

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12958  
NARA Date 11/12/01

MORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

see 1.2  
and Encl. 3  
August 17, 1972

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY KISSINGER  
FROM: AL HAIG  
SUBJECT: Brooke Letter

After careful consideration on how to process the letter from Senator Brooke to the President concerning first strike (Enclosure 1), it was decided to give him only an interim reply pending completion of his keynote speech at the Republican Convention this week. The legislative types felt strongly that the only kind of substantive reply we could give him would tend to irritate him and pose risks in connection with his keynoter role.

Concurrently, we have had some in-house squabbling on the substantive content of a Brook reply. Odeen and his people did a lengthy paper for you which is at Enclosure 2. Odeen and his people are obviously very concerned about the implications of first strike and, in my view, have slanted their argumentation strongly in the direction of assured destruction. In my view, we must take the middle road, but, above all, in answering Brooke, the whole issue should be fuzzed up enough to deprive him of an issue while not committing us to a strategy which thus far has not been national policy. At my request, Sonnenfeldt rewrote the draft prepared by Odeen in two formats -- one for possible signature by Secretary Laird (Enclosure 3) and the other for Presidential signature (Enclosure 4). Phil Odeen's package at Enclosure 2 refers to a Defense prepared draft to the Brooke letter. Subsequently, Defense sent us another redo which is at Enclosure 5.

In my view, the Sonnenfeldt drafts are the most satisfactory and should be the basis for our substantive reply which should be dispatched immediately after the Republican Convention. Because this reply will be made public, whether it is signed by the President or Laird and because it will influence the Senate deliberations on the Interim Agreement, it should, in my view:

- a. Disclaim a first strike strategy in a delicate way, and

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b. Be signed by Laird so that if it proves to be a point of contention we will have flexibility for further doctrine by the President in a subsequent round.

Recommendation:

That you approve my instructing the Secretary of Defense to dispatch the Sonnenfeldt at Enclosure 3.

Approve *AK* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

*With slight change*

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Authority E.O. 12958

By SS NARA Date 8-19-02

UNITED STATES SENATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

EDWARD W BROOKE  
MASSACHUSETTS

0028  
August 7, 1972

Dear Mr. President:

The New York Times has reported that there has been a major change in American missile development programs looking toward the development of technology capable of destroying hard targets. While various types of hard targets are cited, it seems clear that the rumored capability would threaten hardened missile silos. If so, such a development effort would clearly contravene the long-standing United States policy of not developing capabilities which the Soviets might construe as threatening their deterrent.

As you will recall from our past communications on this subject, I have greatly admired the restraint you have shown in emphasizing the need to make mutual deterrence more stable. Your Administration has wisely avoided provocative threats to the Soviet retaliatory forces, while guaranteeing the survivability of our own second strike capability. The stress you placed on this point in your March 14, 1969 statement remains one of the most important benchmarks in the evolution of American strategic policy. When you wrote me on December 29, 1969 stating that "there is no current United States program to develop a so-called 'hard target' MIRV capability," you underscored your fundamental position "that the purpose of our strategic program is to maintain our deterrent, not to threaten any nation with the first strike."

Secretary Laird subsequently reiterated that policy by assuring the Senate Armed Services Committee that "the President has made it perfectly clear that we do not intend to develop counter force capabilities which the Soviets could construe as having first strike potential." In line with that policy, the Armed Services Committee curtailed the ABRES program, restricting it to technology of lower yields and accuracies than required to attack Soviet missile silos. And again, in November, 1970, Secretary Laird reasserted the Government's policy: "We have not developed, and are not seeking to develop a weapon system having, or which could reasonably be construed as having, a first strike potential."

