

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

83

SECRET

.VZCZCFHE708VZCZCFHE704VV OLA357 009694

Action

OO RUEHC

ACDA

DE RUFHOL 10500/1 0690020

1967 MAR 9 PM 8 49

ZNY SSSSS

Info

O R 100001Z MAR 57

SS

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

GPM

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SP

INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS

SC

RUDICR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

SAH

RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME

L

RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

H

RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA

EUR

STATE GRNC

IO

BI

P

SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO BONN 10500

NATUS DISTO USEC

NSC

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR FOSTER'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER

INR

CIA

1. AMBASSADOR FOSTER, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR MCGHEE AND  
DEPALMA, MET FOG ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS' DISCUSSION OF THE NPT  
THIS AFTERNOON WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER. ALSO PRESENT ON THE  
GERMAN SIDE WERE DEFENSE MINISTER SCHROEDER, SCIENCE MINISTER  
STOLTENBERG, FONOFF STATE SECRETARY SCHUETZ, ACTING PRESS  
SPOKESMAN AHLERS, AND A NUMBER OF CHANCELLERY OFFICIALS.  
THE MAIN POINTS MADE BY THE CHANCELLOR WERE:

NSA

DOD

NIC

SCI

AEC

OST

RSR

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 10500/1 SECRET

(A) HIS DESIRE FOR BROAD CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES  
NOT LIMITED TO THE TREATY TEXT BUT COVERING THE RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN THE TREATY AND SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE FUTURE OF NATO; AND

(B) HIS INSISTENCE THAT THE FRG REQUIRED ADDITIONAL TIME SO THAT  
THROUGH SUCH CONSULTATIONS QUESTIONS WHICH ARE STILL OPEN CAN  
BE RESOLVED.

A PRESS STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE TO THIS  
EFFECT FOLLOWING AGREEMENT ON ITS SUBSTANCE WITH AMBASSADOR  
FOSTER AT THE END OF THE MEETING.

2. KIESINGER OPENED HIS REMARKS BY NOTING THAT THE QUESTION OF  
AN NPT WAS A SERIOUS MATTER FOR THE WHOLE WORLD. HE RECALLED  
FOSTER'S 1965 FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARTICLE IN WHICH FOSTER HAD REF-  
ERRED TO THE MANY PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN AN NPT WITHIN THE CONTEXT  
OF NATO AND THE FRG'S INTERESTS. FOSTER HAD MENTIONED THE

SECRET

*me*

SECRET

-2- BONN 10500, MARCH 9, 1967

SECTION ONE OF TWO

POSSIBILITY OF AN EROSIIVE EFFECT ON THE ALLIANCE. KIESINGER SAID THAT THE FRG HAS SIMILAR WORRIES. HIS ADMINISTRATION IS CONVINCED THAT EROSION OF THE ALLIANCE IS A PRICE THAT MUST NOT BE PAID; RATHER THE NPT MUST LEAD TO A STRENGTHENING OF THE ALLIANCE. IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT HE WISHED TO CONDUCT TALKS ON THE SUBJECT WITH HIS AMERICAN FRIENDS.

3. THE SOVIETS HAD PLACED THE FRG IN A MOST DIFFICULT POSITION THROUGH STATEMENTS MADE BY LEADING SOVIET OFFICIALS THAT THE USSR WOULD SIGN AN NPT ONLY IF THE FRG SIGNED. THIS MAKES THE POSITION OF THE FRG UNIQUE AND IMPOSES ON THE GERMAN SIDE A GREAT RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH KIESINGER RECOGNIZED.

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 10500/1 S E C R E T

4. KIESINGER RECALLED THAT HE HAD, ON SEVERAL RECENT OCCASIONS, REFERRED TO AN ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY WHICH HAD ENTERED INTO US-GERMAN RELATIONS. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE HAD BEEN EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE NPT, BUT THESE HAVE MOSTLY BEEN DEVOTED TO THE FORMULATION OF THE DRAFT TREATY. HE WOULD HAVE WISHED THAT THE FRG HAD CONSIDERED THE WHOLE PROBLEM MORE FULLY AT THE TIME THAT FOSTER HAD DISCUSSED IT IN HIS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARTICLE. THE GERMAN SIDE HAS RECEIVED MUCH INFORMATION FROM THE US, BUT EVEN NOW THERE HAS BEEN NO REAL BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF BROAD QUESTIONS SUCH AS HOW THE UNITED STATES VIEWS FUTURE PRIORITIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF NATO WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NON-PROLIFERATION. HE APPRECIATED VERY MUCH HIS TALKS WITH MCCLOY AND WITH AMBASSADOR MCGHEE BUT, WHILE THEY WERE HIGHLY USEFUL, HE CONSIDERED THEM PROVISIONAL AND PIECEMEAL IN NATURE. THE UNEASINESS PREVALENT AMONG THE GERMAN PEOPLE WITH REGARD TO THE NPT RESULTS FROM UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THE TREATY IS "IMBEDDED IN THE COMMON INTEREST OF OUR TWO NATIONS". KIESINGER UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS A MUTUAL INTEREST BETWEEN THE US AND USSR TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, BUT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT SOVIET MOTIVES WERE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE US -- "WHICH WE RECOGNIZE AND RESPECT".

