTAIN LIMITED ABM SYSTEMS. IN DEFINING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE LEVELS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SIZE OF THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, THEIR NATURE, WHAT INSTALLATIONS THEY ARE DESIGNED TO DEFEND, AND THE DISPOSITION OF ELEMENTS OF THE SYSTEM.

8. A THIRD VARIATION WOULD BE THE DEPLOYMENT OF "THICK AREA ABM SYSTEMS." IN THIS CASE, WE WOULD BE DEALING WITH THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS. DEPLOYMENT BY ONE SIDE OF ABMS TO THIS LEVEL COULD EVOKE A SENSE OF CONFIDENCE IN EVADING A RETALIATORY STRIKE AND COULD TEMPT IT TO EMPLOY STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AGAINST THE OTHER COUNTRY, AS SMITH MENTIONED IN HIS NOV. 20 STATEMENT.

9. THUS, SEMENOV CONTINUED, THE ABM QUESTION HAS AN INFLUENCE ON THE ENTIRE PROBLEM OF LIMITING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE. IT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FULLY AT THE NEXT PHASE IN THE TALKS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REAL SITUATION EXISTING AT THE PRESENT TIME. IN PARTICULAR, THERE IS THE QUESTION OF THE DEFENSE BY ONE SIDE BY ABM SYSTEMS OF OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN OTHER INSTALLATIONS LOCATED AT SIGNIFICANT DISTANCES FROM ONE ANOTHER. THIS COULD CAUSE THE OTHER SIDE TO HAVE DOUBTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVERTING IN TIME SUCH A DEPLOYED SYSTEM INTO ONE FACILITATING THE CARRYING OUT OF A FIRST STRIKE. SEMENOV THEN ASKED FOR THE VIEWS OF THE AMERICAN SIDE ON THIS COMPLEX OF ISSUES.

10. SEMENOV CONCLUDED HIS GENERAL REMARKS BY RECOMMENDING A BAN ON THE DISSEMINATION OF ABMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES, ON DEPLOYING ABMS OUTSIDE OF NATIONAL TERRITORIES, AND ON SEA-BASED SYSTEMS.

11. FINALLY SEMENOV ANNOUNCED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION INTENDED AT THE FOLLOWING SESSION TO RAISE SEVERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING VERIFICATION, AND MEASURES DIMINISHING THE DANGER OF THE OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR.  
SMITH

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
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12. IN RESPONSE, SMITH AGREED TO THIS PROCEDURE BUT ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF SEMENOV'S LAST REMARKS. SEMENOV REPLIED THAT HE HAD IN MIND A DISCUSSION BOTH OF VERIFICATION AND OF MEASURES TO DIMINISH THE THREAT OF WAR AND PERHAPS SEVERAL OTHERS.

13. SEMENOV AGREED TO SMITH'S PREVIOUS SUGGESTION THAT NEXT WEEK THE TWO DELEGATIONS SHOULD GET DOWN TO ACTUALLY FORMULATING A WORK PROGRAM FOR THE SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF TALKS. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE WOULD COMMENT AT A LATER DATE ON SMITH'S STATEMENT REGARDING THE SOVIET NON-DISSEMINATION PROPOSAL. CITING AS AN ILLUSTRATION A PEASANT WHO WAITS FOR HIS CROP, HE INTIMATED THAT THE USSR MIGHT BE PREPARED TO BIDE ITS TIME ON THIS PROPOSAL. FINALLY, SEMENOV SUGGESTED A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED BY BOTH SIDES IN GENERAL TERMS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION OWED SMITH A DEBT IN FURTHER EXCHANGING VIEWS ON ILLUSTRATIVE BASIC ELEMENTS AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO PAY OFF THIS DEBT. (A SOVIET DELEGATION MEMBER LATER SAID THESE STATEMENTS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING NEXT WEEK.)

14. AT THE FORMAL MEETING IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NEXT SESSION WOULD TAKE PLACE ON MONDAY. HOWEVER, DURING AN INFORMAL TALK

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FOLLOWING THE MEETING, SEMENOV PROPOSED AND SMITH AGREED THAT  
THE NEXT MEETING WILL BE HELD ON TUESDAY, GP-3.  
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