C17784933 U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2014-07825 Doc No. C17784933 Date: 05/09/2019

Current Class: SECRET

Current Handling: NODIS

Document Number: 1994MOSCOW21443 RELEASE IN FULL

Page: 1

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 21443 01 OF 03 291324Z

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S & C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 021443

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E.O. 12356: DECL/OADR

TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, KS, KN, CH, JA, RS

SUBJECT: A/S GALLUCCI'S DISCUSSIONS OF NORTH

- KOREA WITH RUSSIAN OFFICIALS: DEPUTY

- FOREIGN MINISTER PANOV

- 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. SUMMMARY: IN A MEETING WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PANOV ON JULY 27, A/S GALLUCCI REVIEWED U.S. STRATEGY FOR UPCOMING TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING A CREDIBLE U.S. GUARANTEE THAT THE DPRK WILL OBTAIN LWR ASSISTANCE IN EXCHANGE FOR MEETING OUR NON-PROLIFERATION REQUIREMENTS. PANOV SAID THAT RUSSIA WAS APPROACHED DIRECTLY BY NORTH KOREA CONCERNING LWR'S, WHICH RUSSIA WAS PREPARED TO PROVIDE IF FUNDING WAS AVAILABLE FROM OTHER

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 21443 01 OF 03 291324Z SOURCES. CONCERNING SPENT FUEL, PANOV CONFIRMED RUSSIAN WILINGNESS TO REPROCESS THE SPENT FUEL, SAYING HE THOUGHT THE WASTE COULD BE STORED IN RUSSIA INDEFINITELY. SUMMARY.

3. RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS: DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ALEKSANDER
PANOV; MIKHAIL BELIY, DIRECTOR, MFA FIRST ASIA
ADMINISTRATION (NORTH ASIA AND INDOCHINA); AND

Current Class: SECRET

Page: 1

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Marvin Russell, Senior Reviewer

Current Class: SECRET

Current Handling: NODIS

Document Number: 1994MOSCOW21443

Page: 2

Channel: n/a

VALENTIN MOISEYEV, MFA KOREA DIVISION CHIEF.

USG PARTICIPANTS: A/S ROBERT GALLUCCI, DASD KENT WIEDEMANN, AMBASSADOR PICKERING, PM/RNP DEPUTY DIRECTOR GARY SAMORE, POLOFF GREG FERGIN (NOTETAKER).

4. A/S GALLUCCI BRIEFED PANOV ON THE LAST USG/DPRK MEETING IN GENEVA AND HIS DISCUSSIONS ON NORTH KOREA IN SEOUL, BEIJING, AND TOKYO. HE DESCRIBED THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE NEXT SESSION WITH THE NORTH KOREANS AND THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV IN BRUSSELS. IF THE NORTH KOREAN SIDE WILL NOT MEET WELL KNOWN NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES AND THE ISSUE RETURNS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, HE SAID, THE USG VIEWS THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AS A USEFUL PART OF THE SANCTIONS PROCESS FOLLOWING PASSAGE OF A UNSC RESOLUTION BUT BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT ANY SUCH RESOLUTION MUST HAVE TEETH, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO SECOND-STAGE SECRET

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 21443 01 OF 03 291324Z SANCTIONS.

- 5. PANOV ASKED ABOUT THE TIME FACTOR IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, OBSERVING THAT THE TIME FRAME FOR ACTION ENVISAGED BY THE U.S. IS REALLY SHORT. GALLUCCI RESPONDED THAT THE TIME FRAME IS BASED ON A TECHNICAL IMPERATIVE; THE NORTH KOREANS COULD HAVE SERIOUS SAFETY PROBLEMS SOON IF THEY CANNOT EXTEND THE LIFE OF THE SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IN THE YONGBYON COOLING POND. THE US HAS OFFERED TO SEND A TEAM OF EXPERTS TO SEEK WAYS TO EXTEND THE LIFE OF THE FUEL, SO AS TO BUY TIME TO PURSUE DPRK AGREEMENT TO SHIPMENT OF THE SPENT FUEL FOR REPROCESSING IN A THIRD COUNTRY.
- 6. PANOV OBSERVED THAT BEFORE THE G-7 SUMMIT YELTSIN WAS READY TO ANNOUNCE THAT RUSSIA IS WILLING TO PROVIDE LIGHT WATER REACTOR TO NORTH KOREA IF RUSSIA RECEIVED FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE TRANSFER. PANOV ADDED THAT TWO DAYS AGO NORTH KOREA INFORMED THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT THAT IT DID NOT NEED FOUR 440 REACTORS BUT THREE

Current Class: SECRET

C17784933 U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2014-07825 Doc No. C17784933 Date: 05/09/2019

Current Class: SECRET

Current Handling: NODIS

Document Number: 1994MOSCOW21443

Page: 3
Channel: n/a

LARGER VVR 635 REACTORS. NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD STOPPED IN 1992, BUT BY THEN RUSSIAN SPECIALISTS HAD ALREADY MADE A FEASIBILITY STUDY AND DONE GEOLOGICAL RESEARCH NORTH KOREA KNOWS RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY, AND NORTH KOREAN SPECIALISTS GOT THEIR TRAINING IN RUSSIA. PANOV SAID THAT ROK SUPPLY OF THE LWR IS "UNACCEPTABLE" TO THE DPRK FOR POLITICAL REASONS. THE MAIN REMAINING ISSUE, HE ASSERTED, IS

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PAGE 04 MOSCOW 21443 01 OF 03 291324Z THEREFORE FINANCING FOR RUSSIAN PROVISION OF A LWR.

7. NOTING THE RESULTS OF HIS CONSULTATIONS IN SEOUL AND TOKYO ON POSSIBLE FUNDING, GALLUCCI RESPONDED THAT WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL AND MODEL BETTER. HOWEVER, WE MUST KEEP IN MIND OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE TO RESOLVE THE DPRK NUCLEAR PROBLEM, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHICH COUNTRY SUPPLIES THE LWR TECHNOLOGY TO REPLACE THE DPRK'S GRAPHITE-MODULATED SYSTEM. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE

USG HAD TOLD THE NORTH KOREANS TO KEEP AN OPEN MIND ABOUT THE SOURCE OF LWR TECHNOLOGY. NORTH KOREA WANTS IRONCLAD GUARANTEES THAT IT WILL GET LWR'S, BUT THE U.S. CANNOT PROVIDE A CREDIBLE GUARANTEE UNLESS IT IS SOLIDLY BACKED BY FINANCING AND A RELIABLE, SAFE TECHNOLOGY SOURCE.

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 21443 02 OF 03 291324Z ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 ADS-00 /000W

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 021443

Current Class: SECRET

C17784933 U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2014-07825 Doc No. C17784933 Date: 05/09/2019

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- FOREIGN MINISTER PANOV

- 8. AMBASSADOR PICKERING ASKED PANOV TO CLARIFY WHETHER RUSSIA NEEDS FULL FINANCING OF AN LWR, AND COULD NOT ITSELF BE A SOURCE OF FUNDING. PANOV NOTED THAT RUSSIA'S LABOR COSTS WOULD BE CHEAPER, AND IT COULD CONTRIBUTE ONLY TO THAT EXTENT.
- 9. ON THE ISSUE OF SPENT FUEL, PANOV SAID RUSSIA WAS PREPARED TO COOPERATE, BUT WOULD NEED FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THIS, TOO. A/S GALLUCCI NOTED THAT THE REPROCESSING CONTRACT WOULD SECRET

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 21443 02 OF 03 291324Z GENERATE TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS FOR THE CONTRACTOR. HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POLITICALLY MORE ACCEPTABLE FOR NORTH KOREA TO SHIP THE SPENT FUEL TO RUSSIA THAN SOME OTHER POSSIBLE DESTINATIONS.

