THE WHITE HOUSE

July 13, 1962

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT:

British Guiana

Here is a paper from Dean Rusk which comes out hard for a policy of getting rid of Jagan. It is a careful and thorough argument of one side. It has more energy than most State Department papers.

These documents seem to me to demonstrate that Jagan will indeed go the way of Castro, if he is not prevented. He would be weaker than Castro, because he is even more inefficient, but he would also probably be more easily controlled from Moscow.

But while the papers make a clear case against supporting Jagan, or even trying to sustain peaceful coexistence with him, the case for the proposed tactics to be used in opposing him is not so clear. In particular, I think it is unproven that CIA knows how to manipulate an election in British Guiana without a backfire.

My immediate suggestion is that when you have read this, we should have a pretty searching meeting on the details of the tactical plans, in which you can cross-examine those who are really responsible for their development. I do not think the Secretary of State should go to the British Ambassador with the proposed talking paper until we are a little more sure of our own capabilities and intentions.

There is also a real question whether Dean Rusk is the man to talk with the British on this. The last time he told Home "we could not put up with Jagan" the British simply dug in their heels. Since British support for an anti-Jagan policy would be the most powerful single force for its success, I think you may want to go all out with David yourself on this one.

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