

February 15, 1963

Israel - General

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

I called on AEC Chairman Seaborg today to emphasize the importance of getting on with (1) early re-inspection of the Dimona reactor; and (2) a systematic on-going inspection scheme. I stressed both the delicacy of the matter and the President's personal concern over the problem (e. g. his talk with Golda Meir) and Mr. Bundy's reiteration of our interest to Ambassador Harman.

My sense was that we should move ahead with the next inspection while the Israeli assurances that there would be no difficulty were fresh in their minds. However, the AEC International Division had apparently been concerned lest the use of international safeguards inspections for what are in effect intelligence purposes create a poor image of the procedure and play into Soviet accusations of espionage. Nonetheless, the need to get on with the Israeli inspection seemed overriding in this case, particularly since the last inspection in September had not been fully satisfactory. 3.3(b)(1)

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State and the AEC have apparently agreed that we will initially try out on the Israelis the idea of separate inspections for safeguard [redacted] purposes. I saw no reason why we shouldn't try this out, but doubted the Israelis would buy it. In any case, I stressed that there should be no delay because of prolonged negotiation on this matter; if the Israelis seemed at all hesitant over this proposition, we should go ahead under cover of the safeguards inspection.

R.W.K.
R. W. KOMER

- cc: McG. Bundy
- Carl Kaysen
- Phil Talbot
- Charles Johnson

RWK
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By 448

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