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Authority: NND 98154  
By: NARA Date: 10/27/94

JMK  
Rec'd  
Dec. 30

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1970

Dear Jack:

It was good to see you at the meeting with the President last week. The discussion touched on several of the issues raised in your letter to the President of December 1.

I had hoped there would be a chance to talk to you directly about your letter at that time since it had been sent to the President a few days earlier. The President would like you and your associates on the Committee to know that he appreciates having your thoughtful appraisal and recommendation.

To follow up on the MIRV question, we still have doubts that the rather low-key revival of the formal Soviet proposal represents a serious interest in negotiating this issue. At least, in our probing of the Soviet delegation they have been extremely coy, and have given no sign that their proposals were more than pro forma. In addition, of course, their MIRV program has progressed and deployment may have already started. In any case, you are aware that we are re-examining on a priority basis the entire question of US missile survivability. This includes an assessment of Soviet warhead development and will provide an early opportunity to assess once more the feasibility and effect of possible MIRV limitations or bans and to consider whether and what kind of new US negotiating approaches are desirable.

The points in your letter will, you may be certain, receive the fullest consideration as part of these studies.

As I mentioned previously, I very much hope to join the Committee at one of its sessions. A meeting with the President after the demands on his time in connection with the convening of the new Congress have lessened will also be taken up.

Warm regards,

  
Henry A. Kissinger

The Honorable John J. McCloy  
Chairman, General Advisory Committee  
on Arms Control and Disarmament  
Washington, D. C. 20451

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By: WSA/NARA Date: 10/27/01



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, D.C. 20520

*John... Sec.*  
*JMR*

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MEMORANDUM

December 8, 1970

TO : S - The Secretary  
THROUGH: S/S *Theodore L. Elst Jr.*  
FROM : PM - Thomas R. Pickering  
SUBJECT: Meeting with the GAC, 11 a.m., December 9

*Has Pres. made an answer?*  
*off so, what?*

The General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC) will meet with you at 11 a.m., December 9 in your Conference Room to discuss two recommendations--on the Atlantic Alliance and SALT--which the Committee forwarded to the President December 1. Committee views are contained in the letter that Mr. McCloy, Chairman of the GAC, sent to the President, a copy of which McCloy provided you December 3 (Tab A).

In sum, the Committee believes it would be in the US security interest to make: a) our support for Western European unification more manifest and public, and b) another effort to reach an acceptable MIRV ban in SALT.

With respect to the former, the Committee specifically recommends a strong Presidential reaffirmation of US support for a unified Western Europe. The GAC suggests further greater effort to treat the European institutions as a government, and that we undertake a review of our bilateral commitments to European Communities' states so that when Communities' are prepared to assume the responsibilities involved in such current bilateral commitments, a transfer might be effected.

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On MIRV, the Committee suggests seeking to add a flight test ban (which Committee studies indicate would provide the US with adequate ability consistent with US security interests to monitor Soviet activities) to the Soviet proposal, renewed in Helsinki November 13, for a production and deployment ban. The GAC points out that the US has never proposed a MIRV flight test ban divorced from on-site inspection, and, therefore, in the judgment of the Committee, "the US has not yet made a proposal on MIRV that would meet either our or their minimum need for assurance against cheating."

The GAC has four major reasons for urging such an effort promptly be made to seek a MIRV ban.

-- The adverse impact upon US land-based strategic forces that would be caused by Soviet MIRVing.

-- The GAC is not convinced that the US need for MIRV outweighs the benefits of preventing Soviet MIRVing if Soviet ABM can be held to an NCA level.

-- The GAC is convinced that during a period of expanding Soviet power the many billions of dollars in cost for US MIRVing and new strategic weapon systems could be employed more profitably to improve US conventional forces, and those of US Allies, consistent with the Nixon Doctrine.

-- The adverse effect upon US and world public opinion that would result from not including a MIRV ban in a SALT agreement.

