#### TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN

(U) **Topic:** Iran – Current Topics, Interaction with GCHQ

# (U) Director's Talking Points:

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Emphasize that we have successfully worked
multiple high-priority surges with GCHQ that have allowed us to refine
maintaining mission continuity and seamless transition, and maximize our target
coverage. These jointly-worked events include the storming of the British
Embassy in Tehran, Iran's discovery of FLAME, and support to policymakers
during the multiple rounds of P5 plus 1 negotiations.

## (U//FOUO) SIGINT Director's Talking Points:

• (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Note that our posture on Iran will serve us well going into any crisis or Event, but we still are taking a broader look at Iran, in the context of a possible crisis. This year we have updated contingency plans with GCHQ to reflect the changes in our access and Iran's capabilities.

### (U) Background:

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA has seen Iran further extending its influence across the Middle East over the last year.

1. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Iranian Cyber Attacks:** Iran continues to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks against numerous U.S. financial institutions, and is currently in the third phase of a series of such attacks that began in August 2012. SIGINT indicates that these attacks are in retaliation to Western activities against Iran's nuclear sector and that senior officials in the Iranian government are aware of these attacks. NSA expects Iran will continue this series of attacks, which it views as successful, while striving for increased effectiveness by adapting its tactics and techniques to circumvent victim mitigation attempts.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Iran's destructive cyber attack against Saudi Aramco in August 2012, during which data was destroyed on tens of thousands of computers, was the first such attack NSA has observed from this adversary. Iran, having been a victim of a similar cyber attack against its own oil industry in April 2012, has demonstrated a clear ability to learn from the capabilities and actions of others. While NSA has no indications at this time that Iran plans to conduct such an attack against a U.S. or UK target, we cannot rule out the possibility of such an attack, especially in the face of increased international pressure on the regime.

- 2. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Iran Crisis Contingency Planning:** NSA's posture on Iran will serve us well going into any crisis or event. We continually update contingency plans to reflect the changes in both our access and Iran's capabilities.
  - (TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA's crisis and event plans have been coordinated throughout the U.S. IC and are designed to sync with plans at CENTCOM, EUCOM and CYBERCOM.

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•	(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA's planned battle rhythm focuses on production deadlines that will feed daily briefings and intelligence requirements for policy makers and Combatant Commands.
•	(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) MEA's Iran Division has held one VTC with GCHQ's Iran lead, and his team, with another scheduled for 23 April to discuss ongoing contingency planning efforts on both sides.
surges seamle include networ policyr program 3. (TS/2013, of trilater the foothe bilater at the trilater the	VSI//REL TO USA, GBR) NSA-GCHQ-ISNU Trilateral Discussions: In January during an NSA-ISNU analytic workshop on Iranian Leadership, the first ever al VTC on an Iranian issue was held with NSA, GCHQ and ISNU participants. cus of the trilateral effort, which was kicked off by the VTC, is the
(U) Potential Landmine:	
•	(TS//SI//NF) GCHQ has long advocated that it work with NSA and the ISNU in a trilateral arrangement to prosecute the Iranian target. SID policy has been opposed to such a blanket arrangement, and this specific trilateral should not be interpreted as a broad change of approach. In other areas, NSA and GCHQ have agreed to continue to share information gleaned from the respective bilateral relationships

(U//FOUO) Originator: S2E4 Iran Division Chief, (U//FOUO) Alt. POC: S2E For eign Partner Strategist, (U//FOUO) Classification Review By: S2E Chief of Staff,

with ISNU.

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