

~~TOP SECRET~~

ADMIRAL MOORER'S DIARY
FRIDAY 24 SEPTEMBER 1971

0805 Arrived at the Pentagon.
0830 Chairman's Briefing - NMCC
0901 Met with LTGEN Vogt and LTGEN Knowles. I showed them Col Lucy's paper concerning the legal aspects of the Command and Control problem. General Vogt felt he did not have much of a case on his point regarding the JCS relations to the NCA. The channel is from the President to the SECDEF to the CINCs. Vogt felt that the part concerning the JCS as advisors was sound. I said the NCA consisted of the President, SECDEF as well as the JCS when they are transmitting their advise to the unified and specified commanders. Knowles and Vogt both said it is illegal for the JCS to be actually in the chain of command.

The NCA is not defined and was not defined in the 62 paper, however, we can not make a case that the JCS legally must be in the NCA. The JCS were not put in the chain of command in 1958. I pointed out, however, that SECDEF has the authority to put them in, and that it is not illegal for him to also take them out. Lucy's idea was that subject to the authority and direction of the President through the Secretary of Defense the JCS should be included in any definition of the NCA.

I think the difference comes in between making a plan and implementing a plan. Vogt thought President Eisenhower's object was to take the JCS out of the chain of command specifically because he could not coordinate through committee action.

In my mind Command and Control is not just a radio or teletype or telephone, but is far more than that. Vogt says that Packard and Laird want to return to the law -- that the Chiefs are not intended to be in the chain of command -- but are an integral part of the decision process. We agreed that the JCS provide advise and guidance. What choice do we have -- stone-wall Packard? Vogt thinks the tendency is to cut the authority of the JCS, and Laird and Packard despite their disavowal of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report are implementing it -- with examples the new logistics command, the MSC problems -- transportation, centralization, etc.. Their real intent appears to be the CMO type of approach. If Secretary Packard wants he can issue orders direct to the CINCs and cut the whole cooperate body of JCS out of the picture and even the CJCS if he wants to.

Knowles feels that it is too big to run from the White House today without some assistance. Knowles was generally unhappy about the approach the paper was taking -- does not think it is practical and thinks the authority of the JCS is being reduced.

I said well what exactly do we recommend then?

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Vogt said the Chiefs are not being hurt and we are very lucky to get this far based on the original Packard proposal the CJCS has gained tremendously. I said civilian control was obviously their original plan and I do not know how exactly it should be done, but the present method is undoubtedly wrong. I also think that Vogt's proposal is the first good look we have had at this thing in a good many years. I think the worry is the Service Chief will lose effective control over their facilities. The point Lucy makes is in accordance with the law. SECDEF has authority to go direct to the unified commanders. As long as the system permits direct response to the President and the SECDEF there will be no problems.

Vogt thinks if we put the Chiefs back in Packard would think we would need to go through the office of OSD or work through CJCS and then theoretically the Chiefs could object.

I mentioned that I knew nothing about the PRIZE BULL strikes and I advised the Chiefs immediately and they had no problems with it while we were at Airlie. I also had them called when the planes were launched. It is the same type of operation we are talking about. If the Chiefs were not reasonable they could force every directive to get "tank" treatment, they could object and effectively block it. Vogt showed us the directive 5100.1; SECDEF directive showing Command and Control flowing from the President through the JCS; put in the Command and Control line by this directive. General Knowles then said that going through a headquarters does not indicate command and control and neither General Vogt nor I could understand the idea of Command and Control is not involved if you go through someone. (Knowles had some very strange ideas on Command and Control.)

1001

Met with RADM Donaldson regarding CINCPAC's request to follow the Soviet fleet into the Sea of Okhotsk with four of our ships to observe any exercises if they were conducted. He said that he was going to go ahead and run it up through SECDEF and through his channels before it was given to the special committee. I said that sounded like a fine idea and that I doubted if it would be approved, but it was worth a try. I also indicated that I was not going to be concerned greatly if it did not get approved. Donaldson concurred he did not want me to fall on my sword over it.