- 10. PANOV ASKED ABOUT CHINA'S REACTION TO THE SPENT FUEL QUESTION. A/S GALLUCCI RESPONDED THAT CHINA HAD TAKEN A POLITICAL POSITION. IT WILL MAKE NO COMMITMENTS UNTIL DPRK INTENTIONS ARE CLEAR.
- 11. PANOV SPECULATED THAT, SHOULD RUSSIA TAKE THE SPENT FUEL, ONE OPTION WOULD BE TO KEEP THE FUEL OR WASTE IN STORAGE. ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD BE CRITICIZED BY ENVIRONMENTALISTS, RUSSIA MIGHT BE ABLE TO STORE THE FUEL INDEFINITELY. PANOV SAID STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM. A/S GALLUCCI SAID RUSSIA COULD ALSO CONSIDER PLACING THE PLUTONIUM UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS UNDER RUSSIA'S VOLUNTARY OFFER WITH THE IAEA. AMBASSADOR PICKERING ADDED THAT THE USG IS BUILDING STORAGE PITS FOR PLUTONIUM IN RUSSIA, AND MIGHT RESERVE A SPACE FOR NORTH KOREAN PLUTONIUM.

Current Class: SECRET

Current Class: SECRET Current Handling: NODIS

Document Number: 1994MOSCOW21443

Page: 5

Channel: n/a

12. ASKED ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA, PANOV SAID RUSSIA'S INFORMATION CAME MAINLY FROM NORTH KOREAN MEDIA. ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, THE DPRK FOCUSED ON TWO POINTS: NORTH KOREA'S DESIRE TO CHANGE ITS NUCLEAR POWER

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 21443 02 OF 03 291324Z PROGRAM TO AN LWR PROGRAM, AND THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH THE SPENT FUEL FROM THE YONGBYON REACTOR. IN ADDITION, THE DPRK HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NOT MOVE FORWARD ON RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA UNTIL NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IMPROVED; THERE IS NOW ONE TRACK INSTEAD OF

- 13. ON NORTH KOREA'S INTERNAL POLITICS, PANOV NOTED THAT KIM JONG IL HAD NOT YET BEEN ELECTED PRESIDENT OF NORTH KOREA OR SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PARTY. PANOV CONSIDERED IT STRANGE THAT THREE WEEKS AFTER THE DEATH OF KIM IL SUNG HIS SON HAD NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED AS HIS SUCCESSOR. PANOV OFFERED TWO POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS: 1) THAT THE COUNTRY WAS STILL IN MOURNING; AND 2) THAT THERE WAS SOME FRICTION, AND POSSIBLY A STRUGGLE, INSIDE THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP, ESPECIALLY WITHIN THE KIM FAMILY.
- 14. PANOV SAID KIM JONG IL WAS NOT LOOKING WELL ON NORTH KOREAN TELEVISION, AND WAS NOT SHOWING HIMSELF TO BE A STRONG LEADER. HE MIGHT AGREE TO ABANDON THE PRESIDENCY AND TAKE ONLY THE SECRETARY GENERAL POSITION, GIVING THE PRESIDENCY TO SOMEONE WITH MORE EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS. PANOV THOUGHT THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP WAS AFRAID TO SEND KIM JONG IL TO SEOUL AT THIS TIME. PANOV GUESSED THE YOUNGER KIM'S INEXPERIENCE WITH FOREIGNERS WAS ONE REASON FOREIGN LEADERS WERE NOT INVITED TO THE ELDER

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PAGE 04 MOSCOW 21443 02 OF 03 291324Z KIM'S FUNERAL.

