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TO RUMJBT/AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA 337

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CONFIDENTIAL Ø6 DEC 65 CN: 183A

DATE: DECEMBER 6, 1965

ACTION:

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ECON POL

1. FOLLOWING VIRTUAL DESTRUCTION OF PKI AND ITS FAR LEFT ALLIES

ON SUMATRA, ARMY IMPLEMENTING VARIETY OF MEASURES AIMED AT STRENGTHENING ITS GRIP ON ALL ASPECTS POLITICAL LIFE THIS ISLAND.

ARMY NOW IN PROCESS OF OPENLY ENGINEERING FORMATION OF MOSLEM

EEM

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UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION TO EMBRACE AND CONTROL ALL MOSLEM ORGANIZATIONS. CIVIL SERVICE COWED BY DRASTIC PURGES AND TOP OFFICIALS CLEARLY

TAKING ORDERS FROM ARMY. ACTING GOVERNOR BY HIS OWN ACCOUNT CHOSEN BY GENERAL MOKOGINTA FOR THE JOB. CONSULATE HAS DIRECTLY OBSERVED

THAT HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS NOW UNDER ARMY CONTROL IN DAILY OPERATIONS.

CFN 337 78

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PAGE TWO RUMJEM 392 C O N F I D E N T I A L

AT DISTRICT LEVEL, MILITARY COMMANDERS RECENTLY BECAME HEADS OF DISTRICT GOVERNING BODIES, THE SECOND LEVEL PANTJA TUNGGALS, BY ORDER OF PROVINCIAL COMMANDER. ARMY HAS ACTED TO CONTROL YOUTH AT EARLY AGE BY BANNING ALL STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS IN SUMATRAN SCHOOLS BELOW UNIVERSITY LEVEL WHILE AT SAME TIME MAKING MEMBERSHIP IN ARMY CONTROLLED PRAMUKA COMPULSORY FOR ALL STUDENTS BETWEEN AGES 8 AND 13. IN ADDITION TO EXTENSIVE PURGE AND NAMING ARMY OFFICER AS SEC-RETARY, NORTH SUMATRA NATIONAL FRONT HAS BEEN PUBLICLY LECTURED AND CRITICIZED BY PROVINCIAL COMMANDER. HIS COMMENTS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT FRONT WILL NOW BECOME ARMY INSTRUMENT FOR CONTROLLING PARTIES AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS. PRESS FIRMLY UNDER ARMY DIRECTION FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE PURGE OF PWI JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION WHICH NOW HEADED IN NORTH SUMATRA BY ARMY OFFICER. MOKOGINTA HAS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT IN ADDITION TO PERMISSION FROM MINISTRY INFORMATION, NEWSPAPERS MUST HAVE HIS APPROVAL PRIOR TO PUBLICATION. ARMY ALSO BROADENING AND EXTENDING ITS PHYSICAL CONTROL OF BOTH CITIES AND COUNTRYSIDE BY ARMING SELECTED HANSIP UNITS, A MEASURE WHICH AMOUNTS TO ARMY VERSION OF PKI PROPOSAL TO ARM WORKERS AND PEASANTS. WHEN IMPLEMENTED. THIS MEASURE WILL EXTEND DIRECT MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND INTO EVERY VILLAGE ON SUMATRA.

CFN 8 13

- 2. ALL-SUMATRA COMMANDER GENERAL MOKOGINTA AND OTHER TOP OFFICERS
 HERE HAVZ MADE IT CLEAR ON SEVERAL OCCASSIONS THAT THEY BELIEVE
 POLITICAL PARTIES SHOULD BE ELIMINATED FROM INDONESIAN POLITICAL LIFE.
 ABOVE MEASURES CERTAINLY TEND TO WEAKEN PARTIES ON THIS ISLAND.
 BEFORE ABORTIVE COUP, MOKOGINTA ONCE TOLD ME HE ENVISAGES PROPER
 INDONESIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AS BASED ON FUNCTIONAL GROUPS
 RATHER THAN PARTIES. ARMY MOVES ALSO TEND IN THAT DIRECTION, WITH
 SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL FACTOR OF ARMY CONTROL OVER ALL SUCH GROUPS.
- 3. ALTHOUGH MOKOGINTA HAS SAID THAT ARMY IS NOT RPT NOT ENGAGED IN SETTING UP PERMANENT MILITARY REGIME, IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE ARMY WILL AT SOME POINT IN FUTURE WILLINGLY RELINGUISH ITS NOW SWEEPING POWERS.
- 4. WHILE I ASSUME MANY FACTIONS HERE ARE NOT PLEASED BY PROSPECT OF PERMANENT ARMY REGIME WHICH HARDLY LIKELY BE VERY DEMOCRATIC, THERE IS NO RPT NO APPARENT OPPOSITION. MANY APPEAR TO SEE ARMY REGIME AS ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO COMMUNIST REGIME AND THEY PREFER ARMY. OTHERS ARE SIMPLY WAITING TO SEE WHAT ARMY REGIME WILL BE LIKE.
- 5. REGARDLESS OF ULTIMATE POPULAR REACTION TO ARMY AS POLITICAL MASTER THIS ISLAND, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ARMY CAN BE EFFECTIVELY

PAGE FOUR RUMJEM 392 C O N F I D E N T I A L CHALLENGED ON THE GROUND IN SUMATRA. WITH EXCEPTION OF ARMY, PKI HAD EFFECTIVELY DESTROYED OR EMASCULATED VIRTUALLY ALL POLITICAL FO-RCES HERE PRIOR TO COUP. LONG INACTIVE AND DISCREDITED MASJUMI CERTAINLY IN NO RPT NO POSITION RESIST ARMY DOMINATION. ONE GROUP CAPABLE OF AT LEAST PASSIVE RESISTANCE IS PNI WHICH STILL COMMANDS LARGE FOLLOWING. HOWEVER PNI SPLIT AND UNDER HEAVY SUSPICION OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION. ARMY SOURCES HAVE OPENLY EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PNI SHELTERING SECRET PKI MEMBERS AND LEADERS OF ARMY-CONTROLLED YOUTH GROUPS HAVE TOLD CONSULATE THAT THEY INTEND PURGE PNI OR DESTROY IT. THUS, WHILE PNI MAY CAUSE ARMY SOME DIFFICULTIES, IT IS UNLIKELY TO PRESENT SERIOUS OR EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE TO ARMY REGIME.

6. IN SHORT, SUMATRA IS RAPDILY BECOMING AN ARMY FIEF. EVENTS IN DJAKARTA COULD OF COURSE QUICKLY ALTER THIS DEVELOPING PATTERN. BUT EVEN SHARP REVERSES FOR NASUTION AND SUHARTO IN THEIR STRUGGLE WITH PALACE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE ANY GREAT IMPACT ON MILITARY CONTROL OF SUMATRA.

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