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MEMORANDUM FOR:

NIVO 989738

By Dave ///

on play 600627 CFA20

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The following summarizes principal views and actions of the President on the matters considered at the meeting at 1400 today:


In connection with the point made by Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford that the U. S. must retain freedom to use atomic weapons on its own decision in the event of threat to our own forces, the President indicated that if U. S. military forces are to remain in Europe, we must and will retain the freedom so to initiate use of these weapons.

The President also indicated assent to Admiral Radford's view that, if a clause is included in the Council's resolution on this matter providing that the recommendations of the Military Report are not to be construed to prejudge final decisions by governments on the implementation of plans developed in support thereof, it should be made clear privately to the British and French that the U. S. retains the power of decision indicated above.

In connection with a statement by Secretary Dulles recognizing that Paragraph 37 of the military paper is an essential element of the report on which definitive action by the N. A. Council should be taken, but pointing out the possible need to delay such action until early 1955 because developments such as ratification of the Paris agreements are now at a critical stage, the President indicated that wide latitude is permitted as to tactics and timing in this matter.

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The President indicated he had no question but that quick use of atomic weapons, in the event of full-scale Soviet attack, would be an essential to effective defense in Western Europe, given the future levels of NATO forces that can now be foreseen. He indicated that a calm and careful presentation of the matter to the N. A. Council might prove highly valuable. Through careful exclusion of contingencies other than large-scale, coordinated Soviet attacks from the question presently at issue, the scope of the problem could be greatly reduced. He indicated that careful study of the matter in the governments concerned would inevitably lead them to the conclusion that it is necessary to leave some discretion to the Supreme Commander to adjudge whether attacks are of such nature as to pose dangers requiring counteraction before consultation could be completed.

A. J. Goodpaster

Colonel, CE, US Army

Staff Secretary



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