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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

SECRET/NODIS

December 4, 1975

TO: The Acting Secretary

FROM: S/P - Winston Lord From EA - Robert H. Miller, Acting

Your Meetings with the French and Canadian Ambassadors on Korean Reprocessing

As you know, the Secretary has approved strengthening US opposition to a ROK nuclear reprocessing facility through an approach to the Korean Prime Minister, followed by an approach to President Park if the initial approach fails (Tab 4). Our telegram instructing Ambassador Sneider to implement his approach in Seoul is attached at Tab 3.

The Secretary also approved complementary approaches to Canada and France, in which we would:

- -- "ask Canada to undertake a complementary approach to the ROKG; and
- "inform France of our renewed efforts, formally advise them of our firm conclusion that the ROKG has embarked on a covert program to develop a nuclear weapon, and note the importance to our efforts of their continuing to refrain from early implementation of the contract, pending resolution of the issue."

SECRET/NODIS XGDS-3

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We are attaching talking points to this effect at Tab 1 (Canada) and at Tab 2 (France) for your use when you call in Ambassador Marcel Cadieux and Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet. We draw your attention to the two OES footnotes in the talking points, and to the bureau views regarding these footnotes at Tab 5.

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Talking Points for Canadian Ambassador

Tab 2 - Talking Points for French Ambassador

Tab 4 - Memorandum to the Secretary attached to injured

Tab 5 - Discussion of OES Footnotes

Drafted: S/P:JHKallcki:gMcP


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PM - Mr. Oplinger Concurrence:

OES - Mr. Bengelsdorf

C - Mr. Kelly EUR - Mr. Swartz

& per Jk INR - Mr. Locke (Intelligence only)



Talking Points for Canadian Ambassador

- -- As you will recall from our previous consultations in London and Washington on this subject, we have engaged in vigorous efforts to prevent Korean acquisition of a pilot reprocessing plant from France. We wish to bring you up to date on our efforts in this area and to solicit your support in the next stage of representations to the ROK.
- -- The facility in question has the capability of producing enough weapons grade plutonium for at least several nuclear bombs per year, in the event the ROK abrogated its NPT and other safeguard obligations.
- -- We have concluded that a secret program to develop a future nuclear weapons capability is now underway in the ROK.* We are convinced that, apart from any economic motives, a major factor in South Korea's desire for a reprocessing facility is its utility in that program. Because of this assessment, we formally asked the ROK in August to cancel its French reprocessing contract, but without disclosing the nature of our concerns regarding its nuclear weapons intentions.

^{*} OES recommends that you add the following sentences to this statement: "We believe that this may represent an effort either to fabricate a nuclear device as soon as possible or to achieve a contingent capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice at a later stage. Either scenario, however, would be prejudicial to our interests." OES would be amenable to deleting the word "may" if this would facilitate acceptance of this point. The other interested bureaus do not support this addition. Brief explanations are attached at Tab 5.

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- -- The Acting Foreign Minister recently rejected this request, offering to accept supplementary US inspection of the facility instead. We are not now prepared to accept this counter-offer and Secretary Kissinger has instructed that we renew our strong request for cancellation to the Prime Minister and if necessary President Park. In so doing, we will specifically warn the ROKG that going ahead with the reprocessing deal will result in withdrawal of the Ex-Im request to Congress for \$249 million in credits for the Kori-2 nuclear reactor. Lest the Koreans be laboring under any misapprehensions, we will also confirm our intention not to authorize any national ROK reprocessing of US-derived nuclear fuel and inform the Koreans that going ahead with their deal could seriously affect our future governmental nuclear cooperation.
- -- The French have recently reconfirmed to us that they would not hasten the pace of their dealings with the Koreans and would not object to Korean cancellation of the contract. We intend to advise them of our assessment of Korean nuclear weapons intentions and to keep them generally informed of US efforts to obtain Korean cancellation.
- -- We would greatly welcome any actions that your Government could take to complement our approach to the ROK. We recall that earlier this year you and we achieved veto

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rights over reprocessing spent fuel derived from nuclear reactors supplied by us. However, the ROK is discussing with the French acquisition of nuclear reactors which could in time effectively evade these particular constraints on its ability to reprocess. This strengthens our interest in obtaining cancellation of the deal.

- -- In particular, we would appreciate urgent Canadian consideration of a parallel request that the ROK cancel its reprocessing contract. We would also welcome your consideration of leverage Canada might effectively bring to bear in the nuclear area, for example with regard to nuclear reactor sales or credits and an explicit denial of national ROK reprocessing of Canadian fuel.
- -- We are instructing Ambassador Sneider to make his approach to the Korean Prime Minister at the earliest opportunity, so as to leave the ROK under no illusion that we are acquiescing in the reprocessing plant. Therefore, if your government is (as we hope) prepared to make a parallel approach to the ROK, it may be best for both of our Ambassadors to consult directly on their approaches in Seoul. Naturally, we would look forward to keeping in touch in Washington as our respective approaches develop.