Mr. McCloy will provide separately the names of those members of GAC who will attend tomorrow's meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

The GAC will not expect you to react in detail to its recommendations, since they have just been forwarded

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to the President. The Committee's main interest is to present the recommendations, and the basis for reaching them, to you. However, any preliminary comments you may wish to make would be appreciated by the GAC.

cc:  
U - The Under Secretary

Attachment:  
Tab A - McCloy Letter of 12/3/70

PM/DCA:RAMartin:mym 12/8/70

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By: WMA Date: 10/27/71

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

16362

Washington, D.C. 20451

Established by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of Sept. 26, 1961

JOHN J. McCLOY, Chairman  
I. W. ABEL  
HAROLD BROWN  
WILLIAM J. CASEY  
C. DOUGLAS DILLON  
WILLIAM C. FOSTER  
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LAURIS NORSTAD  
PETER G. PETERSON  
JACK RUINA  
DEAN RUSK  
WILLIAM SCRANTON  
CYRUS VANCE  
JOHN ARCHIBALD WHEELER

December 3, 1970

Dear Mr. Secretary:


I enclose a copy of a letter to the President that conveys two Committee recommendations designed, in the Committee's view, to contribute to our security.

We should like to discuss our analysis and recommendations when we meet with you on December 9.

I will send you the names of those who will be present for the Committee when I have a final list.

I am looking forward to seeing you next week.

Sincerely,



John J. McCloy

Enclosure:

Copy of Mr. McCloy's letter to the President, dated December 1, 1970  
(SECRET).

The Honorable  
William P. Rogers,  
The Secretary of State,  
Department of State.

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JOHN ARCHIBALD WHEELER

December 1, 1970

Dear Mr. President:

Since our last meeting with you in December 1969, the Committee has attempted to work toward a better understanding of the central strategic and political issues that determine the contribution which arms control measures can make to our national security. While awaiting the time when you are able to meet with us again, I would like to advise you of the Committee's conclusions after this year of study.

The Committee is very sensitive to the changed situation in which the United States now finds itself. While we have heretofore achieved a very high level of security from the danger of a Soviet attack because of an overwhelming nuclear retaliatory force, we are now faced with a large expansion of Soviet nuclear capability as well as an expansion of Soviet strength and influence that cannot be offset by the simple existence of our own nuclear arms.

There are two considerations which the Committee would like to advance in this connection. The first constitutes a general condition which reflects concern over the state of the Atlantic Alliance and the other a more specific recommendation relating to the SALT negotiations. Both, we believe, relate directly to the security of the United States.

I

For a number of reasons, there has arisen a growing feeling that a definite shift in the balance of power to our detriment is occurring. The significance of the increase

The President,  
The White House.

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over the last five years of Soviet nuclear potential and the extension of its military and naval presence outside its borders have also coincided with the growing impression that the United States is withdrawing throughout the world. The tendency is perhaps most often referred to in connection with the reduction of the United States presence in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Far East. But the shift in policy is also related to Europe. The defection of France from NATO, the easy acceptance in Western Europe of the Czechoslovakian suppression, the emergence of Soviet military and naval strength in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean, the tendency of both Bonn and Paris to adjust to Soviet policy, all are events which have tended to accent this attitude in regard to Europe.

The malaise of spirit which the Vietnam war and its attendant disorders have induced throughout the nation is another factor causing the Europeans to doubt our ability to provide world leadership.

As this skepticism in regard to our power and will grows, not only our influence, but our overall security, is affected. Our friends and allies throughout the world become less disposed to cooperate with us and more disposed to accommodate and adjust themselves to Soviet policy. Yet friends and allies abroad remain essential to us not only for our diplomacy and general prosperity but, as our recent experiences in the Middle East have revealed, for the deployment of our military strength beyond our own territory in time of crisis.

What can be done to counteract this trend in world affairs is not too clear. Nor can we reasonably suppose that the trend can be reversed overnight. It is very doubtful that such a reversal could be accomplished simply by rebuilding our nuclear superiority, even if this alternative were considered practicable or wise. Any marked increase in our nuclear weaponry would probably be promptly matched by the Soviets.

What seems to be needed, and what under present circumstances would appear to be more effective, would be a deliberate program of political action to reinvigorate the Atlantic Alliance. The concept of a united Europe allied with the United States constituted a vigorous and constructive policy during the 25 year period following the close of the war. It was repeatedly asserted and recognized as a deliberate United States policy. Concrete steps were taken to

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implement it, including the Marshall Plan, NATO and the Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations. It probably remains the most effective long-term offset to the growth of Soviet influence in the West that can be devised.

