DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 949333 ACTION COPY epartment of State ERMANENT RECORD COPY By NARA Date 1-13-12 MEGSAGE CENTER SECRET Control: 4853 **Action** Nº1 7 38 1962 DEC 11 Rec'd: DECEMBER 10, 1962 RUR 12:14 PM FROM: BONN DEPARTMENT OF STATE Info TO: Secretary of State SS SR NO: 1538, DECEMBER 10, 5PM G SP SAL ACTION DEPARTMENT 1538, INFORMATION PARIS 378, LONDON 375 BTF DAC LIMIT DISTRIBUTION SCI P PARIS ALSO PASS USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE IOP INR SINCE JOINT US-UK RPT US-UK ESTIMATE LAST SUMMER OF POSSIBILITIES RMR OF FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR FIELD (EMBTEL 243, EMBTEL 6), DEVELOPMENTS HAVE REINFORCED OUR VIEW THAT NO RP NO SUCH COOPERATION ACTIVELY UNDER CONSIDERATION. IN LATE AUGUST ADENAUER PUBLICLY STATED THAT DE GAULLE NEVER DISCUSSED SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH HIM (A-1466). SUBSEQUENT DE GAULLE VISIT HERE, AS WELL AS COMMUNICATIONS THEREAFTER EXCHANGED BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS, DID NOT RPT NOT, AS FAR AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE ASCERTAIN, INVOLVE NUCLEAR SUBJECTS. AT SAME TIME, DE GAULLE'S HAMBURG SPEECH SEPT 7 TO BUNDESWEHR. RPT BUNDESWEHR ACADEMY, IN ITS REFERENCE TO "ORGANIC COOPERATION IN MILITARY FIELD, PRODUCED CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION THAT HE MEANT NEW TYPES OF COOPERATION, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS (A-757). ALTHOUGH FRENCH OFFICIALS (PARIS A-610) FLATLY DENIED THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF SUCH NUCLEAR COOPERATION TOOK PLACE, WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY PARIS: ESTIMATE THAT IT UNDOUBTEDLY REMAINS SUBJECT RESERVED FOR POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION IN FUTURE, ANOTHER SOMEWHAT UNSETTLING FACTOR IS RECURRENT STORY THAT FRENCH MEMORANDUM SENT AFTER VISIT CONTAINED SOME POTENTIAL "DYNAMITE", POSSIBLY EVEN INTIMATING PROSPECT OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION, AND HENCE WAS EXTREMELY CLOSELY HELD BY GERMANS (EMBTEL 1188). NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS STILL NO RPT NO FIRM EVIDENCE OF FRENCH PUSHING FOR GERMAN CODPERATION IN NUCLEAR MATTERS.
This copy must be returned to RM/R-seatral files with north 1174 DIRECTIONS DATE OF

TO RM/R

SECRET

-2- 1538, DECEMBER 10, 5 PM, FROM BONN

ON GERMAN SIDE, CONTINUING STRONG LINE WHICH US RPT US HAS
TAKEN RESPECTING NEED TO BUILD UP CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND
RECENT CUBAN EXPERENCE, HIGHLIGHTING PROBLEMS INHERENT IN
STRATEGY RELYING PRIMARILY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HAVE SOMEWHAT
DAMPENED EARLIER GERMAN ENTHUSIASM FOR GREATER NUCLEAR EMPHASIS
AND CAPABILITY. CURRENT GOVERNMENT CRISIS WHICH HAS REMOVED
STRAUSS RPT STRAUSS FROM DEFENSE MINISTRY ALSO AFFECTS SITUATION
SINCE HE HAS BEEN MOST PROMINENTLY IDENTIFIED WITH CONCEPT
THAT DEFENSE OF FRG RPT FRG ONLY POSSIBLE THROUGH USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. AT SAME TIME, AS EMBASSY HAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED,
PROBABLY ALL LEADING POLITICIANS HERE, INCLUDING POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS
TO STRAUSS, MAY BE RELIED UPON TO SEEK ARRANGEMENTS ASSURING
EQUAL TREATMENT FOR FRG RPT FRG IN ANY NUCLEAR PROGRAM DEVELOPED
WITHIN ALLIANCE, SUCH AS CURRENT AMERICAN CONCEPT OF SEABORNE MLF RPT MLF.

ALTHOUGH ADENAUER CONTINUES PERSONALLY TO BE ATTRACTED TO BILATERAL FRANCO-GERMAN ARRANGEMENTS IN ALL FIELDS, HIS INFLUENCE IS NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY DECISIVE, PARTICULARLY IF FRENCH ARE NOT RPT NOT PRESSING ANY JOINT NUCLEAR PROGRAM. EMBASSY UNAWARE OF ANYTHING TO SUBSTANTIATE BLANKENHORN RPT BLANKENHORN COMMENT (PARIS 139) THAT GERMANS HAD OFFERED TO BEAR SOME OF COST OF FRENCH FDRCE DE FRAPPE RPT FORCE DE FRAPPE DESPITE HIS COMMENT (WHICH CONFORMS TO OUR OBSERVATIONS) THAT GERMANS OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO INDEPENDENT FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE. MOST RANKING GERMAN OFFICIALS CLEARLY CONTINUE TO APPRECIATE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES WHICH ANY FRANCO-GERMAN PROGRAM MIGHT HAVE.

NEVERTHELESS, AS REPORTED REFTELS 6 AND 243, EMBASSY CONTINUES
TO BELIEVE THAT: (1) AT SCIENTIFIC LEVEL FRANCO-GERMAN CONTACTS
DO EXIST WHICH HAVE PROBABLY GIVEN COMPETENT GERMAN SCIENTISTS
NECESSARY THEORETICAL AND TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE WHICH WOULD BE
REQUIRED IN EVENT EITHER JOINT OR INDEPENDENT PROGRAM OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS SHOULD BE LAUNCHED; AND (2) IF ALLIANCE FAILS SIGNIFICANTLY
TO MEET GERMAN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AS SEEN BY GERMANS, FRG RPT
FRG COULD STILL BECOME ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN INDEPENDENT OR FRANCOGERMAN PROGRAM. ANOTHER PERTINENT FACT WOULD BE ADMITTED FAILURE
TO MEET PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DISARMAMENT

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NN 949333

By NARA Date 1-13-12

SECRET

-3- 1538, DECEMBER 10, 5 PM, FROM BONN

CONTEXT. FURTHER LONG_RANGE RELATED POSSIBILITY WHICH DESERVES WATCHING BUT WHICH DEPENDS ON OUTCOME BRITAIN'S EEC RPT EEC NEGOTIATIONS AND SHAPE OF FUTURE EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNITY IS INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE INCLUDING BOTH FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR COMPONENTS. BOTH OF LATTER FACTORS, HOWEVER, REMAIN TOO PROBLEMATICAL TO AFFECT PRESENT ANALYSIS AT THIS TIME.

DOWLING

HLN



This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu