## Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

**Executive Summary** 

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
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- D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
- 1. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

(TS//NF) 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,<sup>332</sup> assessed by the CIA to be an al-Qa'ida "terrorist operations planner" who was "intimately involved" in planning both the USS Cole bombing and the 1998 East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, was captured in the United Arab Emirates in mid-October 2002.<sup>333</sup> He provided information while in the custody of a foreign government, including on plotting in the Persian Gulf,<sup>334</sup> and was then rendered by the


Toreign government, including on plotting in the Persian Guit," and was then rendered by the
The email, which expressed concern that SWIGERT and DUNBAR would interfere with on-site psychologists, stated that, "[a]lthough these guys believe that their way is the only way, there should be an effort to define roles and responsibilities before their arrogance and narcissism evolve into unproductive conflict in the field." See email from:  [a] to:  [b] RDG Tasking for IC  [c] Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 16, 2003, at 4:54:32 PM.  [c] RDG Tasking for IC  [c] RDG Tasking for IC  [c] RDG Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and
SWIGERT; date: June 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM.  12168 (301822Z JUN 03). The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "In practice, by April 2003, [CIA] staff psychologists had taken over almost all of the provisions of support to the RDI program. As it concerned [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR], however, the appearance of impropriety continued, albeit to a lesser degree, because they were occasionally asked to provide input to assessments on detainees whom they had not interrogated" (emphasis added). The CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. For example, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided an assessment on KSM, a detainee whom they had interrogated.  331 Memorandum for Inspector General, Attention: Assistant IG for Investigations, [REDACTED], from
[REDACTED], M.D., Medical Services re Draft Special Review-Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), at 13.  332 For more information on al-Nashiri, see detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III.  333 ALEC ; 11357 (021242Z DEC 02); 36710  334 See 36595 ; 36726 ; ALEC  For disseminated intelligence, see CIA ; CIA  For other reporting from al-Nashiri while he was in foreign government custody, see  TOP SECRET!// //NOFORN

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CIA to DETENTION SITE COBALT in Country on November 2002, where he was held for days before being transferred to DETENTION SITE GREEN on November 2002. 335 At DETENTION SITE GREEN, al-Nashiri was interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including being subjected to the waterboard at least three times. 336 In December 2002, when DETENTION SITE GREEN was closed, al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah were rendered to DETENTION SITE BLUE. 337

(TS//NF) In total, al-Nashiri was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques during at least four separate periods, with each period typically ending with an assessment from on-site interrogators that al-Nashiri was compliant and cooperative. Officers at CIA Headquarters disagreed with these assessments, with the deputy chief of ALEC Station, commenting that DETENTION SITE BLUE interrogators should not make "sweeping statements" in cable traffic regarding al-Nashiri's compliance. Officers at CIA Headquarters sought to reinstate the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques based on their belief that al-Nashiri had not yet provided actionable intelligence on imminent attacks.

(TS//
interrogators at the detention site judged al-Nashiri's cooperation and compliance by his engagement and willingness to answer questions, while CIA Headquarters personnel judged his compliance based on the specific actionable intelligence he had provided (or the lack thereof). For example, in December 2002, interrogators informed CIA Headquarters that al-Nashiri was "cooperative and truthful," and that the "consensus" at the detention site was that al-Nashiri was





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