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HEADER

O 091836Z DEC 88
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEADWD/PTC WASH DC
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUCLAKA/CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF-POG-SB//
RUCIAEA/FTD WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH//SIIR//
RUCGNTT/NATS PENTAGON WASH DC
RUEALGX/SAFE

O 091555Z DEC 88
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7523
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
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RUFHMB/USMISSION USVIENNA 0201
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CONTROLS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 27431

USVIENNA FOR MANDATE

E.O. 2356: DECL: OADR

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

TAGS: PREL, PARM, US, IT
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S DECEMBER 6-7 VISIT TO ROME
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE VISITED ROME DECEMBER 6-7 AND MET WITH PRIME MINISTER DE MITA, FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI AND DEFENSE MINISTER ZANONE. THE ITALIAN LEADERS SOUGHT NITZE'S VIEWS ON PROSPECTS FOR CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS AND FOR THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION PLANS TO NEGOTIATE A START AGREEMENT ALONG CURRENT LINES. DE MITA RECALLED THAT GORBACHEV HAD PRESSED HARD DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR AN EARLY AGREEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS. DE MITA WONDERED WHETHER AN EARLY AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE,

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BUT SAID HE CAME AWAY FROM MOSCOW FEELING THAT CST NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE LONGER THAN HE EXPECTED. ZANONE RAISED SEVERAL ISSUES DISCUSSED AT THE RECENT DPC, EMPHASIZING THE DIFFICULTIES IN MAINTAINING DEFENSE SPENDING LEVELS CAUSED BY THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF A DIMINISHED SOVIET THREAT. ANDREOTTI PRESSED FOR AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF THE VIENNA CSCE CONFERENCE AND THE BEGINNING OF NEW CST TALKS (EVEN IF IT MEANT MAKING COMPROMISES WITH THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED). WHILE HE PRAISED NATO AS A SOLID AND BALANCED ORGANIZATION IN DIFFICULT TIMES, HE WORRIED THAT THE EVENTUAL NEED TO NEGOTIATE ON BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD PROVOKE DEEP DIVISIONS IN EUROPE. END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH DE MITA

3. ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR RABB, AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE MET FOR FORTY-FIVE MINUTES DECEMBER 6 WITH PRIME MINISTER CIRIACO DE MITA. DE MITA CONGRATULATED NITZE ON RECEIVING NATO'S ATLANTIC AWARD IN BRUSSELS THE DAY BEFORE. RESPONDING TO NITZE'S SUMMARY OF HIS SPEECH IN BRUSSELS, DE MITA PRESSED NITZE TO ELABORATE ON THE PROBLEMS HE SEES FACING NATO IN THE FUTURE. NITZE BEGAN WITH THE BUDGETARY PROBLEMS FACING THE U.S. AND THE NEED FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE SOME KEY DEFENSE SPENDING DECISIONS BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH ARMS CONTROL DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO PROGRAMS INVOLVING ICBM SURVIVABILITY. NITZE ALSO OUTLINED THE REMAINING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED IN THE START AND DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS.

4. DE MITA SAID THAT HE HAD NOTICED IN HIS OFFICIAL TRAVELS IN EUROPE THAT THE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATING FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS CAUSING WIDESPREAD WORRY. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT MANY IN EUROPE FELT FURTHER NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS BEFORE CONVENTIONAL STABILIZATION WAS UNWISE. NITZE REPLIED BY EMPHASIZING THAT REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PER SE WAS NOT NECESSARILY GOOD. TO BE TRULY STABILIZING, NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS HAD TO REDUCE THE RISK TO NATO AND IMPROVE SURVIVABILITY OF OUR OWN SYSTEMS.

5. NITZE CONTINUED THAT THE U.S. FULLY AGREED THAT WE NEED TO PUT FULL PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS ONCE THE NEW CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS BEGIN. AT THE SAME TIME WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PROGRESS IN CST SHOULD BE MADE CONDITIONAL ON OTHER NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY START. NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT THE WEST SHOULD GO BEYOND THE CURRENT FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ENVISIONED IN START, UNTIL WE CAN REACH A CONVENTIONAL

STABILIZATION AGREEMENT. NITZE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT NATO COULD REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS ON START IN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO. BUT HE CAUTIONED THAT IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE REACHING A CONCRETE RESULT IN CST IN LESS THAN TWO-THREE YEARS.

6. DE MITA REPLIED THAT GORBACHEV HAD IMPRESSED UPON HIM DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW THE SOVIET DESIRE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A CONVENTIONAL TREATY QUICKLY. DE MITA SAID THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THE NEGOTIATION WOULD BE A LONG AND DIFFICULT ONE PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS DON'T ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE IS REAL CONVENTIONAL INSTABILITY. HOWEVER, HE HAD HEARD THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT IN THE 1989-1990 TIME FRAME. SHOULDNT WE TRY TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY?

7. NITZE RESPONDED THAT IF GORBACHEV IS SO ANXIOUS TO

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CONCLUDE A QUICK CONVENTIONAL ARMS AGREEMENT HE HASN'T MADE IT VERY EASY IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE CST MANDATE IN VIENNA. THE SOVIETS HAVE RESISTED MOVEMENT IN VIENNA ON KEY HUMAN RIGHTS DEMANDS OF THE WEST. NITZE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE COULD SOON REACH AN ACCORD ON A CST MANDATE, NOTING THAT WE HAVE HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH THE FRENCH ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CST AND CSCE(WHICH DE MITA READILY ACKNOWLEDGED BY ROLLING HIS EYES TOWARD THE CEILING). NITZE ALSO HOPED NATO COULD SOON CONCLUDE ITS EFFORTS TO PREPARE AN ALLIANCE GOING-IN POSITION FOR THE NEW CST TALKS.

8. DE MITA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD NITZE'S POINTS. WASN'T IT ALSO TRUE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE A PROBLEM IN REDUCING EXPENDITURES BEFORE THEY WORK OUT THEIR NEXT FIVE YEAR PLAN (1990-1995)? IT WAS IN THIS SENSE THAT HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE GREATER INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HE RECALLED THAT IN THEIR MOSCOW MEETING GORBACHEV HAD "GONE ON AND ON" IN DESCRIBING BOTH THE NEED TO REDUCE SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING AND THE POINTS HE HAD MADE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS. DE MITA SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED TO DISCUSS CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN SUCH DETAIL WITH GORBACHEV, BUT CAME AWAY FROM THE MEETING WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CST NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE LONGER THAN HE HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPECTED.

MEETING WITH ZANONE

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9. LATER THE SAME EVENING NITZE CALLED ON DEFENSE MINISTER VALERIO ZANONE, WHO BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY REFLECTING ON THE RECENTLY COMPLETED DPC MEETING IN BRUSSELS. THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION, HE SAID ON THE NATO COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT ON ARMS CONTROL, MOST OF IT COMPLEX BUT VERY LITTLE OF IT ADDRESSING THE KEY QUESTIONS FACING NATO. NITZE SAID HE HAD JUST BEEN IN BONN AND EVERYONE HAD A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. NONE WERE REALLY COMPREHENSIVE; EVERYONE WAS FOCUSED ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF SNF MODERNIZATION.

10. ZANONE SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM DISCUSSIONS ON THE MARGINS OF THE DPC THAT THERE IS SOME UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE PROSPECT FOR GREATER EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION AND U.S.-EUROPEAN COOPERATION. WHAT DID NITZE THINK? NITZE RECALLED THAT HE HAD ALWAYS LOOKED ON THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ON THE BASIS OF THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF "ONE FOR ALL AND ALL FOR ONE." HE REVIEWED THE EVOLUTION OF THAT APPROACH AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION OF THE FACT THAT NATO IS BASED ON RECIPROCITY AND NOT SIMPLY A U.S. GUARANTEE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY.

11. ZANONE SAID HE HAD ALSO DETECTED CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY IN BRUSSELS ON THE QUESTION OF THE FLANKS IN THE CST TALKS. THE TURKS WERE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE. HE ALSO ASKED FOR NITZE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE CST TALKS. NITZE REPLIED THAT U.S. CONVENTIONAL ARMS EXPERTS ARE GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATO SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE CST TALKS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF DEALING WITH TURKISH CONCERNS. NITZE SAID THAT PROGRESS IN CST WILL DEPEND ON GORBACHEV'S OWN VIEWS AND THE SUPPORT HE RECEIVES FROM THE MILITARY. TO TEST THE SOVIETS WE NEED CLARITY AND UNITY ON OUR SIDE. FRANKLY, WE STILL HAD PROBLEMS: THE FLANK ISSUE RAISED BY ZANONE, AS WELL AS FRENCH DEMANDS TO MAINTAIN SOME INDEPENDENCE FROM THE BLOC-TO-BLOC NEGOTIATING CONCEPT.