Though the Soviet Union could in all probability match any increases in our nuclear armament, there is no way it can counter the combined political, economic and military strength of a United States allied with a Western Europe which, when unified, would represent a population of almost 300 million people with a GNP of almost 500 billion dollars.

Strengthening Western Europe and the Alliance depends primarily at this stage in history upon Western Europe's achieving a greater degree of unity and on an increase in the vigor and activity of the institutional relationships with our European allies. It also depends on a conscious and sustained effort to bring France back into the Alliance in a significant manner. It demands some special relationship with Japan. In theory, Europe can, of course, assume a greater responsibility for the common defense. In practice, this can only be done if it has a better means of reaching decisions and taking action on a unified basis than the present organization of Western Europe now permits.

While it is evident that Western Europe has the resources of men, technology and money needed to build a powerful counter to the Soviet Union, they can be fully used only if there is a common will and an institutional means of reaching decisions by which the parts can be transformed into the whole. The translation of West European potential into West European power is not within the reach of the individual states, nor even, of several of their number working together.

A greater degree of Western European union would, we believe, assure the maintenance of Western European independence from Soviet pressure, a pressure which is bound to be more dangerous as European interests become fragmented. It would provide the basis for a more effective Western European defense effort. It would also present an ever more powerful attraction to the Soviet satellite states while diminishing the power of the French and Italian Communist Parties as they were submerged in an overwhelmingly non-Communist Western Europe. And a united Western Europe would be able increasingly to play a more responsible role elsewhere in the world as well.

An increased movement toward such a new, viable center of power aligned with the United States would materially

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change the climate of world thought in respect to the shifting balance of power, and as a consequence, we believe, it could enhance our security.

There are, we believe, some practical steps that the United States could and should take to strengthen our ties with Western Europe and to assist the process of Western European unification.

Chief among these would be a clear Presidential reaffirmation of support for Western European unification. There has been no major public restatement of the policy of United States support for Western European unification and early enlargement of the European Communities to include Great Britain since the inclusion of a paragraph in the February 1970 Foreign Policy Report to Congress. In this form it had little resonance. While there was a period during which our open support for West European unification was felt to be a handicap, that time, we believe, has now passed.

A public Presidential statement is particularly important at a moment when Europe is facing the prospect of a European Security Conference in which its internal and external alignment will be tested and when disagreements over trade matters, strategic negotiations with the Soviet Union and uncertainty about our NATO troop levels have clearly raised doubts in Western Europe, as in the United States, about the continued commitment of the United States to the policy of a united Western Europe. Moreover, a public reaffirmation would be propitious now that movement toward Western European unity has resumed as a result of the initiative of the Hague meeting of European Heads of Government last December. The shape of Europe and of our long-term relations with it is being determined in the process.

It would also provide necessary direction to the numerous executive agencies involved in our foreign affairs. As a concomitant of such a statement, we believe that a more conscious effort should be made by the United States to treat the European Communities and the Commission as a government with a steadily expanding range of powers. We might also undertake a systematic review of our bilateral commitments to individual European Communities' states with the objective of establishing a timetable for their consolidation and transfer to the European Communities as rapidly as that institution is prepared to assume them.

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Although there are other positive steps which we believe might be taken, there are two from a negative point of view which should certainly not be taken.

One is a reduction of our force levels in Europe. We believe that your reported decision to maintain existing troop levels was essential to avoid weakening our alliance and to counter the further growth of Soviet influence.

The other step to be avoided is convocation of a European Security Conference before Western Europe has attained a greater degree of unity and before we and our allies have strengthened our own ties. Unless there is a more tightly knit Western European entity, we fear that the Alliance may be seriously weakened by the powerful divisive force which the Soviet Union is trying to exert upon both NATO and the process of Western European unification.

Examination should also begin with our allies of means to modernize NATO, the OECD, the GATT and possibly other international institutions. The aim should be to bring France back into the fold and to establish special ties and a special trilateral relationship among Japan, common Western European institutions and ourselves. The most effective way to achieve this objective should be methodically and purposefully examined with our closest allies.

The very process of common re-examination of premises and needs could enhance and reaffirm the unity of the West, particularly if it culminated in a new conference of heads of states to cap the modernization of our Alliance relations.