 (FYI: Since the matter is of growing urgency, we would greatly prefer not to delay Ambassador Sneider's approach.)

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If you are asked about the effect of the French/
Pakistan reprocessing transaction on our Korean approach:

-- While we are concerned about prospective Pakistani acquisition of a national reprocessing capability, we believe that both our information on Korea's covert nuclear program and the security implications of nuclear proliferation in Korea warrant continued, strong efforts to obtain cancellation of the French/Korean transaction.

TAB 2

Talking Points for French Ambassador

- -- We have had very useful consultations on Korea's desire to acquire a pilot reprocessing plant from France, both in London and in our respective capitals. Your Government knows of our concerns about the potentially destabilizing implications of such a facility in the Korean peninsula. We for our part know of and welcome France's readiness to accept Korean cancellation of the reprocessing contract, as well as your authorities' recent assurance that you would not hasten the pace of your dealings with Korea.
- -- We wish to bring you up to date on our efforts to obtain Korean cancellation and to solicit your understanding of the next stage of our representations to the ROK. As you probably know, the ROK Acting Foreign Minister recently declined to cancel this transaction. Secretary Kissinger has therefore authorized us to pursue our strong request for cancellation at higher levels of the Korean Government.
- -- We have concluded that a secret program to develop a future nuclear weapons capability is now underway in the ROK.*

^{*} OES recommends that you add the following sentences to this statement: "We believe that this may represent an effort either to fabricate a nuclear device as soon as possible or to achieve a contingent capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice at a later stage. Either scenario, however, would be prejudicial to our interests." OES would be amenable to deleting the word "may" if this would facilitate acceptance of this point. The other interested bureaus do not support this addition. Brief explanations are attached at Tab 5.

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
We are convinced that, apart from any economic motives, a major factor in South Korea's desire for a reprocessing facility is its utility for a nuclear weapons program.

- -- In light of this assessment, I trust you recognize the unusual context for our deciding to maintain our strong opposition to a national reprocessing plant in Korea. We are seriously concerned about the political and security implications of such a plutonium-producing facility, even under international safeguards, in a highly volatile area of the world where the US is deeply committed.
- -- We will keep you informed on this issue. I would appreciate your carefully protecting this information in reporting it back to your Government.
- -- Finally, we hope that it is clearly understood in Paris that our difficulties are uniquely associated with the transfer of weapons-usable nuclear technology to Korea, and in no way with the transfer of nuclear reactors and fuel.

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If you are asked whether the US is asking France to take the initiative to cancel the sale:

-- The purpose of our approach to you is to keep you informed of what we are doing and of the reasons for our deep concern. The United States feels that in light of our assessment of Korean nuclear intentions it is obliged to urge the Koreans to cancel the reprocessing plant. We would of course welcome it if France would, in its own interests, come to a similar judgment with regard to this matter.



Discussion of OES Footnotes

OES believes the addition recommended in its footnotes to the talking points is essential to avoid creating the false impression, otherwise likely to be created by the proposed talking points, that the US has absolutely firm knowledge that the ROK is intent on acquiring a weapon as soon as possible. OES believes that it would be exceedingly unwise to convey a more definitive impression to a foreign government, even for understandable tactical reasons, when we have not so advised the Congress or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in conjunction with recent exports to the ROK. The proposed addition conforms more closely to the fully cleared guidance we have given NRC. Without the suggested qualification, however, OES believes that if they were exposed to the proposed talking points, both Congress and the NRC would favor a complete and immediate suspension of all US-ROK nuclear cooperation.

S/P, EA, PM and EUR do not support this addition. They believe that the present formulation accurately reflects our certainty that the ROKG is seeking the reprocessing plant as part of a program to develop a future nuclear weapons capability. They maintain that the question of when South Korea would activate a nuclear weapons capability is not relevant in the present context, and has not been a consideration in USG efforts to terminate the ROK/French deal and thereby deter acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. These bureaus are concerned that the OES addition could be misconstrued as indicating uncertainty regarding a firm conclusion on which the US has based its own efforts, and that it thus could seriously detract from the effectiveness of our approaches to Canada and France. They feel that the difference between our approach to the French and the guidance given NRC is warranted, given the different policy issues involved. They emphasize that we already indicated to the Secretary that under his approved approach we would formally advise France "of our firm conclusion that the ROKG has embarked on a covert program to develop a nuclear weapon," while advising him of OES's exception to their views on the nature of our intelligence (Tab 4, pages 3 and 6). INR believes that either the S/P or OES statement would be accurate from an intelligence standpoint.



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