

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

Reply to: USSTRATCOM/JOCC 901 SAC BLVD STE 2A1 OFFUTT AFB NE 68113-6000

21 Sep 10 SM# 1095-10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subject: Full Operational Capability (FOC) of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)

Reference: (a) Secretary of Defense Memo dated 23 June 2009

(b) Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2008

(c) USCYBERCOM Implementation Plan, Ch1 of 25 January 2010

1. (U) Mr. Secretary, per reference (a), USCYBERCOM was to achieve initial operational capability (IOC) in October 2009, followed by full operational capability no later than October 2010. IOC was delayed to 21 May 2010 as a result of the lengthy confirmation process for GEN Alexander. Because of the concerns noted below, I recommend that FOC be declared when USCYBERCOM is capable of accomplishing required UCP missions of reference (b) with acceptable risk rather than on 1 October 2010.

| 2. (S) USCYBERCOM's key UCP mission   | requirements include the capability to: (1) direct |
|---|--|
| operation of defense networks, (2) conduct passive defense of defense networks. (3) conduct   |  |
| active defense of DoD networks, (4)   | (b)(1) USSC  |
| (b)(1) USSC   | defensive cyberspace operational planning, (5)     |
| execute offensive cyberspace operations, and  | (6) support Combatant Commander theater and        |
| global plans with offensive and defensive cyber options when directed. Although actions       |  |
| accomplished to date noted in paragraph 2 above have enabled capability improvements in these |  |
| areas, I do not believe that USCYBERCOM's capabilities are sufficient to declare FOC          |  |

(U) 3.-(S) I do assess that USCYBERCOM meets the requirements for declaring that the headquarters staff is mission capable. Diligent work on the part of GEN Alexander and LTG Pollett has resulted in: (1) establishment of a joint staff, (2) transition of JTF-GNO mission responsibilities to USCYBERCOM, (3) establishment of a Joint Operations Center, (4) establishment of effective C2 for missions presently being accomplished, and (5) establishing support mechanisms with the Defense Information Support Agency (DISA).

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(U) 4. (S) USSTRATCOM and USCYBERCOM are jointly working to define the actions needed to Commander declare USCYBERCOM FOC in its UCP mission areas and will provide a list of those necessary USSTRATCOM

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actions to you within 30 days. Included in this list will be my two most immediate concerns. First, GEN Alexander needs adequate authorities to accomplish all assigned missions. As I know you are keenly aware, approval of Operation GLADIATOR PHOENIX is the necessary first step toward giving him the authorities to operate and defend our networks successfully. Second, we lack sufficient cyber forces to accomplish UCP missions (4), (5), and (6) in paragraph 2 above. Additionally, we will provide an assessment of how our and other DOD organizations' efficiencies proposals might impact USCYBERCOM's required capabilities.

5. My POC for this request is RADM McClain, USSTRATCOM J3.

KEVIN P. CHILTON

General, USAF Commander