TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, D.C.

REPLY TO ATTN OF: AFCCS

22 October 1962



SUBJECT: Additional Decisions

TO: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. In his draft speech, the President identifies 32 missiles in Cuba capable of striking any target within 1000 nautical miles with nuclear warheads. He further states "Any Soviet show of force anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of people to whom we are committed ... will be met by whatever action is needed." Finally, the President's speech states:

"Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union."

- 2. In view of the above, and in order to present the strongest possible deterrent to Soviet counter-actions, I recommend the following additional actions be taken at this time:
- a. Direct SAC to initiate 1/8 airborne alert beginning at noon local time today. This will be done quietly and gradually, and will be in full effect by tomorrow afternoon.
 - b. Direct SAC to generate its forces toward a maximum readiness posture, also at noon today. The strategic air forces will be in maximum readiness by noon tomorrow, and the force generation should not be apparent until after the President's speech tonight.
- c. Direct CINCSAC, at his discretion and beginning at noon today, to implement dispersal plans for the B-47 force. SAC practices these plans at regular intervals and no particular comment should be evoked.
- d. Direct CINCONAD, beginning at noon today, to implement his plan for dispersal of the CONUS fighter interceptor forces on a very quiet, low-key basis.
- e. Direct DEFCON 3 worldwide at noon today to place U.S. forces worldwide in an increased readiness posture.

The

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13528, Sec. 3.3 DM/NET_, NARA, Date 4/23/12

JOP SECRET

DEFCON 3 readiness is to be accomplished without causing undue public notice, and should therefore not add materially to current speculations.

3. It is my view that - as in the Lebanon crisis and the Taiwan Straits situation - readiness of U.S. military forces comprises a clear warning to the Sino-Soviet Bloc and should serve as a powerful deterrent to any major counteraction. Additionally, such a posture will provide maximum flexibility to the President in choosing further actions, should Sino-Soviet belligerence or active counter-measures so warrant.

CURTIS E. LeMAY Chief of Staff



This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu