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	SUBJECT:	EYES ONLY -	APPLICATION OF	ENHANCED MEAS	IRES TO ARI	AL-RAHI	M AT - NA	SHIRI	
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*	SUBJECT:	EYES ONLY	- APPLICATION O	F ENHANCED MEA	SURES TO 'A	BD			
		AL-NASHIRI	,						
			(b)(1)		•				
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			-(b)(3) NatSecA	iCt		÷,		•	
ė	TEXT:			· .				•	
		₹.							
	1.	ACTION REQUI	RED: PLS SEE B	ELOW FOR APPRO	VAL FOR		(b)(1)		
	APPLICAT	ION OF ENHAN	CED MEASURES TO	'ABD AL-RAHIM	AL-NASHIRI		(b)(3) C	CIAAct	
	SEPARATE CABLE WILL FOLLOW REGARDING TIMING OF SUBJECT'S ARRIVAL (b)(3) NatSe								t
	AT			•		·		• .	
		· · · ·	- z = 1		•		•	-	
	2.	BASED UPON P	SYCHOLOGICAL EV	ALUATION AND H	QS ASSESSMEI	NT		•	
	THAT 'AB	D AL-RAHIM A	L-((NASHIRI)) À	KA ((MULLAH BI	LLAL)) HAS	ACCESS			
	TO PERIS	HABLE THREAT	INFORMATION THE	AT HE WILL NOT	WILLINGLY S	SHARE,			•

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THIS CABLE CONSTITUTES APPROVALS FOR ENHANCED INTERROGATION

MEASURES TO BE EMPLOYED AGAINST NASHIRI AS OUTLINED BELOW. THIS CABLE WAS COORDINATED WITH	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
3. BACKGROUND ON NASHIRI: ABD AL-RAHIM AL-NASHIRI, A SAUDI NATIONAL, LONGTIME MAJOR AL-QA'IDA PERSONALITY AND TERRORIST OPERATIONS PLANNER WAS INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN PLANNING BOTH THE USS COLE AND EAST AFRICA US EMBASSY BOMBINGS. HE ALSO WAS INVOLVED IN SEVERAL OTHER THWARTED ATTACKS, INCLUDING A 1998 PLOT TO SMUGGLE SAGGER MISSILES INTO SAUDI ARABIA FROM YEMEN FOR USE IN AN OPERATION AGAINST US MILITARY INTERESTS. HE RECRUITED HIS OWN COUSIN "JIHAD" TO BE THE SUICIDE DRIVER FOR THE US EMBASSY BOMBING	
IN TANZANIA. MOST RECENTLY NASHIRI HAS BEEN NAMED BY SEVERAL AL-QA'IDA DETAINEES AS THE OPERATIVE RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING ATTACKS ON US SHIPS AND OIL TANKERS IN THE GULF AND ELSEWHERE. HE IS IN DIRECT CONTACT AND COORDINATING PLANS WITH KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMED AND KHALLAD BIN 'ATTASH. 4. PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF NASHIRI: DURING THE RENDITION SUBJECT WAS ALERT AND APPEARED ORIENTED TO THE SITUATION. NO EVIDENCE OF PSYCHOSIS OR SEVERE MENTAL DISORDER WAS OBSERVED. HE WAS TEARFUL AND	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
DISTRESSED, BUT NOT IN EXCESS TO THE SITUATION. HE WAS ABLE TO UNDERSTAND COMPLEX NONVERBAL COMMANDS. DURING THE FLIGHT TO THE SUBJECT SLEPT OR REMAINED QUIET APPROXIMATELY HOURS. HE MADE ONE REQUEST IN ENGLISH FOR WATER IMMEDIATELY UPON ENTERING THE AIRCRAFT, AND DID NOT SPEAK AGAIN. HE DISPLAYED NO EMOTIONS DURING THE FLIGHT. DURING THE SHORT NOVEMBER 2002,	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
INTERVIEW, CONDUCTED TO COMPLETE THE MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATION AND ASSESS RESISTANCE POSTURE, THE SUBJECT WAS ALERT AND ORIENTED TO THE SITUATION. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF PSYCHOSIS OR SEVERE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY. SUBJECT APPEARED ARROGANT. HIS BEHAVIOR SEEMED	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
COMPOSED, ORGANIZED AND GOAL DIRECTED, IN THE SENSE THAT HE RESPONDED TO QUESTIONS WITH QUESTIONS, MADE DEMANDS AND WAS IN CONTROL OF HIS	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
EMOTIONS. WHAT LITTLE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS HE DISPLAYED APPEARED FEIGNED AND CONTRIVED TO DELAY OR DIVERT THE INTERVIEW. THESE OBSERVATIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT THAT THE SUBJECT, THOUGH DISTRESSED ABOUT HIS CAPTURE, DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE SEVERE MENTAL PROBLEMS. THEY WERE INCONSISTENT WITH SUGGESTION THAT HE MIGHT BREAK AND WAS READY TO TALK. BASED ON THE ABOVE OBSERVATIONS IT IS THE OPINION OF HVTI PSYCHOLOGIST THAT	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT IS UNLIKELY TO SUFFER FROM A SEVERE MENTAL DISORDER AND IS NO	(b)(3) CIAAct
MORE AT RISK FOR SEVERE OR PROLONGED MENTAL HARM FROM ENHANCED INTERROGATION METHODS THAN ANY OTHER CAPTIVE IN A SIMILAR SITUATION.	