15. MOISEYEV, WHO SPENT 12 YEARS AS A DIPLOMAT IN

Current Class: SECRET

Current Class: SECRET

Current Handling: NODIS

Document Number: 1994MOSCOW21443

Page: 6

Channel: n/a

PYONGYANG, SAID HE HAD MET KIM JONG IL SEVERAL TIMES, MOST RECENTLY 5-6 YEARS AGO. AT THAT TIME KIM APPEARED HEALTHY, LIVELY, AND EVINCED NONE OF THE NEGATIVE CHARACTERISTICS DESCRIBED IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIA (SPEECH DEFECTS, EPILEPSY, MENTAL INSTABILITY). MOISEYEV SAID KIM KNOWS HIS OWN COUNTRY WELL, BUT NOT FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

16. A/S GALLUCCI NOTED THAT THE LEADER OF THE NORTH KOREAN DELEGATION TO THE GENEVA TALKS KAN SOK JU, SAID HE REPORTED DIRECTLY TO KIM JONG IL ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. MOISEYEV SAID IT IS CUSTOMARY FOR DPRK OFFICIALS TO CITE DIRECTIONS FROM THE TOP LEADERS, TO UNDERSCORE THEIR UTHORITY, BUT THEY DO NOT TYPICALLY REPORT FACE

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 21443 03 OF 03 291325Z ACTION NODS-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 021443

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL/OADR

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FOREIGN MINISTER PANOV

TO FACE. MOISEYEV THOUGHT KIM JONG IL POSSESSED COMPLETE POWER IN THE STRUCTURES ESTABLISHED BY HIS FATHER, AND THERE WAS NO NEED FOR HIM TO BUILD CONSENSUS. MOISEYEV THOUGHT A POWER STRUGGLE WAS POSSIBLE BUT BELIEVED KIM JONG IL COULD REIGN, AND PERHAPS EVEN RULE FOR UP TO FIVE YEARS. IF THERE IS A POWER STRUGGLE, IT WOULD BE WITHIN KIM'S FAMILY.

Current Class: SECRET

Current Class: SECRET Current Handling: NODIS

Document Number: 1994MOSCOW21443

Page: 7

Channel: n/a

17. PANOV COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE MANY
OPINIONS AMONG RUSSIAN ANALYSTS AND HE WAS NOT
SURE KIM WILL LAST FIVE YEARS. HOW THE DPRK
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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 21443 03 OF 03 291325Z
ARRANGED THE SUCCESSION TO KIM IL SUNG WOULD BE
AN INDICATION OF THE YOUNGER KIM'S POWER. IF HE
TAKES BOTH THE PRESIDENCY AND THE SECRETARY
GENERALSHIP, THIS WOULD BE AN INDICATION OF
STRENGTH. PANOV NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT HISTORY
SHOWS THAT IN ANY AUTHORITARIAN SOCIETY AFTER THE
FALL OF A GREAT LEADER, THE SUCCESSION PROCESS
DID NOT WORK. WE WOULD KNOW IN SEVERAL MONTHS
HOW THE SUCCESSION WILL PLAY OUT IN NORTH KOREA.

- 18. PANOV SAID THAT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS TO SHOW THE NORTH KOREANS THAT THEY HAVE A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY TO CHANGE, TO BE COMPENSATED, AND TO DEVELOP ECONOMICALLY.
- 19. THE DISCUSSION MOVED TO KIM'S RELATIVES. HIS UNCLE HAD BEEN ABSENT FOR 17 YEARS. MOISEYEV POINTED OUT THAT THE UNCLE HAD SPENT SEVEN YEARS IN RUSSIA, SPOKE FLUENT RUSSIAN, AND MIGHT HAVE BEEN ARRESTED ON SUSPICION OF BEING TOO CLOSE TO RUSSIA. KIM PYONG IL, THE SON OF KIM IL SUNG'S SECOND WIFE, WAS SAID TO BE A REASONABLE MAN, AND HAD PROVED CAPABLE AS AMBASSADOR TO BULGARIA AND FINLAND.
- 20. PANOV ALSO SUGGESTED LOOKING AT THE ARMY.
 KIM JONG IL HAS SOME POWER BASE IN THE MILITARY,
 HAVING PROMOTED 600 GENERALS, BUT HE WAS NOT
 RESPECTED BY THE OLDER GENERATION. ANOTHER
 GROUP, SAID PANOV, WAS THE TECHNOCRATS, LED BY
 THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO KNOW THE OUTSIDE WORLD

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 21443 03 OF 03 291325Z AND MIGHT OPPOSE KIM JONG IL. PICKERING

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