5. FOSTER REVIEWED HIS LONG ASSOCIATION WITH GERMANY AND THE

PAGE 4 RUFHOL 10500/1 S E C R E T

EUROPEAN MOVEMENT AND STRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH WITH THE NPT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO GERMANY'S INTERESTS AND TO THE OBJECTIVE OF EUROPEAN UNITY. THERE HAD, UNFORTUNATELY, BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FRG AND HE THEREFORE WISHED TO STRESS AGAIN -- AS THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY HAD ALREADY DONE -- OUR DESIRE FOR THE "CLOSEST CONSULTATION" WITH THE FRG. FOSTER MADE CLEAR THAT THERE

SECRET

SECRET

-3- BONN 10500, MARCH 9, 1967 SECTION ONE OF TWO

IS "NO TREATY" IN EXISTENCE. WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT WITH THE SOVIETS AND WITH OUR ALLIES IS THE FORMULATION OF CERTAIN PRINCIPLES, WHICH WOULD BE PUT FORWARD IN THE ENDC AS A FORUM WHERE THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED COULD BE REPRESENTED.

6. FOSTER REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THE NPT SINCE A BASIC CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDE HAD BECOME APPARENT LAST AUGUST, EMPHASIZING THAT FROM THE BEGINNING THE FRG, ALONG WITH OUR OTHER ALLIES, WAS KEPT INFORMED. FOSTER DESCRIBED THE SECRETARY'S INSISTENCE DURING HIS THREE DINNER CONVERSATIONS LAST SEPTEMBER WITH GROMYKO, THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS, THE MCNAMARA COMMITTEE AND SIMILAR MATTERS WERE NONE OF THE SOVIET'S BUSINESS AND COULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE TREATY. IT HAD BEEN CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE FORMULATIONS IN A TEXT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BY THE USSR WITH ITS ALLIES AND BY THE US WITH ITS ALLIES, BEFORE A TEXT COULD BE TABLED IN THE ENDC. GROMYKO HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT LIKE THE WAY OUR WEAPONS WERE DEPLOYED, THE

PAGE 5 RUFHOL 10500/1 S E C R E T

MCNAMARA COMMITTEE, ETC BUT HE RECOGNIZED THAT THESE WERE POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND NOT PART OF THE TREATY. FOSTER MENTIONED THAT THE GENERAL NPT SITUATION HAD BEEN OUTLINED TO FORMER CHANCELLOR ERHARD AND THE THEN FONMIN SCHROEDER DURING THEIR WASHINGTON VISIT LAST SEPTEMBER. SUBSEQUENTLY, HE HAD SPOKEN WITH AMBASSADOR SCHNIPPENKOETTER IN WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER. FOSTER'S PRESENT VISIT WAS A FURTHER INDICATION OF OUR DESIRE FOR FULL CONSULTATION.

7. FOSTER POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT AGREE TO PUT FORWARD A PARTIAL DRAFT IN GENEVA. AS A RESULT, THE NON-ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH OUR FORMULATIONS. THEY ARE BECOMING IMPATIENT AND ARE FEARFUL THAT FINAL DRAFTS ARE BEING WORKED OUT BEHIND THEIR BACKS ON WHICH THEY WILL HAVE NO INFLUENCE. FOR THIS REASON, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO TABLE A DRAFT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WE FEEL THIS IS ALSO DESIRABLE IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE THE MANY MISCONCEPTIONS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY. FROM THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW, TABELING THE TREATY WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD THEN PUT FORWARD SUGGESTIONS AND THUS RELIEVE THE FRG FROM THE NECESSITY OF DOING SO. FOSTER THOUGHT THAT QUITE POSSIBLY SOME OF THE POINTS WHICH THE GERMANS HAVE RAISED WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS IF PUT FORWARD BY ANOTHER COUNTRY.