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By SA NARA Date 8-19-02

Pg: Two


The Administration's remarkably and welcome success in bringing the strategic arms limitation talks to the present stage has heightened the importance of maintaining clarity on this cardinal strategic question. We have left no doubt that if the Soviets devise a hard target MIRV capability threatening our Minuteman force we would consider that inimical to the principals of mutual deterrence incorporated in the initial SALT agreements. Similarly, should the United States seem to be qualifying its stand against perfecting hard target MIRV, -the Soviet Union might well interpret that development as an attempt to gain a disarming capability against the largest component of their strategic forces. Seeking in good faith to build mutual security on an agreed basis of strategic restraint we could hardly undertake to do what we are pressing the Soviet Union not to do.

It is evident that should the Soviet Union launch such a threatening development program, the United States would take whatever steps are necessary to insure the survivability and penetration capability of our own deterrent. There are a number of options open to us in that eventuality, but as Defense Department spokesmen have indicated, they do not require that the United States move toward counter force technology to threaten Soviet forces. Were either or both sides to move in that direction, the stability of the strategic balance would become less secure, as pressures built to compensate for new vulnerabilities by increasing force levels, or by adopting such hazardous policies as "launch on warning."

Our dedication to an exclusively second strike posture serves both our present security and the prospects for more substantial arms limitations to enhance our future security. Given the current commotion on this issue, I think it is imperative for you to restate the previous firm guidelines you had enunciated in directing the Department of Defense not to seek superfluous and provocative hard target technology. I hope and trust you will agree that we cannot afford ambiguity on so grave an issue.

With warmest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

  
Edward W. Brooke

The President  
The White House

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By SS NARA Date 8-19-02

Dear Ed:

[All Options]

In light of the concern expressed in your August 7 letter, I would like to reiterate that our strategic policy remains unchanged. It is to maintain a sufficient deterrent to nuclear war and not to threaten any nation with a first strike.

I believe these fundamental principles are embodied in the strategic arms agreements which have been submitted to the Congress and form the necessary basis for further progress in controlling strategic arms. At the same time, it is necessary that we maintain a sufficient strategic posture to protect our security in the future. I can assure you that our strategic program are directed to this end.

[Option 2]

I have asked Mel Laird to respond to some of the specific concerns reflected in your letter.

[Option 3]

An important part of this effort must be to stay in the forefront of modern technology. It was our superior technology that in large measure made the existing agreements possible. The programs for improved missile warheads are a part of that effort and are being pursued in the light of similar Soviet developments in this field.

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This is a modest development program and the President has reserved on any deployment decision which in any event will not become timely for many years. In the interim we would hope that the further negotiations on strategic arms control will find an effective way to deal with this question on a mutual basis. We are intensively studying this question in preparation for the next phase of SALT.

With warm personal regards.

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Authority E.O. 12958:  
By: ~~SS~~ NARA Date 8-19-02

OSD DRAFT

Dear Ed:

I appreciate receiving your letter of August 7, on the important subject of strategic deterrence. The passage of time and the Strategic Arms Limitation discussions have served but to reinforce my position, expressed in my letter of December 29, 1969, "that the purpose of our strategic program is to maintain our deterrence -- not to threaten any nation with a first strike."

I also noted in that letter my belief that advanced research on ballistic missiles "is essential if the U.S. is to have in hand the technology it may need to preserve strategic sufficiency in the future." It is an unfortunate fact that many important second-strike targets, though fewer in number, are as hard as, perhaps even harder than, silos because lacking the need for the silo door, they can be deeply buried. We must develop the ability to successfully attack such targets without squandering large numbers of relatively ineffective warheads upon them. In this sense, hard target technology is not superfluous and provocative, but rather a more effective use of resources.

Thus, a capability to effectively attack a limited number of hard targets by no means threatens another nation with a first strike, nor is completely consistent with my standing policy.

With warmest personal regards.

RMN

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By ~~SS~~ NARA Date 8-19-02

DRAFT

Dear Senator Brooke:

The President has asked me to respond to your letter to him of August 7 on the important subject of our strategic forces. I should like to assure you that all programs supported by the Defense Department and the Administration are consistent with the defense policies which the President and I, as Secretary of Defense, have enunciated in numerous authoritative statements.