1043

Met with RADM James to discuss the Command and Control situation. I told him that the RED stripe directive 5100.3 describes the facilities and the limitations for Command and Control. I said I would meet with the Chiefs this afternoon followed by a meeting with Secretary Packard. It appears the Services will manage the programs and DCA will manage the funding. I am not sure if that is exactly the way we want to do it. James has faith in DCA. I said I want to set up a how-~~go~~-it curve to analyze the technical difficulties, lack of funds, what organization is best, to use, what do we now have, how are we going to handle the out years. These items are all problem areas and we need to keep this

chart on the components and sub-components of the system. We need to keep control in the military and take action when the plan is approved instead of the WWMCCS control being in OSD; I will run it. I need the system to evaluate it, make the services a program manager and to create a program so we can monitor its progress. What we have now is kind of backwards in the airborne assets for example SAC has the continuous airborne aircraft and the NECPA is on the ground. I think it should be the other way around.

James said we needed to man the NECPA with authoritative people to be able to execute the decisions or to make the decisions if necessary. The only value of NECPA being airborne is if it is manned with the authority. We should link the President to the aircraft communications wise regardless and then we can rendezvous with the President and pick him up in different areas in the vicinity. I said what we really needed is a battle staff airborne. I asked how long the flights are in SAC and James said 8 hours. Also how many staff people they employ and he replied they had 5 teams and they rotated it similarly to our NMCC. I emphasized that there are many areas that we can move out on and break it down into the component parts. We should list the actions necessary for each function and work out the program than monitor it. James felt that DCA was no problem -- they had been very helpful. MGEN Terry is the most cooperative man he has known. I asked about the capability of the computers and he said we have non-compatible-computers now -- they are not connectable so trying to get common hardware and common software is a major problem. James has been turned down on replacing computers in the NMCC. I asked who decided this? He replied that Secretary Packard had.

James thinks that in Packard's original paper there was confusion as to the difference between WWMCCS and NMCS and what each comprises. I said that is very simple the NMCS is what you run in Washington -- the NECPA, Airborne Command Post, Rock, etc. -- while the WWMCCS is that plus the unified command system. This has got to be clear.

I think the military people are the customers and we should tell them what we want. The civilians are the producers and they should provide the technical advice. We do not care how they do it, but we must be given secure communications within the time constraints to get a message from point A to B and we will not quarrel with their methods. The CINCs should send the requirements and I should validate them, the counsel, that I have recommended be established, should make the technical feasibility and budget feasibility recommendations. There should be no question that the dollars required for WWMCCS should be an add-on and no reprogramming of service funds involved for this. Communications should be by secure communications satellite. We should not have the civilians tell us if we need to do something, but how we can do it.

I said we need to surface the problem so I can resolve them. Packard never saw the rewrite of the 5100.3 paper and this proposed counsel will provide a way around the OSD staffies.

I do not want to put up with a delay or let the OSD staff get involved in the strategy. They should only fill the requirements. We must keep the Secretaries out of operations -- their business is to produce.

- 1116 Met with General Knowles and he discussed the Freddie Weyand job in MACV. He said that Doland was opposed to Weyand assuming the added function of Deputy MACV for CORDS. He thinks that there is a disconnect and they do not understand that Weyand is Deputy COMUSMACV and also CORDS is a Deputy COMUSMACV. Weyand would be assuming both of these jobs and Knowles feels that he would be able to do it very well. Both Abrams and McCain are emphatic in their desire to have Weyand assume the two jobs at the same time.
- 1130 Called SECDEF on the telephone and asked to talk to him when he was free.
- 1233 Lunch in my office with Professor Myres S. McDougal, Sterling Professor of Law at the Yale University. He is my advisor on the law of the sea matters. Our discussion was primarily on the law of the sea matters, incidents at sea and some of the problems we have been having with the territorial seas.
- 1400 JCS Meeting in the JCS Conference Room. See attached agenda for discussion items.
- 1450 Met with SECDEF in his office and discussed several items including the General Twitchell problem in Iran; General Weyand relieving as Deputy MACV for CORDS in addition to his present job; the final discussion on Col Simons and his involuntary retirement.
- 1510 Returned to the JCS meeting in the JCS Room and discussed the Command and Control paper in preparation for the meeting with Secretary Packard at 1630.
- 1623 Met with LTGEN Vogt and we discussed the outcome of the meeting with the Chiefs and how their feelings ran on the Command and Control paper. We agreed that we were in about as good a position as we could expect to be before we went up to discuss it with Packard. As usual the Army was on the outside and was advocating that we go to Congress and lobby against the paper on a legal aspect.
- 1628 Received a telephone call from Admiral Zumwalt and he let me know that I had his vote on the C&C paper. I told him that we are better off not to get into a hassel over in Congress as the Army had suggested and lobby against it because we just do not have a legal leg to stand on. Bud said I have his proxy.
- 1632 LTGEN Vogt and I met with Secretary Packard in his office and went over the Command and Control paper in detail. We had the revision to Packard's paper with the citations from the pertinent instructions and I believe we sold Packard in general on the program. In fact there were only two changes to the paper that he advocated. One point in paragraph 3.a he wanted to have inserted in lieu of what we had "as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff while discharging their responsibilities to furnish the advice and guidance upon which the orders

of the Secretary of Defense are transmitted to the unified and specified commanders." The other change he desired was on page 8 under 6.b to read "under the direction of the Secretary of Defense the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as executive agent for the JCS will." General Vogt and I felt that this was a moral victory and that he would be making some more very minor changes and be sending us down a proposed final draft shortly.

1710

Met with LTGEN Vogt and LTGEN Knowles in my office. We discussed the meeting in Packard's office and I told Vogt to incorporate the changes that were approved by Packard in the Command and Control paper. Vogt said he would get them incorporated and get me a copy back tonight. We all felt that we had made great progress and that the paper now was something that we could live with and felt that the Chiefs could live with it also. It came much closer to the Chiefs desires than we expected we would come.

1717

Called Admiral Zumwalt on the telephone and briefed him on what had occurred in Packard's office. I told him the suggestions that I had made to correct the paper and that Packard bought these two changes. I said that I do not know how long they will stay since Laird had not seen them yet, but he could not argue very much with under the direction of SECDEF the Chairman acting as executive agent for the JCS will----- . I said that I was in company with the Army now and I have done everything that I could. Zumwalt felt the Air Force and Marines would be on board and I said I got the Chiefs back in and that was as far as I could go. I said Shillito wanted to see me and asked if I had been in contact with Zumwalt. Bud heard from Carl Wallace that George Norris, the counsel over there, was going to try to negotiate a deal and maybe Shillito wants to talk to me about that. He is suggesting that the Navy keep procurement and let the Army procure. They are proposing that the Deputy Commander MSC be an Army man and Bud thinks that is alright since we have a Navy man at MTMTS. He thinks that's what Shillito will talk about. I asked if he had any objection to that proposal and Bud said no, he wanted to keep the procurement.

Bud said that Tex Guinn had talked to Mason Freeman and told him that I had made a strong pitch for him to get three stars, but they just did not have anything open now and would give him the best two star job we could and this is COMWESTERNSEAFRONTIER. Freeman appeared happy with that job and would be relieving Matter. He would probably be leaving about the middle of January and I asked who was going to relieve him. He said they would work it out and see if they could get another service to do it. My only stipulation was that he not leave at the same time as General Vogt.

1722

Met with SECDEF in his office.

1724

Received telephone call from ASN (M&RA) Johnson to discuss MSM awards that I had forwarded for three Navy people. He wanted to know if I had

strong feelings on them because the board turned all three down. Two are retiring -- Johnson could see giving awards to the two who are retiring, but the sticky one was Colonel Fred Knight whom the board felt should have a JSCM rather than a MSM. He asked how I felt about this. I said this recommendation comes from his boss who is a three star officer. We have a difficult time getting good people working on the Joint Staff particularly from the Navy and I think that they should be given recognition. I said that otherwise we will not attract the people that we need. In other words I would not have signed them if I did not think that they did deserve the awards. I do not rubber stamp them. Johnson said he was concerned about over-riding the board since the board decision went through the Commandant. I told him that I reverse my board all the time -- that is what I get paid for. Johnson said he did not think that he had any problem on the two that were retiring, but asked if I was saying that the one that was not retiring was better. I said the Navy had a terrible record of retiring Captains on the Joint Staff that never did make Flag officer. We are trying to get better people and they do not want to come to the Joint Staff. I said I am trying to reverse that trend and that I have been making some progress. I feel that if they can get more medals and promotions in their own services they will never come here -- that is the point. Johnson said "you just made yours."

