

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Info

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN
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INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ BONN 11806

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VIPTO 75

PARIS FOR VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT: III: NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

1. IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, VICE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT THE NPT WAS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO THE US. PRESIDENT JOHNSON PUT A HIGH PRIORITY ON IT. IT WAS ALSO A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT VICE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASIZED IN HIS TALKS IN NETHERLANDS, ITALY, BRITAIN AND GENEVA.
2. CHANCELLOR OBSERVED THAT NPT WAS, BEYOND DOUBT, THE SINGLE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM EXISTING BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE U.S. HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE AT OUTSET THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS PROBLEM.
3. CHANCELLOR STATED THAT THE GERMAN POSITION ON THE NPT MIGHT SEEM PARADOXICAL AT FIRST GLANCE. FRG HAD RENOUNCED PRODUCTION OF ABC WEAPONS ON ITS OWN SOIL IN ITS TREATY WITH THE WEU. FRG, INCLUDING HIS OWN GOVERNMENT, HAD DECLARED REPEATEDLY THAT IT DID NOT WANT NATIONAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY WERE SERIOUS ABOUT THIS MATTER.
4. FRG DID, HOWEVER, WANT TO KEEP OPEN THE SO-CALLED "EUROPEAN OPTION." A UNITED EUROPE SHOULD BE ABLE TO HAVE A MODERN DEFENSE SYSTEM. IT WAS THE CONCERN, NOT JUST OF GERMANY BUT ALSO OF OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, TO KEEP THIS OPTION OPEN. FRANCE DID NOT WANT GERMANY TO HAVE CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR ARMS, WHICH WAS A VIEWPOINT HE COULD UNDERSTAND AND RESPECT.
5. VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT US WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH IDEA OF A EUROPEAN OPTION. THERE SHOULD BE SOME RIGHT OF SUCCESSION TO THE NUCLEAR POTENTIAL NOW HELD BY BRITAIN AND FRANCE, IF A UNITED EUROPE SHOULD EVOLVE.

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NLJ 91-396
By *WJD*, NARA, Date *10/19/04*

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6. CHANCELLOR COMMENTED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO SAY ON THIS POINT. HE ALSO EXPRESSED HOPE THAT SOLUTIONS COULD BE FOUND FOR QUESTIONS OF RESEARCH, SPIN-OFF, ETC. HIS CABINET WOULD HEAR A REPORT FROM A WORKING GROUP ON THIS PROBLEM TOMORROW.

7. VICE PRESIDENT ASKED CHANCELLOR IF HE HAD SEEN THE LATEST REVISED DRAFT OF THE NPT. REAL PROBLEM WAS ARTICLE III. THIS MIGHT TAKE MORE TIME TO DISCUSS. HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING WHAT FRG CABINET WOULD DECIDE ON THIS MATTER.

8. CHANCELLOR REPLIED THAT NO DECISION COULD BE EXPECTED TOMORROW. AFTER REPORT OF WORKING GROUP, FONMIN BRANDT AND AMB SCHNIPPENKOETTER WOULD HAVE TO GIVE THEIR VIEWS TO THE CABINET.

9. HE WANTED TO ASSURE THE VICE PRESIDENT THAT SOME OF THE GERMAN REACTIONS TO DRAFT TREATY, AS REPORTED BY PRESS, WERE NOT SHARED BY HIMSELF OR BY MOST MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT. SOME PEOPLE HERE CONTENDED THAT TREATY WAS NOT POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE AT ALL. HE AND MOST MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT SHARE THIS VIEW. HE WAS NOT AGAINST THE TREATY AS SUCH, BUT BELIEVED THAT SOME POINTS OF IMPORTANCE WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED FURTHER.

10. THE PRINCIPAL POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR FRG IN CONSIDERING NPT WAS ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SOVIET UNION. FRG WOULD BE TAKING AN OBLIGATION TO A COUNTRY WHICH, FOR YEARS AND WITHOUT ANY REASON HAD ATTACKED, SLANDERED AND THREATENED IT. FRG WAS HONESTLY SEEKING TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION, AND HAD MADE SUGGESTIONS TO THAT END. THE ONLY RESULT HAD BEEN A SOVIET NOTE ACCUSING GERMANY OF NUCLEAR PLOTTING AND REVANCHIST PLANS. KOSYGIN HAD SAID IN LONDON THAT FRG WOULD HAVE TO SIGN THIS TREATY WHETHER IT LIKED IT OR NOT. THE USSR WOULD IF A TREATY WERE SIGNED PARTICIPATE EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY IN CONTROLLING THE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE TREATY.

11. VICE PRESIDENT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS A SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT THE US WOULD HAVE TO TALK TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT THIS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOVIET NOTE HAD BEEN IMPOLITE, ARROGANT AND FULL OF VITUPERATIONS. MAYBE SUCH STATEMENTS WERE NECESSARY FOR PEOPLE LIKE ULBRICHT WHO NEEDED A PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE FROM TIME TO TIME.

12. FRANK AND STRAIGHT WORDS, VICE PRESIDENT CONTINUED, WERE NEEDED BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND CHANCELLOR AND OTHERS ON MATTER OF SAFEGUARDS. THIS WAS THE CRUX OF ALL THE POLITICAL DEBATE. IF FRG COULD RESOLVE THIS POINT, HE FELT THAT ALL OTHERS WOULD FALL IN LINE. HE HOPED THAT PROBLEM OF SAFEGUARDS COULD BE WORKED OUT.

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WITH SOVIETS. ORIGINALLY THEY DID NOT WANT ANY SAFEGUARDS. LATER, THEY APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD WAY OF CAUSING TROUBLE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. HE HOPED THAT STANDARDS OF EURATOM COULD BE BROUGHT IN LINE WITH THOSE OF IAEA. MAYBE SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN HAVING US INSPECTORS IN SUCH TERRITORY AS POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY. PERHAPS SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, SIMILAR TO USING NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES IN UN PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS.

13. ON CIVIL TECHNOLOGY VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE COULD ASSURE CHANCELLOR THAT US WOULD COOPERATE FULLY. US WOULD BE WILLING TO PUT THIS IN AN AGREEMENT, SO THERE WOULD BE NO DOUBT ABOUT IT. SIMILARLY, THE EUROPEAN OPTION MUST BE CLEARLY TIED DOWN.
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