In particular response to your letter, I would like to assure you that there will be no decisions by this Administration in regard to our strategic forces that would involve either superfluous or provocative programs and, in particular, none of a first strike character. The sole goal of the Administration is to ensure that we have a responsible and sufficient defense posture which safeguards our security in the years ahead. We are at the same time determined to make the most serious effort to build on the strategic arms limitation agreements signed in Moscow last May and now before the Congress. Our defense policies, while taking account of requirements presented by the programs of the other side, will be consistent with that effort.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Edward W. Brooke  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

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Authority E.O. 12958  
By SS NARA Date 8-19-02

DRAFT

Dear Ed:

I appreciated receiving your letter of August 7 on the important subject of our strategic forces. You may be certain that all programs supported by the Administration are consistent with the defense policies which we have enunciated in numerous authoritative statements. In response to your letter, I would like to assure you that there will be no decisions in regard to our strategic forces that involve either superfluous or provocative programs and, in particular, none of a first strike character. My sole goal is to ensure that we have a responsible and sufficient defense posture which safeguards our security in the years ahead. We will at the same time make the most serious effort to build on the achievements of the strategic arms limitation agreements signed in Moscow last May and our defense policies, while taking account of requirements presented by the programs of the other side, will be consistent with that effort.

Sincerely,

RMN

The Honorable Edward W. Brooke  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

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Authority E.O. 12958

By: ~~SS~~ NARA Date 8-19-02

Dear Ed:

In light of the concern expressed in your August 7 letter, I would like to reiterate that our strategic policy remains unchanged. It is to maintain a sufficient deterrent to nuclear war and not to threaten any nation with a first strike.

I believe these fundamental principles are embodied in the strategic arms agreements which have been submitted to the Congress and form the necessary basis for further progress in controlling strategic arms. At the same time, it is necessary that we maintain a sufficient strategic posture to protect our security in the future. I can assure you that our strategic programs are directed to this end.

An important part of this effort must be to stay in the forefront of modern technology. It was our superior technology that in large measure made the existing agreements possible. It should be recognized that in a second-strike situation, there would be a potentially significant number of hard targets other than missile silos, which would require improved reentry vehicles for effective targeting. I believe prudence dictates that we continue to explore such technology.

The programs for improved missile warheads are a part of that effort for superior technology, and are modest programs for development only. I have reserved judgment on any deployment decision but would point out that, even if taken, such deployments would not give us a first strike capability. Our future decisions in this regard will depend on the changing world situation, including, of course, progress in our continuing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Our objective remains to assure a continuing credible

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... and not to acquire a first-strike capability.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Richard M. Nixon

Richard W. Brooke  
United States Senate

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By: EO 12958  
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August 15, 1972

Dear Senator:

I would like to apologize for the delay in response to your letter of August 7 to the President in which you expressed concern over reports regarding a major change in U.S. missile development programs associated with developing technology for destroying hard targets.

Your views will be brought to the President's attention at the earliest opportunity and you may expect to hear further in this regard.

Sincerely,

Tom C. Korologos  
Deputy Assistant  
to the President

Honorable Edward W. Brooke  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

✓cc: w/inc to Dr. Kissinger  
bcc: Gerald Warren - FYI

TCK:RMCF:jk

AUG 17 1972

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Ref ID: A6012955  
NARA Date 11/12/04

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

URGENT ACTION

August 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Phil Odeen *PO*

SUBJECT: Senator Brooke Letter on First Strike Policy

*Phil: per memo  
discuss with  
Have copy of  
It was approved  
I'm sending over to  
find for him to  
shepherds  
Kissinger  
PO*

Senator Brooke has written the President asking him to reiterate that it is not U.S. policy to seek hard target kill capabilities (Tab A). The request was prompted by news reports that we have changed our strategy and are developing hard target counterforce capabilities.

