

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

U.S. News & World Report Story on Jonathan Pollard

FROM:

James P. Lynch *JPL*
Director of Security

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

21 MAY 1987

TO: (Organization, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

D/PAO

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Attached is some background information which relates to specific elements of the story on Jonathan Pollard that U.S. News & World Report is expected to print:

Also attached is a suggested response to press inquiries.

cc: DDA

(b) (1)
(b) (3)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAY 2006

~~SECRET~~U. S. News and World Report

(1) Expected allegation: Before Pollard applied to the Navy, he sought employment at CIA and was turned down on the grounds of mental instability and drug use at Stanford.

Fact: In December, 1977 Jonathan J. Pollard did apply for employment with the Agency under the Graduate Fellow program. On 24 May 1978 he was [redacted] disapproved for employment [redacted]

(2) Expected allegation: CIA withheld information when Defense Investigative Service conducted a security namecheck with CIA.

Fact: On 8 November 1979 in answer to a namecheck submitted by DIS, copies of field investigative reports were made available to that organization. Polygraph derived information was not provided to DIS.

(3) Expected allegation: The Agency denied any knowledge of Pollard when he was first arrested.

Fact: Pollard was arrested on 21 November 1985. On 22 November 1985 a memorandum was sent to the FBI with a copy to the Naval Investigative Service detailing pertinent information concerning Pollard held by this Agency.

(4) Expected allegation: Pollard because of his SCI clearances and courier card, had access to intelligence libraries, including CIA. The implication being that even though CIA knew of his character, we gave him access to sensitive documents.

Fact: Pollard did make two visits to the Agency Headquarters and attended a three day conference [redacted] in which he would have been exposed to classified information. [redacted] he could have access to various Agency documents through the DIA and NISC channels. The visits would have been based on certification of his clearances and access approvals by his parent command.

~~SECRET~~

Suggested response to press inquiries: Jonathan Pollard made application for the Agency's Graduate Fellow Program in December, 1977. Following security processing, he was [redacted] disapproved for employment in May, 1978. No information regarding mental instability was developed during the security processing and therefore was not a factor in the [redacted] disapproval decision.

Approximately 1 1/2 years later the Defense Investigative Service conducted a security namecheck at CIA as a part of its investigation of Pollard for employment with the Navy. Per established practice amongst Government agencies, copies of field investigative reports were made available to DIS. The decision to pass additional information such as polygraph derived information regarding lifestyle issues vice clear national security issues to other Agencies, in particular to Agencies which do not utilize the polygraph as a screening tool, is always a difficult decision. Fairness to the individual, his right of privacy, and the amount of time that has passed since the information was developed are key considerations in this process. As a result of this process, no polygraph derived information on Pollard was passed to DIS at that time. Although the same considerations for the individual's rights would apply, the information would be passed under today's operating philosophy.

Jonathan Pollard was arrested on 21 November 1985. On 22 November 1985 a memorandum detailing all pertinent security file information on Pollard held by this Agency was forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a copy provided to the Naval Investigative Service.

Mr. Pollard was granted a security clearance and compartmented information access approvals by Department of Defense elements. As with other individuals holding similar clearances and approvals he could through approved channels have gained access to certain Agency documents. Simply because an individual does not meet the rigid hiring standards of CIA does not mean that he should never be eligible for employment and clearance by other U.S. Government Agencies. This is particularly true where a time delay is involved. Unless a clear threat to national security is known, this Agency would honor the certified security clearances granted by another agency.