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	INR IMR		MATIONAL INTENTIONS IN MUCIEAR SIELD AND PELATED PROBLEMS	_
			TAGIONAL TRIENTIONS IN ROCLEAR FILED AND RELATED TROSECTION	
			EXCHANGE TOOK FORM OF BRITISH COMMENTS ON BASIC POINTS CONTAINED IN EMBTEL 6 AS AMENDED BY DEPTEL 29. FOLLOWING	_
			POINTS WERE PRESENTED AS BASIS OF DISCUSSION:	
			1. GERMAN INTERESTS IN NUCLEAR FIELD CAN BE CONSTRUCTIVELY	30
			CHANNELED SO LONG AS FEDREP CONSIDERS ITS LEGITIMATE SECU-	
			RITY REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING BERLIN, ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARDED	,
7		1	BY EXISTING TREATY COMMITMENTS, PARTICULARLY NATO, BACKED BY EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENT.	1
1		1		_
1		17	2. PROLIFERATION NUCLEAR CAPABILITY BEYOND PRESENT "CLUB" COULD CHANGE GERMAN ATTITUDE. IN ABSENCE PROGRESS PRE-	I
. 77	4	M.	VENTING FURTHER DISSEMINATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WE MUST	-
9		. Da	RECKON WITH GERMAN INTEREST IN ACHIEVING EQUAL STATUS WITH THE CONTROL OF THE CON	
7	RLI/R		OTHER MAJOR POWERS, PROBABLY MORE ON PRESTIGE GROUNDS THE CONSIDERATIONS STRATEGIC NECESSITY. IF US WERE TO CHANGE TO	/
9	in 17	d	POLICY TO PROVIDE NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE TO FRANCE, FOR EX-	. 1
(s)	å H	S	AMPLE, THIS WOULD IN TIME PROMOTE PRESSURES WITHIN FEDREP	١
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
ALONE OR WITH FRENCH, BUT CAUTION REQUIRES US ASSUME THAT LATENT INTENTION EXISTS IN SENSE THAT ANY RESPONSIBLE GERMAN LEADER MUST KEEP POSSIBILITY IN BACK OF MIND AS POSSIBLE ANSWER TO FUTURE CONTINGENCIES FOR WHICH NO CONCRETE ANTICIPATION NOW REQUIRED.

4. SO FAR AS ORGANIZING WESTERN NUCLEAR COLLABORATION IS CONCERNED, FÉDREP WILL CONTINUE PRESS ITS INTERESTS ONLY IN SENSE OF ENSURING NATO ARRANGEMENTS ARE ADEQUATE TO ENSURE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CASE CONFLICT. HOWEVER, IF MULTILATERAL SOLUTION NOT DEVISED WHICH WILL PERMIT GERMANY PARTICIPATE ON BASIS EQUALITY WITH OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, FEDREP MAY BE INCREASINGLY ATTRACTED TO OTHER APPROACHES, INCLUDING NATIONAL PROGRAM OR FRANCO-GERMAN COLLABORATION.

AFTER PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION JULY 13, BRITISH PRESENTED JULY 23 FOLLOWING POINTS REPRESENTING THEIR VIEWPOINTS:

VK

- 1. GERMAN INTERESTS IN NUCLEAR FIELD CAN BE SATISFIED WITHOUT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN PRESENT STRUCTURE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SO LONG AS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS ITS LEGITIMATE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING BERLIN, ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARDED BY EXISTING TREATY COMMITMENTS, PARTICULARLY NATO, AND BACKED BY EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENT.
- 2. MAIN ELEMENTS IN GERMAN THINKING ON NUCLEAR MATTERS:
- (A) GENERAL BELIEF, SUPPORTED BY GENERAL NORSTAD, OF MILITARY NEED FOR NUCLEAR FORCE UNDER SACEUR IN EUROPE.
- (B) FEAR THAT IF DECISION LEFT ENTIRELY TO THEM ALONE AMERICANS MIGHT ACCEPT LOSS OF LARGE PART GERMAN TERRITORY BEFORE DECIDING TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
- (C) BELIEF THAT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN CONTROL WEST'S NUCLEAR STRIKING POWER WOULD INCREASE CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENT.
- (D) REFUSAL ACCEPT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GERMANY OVER AND ABOVE THAT ALREADY EXISTING UNDER REVISED BRUSSELS TREATY.



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- (E) GROWING CONSCIOUSNESS THAT GERMANY'S INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN WESTERN DEFENSE ENTITLES HER TO SOME SAY IN CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ASSIGNED TO SACEUR.
- 3. AT PRESENT THERE DOES NOT EXIST DELIBERATE INTENTION IN GERMANY TO EMBARK ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM EITHER ALONE OR WITH FRENCH. IT MUST OF COURSE BE ASSUMED THAT SOME GERMAN LEADERS HAVE THIS POSSIBILITY AT BACK OF THEIR MINDS AS POSSIBLE ANSWER TO FUTURE CONTINGENCIES FOR WHICH NO CONCRETE ANTICIPATION NOW EXISTS. BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT MANY RESPONSIBLE GERMANS, INCLUDING PRESENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, ARE DETERMINED, WITH EYE ON PAST, TO PREVENT GROWTH OF INDEPENDENT GERMAN MILITARY POWER AND WOULD CONSEQUENTLY BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY SCHEME FOR GERMAN NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE.