These stories have created a considerable stir. We understand Brooke plans to amend the Jackson SALT reservation to put the Congress on record against either side developing counterforce capabilities. The prospect is for a Senate debate, a possible delay on the interim agreements (and hence the ABM Treaty) and the possibility that this could become an issue in the campaign.

The origin of the furor was Laird's preemptory move, after the SALT Agreements were signed, in requesting \$20M additional funding for improved RVs for MM III and Poseidon. (This was done without asking clearance or even informing the White House.) Basically these funds are to be used to "weaponise" 300-500 KT warheads for MM III and 100 KT warheads for Poseidon. (They are now respectively 170 KT and 40 KT.) AEC has already done the necessary development work on the nuclear device.

There are three issues:

-- Substantively, do we need or want this capability and if so, how far do we want to press to get it?

-- How will this affect our relationship with the Soviets, SALT II, etc.?

-- How should we handle the Brooke letter and the likely Congressional debate.

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Previous U.S. Policy Statements

The Administration is on the public record with several statements on this issue (a more comprehensive record is attached at Tab D).

-- In a letter to Senator Brooke, 29 December 1969, the President stated, "There is no current program to develop a so-called hard target MIRV capability."

-- In a letter to Senator Brooke, 5 November 1970, Laird stated, "We have not developed and are not seeking to develop a weapon system having, or which could reasonably be construed as having a first strike potential."

-- A DOD "position paper," read by Senator Stennis on the floor of the Senate, 5 October 1971 concerning a Buckley amendment to the defense appropriation bill which would have provided more money for improving MM III and Poseidon warheads "in connection with providing counterforce capabilities." It said: "The Defense Department cannot support the proposed amendments. It is the position of the United States to not develop a weapons system whose deployment could be reasonably construed by the Soviets as having a first-strike capability. Such a deployment might provide an incentive for the Soviets to strike first."

Current Public Affairs Line

White House press spokesmen have dodged questions based on the press stories. However, Jerry Freidheim yesterday spent his entire press briefing on this issue. His basic line was:

-- We are accelerating R&D on improved accuracies and yield-to-weight ratios for our ICBMs and SLBMs in order to maintain our technological superiority in these fields.

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-- We have not decided to deploy these systems. We are several years away from a deployment decision, but the program would give us the option in the future to deploy a hard target kill capability.

-- Our strategy has not changed and we are not planning a first strike force in any sense.

-- This insures a strong position for SALT II and a hedge against failure of follow-on SALT.

-- We may need this capability to deal with the enemy's hardened command and control facilities and nuclear storage sites.

#### The Reasons for New Warhead

Despite the variety of reasons given, the main purpose of the program is to develop a silo kill capability. The JCS want hard target forces for warfighting purposes -- to fulfill the SIOP which gives first priority under all circumstances to attacking Soviet missile silos. In OSD the argument is that Soviet development of a severe threat to Minuteman is likely and we should have the same capability so as to not be in an asymmetrical position that could have adverse political and psychological consequences.

We have never gotten a detailed explanation of DOD proposed program, but basically it will:

-- increase MM III yields from 170 KT to 450-500 KT.

-- provide for accuracy improvements, through hardware and software improvements, from the present CEP of .16 nautical mile to .075 nautical mile (450 feet).

If these improvements are made on the entire Minuteman force the effect on the 1600 ICBM Soviet force (assuming very hard silos) will be:

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USSR Silos Surviving

1000 MM III, <u>with high accuracy</u> (0.75 n. mi. CEP) and <u>current</u> 3-170 KT <u>warheads</u>	115
1000 MM III, <u>with high accuracy</u> (0.075 n. mi. CEP) and the <u>new</u> 3-500 KT <u>warheads</u>	35

Without such capabilities today we can destroy more than 50 percent of the Soviet ICBM force and with currently programmed improvements almost 70 percent of the Soviet ICBM force in 1975.

As you know I have serious doubts about the value of this program to increase the yield of our RVs. I don't see what real value we get beyond that of our current programs to increase accuracy and numbers of RVs. A brief summary of the considerations - for and against - are at Tab E.

