ACOO6 **RELEASE IN PART 25x1**



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

9/20/27

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ANGENTINA PROJECT (S200000044) U.S. DEXT. OF STATE, A/RPS/IPS Margaret P. Osefeld, Director

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(X) Deny

Exemption(s)

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FROM:

TO:

INR - Harold H. Saunders

The Acting Secretary

SUBJECT:

CIA Liaison Relationships with Foreign

Security or Intelligence Services

This item mainly concerns possible conflicts between our human rights and terrorism objectives, as played out in the context of CIA relations with foreign intelligence and security services.

The attached paper describes the liaison function CIA carries out vis-a-vis foreign security/intelligence agencies in countries where human rights violations have been a serious problem

The valueX1 to the U.S. of the liaison is assessed, along with the counterpart agency's role in possible human rights violations. The final section of the paper sets out some quideline limitations on the liaison function, plus a section on restrictions placed on the use of unilateral U.S. penetrations of international terrorist organizations.

As requested by Mrs. Derian, D/HA comments are attached.

In commenting on the country statements, ARA raised questions about the value of the liaison function in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. They suggest that in these countries human rights violations are such major problems that we should ask ourselves if we can afford to be connected in any way with these security/intelligence organizations. In the case of Chile, ARA objects strongly to CIA's requesting from DINA They regard Argentina as the most egregious human rights violator in the hemisphere. In Uruguay ARA is troubled by the question of whether one can really separate the ties with the DNII of the Montevideo police from the impression of liaison with the police in general.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Kathleen Allegrone, Senior Reviewer

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Against these concerns we must attempt to balance the possibly critical importance of liaison as a source of information on terrorist actions directed against U.S. citizens. Liaison also contributes to our knowledge on human rights problems and may offer an opportunity to influence the foreign intelligence/security agency to pay more attention to human rights considerations.

Our chief objection to the proposed guideline limitation is that there is no reference to continuing evaluation and policy control either in the field or in Washington. We believe the value to us of the liaison function and the degree of danger of its linking the U.S. to human rights violations must be subject to regular and systematic review. This is best done in the field by the Ambassador, and should have appropriate instructions

on this point. In Washington, periodic reviews

would provide an additional assurance that both our human rights and our anti-terrorism policies are being carried out in an appropriate fashion.

Recommendation

That you propose to the SCC:

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- (a) instituting a requirement at the posts in question for regular and continuing evaluation by our Ambassadors of the value of the liaison function as opposed to its possible costs in human rights;
- (b) setting a requirement for semiannual reports on this problem
- (c) establishing a required semiannual review of these reports and the broader question by the SAWG.

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INR/DDC:TJCHeavner:sp 9/26/77 Ext. 22285



National Security Archive,

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University,

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037,

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu