


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Date: 04-01-2014

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 09295

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, TECH, MNUC, CN

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY: BILATERALS WITH FRANCE

1. U.S./FRENCH (VEST/DE NAZELLE, GOLDSCHMIDT) BILATERALS ON NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY TOOK PLACE TUESDAY JUNE 17 AND COVERED MULTILATERAL EXPORT POLICY "DISCUSSION PAPER" AND SPECIFIC NUCLEAR EXPORT CASES OF BILATERAL CONCERN.

2. WITH REGARD TO MULTILATERAL DISCUSSION PAPER, FRENCH REITERATED PREFERENCE FOR PAPER SETTING FORTH GENERAL PRINCIPLES, WITH BRACKETED LANGUAGE, RATHER THAN MORE DETAILED APPROACH OF U.S. PAPER.

3. FRENCH ENVISAGE DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLES WHICH WILL IDENTIFY ITEMS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT. ITEMS WOULD THEN BE REFERRED BACK TO GOVERNMENTS WITH INDICATIONS OF WHICH COUNTRIES SUPPORT AND WHICH DO NOT SUPPORT THE VARIOUS ITEMS. A THIRD MULTILATERAL MEETING

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WOULD THEN BE HELD IN SEPTEMBER AT WHICH TIME AN AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES WOULD BE REACHED AND PUT INTO EFFECT WITH A WORKING GROUP COMMISSIONED TO WORK OUT DETAILS.

4. ON SUBSTANCE, FRENCH OBJECTED TO EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE RELATED TO APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS, SAYING THAT U.S. FORMULATION, REQUIRING BILATERAL SAFEGUARDS FOR EXCEPTIONS, WAS MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN FRENCH PROPOSAL. THEY WISHED TO HAVE FLEXIBILITY NOT TO APPLY ANY SAFEGUARDS IN SOME CASES, IF APPROPRIATE, BUT THEY EMPHASIZED THAT THESE WOULD BE EXTREMELY LIMITED EXCEPTIONS OF A DE MINIMIS NATURE, SUCH AS SUPPLY OF MATERIALS TO OVERCOME A TEMPORARY SHORTAGE TO A COUNTRY WHICH ALREADY HAS LARGE CAPACITY FOR PRODUCING SUCH MATERIALS.

5. FRENCH OBJECTED TO OBLIGATORY NATURE OF MULTINATIONAL FACILITIES FOR ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING. THEY ALSO QUESTIONED (1) INCLUSION OF HEAVY WATER TECHNOLOGY FOR SAFEGUARDS ON REPLICATED FACILITIES, (2) CONSTRAINT ON ENRICHMENT FACILITIES TO LESS THAN 20 PERCENT ENRICHMENT AND (3) SUPPLIER AGREEMENT TO PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS. FRENCH DID NOT HOWEVER OBJECT SPECIFICALLY TO PROVISION REQUIRING SUPPLIER CONSENT ON REPROCESSING OR OTHER ALTERATION OF SUPPLIED MATERIALS (PARAGRAPH A-5 OF DISCUSSION PAPER). IN GENERAL FRENCH SHOWED SOME WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER U.S. ARGUMENTS ON THE ABOVE ITEMS, AND AGREED THAT A DISTINCTION COULD BE MADE BETWEEN ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING.

6. MAIN SPECIFIC EXPORT CASE DISCUSSED WAS REPROCESSING

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USMISSION IAEA VIENNA PRIORITY

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EXDIS

FOR KOREA VEST INDICATED THAT U.S. HAD REMINDED ROK THAT U.S. HAS RIGHT OF APPROVAL ON REPROCESSING OF U.S. FUEL. VEST ALSO DESCRIBED SERIOUS U.S. CONCERNS CONCERNING ROK INTEREST IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND THAT U.S. WAS CONSIDERING APPROACH TO ROK TO TRY TO DISSUADE ROK ACQUISITION OF NATIONAL REPROCESSING.

7. GOLDSCHMIDT AND DE NAZELLE INDICATED ROK WILLING TO SIGN ANYTHING THE FRENCH HAVE ASKED FOR. GOLDSCHMIDT AT FIRST ASKED U.S. TO SEEK ROK ACCEPTANCE OF FRENCH PARTICIPATION. WHEN U.S. DEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT U.S. WOULD PROBABLY URGE ROK NOT TO ACQUIRE ANY IN-COUNTRY REPROCESSING CAPABILITY GOLDSCHMIDT RESPONDED THAT THERE WASN'T MUCH MONEY IN REPROCESSING SALES AND THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO KOREAN CANCELLATION OF THE DEAL IF SAINT GOBAIN WAS REIMBURSED FOR TERMINATION COSTS.

8. ON PAKISTAN, GOLDSCHMIDT SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAD NOT

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YET ACCEPTED SAFEGUARDS ON TECHNOLOGY AND THAT FURTHER
FRENCH/PAKISTANI DISCUSSIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK
IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION, U.S. DEL MENTIONED IRANIAN
INTEREST IN CONCEPT OF REGIONAL MULTINATIONAL
REPROCESSING.

RICHARDSON

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