In addition there is the need for consideration of the impact on the Soviets; how it may affect their programs (particularly their counterforce programs), how it will impact on SALT (whether it will serve as a bargaining chip if there is no practical way to control counterforce) and how it will affect the fragile new relationship of mutual restraint we are seeking to hold with the USSR.

Our Options

At this stage, our immediate problem is how to respond to Senator Brooke in a way that will protect the President, minimize debate, and avoid repudiating either the President's earlier position or Laird's program. We have three alternatives:

1. The President can send a bland reply to Senator Brooke reaffirming that our strategy is unchanged.
2. In addition the President can say that he has asked Laird to reply more fully.
3. We can ask Laird to reply on behalf of the President.

Draft texts reflecting these three approaches are attached at Tab B.

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If Laird is to play a role, we should make sure that he emphasizes that our strategy is unchanged and that his reply on the warhead program is not argumentative so as to avoid stimulating further debate. We also have a draft reply for the President prepared by OSD (Tab C). It appears inappropriate for either the President or Laird.

Next Steps

Prepare memorandum to the President recommending:

- Option 1 \_\_\_\_\_
- Option 2 \_\_\_\_\_
- Option 3 \_\_\_\_\_
- Other \_\_\_\_\_

*ab*  
Sonnenfeldt and Lehman concur.

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Statements Made by U.S. Officials  
Concerning Development of U.S. Counterforce  
("Hard target kill") Capabilities

(in chronological order)

- 1. "Memorandum for the Secretary of the Air Force; SUBJECT: Hard Target Policy" David Packard; 19 December, 1969.

The Air Force has been considering development of a new RV, the MK 19, with higher yield than the MK 12, to provide a hard target kill capability for Minuteman III.

I feel this is not the time to initiate such development. My concern stems primarily from SALT considerations. I do not wish to take any steps, or appear to take any steps, which might undermine or jeopardize these talks. Additionally, the SALT results may have a major impact on our counterforce plans.

For these reasons please postpone any further serious consideration of any such weapons, or hard target capability, for US ICMB's until after the outcome of SALT has clarified. (SECRET)

- 2. In testimony before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, released by Air Force Chief of Staff General Ryan on October 7, 1969, it was stated that the US had a program which "we are pushing to increase the yield of our warheads and decrease the circular error probable so that we have what we call a hard target killer which we do not have in the inventory at the present time." This statement caused Senator Javits and Senator Brooke to write letters inquiring about US policy in this area. The responses were as follows:

--President Nixon in a letter to Senator Brooke, 29 December, 1969.

Your thoughtful letter of Dec 5 prompts me to reiterate my fundamental position that the purpose of our strategic program is to maintain our deterrent not to threaten any nation with a first strike. Having said that let me go on to some specifics:

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 12/31/82

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"There is no current US program to develop a so-called "hard target" MIRV capability. The particular program to which General Ryan referred did not receive DOD approval for funding in a forthcoming defense budget.

"The US does carry on certain programs of advanced research on many aspects of ballistic missile design. The highest priority of these programs is assuring that US missiles will be able to penetrate defenses. However, it is a straightforward fact about technology that some of the methods which are required for penetration might also be applied to increase accuracy and yield.

"I do not believe that this fact makes such research unnecessary. On the contrary I believe it is essential if the US is to have in hand the technology it may need to preserve strategic sufficiency in the future. Nor do I believe that such research is significantly provocative. The technological possibilities in the future, not any specific program are what may contribute to uncertainty on both sides.

"It is my very strong hope that we will be able ---- by agreement with the Soviets if possible and by the prudent calculation of our own programs in any event ---- to continue to assure both strategic sufficiency and strategic stability in the future." (Unclassified.)

-- Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamons, Jr., in a  
10 letter to Senator Javits 8 January 1970.