PAGE 5 RUFHOL 10500/1 S E C R E T

S. FOSTER EMPHASIZED THAT WE SHALL STILL BE CONSULTING WHEN

SECRET

SECRET

-4- BONN 10500, MARCH 9, 1967

SECTION ONE OF TWO

THE DRAFT IS TABLED AT GENEVA. THE DISCUSSIONS THERE WILL BE A CONSULTATIVE PROCESS. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO ACHIEVE NON-PROLIFERATION. THIS OBVIOUSLY PLACES CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES BUT IT OFFERS GREAT PROMISE FOR THE STABILITY AND WELL-BEING OF THE WORLD AND ALSO PRESENTS POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS IN GERMANY'S RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND IN REGARD TO MOVEMENT TOWARD EUROPEAN UNITY.

9. FOSTER MADE CLEAR THAT INSISTENCE ON SAFEGUARDS DOES NOT STEM FROM THE SOVIETS BUT FROM THE UNITED STATES AND SOME OF ITS ALLIES. WE FEEL THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STABILITY OF THE TREATY WILL BE FURTHERED BY THE MUTUAL TRUST WHICH ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS WILL PRODUCE. FOSTER ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS CONTRARY TO LOCAL PRESS REPORTS, ARE NOT ENGAGING IN DELAYING TACTICS ON THE TREATY. THEY ARE ANXIOUS TO MOVE FORWARD AND TALKED FOR A TIME OF TABLING A DRAFT ON THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENDC.

10. KIESINGER SAID THAT HE WOULD ALWAYS BE HAPPY IF OTHER COUNTRIES RATHER THAN THE FRG - EXPRESSED CERTAIN OBJECTIVES WHICH ACCORD WITH THE VITAL GERMAN INTERESTS. HE ALSO FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE FEAR OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES THAT AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED BEHIND THEIR BACKS. HIS OWN IDEA WAS THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER, WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, TO HAVE DISCUSSED ALL ASPECTS OF NON-PROLIFERATION "BEHIND LOCKED DOORS", BEFORE ANY INTENTION OF SIGNING THE TREATY HAD BECOME PUBLIC. HE WAS DIRECTING THIS COMMENT TO THE FRG AS WELL AS TO OTHERS. HE THOUGHT THAT WE WERE NOW AT A POINT WHERE IT WOULD NOT BE EASY "TO MAKE UP FOR WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DONE".

GP-3. MCGHEE  
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, USIA 3/9/67

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

83

SECRET

Action

NNNNVZCZCFHE705VV OLA358  
OO RUEHC

ACDA

DE RUFHOL 12500/2 0690100  
ZNY SSSSS

Info

O R 100001Z MAR 67  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

SS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

1967 MAR 9 PM 8 49 009696

GPM

INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS

SP

RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

SC

RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME

SAH

RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

L

RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA

H

STATE GRNC

EUR

BT

S E C R E T SECTION TWO OF TWO BONN 10500

IO

NATUS DISTO USEC

P

NSC

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR FOSTER'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

NIC

SCI

AEC

OST

RSR

11. KIESINGER RECALLED THAT IT WAS THE OBJECTIVE OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO OVERCOME EUROPEAN TENSIONS AND THE DIVISION OF THE CONTINENT AND TO DEVELOP BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. HE DID NOT WISH TO HOLD TO STERILE FORMULAS ON THE GERMAN QUESTION UNDER WHICH REUNIFICATION MUST PRECEDE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FRG COULD NOT ACCEPT THE REVERSE, DETENTE WOULD COME FIRST AND THEN, ONLY IN SOME DISTANT FUTURE--"LIKE AND APPLE DROPPING FROM A TREE"--THERE WOULD BE A RESOLUTION OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM. KIESINGER UNDERLINED AGAIN THAT GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR WERE INORDINATELY DIFFICULT AND STATED THAT "EVEN AFTER WE MIGHT HAVE SIGNED A TREATY AND I REPEAT, MIGHT HAVE SIGNED", THE SOVIETS MIGHT STILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THE SAME ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE GERMANS. THE FRG DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERS INTEND TO USE THREATS OR BLACK-MAIL AGAINST GERMANY, BUT THE SITUATION COULD CHANGE. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES GERMANY WOULD FACE A SPECIAL PROBLEM AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT MUST CONSIDER "HOW WE COULD DEFEND OURSELVES BEING OURSELVES DEFENSELESS". DEFENSE WOULD OBVIOUSLY DEPEND ON NATO AND ON THE UNITED STATES, WHICH, THE CHANCELLOR SAID, UNDERSCORES AGAIN THE NEED TO KNOW HOW THE UNITED STATES SEES THE FUTURE. HE HOPED THAT IT DID NOT SEEM ARROGANT TO PLACE SO MUCH IMPORTANCE ON THIS POINT, BUT HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR HOW DIFFERENT THE GERMAN POSITION WAS FROM THAT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.

