TELEGRAM Department of State

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IRISH ITEM: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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ment must be Returned

1) USDEL should emphasize to Irish that, while we sympathize with objectives their proposal and are prepared join in analytical discussion thereof in expert forum, we strongly urge Irish revert to procedural resolution like that of last year. In explaining our position, USDEL should stress following points:

possession or custody At present the US neither transfers/ Material of nuclear weapons nor intends to make such transfers. Indeed it is restricted by law from so doing (

- b. US still knows of no way of verifying ban on transfer as proposed by-Ireland in view impossibility detect weapons concealed before or after agreement, extreme length national frontiers, possibility smuggling fissionable material, and weapons design in microfilm, just like narcotics. This problemC infinitely greater in dealing with closed societies of Communist bloc.
- c. Requirement for effective inspection such a ban much more critical than, for example, test suspension. Successful violation could endow nation with entire capability necessary to fight diversionary nuclear war.
 - d. US has had bitter experience unverifiable declaratory agreements which

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society bound by democratic tradition and public opinion must respect, but totalitarian regime need not. Some control worse than none if it x restrains honorable government but provides cloak for clandestine action potential aggressor. This factor plus open societies of West in contrast closed Communist bloc societies makes it clearly impossible in our own interest to commit the US to such proposition as the Irish suggest. In addition, to do so would set a precedent for other such unverified pledge arrangements and in so doing would play directly into Soviet hands.

- e. For these reasons, US believes crux nuclear disarmament lies in areas production and weapons development and, therefore, until and unless fresh scientific developments permit alternative approach, we favor the three-pronged attack on problem we have already proposed, i.e., through inspected agreements on nuclear test discontinuance, fissionable material production "cut-off", nuclear weapons stockpiles by reduction "transfers to peaceful uses".
- f. Ten nations failed examine any measure disarmament, not just Irish proposal. Failure due primarily Soviet insistence conference first agree in principle to negotiate GCD in its entirety. We hope Soviets willing resume business-like negotiations soon, at which time this item can be dealt with. Only through negotiations of verifiable agreements can these problems be worked out. It is for this reason that the US continues to urge the Soviet Union to resume negotiations and that the US has repeatedly indicated its readiness to do so immediately.
- 2) As suggested our position paper SD/A/C.1/125, we realize prospects for referral resolution may be unfavorable. Request therefore you keep situation under continual assessment and keep department informed.

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