

ADMIRAL MOORER'S DIARY

THURSDAY 23 SEPTEMBER 1971

- 0812 Arrived at the Pentagon.
- 0818 BGEN Pauly and the duty weather officer called to brief me on the weather in the Panhandle in North Vietnam. There is a window that will be open for approximately 48 hours with improved ceilings, scattered to broken level and would be good for strikes in the Dong Hoi area. NOTE: With both the President and Dr. Kissinger leaving town today, it is very doubtful that any strike will be authorized.
- 0819 Received a telephone call from Admiral Zumwalt. He said he was having lunch with Henry Kissinger today and would discuss the Far East situation and the role for the Navy and Marines. He plans to talk about land based versus sea based air power. He will also address the Iceland and Malta problems and include the law of the sea.
- He does not plan on raising the large carrier versus small carrier issue and thinks it would be better to come from me, but if Henry raises it he will respond. I said to go ahead and talk about it along the lines of his paper. Zumwalt is not sure of the best approach. He wants to stick to the large carriers and would if he were 80% confident of Laird and Packard's support. He would also go for the Nuclear carrier, but he does not have that confidence. The trade off for the nuclear carrier would be to switch to conventional carriers and try for two more 688 class submarines which would cost the same thing. He asked what the politics were. I said I think you have to play it with first choice/second choice option. You could get caught and have to eat a lot of words if he shifts it back. Zumwalt is going to try to avoid the question, but may address home-porting.
- 0832 Chairman's Briefing - NMCC
- 0914 Called Admiral Weinel on the telephone and asked him if he had seen Throck-Morton's planning message. Blackie said he had and felt that he was reacting and misunderstanding the problem. He has the J5 from EUCOM in his office who says that CINCSRIKE or the new CINCREC and his components are concerned and will be working on the deployment planning and employment planning. EUCOM is supposed to do that and how he employs the forces will not be CINCREC's responsibility. I said I think he is right the unified commanders that need assistance should come to him and not to the component commanders. Blackie said EUCOM made the first mistake. I said EUCOM is talking about day to day working relationships between staffs and not between component commanders, their component commanders and CINCREC's components over here. In principle he is correct.
- 0944 Called LTGEN Vogt on the telephone. Vogt said that he has made a couple of changes to the paper that Packard sent down and also he talked to Mel Zais and Jack James about it. I asked him what was the problem with Packard being out of sorts. Vogt said that is what Furlong reported -- he came down and recommended that you do not volunteer to talk to him today on anything that requires any negotiating. Said

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he is not in the mood, but if he calls for you it is another thing. I think it might be a stall so they can twist it around the other way. I asked what their staff came up with. He said they had a lot of duplication. Vogt told him that we had eliminated a lot of the duplication in our version. He said good and apparently that is all the contribution they made.

He wondered if the MSC thing was still a problem. I said it was not smoldering it was in flames, it has blown all out of proportion, Helen Bentley has gotten into the act and it really depends on whether Laird can make Herbert turn off his committee, because they are really going after the legal aspects. Of course, I said their whole problem is they are all out of joint because they were not consulted. I said I told Dave Packard the other day that you just can not do things in this town that way. You have to go around and touch bases with the executive, legislative, and make sure there is no law violated. I told Packard the other day my counsel confirmed that it did not change the function of the JCS. Of course, I narrowed it down to the specific statute that he was asking about and not the whole reorganization act. It says that the JCS would coordinate with the Services and provide the guidance with respect to contingency planning. There may well be other parts of the reorganization act that were not violated.

0955

Called Admiral Duncan on the telephone and told him that I had just gotten a letter from Peter-Hill Norton and he asked if I could take Eileen to New York and told him that I could not, but there was ample commercial air transportation available. I said I was transporting the wives to Norfolk in my airplane, but I would arrange her flights. I just could not see making a special flight to go to New York. Duncan said he would not do that for me either. I said I would not ask him. Anyway, he thanked me for my letter and understood about the private plane and said Eileen has now decided to join the others. She wants to spend the night of the 28th in Norfolk -- so lets try and put her back in the schedule. Duncan said he knew about it and he is going to stay with Holloway. He had accepted with a request for reservation, but if Eileen comes here this will get him out of the Rhode Island house. Duncan thinks it would be good for Jimmy and Peter-Hill to get to know each other.

Duncan said he received an invitation to the White House for the ceremony presenting a medal to Brosio on 29 September. He said he did not think he should make it; if the President wanted to see him for about a half an hour he would break his neck getting there, but this is a formal event and he would not even get to talk to him. I said we would take care of it; some secretary probably sent it without checking and I would get in touch with them and square it away. I said to not answer it until he hears from me. Duncan said he was sure I would get one too. They all know about this military committee tour, but they do not know that Duncan is on it. Andy Goodpaster is in the same boat, I said he does not live in the country and they probably do not know he is here on the MC tour. This is not a command performance, but shows poor planning; when Brosio is in Canada we are here and when we are in Canada Brosio

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is here. I am not going to break off from the tour at Offutt.