"The program General Ryan referred to in his statement consists of: (1) a proposal for a more accurate and higher yield reentry vehicle, and (2) normal evolutionary improvements in accuracy and reliability. ....These efforts have no direct funding..consideration of the proposed reentry vehicle is but part of our development planning process, in which many possible solutions to existing and potential needs are postulated and examined for feasibility cost and appropriateness. Thus, the program described by General Ryan is not a reflection

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of intent to achieve a first strike capability; and there is no Air Force program in being or contemplated directed toward a first strike capability." (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. In a speech to the Air Force Association on September 22, 1970, General Ryan stated that qualitative improvements in Minuteman III will make "This missile...will be our best means of destroying time-urgent hard targets like the long-range weapons of the enemy." This statement prompted Senator Brooke to ask Secretary Laird whether there had been any changes in US counterforce policy. Laird responded in a letter dated 5 November 1970:

"We have not developed, and are not seeking to develop a weapon system having, or which could reasonably be construed as having, a first-strike potential.

"I believe that General Ryan's comment (October 7, 1969) was made in the context of limiting damage to the United States by second-strike employment.... You should know that even used in the context described by General Ryan, the capability of Minuteman III against hardened silos is relatively low."

4. On October 5, 1971, the Senate debated two amendments to the Military Procurement Bill proposed by Senator Buckley of New York. The amendments would have provided R & D funds to improve the warheads of Minuteman III and Poseidon "in connection with providing counterforce capabilities."

Senator Stennis of Mississippi opposed the amendments on the grounds that the Defense Department opposed them. He quoted the DOD position paper on the amendments:

"The Defense Department cannot support the proposed amendments. It is the position of the United States to not develop a weapon system whose deployment could reasonably be construed by the Soviets as having a first strike capability. Such a deployment might provide an incentive for the Soviets to strike first."

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Senator Stennis went on to comment:

"That first strike capability essentially means the same as the word 'counterforce'. The word 'counterforce' is in the amendment....

"It is not often that the Department of Defense comes out against an amendment that would put more money in a bill .... They say that it is the position of the United States -- that means the position of the United States through its Chief Executive."

Congressional Record, October 5, 1971, p. S15891

5. The Secretary of Defense included the following requirement in his "Policy and Planning Guidance" for FY 72: "We should not plan strategic offensive forces for the purpose of limiting damage to the United States in the event of a large nuclear attack. This does not preclude damage limiting war-fighting plans, but no forces are to be procured specifically for this." (TOP SECRET)

6. Admiral Moorer's FY 73 Posture Statement prepared 8 February 1972 stated:

-- "Our ICBMs have only a very modest hard-target kill capability, and this is an important point to bear in mind. The Titan II has a large warhead but lacks accuracy. Our Minuteman missiles have better but carry relatively small warheads. As I noted last year, the development of a hard-target version of the Minuteman III with a CEP of 0.25 n.m. and a single 1.5 MT warhead was terminated shortly after it was started in the mid 1960's". pp 13 (TOP SECRET)

-- "None of our current SLBMs are designed to be launched on a depressed trajectory. Neither are they planned for attack against hard targets." pp 39 (TOP SECRET)

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7. The President's February 9, 1972, report to the Congress, US Foreign Policy for the 1970's, states on page 160:

'We have not provided our missiles with the combined numbers, accuracy, and warhead yield necessary to threaten Soviet forces with a disarming strike. The Soviets have the technical capability to develop similarly sophisticated systems but with greater warhead yields and consequently greater capability for a disarming strike.

'We are approaching a crucial turning point in our strategic arms programs. If the Soviet Union continues to expand strategic forces, compensating US programs will be mandatory. The preferable alternative would be a combination of mutual restraint and an agreement in SALT.'

(UNCLASSIFIED)

8. In his press conference following the signing of the SALT I agreements, June 15, 1972, Dr. Kissinger said that: 'Technological advance -- opens more and more temptations for seeking decisive advantage. At premium is put on striking first ---Potentially decisive additions are extremely dangerous and the quest for them is destabilizing.'