1732

Called General Palmer on the phone and told him that we had the meeting with Packard and got him to agree that the NCA definition consisted of the President, SECDEF or their designated officers as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff when discharging their responsibility to provide guidance, etc.. He said "Oh you used Bud Zumwalt's solution" and I said no that was really mine. Palmer said he did not want to take any credit from me. I said Bud's idea was to put a foot note in the new text, but I got them to do better and put in the text. I got a compromise with him both ways and now it reads -- under the direction of the SECDEF the CJCS acting as the executive agent for the JCS will..... Palmer thought that was great and that it protected the Chiefs. His only suggestion was if we had to go back later on the requirements part of the Chairman acting as the executive agent. I said I had a long discussion with Packard and explained to him my thinking on executing messages and that there is a lot of planning and staff work with the WWMCCS to be done. Palmer said that Packard is a real frank honest guy, but he does not trust some of the people around him. Packard said he had a few minor inserts and he wants to put the DCA in so we are not completely out of the woods yet. He had not taken it to Laird yet and did not hard line it. Palmer was happy.

1736

Called General Meyer on the telephone and debriefed him on the meeting with Packard as I had done with Zumwalt and Palmer. He said that the changes that I had made sounded fine to him and thought it was more than we would get.

After I had covered both of the points that were changed Meyer felt that we had gotten everything we would get, and got everything the Air Force was looking for anyway. I told him

Packard had a few minor additions with respect to DCA and he accepted all the other changes. Meyer was happy. Packard was pretty nice about it and Meyer said he thought that sounded great and he asked if I talked to Palmer and I said yes -- the Army sure does hard line everything. Meyer asked how Palmer had reacted and I said he was delighted and maybe it will work out.

Meyer said that Ambassador Hill had sent a message to Air Force saying that he thinks "it is imperative that the Air Force have high level representation on the law of the sea meeting scheduled for 4 October that Warner is running." And he asked if that was alright with me. I said that was fine with me. Meyer wondered if I wanted to talk to Warner because high level representation meant me, CNO, Meyer etc... I asked Meyer to come and go with me.

1739 Met with Secretary Barry Shillito in my office. During the conversation with Shillito I gave him hell for releasing JCS papers to Congressional Committees and he said he would not do it again. Shillito brought up the fact that a real estate board that Erlichman is the head of took part of the Marines beach at Pendelton and are now looking at Guam to try and take the NAS Agana away from the Navy there. I told him now that we were withdrawing from Taiwan and Okinawa it is particularly important to us to remain in Guam. I said that we were willing to work with him and Jack McCain to build up a justification for land in Guam and write it into the TTPI negotiations.

1742 Received a telephone call from SECDEF saying that concerning the four ships going into the Sea of Okhotsk...before he could go further I told him that Alex Johnson had called me and Dave while I was in Dave's office and that we would all agree with the operation if SECDEF would. SECDEF said it would be better if we backed away from it at this time. I told him we would, but at the same time I was asking for a plan, and I got Alex to make a statement in favor of it, and that we might send a small task group up there a little later when the political activities calmed down. SECDEF said he was glad we got it to him before it went over to the 40 Committee and I told him that I always clued him in before it got to that level.

1744 Called RADM Donaldson on the telephone and told him that SECDEF did not approve the operation, however, when he worked up his message he should ask for a plan for the future at the same time. He said he would have it in my office shortly.

1751 Called LTGEN Vogt on the telephone and told him, on the paper that Ash had sent him, that I took it up to Laird and he said he would take care of it so he can just forget it. If anyone asks a question you can say it was referred to SECDEF and that gets us off the hook. I told him about Shillito's visit and that I have given Shillito hell for giving JCS papers to Congressional Committees and he said he would not do it again. We should really get a written policy out that we do not give JCS papers out. I told Vogt to make sure he had a tight hold across the board

on JCS papers. He said he would double latch it. I said I was going to call Blackie because Shillito brought up the real estate board that Erlichman is the head of and he went into the fact that they took away the Marines beach at Pendelton and are now looking at Guam to take the NAS Agana away from the Navy. I made the point about the TTPI negotiations and that the real estate in the area is very important to us since we are withdrawing from Taiwan and Okinawa. I said we would be working with Shillito and Jack McCain to get a justification for retaining this land in Guam and tying it in with the TTPI negotiations. Vogt said he would tell Blackie that. I said it was not urgent, but Vogt agreed that the forward areas are important since we are getting kicked out of what we do have it will be doubly important. I said Erlichman was a real estate man from Seattle and has been giving us trouble with Waikiki too and pushed the Marines off the beach right under their noses and he wants to take the airfield from Guam now too. Vogt made the comment that he wants to get into SIOP too. I said I turned that over to Laird. I also told the Chiefs what had happened up in Packard's office.