1005

Met with LTGEN Woolwine, LTGEN Vogt and LTGEN Knowles in my office to hear Woolwine's Vietnamization Logistics Briefing. He indicated that the plan was going on track and according to plan. It covered the following major items: ammunition, 120 day supply; POL filled to capacity; primary equipment for FY 72 and 73 crimp; secondary equipment for a four year stockpile.

In ammunition the ARVN have on hand 93K tons of the 120 day supply of 180K tons. The VNAF have 20.6K tons of a requirement for 50K tons. The major problem on ammunition is storage. If the war were to stop tomorrow ammunition would be a great problem for the ARVNs because their storage facilities are not all ready.

POL. All the on-hand requirements exceed the program and there is no problem.

Title Transfers. We have been proceeding with the in-country equipment stockpile. The out of country equipment is being prepared for transfer when told on four day notice.

Major Army Items. The ARVNAF is in good shape on the major items and have received the majority of the items required.

Navy Items. Two ships are on loan to the VNN until it is decided if they will be turned over or not. The ACTOVRAD will be turning over 20 radars in all and three have been completely turned over as of now.

Air Force Items. The VNAF still have to receive some 530 aircraft to meet their requirements.

Secondary Items -- Army. ARVN are in good shape on the secondary support items. They have received the majority of all requirements.

Secondary Items -- Navy. The Navy is completely on top of secondary item turn-over and there is very little left to go.

Secondary Items -- Air Force. They have just about completed their job and the VNAF are in good position on this support.

Helicopter Parts. There are many outstanding items and this is a possible problem area.

Communications and Electronics -- Tasks. We have agreed to turn over the signal today in Saigon. One problem will be COMSEC equipment, and how to account for the custody of the equipment. It will be something like nuclear weapons, but the equipment will wind up getting out of the custodians sight.

Contractor Support. We have 96 million dollars to absorb in this program.

Un-Programed Costs Less C/E: Army - 378M; Navy - 844K; Air Force - 198M. The Navy says these funds are already in an approved program so it is not an additional cost. However, the Army and Air Force have not programed and have a sizeable variance with the Navy figures. The

Air Force has been told to absorb 90M on ammunition. The Army is not hurt yet and if it is required to absorb the funds there should be about 185M to absorb.

We are making very good progress and are following the intent of Laird's memo. SECDEF told the President on Monday that he was very pleased with the progress. When the ships start arriving with the equipment it will be very noticeably. However, it is difficult to hide tanks. I said I was very happy with the terrific job that J4 had done on this project and when you stop to think this war is being fought by draftees and with a logistic operation which defies imagination for both the United States and the Vietnamese forces.

1045

General Woolwine left and Generals Vogt and Knowles remained behind to discuss Command and Control again. Vogt showed me the re-draft of the Packard memo as he had revised it and discussed the pertinent laws and the way he had applied them to the directive. The major problem seems to be chain of command and the NCA. If the NSA is addressed it includes the President, SECDEF and the JCS and JCS will provide strategic direction, however, if mentioned this needs to be defined in the paper. I said the NSA was written when they were thinking of a single service and it was pushed beyond the desired limit, and it really pushed us into a civilian hand. Vogt said SECDEF assigns the missions to the unified commanders. I said the military departments administer the forces used by the unified commanders. For example, the JCS can not order a strike without the approval of the President. JCS furnished advice and guidance to the NCA, which really protects Packard by ensuring that he is not crossing Congress. Unfortunately Packard is only looking at the implementation of the plans and he forgets the great volume of communications involved in the plans and all wars are not going to be like the Vietnamese war. It is up to us to protect Packard from another MSC flail.

We went through the paper page by page and discussed each change which General Vogt had recommended. Most of the pages had minor alterations on them -- page one and two were major changes and are the real gut issue.

On page 8 there are some major changes where the duties or the responsibilities of the CJCS are enumerated. This gives an additional validity to the CJCS in the executive chain. They have removed ASD(T) from the validating role and we can not fight the responsibilities of ASD(T), however, validation is not one of his roles. I also noted that ASD(I) is a technical man and that is exactly what he should be involved with the technical aspects. I asked John Vogt to lay me out a line in/line out on the paper showing the changes that were made from Packard's paper and in the margin note the citation for the legal authority or the quote which certifies this change.

We agreed that someone has to take charge and march off and as far as the budget is concerned, this program would be exempt from reprogramming it would have to be funded.

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1140

Received a telephone call from Mr. Selden. He told me that Peter Knaur, the ISA special assistant for Congressional relations, just dropped dead at 44 and they need to get a replacement. He said he did a fine job and they really need a good man there. He thought perhaps Hoke Sisk, USN, Captain, RET, my former operations officer, would be a good candidate. He wondered if I thought Sisk would be interested in it even though it is not a prestigious job. Hoke seems to be wondering around lost and he would be good because he knows the people and how to get along on the Hill. It would be a GS-16 job with pay of about \$28-30K a year. He has not seemed to do well in his business ventures so perhaps he might be interested. I said he knows his way around and why didn't they give him a call. Selden said he was just mentioning this to me because Warren Nutter wanted to talk to me about it and see what I thought of him. I said he used to be my operations officer and Selden said he met him in Norfolk and knows he did a good job on the Hill. Peter would be hard to replace because he had been doing it for ten years. Selden said he apparently had some problem a few months ago. At any rate he went home, sat down on the bed and died. He just did not show up for work the next day and they found him.

