
	(b)(1 Date: 200212 (b)(3	) ) NatSecAct		#3	36-18
	TO: ALEC	(1.)(4.)			•
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	FROM:	(b)(3) NatSe	ECACI		
	SUBJECT: EYES ONLY -		BER 2002 INTER	RROGATION SESSIONS WI	TH 'ABD AL-
	/b\/4\		- BODY		
	(b)(1)———(b)(3) CIAAct		<u> </u>		
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	TO: PRIORITY ALEC I	NFO DIRECT	OR.		
	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAc (b)(3) NatSe			,	
	SUBJECT: EYES ONLY	- DETAILS OF DECE	MBER 2002 INTI	ERROGATION	
	SESSIONS WI	TH 'ABD AL-RAHIM HU	SAYN MUHAMMAD	'ABDU NASHIR	
		(b)(1)—— (b)(3) CIAA			
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	TEXT:	(b)(3) NatS	BECACI		
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	1. ACTION REQUIAND EIGHT BELOW IN D	RED: NONE, FYI.		T PARAS SEVEN	
		KAPI INIEL FURMAT;	DEFER TO READ	WOUNTERD FOR IND	•
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	DISSEMINATION OF OTH	ER DETAILS BELOW.		(b)(1)	NatSecAct
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. (	DISSEMINATION OF OTH	INIOR AL-QA'IDA OPER		-RAHIM HUSAYN	NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3)



	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	
	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	
	SEEKING TO IMPRESS UPON SUBJECT  THE SEVERITY OF HIS PREDICAMENT AND ELICIT MORE INFORMATION,  EXPLAINED TO SUBJECT WHY SUBJECT WAS ONLY MAKING THINGS HARDER ON HIMSELF. "YOU HAVEN'T GIVEN US ANYTHING THAT'S HELPFUL,"	(b)(3) CIAAct
	BEGAN. "SINCE THE MINUTE YOU STOPPED TALKING ABOUT PORT RASHID YOU HAVE GIVEN US NOTHING. YOU TOLD US A LITTLE ABOUT BUT WE HAD TO SQUEEZE IT OUT OF YOU," SAID, WRINGING HIS HANDS IN FRONT OF SUBJECT'S FACE. "YOU ARE EITHER PURPOSEFULLY TRYING TO CONFOUND US - WHICH WON'T WORK - OR YOU ARE JUST BEING IMPRUDENT.	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
	THIS PLACE YOU'RE GOING, IF YOU ACT THERE THE WAY YOU'VE BEEN HERE,  THEY WILL TRASH YOU, " EXPLAINED. "I WON'T BE THERE TO HELP  YOU, BUT THESE MEN" - POINTED TO THE SECURITY TEAM - "WILL."  SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT "THIS IS NOT A JOKE, AND I'M NOT TRYING TO  TRICK YOU. IF YOU PROVIDE INFORMATION I WILL HELP YOU, BUT IF YOU DO	(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct
o)(1)	NOT YOU ARE HEADED FOR THE INNER RING OF HELL, AS MY FRIEND TOLD YOU BEFORE." SUBJECT BEGAN TO PROTEST THAT HE HAD TOLD EVERYTHING HE KNEW IN DETAIL AND WAS "NOT RUNNING AWAY FROM THE SUBJECTS," BUT INTERRUPTED HIM, SAYING "THAT'S THE WAY IT IS. ACTING CONTRIVED OR UPSET WON'T WORK A BIT OUT THERE. THE ONLY THING THAT WILL WORK IS MORE INFORMATION."	(b)(3) CIAAct
	Actinvolved in the plans at the port of jeddah. SecAct	
	"RIDICULOUS"; INTERRUPTED HIM AND SAID HE DID NOT WANT SUBJECT TO TALK ABOUT RIDICULOUS IDEAS, BUT TO TALK ABOUT REAL ONES. SUBJECT SAID THAT "OTHERS" HAD TOLD HIM ABOUT SURVEYING THE PORT OF JEDDAH FOR TARGETS THERE,	(b)(3) CIAAct
	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	