## II

With respect to the SALT, two things have taken place recently which prompt us to renew our recommendations in respect of MIRV deployment. One is the Soviet restatement in Helsinki of a desire for a MIRV ban and the other is the initiation of Soviet MIRV testing.

These two developments convince the Committee that what may well be our last chance to prevent Soviet deployment of an operational MIRV is rapidly slipping away. Unless means can be found within the next few weeks or months to halt Soviet MIRV development, the Committee believes that the security position of the United States will be adversely affected and the arms race will enter a new, costly and potentially less stable phase. We believe, therefore, that it is important that a prompt effort be made during the

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Helsinki phase of the SALT negotiations to stop Soviet MIRV preparation at its present point of evolution. We believe, and our convictions were reinforced by the recent Soviet reopening of the issue in Helsinki, that there is still a chance to negotiate an acceptable MIRV prohibition with the Soviet Union.

An agreement to limit ABM deployment, such as that proposed by the United States to the Soviet Union at Vienna, would also be very valuable to the security of the United States in restraining the Soviet Union. As we earlier reported to you, and despite recent Soviet acceptance of an NCA level in principle, our preference would be that the level of ABM be agreed at zero. This would both minimize the dangers of Soviet SAM upgrading to an ABM capability and diminish the need for our own MIRV deployment.

However, an agreement which also placed limits on the number of ICBM launchers and bombers would, in our judgment, be much more valuable to our security in restraining the Soviet Union if it were accompanied by an effective prohibition on MIRVing.

You will recall that in March we urged that a SALT agreement include a prohibition on MIRV deployment. At that time we concluded that a prohibition on MIRV should be accompanied by a low or zero level of area ABM together with a MIRV flight test ban. Later, after a further examination of ABM, MIRV and on-site inspection, we reported to you on June 27 that on-site inspection would have very doubtful value in adding to our confidence in Soviet observance of a MIRV ban and would be of limited value in connection with any prohibition on the upgrading of SAM facilities to ABM capacity if SAM upgrading for air defense were permitted. We added that a MIRV prohibition would appear to be highly desirable from the point of view of our own security. And we pointed out that the United States had not proposed a MIRV ban to the Soviets without on-site inspection nor had we responded to their proposal not to produce or stockpile MIRVs as part of an agreement.

In essence, our recommendations embodied our concern that Soviet MIRVing would compel us to speed up deployment of costly new deterrent weapons systems, the funds for which would be drawn from our general purpose forces. This, in turn, would make us increasingly vulnerable to sub-nuclear encroachment by the Soviet Union.

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We believe that we understand the many considerations which led the United States to the formulation of a limited proposal excluding MIRVs at the close of the Vienna talks. We are very conscious of the lack of Soviet receptivity to our original proposal for a MIRV prohibition accompanied by on-site inspection.

The recent Soviet SS-9 tests, however, suggest the beginning of a genuine MIRV development program. While the best evidence is still not conclusive on this point, we believe that it is not in our security interest to wait to be sure. According to the agreed intelligence judgment, by the end of a year the new Soviet warhead might well be deployable but have no greater accuracy than the present SS-9 triplet. By the end of 1972, however, the system might be sufficiently improved to provide a hard target capability.

Nevertheless, if the Soviets would agree to stop testing before their program has developed accuracy greater than the present SS-9, we believe that our monitoring of Soviet testing could still provide adequate assurance against clandestine MIRV improvement and, therefore, of deployment of an accurate MIRV. Moreover, there would also be advantage to our security in a ban on testing which did no more than freeze Soviet MIRV development at a primitive level compared to our own.

There are four major reasons that compel us to the view that it is in our interest to try to prevent Soviet MIRVing.

1. The adverse impact upon our own land based strategic forces that would be caused by Soviet MIRVing is the most important of these. Our entire Minuteman system would be put at risk and neutralized more rapidly by such a development than would otherwise be the case. We would be faced with an early choice of shifting sooner to new underwater systems, land mobile ICBMs, to new airborne systems or to a hard point ABM, each of which, or together, would cost some tens of billions of dollars. Alternatively, we could rely upon only two deterrent systems (air and submarine) or fall back on a doctrine of launching our land based missiles at warning of a Soviet attack to avoid their destruction on the ground. The latter would seem to the Committee to be fraught with great hazard, exceeded only by the likelihood that the Soviet Union, too, might go to a launch on warning doctrine.