1210

Met with Col. Lucy and discussed his rationale on the legal aspect of the reorganization act of 1958 and how the JCS will not exercise command (see attached memo). Lucy said, of course, the President commands the Armed Forces, but the NCA is larger than the CINCs and the law. They can not exclude the JCS from this apparatus. By law the JCS can be taken out of the chain of command, but not out of the body commanding the Armed Forces.

I asked why they did not say what they meant when they wrote these laws in the first place and why is it necessary to have an interpretation of everything. Lucy said the changes depended on the circumstances and if the words were not absolutely plain an interpretation would be made. I said the general counsel has given Secretary Packard just the opposite advice. Lucy thinks that Congress would back his approach. Lucy pointed out a very good fact that we were supposed to be talking about the WWMCCS system for control and why try and change the whole concept of the JCS structure over a minor peripheral problem. Lucy said if the problem was defined in a long term then the specific elimination of the JCS is deliberate, however, they should not pull the JCS out due to a simple change in function. Only the President or SECDEF have the authority to change the chain of command. The NCA is a much broader base than the chain of command. I said the JCS was put in the chain of command by President Eisenhower and it actually does not show in the law.

At any rate I asked Bob Lucy to look this paper over very carefully and be sure we were on the right track on our legal aspects.

1217

Received a farewell courtesy call from RADM Timbrell, the Defense Attache, Canada.

1233

Lunch in the Chairman's Dining Room.

1414

Met with Admiral Zumwalt - private.

1440

Received a telephone call from Admiral Zumwalt and he mentioned some things he forgot when he just visited me. He is uncertain at what should be done about the SLBM flexibility and SALT negotiations. Zumwalt said that the worst thing we could do would be to agree not to have the freeze and not build ULMS. If we are going to let the Soviets have a loop hole then we should choose the ULMS program. If they build we must build. I asked him if they took up the basic position of the freedom to mix. Bud said he did not discuss that with the ULMS question and made the statement that Congress will never authorize anything more for the land based program and they shouldn't. I said although dedicated they are trying desperately to get an agreement before election.

I think they handled the SALT negotiations in a very amateur manner. Bud said for political reasons they would leave out the Soviet SLBMs and direct us to accelerate action on the ULMS. If it comes out of SAFEGUARD MONEY that will be fine. I said yes that will be alright and that I still do not understand who took such a firm stand against the NCA because NCA makes better sense for us than the Soviets. In fact that is the only thing that does make sense. Bud said he guessed the disarmament troops did not want us to be too safe. I said Henry was sold on it and Packard was against the NCA, but for different reasons. Saying that Congress would not approve it is wrong. The draft bill proved to me that if you go over there and give Congress the straight story they will go along with anything logical and reasonable. Anyway the SALT thing has been handled very poorly.

I said I talked to the President several times, but you have to keep repeating it that our submarines operate in friendly waters and their submarines operate in unfriendly waters. We will always have an advantage if we maintain a big Navy that adds to the stability of our sea base deterrent and decreases the effectiveness of their sea base deterrent.

I said I got a letter from John Sparkman on the PROXIRE thing. Bud said he also sent him a copy. I asked if there was a hand written note on his and Bud indicated no. I said he had written me a note. Bud thanked me for my help.

1540

Swim call.

1735

Met with Col Nutting and told him to make up a back-up book regarding NATO for my presentation before Congress and that he should talk to Bob Lucy and prepare a back-up book for me. This will be useful both this winter before Christmas and as a reference for meetings.

1800

Met with LTGEN Knowles and discussed Fred Weyand taking over the CORDS and still maintaining his job as Deputy USMACV. CINCPAC has come in with a message reaffirming this as his position and I asked Knowles if Weyand would be both CORDS and the Deputy MACV. Knowles indicated he would be and that he could do both jobs very well. He thought perhaps that SECDEF was thinking of some other slots. He felt it is possible for Weyand to make four stars and relieve Abe then a three star could move in to relieve him of both jobs. Knowles said the Vietnamese think

Weyand is the greatest thing going. I said my concern was that as the war winds down the civilians would bug out and leave the military with the civilian jobs so we will get the blame no matter what happens. They usually provide one of each so this will not happen.

I asked Knowles about Simons and we thought it might be best to let sleeping dogs lie, however, said it might be appropriate on the anniversary of SONTAY if they did not give him a medal, to recall him and have a big luncheon and present an award to him.

- 1826 Col Belles, DIA, and Col Davis called to show me the photo BDA of the PRIZE BULL strike. Photographs were excellent and it appears we did a fine job on this strike. I have sent a congratulatory message regarding the strike.
- 1838 Departed the Pentagon for Quarters SIX.
- 1900 Reception for Distinguished Guests followed by the 28th Annual Dinner hosted by the National Security Industrial Association, Sheraton-Park Hotel.

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