/ <b>.</b>	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAc (b)(3) NatSe		· ·
	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct		
	TOLD SUBJECT	TO GET BACK TO PORT OF JEDDAH,	(b)(3) CIAAct
	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAc (b)(3) NatSe		
	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	(b)(3) CIAAct	
(1) (3) CIAA (3) NatSe			
	SHOUTING NOW, COI REASONS FOR THIS." SUBJECT BEGAN BABBI	NTINUED, "I WANT TO KNOW YOUR LING AGAIN, SAYING THAT HE HAD THE RELATION WAS NOT DONE	(b)(3) CIAAct
	(sic). (b)(3) C	CIAAct	(b)(3) CIAAct
	"LET ME EXPLAIN YOUR DILEMMA," INFORMATION, BUT YOU DRIBBLE IT OUT. IT ANYTHING YOU SAY ANYMORE, OR ELSE WE O DO SAY. THIS IS YOUR OWN FAULT, AND IT JUST TOLD ME IS, FOR THESE REASONS, HE REASONABLE - BUT BECAUSE YOU ARE SO DE BELIEVE IT. WE ARE ASKING NICELY NOW,	OVER-INTERPRET WHAT YOU FINALLY I WILL HURT YOU. THE STORY YOU ARD TO BELIEVE. YOUR STORY IS AMNED DIFFICULT, WE CANNOT BUT WE HAVE TOLD YOU THAT YOU	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct
	ARE ABOUT TO GO TO ANOTHER PLACE. YOU IT IS GOING TO GET YOU HURT. I HAVE TO AND I AM NOT LYING TO YOU NOW."		
	10. ONCE FINISHED TRANSLATE SUBJECT TO TALK ABOUT EVERYTHING HE KI	FING THIS WARNING, TOLD NEW ABOUT RAMZI BIN AL-SHIBH.	(b)(3) CIAAct
		(b)(1) (b)(3) CIA (b)(3) Nat	

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(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	
(b)(3) CIAAct  (b)(3) National (b)(1)  (b)(3) National (b)(4)	
12. SUBJECT ASKED HIMSELF ALOUD WHAT ELSE COULD BE SAID ABOUT RAMZI BIN AL-SHIBH. SUBJECT OFFERED UP THAT HE HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED BIN AL-SHIBH TO BE REASONABLE, AND CALM. REPLIED WITH ANGER IN HIS VOICE THAT THIS (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2018/07/31 C06665566 (b)(3) CIAAct	
" POINTED OUT	
THAT SUBJECT HAD TALKED ABOUT PLANS FOR OPERATIONS IN HORMUZ, PORT	h)(1)
RASHID, A SURVEY AT	b)(3) CIAAct
	b)(3) NatSecAct
THE OF BRAIT ONE WAS RAMAT BIT ALL-BITS REPERRING. I DO NOT DISCOSS	b)(b) Natoechct
ANY OPERATIONS WITH BIN AL-SHIBH, "SUBJECT SAID.	
	(b)(1)
	(b)(3) CIAAct
SUBJECT SAID THAT ONCE HE HAD STARTED PLANS FOR THE HORMUZ OPERATION,	(b)(3) NatSecA
HE HAD ONLY THOUGHT OF HORMUZ. TOLD TO SPEAK UP, SUBJECT SAID THAT	
AL-QA'IDA HAD "NO SPECIFIC PLAN" IN EARLY 2002, AND THAT HE HAD	
BECOME INCREASINGLY OCCUPPIED WITH SUBSEQUENT PLANNING FOR AN	
OPERATION AT PORT RASHID, AND THAT HE HAD SPENT "A WEEK OR TWO IN	•
SAUDI ARABIA" BUT HAD BEEN VERY CAREFUL NOT TO TELL ANYONE ABOUT IT.	
(b)(1)	
(b)(3) NatSecAct	
(b)(1)	
(b)(3) NatSecAct	
(b)(1)	
(b)(3) CIAAct	
(b)(3) NatSecAct	
(5)(5) Hate 55/161	
	·
MOLD OUR TROP WILL U.T.C.	(b)(2) CIAA =+
TOLD SUBJECT THAT HIS	(b)(3) CIAAct
COMMENTS WERE CONFLICTING, AND MADE NO SENSE. HOW, SUBJECT WAS ASKED,	
DID HE EXPLAIN TRIPS TO SAUDI ARABIA, FREE TIME, AND VISITS WITH	
INSIGNIFICANT PEOPLE TO SEE HOW THEY WERE DOING IF, BY SUBJECT'S OWN	
ADMISSION, HE HAD BEEN CONSUMED WITH PLANNING FOR THE HORMUZ AND PORT	
RASHID OPERATIONS? "IT SOUNDS TO ME LIKE YOU ARE SAYING YOU WERE	
BREAKING CONTACT WITH PEOPLE WHO COULD HELP YOU, " SAID. SUBJECT SAID THAT HE HAD FREGUENTLY MET WITH MANY MEN. WITHOUT (6)(3)	) CIAAct