I think that Laird and Bushardt might turn it around so I am not sure we are out of the woods yet. We should be able to live with it though. The Army seems to be happy, but if they are not I told Vogt one thing they are not going to get any sympathy from me -- that I have had it. He said they do not have anyone else with them either.

1803

Called Admiral McCain on the telephone and told him about the Sea of Okhotsk operation and that SECDEF had decided to cancel it. We had been talking it over a lot and because of things taking place like Gromyko coming in Monday and Warner going to Moscow for incidents at sea conference we decided to put it off, but I have got support from State to permit us to send our own group in at a later time as soon as the political arena cools. I asked McCain to submit a plan for 2 or 3 ships to run in there like we do in the Black Sea. McCain thought that was good.

Jack said General Lai was there and that he met him at the airport and gave him the best wishes and asked what Lai's first name was because he keeps calling him Jack. I said it was Ming Tai. Jack said he liked Lai personally and was taking him up to headquarters to brief him and having a big dinner party for him tonight.

Jack said he would be calling Abe to see what is going on and he would be calling me back later. He said he discussed the business on the chain of command and he is going to tell him that I am in accord with his feelings. I asked that he tell Abe that I would take care of it and also that I am supporting him all the way on Weyand going to CORDS, but that no decision is made as yet. I think I have got them wavering a bit. McCain said Cross should not get the job and that when McCain was talking to Marshall Green he was really worried about his own position in life if the truth be known. Green felt the US was going wrong and that there was grave danger

particularly in the economic areas, in the way they were being handled, and that we were going into the atmosphere of neo-isolationism. The general impression that McCain got is that Green feels insecure and objects to Kissinger getting into his business. I said Henry is going to nail him to the cross. Jack said Green asked him if they were going to recommend that Cross get the job. Jack said that he did not know whether I knew it, but when Vice President Agnew was in Signapore Lai Quong Ku asked that he relieve Cross. I said there was another little problem here and that is that Cross was Laird's roommate. Anyway Cross is not big enough to handle the CORDS job. I told McCain that the real estate board that screwed us up in Waikiki and Ft. DeRussey and took the beach away from the Marines in Pendleton now want to take Navy Agana in Guam. I said I just talked to Shillito about it and that we should be out with a message requesting CINCPAC to make a survey of our requirements in Guam and fit it into the TTPI negotiations. I said to emphasize the fact that we are getting into an instable period due to the move in Okinawa and Taiwan and that we might have to reduce our presence, etc.. In other words the key point is that this is not the time to give up real estate in that area. If you get a message about this asking to work with this group the real purpose of the examination is to build up rational for holding onto that land.

McCain said getting back to Green the rest of the meeting was just standard. Jack thanked Green for inviting him to attend the Anzus meeting and he put on a presentation for him like he did at the SEATO gathering. McCain is leaving Sunday for SEATO and Bangkok and going to see Abe en route and unless I object he is going to ask him how he feels about going back to Washington as the Chief of Staff of the Army. I will not put it out just that way, but I will find out if he is willing to come back to Washington. Charlie Corcoran who was Abe's Chief of Staff at one time said he did not know how Abe would answer. Abe said he had the best job in the Army where he is and would just as soon as stay there. I said I doubt very seriously whether he would want to come back. Jack said he would let me know. I told him I had the NATO Military Committee coming in Sunday -- that it was a once in five years affair so I would be out of Washington 5 days next week. I said Westmoreland will be acting and that if McCain had anything he wanted taken care of that he wanted me to do personally to wait until I got back. Jack said he would talk to me Saturday before he left and said he wanted Carrie and me to stay with him when we came out there. He has a new record rig from Abe. I told him I had one just like it -- a 5,000 San-Soui and an Akai tape deck. Jack said I did not have a reverberator. I said no I do not -- how about getting me one. He said he got it from the exchange in Saigon and that even Abe did not have one, but it goes into the system and adds depth to the music. I told him that on that little weapons system I designed for him I had the boys in visual aids draw up a standard version that is really terrific and I would send it to him. Jack said one thing about it was that it was a bull elephant so it would have to be castrated before the zoo would take it. I said you can't do that -- you will take the fuse out of the gun.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 13526

1830

Met with LTGEN Knowles and he mentioned the disconnect between CIA and DIA position regarding the China situation. He was getting it squared away.

1837

Departed the Pentagon for Quarters SIX.

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