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SECTION 1 OF 3

TEXT

SUBJ: INDONESIAN MILITARY MOTIVES IN EAST TIMOR (U)
DOI: 10 MAY 99 {AS OF 1000 EST}
TEXT: 1. ~~(S)~~ THE ARMED FORCES' DETERMINATION TO RETAIN EAST TIMOR IN
INDONESIA UNDERPINS A POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR MILITANT TIMORESE
INTEGRATIONISTS, ALTHOUGH THE VIOLENT EXCESSES OF THESE GROUPS HAVE
FORCED CHANGES IN THE MILITARY'S APPROACH. THE STRONG ANTI-INDONESIAN
FEELINGS PREVALENT IN EAST TIMOR SUGGEST THE MILITARY WILL BE HARD
PRESSED TO PREVENT A PRO-INDEPENDENCE VICTORY DURING THE PLANNED UN
REFERENDUM IN AUGUST. SUCH AN OUTCOME WILL CREATE FURTHER PROBLEMS
FOR DEFENSE LEADERS WHO STILL SUPPORT THEIR TIMORESE ALLIES BUT
ACKNOWLEDGE THE COUNTRY'S NEED FOR A STABLE AND COOPERATIVE EAST
TIMOR.
2. ~~(S)~~ CLINGING TO EAST TIMOR. PRESIDENT HABIBIE'S SURPRISE OFFER IN
LATE JANUARY - TO RECOMMEND EAST TIMOR'S INDEPENDENCE IF THE
TIMORESE REJECT JAKARTA'S AUTONOMY - HAS LEFT A CONFUSED PICTURE OF
INDONESIAN INTENTIONS. DESPITE A PERSONAL INTEREST IN JETTISONING THE
TROUBLESOME PROVINCE, PRESIDENT HABIBIE, FACING PRESSURE WITHIN HIS

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POLITICAL BASE AND GROWING SEPARATIST DEMANDS ELSEWHERE, HAS BEEN FORCED TO ADOPT A TWO-TRACK APPROACH OF ACCOMMODATING FOREIGN DEMANDS FOR THE PROVINCE'S SELF-DETERMINATION WHILE BACKING MEASURES TO ACHIEVE A WINNING VOTE FOR AUTONOMY. LAST WEEK'S UN-MEDIATED AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAKARTA AND PORTUGAL, THE FORMER GOVERNING POWER, SET THE BASIC GUIDELINES FOR THIS PROCESS, INCLUDING THE UN-MANAGED "CONSULTATION" ON 8 AUGUST.

3. ~~(C)~~ THE MILITARY'S POLICY UNDERSCORES A STRONG DETERMINATION TO ENSURE A PRO-AUTONOMY VOTE, CONTINUING ITS 23-YEAR STRUGGLE TO RETAIN INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY. CRITICAL OF HABIBIE'S OFFER TO RELINQUISH EAST TIMOR, THE MILITARY HAS TURNED TO PROGOVERNMENT TIMORESE TO SPEARHEAD THE PRO-AUTONOMY CAMPAIGN. LOCAL COMMANDS HAVE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN FOSTERING SUPPORT FOR NEWLY FORMED MILITANT TIMORESE MILITIAS, PROVIDING TRAINING AND SURPLUS ARMS FOLLOWING STEPPED-UP REBEL ATTACKS LAST YEAR. THE MILITARY STOOD ASIDE DURING THE MILITIA'S MONTHS-LONG CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE, INCLUDING A RAMPAGE THROUGH THE CAPITAL, DILI, ON 17 APRIL THAT LEFT MORE THAN 20 PEOPLE DEAD.

4. ~~(S)~~ NEW MILITARY APPROACH. MILITIA ATROCITIES HAVE HEIGHTENED THE PRESSURE ON ARMED FORCES COMMANDER GEN WIRANTO. SEEKING TO SILENCE CRITICS, WIRANTO ORCHESTRATED A TRUCE, AND LOCAL COMMANDERS HAVE SINCE ORDERED TROOPS NOT TO TOLERATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL UN VOTE. THE MILITARY IS NOW SEEKING TO RALLY NONVIOLENT PRO-INTEGRATIONIST FORCES TO CAMPAIGN FOR AUTONOMY, BUT ITS TOLERATION OF MILITIA PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND BRUTAL BEHAVIOR PERSISTS. CLASHES IN DILI ON 9 AND 10 MAY BETWEEN MILITIA GROUPS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE YOUTH UNDERSCORE THE EXISTING TENSION, WHICH SECURITY FORCES HAVE YET TO DAMPEN.

5. ~~(S)~~ FUTURE UNCERTAINTIES. THE UN'S BROAD AUTHORITY TO MANAGE THE VOTE, COMBINED WITH INDONESIA'S COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER, WILL GIVE THE MILITARY STRONG INCENTIVES TO RESTRAIN MILITIA VIOLENCE. HABIBIE HAS ACQUIESCED TO A UN FORCE, INCLUDING CIVILIAN POLICE. THIS INTERNATIONAL FORCE SHOULD HEIGHTEN CONFIDENCE AND DISCOURAGE VIOLENCE BUT ALONE WILL NOT ELIMINATE FIGHTING OR POTENTIAL THREATS TO UN PERSONNEL. SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY WILL FALL TO THE INDONESIAN POLICE, WHICH WILL BE EXPANDED IN CONCERT WITH A TROOP DRAWDOWN. HOWEVER, CONSIDERING POLICE FEAR OF MILITIA RETALIATION, THE MILITARY'S CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT IN ENSURING SECURITY AND THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL WILL REMAIN CRITICAL.

6. ~~(C)~~ A MILESTONE IN THIS PROCESS WILL BE THE DISARMAMENT OF THE WARRING TIMORESE GROUPS. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO MOVE QUICKLY ON THIS FRONT, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SEEKS A TRANSFER CEREMONY WITHIN THE NEXT 2 MONTHS. NONETHELESS, A COMPLETE WEAPONS HANDOVER IS UNLIKELY IN VIEW OF THE SUSPICIONS THAT AROUND. RUMORS OF HIDDEN STOCKPILES AND THE PREVALENCE OF TRADITIONAL ARMS FURTHER COMPLICATE THE SITUATION.

7. ~~(C)~~ ANOTHER UN CHALLENGE WILL BE ENSURING A FAIR VOTE, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE SHORT RUNUP AND PREVAILING TENSION. BOTH SIDES INTEND TO STEP UP EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE VOTE, WITH PRO-INTEGRATIONISTS PLAYING ON DEEP-SEATED FEARS OF A CIVIL WAR IF AUTONOMY IS REJECTED. THE UN FORCE WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY HALTING MORE SUBTLE COERCIVE MEASURES. THE MILITIAS ALREADY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DRIVING INDEPENDENCE SUPPORTERS UNDERGROUND IN SOME AREAS, BUT REBEL LEADER JOSE "XANANA" GUSMAO REMAINS CONFIDENT THE UN FORCE WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW AN OVERWHELMINGLY PRO-INDEPENDENCE VOTE.

8. ~~(C)~~ POSTELECTION SECURITY IS NOW MUCH LESS CERTAIN, CONSIDERING

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