SPECIFIC REASONS TO DO SO. (b)(3) CIAAct	
15. "YOU ARE A HARD MAN TO BELIEVE," SAID. "YOU	
CONTRADICT YOURSELF OVER AND OVER. HERE'S A CHANCE FOR YOU TO	
ACTUALLY BE HELPFUL." SUBJECT WAS ASKED WHAT HE KNEW ABOUT PLANS E	
AL-QA'IDA OR GROUPS AFFILIATED WITH AL-QA'IDA THAT INVOLVED PEOPLE TARGETS IN (b)(1)	G OR
(b)(3) CIAAct	
(b)(3) NatSecAct	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
(b)(1)	
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	
(b)(3) NatSecAct	
	·
MOLD GUD TROP WANT IN GUD TROP DAD NOW DROTTY WO	(b)(3) CIAAct
TOLD SUBJECT THAT IF SUBJECT DID NOT BEGIN TO EXPLAIN THESE MATTERS IN A WAY THAT WAS TRUTHFUL AND MADE SENSE,	
WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HELP HIM. "IT'S ALMOST AS IF YOU WANT	(b)(3) CIAAct
GET INTO MORE TROUBLE," SAID. "I'M GOING TO ASK YOU A FEW	(b)(2) CIAAat
MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT JEDDAH, AND I EXPECT YOU TO DO BETTER. IF YOU DON'T, I'VE ALREADY TOLD YOU WHAT WILL HAPPEN." SUBJECT BEGAN TO	J. (b)(3) CIAAct
PROTEST THAT HE HAD TOLD EVERYTHING HE KNEW, BUT TOLD HIM	(b)(3) CIAAct
THAT ON THE CONTRARY, "EVERY TIME YOU OPEN YOUR MOUTH YOU MAKE	
YOURSELF SOUND LIKE SOME STUPID LITTLE HELPER, THE SHAYKH'S LITTLE ERRAND BOY." SAID NOBODY BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE,	·
SAID SUBJECT WAS QUICKLY RUNNING OUT OF CHANCES TO HELP HIMSELF.	(b)(3) CIAAct
	· ·
(b)(1)	·
(b)(3) CIAAct	
(b)(3) NatSecAct	

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	19. INTERROGATION SESSION ENDED WITH HARSHLY DELIVERING	
	THE BRIDGE THAT SUBJECT HAD FAILED TO DISCUSS THE PEOPLE OR	
	CIRCUMSTANCES OF PLANS FOR ATTACKS IN WHICH INTERROGATORS ALREADY	(b)(3) CIAAct
	KNEW HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED, DESPITE BEING FED INFORMATION FROM	(D)(S) CIAACI
	TO PROVE THAT WE KNEW THIS WAS THE CASE. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT WHILE	
	OTHER AL-QA'IDA DETAINEES HAD EITHER UNASHAMEDLY ADMITTED THEIR PLANS	
	AND INTENTIONS, OR HAD TOLD INTERROGATORS THAT THEY WOULD NOT TELL	
	WHAT THEY WERE, SUBJECT HAD CHOSEN TO LIE AND TO TRY AND BLAME ALL OF	
	HIS OWN ACTIVITIES ON HIS SUPPOSED FRIENDS. SUBJECT WAS ASSURED THAT	
	INTERROGATORS WOULD DO THEIR DUTY AND THAT SUBJECT WOULD PROVIDE THE	
	INFORMATION THEY KNEW HE HAD, BUT BECAUSE OF HIS OWN CHOICES THIS	
- \ (4 \	WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR "THE HARD WAY." INTERROGATION CONCLUDED AT 1105	
o)(1)	Not Coo Act	•
0)(3)	NatSecAct(b)(1)	
	(b)(3) CIAAct	
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	

END OF MESSAGE

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