12. ZANONE SAID THAT THE MOST DELICATE PROBLEM AT THE DPC HAD BEEN THE QUESTION OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE USSR AND OF A DIMINISHING SOVIET THREAT. FULLY NINETY PERCENT OF THE DISCUSSION AMONG MINISTERS AT THE OPENING DINNER HAD BEEN OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT THE THREAT HAD DECREASED. MASS COMMUNICATION IS NOW OVERWHELMING POLITICIANS' ABILITIES TO LEAD POLITICAL OPINION. IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE SPENDING, SINCE

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PARLIAMENTS ARE BECOMING INFECTED WITH THE SENSE OF A DIMINISHED THREAT. NATO'S RECENT STUDY ON THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE WAS RIGHT ON TARGET, BUT IT WILL NOT CONTAIN THE CURRENT TREND. WE SIMPLY CANNOT LET GORBACHEV SUCCEED IN TAKING THE INITIATIVE AWAY FROM US AND CONSTANTLY PUTTING US ON THE DEFENSIVE.

13. NITZE AGREED AND SAID THE PROBLEM WAS MOST WORRISOME IN GERMANY. SOME POLITICIANS THERE THINK THAT THEY CAN WIN VOTES BY GOING ALONG WITH THE NOTION THAT THE ARMS CONTROL PROBLEMS ARE ESSENTIALLY SOLVED AND ALL THAT REMAINS IS TO SIGN AGREEMENTS. THE REALITY IS THAT MUCH WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS WHICH TRANSLATE HOPES INTO CONCRETE REALITIES.

14. ZANONE CITED THE RELOCATION OF THE 401ST AS A CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM IN ITALY. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN UNITED IN FAVOR OF THE RELOCATION DECISION AND THE PARLIAMENT HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY IN FAVOR. THIS HAS NOT STOPPED, HOWEVER, CONTINUOUS COMMENT IN POLITICAL CIRCLES IN ITALY TO THE EFFECT THAT PERHAPS WE OUGHT TO NEGOTIATE A WHILE BEFORE BRINGING THE AIRPLANES TO ITALY. THIS ARGUMENT COMES NOT JUST FROM THE LEFT, BUT FROM THE CATHOLIC WORLD AND THE UNIONS, POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE AN IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT PARTIES. NITZE SAID HE HOPED THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN OVERCOMING THOSE CONCERNS, TO WHICH ZANONE RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THE 401ST RELOCATION DECISION WAS A VITALLY IMPORTANT DECISION FOR ALL OF NATO.

15. AFTER BRIEFLY SHARING CONCERNS ABOUT THE MEDITERRANEAN, ZANONE RAISED AMERICAN CONCERNS ABOUT EUROPEAN POLICY POST 1992 AND ASKED NITZE'S VIEWS. NITZE SAID THE ROOT AMERICAN CONCERN WAS ABOUT THE GROWTH OF A "EUROPE FOR EUROPE SENTIMENT." AMERICANS WORRIED ABOUT AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH EUROPEANS WERE FREE TO CAPITALIZE ON THE EXCLUSION OF THE U.S. AND JAPAN FROM THE EUROPEAN MARKET. ASKED SPECIFICALLY BY ZANONE WHAT EUROPE COULD DO TO CLARIFY BETTER ITS POSITION FOR THE AMERICANS, EMBASSY POL/MIL COUNSELOR SUGGESTED CONCRETE DEEDS AND NOT JUST WORDS. HE NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR RABB WAS AT THAT MOMENT WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL THORNBURG. WERE HE PRESENT HE WOULD ANSWER ZANONE'S QUESTION BY STRONGLY URGING ITALY TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF ACQUIRING HUGHES RADAR TECHNOLOGY FOR THE NEW EUROPEAN FIGHTER WHEN THE ISSUE COMES UP SOON IN THE EUROPEAN FIGHTER CONSORTIUM. THIS WOULD SEND A STRONG SIGNAL OF U.S.-EUROPEAN COOPERATION AS WE MOVE TOWARD 1992 AND BEYOND.