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3) CIA		
3) N al	tSecAct	(b)(1)
		(b)(3) NatSecAct
<u>,</u> .	DURING THE SHORT NOVEMBER 2002, INTERVIEW, CONDUCTED	(6)(6) (14(6)6) (6
)) () () ()	Δ_{ct}^{AT} (b)(3) CIAAct	
B) CIA	BY HVIT PSYCHOLOGISTS AND TRANSLATOR	
) Nat	SecAct The subject's resistance posture was characterized by an	
•	ORGANIZED AND CONCERTED EFFORT TO STALL, DELAY, AND DISRUPT THE	
	INTERVIEW. AS NOTED ABOVE, HE ANSWERED QUESTIONS WITH QUESTIONS,	
	MADE DEMANDS, AND FEIGNED AN INABILITY TO COMPREHEND BASED ON HIS	(b)(1)
	PHYSICAL CONDITION. HIS COMPOSURE MADE HIM APPEAR UNCONCERNED	(b)(3) CIAAct
	ABOUT	(b)(3) NatSecAc
	THE SITUATION HE WAS IN. ONE POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE SLEEP HE	, , ,
	OBTAINED ON THE PLANE RIDE TO HELPED HIM RECONSTITUTE.	
	THE	(b)(1)
	INTERVIEW WAS KEPT SHORT, SO THAT HE COULD NOT GET COMFORTABLE	(b)(1)
	WITH	(b)(3) CIAAct
	THE INTERROGATORS AND SO AS NOT TO REINFORCE HIS USE OF RESISTANCE	(b)(3) NatSecA
	TECHNIQUES IN A SETTING WHERE OUR RESPONSES WERE LIMITED. WE	
	RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING INITIAL INTERROGATION PLAN:	
	·	
	(b)(1)	
	(b)(3) CIAAct	
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	
	(b)(5)	,
	(-)(-)	
		,
,		
	8. APPROVAL FOR ENHANCED MEASURES: APPROVAL IS THEREFORE	•
	GRANTED TO IMMEDIATELY EMPLOY ENHANCED MEASURES AS NECESSARY TO	
	EXTRACT THIS INFORMATION. BASE HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL TWO OF THE	
	MOST QUALIFIED AND EXPERIENCED TRAINED HVTI PSYCHOLOGISTS WHO HAVE	
	SUCCESSFULLY USED THESE MEASURES AGAINST ABU ZUBAYDAH. BASE ALSO	
	HAS THE REQUISITE MEDICAL PERSONNEL ON HAND TO MONITOR THE	
	PHYSICAL RESPONSES AND TO INTERVENE AS NECESSARY SHOULD ANY	
	EMERGENCIES ARISE.	
	nincontello intello.	
	(b)(1)	•

-,		.*		
	•		(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	·

END OF MESSAGE

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