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> 4. PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY BEYOND PRESENT CLUB COULD CHANGE GERMAN ATTITUDE. ALTHOUGH MERE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS PREVENTING FURTHER DIFFUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS UNLIKELY BRING ABOUT CHANGE, ACQUISITION OF NATIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY BY OTHER POWERS (WITH EX-CEPTION PERHAPS OF CHINA) CERTAINLY WOULD. MORE ON PRESTIGE GROUNDS THAN CONSIDERATION OF STRATEGIC INTEREST, IT WOULD CREATE HEAVY PRESSURES FOR GERMANY TO POSSESS HER OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. GERMANS ACCEPT FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM AS PART OF STATUS QUO. BUT ATTITUDE MIGHT CHANGE IF US WERE TO CHANGE POLICY AND PROVIDE NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE TO FRANCE. THIS MIGHT PROMOTE PRESSURES WITHIN FEDREP FOR COMPARABLE TREATMENT. IN EITHER EVEN, HOW-EVER, DETERMINATION TO RESIST SUCH PRESSURES AS LONG AS POSSIBLE WILL PERSIST WITHIN PRESENT GERMAN LEADERSHIP.

5. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT GERMAN RELUCTANCE TO HAVE CLAUSE ABOUT NON-DIFFUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY BERLIN AGREEMENT NECESSARILY INDICATES THAT GERMANS WANT TO KEEP DOOR OPEN FOR OWNERSHIP THEIR OWN NUCLEAR ARMAMENT. MAIN MOTIVE IS AVOID UNDERTAKING, IN NARROW FOUR_POWER CONTEXT OF BERLIN, OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS RUSSIANS WHICH WOULD NOT ONLY CONSTITUTE UNACCEPTABLE DISCRIMINATION BUT MIGHT ALSO CONCEIVABLY BECOME A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF FUTURE EMBARRASSMENT NOT ONLY TO THEMSELVES BUT TO WESTERN ALLIANCE AS WHOLE.

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
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- 6. WE BELIEVE THAT MAIN INTEREST OF GERMAN GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE BE TO SEE THAT NATO ARRANGEMENTS ARE ADEQUATE TO ENSURE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CASE OF CONFLICT. TO THIS END MOST RESPONSIBLE GERMANS BELIEVE THAT SOME FORM OF MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE IS DESIRABLE AND GERMANY IS ENTITLED PARTICIPATE IN CONTROL OF SUCH FORCE. IN INTERVIEW KOELNISCHE RUNDSCHAU OF JUNE 27 STRAUSS SAID "FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SEES SOLUTION NOT IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, BUT EITHER IN EUROPEAN SOLUTION, COMPLETELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATO, OR IN ATOMIC PARTNER-SHIP BETWEEN NATO AND WASHINGTON, IN WHICH FINAL DECISION STILL REMAINS WITH AMERICAN PRESIDENT, BUT IN WHICH MEASURE CONSULTATION WITH NATO PARTNERS MUST ALSO BE GUARANTEED. " IN INTERVIEW JUNE 23, SCHROEDER SAID BONN AND WASHINGTON WERE AGREED ON AIM ACHIEVING "MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE UNDER NATO FOR EUROPE." DURING VISIT TO PARIS CHANCELLOR IS BELIEVED HAVE SPOKEN IN SAME GENERAL SENSE.
- 7. IF MULTILATERAL SOLUTION CANNOT BE DEVISED WHICH PERMITS GERMANS PARTICIPATE ON BASIS OF EQUALITY WITH OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THERE WOULD BE GRADUAL LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND INCREASING DISPOSITION TO QUESTION ITS VALUE. GERMAN LEADERS MIGHT BE INCREASINGLY ATTRACTED TO OTHER APPROACHES INCLUDING FRANCO-GERMAN COLLABORATION OR EVEN GERMAN NATIONAL PROGRAM ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PRESENT GERMAN LEADERSHIP WOULD EVER CHANGE COURSE TO THIS EXTENT.
- 8. GERMANS ARE SATISFIED FOR MOMENT WITH PACKAGE AGREEMENT AT ATHENS. THERE IS CONSEQUENTLY NO WIDE_SPREAD PRESSURE FOR RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS NATO MRBM FORCE. NEVERTHELESS DESTRE FOR FORCE IS STILL STRONG AND REMAINS GOAL OF GERMAN POLICY. HOWEVER, THEY MAY NOT BE SATISFIED IN LONG RUN UNLESS THERE IS PROGRESS TOWARDS IT.

IN OUR ESTIMATION THERE IS NO FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION OR DISAGREEMENT INVOLVED IN FOREGOING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. BRITISH VIEWS EXPRESSED IN JOINT EVALUATION ON FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION (EMBTEL 3165, JUNE 25) APPEAR SOMEWHAT INCONSISTENT WITH VIEWS EXPRESSED ABOVE.

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THERE ARE, HOWEVER, AS CAN BE NOTED, MANY INSTANCES OF REAL DIFFERENCE IN EMPHASIS IN WHICH BRITISH STRESS THAT CURRENT SITUATION DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY IMMEDIATE MOVE TOWARDS ESTABLISHING MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE. THIS DIFFERENCE IN EMPHASIS IS BASED ON BRITISH ANALYSIS THAT POLITICAL PRESSURES WILL NOT FORCE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN NEAR FUTURE TO DEMAND SHARE IN CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR DECISIONS CONCERNING USE. ASIDE FROM ANY DELAY CAUSED BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE, IT CAN BE EXPLAINED BY BRITISH RELUCTANCE TO APPROACH PROBLEM OF MRBM FORCE AND TO POSTPONE ANY ACTION CONCERNING REORGANIZATION OF NATONUCLEAR DEFENSES UNTIL LARGER PROBLEM OF FUTURE BRITISH RELATIONS WITH FUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

IF THIS ANALYSIS IS CORRECT, BRITISH WOULD TEND TO PLAY DOWN GERMAN REACTION AND GERMAN PRESSURE IN ORDER TO GAIN TIME.

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