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MEETIG WITH ANDREOTTI

16. FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI EGAN THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF HIS DECEMBER 7 MEETING WITH NITZE BY ASKING WHETHER THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GORBACHEV THAT SAME DAY WOULD MARK A CONCRETE STEP FORWARD IN U.S.-USSR RELATIONS. NITZE REPLIED THAT THE MEETING WAS NOT ENVISAGED AS A NEGOTIATION, PARTICULARLY ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, BUT SECRETARY SCHULTZ DID INTEND TO RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE EASY FOR THE SOVIETS; THEY NEED TO ACT SO THAT WE CAN CONCLUDE VIENNA, AGREE ON THE CST MANDATE AND BEGIN CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS.

17. ANDREOTTI SAID THAT MITTERAND HAD BEEN TOLD BY GORBACHEV IN MOSCOW THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY NOW TO DECIDE ON CONVENING A MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE. ANDREOTTI SAID IT WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT WE SHOULD HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT OF A CONFERENCE, BUT IF THE CONDITIONS ARE NOT RIGHT AT THE TIME IT IS TO BE CONVENED, WE "CAN MANAGE AND FACE THE ISSUE AT THAT TIME."

18. ON CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, ANDREOTTI SAID WE NEED TO FIND A FORMULA WHICH DOES NOT "HUMILIATE THE NON-ALIGNED AND NEUTRALS" PARTICULARLY, AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND, WHICH HAVE PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE IN VIENNA. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING NOW IS TO CONCLUDE VIENNA AND

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BEGIN THE CONVENTIONAL TALKS. BOTH DCM HOLMES AND MFA DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR NEGROTTO THEN QUICKLY INTERVENED TO CLARIFY FOR ANDREOTTI THAT A FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING THE CST/CSCE QUESTION SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT (OF WHICH ANDREOTTI WAS CLEARLY UNAWARE). NITZE ADDED THAT THE PROBLEM HAD REALLY BEEN THE FRENCH AND NOT THE NNA.

19. ANDREOTTI SEIZED ON NITZE'S STATEMENT TO SAY THAT THE TRUE PROBLEM WITH THE FRENCH AND THE BRITISH WAS THEIR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. ANDREOTTI SAID HE BELIEVED "SOMEDAY" WE WILL HAVE TO FACE THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE ON THESE SYSTEMS. NEITHER THE BRITISH NOR FRENCH WANT TO FACE THE PROBLEM. ANDREOTTI SAID HE FEARED THAT WHEN THE ISSUE IS ENGAGED IN THE FUTURE, THE ISSUE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS "WILL PROVOKE GREAT DIVISIONS IN EUROPE." NITZE COMMENTED THAT ONE OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT HAD BEEN OBTAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT NOT TO INCLUDE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS IN THE 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS AGREED TO FOR START.

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20. ANDREOTTI SAID NITZE WAS RIGHT. HE HOPED THAT THE NEW BUSH ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT ALTER THE POSITION OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ON START. WE NEED TO MOVE AHEAD AND REACH AGREEMENT ON A FIFTY PERCENT CUT IN STRATEGIC FORCES. NITZE SAID THAT PRESIDENT-ELECT BUSH HAD FOLLOWED THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS CLOSELY AND DISCUSSED ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN EUROPEAN CAPITALS. NITZE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE PRESIDENT-ELECT WILL FOLLOW THROUGH IN A SENSIBLE WAY.
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21. ANDREOTTI CONGRATULATED NITZE ON RECEIVING THE NATO ATLANTIC AWARD. WHEN NITZE PRESENTED HIM A COPY OF HIS SPEECH, ANDREOTTI COMMENTED THAT NATO HAD PROVED IN DIFFICULT TIMES TO BE A SOLID AND VERY BALANCED ORGANIZATION. NITZE AGREED AND SAID THAT ITALY AND ANDREOTTI PERSONALLY HAD DONE A GREAT DEAL TO PROMOTE NATO, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH WAS THE ITALIAN ROLE IN BACKING THE GERMANS AT KEY DECISION POINTS SUCH AS INF DEPLOYMENT.
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22. ANDREOTTI CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY RECALLING THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD CREATED IN THE ITALIAN POPULACE AN AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEMS OF SECURITY. THE ITALIAN PEOPLE KNOW THE GOVERNMENT IS IN FAVOR OF DIALOGUE AND PEACE. THEREFORE, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT SAYS THAT SOMETHING IS NECESSARY TO FOSTER THIS GOAL, SUCH AS DEPLOYMENTS AT COMISO OR MORE RECENTLY ACCEPTING THE F-16 RELOCATION AT CROTONE, THE PEOPLE ARE AWARE AND ACCEPT THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION. RABB

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