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2. We are not convinced that our own need for MIRV outweighs the benefits of preventing Soviet MIRVing if Soviet ABM capability can be held to the NCA level. There is, to be sure, the danger that Soviet SAMs may be susceptible to improvement to the point that they would deny us an assured destruction capability in a retaliatory missile strike unless we had MIRVed. However, we have examined this case with considerable care and conclude that collateral restraints on SAM upgrading could reduce this largely theoretical risk to a very low level.

The additional use for MIRV as a means of expanding target coverage in a less than full nuclear exchange we do not find adequate to justify the vastly greater disadvantage to our security resulting from Soviet MIRVing. We are persuaded that the most credible role for nuclear weapons, whether tactical or strategic, is that of deterrence rather than for fighting a limited nuclear war.

3. We are convinced that during a period of expanding Soviet power, the many billions of dollars that our own MIRVing would cost us directly and indirectly, for new strategic weapons systems could more profitably be employed in the improvement of our conventional forces and those of our allies consistent with the Nixon Doctrine.

4. The adverse effect upon United States and, indeed, world public opinion that its exclusion will be apt to have is the final, but by no means least important, reason for such a MIRV ban in the SALT. A strategic arms control agreement which in fact permits a manyfold increase in the number of Soviet and United States nuclear warheads could be widely criticized as cynical and deceptive.

It is because of these fundamental public policy considerations that we recommend that new efforts should be made to bring MIRV into the SALT negotiation even if Soviet MIRV testing may have now begun.

We cannot judge ultimate Soviet attitudes, but we believe that until a precise and negotiable proposal has been made to them, no one can know how their highest political leadership will respond. Many of the same reasons that lead us to conclude against MIRVing would seem to appeal to the Soviets as well. The Soviet Union, too, would rapidly find its land based ICBM systems (which constitute a larger share of its deterrent than our own) obsolete and it, too, would be faced with the need for the early deployment of enormously costly alternative systems.

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It is also important to note that the Soviets are in so many words clearly on record both in Vienna and Helsinki as favorable to a MIRV deployment and production prohibition. They have previously implied opposition to a ban on flight testing. But they have not refused to accept a test ban when divorced from on-site inspection and combined with an agreement not to stockpile or to produce MIRVs as they have asked. In short, the United States has not yet made a proposal on MIRV that, in our judgment, would meet either our or their minimum need for assurance against cheating.

This is a matter of such national consequence and such urgency that we recommend that this issue be pressed as of highest priority during the current Helsinki phase of the discussions. In our view, it would be desirable to propose, in response to the Soviets' November 13 statement on MIRV, that an interim standstill be agreed upon to stop the clock for some fixed period of time while the possibilities of a MIRV prohibition are explored by the two governments. The standstill would need to include some United States engagement with respect to our MIRV deployment in return for a commitment from the Soviet Union to stop flight testing. The standstill could take effect immediately upon Soviet assent to this procedure.

During such a standstill we would maintain a prompt capability to resume the MIRVing of our Minuteman and of our Polaris missiles in case of a Soviet resumption of testing. And, because of our several means of surveillance, we would have a very high degree of assurance of knowing of any Soviet testing and, therefore, of deployment.

If our analysis of our security position is sound and if there is little or no receptivity to the proposal for a MIRV ban, we believe that you, as President of the United States, might press on a higher level for consideration by the Soviet Union of such a proposal.

The Committee feels that American and world public opinion would respond sympathetically to a direct call upon the Soviet leadership to join with us in finding ways to include a MIRV ban before the Soviet deployment takes us past the point of no return. This would be so even if such a call were rejected.

Just as the initiatives recently taken by the President in the Middle East and in Vietnam have won wide approval as helpful contributions to world peace, so we believe, would

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a similar initiative in regard to the avoidance of the great increase in nuclear warheads which the deployment of MIRVs would almost certainly induce.

The Committee hopes that these two recommendations on the Atlantic Alliance and the SALT, designed to improve the security of the United States, will be of some assistance to you during this rapidly changing period of our foreign relations.

Respectfully,

John J. McCloy  
Chairman

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