12. THE CHANCELLOR THEN TURNED TO QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE.

SECRET

SECRET

-2- BONN 10500, MARCH 9, 1967 SECTION TWO OF TWO

IN REGARD TO TIMING HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE A DIFFERENCE IN INTERESTS BETWEEN THE US AND THE FRG. THE US WISHED FOR QUICK TABLING OF A TEXT, WHEREAS THE GERMAN SIDE FELT THERE WERE MANY UNSETTLED PROBLEMS STILL TO BE RESOLVED. THE FRG DESIRED MORE TIME, BUT THIS WAS NO INDICATION OF ILL WILL ON ITS PART OR OF A DESIRE TO KILL THE TREATY. THE CHANCELLOR WISHED TO HAVE A TREATY WHICH COULD BE PRESENTED TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE ON A SOUND BASIS AND IN GOOD CONSCIENCE. HE FELT THAT, ONCE A TEXT WAS TABLED AFTER SO MUCH EFFORT, THE INEVITABLE TENDENCY WOULD BE TO CONSIDER IT AS FINAL. IT WOULD BE VERY BAD IF THE FRG IN ACCORD WITH ITS INTERPRETATION OF ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS, WOULD HAVE TO REJECT CERTAIN FORMULATIONS AT THAT POINT. KIESINGER ASKED IN THIS CONNECTION WHETHER THERE COULD BE A BETTER MEANS OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE US AND THE FRG. HE WAS WORRIED BECAUSE TALKS WERE NOW TAKING PLACE IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS, AND POSSIBLY TO SOME EXTENT AT CROSS PURPOSES. HE ALSO WISHED TO KNOW HOW THE US FORESAW FUTURE PROGRESS ON THE TREATY--WHAT WAS OUR TIMETABLE?

13. FOSTER REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO TIMETABLE. FUTURE PROGRESS WILL DEPEND IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES. THERE IS NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT A LONG DELAY COULD PRODUCE MORE PROBLEMS. SOME COUNTRIES--INDIA FOR EXAMPLE--MIGHT IN THE INTERIM MAKE A POLITICAL DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH NATIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS. AS FOR CONSULTATIONS, FOSTER SUGGESTED THAT THESE BE HELD IN WASHINGTON IN AN ORDERLY FASHION. THE PRESENTATION OF THREE SEPARATE GERMAN MESSAGES BY DIFFERENT REPRESENTATIVES WITHIN 24 HOURS, AS HAD BEEN THE CASE YESTERDAY, PRESENTED CERTAIN PROBLEMS FOR HIS STAFF. FOSTER STATED THAT WE SHALL RESPOND TO THESE GERMAN SUGGESTIONS BUT NOTED THAT SOME OF THEM POSE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. THE REVISION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS BY THE US AND THE FRG COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS NOT ONLY WITH THE SOVIETS BUT WITH OUR OTHER WESTERN ALLIES AS WELL. FOSTER MENTIONED THAT HE WOULD TRAVEL TO OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS, CONSULTATIONS WOULD ALSO BE CARRIED OUT IN NAC ON SOME OF THE LARGER PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE WHICH THE CHANCELLOR HAD MENTIONED.

14. AT THE CHANCELLOR'S REQUEST, MINISTER STOLTENBERG BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED HIS EARLIER MEETING WITH FOSTER (PREPARED BY SEPTEL). THE CHANCELLOR THEN PROVIDED THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED PRESS STATEMENT WHICH, AFTER MINOR REVISION, WAS AGREED IN THE FOLLOWING FORM:

"THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AND THE AMERICAN DISARMAMENT REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR FOSTER, HAD AN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION TODAY ON THE NPT AND THE PROBLEMS CONNECTED THEREWITH. IN CONNECTION WITH

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority AIAA 72893

SECRET

-3- BONN 10500, MARCH 9, 1967 SECTION TWO OF TWO

THE FUTURE PROCEDURE, THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR NOTED THAT IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TREATY TO WORLD PEACE AND ALSO TO THE FUTURE AND THE SECURITY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE, SUFFICIENT *TIME* MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR THOROUGH CONSULTATION ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE TREATY INCLUDING ITS INCORPORATION IN THE COMMON ALLIANCE POLICY OF THE WEST. AMBASSADOR FOSTER DECLARED THE READINESS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND WITH ALL OF THE NATO MEMBERS."

GP-3. MCGHEE  
BT

NOTE: PASSED ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, USIA 3-9- 67

SECRET



National Security Archive,  
Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University,  
2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037,  
Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, [nsarchiv@gwu.edu](mailto:nsarchiv@gwu.edu)