9. In a speech delivered in June 1972 and reported in Space Business Daily June 26, 1972, p. 24, Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, Jr., noted that:

'We must make the best use of technology to maintain and continually modernize our strategic deterrent forces. But in so doing, we must also consider such factors as the effect of a new program on the prospects for arms control agreements or on the force decisions of other countries. The ideal weapon is one that promises a sure capability to retaliate but does not have the characteristics that would seem to threaten a surprise first strike against another nation's forces...' (UNCLASSIFIED)

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Basic Issues in Acquiring More U.S. Hard Target Counterforce

The strategic arguments against acquiring greater capabilities have been threefold:

-- First, a well hedged urban industrial capability provides sufficient forces for most hard targets (e.g., C-3 facilities and weapons storage facilities) as well as a considerable capability against silos.

-- Second, there seemed to be little advantage to a silo attack; we could not significantly limit damage to the U.S. should the Soviets retaliate against our cities (they will have a major SLBM force by 1975).

-- Third, causing the Soviet ICBM force to be extremely vulnerable could undermine stability in a severe crisis.

Other Factors

There are several other factors that need to be considered in weighing the requirement for the Laird program.

-- Our need for a capability to destroy hardened military facilities such as command and control installations and nuclear storage depots. In situations other than an all out response it would be desirable not to strike command and control facilities so that we do not provide automatic pre-programmed responses. It would be essential that the Soviet Government maintains positive control over their forces if there is to be a chance of deterring escalation to an all out exchange. As for attacks on nuclear storage this is an important but not a critical target system.

-- Is there a need for hard target capability to have adequate flexible response options? While there are hard targets that we may want to include in limited strike options, we understand that the OSD targeting study casts considerable doubt on the viability of an attack on Soviet ICBMs as "limited" strike option. It does not support a requirement for major hard target capabilities, and as Johnny Foster said in his briefing the real need is for better command and control. Under the new policy concept, the counterforce task has the lowest priority in retaliation on the sensible ground that we would be largely shooting at empty holes. In preemption the concept is to try to avoid escalation and not put either side in a "use or lose" position with respect to their forces. A limited attack on a portion of Soviet ICBM silos which demonstrated a clear U.S. hard target capability would create such a situation. A full scale attack on Soviet silos (even if it left only 35 survivors) would be a major attack (2000 + weapons) and would probably invite a Soviet retaliation. Even if we could reduce their surviving ICBMs a handful, the surviving Soviet SLBMs and Bombers could inflict unacceptable damage to U.S. cities and industry as well as provide options to attack a wide variety of other U.S. military targets.

-- There is a large measure of inevitability in the acquisition of counterforce capabilities on both sides particularly as a result of marginal accuracy improvements on our side and large throw weight on their side. Thus all that SALT can do is postpone the day that ICBMs become marginally survivable or phase them out on a reciprocal basis.

-- Does an improved hard target capability provide a hedge against Soviet counterforce capabilities? This frankly makes no sense militarily. Survivability is the response to counterforce, not more counterforce.

#### Impact on the Soviets

An important part of the problem is the Soviet reaction to this program. They are undoubtedly aware that counterforce technology is within our grasp and that accuracy improvements alone will lead to increasing Soviet vulnerability.

We need to consider three questions:

1. Will it spur their counterforce capability? It may not, but it certainly won't encourage restraint.
2. Is it a bargaining chip? Will it cause them to negotiate more seriously in SALT? The Soviets respond better to the stick than the carrot; they are likely to have greater incentive to negotiate limits on counterforce if they perceive a growing counterforce threat on our side. However, they already will have substantial incentives to try to limit or mitigate the possibility of ICBM vulnerability. The problem is that there may not be any negotiable, verifiable and acceptable qualitative arms control measures to limit counterforce capabilities.
3. Most importantly, how will this program affect the fragile new relationship of mutual restraint we are seeking to build upon? If it raises questions about our intentions it could undermine this relationship. On the other hand, if the Soviets build such a capability they can hardly expect us to refrain out of concern for their sensitivities.

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